Small Charitable Donations Bill

Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts Excerpts

Tuesday 18th December 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, this may be a slim Bill but, as has already been made clear, it is an important one and I warmly endorse the purposes behind it. I do so for the very obvious reason that it is common knowledge that fundraising for charities is not easy at present. Of the surveys that the noble Baroness referred to, at least one indicates the impact on charities of the economic crisis and subsequent recession. These competitive pressures have led to the emergence of some unusual stresses. Between 2.30 pm and 3 pm, we were discussing the Question from my noble friend Lord Naseby about the competitive pressure on the National Lottery. That body saw an increase of 8.6%, or £246 million, in the six months to September, but it is clearly concerned about its competitive position. So that macrostatistic, along with a lot of microstatistics, indicate why this Bill is particularly important to smaller charities.

Turning to the Bill itself, I begin by congratulating my noble friend and the Government on the steps taken to increase accessibility. As he pointed out, the historic record required to enter the scheme is being eased from three out of the past seven years to two out of the past four, and the multiplier is being increased from 2:1 to 10:1. This will be particularly important for newly-established charities, which will not have a well established donor basis. My noble friend kindly arranged a briefing on the Bill last week. I have one or two questions, of which I gave him advance warning then.

The first question relates to the nature of the two qualifying years. Do they have to be consecutive or not? He reassured me at the briefing that they do not. I would be grateful if we could hear that on the Floor of the House, because there is a lot of sector interest in the detail of this Bill. Could he explain, therefore, how that ties in with Clause 2(2)? Clause 2 is headed, “Meaning of ‘eligible charity’”. Subsection (2) says:

“If a charity did not make any successful gift aid exemption claims in a period of 2 consecutive tax years, any claim … is to be disregarded”.

My noble friend indicated that “consecutive” was not an important word but the wording of the Bill seems to indicate that it might be. I am sure that his Bill team will have a simple answer to that, but it would be helpful to have it on the record.

The second area of concern is what I describe as “in again, out again”. Smaller charities have periods of intense activity interspersed with periods of quietude. I will take an example of a medium-sized charity in a city, focused on homelessness. The charity may experience a period of very strong professional or volunteer leadership, which leads to a high level of activity; as a result, probably, a successful entry is made to the new gift aid scheme. However, after a time this dynamic leadership moves on and is succeeded by less active individuals. During this stewardship, among other things, gift aid applications are not made. After the fallow period, new people arrive once again, who find that gift aid applications were not made in any of the past four years. It would be helpful for us to know whether this will be a one-off entry—once in the scheme, you are in it—or whether there is a constant rolling programme whereby two out of four years must be kept in order for the charity to remain eligible.

On this part of this Bill, I need to make a plea on behalf of newly-formed charities. The House will be aware that the problem for many smaller charities is how to fund their central expenses—what we might describe as keeping the office warm and the lights on. It may be difficult to find funding for the provision of services but it can be found, whether it comes from local or national government or from grant-giving foundations; but not, for example, for the cost of preparing the bid for these contracts, or indeed for keeping the organisation running. For such charities this new gift aid scheme could be highly significant. Of course, the charity will have to be four years old before it can become eligible.

My noble friend quite properly and understandably underlined the dangers of tax evasion. I have no doubt that that may be thought to be more prevalent in newer charities. For all charities—new, old or well established—HMRC requires a “fit and proper” test to be met. Given the particular needs of newer charities, it would be helpful if my noble friend could explain why it was felt that the “fit and proper” test was not good enough for smaller charities when they were set up, and whether any thought has been given to other ways of including smaller, newer charities—for example, by having a lower level of multiple during those formative, probationary years, or perhaps a multiplier of only 5:1, as opposed to 10:1. Any danger of tax evasion would then be commensurately reduced.

My final set of questions is grouped around the heading, “What happens next?”. In the Public Bill Committee in the other place on 16 October, Mr John Preston, the national stewardship officer for the Church of England, explained that the church currently spends 200,000 hours of volunteer time administering the present gift aid system. He expressed the hope to the Public Bill Committee that this time commitment would be reduced following the passage of the Bill. An illuminating remark followed from Mr John Hemming, the Liberal Democrat MP for Birmingham Yardley:

“What you are saying is that it is not necessarily stuff in the Bill”,

that matters,

“it is a question of how HMRC handles it. Referring specifically to the Bill, is there something we can simplify—to make it easier—or is it really just a question of how HMRC takes it?”—[Official Report, Commons, Public Bill Committee, 16/10/12; col. 5.]

It would be helpful, therefore—here I follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town—to talk a little about the timetable for introducing the scheme and the nature of the publicity that will be followed. I assume that HMRC will write to every gift aid charity to try to publicise it in that way and to explain how these concessions would work. My noble friend referred in his opening remarks to the fact that guidance would be provided. I hope that he will forgive me for saying that the guidance needs to be very simple. These are small charities working on a shoestring; they do not have access to accountants or lawyers. The guidance needs to be as user-friendly as possible.

I gave my noble friend advance notice that I wanted to take the opportunity this evening to talk about the relationship between HMRC and charities. I wanted him to take on board—and perhaps discuss with HMRC—the attitude it is adopting towards the charitable status of many smaller charities. I want to give the House an example. This charity has an income of £15,849 in the year in question. In August 2012 it received a notice from HMRC asking it to complete a form CT600 (short), because it is a small charity. The form was sent off in September. Two weeks later HMRC returned the form, saying that it no longer accepted paper forms—HMRC had, of course, sent it out in the first place—and that filing had to be done online. To file online requires a user ID number, a UTR number—UTR stands for unique tax reference—and a corporation tax activation code. On receipt of these, about a fortnight later, the trustees tried to file again and were refused. They were told to wait because the corporation tax activation code was not yet working. After waiting two more weeks, they tried again; again, they could not file, because the link on the HMRC website that should have read “How to file a return” was missing. They then resorted to the HMRC helpdesk. They were logged on to a form which appeared to be CT600 (long)—in other words, for a large company—whereas they wanted a CT600 (short) form. Further inquiries to the helpdesk revealed that one logged on to the long form anyway and it automatically adjusted itself to the short form as one went along. However, this was not clear to the uninitiated in advance.

So it went on. The final surprise to the trustees was when they offered to send in a PDF of their audited accounts, which provides independent verification of their accuracy, they were told that these were not required. This process took from August 19 to November 5 —this for a charity with revenue below £16,000 per annum. I cannot begin to guess what the cost was to HMRC of all this backing and filling. However, this is just one of many examples. I hope that my noble friend will use this and, indeed, the other examples that I would be happy to provide to urge the tax authorities to be proportionate and open and to understand how the smaller charity sector works.

The second area I want to raise tonight is the tax position of foundations. I gave my noble friend a heads-up on this, and I am afraid that, because I had not dug into the full question, I may have slightly misled him. A family foundation with a permanent endowment is not able to reclaim the 10% advance corporation tax on the donations it gives. Foundations were caught up in Gordon Brown’s raid on pension funds. Their income, and therefore their grant-giving potential, was reduced by 10%. The question on which I seek an answer tonight is: why should foundations not be able to gift aid that tax allowance to tax-recipient charities as private individuals can? It is not a question of double-dipping gift aid, because the permanent endowment on which gift aid may well have been claimed and taken remains intact. Why cannot gift aid be given on the returns that the permanent endowment has earned? I appreciate that these are technical questions but they are important to the charitable sector. I am not asking my noble friend to give a full response tonight; I am more than happy for him to write to me and put a copy in the Library. In welcoming this Bill, I am asking the Minister to make sure that all the good it is planned to do, and that we hope it will do, will not be undone by heavy-handed bureaucracy by the tax authorities.

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[Lord Newby]

I would be only too pleased to write to all noble Lords here. Basically, it is the interaction of the general Gift Aid scheme and this particular element of it; but I will write to clarify that point absolutely.

The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, asked again about the cost and whether HMRC would be proportionate, not heavy-handed, and efficient. He will not be surprised to hear me say that, of course, that is what HMRC plans to be. I hope it will be. My experience, working in HRMC—or Customs and Excise as it was—was that it did a lot of things extremely efficiently, and every now and then it did something which was less than efficient. It was the less-than-efficient examples which tended to get most of the publicity. I know that the relevant section of HMRC understands the point that the noble Lord is making. The Government are not setting up this scheme in order not to hand out the cash. We are setting up the scheme because we are very keen that it is successful and is able to help charities in this way.

The noble Lord asked about foundations and why they are in a position that is different from that of individuals. I am tempted to say, “Because they are not individuals”, but I will happily write to him with some of the background as to their tax treatment, which I absolutely understand is different from that of an individual.

He asked whether a two-year period was necessary, because a charity must already have been through the registration process, including the “fit and proper person” test. The test helps to ensure that charities, community amateur sports clubs and other organisations entitled to charity tax reliefs are not managed or controlled by individuals who might misuse the tax relief. Unfortunately, as I said earlier, fraudsters have been known to exploit charity tax relief, so the “fit and proper person” test exists to prevent that. However, even if a charity appears to be compliant in the first few years, changes in personnel can affect its attitude to compliance, so HMRC will need to continue to have evidence on which to base its assessment of the risk that the charity poses in relation to the scheme. That is why we have gone for a two-year qualification period. We believe that that gives an adequate protection against potential fraud, because people will have had to be up and running, making the thing work. Equally, it is not too long, which was the concern about the original proposals.

The noble Baroness, Lady Barker, asked specifically whether it would be possible under this scheme to collect funds and claim the gift aid from activities in housing association premises. To take a simple example, if the charity is a small local charity linked to a specific housing association and it wants to raise money from a collection in its premises or in a pub or anywhere else, it can do that. Things get more complicated if it is a branch of a large housing association—somewhat like a Catholic church—which wants to pray in aid the community building rules. In that case, because the housing association premises are essentially residential premises, it will not be able to do that, because that is the definition we have put in place.

That demonstrates that tax is complicated. There is no system we could have put in place that would have had any reasonable protection against fraud and which would not have run up against those kinds of complexities—and undoubtedly there will be anomalies. However, with tax, the choice before you is not whether you have anomalies but whether you do something or not. You are bound to have these anomalies. We took the view that putting in place a scheme that enabled charities to have access to £100 million was worth it, even though we knew that there would be some anomalies, because they come with the territory, as it were.

I believe I have answered the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, raised about guidance to users. We are doing that on the various levels that she talked about. We have consulted, and will continue to consult, the standing body that HMRC has for dealing with the charity sector as a whole.

The noble Baroness made the very interesting suggestion of having a website, on which reports and a financial statement would be put. That is a possibility. I suspect that, if we had done that, someone would say that it was grossly unfair to small charities that did not have a website. However, given that we expect everybody in respect of benefits to use electronic communications, and that HMRC increasingly wants taxpayers to use them, it is not an unreasonable suggestion, and I am sure that my colleagues in HMRC will look at it.

The right reverend Prelate asked a couple of questions about simplicity and whether all the requirements were needed. As I said before, we had to take a view, and that view was that this struck the right balance between ease of access to the scheme and protection against possible fraud.

This debate has demonstrated that, if this were not a money Bill, we would be having extremely interesting discussions in Committee and on Report. Sadly, however, this is a money Bill. I therefore hope that I have been able to deal with the points that have been raised—

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

I did not hear the Minister address this directly but do I take it from the commencement date of the Act that Gift Aid under the new scheme will be available in the next financial year, starting 6 April 2013? Will it be in by then?

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, I believe that it will be but, again, if I am mistaken, I will include that in the letter that I have already committed to write to the noble Lord.

We have sought to strike the right balance between effectiveness, accessibility and security, and I believe that we have achieved that. The scheme will deliver an important new stream of revenue to the charity sector. I therefore commend this Bill to the House.

Financial Services Bill

Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts Excerpts

Wednesday 28th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ramsbotham]

My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Mitchell, and all those who put their names to the amendment. I hope very much that another government ministry will support this amendment—the Ministry of Justice. Nowhere is the misery caused by these loan sharks felt more keenly than by the prison population and their families. The damage done to potential rehabilitation suggests to me that if the MoJ is serious about the “rehabilitation revolution” that it commends, it should support the amendment to the hilt.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, it is greatly to the credit of the noble Lord, Lord Mitchell, that he has not ducked the challenge of balancing the accessibility and availability of credit with its affordability and the terms on which it is made available. A number of noble Lords have made it clear, as indeed has the noble Baroness, that the availability and accessibility of credit is important. My noble friend on the Front Bench made a powerful intervention; he indicated a number of ways in which the amendment could be got around because of the gaps in it. It is important that we get this right and make it bullet-proof. For example, some of his thoughts about—if I heard him right—making a contract unenforceable under certain circumstances would add a great deal of power to this. I hope very much that we will be able to have a period of reflection and ensure that the unintended consequences that could come about, as evidenced by my noble friend’s speech, are avoided and we get something that stands the test of time.

[Lord Barnett]

My Lords, I have a couple of points. Throughout the Bill, my noble friend Lord Peston and I have constantly raised the question of “may” and “must”. That question arises in this amendment, too. The amendment, moved so wonderfully by my noble friend, states:

“The FCA may make rules”.

That could be “must” because the amendment is already constrained by the end of that sentence,

“on terms that the FCA judge to cause consumer detriment”.

That is why it is so important, as my noble friend Lord Peston said, that we see the Minister’s amendment as soon as possible. I am not a lawyer but I do not distrust them; however, the lawyers who advise Governments can make mistakes, which are usually resolved by lawyers on both sides eventually having an argument, at great cost to everyone including the courts, until someone decides in court who was right. On this occasion we have to try to get it absolutely right. I regard what the Minister said as very helpful.

My noble friend said that we must see the amendments as soon as possible. However, nothing is built in stone. No law states that we have to have Third Reading next Wednesday. If necessary it could be delayed a little. The important thing is to get it right. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, will consider having a discussion with the authorities, or with the Leader of the House or whoever, about whether, if we do not get sight of the amendments as soon as possible, we should delay Third Reading until we are sure that we have got it right. That is crucial. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, can inform us that he will do that.

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[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, my noble friends Lord Mitchell, Lord Peston, Lord Barnett and Lord Davies of Oldham have all had the opportunity to thank the Minister today for hearing their arguments and meeting them. Perhaps it is now time for the Minister to do the same for one of his own side, and accept these arguments from his noble friend Lord Flight. The noble Lord, Lord Flight, is right on this: consumers will only be able to drive competition if they can swiftly, easily and cheaply change bank accounts. Without that, there really will be no way to drive up standards.

It was interesting to hear the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, talk about phone calls and automatic voice recognition. It reminds me of a wonderful publication produced by the National Consumer Council called The Stupid Company. This asked a whole lot of consumers, not just in financial services, “What are the things you most hate about companies?” In the top three was automatic voice recognition. It was really interesting that when that was played back to companies, they continued to use it although they knew that it was the thing their consumers most hated. Banks are like that. Until people can change banks easily, I fear that they will continue to do things that none of us likes. I hope very much, therefore, that the Minister can send Lord Flight home happy this evening by having accepted his amendment.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

The noble Baroness leapt to her feet very quickly. I know that the House is like a horse running for the stables, and I will not detain the House long. I support my noble friend’s amendment. As regards money-laundering and transferability, I would like to pick up a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Newby, in replying to the debate on 24 October, when he talked about the transferability of direct debits and how that works as regards the Payments Council initiative.

I am afraid that this again involves the charity sector. There is general agreement that there are far too many charities and that many ought to be closed down. There are many thousands of shell charities, which are the result of mergers. There has been a perfectly proper merger and there was no problem as the Charity Commission, the trustees and the lawyers were all happy with it. However, when you ask why this shell charity remains, it is because the banks will not accept the transfer of standing orders and direct debits to the new, enlarged charity. The charity then has to go through the process of asking every single direct debit and standing order signatory to re-sign. Administratively, that is an extremely complicated process and many of course decline to do so.

I am not asking my noble friend to reply tonight but I say this in the hope—it is probably a forlorn hope—that the Payments Council is listening to this debate and might therefore see whether it can find some way to enable this administrative inefficiency to be dealt with. That would enable some of these shell charities, which no longer need to exist and exist only to collect direct debits and standing orders, somehow to be subsumed into the new charity of which they are now a part.

[Baroness Kramer]

My Lords, I will intervene only for a moment but in case the Government are unable to meet the hopes of the noble Lord, Lord Flight, and others today perhaps I might say that I chair the sub-panel of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards which is looking at competition in retail banking. Account portability is a significant part of that and the staff are now on the alert to take the report of the comments made today in Hansard and make sure that it and the amendments are put before the panel’s next meeting

Financial Services Bill

Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts Excerpts

Monday 26th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, Amendment 97A seeks to require each of the two regulators to establish an independent committee to determine whether to publish a warning notice relating to any individual whom it plans to discipline and to whom that individual may then make representations. The RDC, as we know, has no statutory basis so cannot usefully be referred to, hence the formulation of the last paragraph of my Amendment 97A. This amendment does not preclude a regulator publishing a warning notice against an individual for market abuse or for acting without individual approval when required, matters which I think are different in nature and would distract from the key principle at stake if they were not thus excluded.

It seems to me that government Amendments 97ZA and 97ZB achieve that which I sought to argue for both in Committee and today—that is, a fair process of taking a decision and a fair process of deciding to publish. Via a somewhat tortuous route, the Government seem to have it exactly right for the FCA. The RDC will be the body taking the fair tribunal and then taking the decision on the warning notice. What is still lacking is what will happen at the PRA. There is no indication whether it is considering using the RDC or having any sort of sensible judicial body. If it does, then it will apparently be bound by Amendments 97ZA and 97ZB, if enacted. I would therefore hope that the Minister can give the House some comfort that the PRA is intending to mirror broadly the intended arrangements for the FCA; Amendments 97ZA and 97ZB seem to achieve what is wanted for both regulators. It is appropriate that for both regulatory bodies there should be a fair due process, both out of principle and fairness; we should not forget the other stakeholders, the pension funds that hold the shares of institutions that may be badly damaged by the reputational damage of a warning notice.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, I wonder if my noble friend could deal with one aspect of his explanation of government Amendment 94A. It may be that I misunderstood what he said. Is this to be a general removal of power—that is, a backstop—or is it going to be available in individual cases? It is not clear from his explanation whether it will be gone for ever or if an individual case could say to the Treasury, “We are going to be unfairly treated. Please step in”. At the moment, the former is a very blunt instrument and a lot of eggs could be broken before you get back to a more satisfactory situation if you felt that the regulator was using the power unwisely, unfairly and disproportionately. Could he explain the point when he comes to wind up the debate?

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing these amendments and I hope I am right in understanding that the backstop power is for the whole thing and not for individual cases. I see that the Minister is nodding in agreement that I have the interpretation right. I thank him for that now being an affirmative order if it was to be changed. I am confident that the public interest will not bring it back to this House, so I am quite relaxed about it.

The other amendments aside from the first one relating to the backstop power are about ensuring some independence on the issue of warning notices, or in the case of Amendment 97ZA in the name of my noble friend Lord Eatwell and myself, on the whole disciplinary process. This amendment would ensure that a properly constituted and independent determinations panel would be responsible for dealing with all cases presented by the FCA or indeed by the PRA. As I explained in Committee, that is in effect the procedure introduced for the Pensions Regulator in 2004. It is seen as robust and independent, and it has indeed turned down some of the cases that have been taken to it. I would have to say, of course, since I was a member of it, that it was effective. It has been a useful way of ensuring that there is confidence that when cases are brought by staff, they are well scrutinised.

As the Minister has said, the government amendments in this group other than the first one on the backstop go some way to answering our concerns. However, I do not think that they go quite far enough, although I guess that we should be grateful for some movement. They introduce a degree of independence to the consideration of a case brought by FCA or PRA staff, but they fail to ensure the continuance of the RDC to give its statutory backing. We hear what the Minister says about the statement of the current FSA on what the future FCA will voluntarily choose to do, but I hope that the Government do not at some point in the future rue the day that they failed to protect the RDC’s existence and independence. For the moment, however, perhaps the noble Lord could confirm the Government’s commitment, not just that of the FCA, to the continuance of the RDC.

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[Lord Eatwell]

My Lords, I support my noble friend’s very sensible amendment. I loved his last line: that “may” may be what is required in this respect. The amendment does two things. First, it is future-proofing—something on which the Treasury is usually very keen. Secondly, in an area where we know—and the Government have acknowledged—that abuses are taking place, it preserves the potential for self-regulation but is a shot across the bows, which should make those who are behaving improperly take much greater care. It preserves a spirit of self-regulation, if self-regulation is seen to work effectively. Given that the Treasury or the Secretary of State may by order amend Schedule 17 in the manner set out by my noble friend, I would like to commend this amendment to the Government.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

I rise briefly to support these amendments. They seem extremely sensible. I do not want to repeat what the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, has just said. I like the idea of “may”; I like the idea of self-regulation; and I like the chance for the industry to be able to put its house in order. That is clearly very sensible. The only point I would add is that we now have a situation where a substantial proportion of claims coming forward are fraudulent, semi-fraudulent or unjustified. In each case, the firm about whom the complaint is made must pay £850 to have the case investigated. That is a staggering sum of money and it ends up being paid by the consumers. We really need to find a way to short-circuit that, so that where the claims are fraudulent, something can be done to ensure that the claims management companies, rather than the firm, end up with some of the costs—and, indeed, to ensure that the costs are not passed on to the rest of us. There is a good idea here. I hope that the Government will give the amendments a sympathetic hearing.

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, clearly there are serious conduct problems among a minority of claims management companies. Nobody denies that. We are all too well aware that the reaction of the claims industry to the mass mis-selling of payment protection insurance has also brought with it a fall in compliance standards and an increase in poor practices, to some of which the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, referred. He said that something needs to be done. Something is being done. The claims management regulator is taking forward a programme of reforms which are due to be implemented next year. These include a ban on claims management companies offering financial rewards or similar benefits as an inducement to make a claim; tightening the conduct rules so that the requirements of authorisation are made clearer and protection for consumers is strengthened; and extending the role of the Legal Ombudsman to act as an ombudsman for consumers with complaints about claims management companies, which I think deals with some of the points that were made about the ombudsman.

However, we will continue to require a robust and co-ordinated approach from both the claims management regulator and the FCA in responding to risks of detriment. That starts with the financial services regulator. Lessons have been learnt from PPI. The FCA will have an objective requiring it to intervene earlier to prevent detriment arising and, where mass detriment is occurring, use its powers to establish or agree redress schemes so that affected customers are proactively contacted and compensated. We have seen the FSA already moving much more quickly to agree redress schemes with the major banks in relation to the interest rate hedge mis-selling.

However, where CMCs have a role to play, consumers already seeking redress need to be protected against further detriment. So we will see the claims management regulator stepping up its approach and resources devoted to tackling the underlying problems that exist in the conduct of some CMCs. We have already seen the establishment of a specialist PPI compliance team at the claims management regulator. To ensure that the regulator is sufficiently funded going forward, the MoJ is proposing to increase fees levied on CMCs, particularly those operating in the financial products and services sector.

However, I am not convinced that institutional reform is necessarily the answer. At the moment, it could represent a distraction from the task at hand, particularly given everything else that is happening in changing the financial sector regulatory architecture. It is important to remember that CMCs operate in a number of sectors, not just financial services. In fact, personal injury remains the largest sector. PPI is a very significant sector currently, but the next wave of activity and potential detriment may come from another sector. As I have said before, we do not think that it is appropriate for the FOS to act as a quasi-regulator, as the amendments propose. That would detract from its role as an independent ombudsman. It is simply not what an ombudsman does. That is why it does not matter whether the clause says “must” or “may”. Our objection is not about that; it is that an ombudsman is not the right person to act as a quasi-regulator. The regulators do that. The ombudsman looks at particular claims of mistreatment.

Amendment 101A would simply provide an enabling power. However, it is making a proposal in terms of institutional change which we think is inappropriate. That is not to say that the Government are complacent in any respect about the need to do more in terms of the regulation of CMCs. The range of activities that I have mentioned gives us cause to believe that we will see a very significant increase in the effectiveness of regulation in the period ahead. In the light of that, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

Financial Services Bill

Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts Excerpts

Monday 26th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Peston]

Partly because of the noise I did not quite get all the argument that the noble Lord was putting forward. Is his argument that the FCA thought there was a problem, got involved, then heard some cogent reasoning from the firm concerned and therefore felt that there was no need for this to become public knowledge? That, I think, is the noble Lord’s argument, but there is one bit that troubles me. Would firms—and consumers, for that matter—not benefit if they knew about the problem and discovered that there was a good case for not proceeding with it? In other words, one of the things that we lose from not making what happened public is that, outside of this, no one gets to learn anything from what happens. Can I persuade the Minister just to respond to that?

I agree with my noble friend on the Front Bench, of course, that if we had had a code of conduct in the first place, along the lines that she suggested, we would not have a problem anyway.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

I understand that my noble friend on the Front Bench is saying that you would not need to publicise it because there was no problem. All you would be doing is raising concerns in the minds of the consumer about a problem that in fact did not exist, because the regulator was satisfied by the explanation it had received from the firm in question. It would be entirely inappropriate to raise questions about a firm’s probity and behaviour when there was no problem in any case and the regulator was convinced of that fact.

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Moved by

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

84A: Clause 23, page 99, line 40, at end insert “or under section 138KA(2)”

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 84B and 116A. This issue has arisen since we went through this part of the Bill in Committee. I seek some ministerial reassurance. It concerns common investment funds and common deposit funds. These provide means by which charities—particularly smaller charities—can access financial expertise that they could not do on their own, in essence by entering into some form of pooling arrangement. The advantage, therefore, is that they can hire a more sophisticated and expert manager than they might be able to do on their own because they are small and, by pooling, they can also possibly obtain reduced fees.

I declare an interest as chairman of the Armed Forces Charities Advisory Committee, which is a common investment fund with some £200 million under management and acts for several hundred small, individual service charities from the Army, the Navy and the Air Force. In part, I am the author of my own misfortune because the investment activities of these groups are undertaken by FSA-regulated firms but the actual vehicles are regulated by the Charity Commission. In my review of the Charities Act, I recommended that they should be transferred to the Financial Services Authority, because they are clearly investment vehicles and, although the Charity Commission is a splendid body of men and women, it is not equipped to undertake financial regulation. I have concerns about the future of those groups in our brave new world.

Briefly, common deposit funds are often seen as money market funds, but they are not, because they are not unitised. Each depositor has an aligned deposit for the individual charity. They do not pay out all the interest; they can therefore accumulate modest reserves over time. The amendment enables them to lend at longer maturities; they do not have to lend it all at very short maturities. In consequence, because they always have a leaner operating structure, they can offer better rates of interest to their participating charities. For example, at the end of September 2012, the average common deposit fund interest rate was 1.075%, compared to general availability of 0.627%. That is an improvement of about 0.5%, which is obviously valuable to charities in these days of very low interest rates. They are widely used; there are 160,000 registered charities, but there were 44,000 depositors in those funds at the end of September, and 93% of them have less than £100,000 as the deposit.

What is the problem? The problem is that it is a very small group indeed. There are only four deposit funds and no more will be created. The reassurance I seek from my noble friend is that the FCA will be sympathetic to that group amid all the other pressures that it will face after it becomes empowered. Will it be prepared to consider innovation even-handedly, or will one size fits all be the default option? If it were to impose one size fits all, which would probably be to treat them as money market funds, the funds would have to unitise. They would have to pay out all their reserves and therefore not be able to offer the improved interest rates that they can now.

These three amendments are an attempt to fly some air cover over common investment funds and common deposit funds. The amendments apply to both CIFs and CDFs. They would require the FCA or the PRA to consult on any rule which applies to CIFs and CDFs, to have regard to any representations made and to carry out an impact assessment considering the differences between CIFs, CDFs and CISs. Amendment 116A gives the Treasury the power to exempt CIFs and CDFs from any relevant provisions made under FiSMA 2000. The effect of inserting a consultation clause at the bottom of page 102 is to oblige the FCA to consider the particular features of those two instruments and to empower the Treasury to exempt them from rules that the FCA and the PRA may wish to make under the alternative investment fund managers directive, where it is willing to do so.

As I said, they are modest amendments for a small group of funds, but they are designed to protect them because they are performing a very useful service. I regard how they are in fact treated in the brave new world as a true test of all the FCA’s fine words about facilitating innovation. I look for my noble friend’s reassurance on that, and I beg to move.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, I support, dot and comma, everything that the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, said. The three amendments in this group are couched in prudent terms that give discretion to the FCA to recognise the fact that, to use the adage, one size does not fit all. If there is in this world one great gulf, it is between some of the more sophisticated, City-type deposit funds and, at the other side of the sea, those of charities. The discretion is confined expressly to charities, or funds, I should say, established under the Charities Act 1960, the Charities Act 1993 or the Charities Act 2011, which, in my view, provides the necessary reassurance that this cannot be a horse that runs wild. I hope, therefore, that the Government will feel free to accept this group of amendments.

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, I have just discovered that I need to declare an interest in relation to these amendments. I have been looking at the small number of existing CDFs, and I see that one of them is the Church of England Deposit Fund, which I suspect is a significant part of the Church of England’s investment. This almost certainly means that my wife’s pension depends on this fund doing well. So, speaking personally, I have every incentive to ensure that these funds are appropriately regulated. In any event, I was minded to declare an interest.

I shall take the amendments in turn. In his report on the review of the Charities Act 2006, my noble friend recommended that:

“Regulation of Common Investment and Common Deposit Funds should pass from the Charity Commission to the FSA, as the Commission does not have the expertise to regulate what are primarily financial products (albeit only available to charities)”.

He has set out today why he has concerns that the regulatory approach by the PRA or FCA may not be appropriate for these very specific structures. The amendments would require the regulators to set out, as part of their consultation, where they see rules or requirements having a particular impact on CIFs or CDFs, and gives the Treasury the power to disapply requirements that apply to collective investment schemes. I will briefly set out why I think that these amendments are not appropriate or necessary, while agreeing absolutely with the thrust of my noble friend’s sentiments about them.

First, we do not believe that they are appropriate because they pre-empt the decision on whether the regulation of CIFs and CDFs should be transferred to the FSA, and later the new regulators. The Government have not yet responded to my noble friend’s report, and I do not want to use this debate on one of his proposals to pre-empt the full and proper response to the report as a whole which the Government will publish soon. In addition, in his report my noble friend notes that the Treasury,

“is already considering how best to reform the regulation of CIFs and CDFs as part of their work to implement the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive (AIFMD), and as part of this are considering possible legislative opportunities”.

That is, of course, correct and the Government will therefore set out their position on this matter when they consult on their approach on implementing the AIFMD early in the new year and respond to my noble friend’s report at that point.

I do not think that these amendments are necessary or appropriate even if the regulation of these funds moves across to the FCA. They are not necessary because the regulator already has to take a proportionate approach, sensitive to the needs and goals of different types of financial institutions and the needs and objectives of different consumers. Earlier on Report we debated and approved two government amendments requiring the FCA to have regard to the differing expectations of different consumers and to the desirability of exercising its functions in a way that recognises the differences in the nature and objectives of different businesses. While we were talking at that point principally about various social investment vehicles, the thoughts and principles which underlay our tabling of those amendments apply equally to these amendments; namely, that this is a specific small sector that needs to be dealt with differently from the rest of regulation and that the FCA needs to know from the start that it is expected to show sensitivity and proportionality in dealing with these different and rather unusual categories. That is what our amendments seek to achieve and we are confident that they will have that effect.

The regulators will have other tools to consider the needs of individual institutions, such as the ones that we are talking about under these amendments. For example, they can issue a waiver from a rule, meaning that a particular firm does not have to comply with a requirement, or issue a modification to a rule that enables the applicant to comply with an amended rule that better fits its own circumstances. All applications for waivers or modifications are considered on their individual merits, and there is no reason why rules that apply appropriately to other, larger and different sorts of funds should necessarily apply to the funds that we are discussing now, because the waiver can be brought into effect. There is therefore no need to give the Treasury the kind of power envisaged by Amendment 116A, which would cut across the independence of the regulator. I hope that I have been able to persuade my noble friend that we are sympathetic to what he is seeking to achieve and that we believe that the amendments we have put into the Bill will achieve the objectives that he is seeking. I hope that, in the light of that, he will feel able to withdraw his amendments.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, I am grateful for that extensive and full reply, and I appreciate its sympathetic tone. I also recognise that we have had two amendments from the Government in Committee and on Report, broadening, and better addressing, the issue of social investment. My concern remains that, in the heavy-hitting consultation on things like the alternative investment fund managers directive, small battalions will get lost. However, the Minister has said that the Treasury and the FCA will be sensitive and proportionate, and I suppose that is as far as we are going to get today. I am grateful for that small step, and we shall be watching to see how sensitive and proportionate they are. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 84A withdrawn.

Financial Services Bill

Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts Excerpts

Monday 12th November 2012 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

41: Clause 6, page 34, line 1, leave out “or restriction which is” and insert “, restriction or operational rules which are”

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 41, I will speak to Amendments 42 and 43. My noble friend Lord Sharman has put his name to them as well but sadly he cannot be with us tonight. This is familiar territory for noble Lords who took an interest in Committee, so I will endeavour to cut to the chase, emphasising both the reasons for these amendments and why I have so far failed to be reassured by my noble friend’s response. These amendments seek to change Clause 6, which introduces a new Section 3B entitled:

“Regulatory principles to be applied by both regulators”.

The clause goes to the heart of the philosophy that underpins the new regulatory structure. At present, the regulator is only required to be “proportionate” in its approach. My amendment seeks to add the words “reasonable and fair” so that there are three adjectives.

I make it clear at the beginning that this is not an attempt to plead for lower regulatory standards. It is absolutely in the interests of the City to have proper standards of regulation, which is the best way to encourage the growth and development of the financial services industry. Achieving the appropriate level of regulation requires a difficult balance to be struck. If it is too low, London’s reputation as a good and safe place to do business will be damaged and business will move away. If it is too high, the costs, both financial and in management time, will mean that innovation will be discouraged, whole areas of activity will have the stability of the graveyard and plans for the expansion of established businesses will be shelved or transferred to other financial centres. Somebody explaining it to me in the City said, “It’s like Neapolitan ice cream, you have to try to scoop out the vanilla layer that is in the middle between the chocolate and the strawberry”.

I am convinced that the new system will work most effectively if we can encourage the use of judgment and not rely merely on the rigidities of process or box-ticking. Process of course has an important part to play; it provides the framework of the regulatory system, but unless it is informed by judgment it cannot be truly effective. In earlier debates on this issue, I explained why, in my view, confining regulatory principles to “proportionate” emphasised process at the expense of judgment. I explained in Committee the definition of these three words in the Oxford English Dictionary. I pointed out that “proportionate” suggested a defined, fixed relationship, as well as a one-way one. The example that I used from the Oxford English Dictionary was:

“The toll .. on the canal is proportionate to weight”.

By contrast, “reasonable”—

“Having sound judgement; ready to listen to reason, sensible”—

suggested an element of judgment and of a two-way process.

Currently, there is a widespread view in the City that the regulatory philosophy has shifted to give a much greater emphasis to process and box-ticking, and to the regulator being seen to have covered the bases at the expense of an open judgment-based relationship. I referred earlier to the Star Chamber-like processes of the significant influence function committee, whereby individuals are left in a Kafkaesque limbo for months. I have referred to the indiscriminate use of Section 166 skilled persons reviews, 800 of which are said to be outstanding and likely to cost some £160 million to £200 million to complete. All of that will in due time be paid for by the consumer.

My noble friend Lord Sassoon, not here tonight, has pointed out that if people or firms believe that they have been unfairly treated, they can apply for judicial review. The idea that an individual would take on the might of the regulator is laughable. Whichever of my noble friend’s Bill team officials drafted that reply needs to get some exposure to the real world.

This change of approach by the regulator has caused an equal and opposite reaction in the regulated community. We have seen the emergence of plea bargaining. Just as Mr Tappin, extradited to the US on a charge that he strongly denied, concluded that a guilty plea leading to three years in a UK jail was preferable to a possible 30 years in a US penitentiary, so individuals decide to give up the fight and agree to a reduced penalty in return for a guilty plea. As one person put it to me, “I want to get on with my life”. He did not believe that he was guilty, but he had a life to live and did not have the time available or the resources that the regulator has at his disposal.

As my noble friend Lord Flight pointed out in our debate in Committee on 24 October, firms now disclose the minimum necessary to comply with the law. They have learnt that any admission of weakness will be seized on by the regulator, who all too often appears to act as if they believe that they have been told only half the story.

I do not believe that these and similar developments bode well for a future regulatory approach. How do we break this vicious circle? The early signs from the FCA are not encouraging. Some testosterone-fuelled remarks about “shooting first and asking questions after” have been quoted previously in your Lordships’ House. Could there ever be a sensible regulatory principle? The tone of Journey to the FCA, the booklet recently published, seems to give only the slightest of nods to the need to create appropriate relationships with the regulated firms. I have quoted previously at some length from that document to show what I mean and I shall not trespass on the good will of the House at this late hour again this evening.

This is not just a theoretical discussion. Once confidence in the regulator’s readiness to listen to reason is damaged or lost, we risk a move away from the United Kingdom and the City. It may be a trickle at first, but it could quickly gather pace. I hope that the Minister’s officials have drawn his attention to the article in last Friday’s Financial Times,

“MPs to probe London job losses”,

in which a lobby group points to,

“an ‘amber warning light’ flashing over the country”.

I hope that his officials have also picked up the piece in the Sunday Times about London being ousted by New York as the largest financial centre. The Bill team may disregard that as journalistic puff, but they might like to read the document from the ABI which states:

“As we discussed in Chapter 1, we would like to go further in developing a common FCA and industry sense of purpose, to deliver well-functioning markets that benefit consumers and, ideally, help the country tackle some significant public policy challenges. It is in the interests of the FCA and the industry to work together to jointly enhance their reputations. Increased public trust and greater customer confidence would be beneficial for the industry, but they would also reflect well on the FCA, and indeed the Government”.

Significantly, it then states:

“This requires a change from the FSA’s traditional approach, which did not usually convey a drive towards medium-term positive outcomes”.

These may or may not be the beginning of a trickle, but they are certainly a lot of straws in the wind of people dissatisfied with the philosophy that is being adopted and that would be enhanced if we had just the word “proportionate” left in the regulatory principles.

I shall make one final point. I said earlier that my noble friend had always maintained that there is no need to add “reasonable and fair” because “proportionate” includes that requirement. As I have explained, I do not agree. However, I am not sure that the Government really agree either. When my noble friend wrote to me, the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, about the social investment issue that we discussed earlier today, the note read,

“Ministers are clear that this should not be done at any cost … we want to see the regulator react flexibly, openly and proportionately”.

Clearly, his officials do not believe that the definition of proportionality includes flexibility or openness, or why would they have drafted the note in that way? How then can they argue that “proportionate” includes “reasonable and fair”? If my noble friend were to say that, if I were to withdraw my amendment in favour of one that replaced the words “reasonable and fair” with “flexible and open”, he would accept it, I would be happy to do so. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, these amendments again look to amend the proportionality principle to which both regulators are required to have regard when carrying out their general functions. Noble Lords will not be surprised to hear me say that that principle will play an extremely important role in the new regulatory system. It ensures that the regulators must consider whether the burdens they impose will be proportionate to the benefits that are likely to result. I am sure that that principle is universally accepted.

Amendment 42 specifically adds a requirement for the regulators to have regard to being “reasonable and fair”, as well as “proportionate”. Noble Lords will remember that my noble friend Lord Sassoon expressed support for the sentiment behind the amendment at an earlier stage. I am sure that all noble Lords would accept that nobody from this Dispatch Box would be a proponent of a new regulatory system we were creating if for one second we thought that the regulators would act in a way that was unfair or unreasonable.

Does the Bill achieve that objective? We believe that it does. The regulators will not be required to have regard to being fair and reasonable; they will have legal duties to be fair and reasonable; they go further than the amendment proposes. As we explained at an earlier stage, the regulators will have a duty under public law to act reasonably; they are also under a duty to comply with the rules of natural justice, so they will be required to follow procedures and processes that are fair.

My noble friends Lord Hodgson and Lord Flight gave a definition of proportionality. The definition that they gave was narrower than most people’s view of what proportionality means. In certain circumstances, it is a mere mathematical concept, but if I say that I am going to give a proportionate response to something that someone does to me, it is not simply calibrated or adding up figures; I think that it is seen in common parlance as being synonymous with a reasonable and fair response. As I said, the requirement on the regulators under public law to act in that way underpins that thought.

I have considerable sympathy, however, in respect of the threats that London faces as a pre-eminent financial centre. It is not surprising that Hong Kong and Singapore are growing very quickly, given what has happened to the economies in those parts of the world. You would expect growth there, although London is contracting in part because some of the activities that have been undertaken in London are no longer either profitable or, in some cases, credible. When one sees, for example, UBS downsizing significantly in London, it is not doing it because of the regulatory regime; it is doing it for fundamental business purposes, against which these provisions would have no bearing.

Where I agree with my noble friends is that we must ensure that the mindset of regulators in the UK is not negative. It has always been our intention that they would adopt a judgment-based approach; that has been stated on many occasions. That is the key to effect a change of culture in the way that the regulators work. If the amendment would have that impact, the Government might be more sympathetic to it. We simply do not believe that it would. As I said, we believe that the Bill will require the regulators not just to act proportionately but, under their more general duties, to act reasonably and fairly as well. On that basis, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My noble friend will not be surprised to hear me say that I am extremely disappointed with that response. I thank my noble friend Lord Flight for his helpful comments, in particular, about effective regulation being a two-way street where people communicate issues and problems that they are facing, not in fear that they will have the book thrown at them but because it is in the regulators’ and regulatees’ interests to address problems and find solutions before they become unmanageable.

My noble friend falls back on the legal words that the regulator has to be fair and reasonable and that there is natural justice. I prefer his point about mindset. The fact is that “proportionate, fair and reasonable” imposes a different mindset on the regulator than “proportionate” on its own. He and the Government may have convinced themselves that the threat to London is coming from the natural effluxion of economic activity to the Far East. I think that they are in danger of being sadly mistaken. We have a chance in this Bill to address the problems that have bedevilled us until recently and to set out our stall for a new, judgment-based, regulatory regime, philosophy and approach. By these as by a series of other decisions taken by the Government, we are missing an opportunity which we will greatly regret having not taken in the years ahead. However, the hour is late, and though I am sorely tempted to divide the House just to have my own bit of testosterone, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 41 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, we all accept that the financial services sector is integral to the prosperity of the wider economy. However, we have also seen what happens when light-touch regulation and excessive risk-taking by financial institutions conspire to produce the perfect storm, culminating in the recent financial crisis. The aftermath of this, of course, is still an impediment to growth in the UK. An appropriately regulated financial sector will be key to the economy’s resurgence, and I am confident that the reforms that we are making to the regulatory system in this Bill will ensure this.

However, at Second Reading and in Committee, my noble friend Lord Sassoon listened to concerns from noble Lords on all sides of the House that the regulators would be excessively focused on their remits and would act in a disproportionate way which might constrain the financial services sector from acting to support activity in the wider economy. That is why a commitment was made to return with an amendment that would require the PRA and FCA to consider the wider impact of their actions.

Amendment 44 delivers on this commitment. It requires the FCA and PRA to have regard to the desirability of sustainable growth in the economy of the United Kingdom in the medium or long term. This is a concept with which of course it would be extremely difficult to disagree. Sustainable economy growth is desirable, and it is important that the regulators will now be required to show how they have considered this in carrying out their general functions.

To a certain extent, this gets back to the amendments that we have just debated. The regulators should not be the agents of the industry that they regulate. Regulation itself is not about enhancing the international competitiveness of our domestic financial sector, even if that is an outcome when regulation is proportionate and effective. This amendment recognises the link between an apparently appropriately regulated financial sector and the growth of the wider economy, and requires that the regulators bear it in mind. That is why the amendment I have tabled strikes an appropriate balance: it creates an expectation that the regulators must think carefully about the impact that their regulation may have on the wider economy; this is absolutely right. Seen in the light of the recent financial crisis, it is clear that taking appropriate regulatory action in good time would have served to safeguard sustainable economic growth in the medium to long term. This amendment will ensure that the regulators consider the wider economic impact of their actions. I beg to move.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, despite my disappointment over the last three amendments, I congratulate the Government on having brought forward this amendment. It follows the Government’s sensible decision earlier in the passage of the Bill to give the Financial Policy Committee an explicit objective of growth and employment. This amendment achieves a sensible and pragmatic solution, takes account of the needs of the economy and the priorities of business and the financial sector, and at the same time allows regulators rightly to focus on their important consumer protection and financial stability objectives.

There is a small sting in the tail for the Minister. Given that this is a new requirement for the regulators, I encourage him to ask the FCA to come forward with its vision of how it will interpret its regard to economic growth. The regulator is already up and running in shadow form, with designated leadership teams already starting to set out publicly their approach. It is clearly important that the will of the Government and indeed of Parliament is incorporated in that regulatory planning. I applaud the Government for bringing forward this amendment but would argue that in order to achieve their desired goal of supporting growth, work needs to begin now to set out how the regulators will interpret and implement this new requirement.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, during the Committee stage of this Bill I made the point that it would surely be appropriate for the life industry to be represented on the PRA board, against the background that the PRA fairly openly was admitting that it did not have much interest in the life industry. It was really concerned with its banking duties. But in the event of severe bear markets in equities, life companies can get into a situation where it is desirable for the solvency rules to be suspended in the short term so as not to have a downward spiral effect on asset values. This amendment simply proposes that there should be at least two non-executive members with experience of the insurance business on the board of the PRA. The Government certainly took the point in principle that the industry should be regulated. This is designed to put modest bones on that. I beg to move.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

I will briefly support my noble friend’s amendment. There has been quite a lot of talk about how the Bill is oriented towards banking and that particular sector of the financial services industry. The insurance industry—particularly the life insurance industry, which marches to the beat of several different types of drum, one of which, in respect of solvency, my noble friend referred to—needs to make sure that its voice can be heard, because it is such a critical part of our savings industry. While one does not wish to be too prescriptive in the way these bodies are made up, I am sure that some reassurance to the life insurance industry that its particular expertise and particular needs will not be overlooked would be welcome and desirable.

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, the Government absolutely agree that insurance expertise should be represented on the PRA board. That is why my noble friend Lord De Mauley said when we previously debated this matter that the Bank had committed to that principle and that there would be insurance expertise on the PRA board. However, we believe that it is up to the Bank to ensure that the board has the right balance of skills and experience to enable it to make effective decisions and deliver its objectives in respect of all the firms it regulates. The trouble with the amendment is that if we were to require in the Bill that the board should have insurance expertise, people would rightly ask why the Government had not made similar provision for other sectors such as mutuals and investment banks. We do not think that that is a sensible way to go. However, with the commitment that there will be insurance expertise on the PRA board, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.

Financial Services Bill

Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts Excerpts

Monday 12th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Deben]

My Lords, I refer again to my declaration of interests. I understand the reason for this amendment, but it seems not the right way to achieve its end. To suggest that you have to balance protection on the one hand with access on the other seems a misunderstanding of what protection ought to be. I am sorry that the Government have so far been unwilling to place upon the regulator a responsibility to have regard to the extent to which advice is available. That ought to be part of what the regulator does when he thinks about how he is going to regulate and the demands that he is going to make. There is a real argument that we are going to find that there will be fewer opportunities for those of modest means to get proper advice. It is important for the regulator to take that into account when he lays burdens upon the industry. I think that is right, but I am sure that this is not the way to achieve that end, partly because it does not help the industry to suggest that somehow or other protection for consumers is necessarily contrary to the need to provide for a wider range of people to have advice. The failure to get this right has been one of the problems with the industry in the past.

I hope that the Minister will resist this amendment, but that he will do so recognising that there is a real concern behind it, which is that the cost of regulation and the degree to which regulation is disproportionate falls most on those who most need advice and very often are not in receipt of a great income and do not have large reserves. I hope that the Minister will accept that there is a concern here. It is one that the Government have failed properly to address, and it is not well addressed by suggesting that there is a kind of conflict where conflict does not necessarily occur.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, my name is on this amendment, and I briefly rise to support my noble friend. The key phrase in his remarks was “responsible behaviour by providers” and the key phrase in the comments by my noble friend Lady Noakes was “nervousness among providers”. This comes about because this is an industry where there is huge opportunity for ex post judgments. What appears extremely fair and reasonable at one point can, with the effluxion of time, without any malfeasance on either side, come to be seen as having been perhaps not a very suitable way to provide information, products or whatever. We have to be very careful that we do not shut off opportunities for the moderately wealthy or the less than moderately wealthy to get access to proper advice. In doing this, we will need to address the sorts of issues raised by my noble friend.

It is now made worse by the activities of claims management companies that jump on the bandwagon. It is instructive that each firm that is complained against is charged £850 by the Financial Ombudsman Service, irrespective of whether the claim is found to be genuine. This is not a completely free exercise because it will end up on the shoulders of the consumers, or customers, because of the circularity of the way that these firms have to operate. The combination of products with a very long life, a volatile financial services system and a predatory claims management system will lead, unless the regulator has the proper balance in his requirements, to withdrawal of advice, products and services to a large number of our fellow citizens.

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, I have lent my name also to this amendment. I am seriously concerned at a contrarian impact from quite a lot of what is in this Bill. There will be less and less product and advice for ordinary people. I have already made the point with regard to RDR. The FSA itself has decided that VCTs and EIS are not suitable unless people are sophisticated investors. In the end, mostly ordinary folk will just be left with cash deposits for their savings. Anyone who has studied economics must expect that at some stage in the not-too-distant future there will be a period of very high inflation as a result of QE so people will be severely damaged if they hold all their investments in cash long term. I am not sure whether the balanced approach is correct, but if you want providers to continue to provide other than to the more sophisticated part of the population, if you make the risks and penalties in so doing sufficiently high, the common-sense commercial judgment is to say that we are not interested in being in that part of the market. It is important and makes sense to think of a balance between the two.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, this group of amendments concerns social investment, a topic that we have already spent considerable time discussing during the various stages of the Bill. It is an important issue, and one that the Government have given considerable thought to, and so it is only right that we return to it at Report.

There is one point that we have made on numerous occasions and that I would like to reiterate before I turn to the detailed amendments. There is no doubt in my mind that the Government are committed to supporting the nascent social investment sector and will stand firmly behind it. However, we must not forget that this is, after all, not something in which consumers engage for purely altruistic reasons. If that were the case, individuals would simply donate or gift their money. That means that we must offer the appropriate protections to consumers entering into a social investment, as we would expect for any other financial transaction. As my noble friend Lady Kramer noted in our discussion on 25 July,

“we have no wish to expose people to scams or to create an opportunity for this to be used as a back door to taking unfair advantage. That is extremely important”.—[Official Report, 25/7/2012; col. 717.]

I could not agree with her more.

I turn to the government amendments in this group. Amendment 26 adds a new “have regard” to the list of matters which the FCA must consider when assessing what constitutes an appropriate degree of consumer protection. In future it will need to consider the different expectations of consumers in relation to different types of financial advice. This is intended to ensure that the regulatory approach takes into account that consumers might have non-financial—for example, social—goals.

Amendment 45 will add a new regulatory principle to proposed new Section 3B which applies to both the PRA and FCA and will require them to have regard to the different nature and objectives of different financial services businesses. This is intended again to make clear that there should not be a one-size-fits-all approach to regulation.

Noble Lords will be aware that these amendments do not refer to social investment specifically. That is because we want them to apply across the board rather than exclusively to social investment. We want the regulator to take a measured and targeted approach to regulating both alternative and existing firms and business models and protecting their consumers, and we do not want this to be limited to social investment alone. For example, there are other innovative sectors that would benefit from this, such as peer-to-peer lending. Incidentally, I can confirm to the House today that the Government will be transferring the regulation of peer-to-peer platforms to the FCA as part of the wider consumer credit transfer in April 2014.

My noble friend Lord Sassoon promised an update on two matters of policy concern that my noble friend Lady Kramer and others have raised on previous occasions. My officials have been working very closely with the Cabinet Office and the FSA over recent weeks and months. On suitability, I hope noble Lords will be pleased to hear that the FSA has confirmed that its assessment is that the existing rules do not restrict advised sales of social investment products. I have therefore agreed with the FSA that it will find a suitable way of communicating this to the industry and to consider whether anything more needs to be done to increase certainty for industry, because I know that that has been a major issue. To decide on the best way forward, the FSA will liaise with industry and other interested parties in the coming months.

On financial promotions, at this point the Government are not proposing to make any changes either through the Bill or through secondary legislation. We are alive to the potential for consumer protection concerns to arise in this area, and the potential for any instances of consumer detriment to have a highly damaging impact on a nascent sector. However, the issue is still being actively debated and is open for consideration as part of the Cabinet Office’s red tape challenge. Interested parties may make representations on the issue until the final panel meeting takes place at the end of the month.

There are also opportunities to explore whether there are any other, non-legislative ways of mitigating costs to social investment offerings of complying with the financial promotions regime, for example working with larger firms which may be able to provide assistance with compliance or approval. I encourage large firms to step up their efforts in this area. Finally, I can confirm that the FSA will provide a named contact to industry and other interested parties on matters relating to social investment. I hope that I have given noble Lords some reassurance that progress is being made in this area.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, my Amendment 31 is sandwiched between the two government amendments in this group. I think it is important not to look a gift horse in the mouth. Amendment 26, which adds to the consumer protection objectives, and Amendment 45, which adds to the regulatory principles, are a substantial improvement. The situation is certainly a great deal better than it was when we were in Committee and we had to rely on proposed new Section 137R, which is entitled “General supplementary powers”. Therefore, I am most grateful to my noble friend, the Bill team and the Government for the thought that they have given to this matter.

I shall speak briefly to Amendment 31. I recognise what my noble friend Lord Newby has said—that the Government have got it. By “got it”, I mean they understand the importance of creating a regime which, while recognising the need for proper consumer protection, will provide an appropriate regulatory structure, which in turn will not impede the proper and measured development of social investment. I hope that the Government will keep up the pressure and continue to stress this policy clearly and strongly to a wider audience. The wider audience has two major parts to it. The first is the regulator, which my noble friend referred to.

The Financial Services Authority very kindly arranged for me to meet two of its staff between Committee stage and now. They were interested, considerate, and keen to learn. However, without being in any way critical, they were a long way down the learning curve as far as social investment was concerned. When I discussed with them what their other responsibilities were, which included RDR, I was worried as to how they would be able to give sufficient time to the work that will be needed to provide and develop a proper regulatory framework for the issue of social investment. We have heard already this afternoon about the size and complexity of RDR and one is worried that social investment will be squeezed as a result. I hope that when my noble friend responds to my brief remarks he will feel able to stress again the importance that the Government place on the FCA in future and the FSA now in devoting the necessary time to the intellectual heavy lifting required to establish the right regulatory framework. This is not just a UK-centric issue; we have the thought leadership on social investment here in the UK, and some of the most innovative ideas have been pioneered here and are now being copied around the world. There is a real opportunity for the UK to lead the way in creating a new asset class, and we must not let it slip by allowing the regulator to put the issue into the “too difficult” tray.

The other audience that I hope the Government can spend some time persuading is that of the professions. If the Government want the social investment market to grow, there are many professional groups that have the power to help or hinder—inter alia, financial advisers, bankers, accountants, lawyers, auditors and investment managers. Each of these groups will have their individual concerns, the intellectual heavy-lifting required to devise rules and procedure for the new activity and the inevitable risks in anything new. The argument will run among some in each of those groups that we could stand back until it is clear that the social investment market will take off. In part, this reluctance to move forward is one reason why it is not taking off.

There are plenty of examples of how the attitudes in the professions have impeded this development. We came across a charity that wanted to make an investment of between £50,000 and £75,000 in activities in Nepal. It was told that if it was going to do that it would have to take a due diligence programme, which would have cost about £25,000. The result was that instead of making an investment, it gave a grant. It is those sorts of attitudes that one has to tackle—and it requires a fresh type of thinking. That example will not be dealt with by my amendment, but my amendment was designed to help to create an atmosphere in which social investment can become a mainstream rather than peripheral activity. That is why my preference has always been to have the words “social investment” in the Bill.

As I have said many times in the Chamber, I have been involved in the private equity industry for most of my career. It is worth remembering that all these concerns, worries and questions arose 30 years ago as private equity investment got under way, with doubts about interim valuations, suitability and investor protections. We overcame the doubters then to the great benefit of the UK and, in doing so, made the UK a world leader in private equity—and we can do the same with social investment, if the Government are prepared to make their support and encouragement clear. Nevertheless, I recognise that the social investment movement is at a very early stage. There are great hopes for it, but it is still a very fragile flower. That is why my amendment, while mentioning social investment directly, is entirely permissive; it does not require the regulator to do anything now.

It would be helpful if my noble friend the Minister could confirm that, in relation to the consumer protection objective, the Government recognise the different expectations that the social investors may have; that in relation to the competition objective, they recognise the importance of community finance provision to the financially excluded; and that in relation to the regulatory principles, they recognises the different natures and objectives of social investment businesses. I would be most grateful if he could do this when he comes to reply. Notwithstanding that, I again reiterate my thanks to the Government for the improvements that they have made.

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, it seems to me that social investment is clearly a territory that should be confined only to more sophisticated investors. It is unrealistic to imagine that unsophisticated retail investors will really understand investing in a project that might return them 10% or 20%, or they might lose all their money—or it might really be a charitable gift. I would be extremely concerned if social investment was something that was being made widely available to unsophisticated investors. In terms of the list of the products that the FSA or FCA might decide to keep away from unsophisticated investors, it ranks much higher than a VCT, for example, in terms of understandable risk.

Financial Services Bill

Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts Excerpts

Monday 12th November 2012 Lords Chamber

I greatly urge the Government to follow—for once—the EU and to accept the EU’s finding on RDR reforms that there is an ongoing role for commissions. I beg to move.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, my noble friend raised some very interesting points. Of course the RDR issue has two parts. He referred to the basis for charging, but there is the qualification aspect as well. RDR will require advisers to get QCF level 4, which is only A-level standard. It does not seem to me to be too much to ask that people who are advising on savings should have an equivalent of an A-level qualification. I rather support the idea that RDR should endeavour to encourage the emergence of a profession. He referred to the fact that the profession was largely an elderly one and that we needed to encourage some new, younger blood. Careers will be more likely to be attractive if the idea of RDR with some qualifications—making you like the solicitor and accountant in your high street—comes to pass.

My noble friend’s second point was about the method of charging. We have here the question of how we square the circle between the reluctance to pay fees and the need for continuing advice. If you have a pension scheme that will last you for 15, 20 or 25 years, you need someone who is prepared to step up and advise you as to how it is going ahead. My problem is that we are now sufficiently far down the track on the idea of fee paying and the ending of commission. There is no doubt that commissions were raised not so much from the IFAs but often from the producers, to try to make the sale of the product more attractive. I do not think, as my noble friend said, that by any manner of means the IFAs have been the only people to blame, but we are sufficiently close to the start now that we need to continue with the approach of fees. It is not ideal, but I think that order plus counter-order would equal disorder. We have been marching the IFA community towards a fee-based remuneration schedule for two or three years. To pull back in the middle of November, when it is due to go live on 1 January, would cause the most enormous difficulties for the producers and the industry.

[Lord Naseby]

My Lords, I was not intending to take part in this debate. At one time, I was chairman of the Children’s Mutual, which was a friendly society/insurance company. At the weekend, in Northampton, I had discussions with some friends whom I would call middle-class savers. Not a single person, frankly, was the least bit prepared to pay a fee. It goes deeper than that. One’s own children are not prepared to pay fees up front.

There may have been much wrong with the old system in that it was not as closely scrutinised as it should have been in terms of the total cost to the saver. Nevertheless, here we are three and a half years into a major austerity programme and sufficient resources are not available for people who are genuinely wanting to or having to save. I do not know what the minimum fee will be and perhaps my noble friends on this side will be more up to date on that. I cannot see that it can be less than £500, if not considerably more.

I say to my Front Bench that it is all very well ploughing on because this has to happen in January but, as an aside, I reflect on how the FSA took three and a half years to realise that the projections on pensions were totally out of court. We have all been living with a base rate of 0.5% for a couple of years. Here we have projections approved by the FSA at, I think, 5%, 7% and 9%. That was totally out of court and nothing happened from the FSA. There had jolly well better be a plan B somewhere in the hip pocket because I very much fear what will happen. During the first three or four months nothing much will happen but, thereafter, there will be a major crisis unless there is a plan B ready to deal with it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Barnett]

The noble Lord makes a good point. He should perhaps have talked to some of his friends on the last group of amendments, when they all voted with the Government. I wonder what they might do this time. Has he convinced them, I wonder? We will have to wait and see. I was surprised by the proposed new section to which he referred because I thought I had understood the “may” or “must” argument. Those words are used profusely throughout the Bill. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, told us that he had asked officials to go through the whole Bill and work out which of them they should keep. What I had not appreciated—this is a point drawn to our attention by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips—is that on page 20 we have, in new Section 1B(4), another method of having “must” or “may”. We have a qualified must:

“must, so far as is compatible”,

with the later words. In practice, it is not “must” at all. The noble Lord wants to strengthen it, and I agree. We need to strengthen the arm of regulators everywhere. That is why I voted for the previous amendment.

We may be told that we should wait for the banking Bill, which we have in draft. We cannot be sure that that Bill will appear in that form. I know that at least one noble Lord on the Opposition Benches wants to insert in it something that the Government do not have in mind to insert; namely, a Glass-Steagall amendment. The Minister will know what I mean. I do not know whether he has committed himself or the Government to the draft Bill appearing in the new year. I think he said that we will have it in the new year. Perhaps he will confirm that. We clearly need a banking Bill.

I understand when the Minister says that the Government will take into careful consideration what the banking commission says, but he has not committed himself on that either. What exactly are the Government committing themselves to? They have set up this very high-powered commission, of which colleagues on all sides of the House are Members, and I understand that they are doing a first-class job, but we have been told only that he may, after serous consideration, introduce what the commission recommends. Will he firm that up this afternoon? Will we definitely have a Bill early in the new year, based to a large extent on the work of this high-powered commission, that will deal with some of the points that have rightly been raised about integrity and care? All these matters could be in a banking Bill as well as in this Bill but, for the moment, we have only this Bill. I support my noble friend Lady Hayter and the noble Lord, Lord Phillips. I will support him when he moves his amendment, and I hope his colleagues on the Liberal Democrat Benches will do the same.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My noble friend Lord Phillips is quite right to draw attention to the importance of integrity. Integrity lies at the heart of confidence in the financial services system, indeed, in any commercial activity. In Amendment 26D, the noble Lord seeks to insert an additional requirement about,

“the fairness and integrity of policy and conduct of those directing or operating in the financial markets”.

He needs to be aware that the significant influence function committee already checks everybody who is undertaking the sorts of roles that he considers important—which are indeed important—and does so very thoroughly. It has done so with increasing pressure and difficulty in recent years, so much so that people are now ceasing to wish to undertake these roles. They are starting to ask whether they need all the hassle, the problems and the dangers of adverse publicity from people like the noble Lord, Lord Phillips. Powers exist to give authorisation to the people who will set the tone and the philosophy that he seeks to achieve, which all of us who work in the City feel are essential and which, as he rightly pointed out, have not always been present in the past. I say to the House, and to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, that we must get the philosophy right. The creation of codes and more regulations will not necessarily produce the right people. We are looking for people with judgment. We rely on judgment, not on process, and as we do this we are in danger of moving more and more to a process-driven system that does not allow the exercise of judgment that will lead to the desirable results that my noble friend indicated in his remarks.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

I was not aware that I said that everything in the City was perfect. I said that integrity lies at the heart of the financial services industry, as indeed it lies at the heart of most commercial endeavour. I said that there were clearly areas where the City had fallen short, but I pointed out to my noble friend and to the noble Lord, Lord Peston, that the significant influence function committee has very considerable powers that it has been exercising with increasing strength in recent years. Therefore, I doubt that we need amendments such as this.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

I am a bit confused. If the noble Lord absolutely agrees with me on the primacy of integrity, he cannot have read proposed new Section 1B(4) of FiSMA or he would not be content to oppose these amendments. New Section 1B(4) clearly states that the three objectives are equal but one is more equal than others—namely, competition. If he agrees with me and if one is going to be more equal than others, it should be integrity.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, I am not on the Front Bench, but as I read it, proposed new Section 1B(4) gives equal weight to these objectives. It states that in,

“so far as is compatible with acting in a way”,

the three are equal. I agree that integrity is extremely important, but we are not in a position where we want to avoid the other objectives, which have a real place in the creation of a dynamic City that is competitive on the world stage.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

I hesitate to trouble the House with a further intervention—

Financial Services Bill

Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts Excerpts

Tuesday 6th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord McFall of Alcluith]

I support my noble friend’s amendment. It is important to emphasise oversight because we are setting up a more complex body than the one we had before; we are going from a tripartite body to a quadripartite body. There are many interstitial areas and oversight is even more important in those areas.

As I mentioned earlier, there will be many conflicts between the FPC and the PRA. On the relationship between the Prudential Regulatory Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority, will prudential regulation trump conduct of business, which has happened in the past? Will the FCA feel inferior to the PRA as the FSA felt inferior to the Bank of England?

As to the culture, we can have all the rules we like but, within a plethora of rules, there can be a monoculture which reports to the top and a diverse range of opinions do not get listened to. There are many lessons to be learnt there. An oversight committee is very important in order to look at that and ensure that the Bank of England is indeed exercising the best corporate governance and best practice.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, like my noble friend Lady Noakes I have some difficulty in understanding the thrust of these amendments. I see the issue of the nomenclature, which may be unfortunate, but I have to say, as a director of a company, that keeping under review and overseeing are almost one in the same. I do not see the difference between those two functions. It is absolutely clear that keeping under review and oversight are running on similar tracks.

The dangers behind the noble Lord’s amendments are that we are starting to find a way of dividing responsibilities. We are moving from clear lines of responsibility to a situation where a sub-committee of the board, as appears in the Bill, is starting to dictate the pace of the board itself. That is an unworthy, unnecessary and potentially dangerous development.

[Lord Myners]

My Lords, I support my noble friend’s amendment. The decisions on the aggregation of power within the Bank of England are now set. The Government are clear in their determination to achieve that.

In my view, no one form of regulatory architecture can be assuredly more successful than others. Looking around the world at what happened with the global financial crisis, we saw many different structures of regulatory architecture come under strain. Some point to the twin peaks system associated with Canada as evidence that the Government’s current thinking in this area is consistent with a model that appeared to work better there than in other jurisdictions. However, if one wishes to understand why Canada did not experience the same harsh consequences of the global financial crisis, as in the United States, Europe and the United Kingdom, one finds the answer in matters other than regulatory architecture—including the nature of the economy and control of lending and leverage—which are inherent in the Canadian system and distinct from those followed elsewhere.

If we are going to aggregate this power in the hands of the Bank of England, we have to ask ourselves questions about checks and balances because we learnt from the failure of individual UK banks and institutions that, in almost all cases, there was an overly dominant individual in charge of the organisation that failed. That is the big lesson, which the FSA has not picked up completely in its reports on the collapse of RBS and HBOS. However, it is a clear lesson, whether it is Sir Fred Goodwin at Royal Bank of Scotland or Mr Adam Applegarth at Northern Rock; and similarly Mr Crawshaw at Bradford & Bingley and Mr Cummings, Mr Hornby and others at HBOS.

Are we creating an architecture here in which we are putting too much power in the hands of one person? I think we are. I was a member of the court for four years and have seen how it and the Bank operate. One must be careful not to extrapolate from the behaviours of the existing incumbents of senior positions in the Bank and members of the court into the future, but a very clear lesson to me was that the court just could not be effective at corporate governance, as both the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, referred to earlier. The court cannot be effective in that way. When I was a member in 2007, three members of the court sought to escalate matters to the Treasury about the Bank’s management of liquidity and of risk. It simply was not possible for my two colleagues and me to register with the Treasury or anyone else, in any meaningful way, our concerns about the Bank’s failure to understand the risks that were accumulating in the system.

Are we creating a structure now in which that could not happen again in the future? I do not think we are. We are not clear as to the role of the court. We give it some responsibilities but very little power to influence the responsibilities that we give it. We must ask important questions about the constitution and membership of the court to ensure that, in future, it is not simply a ceremonial body that is, on the whole, discouraged by the governor from asking questions, but something that at least approaches the independent challenge that one would expect—

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords—

[Lord Myners]

I will give way in a moment to the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, who has had his opportunity. We must look to create a body that is capable of appropriately challenging the current governor and governors in the future. I am not sure that this is necessarily seriously advanced by the language we are using here. Perhaps I will anticipate the point on which the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, wishes to intervene by saying that he is quite correct about perhaps dancing on the head of a pin when it comes to whether these are questions about supervisory roles or oversight. However, it is absolutely critical that we ensure, in this Bill, that the court is able to appropriately challenge and check the authority that this Bill places in the hands of the governor. We have learnt painfully in recent years about the consequences of coping with a dysfunctionality between the governor and members of the court. I give way to the noble Lord if he still wants to come in.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

The noble Lord was quite right. I understood the force of his polemic and the seriousness of the point he was making but could not see how that is in any way addressed by adding the word “overseeing” to “keeping under review”, which seems to me, as he indicated, to be a distinction without a difference.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, I wonder whether the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, has taken sufficient account of the provision in proposed new Section 9A(1)(b) that allows the court to review the strategy at any time. There is reference later in the proposed new section to revision of the strategy. I would have thought that those provisions covered precisely the concern that he correctly raised.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, I am slightly concerned at the proposed obligation to conduct an annual review. The role of directors is constantly to keep a strategy under review and to see whether it is still relevant. However, to impose this would impose a burden. A proper strategy review is an extremely expensive and far-reaching undertaking. It would be far better to have a backstop of a three-year requirement and rely on the good judgment and good sense of the directors, in particular the non-executives, to call for more frequent reviews as and when they are needed. It is inconceivable that we would go through the sorts of events that we have been through since 2008 and that non-executives would sit and say, “We do not need to look at the strategy”. It is part of their role to do that and we should rely on their judgment, not on process, with a backstop of the three years, as proposed.

[Lord Myners]

My Lords, I will pick up on a term in the final sentence of the contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson. He referred to relying on the judgment of the non-executives. Many issues around the court will depend on the quality of the people appointed, and how they conduct themselves. A slightly less than perfect structure, superbly implemented, is likely to give a better outcome than a perfect structure that is poorly implemented. The Minister on a number of occasions referred to best corporate practice. Can he envisage any situation in which a corporate board performing effectively would not carry out an annual review of strategy? Every board of which I have been a member has had an annual strategy session to look again at past strategy and in many cases endorse or modify it in the light of circumstances. Regardless of what we say here, court directors seized by their legal responsibilities would almost certainly want to carry out an annual review. Does the Minister agree with that observation?

Financial Services Bill

Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts Excerpts

Wednesday 24th October 2012 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

192A: Clause 74, page 145, line 20, at end insert—
“( ) In carrying out an investigation, the regulator must have regard to its regulatory principles and act proportionately, reasonably and fairly.”

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, after that diversion through a possible Division and a discussion of batting averages, I rise to move Amendment 192A and shall also speak to Amendment 192B. We discussed, in relation to the previous amendment moved by my noble friend Lady Noakes, whether an investigation should take place. My amendments are concerned with Clause 74 and the way investigations take place once they are under way—the conduct of investigations, as in the heading of the clause.

At our Committee session just before we rose for the Summer Recess on 25 July, I moved a series of amendments which were designed to ensure that the regulatory approach was properly balanced and appropriate. Those amendments related to a point some way back in the Bill, on page 28, where we were looking at the regulatory principles to be applied by both regulators. My noble friend, who is not here at present, was able to reassure me on a number of the amendments that I moved, but on one I fear he failed. I argued that it was not sufficient for a regulator to be only proportionate in his activities; he also needed to be reasonable and fair. I then gave the Committee some practical examples of where, in the view of many in the financial services industry, the regulator may have been acting proportionately but was not acting reasonably or fairly. Therefore, my Amendments 192A and 192B are concerned with Clause 74, which relates to the conduct of investigations, and they seek to bring those two words into the phraseology of the clause.

At present in Clause 74 the wording is quite strange in the sense that in subsection (2) the regulator has only to,

“have regard to the desirability of minimising any adverse effect that the carrying out of the investigation may have on the exercise by the regulator of any of its other functions”.

It says nothing about the investigated firm; it refers only to the duties and responsibilities of the regulator. When my noble friend on the Front Bench comes to reply to the debate, it would be helpful if he could explain the exact purpose of this clause and what its practical effect would be.

Amendment 192A is designed to make it clear that investigators must be not only proportionate but, for the reasons that I have made clear, fair and reasonable in their work. Amendment 192B amends subsection (3) of the clause and provides for the postponement or suspension of the investigation where those regulatory principles are not being met.

When we discussed the “fair and reasonable” issue on 25 July, one reason that my noble friend gave was:

“The provision itself in Amendment 134 is unnecessary”.

He went on to say:

“The regulators have a duty under public law to act reasonably and can be challenged in the Upper Tribunal or by way of judicial review if they fail to discharge that duty, which would be broadly the case if the requirement were on the face of the Bill. The regulators are already under a duty to comply with the rules of natural justice—in other words to follow procedures and processes which are fair”.—[Official Report, 25/7/12; cols. 794-5.]

My noble friend read his speaking note beautifully but he cannot really believe its consequences. He is far too experienced a campaigner to consider that judicial review provides an answer to a firm that has been unfairly and disproportionately treated. A judicial review will take months and perhaps years to complete, whereas the effective life of a financial services firm in these circumstances can be measured in days. Confidence, as all of us who work in the City know, is an essential part of any firm’s reputation. Confidence is a fragile flower and news of an impending judicial review will cause it to wither and die. Indeed, fighting the regulator by means of a judicial review will increase the damage to the firm. Even if, after several months, the judicial review finds in favour of the firm, the firm will most likely then be only a pile of ashes.

When my noble friend replied, he said that “proportionate” equalled “fair” equalled “reasonable”, so I have since spent a little time with the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. At page 2372—so “shorter” is not very short—“proportionate” is defined as:

“That is in … proportion (to); appropriate, proportional, corresponding”.

The example given there is:

“The toll … on the canal is proportionate to weight”.

In other words, there is a fixed relationship. There is no flexibility. There is the weight of the goods and that is what is going to be charged.

Turning to “reasonable”, the definition is:

“Having sound judgement; ready to listen to reason, sensible”.

That seems to be a slightly different relationship. It is slightly more of a two-way relationship which the definition of proportionate did not imply. So I would argue, despite my noble friend’s persuasive remarks in July, that fair and reasonable are not otiose in relationship to “proportionate”.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Peston]

We are indebted to the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, for raising these matters, although we discussed similar matters last week under the guidance of the noble Lord, Lord Flight, and my noble friend Lady Hayter. The central question here is our fear—fear in the relevant sector as well—that the regulators damage our financial services sector rather than improve its performance. I think that is the theme that lies behind these matters. I have two questions, but I am bad at reading amendments, so I want to be certain about them. Presumably the new subsection proposed in Amendment 192A would come before subsections (1) to (7) in Clause 74. Am I right that it would be the lead-in?

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

Yes.

[Lord Peston]

It would establish the principle which everything else must follow. That is fine; I understand what the noble Lord is saying. That leads me to ask two central questions. In Clause 73, and I think in something similar earlier, subsection (2) refers to “Relevant events” that occur in relation to,

“(b) a person who is, or was at the time … carrying on a regulated activity”.

What worries me as a matter of logic is whether we will end up with the regulator having to investigate him or herself. If these people have not met the standards, who is responsible? They are partly, of course, but this would also be an indication of regulator failure. To my way of looking at it, we have a part of the Bill that is totally bizarre. From a logical point of view, the answer to the question “Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?” is that the regulator is the custodes himself, if you like. I would certainly welcome an analysis from the Minister in his reply which shows that we are not seriously involved in a logical contradiction here.

My second question is whether the fact of an investigation of the kind we are discussing is to be in the public domain. In other words, will it be publicly known that the regulator is investigating one of the things going on here? It may be that I have not read it properly, but is not that itself potentially enormously damaging, again a point that was raised last week? I should like the answer to these two questions. It may be that Treasury officials will have to do a bit of thinking about this part of the Bill when they are not thinking about the logical nature of “may” versus “must”. As I have pointed out before, there is a vast philosophical literature on this. How much of it they will have time to read, I do not know. However, the central point is to get a rational response to the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson.

[Lord Davies of Oldham]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, for identifying this issue, but I must say that if noble Lords opposite do not think that the nation is expecting a Bill and eventually an Act of Parliament that tightens up regulation in the wake of the circumstances we suffered four to five years ago, then all I can say is that such a position is not tenable. The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, is indicating that the principles of the regulator should be expressed in these terms. Who can be against the principles of fairness? Of course we want and expect the regulators to act fairly, but let us remember that they may be acting under a direction from the Treasury because something has gone wrong. The idea that the first thing the regulator must do is consider the principles on which it must act rather than in fact investigate the nature of the problem, as it has been instructed by the Treasury to do, seems to put the cart very firmly before the horse.

In responding to this amendment, I am sure that the Minister will have some warm words for his noble friends who have spoken in favour of the amendments, but I hope that he will defend the basic objective of the Bill. I shall give way to the noble Lord.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

I am extremely grateful. I did not want to interrupt his peroration, but dare I say that if he had listened carefully, he would know that I said that this is not about reducing regulatory stringency? I made that absolutely clear and I said it in terms; there is no question about that. This is a question about being fair and reasonable, it is not about reducing regulatory stringency. I do not want that particular line of attack attached to my amendments. I could not be clearer than that, and I think my noble friends on this side of the Committee are all as one so far as that is concerned.

[Lord Davies of Oldham]

The noble Lord will forgive me if the consideration that others might have with regard to a regulator potentially operating under direction from the Treasury to deal with a serious situation is that it should be dealing with it quickly and efficiently, and not just having regard to how much it acts appropriately or fairly, in the way in which the noble Lord has indicated. Of course, regulators know that if they act entirely improperly, even unlawfully, legal action will follow against them, but, in a Bill that is concerned to make regulation more effective, it surely cannot be that the principles upon which the regulators must act are more important than the effectiveness with which they carry out their role.

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[Lord Newby]

My Lords, the noble Lord asks a number of questions. First, why might the Treasury have a role and why is the regulator not doing it already? There may be a number of occasions when the Treasury first gets information from somebody and wants to tell the regulator. There are some occasions when the Treasury might want to prod the regulator into action. I have been critical of occasions when I felt the regulator has not moved as quickly as I would have liked in undertaking investigations. This part of the Bill enables the Treasury to give it a kick if it is needed. The other point, which is a valid point, is that if there is a really serious problem of regulatory failure, this is not the only way in which the Treasury can make sure that an investigation is undertaken. The Treasury can appoint any kind of investigator that it wants. This part of the Bill simply explains how the Treasury operates and the rules which apply if there is a lesser regulatory failure which probably happened some time in the past, where it seems appropriate for the regulator to have a look. I understand the noble Lord’s concerns, but he should not be as worried as he is.

I will respond to the second amendment in this group, which we have not debated at great length. It seeks to add to the grounds on which the regulator may decide to postpone or suspend an investigation if the investigation did not meet the principles by which the investigator must abide. Unlike with the previous amendment, where we agree with what the noble Lord seeks to achieve but do not think that he needs to have his belt and braces, we think that this amendment could have perverse and unexpected effects by enabling the regulator to stop an investigation for any reason it wanted. For example, it could realise that an investigation was going to be very time-consuming and burdensome, perhaps because of the level of detail involved. Under this proposal, it could end an investigation and argue that it was doing so because the investigation breached its principle on economic and efficient use of resource. For those reasons, we cannot support that amendment.

A number of noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Hodgson and Lord Flight, expressed broader concerns about the FSA and the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, quoted Lex in aid of that. The noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, and the noble Lord, Lord Peston, said that the FCA should have regard to competitiveness. These are broader issues that go beyond the scope of the amendments, but on the concerns expressed by Lex, I can understand why people are at this stage worrying about whether the balance that the regulators strike between the interests of the firms and those of the consumers of their products is right. We are pretty confident that it will be. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, pointed out that it is important that the regulators are rigorous and balance the interests of the firms and those of their consumers. The way in which the Bill is structured should enable them to do that and we are confident that they have that very much in mind.

Competitiveness has been debated previously and we have already agreed that we will look at this issue, particularly the degree to which the PRA and FCA should have regard to the importance of economic growth. We have said that we will return with further amendments in this area on Report, when we will no doubt have an extremely interesting debate on them. For today, however, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, will decide not to press his amendments.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Newby for that extensive and courteous response. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Flight, and the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, for their support. I can accept that this is a part of the Bill where the particular concerns that I have do not weigh as heavily as they did on the regulatory principles on page 28 of the Bill which we debated before we broke for the Summer Recess. I am happy to withdraw my amendment today, but I am not yet convinced that “reasonably and fairly” is not a useful addition in some part of the Bill even if it is not here. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 192A withdrawn.

Financial Services Bill

Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts Excerpts

Monday 15th October 2012 Lords Chamber

My request to the Minister is that any proposal for granting the powers should be subject to the same conditions and the same external approach as under the revised Banking Act regime. I suggest that this could include the requirement that provisions should be proportionate to the risks to market stability and be exercised only with the approval of the PRA, the FCA and HM Treasury. The reason for this is to ensure the famous level playing field for clearing houses. If additional powers and direction are the given to the Bank, under both the Financial Services and Markets Act and the Banking Act, it would seem to make sense to make them subject to the same conditions and to offer consistency across the legislation.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

Before the Minister replies, I add my request to him to explain the issue of the level playing field. We have a very complicated piece of legislation here. In Amendment 176D we are looking at an additional power to direct UK clearing houses, and in Amendment 193G there is an application to UK clearing houses. I would like the Minister’s reassurance that this is not going to lead to differential treatment, because it will be extremely confusing if that is the case, and that the basic conditions, as the noble Baroness said, are going to be the same and that we are not going to find ourselves at sixes and sevens because it depends on which part of the Banking Act or FiSMA is applicable in a particular case. I realise that this is a technical point, but it is important that we try to get as much clarity and as much of a level playing field as possible.

[Lord Barnett]

My Lords, I would like some clarification. New Clause 296A in Amendment 176D says that the Bank of England “may” direct, not “must”, even though it has regard to the public interest, while new Clause 296A(2) says that the direction “may” specify various things. The direction is then enforceable only on the application by the Bank by an injunction or by other complicated means. Why should it not be “must” if it is in the national public interest? I do not understand why the word “may” is there rather than “must”.

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[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, I rise to support the amendments of my noble friend. In Committee, I said I believe that the regulatory philosophy, culture and approach has shifted and that far from it being an attempt by both sides to achieve the best and right way forward it has become an entirely aggressive, uncontrolled approach by the regulator without any thought to the consequences of how his actions will impact on the firm in question or the City as a whole.

I have also spoken about the increasing use of Section 166; the way that the significant influence function committee has used its powers to damage people’s careers and leave them absolutely no redress at all. They are left in limbo. My noble friend says that people can go for judicial review, but if he believes an individual is going to take on a regulator in this way, he cannot be doing anything other than reading the Treasury briefing note. I cannot believe, with his experience of the City, that he really believes an individual is going to be able to take on an organisation like the FCA, or the FSA as it now is, with its limitless resources, limitless amount of time and limitless access to legal expertise. I believe my noble friend raises a very serious point.

I understand the argument about transparency and it is an attractive one but the fact of the matter is we may be having transparency about inaccurate or wrong information. That cannot be sensible. We owe it to all sides for transparency to be about things that are correct in every sense. When a regulator, with all its authority, is able to put out its view it means that the person about whom the allegations are made never has a chance to obtain proper redress. In the eyes of the public there is no smoke without fire, people will say there must be something or the regulator would not have put the information out there. Even if it is proven in the end to be absolutely wrong, and even if it has not gone bust in the meantime, the firm will be immensely damaged. People will say that there must have been a case to answer because such a great authority, which has all the power of the state behind it, would not put out a notice without a reason.

I really feel that we have to be much clearer about who makes the final call about whether to publish. Judging from the Bill, it seems to me that it is far too cosy and far too easy for the regulator to be making these decisions to publish. There are not nearly enough outside checks and balances to ensure that a proper assessment of the information and evidence is made available and assessed before a very precipitous, potentially exceptionally damaging disclosure is made. I hope the Minister will be able to go a long way to meet my noble friend’s amendments.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My Lords, the starting point for my intervention on this group of amendments is our belief that consumers will benefit from transparency, contrary to the suggestions made by the noble Lords, Lord Deben and Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts, to help them make—

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

I do not think my noble friend Lord Deben and I said that we were against transparency. We said—or, at least, I said and I think my noble friend Lord Deben said—that we wanted to make sure that what was made transparent was accurate. Inaccurate transparency does not help anyone.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

The assumption is—it has been said a number of times—“What if it is proved wrong?”. However, many, if not most, of these will be proved right, and that transparency surely will be of enormous benefit to consumers and investors in a way that I hope to demonstrate.

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[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, the noble Baroness’s amendment has much to commend it. I picked up two points in her comments. On the question of, to use her words, eroding confidence in the regulator, that confidence is already being eroded at present because of the way in which the regulator is behaving, and her proposal would go some way towards ensuring that that was put right. She and I can agree, because we have already agreed on the importance of transparency, that this would achieve not only transparency but, particularly, accurate transparency, and that someone would not be condemned without having had a proper chance to put their side of the case. Like my noble friend Lord Deben, I think that there are some tweaks to be made to the terms of office and so on, but as a concept this has much to commend it.

[Lord Flight]

My Lords, all that I was really calling for previously was for the RDC to be embodied in statute to provide this role. The amendment proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, offers something rather better because it is a duly organised and independent body that would provide the safeguard of justice. That, it seems to me, is what we all want.

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[Lord Peston]

My Lords, in supporting my noble friend’s amendment, I say that I am a strong supporter of the European Union, and that I hope one day to live in a country where the Government is also a strong supporter of our membership of the European Union—something that has not been the case for many years. I refer not just to the present Government but to the previous one. However, although I regard myself as a supporter of the European Union, I am well aware that often it drips into areas that are none of its business. When I first saw the amendment, I thought: what possible grounds are there for the European Union to consider supporting charities, let alone setting limits on how they can be supported? I assume that this is a probing amendment, although my noble friend has not told me so. Really the European Union has no business to be in this field; that is the message we would like to get over.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

My Lords, my Amendment 187CA in this group relates to another aspect of the operation of the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. The current wording by which the scheme operates gives it a lot of discretion in the way that the costs of the scheme are allocated. Section 213(5) of FiSMA states:

“In making any provision of the scheme … the Authority must take account of the desirability of ensuring that the amount of the levies imposed on a particular class of authorised persons reflects, so far as practicable, the amount of the claims made, or likely to be made, in respect of that class of person”.

There are two get-outs.

I make it clear that this is not about restricting the rights of consumers to obtain compensation. It is a critical and essential part of maintaining proper confidence in our financial system that there are proper and appropriate ways for people to claim and get compensation for mis-selling or other malfeasance. However, the amendment is about ensuring that the polluter pays. It has become more difficult in recent years to trace the allocations and levies made by the Financial Services Compensation Scheme to the particular class of persons and businesses to which they have been applied. Often, there appears to be a shifting of the pea around the plate, with a disproportionate share landing on those perhaps least able to complain. I hope that my noble friend will listen to the amendment with sympathy. The funding system must reflect the differences in risk and instability posed to the public and to the wider economy by firms and the financial products they offer.

I make it absolutely clear that my amendment does not enforce an unacceptable level of correlation. The words “as far as practicable” will remain, and will therefore provide the scheme with a degree of flexibility—a get-out, if you like. However, the additional words, “take account of the desirability of ensuring”, are too woolly. They lead to situations where people feel that the scheme is not operating fairly. Therefore, I would like to see those words replaced by the single word, “ensure”, as a means of ensuring that the Financial Services Compensation Scheme penalises the polluter and not the wider financial community.

[Lord Newby]

My Lords, Amendment 187AB, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, would require the Government to notify other EU member states that the limits on compensation payments to charities in the event of a loss of their bank deposits should be reviewed. The noble Lord, Lord Peston, asked what on earth this had to do with the EU. I suspect that he, like me, had not heard of the deposit guarantee scheme directive, which is an extremely valuable piece of legislation. It means that across the EU there is a maximum harmonised limit of compensation per depositor in the case of banks or other financial institutions going bust. It makes sure that across the EU there is a common framework for paying out when organisations get into financial difficulties.