Emergency Service Network Programme

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Monday 24th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Given the overspend, I do not know whether the noble Lord was the left hand or the right hand in the previous Government. But whichever he was, I declare an interest: I was the Police Minister in 2009-10, and this had not started then. The delay, obfuscation, overspend and costs happened entirely on the previous Government’s watch. However, let us put that to one side. The key thing is ensuring that our police forces, fire services and others have appropriate services. The Home Office will provide some masts because there are some security implications, which we need to examine and deliver on. I hope that I can reassure the noble Lord, and the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, that the Home Office will have a grip on this and will deliver, and that it has a three to five-year plan to get the basics in place, with a handover as soon as possible.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I refer to my policing interests as listed in the register. I am pleased that the Minister acknowledges the grotesque excess expenditure and delays that are clearly the fault of the previous Government. What consideration is being given to the resilience implications of the emergency services using a mobile phone network? At the moment, if the Airwave network goes down, the police and other emergency services can use mobile phones to communicate with each other. If something affects the mobile phone network, what will be plan B?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Plan B is part of plan A, which is also to provide the 292 4G mobile phone sites that the noble Lord mentioned in his question. We have picked this up. We have made a decision to terminate the previous contract; we had a court case to do that. We are now putting in place a revised contract—we have to exit the former contract—and resilience will be built in to make sure that this is the most important service that can be provided, because this is how police, fire and other emergency services communicate with each other in times of difficulty. It is an absolute priority for the Home Office to get this right, and I hope that we will do so in the course of the next few years.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 12th February 2025 Lords Chamber

Finally, the Minister said that he was accepting plugs, so I will make another—it is always a mistake to open a door—concerning the police counterterrorism security advisers, who are based not only in London but in our regional police counterterrorism units. The Minister mentioned that the Government will look at resourcing for local authorities, for example. I hope that he considers this idea. They are relatively few in number. We are talking about, potentially, 180,000 venues, and perhaps not all of them will need this, but there will be a significant start-up volume. Will he at least consider that group? It is part of police funding and is the forward-facing part of the group that the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, mentioned. This idea deserves consideration, at least.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I associate myself the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, about counterterrorism security advisers. They are part of this defence mechanism; they certainly need to be better resourced and could do a great deal as a consequence.

The points made by the noble Lord, Lord Udny-Lister, are extremely important and have great value; they reflect the comments that I made in my two reports on prevention of terrorism in London. A great deal can be done to design out different sorts of crime, or, as in this case, to make it more difficult for terrorists to act, or to make it easier to respond to a terrorist incident. I do not wish to prolong the discussion, because there is an issue as to whether this is the right legislation. Clearly, it needs to be considered in the context of the planning system, but I also take the point about that perhaps taking an inordinate amount of time, rather than trying to move this forward at this stage.

If I may inject a slightly partisan point at this stage, I do recall, at a lower level, the issues around designing out crime. At one stage, a whole series of recommendations were in the building regulations to make crime more difficult—for example, making it more difficult for burglars to kick in doors. The previous Government dismantled all that, which was extremely unfortunate.

[Viscount Brookeborough (CB)]

My Lords, I support this amendment. I wonder whether the Minister and the advisers have been to Northern Ireland, where, for a long time, buildings have been designed for the exact threats he is talking about. I am not sure of the system, but I do not think that those designs originated from planning control or building control; they were brought on by the organisations themselves in order to provide protection. There must be lessons to be learned there on how best to stop these sorts of attacks; after all, although I hesitate to say it, we were under them for 40 years.

On the subject of the various organisations, including the SIA, we can point people in the right direction and get advice to them, but resources will have to be put into the communications between people and those organisations. The advice may be there but currently, there is not the manpower to communicate to the extent that will ward off terrorist attacks.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 10th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has put forward an important group of amendments. When I think about this, I am guided by two principles. The first is that anything the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, says about terrorism is probably worth listening to extremely carefully.

Secondly, I strive to be consistent in your Lordships’ House. I appreciate that that is not something that all noble Lords, particularly some who were recently in government, have necessarily embraced, but I cannot forget the number of occasions in the last 14 years when I have trooped through the Lobbies against Henry VIII clauses—for all the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, highlighted. I look forward to my noble friend’s response on precisely that point of why Henry VIII clauses might be needed in this case. If he is not so minded, perhaps he might give us an indication of the alternative.

The other point—again, I hope it is consistent with what I have already said—is that I am aware that the Bill has been through a large amount of consultation in reaching this House. That consultation has led to a series of compromises. I said earlier that my preference would have been for the limits to be set at lower levels and for the provisions to kick in at venues of 100. It is the Government’s judgment, from listening to that consultation, that 200 is a better figure to go for. I would be uneasy if we were saying that these major provisions, having been through such extensive consultations, could be changed without a consultation process and certainly without a proper process of parliamentary endorsement.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I speak in support of Amendments 21 and 23 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. These amendments propose the removal of Clauses 5(4) to 5(6) and 6(4) to 6(6), which currently contain Henry VIII provisions granting Ministers the power to amend by regulation primary legislation relating to public protection procedures, including the ability to make them more onerous.

These are important amendments and I support them for several key reasons. First, they uphold parliamentary sovereignty and democratic accountability. The inclusion of Henry VIII clauses in the Bill would, in effect, bypass the scrutiny of Parliament by allowing Ministers to unilaterally change key aspects of public protection procedures. Such powers should be granted in only the most exceptional circumstances, where there is a clear and pressing need for flexibility.

In this case, however, the procedures in Clauses 5(3) and 6(3) have already been carefully considered and subject to full scrutiny, and will be endorsed by Parliament upon the Bill’s passage. It is therefore difficult to justify granting Ministers the ability to unpick these provisions without returning to Parliament for proper debate and approval.

Secondly, granting such sweeping powers undermines legal certainty. The security landscape is undoubtedly complex and may evolve over time, but that is precisely why legislation must provide a stable and predictable framework. If Ministers can alter public protection procedures by regulation, it will create uncertainty for the businesses, public authorities and other stakeholders that will implement these security measures. This uncertainty could hinder the very objective that the Bill seeks to achieve in enhancing public protection.

Furthermore, the inclusion of Henry VIII clauses risks undermining public trust. Effective public protection measures require the co-operation and confidence of the public and stakeholders alike. If these measures can be altered without consultation or parliamentary oversight through the proper primary legislation process, it may lead to perceptions of arbitrary governance and erode confidence in the fairness and transparency of security regulations.

I am not blind to the Government’s need for flexibility in responding to emerging security threats. However, existing mechanisms allow for swift and proportionate responses without the need for unchecked ministerial power. Maintaining proper parliamentary scrutiny is essential to preserving the legitimacy of any regulatory framework. The amendment strikes a necessary balance between security and democratic accountability. It ensures that any future changes to public protection procedures remain, as they should, subject to the robust oversight of Parliament. I urge the Government to accept this amendment and demonstrate their commitment to parliamentary sovereignty, legal certainty and public trust.

I will now speak to the important amendments to Clause 32 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. They address the regulatory powers granted to the Secretary of State regarding the thresholds for qualifying premises and events under the Bill. Amendment 38 seeks to require that any reduction in the thresholds for qualifying premises and events be justified by a change in the threat level from terrorism. While I appreciate and respect the intention behind this amendment, I must approach it with some caution. The need to ensure that security regulations are proportionate to the prevailing threat level is, of course, essential. However, linking regulatory changes exclusively to a shift in the formal threat assessment may create unnecessary rigidity.

Security risks are often multifaceted and not always captured by changes in official threat levels. Local intelligence, emerging patterns of behaviour or other factors may necessitate adjustments to security requirements even when the formal threat level remains static. For this reason, although I appreciate the noble Lord’s desire for transparency and justification, I am somewhat hesitant to fully support his amendment. None the less, I commend the focus it places on ensuring that regulatory changes are evidence based and justified.

I am more supportive of his approach in Amendment 39, which would require the Secretary of State to consult relevant stakeholders before making regulations under this section. This is a measured and sensible proposal that aligns with the principles of good governance. The wording, adapted from the Fire Safety Act 2021, provides a strong precedent for such consultation requirements.

Consultation is essential not only for ensuring that regulatory changes are practical and effective but for fostering buy-in from those directly affected by these measures. Venues, event organisers, local authorities and security experts are on the front lines of implementing public protection measures. Their insights and experiences are invaluable in shaping regulations that are both proportionate and workable. Moreover, consultation promotes transparency and accountability, helping to build public trust in the regulatory framework. In a democracy, it is only right that those affected by significant changes to security requirements have the opportunity to contribute their views and understand the rationale behind decisions.

In conclusion, while I take a cautious approach to Amendment 38, Amendment 39 takes a better approach. I urge the Government to look at this proposal as a possible safeguard for ensuring that regulations are both effective and democratically accountable.

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[Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Murray, has been very careful in the drafting of this amendment and I respect the work he has done, although, like the noble Baroness, I do not agree with the amendment. It seems to undermine the fundamental purpose of the Bill, which is to place responsibility on those people who control premises. To create a box-ticking exercise of this kind, which is what it would amount to, would simply facilitate the payment of an annual subscription and leave it to some other company to take that responsibility.

The noble Lord will be aware, I am sure, that, when somebody employs an independent contractor to carry out part of the work they are contracted to do—for example, a floor layer to do part of a construction contract—the person who engages that independent contractor has at least a common-law responsibility to ensure that they take reasonable steps to ensure that the independent contractor is competent and does the work properly. This amendment would appear to remove that potential responsibility. All of us who have been involved in cases involving questioning the work of independent contractors will know that sometimes such claims can be successful because the employer has not carried out proper scrutiny of the independent contractor.

I also draw to the House’s attention paragraph 8.106 of Manchester Arena Inquiry Volume 1: Security for the Arena. Sir John Saunders recommended that

“consideration is given to amending the SIA legislation to require that companies which carry out security work which may include a counter terrorism element are required to be licensed”.

He recommended, therefore,

“that only fit and proper companies carry out this work”,

under an amended SIA licensing procedure similar to the procedure that the SIA already operates for security companies carrying out door security work and similar activities. If the aim of the Bill is, as I believe, to place clear responsibility on those who operate property to take reasonable steps to secure the public against terrorist acts, that responsibility should not be shuffled aside by an amendment of this kind.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I think I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. I am slightly concerned about this amendment. We have had, in previous stages of the Bill and in previous debates in Committee, concerns about the number of private contractors—the snake oil salesmen whom the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, talked about—who will crawl out of the woodwork and offer advice to people that they do not need, because either it will be common sense or there will be perfectly clear guidance issued by the Home Office and the Security Industry Authority that will make clear the sorts of things they need to do.

I am worried that, after all the discussion we have heard from His Majesty’s Opposition in Committee about the costs and burdens that will be placed on village halls, small enterprises and so on, they will now be encouraged by this amendment to go down the route of employing contractors who will seek to make a profit out of the arrangements, which will in fact add to the costs, when the reality is that they could do this themselves using the advice and guidance that we expect will be provided by the Security Industry Authority.

I am reminded of those companies that used to advertise themselves as being able to secure you a European health insurance card. I am not trying to raise any issue about the EU, Brexit or remain. This was, as noble Lords know, a system whereby all you had to do was put into the Department of Health’s website your name, address and national insurance number and you then got your European health insurance card, which would help defray the costs of falling ill within the EU. There were companies that would charge £15, £20 or more, simply for filling in the details you would provide them. I wonder whether the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Murray, might inadvertently create a market in which companies would recycle the guidance and advice issued by the Security Industry Authority and charge people for it.

[Lord Elliott of Ballinamallard (UUP)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly. I have listened to this amendment with some interest, and I understand the noble Lord’s reasoning for tabling it—sometimes such things require expertise. But I do not accept taking it away from public finances into the private sector, because the private sector will probably be financially burdened enough by this legislation.

My concern is that it might provide the opposite of the noble Lord’s intended idea. It might be very costly, as has been outlined, and you might not get the expert advice you need. But I do not disagree with the principle of allowing outside advice. That could be done through a training system for each individual company rather than being provided by an independent company. If there was a terrorist incident, one of the first things that might be asked is “What advice and what training did you take in respect of securing your premises and ensuring public safety?” So I understand the basis of the amendment, but I am not so sure that it is entirely there.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

Having heard the opening speech from the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, the one thing that seems clear to me is that there will be different bodies out there with different responsibilities and we will have the SIA coming in. It is important that, before Report, it is clear who will sit at the top and have the last word, because there may be competing interests from different authorities. I do not know what all the details are, but the noble Baroness has set this out. If it is to be the SIA, so be it, but there may be other bodies which know much more about important matters. There needs to be thought within government about how that is to be addressed with specialist knowledge and so on.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, there is enormous advantage in the various regulatory frameworks being consistent. That is a very basic principle. If you are looking for a holistic approach to protective security—which is what this Bill is about—there is the element of personal responsibility involved in making sure that sensible precautions are taken at a local level, but there will also be responsibilities on licensing authorities. It is my view that the various licensing authorities should proactively put in proportionate requirements for the various organisations concerned. In many cases they do that already, but I am not sure that it is a consistent process because each licensing authority is technically separate. While I am not sure that it is in the scope of this Bill to try to regularise the position of different licensing authorities, a holistic approach to protective security would ensure that licensing authorities behave in a consistent fashion.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, has hit on a good point, particularly when you consider that at least four bodies would have a view about evacuation—the Health and Safety Executive, licensing authorities, the SIA and the fire regulators. Each has its own inspection regime, which means that there could be four inspections in one year about the same event. They would all want to make sure that this does not cause more cost but does cause more effectiveness. Whether it is in the Bill or something to reassure the people operating these premises, I think it worth considering at this stage. Nobody is saying that it should not happen, but it is about how it works together. This would be one more body in a similar area if we considered evacuation only, but I suspect that there are other overlapping areas.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 10th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I am very keen on Amendment 33 although I have not put my name to it—it is in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Sandhurst. It suggests an advisory board for the SIA with the intention of ensuring a collaborative approach to regulation.

I am keen on the amendment because one of my fears about the Bill is that it could be one of those laws that, in effect, means the state abdicating responsibility for public protection and outsourcing it to businesses and community organisations with very much a “You’re responsible for that” attitude, and it is then policed by the regulator. As I have mentioned on a number of occasions, I am worried about the damage that might do to civil society.

I really like the idea of addressing some of the issues raised earlier by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, about how we ensure that there is a more collaborative approach. I would like civil society not to feel that it is being done to, dumped on or put in charge of public protection on its own. This strikes me as a good way of approaching that.

I put my name down specifically on Amendment 34 because one of the important things about it is a review that considers all the implications of the Bill some way down the line. We need to be able to consider trade-offs all the time. It is wrong to suggest, as I think was suggested in a debate on an earlier group by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, that those of us who were trying to consider cost-benefit analysis and trade-offs were being somehow glib about the possibility of people being killed in a terrorist bomb and that we somehow have a “higher-risk appetite”—the phrase used—or a higher threshold for risk-taking, whereas the important and responsible thing to do would be to ensure that we always considered safety first.

I think we have to acknowledge—

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

I think the noble Baroness is misinterpreting what I said. I said that in making these judgments, you had to have a risk appetite and that you needed to do that explicitly. I was not saying that any particular risk appetite was right or wrong; I was saying it should be made explicit. I certainly was not suggesting that the noble Baroness was therefore glib about people being killed. I was merely saying that that is the trade-off, and anyone making those decisions has to be clear about the trade-off they are making.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I thank the noble Lord for that clarification and I am relieved to hear it. I think it was the bit where somebody asked, “How would you answer the situation where 199 people were killed if the limit was 200?” All I am saying is there is often a conversation like this when we talk about safety, risk and responsibility.

I like this amendment because it introduces into the debate about the Bill the opportunity—some months down the line—to have a cost-benefit analysis of whether it has worked. I first came into this House at the height of the lockdown period. On a number of occasions—rather tentatively at the time, because I was new—I, along with others, called for a cost-benefit analysis. I kept asking, with lockdown and all those measures in the name of safety, whether we could just assess whether they were the only way that we should proceed. I was told that we had to be very careful because old people were going to die, and so on and so forth—you are familiar with the arguments.

The reason I mention that is that we can now look back and say that many of those old people were locked up in care homes and greatly suffered. We can say about young people—when some of us argued that we should conduct a cost-benefit analysis of closing schools—that we now have a crisis of worrying about pupils and the impact that lockdown had on them. There is a discussion that the Government are initiating about the cost and impact of lockdown on employment people’s habits as we speak.

It is sensible with a Bill such as this to introduce a review that will give us the opportunity to do a cost-benefit analysis. This is particularly important because a regulator is introduced. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, explained that we need to be able to see whether the regulator is the appropriate way of getting what we would like, which is more public protection, or whether, in fact, it undermines some of the important aspects of local regulatory interventions.

We debated a very interesting group just before the break, when the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, raised the point about the number of regulatory regimes that each venue already apparently has to adhere to in terms of licensing, and so on. This amendment gives us an opportunity to see whether the central regulator is the appropriate way of ensuring that we keep people safe with respect to premises and terrorism.

--- Later in debate ---

On Amendment 36, on taking into account the views of the local authority in determining the amount of a penalty, I am unclear what the local authority would add: the history of an organisation’s compliance with licensing, perhaps? The clause in the Bill allows matters that are considered relevant to be considered. So I am not sure where Amendment 36, with its proposed new paragraph (d) in Clause 20(2), is heading. I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, if I have should have heard that from him: I am afraid that I did not.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, who, on the first day of Committee, suggested that we ought to have subheadings for groups of amendments to tell us what they were generally about. This may or may not be an issue worth pursuing. If we had a subheading for this particular group of amendments, it would be “The quango-fication of Martyn’s law”, because we are talking about two not-quite-superfluous extra bodies that would be created as a result of these amendments.

Normally, the position of His Majesty’s Opposition would be to say that we had too many quangos and public bodies being set up, rather than to suggest some entirely gratuitous ones. For example, Amendment 33, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, talks about an advisory board which shall “guide” the implementation and enforcement of the Act. Now it is a strange advisory board that “guides”. This again raises questions about the organisational structure of the Security Industry Authority, its governance structure and its relationship with the Home Office. It seems an unnecessary requirement. If it wants to take advice or consult widely with different sections of communities or organisations affected, that is something it can do. The same applies to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Frost, which talks about setting up a review panel to monitor the Security Industry Authority. What, then, is the purpose of the Home Office?

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I agree. I am surprised that the Opposition suggested more bureaucracy. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, was right about the advisory board: if it is a good idea, and it could be, it is for the SIA to decide. Otherwise, if it were a separate body, there would be even more cost.

I have agreed with the noble Lord, Lord Frost, on many things about Europe, but I am afraid that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, was entirely right: you cannot say that it is bureaucracy in that context but not in this, because it is. It would confuse rather than clarify. Surely the purpose of the SIA board is to do the very thing that he described under the supervision of the Home Office. If it gets it wrong, I presume there would be a change in the legislation. He made a stronger argument for more clarity in the law and that it was the wrong solution for a problem that may materialise.

Finally, this reminded me that, post 9/11, the Americans concluded they had too many intelligence agencies. I think they had 19 at the time, and the result was that they were not communicating. Their solution was to put things called fusion centres outside the major cities—big warehouse buildings in which all these bodies would work together. Instead of reducing the number of intelligence agencies or finding a better solution, they built a place where they could meet better. I did not see the sense in that, so I cannot agree with either of these amendments.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 5th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak in support of my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower’s amendments in this group, specifically Amendments 21A and 23A, and I hope to do so very briefly. It strikes me that Amendment 21A is a crucial brake, as it were, on the power of the Executive. It introduces a test of reasonable proportionality to the creation by the Secretary of State of further procedures by regulation.

I know that there are some later amendments by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and others on the totality of the Henry VIII clauses in this clause and ensuing clauses. But, in the event that these specific provisions, namely subsections (4) and (5), remain in the Bill, Amendment 21A represents a crucial limit on the powers of the Government. In the age-old phrasing relating to proportionality, it is important not to use a sledgehammer to crack a nut. Insisting that “further procedures” meet an additional test of being reasonably proportionate imposes on the Secretary of State a duty to consider the question of proportionality in a measured and proper way.

Finally, Amendment 23A, as others have said, would provide an express and definitive timeframe for ensuring documentary compliance. The legislation would thus avoid uncertainty and vagueness by creating a specific time period. That strikes me as being in the interests of the person responsible for the enhanced duty premises or qualifying event and in the interests of the SIA. In short, everyone would know where they stand, and I suggest that that kind of awareness is to be commended. I look forward to hearing the Government’s clarification of all the points made.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I listened carefully to the speeches which have been made. The noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, talked about sledgehammers cracking nuts; I slightly wonder whether that is what the amendments in this group would have the effect of doing. It is clear that for the qualifying premises—let us separate out the enhanced duty ones for a moment—what is being talked about is taking reasonably practical measures, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, and that there should be appropriate public protection.

When I listened to the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, I thought that it sounded as if, as an event organiser, he is already exemplary because he has thought about these things. I am sure that he has briefed the volunteers and the people around him about this. I slightly wonder why people have got so worked up about what the consequences and implications of all of this are.

If people want to know why there is this question of whether you invacuate or evacuate—whether you lock the doors or whatever—I am very taken by the accounts I heard of the Borough Market incidents. There were decisions which had to be made instantly as to whether to shut and barricade the doors or bring people in from outside. That assessment is going to be made on the spot, in an instant, but it is much better if the event organisers or the premises organisers have spent a bit of time thinking about it in advance, as clearly the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, has done, briefing each other and considering the various “What ifs?”. There is no right or wrong answer in those cases; you have to make the best assessment, but you will always make a better one if you have thought about it in advance, worked out what the choices are and what drives them.

My other point is about Amendment 22 and the waiving of public protection procedures. This sounds like the sledgehammer to crack a nut, as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron. A bureaucratic process will be set up whereby an events organiser or a premises organiser will make an application for a waiver to a public body, no doubt filling in lots of forms. Frankly, would it not be quicker just to do what the Bill asks: to make appropriate, reasonable arrangements? That is surely what is there and, if they are appropriate and reasonable, then the organisers will not have problems as a result of this Bill.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lords who have tabled these amendments because, self-evidently, they have generated a discussion on some important points. That is extremely valuable, not just as clarification today but for those who ultimately, should this Bill become an Act, have to implement it downstream, so I am grateful to noble Lords for them. If I may, I will try to deal with the amendments in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Sandhurst, first and then return to that of the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, as a separate series in due course.

Amendment 20A from the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Sandhurst, concerns the procedure under Clause 5 for preventing individuals entering or leaving premises or events. Clause 5 sets out some types of procedure, four in total, of which lockdown procedures may be used to reduce the risk of harm by moving people away from danger. I think the proposals in the legislation are dependent on the premises or event. They would potentially include locking doors, closing shutters or, in some cases, moving people to a safer part of the premise.

The noble Lord highlighted some examples in his contribution. If an armed attacker were outside a theatre, leaving doors open or unlocked would risk the attacker entering the premises. There could be a plan whereby, at certain events, a lockdown procedure would have to be activated to secure the auditorium against entry, such as locking the doors until the police arrive or securing the scene, which may reduce harm to staff and the audience. It might be a procedure relating to particular circumstance. It will vary according to the type of situation or attack.

In some cases—as my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey mentioned, this happened in the event at Borough Market—a lockdown might help to save lives. In other cases, it might be more appropriate for people to flee. Statutory guidance will be published by the Home Office/SIA in due course to illustrate the Bill’s provisions, including on public protection measures. During the London Bridge attack—the noble Lord said that he wanted the Minister to give examples—some premises successfully executed a lockdown procedure and, in doing so, saved lives. That is really important to remember.

We are not being prescriptive. Going back to what my noble friend Lord Harris said, the public protection procedures in Clause 5(3)(a), (b), (c) and (d) set down the type of things that organisations and the responsible person need to think about and prepare for as part of a plan. With all due respect to the noble Lord, the changes he is proposing are not necessary because the Government consider that the requirements of the clause are appropriate as drafted. Again—we will come on to this issue in a moment, with other amendments in the name of the noble Lord—we are trying to be proportionate and reasonable.

On Amendment 21A, I suggest to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that proportionality is at the heart of the Bill as a whole. It is important to remind the Committee that this Bill has been through several iterations. It has been through consultation, drafting, a Home Affairs Select Committee, previous Government engagement and the engagement of this Government. Out of that, we want to get proportionate measures that ensure that in-scope premises and events take proportionate and appropriate steps.

It is about being reasonably prepared and prepared for risk—straying into what the Lord, Lord De Mauley, said—whatever the size or location of a premises. He is right that the majority of these attacks have taken place in urban areas at large venues, or in urban tarmacked areas. That is not to say that it will not happen elsewhere, that a terrorist group will not pick a farm event, a small village hall or another similar event.

That is why not just this Government, but the Government he supported, put in place the measures before us today. It is why the Bill went through a public inquiry, emerging from the recommendations of Sir John Saunders. It is why it went through the draft legislation process, and why the Commons Home Affairs Committee supported it on a cross-party basis, even though the majority of its members were from His Majesty’s Opposition. We are trying to be proportionate and reasonable, and the public protection procedures in Clause 5 are an important element of the Bill’s effectiveness and power.

I hope that assuages the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel. Again, we are trying to do something that is proportionate, achievable and relatively cost-effective. I have mentioned elsewhere the cost of the potential measures. We have estimated it at around £330 per year for the lower tier. That is not in terms of cash being paid out to anybody; that is our assessment of the potential costs that can be incurred. It is about good practice, good training, good support, making sure that we have evacuation and invacuation procedures, looking at the exits and entrances and what would happen, and making those assessments, while making sure that the responsible person knows what they are.

The Secretary of State could add further procedures if they consider that necessary, but I am straying into later amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich. I have some sympathy with those, and I hope that when we reach them—probably now on Monday—I will be able to give some comfort to the noble Lords, Lord Cameron and Lord Anderson, about the use of Henry VIII powers. However, we will deliver that at a slightly later date in the consideration of the Bill. Whatever happens, if there were any changes under the current proposals, they would be subject to the affirmative procedure, so this House and the House of Commons would have an opportunity to support or reject any changes brought forward by the Government as a whole.

On Amendment 23A, from the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Sandhurst, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, again gave a reasonable level of support to the idea of a timeframe for any duty and consideration being put in place. Clause 7 places the legislative requirement on those responsible for enhanced duty premises and events to prepare and maintain a document that records important elements of their compliance. That is a valuable document that will help the regulator consider compliance. It should be provided to the Secretary of State via the Security Industry Authority as soon as is reasonably practical. This will enable the SIA to make an initial evaluation of the premises’ or event’s security approach and engage in meaningful discussion or engagement about any potential inspection.

There is no single standard type of premises or event. Some will have long-established premises with little change needed and some will have to make changes accordingly. To ensure that regulatory provisions work as effectively as possible for all, the document should be sent to the SIA at an early stage. However, at the moment, by providing a maximum timeframe of six months, the amendment may result in either inaccurate documents or material that is out of date being sent. It could hinder regulatory activity and it could hinder the provision of advice and help to strengthen the venues’ practices. But I have noted what the noble Lord said and what the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said in support. Although I do not wish to accept the amendment today, those points have been put on the record and we will obviously examine them in due course.

I turn to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley. I genuinely understand his motivation to ensure that the Bill does not render it difficult to put on many events that are valuable for cultural, social, tourist and business purposes. I accept and understand that objective. The Bill as drafted has caused concerns that he has put on the record—which, again, I will examine because of his timeframe, and if he writes to me I will examine those concerns as well—that are founded on his belief that this will be damaging. But, in my view, the Bill sets down the issue that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey mentioned: procedures for public protection in place so far as is reasonably practical. In determining what is reasonably practicable, the responsible person—which may in this case indeed be him—will take into account their operating context and the particular circumstances of the premises or event. They will consider the appropriate procedures in the light of the cost and resources. That is the assurance I give him.

What we are asking for in the Bill, under the various clauses before us, is that he thinks, as I think he has tonight, about the consequences and about whether there is a threat; that he makes that assessment; that he makes the provisions; that he—or she—looks at whether those areas need to have that plan; that he makes sure that the volunteers in an organisation know about that plan; and that he makes sure, potentially, that the paid professionals he or she is dealing with look at and understand that plan. Accordingly, no procedure is required to be put in place at unreasonable cost to the responsible person, and in the measures in the clauses that he mentioned and expressed concern about, such as public protection measures, he will note that there is no mandating of those public protection measures or mention of scanners or other material. There is simply an assessment for the responsible person to organise accordingly.

The first condition in the noble Lord’s amendment for the grant of a waiver is therefore unnecessary. Furthermore, it is anticipated that developing and implementing these procedures should be simple, for cost and staff time. Some of the actions required as part of the procedure could be as simple as locking doors, closing shutters and identifying a safe route to cover. Some of the areas that he has mentioned, such as open-air events, will qualify under the Bill only if they have the requirements in earlier clauses—a building, or a paid entry or exit or ticketing system. Again, I accept that some of the events that he referred to in his contribution may have that, but the whole purpose of the Government’s proposals—which I remind him was shared by the previous Government in broad terms—is to provide good practice, a framework and a consideration for somebody responsible to think of a plan in the event of a terrorist attack.

I assure the noble Lord that this is not about preventing a terrorist attack. That is the job of the police, to whom I pay tribute, the Security Service, to which I pay tribute, and the myriad organisations trying to make sure that we stop bad people doing bad things before they ever get to the stage of doing them. But, sadly, he will know that the risk is always there. The security services try to do this every day of the week, but there may be occasions when something difficult and challenging happens, and this Bill is about what happens when that begins. It is about mitigating the risk, having that plan and proposals in place, and having those public protection measures to stop an attack and reduce the vulnerability in that place.

I genuinely understand the noble Lord’s intention and I look forward to receiving his letter and giving him a full response to it. I hope that I can assure him that the Government’s objective is to put good practice in place at minimal cost and ensure that those people who have a responsibility for an event transmit the evacuation protection plans to those who can impact those plans in the event of that split-second moment, as my noble friend Lord Harris of Haringey said, when a daily event of enjoyment, pleasure and fun suddenly sees, in its immediate effect, a terrorist attack under way. We are trying to ensure that the split-second decisions that saved lives in Borough Market are thought about beforehand to save lives in the event of an attack.

I would love to assure the noble Lord, Lord De Mauley, that no attack would ever take place at the Caerwys Agricultural Show in my former constituency, for example, or at a scout gathering somewhere else, but I cannot. We will stop it upstream when we can but, in the event of an attack happening, we are asking whether the people on the ground know what to do. That is what the Bill is about, and that is why I urge him to write to me and not to press his amendments this evening, as, indeed, I urge the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Sandhurst. Their points are well made and they will continue to be considered, not just during the passage of the Bill but, crucially, when Royal Assent is achieved. The two-year period that we have to implement the Bill is the time when the guidance and discussion that the noble Lord seeks will be part of the consideration of this, I hope, successful and productive legislation.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 3rd February 2025 Lords Chamber

A purpose clause will focus the mind of the Secretary of State to ensure that the regulations made and the activities of the regulator, whoever that may turn out to be, are truly relevant to the purposes of this legislation, namely: to protect against an attack, where practicable, and ensure that proper measures are in place in the event of an attack. However, they must be realistic and proportionate. We cannot make this a perfect world, and I have lived in London and worked here since 1971.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I have to admit to being unclear, after what I hope will be a short debate of 20 minutes, as to what exactly this amendment is for. It may be that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, wanted a mini-Second Reading debate, because that is what we have had. I remind him, and noble Lords who have spoken, that this is Committee and not Second Reading. The arguments should therefore be addressed to the amendment concerned.

I am also unclear, when I look at Amendment 1, what it actually adds. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, said that the Long Title of the Bill really spells it out. If that is too much for anybody who is unclear what the Bill is about, simply look at its title: “Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill”. Does that not really rather sum it up? Why do we need this clarificatory line to say:

“The purpose of this Act is to protect premises from terrorism”?


You just have to read the title of the Bill; it says that already.

Noble Lords have talked about mission creep and the problems of defining terrorism. Can I just make one point quite clear? If, as a citizen, you become involved in an act of violence, you are not going to worry about whether the individual concerned meets a particular category of terrorism. What you want is immediate action and somebody coming to protect you. The Bill is about trying to prevent that initial act of violence. This amendment adds nothing and is pointless. The noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, whom I respect on so many issues, said that the Opposition’s purpose is to get the Bill implemented as soon as possible. I suggest that introducing amendments like this will not add to that cause.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, made one point with which I agree. It is that there is a need for focus. Unfortunately, this amendment is not focused. He talks of the threat of terrorism: the Long Title and the text use the term “acts of terrorism”, and that is where the focus needs to be.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sandhurst (Con)]

My Lords, whichever way we look at this, I suggest that it is absolutely plain that we need a clear definition of “building”. A number of good points have been made. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew, made a good suggestion. The amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is also a good one. There is merit also in taking at least part of the Building Act, but “building” needs to be defined. Thus, I think it must be clear, when one considers it, that Section 121(2) of the Building Act is not completely apposite, because it does include the words,

“a vehicle, vessel, hovercraft, aircraft”.

One could include the definition there but exclude expressly those words or any other bits. One could do it by reference to the Building Safety Act, or it may be that the best route is to go to the definitions section at the back, look at the two existing statutes that are in place and take a good definition combining those where appropriate. I suggest that we certainly need a proper definition of “building” at the back, which must include demountable, collapsible buildings—things that very often look almost like a tent. Are large tents to be included, or a circus site event which could hold 500 people? If we are going to protect people, let us get it right.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I think the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, has put his finger on it. It seems to me that, if it is a large tent and 500 people are gathered within it, then somebody ought to be making arrangements to ensure that people are protected. That is what the Bill is about. I have listened with great fascination to the discussion about where we draw the definition of “building”. I always tend, because I am prejudiced that way, that when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, gives us a view on definitions, we should take serious note of that, because in my experience he is usually right. I leave it to the Government to come forward with what they think is a satisfactory definition that embraces what we need.

Ultimately, what we are trying to say with this legislation is that people who organise public events, whether they are formal events, community events, concerts or whatever else, should be thinking in advance, “Is this going to be secure?” That also means thinking about what I will do if somebody over there commits a terrorist act that has an implication for the people who are gathered in my event. I hope that my noble friend, when he replies, will say that the Government will look again, will gather together all those with strong views on the definition of “building”, temporary or otherwise, tents or not, and work out what works best. I think that our objective here is quite clear: that people should have a responsibility for the protection of people when they have gathered them together for whatever purpose.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 20. First, I say in passing, on the concern of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, about the scope of the Bill, that terrorism is very well legally defined. It is either violence or the threat of violence for a political purpose. How that is interpreted depends on the political purpose and the act. It is a broad definition, and some may wish to change it, but it is well understood within the criminal law.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Brookeborough (CB)]

My Lords, I too recognise that inevitably we have got to fix a figure, and that is for this House and/or another place to do. I would just like to say one thing about Amendment 8, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Murray, where he says,

“if smaller, the Secretary of State determines”.

One has to see the reality of that, which is that this would probably happen anyway—although I support his amendment—to the extent that how or why would the Secretary of State intervene? He would intervene only because of intelligence.

We have to remember that it is not just what we all think in here. Our intelligence services have kept us safe—touch wood—we are told from many planned incidents over the last few years. Therefore, regardless of the number being six or 800, we rely on them to come through and tell us where the threat is. We have been talking about whether it is a small premises that is attractive to terrorists or a large one, or whether it is a significant name of an event or whether it is the people attending. They will go first to find a target that will gain them the maximum amount of attention. They then say, according to what happened with us and I am sorry to go back to it, “Which one is easy for us to go for?”.

We cannot decide that in here. But we must put the numbers down. I agree with Amendment 8 from the point of view that it recognises that the Secretary of State must have the power to intervene on any event, and not just necessarily the Secretary of State but the police and the intelligence that leads to some form of action on it. So I do support the amendment.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I am pleased that we are having this debate. I am not going to decry the three previous groups, but this actually comes to the nub of what I suspect what this Committee stage will be about.

I listened very carefully to what the noble Viscount just said. I have to say that it is quite possible that, under any set of circumstances, the police or the security service will have identified a high risk. Under those circumstances, I hope they would intervene and I hope the organisers would take it extremely seriously and respond—and actually, I suspect that in every single case they would. But the fundamental issue, which is raised by this set of amendments, is not what is the burden of this but what is the risk appetite that the people who are organising this event, and that we as a nation have, about the event concerned?

Every organisation, when it considers its risk register, will consider its risk appetite: what are we prepared or not prepared to tolerate? This figure is, of course, arbitrary. It could be 100; my personal belief is that it should have remained as 100, but the Government consulted very widely, listened to the views that were expressed and came up with this number. So we are presented with 200. A terrorist attacking a premises of 199 is potentially going to kill a very significant number—as many as were killed at the Manchester Arena. They may not be able to injure quite as many as at the Manchester Arena, but they could cause immense damage.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

What is the noble Lord’s risk appetite for closures of community venues and village halls as a consequence of these provisions if the threshold is set too low?

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

That is what it means to consider your risk appetite: you consider the risk of something dreadful happening and the risk and the consequences associated with trying to address it. That is the choice we must make. I suspect that ultimately we are going to disagree on this. My risk appetite, because I do not really like being killed in the name of some terrorist or other ideology, is that I would prefer the number to be smaller; I would prefer it to be 100. I accept that some noble Lords opposite would rather see the figure set higher. We have a different view of the risk appetite.

My answer to all these amendments is that the Government have consulted widely and responded to that consultation. They have increased the number from 100 to 200. Personally, I am prepared to accept the risk judgment made by Government Ministers on that basis. That is the way in which we should approach it. We will all have different numbers in mind and different views of risk appetite, but ultimately we expect our Government to take a sensible, balanced risk appetite, and I believe that this is it.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 7th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as chair of the National Preparedness Commission.

I will also start by paying tribute to Figen Murray: tempered by her own experience of the tragedy of the Manchester Arena terrorist attack, her work promoting the principles behind the Bill has been nothing short of extraordinary. Not only has she campaigned, but she has researched the subject and was awarded an MSc by the University of Central Lancashire in 2021. Her thesis, which I have read—particularly as I am quoted in it—argues that legislation needs to be part of a wider initiative to inform the public, so that people can be empowered to be more vigilant and more conscious of their personal safety. A legislative framework and public awareness not only have to go hand in hand but are mutually reinforcing.

In 2016, Mayor Sadiq Khan—I congratulate him on his knighthood in the New Year Honours List—asked me to report on London’s preparedness to respond to a major terrorist incident. One of my recommendations, published six months before the Manchester Arena attack, was that, as a condition of licensing, venues should have to be reviewed by a police counterterrorism security adviser and to have taken the necessary action as a result of that review.

The point of this, which is implicit in the Bill before your Lordships’ House, is that there cannot be a one-size-fits-all approach. Each venue is different and faces a different type of threat, but the principle of carrying out a basic assessment of the risk and taking sensible, proportionate security measures is simple, straightforward and should be unavoidable.

Concert halls, theatres and other venues must, by law, take fire precautions as well as meeting other regulatory requirements. It seems extraordinary, therefore, that, until the Bill passes, there is no requirement on them to take advice on reducing the risk of a terrorist attack and to take sensible precautions. In some instances, bag checks may be enough; in others, they may want to look at other measures. In extreme cases, metal detectors or knife arches may be more appropriate for the largest of venues. Similar rules should also apply to sports stadia, large shops and shopping malls.

This principle was accepted by the previous Government. The 2019 Conservative manifesto said:

“In the wake of the terrible events in Manchester in 2017, we will improve the safety and security of public venues”.


Last year’s manifesto was even more explicit:

“We will urgently introduce Martyn’s Law … This will ensure premises are better prepared for terrorist attacks by requiring them to take proportionate steps to mitigate risks”.


Thus, there is wide political consensus about this measure and, after the delays of the last few years, I am pleased that this new Government are at last taking action.

Let us be clear: terrorism has not gone away. Only last week, we saw the car ramming in New Orleans. Ken McCallum—also knighted in the New Year Honours List, and whom I also congratulate—warned in October that:

“Since March 2017, MI5 and the police have together disrupted 43 late-stage attack plots”.


“Some of those … were … in the final days of planning mass murder”,


at the point when the intervention took place.

The nature of the terrorist threat has changed. It no longer necessarily comes from organised groups. In my second report for the Mayor of London, completed three years ago, I warned that attacks are increasingly committed by individuals who operate alone, frequently self-radicalising and learning techniques online. Attacks of this nature are inevitably harder to detect and prevent in advance. They may also be opportunistic and mean that the range and nature of potential targets have widened to include far more venues that previously would not have been considered under any circumstances.

What is more, while the majority of those planning attacks would appear to be Islamist extremists, an increasing proportion are domestic and extreme right-wing. As Ken McCallum said, MI5 and the police are increasingly encountering would-be terrorists who are more volatile and with only a tenuous grasp of the ideologies they profess to follow, and it is becoming harder these days to determine whether a particular act or planned act of violence is ideologically motivated or driven by another factor such as mental health. It does not really matter what the ideation or motivation is: the effects are the same, and the needs for the sensible precautions being included in this Bill remain under all those circumstances, irrespective of whether it is traditional terrorism or something else.

Of course, as I warned three years ago, in online spaces, extremism is increasingly prevalent and, more worrying still, has become almost normalised; this point has just been made by the right reverend Prelate. This spills over into greater polarisation in the real world, which, in turn, can and does lead to violence. That is the context of modern terrorism, and that is why anyone can be a target. The first volume of the Manchester Arena inquiry reported:

“None of those directly concerned with security at the Arena … considered it a realistic possibility that a terrorist attack would happen there”.


Yet, as we know, it did, and 22 people were killed and 1,017 injured. That is why this Bill is needed.

Nowadays, it is taken as a given that the places we visit abide by health and safety regulations and will take appropriate fire precautions. It is surely not unreasonable to expect them also to take appropriate and proportionate protection measures against terrorist violence. Now, of course, better security checks and a Protect duty will not prevent terrorism, but they make soft targets harder. Where many people congregate together, they have a right to expect that the appropriate and proportionate measures to protect them will have been taken. The aim should be that all venues have their own Protect plan and, in the event of an incident, be geared up to guide and shelter those who visit. At the very least, those responsible should have considered the implications—how to evacuate, how to invacuate, what doors should be locked, and so on—and that this has been conveyed to those working in the location concerned. It is much better to have thought about it, even just a little bit, before an event happens than to be doing so in the heat of an attack.

The principle has to apply to other sectors as well. In the past, most places of worship—again, the right reverend Prelate has talked about this—have often seemed to operate on the basis that an attack would not happen to them because of their innate goodness, but they, too, need to plan and take sensible precautions. They have been the subject of attacks in Europe and elsewhere. Of course, it is difficult: places of worship are intended to be open places of sanctuary and peace, but that does not mean that they cannot be targets, and sensible and proportionate measures should be taken there too.

In my 2016 review, I made a series of recommendations on strengthening the Protect responsibilities, which I think remain valid today, including that the Home Office will need to provide more funding for CT security advisers around the country; that counterterrorism advice should automatically be taken by those applying for venue and event licences; that there should be short- form advice on CT matters for small and micro businesses rolled out using local authority and neighbourhood policing networks, so that everyone has access to that sort of sensible advice; that owners and operators of shopping centres and other large venues should ensure that Project Griffin training is being given at regular enough intervals to deal with the high staff turnover that those businesses and organisations experience; and that there should be specific training for other sectors.

I also suggested that the Department for Education should build on the model of having a designated governor responsible for safeguarding, to ensure that each school appoints a governor responsible for ensuring security and preparedness against an attack—to at least think about it in advance. Each school should have a preparedness plan, and those plans should be tested. Schools have fire drills where they evacuate pupils, so they perhaps need to have lockdown drills to invacuate pupils or at least to have considered how those might operate.

I hope that the Bill gets a smooth passage through your Lordships’ House. I believe that we owe it to the victims of the Manchester Arena attack, the two London Bridge attacks and all the other attacks of recent years. It is our responsibility to give them, and the public who visit those venues, the security that this offers.

Defending Democracy Taskforce

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Monday 6th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

It is a continuing process and, as the noble Lord will know, the task force was established when his Government were in office and continues now. It is an ongoing process; we are looking at this and will produce lessons whenever they are forthcoming. In relation to the local elections in May, we have extended Operation Bridger, which gives support, if required, to Members of Parliament and Members of this House and key individuals who face elections in May. That operation, Operation Ford, is available to give support to individuals who face election at any time when parliamentary elections are not forthcoming.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister referred to the counterterrorism strategy. He will be aware that the Prevent strand of Contest has had very difficult and sometimes very poor press, perhaps as a result of misinterpretation of its objectives. Will the Minister tell us whether the intention is now to focus on safeguarding vulnerable individuals who are liable to be seduced by some of the materials that are available online and therefore prevent them being drawn into violent extremism of one sort or another? This should be a safeguarding approach rather than one that is seen as the pursuit of potential terrorists.

Guns Manufactured by 3D Printers

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Tuesday 10th December 2024 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the number of guns manufactured by 3D printers circulating in the United Kingdom.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am pleased to tell my noble friend that no viable fully 3D-printed firearms have been found by law enforcement in the United Kingdom. In 2023, there were 25 instances where police seized 3D-printed component parts or other items associated with 3D printing of firearms.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for that reply. He will have seen the reports this morning that the person who supposedly shot the insurance executive in New York was carrying a 3D-printed weapon. He will be aware that the firearm of choice for young men in Australia and New Zealand is now a 3D-printed weapon. He will be aware that it is possible, by searching for FGC-9 on the internet—I apologise for offending the sensibilities of anyone in the House, but FGC stands for “Fuck Gun Control”—to get detailed manuals of how to make a 3D-printed firearm. What is being done to stop the circulation of such manuals? Is it an offence to download such a manual, as it would be in other circumstances?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I can tell my noble friend that it is an offence to manufacture and distribute a prohibited weapon, such as a handgun or semi-automatic rifle, however it is manufactured. That carries a sentence of life imprisonment. The maximum penalty for possessing such a prohibited weapon, including any 3D-printed prohibited weapon, is 10 years’ imprisonment with a minimum penalty of five years. We will keep legislation under review and there will be opportunities during the course of this Session to review that legislation in relation to any issues that might need to be brought forward.

Police Reform

Lord Harris of Haringey Excerpts

Monday 25th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Trans people have a right to exist and be employed in communities to work with communities, and I will defend that right for trans people to hold responsible positions in society. If the noble Baroness wants to write to me with a specific example, we will look at that but, as far as I am concerned, let us get round to the basics that trans people are people.

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I refer to my policing interests in the register. Is it not the case that successive Governments have focused almost to the exclusion of all else on the question of police numbers? Does my noble friend agree that there is a case for allowing chief constables and police and crime commissioners much more flexibility about the way in which they use the total police workforce, perhaps not always using police officers but instead using PCSOs or police staff to carry out the functions that need to be carried out? It is not necessary to have a fully warranted, fully trained constable to carry out all the things that a police force needs to do.