Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Hain Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Wednesday 3rd November 2021 Lords Chamber

This is not to say that any particular technology is offensive per se—some of it may be very useful to criminal investigations and crime prevention in the public interest, but, goodness me, it needs to be on a statutory footing. Look at the way in which the extraction of mobile phone data developed and was not, for a considerable periods of time, on a statutory footing, what happened and how the Government then had to respond, even in this Bill. I am asking for a broader response to all of this kit—all of this technology. I beg to move.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

I speak in support of Amendment 132B, in the name of my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, to which I have added my name, and which provides for a new clause in the Bill. I ask the Minister to listen quite carefully and consider bringing back a government amendment on Report to address the issues that we have raised. There is a really important issue about the accountability and scrutiny of these developing technologies of surveillance and weapons.

The purpose of the proposed new clause is to ensure that drones and other new surveillance or weapons technology can be deployed by the police only within parameters and regulations set by the Secretary of State; in other words, it seeks to ensure proper parliamentary accountability and scrutiny rather than leaving it as a matter of exclusive police discretion. As my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti has pointed out, when, in the past, other forms of technological surveillance, and indeed digital technology, were not properly regulated, they started to encroach on privacy in a major way. We have all seen examples of that or experienced it ourselves.

Police in England and Wales are considering using drone-mounted cameras that could film high-quality live footage from 1,500 feet—457 metres—away, which raises concerns among civil liberties campaigners. The National Police Air Service—NPAS—which provides air support to 46 police forces, has asked private companies for information about systems that offer both airborne imaging and air-to-ground communication. A government website stated on 21 September:

“The imaging systems are intended for use on BVLOS (Beyond Visual Line of Sight) remotely-piloted aircraft systems: ‘Drones’.”


The NPAS told potential bidders that the systems should be capable of transmitting live, high-quality images even in low light, using electro-optical or infra-red systems. It said that this would enable officers to pick out detail such as facial features, as well as clothing and vehicle registration plates, at a distance of between 500 feet and 1,500 feet. The NPAS added that the cameras should be able to operate on a drone that stays in the air for up to four hours and flies up to 30 miles from the base station from which it is controlled.

Drones have been used by various English and Welsh police forces, including the Metropolitan Police, which has explained that they have been deployed to survey crime scenes and provide live footage of operations. That is all to the good as a response to serious crime. It seems, however, that the NPAS may plan a national rollout of drone technology, which raises all manner of civil liberty issues, including privacy, how much autonomy will be granted to private companies operating such drone technology for surveillance by the state, and whether it will target legitimate protesters as opposed to criminals and terrorists.

I ask these questions because these important issues cannot simply be a matter for operational police decision-making. They should be placed within an accountable regulatory environment that can be scrutinised by Parliament. CCTV is already ubiquitous and operated by private companies able to watch whatever we do, certainly in urban areas. Surveillance of the vehicles we drive is also universal. Big tech companies are increasingly monitoring almost our every move.

Deployment of police drones with algorithmic and facial recognition technology should be properly regulated. This is the essence of what I am asking the Minister to respond to. Drone surveillance has even been used to stalk dog walkers during lockdown. It is not acceptable for a Home Office spokesperson simply to say, recently:

“Use of drones is an operational matter for police forces.”


Nor is it sufficient for Ministers to say that the police are already subject to the Air Navigation Order and the general data protection regulation. Although it was reported in the Guardian that the Home Office says increased use of drones would allow police forces to replace helicopters, reducing noise and carbon emissions, that should not be a reason to duck the necessity for proper accountability and scrutiny. I stress, to the Minister and to your Lordships’ House, that this amendment does not seek to block police deployment of drones for legitimate purposes such as to tackle criminals, drug or people traffickers, terrorists, or racist or fascist demonstrations targeting black, Jewish or Muslims citizens.

The Undercover Policing Inquiry, to which I gave evidence earlier this year, has already revealed stark injustices and abuses of liberty and privacy. The High Court has recognised this in its recent judgment finding against the Metropolitan Police in a case brought by environmental protestor Kate Wilson, who was intimately and improperly befriended by undercover police officer Mark Kennedy. Other example like this were revealed by the Undercover Policing Inquiry. I mention these because they relate to accountability, scrutiny and proper regulation. One undercover police officer told the inquiry that she did not know why she was infiltrating one feminist group, as only four people attended a meeting she went to. But she was deployed in this way, instead of on serious undercover police work, such as what I saw and approved as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. That was legitimate undercover police work.

This amendment is about ensuring drone technology is used to put serious crime under proper surveillance, is accountable and does not get out of control, as undercover police officers did. I have spoken previously in this House, on another Bill, about the improper use of undercover police officers to monitor and put under surveillance anti-Apartheid demonstrators, instead of pursuing the South African security services who were bombing Nelson Mandela’s headquarters in London. I will not go on about this, but my point is that the deployment of undercover police officers should have been more properly regulated. I hope that the current inquiry, headed by Judge Mitting, will produce recommendation to that effect, given that it was set up by the Government, which I welcome. The question is how deployment is regulated and who makes the ultimate decisions. I believe it should be based on a warrant—which I signed hundreds of, as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland and when substituting for the Home Secretary or Foreign Secretary—to deal with serious crime.

To give an example of what I think would have been a legitimate deployment of drone technology if it had existed then—I will describe this generally so as not to give away what was really going on—I witnessed graphic video-based surveillance of paramilitary members with guns seeking to attack fellow citizens in Belfast when I was Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in 2005. That was done for entirely legitimate purposes. I will not describe how exactly it was done because I do not think that should be publicly revealed. The operation of a drone in that situation—because drone technology did not exist in the form that it does now—would have been entirely legitimate and I saw at first hand the way it could be legitimately deployed.

However, I can also see how this could be spread, if it is simply an operational decision by police, to target non-violent demonstrators and environmental activists. We may not approve of their methods, but we have already seen members of Extinction Rebellion put on a terrorist list by police forces. When that was revealed they of course said that they should not have been. This is about parliamentary scrutiny and accountability. Without such accountability, how do we know that drone-based surveillance is not being targeted on illegitimate purposes like undercover police officers most certainly were?

If the noble Baroness is willing to look at this, and she might find some technical reasons why our amendment is not acceptable to her, it may be that the same kind of authority should be given as under the warrant procedure for authorising surveillance. As I have just explained, I signed hundreds of those as Northern Ireland Secretary of State and in other capacities. Maybe that is one of the ways in which ultimately the Secretary of State would take the decision and be ultimately accountable under the legislation that Parliament passes. Parliament can therefore scrutinise, if not every decision, then the general pattern of decisions made. We need something similar for drone surveillance and this amendment tabled by my noble friend provides for that. I hope the Government will address this so that we do not have to bring back the same amendment or a similar one on Report, because the Government will have recognised this is an important issue and taken the initiative themselves. I ask her to consider that.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, way back in 2004 I was the Deputy Mayor of London—when there was only one deputy mayor and not a whole host of them. In that role I attended DSEI, the arms fair. What struck me was that there was a terrifying amount of military equipment being sold and repurposed for use by police forces and Governments against their own citizens. That was a few years ago and I imagine the situation has got much worse since.

On another occasion I was outside a kettle in Whitehall chatting to the senior police officer trying to give him some good advice about how to communicate with the crowd. He had a phone call, he stepped away to take it and when he came back, he said “I’ve just been told not to speak to you any more.” I asked, “Who by?” and he pointed at the helicopter that had been flying over us. That was the first time I realised just how powerful the cameras were; they had not only been able to photograph me but also recognise me which, from the top of my head, I would have thought almost impossible.

There is always a great amount of mission creep with this type of technology and people can get carried away with it. Our own Prime Minister infamously wasted hundreds of thousands of pounds of public money buying illegal water cannons when he was Mayor of London. They ended up rotting down in Kent and I am not sure we ever managed to sell them—perhaps we sold them for scrap. As far as I know there is still no oversight or regulation of the facial recognition technology. I would be very interested to hear the Minister tell me about that, because I have been agitating for that for some time.

--- Later in debate ---

I want to address the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, about the Justice and Home Affairs Committee inquiry into the use of new technologies in law enforcement, which I am sure will touch on many of the issues raised today. We look forward to the report that stems from that and will study any recommendations very carefully.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

Can the Minister say something more about facial recognition technology? She has covered this to some extent, but what is different from the heli-tele era that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, described, or the incident in Belfast I described, when you did not have facial recognition technology? This is going that way if it is not there already, and does that not raise important regulatory questions, or is this being addressed by the committee she has just described? I would be grateful if she could elucidate.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

I have not engaged with the committee. The committee could invite me, but I think it spoke to Home Secretary in the past few days. Live facial recognition is the comparison of images against a watchlist, whereas heli-tele seems to be—from what the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, was describing—aerial CCTV. The two are quite different and are governed under different laws. The LFR is a comparison against a watchlist, and that is why it is different.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Hain Excerpts

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Monday 11th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dubs (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 5, I shall speak also to Amendment 23, which is grouped with it. I intend to seek the opinion of the House, unless I get a dramatic concession from the Minister at the end of the debate.

These amendments impose a requirement for prior judicial approval of criminal conduct authorisations, with some provision for urgent cases. I speak as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Our report, which has been widely applauded in this and previous debates on the Bill, has obviously been very helpful, and I am using a lot of information from it. I am also grateful to Justice, which provided a comprehensive report, with proposals for amendments. I am grateful to the Minister, who arranged for my noble friend Lady Massey and myself to have a briefing with some of the officials and senior police officers. We had a detailed discussion, and although it was directed at amendments relating to children which will be discussed on Wednesday, some of it is nevertheless relevant to the amendments that I am proposing today. I think I may quote from that without pre-empting the discussion about children on Wednesday.

The Government claim that prior judicial authorisation is not necessary because:

“The use of CHIS requires deep expertise and close consideration of the personal qualities of that CHIS, which then enables very precise and safe tasking.”—[Official Report, Commons, 5/10/20; col. 662.]


As I understand it, the Government believe that authorisations are better left to public authorities’ delegated authorising officers, who are, supposedly, more equipped to deal with CHIS than judicial commissioners, who are one step away.

However, the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, the former Director of Public Prosecutions, who has been quoted more than once in this debate, said:

“There is no comfort in allowing senior figures in the police or the intelligence agencies the power to sanction lawbreaking, without the need to first obtain independent warrants from judges or some other authority.”


That seems pretty clear.

The use of prior judicial authorisation has, of course, been discussed in the past in relation to RIPA. But in 2016, the European Court of Human Rights held that judicial authorisation

“offers the best guarantees of independence, impartiality and proper procedure.”

This is particularly pertinent to surveillance, which is,

“a field where abuse is potentially so easy in individual cases and could have such harmful consequences for democratic society”.

The court concluded that

“it is in principle desirable to entrust supervisory control to a judge”.

That is part of the basis of this amendment.

Concerns about whether this is feasible do not carry much weight. There is no reason why judicial commissioners could not review CCAs; they are already well-practised in making complex assessments of sensitive material in an independent, detached manner and at short notice, and they are always very senior judicial figures.

The Select Committee looked at all this. It is very clear that the Bill does not provide for any independent scrutiny of criminal conduct authorisations before they are made and acted upon. The report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights noted that, while the process of granting criminal conduct authorisations would be kept under review by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, his

“role in the oversight of CCAs is entirely ‘after the event’ … nor does the Bill provide for the IPC to be informed of authorisations at the time they are made, so that prompt scrutiny can take place.”

The report further noted:

“The lack of prior independent scrutiny for CCAs under the Bill stands in marked contrast to the procedures in place for other investigatory functions”,


such as police search warrants and phone tapping. The former Director of Public Prosecutions, Sir Ken Macdonald—as he then was—has been quoted several times as saying that:

“Under this bill it will be easier for a police officer to commit a serious crime than to tap a phone or search a shed.”


This has been quoted so often it must go in the Oxford Dictionary of Quotations. The argument in favour of judicial approval is there.

I refer to the Pat Finucane case in Northern Ireland—one of a number of cases—which is also mentioned in the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. There was a real abuse of powers which under my amendment would, I am pretty sure, have been prevented by a judicial commissioner. That case is very much unfinished business. Indeed, there is a plea, which I fully support, for a full independent review of what happened when Patrick Finucane was murdered by, or with the knowledge of, British agents. That is business for another day but, in the meantime, we have this amendment.

Some of these amendments are so crucial to the working of the Bill that it is difficult not to tread from one into the area of another, but this amendment is fundamental. Prior judicial approval for a CCA is absolutely essential to providing the safeguards which were referred to in the previous debate and which we need before we can allow such a Bill to become law in this country. I beg to move.

[Lord Hain (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 16 in my name and those of my noble friend Lord Blunkett, a former Home Secretary, the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, and the noble Baroness, Lady Wheatcroft, to each of whom I am grateful. It is a very straightforward amendment that would add confidence to the deployment of state-employed undercover officers by ensuring that each had to be authorised by a Secretary of State in exactly the same way as existing legislation requires for surveillance operations.

My noble friend Lord Blunkett and I both signed hundreds of warrants for surveillance operations under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which was updated by this Conservative Government in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, at a time when the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, was a government Minister, even if not in her current role. In other words, she and her Conservative Government re-enacted legislation requiring Secretary of State authorisation for surveillance, and so it is a puzzle to me why Ministers have not accepted this amendment.

The amendment endorses the identical principle for CHIS or undercover officer deployment in a way that would add to public confidence, which has been badly damaged by evidence that led to the current inquiry on undercover officers established by Prime Minister Theresa May and chaired by Sir John Mitting, a former High Court judge. It was established because the Conservative Government—in which the noble Baroness was a Home Office Minister at the time—felt undercover policing had got out of control and needed to be made more accountable.

The abuses so far revealed in the inquiry’s proceedings fully justify the Conservative Government’s decision to launch it. I will mention only several. We have learned that the campaign by the noble Baroness, Lady Lawrence, and her family to discover the truth about her son Stephen’s brutal racist murder was outrageously infiltrated by undercover officers. Why were they not instead targeting the racist criminals responsible for Stephen’s murder? If that deployment had been subject to authorisation by the Home Secretary, would it have happened? I very much doubt it, because surely a question would have been asked of the operational police decision as to why the innocent victims of a vicious racist murder were being targeted and not the criminals responsible.

There are many other examples, including my own personal experience. As confirmed by evidence given to the Mitting inquiry, from 1969 to 1970, a British police or security service officer was at almost every anti-apartheid and anti-racist meeting that I attended, private or public, innocuous and routine, or serious and strategic, such as stopping all white apartheid sports tours and combatting pro-Nazi activity. Why were they not targeting Nazi groups responsible for attacks on black people, Jewish citizens and Muslims?

Why were they not targeting the criminal actions of the apartheid state responsible for, among other things, fire-bombing the London offices of Nelson Mandela’s African National Congress in March 1982 and, in 1970, murdering South African journalist Keith Wallace, who had threatened to expose the apartheid security service operations in the UK? In June 1972, why did they show no interest whatever in discovering who in South Africa’s Bureau of State Security sent me a letter bomb capable of killing me, similar to those that had killed anti-apartheid leaders across the world?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

While I have the opportunity, I thank the noble Lord for the conversation we had the other day—it was very helpful in allowing me to know exactly what both noble Lords required. I cannot give that undertaking at the Dispatch Box but I can go back and ascertain just how often the Home Secretary receives these reports and whether the Investigatory Powers Commissioner might be thinking of making more regular reports in future if necessary, or indeed spot reports as and when required. I can certainly undertake to do that.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

I too thank the Minister for her reply and for her engagement. It is clear from the balance of the debate that there is no point in my pressing Amendment 16, and therefore when the time comes, I will not seek to divide the House on it.

However, to follow up on the question of my noble friend Lord Blunkett, will the Minister give an assurance that the Home Secretary will take a particular interest in the most politically sensitive deployment of a CHIS, which is the area that has given rise to real worry? Whether that is in the form of a quarterly report or regular interactions with the head of the Metropolitan Police, other chief constables and the head of the security services is a matter for consideration, but there should be some hands-on authority by the Home Secretary and regular interest in deployments in politically sensitive areas.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

It was very good for us to have a chat the other day because we could discuss things that clearly we cannot discuss on the Floor of the House. I completely understood the sensitivity between some very nuanced situations and the purely operational role of the deployment of CHIS for criminal conduct. I will most certainly go back and put those points. Again, I thank the noble Lord for the time he took to discuss his concerns with me.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Hain Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 1st December 2020 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Haskel) (Lab)]

My Lords, I have had six requests to speak after the Minister, from the noble Lords, Lord Hain and Lord Blunkett, the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. I call the noble Lord, Lord Hain.

[Lord Hain (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her typically courteous and thoughtful response, particularly her offer to talk to a number of my noble friends and other noble Lords about possible oversight that would be acceptable to the Government. Could she look again at Amendment 15? I and my noble friend Lord Blunkett worked very closely with the Security Service, in my case when I was Secretary of State for Northern Ireland—including with the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller—GCHQ, and, when I was in the Foreign Office, with MI6. I have authorised warrants, as I have explained, for vital work in surveillance and interception, and worked with undercover officers.

I appeal to the noble Baroness to meet my noble friend Lord Blunkett and myself informally to discuss the terms of Amendment 15, because it is very practical. It can happen in real time; I have been involved in authorising warrants in real time, including one on Islamist bombers planning to attack London when the operation was live. So, it does deal with her point. It is practical; in some respects, it is the most practical of all these oversight measures. It would give greater legitimacy to and authority for the deployment of undercover officers for the purposes that she is quite properly seeking. They can play vital roles in combating terrorism, for example. I ask her to look again at this and perhaps meet us to discuss it.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

The noble Lord knows how I operate, so he can be absolutely sure I would be happy to meet noble Lords to discuss some of these amendments. I was particularly attracted to the post-facto oversight, because operationally —I do not know whether the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, is going to say something about this—prior authorisation could be very difficult. To get that notification as close to real time as possible is, I think, what we are all seeking.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Hain Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 11th November 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hain (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I too welcome the Minister to this House. To declare an interest, I am what is described as a “non-police, non-state core participant” in the Undercover Policing Inquiry, and I am due to give evidence early next year. I was targeted by undercover officers for some 30 years, including when I was an MP. But what troubles me most are the clear abuses practised by undercover officers involving people I know well.

Ecological activist Kate Wilson is not a criminal. She is a principled radical activist. She was at primary school in London with my two sons. Our families shared holidays and often visited each other’s homes. She was targeted by undercover officer Mark Kennedy, who formed an intimate and what she described afterwards as abusive relationship with her over seven years. He even reported back to his superiors on contacts with my family when I was a Cabinet Minister. Why were police targeting Kate instead of drug barons, human traffickers, criminals and terrorists?

Doreen Lawrence, now my noble friend Lady Lawrence, was a law-abiding citizen when her family’s campaign to discover the truth about her son Stephen’s brutal racist murder was infiltrated by undercover officers. Why were they not targeting the racist criminals responsible for Stephen’s murder?

Undercover officers attended anti-apartheid meetings in my parents’ living room from 1969 through the early 1970s and reported back that I was a speaker at anti-racist meetings when I was an MP in the early 1990s. Why were they not targeting those responsible for, among other things, crimes in London of fire bombing and murder by the oppressive actions of the apartheid state? Why did they show no interest whatsoever in discovering who in South Africa’s Bureau of State Security was responsible for sending me a letter bomb in June 1972 capable of blowing my family and our south-west London home to smithereens were it not for a technical fault in the trigger mechanism?

In each of these cases, the police were on the wrong side of justice, on the wrong side of the law and on the wrong side of history: infiltrating the family of a climate change activist instead of helping combat climate change; covering up for a racist murder instead of catching the murderers; harassing anti-apartheid activists campaigning for Nelson Mandela’s freedom instead of pursuing crimes by the apartheid state.

Fortunately, Kate Wilson’s early eco-activism helped make climate change an international treaty. We stopped the 1970 all-white South African cricket tour; we helped bring down apartheid; and Nelson Mandela went on to be elected President. The Anti-Nazi League, of which I was a founding national officer, succeeded in destroying the fascist, racist National Front. But why were undercover police officers trying to disrupt us, diverting precious police resources away from catching real criminals?

However, perhaps I differ from other core participants in the inquiry because I do believe there can be a need for undercover officers. When I was Secretary of State for Northern Ireland from 2005 to 2007, I met undercover officers doing brave work trying to prevent dissident IRA splinter groups from killing and bombing. I also signed surveillance warrants to prevent Islamist terrorists bombing London and was aware of vital undercover work around their cells.

But where to draw the line—if indeed, it is possible to do so? How do you stop that sort of legitimate undercover police or intelligence work sliding over into the illegitimate? Counterterrorism police recently putting non-violent Extinction Rebellion on their list of terrorist groups hardly inspires confidence. Why does this Bill not even begin to answer any of these key questions?

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Hain Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 14th September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to support Amendments 49 and 51. I listened carefully to what the noble Lord, Lord Oates, said in introducing them so cogently and reasonably, and I had the advantage of being able to have had a conversation with him last week where he explained the generalities of the amendments to me. I thought the arguments were compelling; the noble Lord, Lord Polak, put it well when he said this was a practical and sensible option. All three speeches that we have heard so far have underlined why this is not one of those ragged political debates that require us to take positions; it is something about which we can do something useful this evening in Committee.

I will turn, if I may, from the generalities to something specific, a particular case of people who will be especially disadvantaged by the impact of digital-only status: the Roma community. On 2 August, Roma Holocaust Memorial Day commemorated the shocking liquidation of Roma in August 1944 at the so-called Gypsy family camp at Auschwitz- Birkenau. On that infamous day, 2,897 men, women and children of Roma or Sinti origin were murdered by the Nazis. Of around 23,000 Roma taken to Auschwitz—and hundreds of thousands more perished during the Holocaust—an estimated 20,000 were murdered there. At the time of the liberation of Auschwitz, only four Roma remained alive.

Now, 76 years later, Roma people still face discrimination and liquidation. I especially commend the work of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Roma in ensuring that Parliament understands the horrors that this community has experienced and the special circumstances and challenges which it faces today.

In debates like this, I miss the voice of Lord Avebury, a good and long-standing friend and the author of the Caravan Sites Act 1968. At the memorial event celebrating his life, Damian Le Bas, a Roma who wrote The Stopping Places: A Journey Through Gypsy Britain—a remarkable insight into the world of Travelling people—spoke powerfully about how parliamentarians such as Lord Avebury can act to ensure that the UK’s 200,000 Roma can lead lives of dignity.

Lord Avebury would have been the first on his feet to support these amendments, pointing to the lack of awareness within the Roma community of digital immigration status and the way in which digital exclusion simply builds on the other exclusions which Roma historically have experienced. The Roma Support Group says that only 3% of Roma are able independently to complete online applications such as those required by the European Union settlement scheme. Very little data exists about how many Roma have applied to the EUSS so far and been given settled or pre-settled status. As the debate proceeds, I will hand the Minister a copy of the Roma Support Group’s briefing on this so that she can read some of the cases illustrating this point. I would be grateful if the Minister could say how this problem can be addressed, especially as the Home Office data does not include a breakdown of ethnicity.

Enabling those who need it to receive physical evidence of their status in the UK would certainly be a start, and enabling programmes to be developed which could address the issue of digital exclusion, on which this debate has helped us to focus, would be a very good outcome.

[Lord Hain (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Alton, that we all cherish the memory of the much-missed Lord Avebury, who was a champion for human rights globally.

I will speak to Amendments 49 and 51 on the need for documented proof of settled status, and commend the noble Lord, Lord Oates, for his compelling speech, and the crisp speech—notably from the Government Benches—from the noble Lord, Lord Polak. The ending of free movement, which this Bill implements, is nothing less than a tragedy. We should not be severing our links with our nearest neighbours, with whom we have the most in common. This seismic change in our freedom impacts all UK citizens, as we will lose our rights to live, work and study in the EU and EEA countries. For EU nationals living here—many of whom are our family members, friends and colleagues—and for UK citizens living in EU member states, the changes will also be profound, bringing a potential loss of security and life choices in the future.

The aim of the Government’s Brexit project of ending free movement to and from the EU and replacing it with the future global points-based immigration system was supposedly to deliver on their aim of reducing net migration. This policy is not supported by the evidence. In 2019, despite free movement, net migration from the EU fell to less than 50,000, but net migration from outside the EU, where there is no free movement, increased to its highest level for 45 years, above 280,000. Is this what “taking back control” was supposed to be about?

Those EU nationals who for whatever reason do not acquire settled status by the deadline of the end of June 2021 will move from an immigration system that currently works to the same unreformed system that currently applies to non-EU nationals, which is inhumane, dysfunctional and, frankly, chaotic. Even those who succeed in registering under the EU settled status scheme will receive no physical documentation as proof of their status; their rights will not be guaranteed in primary legislation and will potentially be subject to alteration by Ministers under the very considerable Henry VIII powers that this Bill bestows on them.

The Financial Times reported in July that the number of EU migrants who have applied for the right to stay in the UK after Brexit already considerably exceeds official estimates of the Europeans who are eligible to remain, raising further questions over the effectiveness of the Government’s scheme. Home Office statistics up to July show that 3.8 million applications have been made, far more than the official estimate of 3.4 million EU citizens living in the UK that was produced by the Office for National Statistics. In fact, the Financial Times survey of EU embassies discovered that the UK Government might have underestimated the EU-born population of the UK by more than half a million people. By the end of July more than 3.5 million grants of status had been made. However, around 40% of those applicants had been granted only pre-settled status, leaving them in a kind of limbo with their status still unresolved for the long term, while many more applications are still anticipated.

Experts warn that the confusion over the real number of EU citizens living in the UK will make it almost impossible to assess how many eligible people will fail to secure settled status by the time the process closes on 30 June next year. However, it is likely that tens of thousands will suddenly become unlawfully resident in the country that they have legally made their own and be left facing the full force of the Home Office’s “hostile environment”—namely, criminalisation and the threat of deportation.

The groups most affected are likely to include many from the age groups under 18 years and over 65 years, who have had worryingly low application rates. For example, there are 9,000 eligible children and young people in the care system in the UK, for whom only 500 applications have so far been made by local authorities. Non-EU-national family members of EU nationals, rural farm workers, those in isolated communities, those with limited English-language skills, those who are homeless, victims of domestic abuse, those without relevant or up-to-date documents and those who are not digitally literate—often the elderly—are all potentially at risk. That last problem has been exacerbated by the pandemic as the support services normally available to such groups have been forced to move online.

For those groups and others, such as full-time students, full-time parents and those who have previously left the UK temporarily for more than six months, providing the required proof of continuous residence for five years to the Home Office can be very challenging, if not impossible. This means that people with a rightful claim to British residence may lose their legal status overnight. It is another Windrush in the making.

The other main impact of the Bill is of course that, as a direct consequence of the abolition of EEA free movement for UK citizens, we, our children and our grandchildren will from January 2021 lose our rights to live, work and study in the 27 member states of the EU plus the three EEA countries and Switzerland—the biggest diminution in value of a country’s citizenship in history. Therefore, at the same time as the UK Government are opening up higher-paid jobs in the UK to the whole world under the points-based system, the brightest and best UK citizens seeking international career opportunities in the biggest, richest market on our doorstep, the EU, will be second-class citizens in their own country.

In addition, the multiple impacts of the Bill on the estimated 1.5 million UK citizens already resident in European Union member states, who will also become second-class citizens within the EU, should not be forgotten. For example, those with non-British spouses and family members will not have an automatic right to return to the UK with their family after 31 December 2020. Frankly, the Bill is an inhumane, reactionary mess and these amendments try to ameliorate that. I stress that they are not party political; they are simply about humanity. That is why I hope the Minister will accept them when she replies.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Hain Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 7th September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hain (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I wish to speak particularly to Amendments 2, 47 and 57. I strongly agree with the excellent opening speech on this group by my noble friend Lord Hunt and with many other speeches, including those of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and my noble friend Lady Lister. This Bill illustrates that the pandemic has revealed fundamental flaws in the present United Kingdom non-EU immigration system and the Government’s post-Brexit plans for immigration. In an economy which previously had record levels of employment, and despite the joblessness effects of Covid on the labour market, their proposed points-based system could produce damaging labour shortages in many sectors, including the NHS, social care, which has been spoken about authoritatively in this debate, farming, food processing and construction.

None of this should come as a surprise, as the 2016 referendum campaign was based on rhetoric falsely linking the free movement of EU workers with the legacies of Tory austerity: housing shortages, depressed wages and huge cuts in public services, especially social care. The promise to take back control of borders may have appealed to nationalistic jingoism, but it was never rooted in the reality of modern Britain, where EU and non-EU migrants of all skills levels and income brackets keep the economic and social wheels turning. EU and other migrant workers were always, in fact, net contributors, through tax and national insurance, to the National Health Service, social care and other public services. Despite the Government’s intention to equate low pay with low skills and low value, the pandemic has abruptly brought migrants’ significant front-line roles as key workers in keeping the country afloat to the attention of the public, among whom it is now widely recognised, whereas perhaps it was not in 2016. As the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants has stated, the Bill

“will deny our communities the care and professionalism contributed by migrants in these areas, to our own detriment.”

The Bill does not set out in detail what the future points-based UK system will look like. These changes will be covered in unamendable Immigration Rules. The Bill gives the Government Henry VIII powers to modify primary or secondary legislation as appropriate. Despite the Government’s claims that these powers are usual, they will diminish the role of Parliament in an area of policy where many, including the Lords’ Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in its 2019 46th report, have concluded that greater scrutiny is already required.

In the social care sector, on which millions of extremely vulnerable British people depend—many of them our relatives, in care homes and in their own homes—the vast majority of social care roles do not meet the planned immigration system’s salary threshold of £25,600. The noble Lord, Lord McCrea, who spoke immediately before me, emphasised that point in relation to Northern Ireland. Using data collected before—I stress, before—the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, Skills for Care estimated the number of vacancies in the sector at 133,000. It also estimated that 5% of the 1.65 million workforce, or more than 80,000 staff, are at risk of losing their employment rights at the end of the transition period, in a sector where nearly half of employers are already struggling to fill existing vacancies because of low pay, anti-social hours and the demanding nature of care work.

The Government, in their wisdom, have decided that front-line social care staff will be excluded from their fast-track health and care visa, with the Home Secretary stating that this will encourage employers to invest in workers from the UK. Who is going to pay for this? Will it be people receiving care, cash-strapped local authorities, whose budgets have been massively cut, or private-sector care providers, many of whom are teetering on the brink of financial collapse? Parliament’s library briefing confirms that

“a wide range of organisations are concerned that short-term funding pressures remain. In 2018, the Local Government Association estimated that adult social care services faced a £1.5 billion funding gap by 2019/20 and £3.5 billion gap by 2024/25.”

While the points-based system is a fundamental change, other aspects of the non-EU immigration system such as enforcement, the right to bring dependants, settlement criteria, asylum, no access to public funds and more will remain unchanged when EU citizens without settled status become subject to them in 2021—next year. The pandemic has demonstrated that because of these policies, many such migrants are at significant risk of exposure to the virus, fear accessing healthcare, lack access to safe housing and are unable to stop working or to self-isolate because they are on poverty wages. This is not only detrimental to the health of migrant communities; the health of the wider public is also put at risk.

The Bill is a missed opportunity to deal with many more important questions, on which I support contributions and amendments from noble colleagues, including measures to combat modern slavery and indefinite detention, and to address family reunion for refugees and safe routes for unaccompanied children. These unresolved issues mean that the existing UK immigration regime for non-EU immigration is already a stain on our national reputation. Its extension to EU citizens from 2021 is a matter of deep regret, creating a new Brexit generation alongside the Windrush generation.

All British citizens living in the EU want to be reassured that we will uphold the treaty rights of EU citizens in the UK, the better to insist that they are upheld for our citizens in the EU. The Bill fails to provide that reassurance. If the Government want to retain the respect of our former friends and partners, they should listen to the concerns expressed by EU ambassadors and others and accept amendments which will guarantee the rights of the Brexit generation of European Union citizens, including vital social care workers, who have legally made their lives in our country, by writing them into this primary legislation.

Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Hain Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 22nd July 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hain (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, under cover of the pandemic, Ministers are doggedly pursuing their Brexit immigration agenda when we are in the grip of a pandemic-induced economic tsunami. A hard Brexit, sought by many Conservatives, will sever links with our most important trading partners and neighbours, and unilaterally end free movement on 31 December, with our economy still on its knees and facing a major skills crisis.

This will be the second time in the last 10 years that a Conservative Government have retrospectively changed the rights of migrants who have legally entered this country to live and work here. The Bill aims to prioritise “skilled” labour with a points-based system based largely on salary. However, as shown by a recent Ipsos MORI poll, the public recognise, with my noble friend Lord Rosser, the important role played in the pandemic by the 180,000 European Union-national health and care workers, most of whom would be identified by the Home Secretary as “low-skilled” and would not have qualified for visas under the Bill.

Unless deals on citizens’ rights are reached with the European Union, these workers, many of them heroes in the Covid crisis, will be exposed to the harsh reality of the Home Office’s failed and inhumane hostile environment policy. It is also likely that there will be a second Windrush for the children of migrants, as the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, said in this House on 2 July. The Government’s promises on EU nationals’ rights mean nothing if they are not backed by primary legislation. They should be granted automatic settled status. The Bill does neither.

To lead a recovery from Covid, the Government are promoting investment in construction and infrastructure, highly dependent on skilled labour from the EU, yet they have no effective strategy for domestic skills-based programmes, which take years to deliver results. By ending free movement, the UK will become less accessible to highly skilled EEA migrants, on whom we have depended for years. The Huawei debacle has illustrated that the “global Britain” assumed by leave in the referendum campaign no longer exists. Our legal, economic and trading relationship with the EU—the world’s biggest, richest market, right on our doorstep—which is in no way settled, should remain our most important for years to come. Our immigration system should reflect that, not the other way around.

Another huge consequence of the Bill is that, as a direct consequence of the lack of reciprocal agreements on citizens’ rights, 66 million UK nationals will lose the benefits of their EU citizenship, their rights to travel freely and to live, work and study elsewhere in our European home. Frankly, this is all a shambolic disgrace.

Windrush Compensation Scheme

Lord Hain Excerpts

Wednesday 24th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I do. I think that finally having a Government who acknowledge what went on over seven decades provides a real impetus. I find that we are one of the most tolerant countries in the world, but it is shameful how long this has been going on. Funnily enough, I looked at the internal Home Office website yesterday because I was looking up something in Parliament, and the first thing I saw was the history of the Windrush generation—so maybe things are improving already. We are certainly more knowledgeable about who the Windrush generation were, what they came here to do and the legacy of rebuilding Britain that they have achieved for us. So I have great hope—I think we must always hope—but we need to do this together.

[Lord Hain (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I respect the Minister for her diligent decency. Will she accept that, despite government promises, over 3,000 Windrush victims have still not received any kind of justice, and miserably fewer have received any compensation at all? Some have died, been deported or wrongfully imprisoned, lost jobs, pensions, homes, all their dignity and rights—leaving them and their families, all proud British citizens, utterly traumatised. Surely this is a crime against humanity, with Tory Cabinet Ministers, headed by Theresa May, responsible.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Now and in the future, we want to ensure that the people who receive compensation get the full amount to which they are entitled. The compensation scheme is very broad, so I agree with the noble Lord that, on the one hand, 3,000 not receiving any compensation at all is one thing, but we are working through the system and there are a number of offers in place. We want to ensure that people who take up those offers receive the full amount to which they are entitled, and that the relatives of people who have died—the noble Lord mentioned them, and a lot of people will have died in that time—are given the money they are due and that their parents were owed.

Anti-terrorism Policy

Lord Hain Excerpts

Tuesday 17th March 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I most wholeheartedly agree with the noble Lord’s first point: far-right extremism is indeed on the increase at a rate that we did not think possible some years ago. In fact, it makes up 50% of referrals to Prevent. Prevent is currently being reviewed, but I think it provides a valuable tool for safeguarding very vulnerable people from the far right and any other type of extremism.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, does the Minister agree that we have seen an unprecedented convergence of anti-Semitic attacks, Islamophobic attacks and racist attacks? Never before in our history have we seen these three forms of race hatred all converge; that is what makes it particularly threatening. Does she also agree that the many UKIP and Brexit Party members who have been accused of Islamophobia should stand condemned?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Without calling out any particular party, anybody who engages in anti-Semitism, Islamophobia or any other type of hatred should be condemned. It is up to all political parties to show leadership to this end. The noble Lord is absolutely right that there is an almost perfect storm of far-right and Islamist-type extremism, whose messages are similar but opposite in tone. It provides a perfect melting pot, as he says.

Online Hate Speech

Lord Hain Excerpts

Thursday 30th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I am sure the noble Lord will appreciate that I would not comment on ongoing considerations of proscriptions. But they are kept under regular review.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, can we assume that President Trump tweets only messages he has thought carefully about and agrees with? If so, he has endorsed a Nazi group with a vicious record of attacks, racism, Islamophobia and anti-Semitism. Surely there can be no question of a state visit until he has expressed at least some remorse about this.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I would not want to make any assumption about how people think when they tweet. As for the state visit, the invitation has been extended and accepted, but a firm timetable has not yet been finalised.