European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I have a similar question for the Minister. In paragraph 1(1) of Schedule 1, we are told:

“There is no right in domestic law on or after exit day to challenge any retained EU law on the basis that, immediately before exit day, an EU instrument was invalid”.


I understand why that should be so, by reference to EU law principles, because at the moment you cannot challenge, in our courts, the validity of an EU instrument; you have to go to the Court of Justice. I am not sure whether the provision in paragraph 1(1) prevents, after exit day, a challenge to a provision of retained EU law brought by reference not to EU law but to common law principles. For example, are challenges on the grounds of legal certainty, the presumption against retrospectivity, or proportionality, which has already been mentioned, prevented by paragraph 1(1)?

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

Would the noble Lord agree that proportionality now seems to be part of UK law, notwithstanding what the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, said?

[Lord Pannick]

I do not think that the courts have accepted that proportionality can be a challenge by way of judicial review where you are not raising an issue of EU law or convention law—but we have come a very long way towards recognising proportionality as a principle of the common law. That is one reason why I am asking this very important question. I simply do not know whether you can challenge retained EU law after exit day by reference to traditional common law principles.

One reason why this matters is that the Supreme Court, in the HS2 case, suggested that this might be possible under existing law. As was raised in the debate last Monday, we should also bear in mind that, under Clause 2, retained EU law includes statutory instruments that do not owe their legal basis to the European Communities Act. They include statutory instruments enacted through other mechanisms, albeit that they are linked to EU law. At present, one can challenge those instruments by reference to traditional common law principles. Therefore, if Clause 1(1) were intended to prevent such a challenge after exit day, it would be a significant change in the law.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, that short exchange has demonstrated how complicated this area is and how important the general principles of EU law are in it. It is, perhaps, late at night to be discussing this but it is extremely important because of both the principles and the way they operate. If one looks at it in this way, and takes the Government’s intention not to take away rights as a part of this process, one has to recognise that the architecture which provides rights at the moment is quite complicated. As a commentator has said, there is no single, simple answer to restoring the position in the light of what the Government propose to do.

Amendment 41, which stands in my name, follows the principle the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, initiated by saying that the general principles of EU law should continue to be capable of giving rise to rights which can be enforced by our courts. The point has already been made that there is a difference between these general rights existing as a way of interpreting other rights—as an interpretive technique—and giving rise to freestanding rights themselves. Paragraph 3 of Schedule 1 prevents any action being founded in contravention of one of the general principles or rendering any Executive act unlawful or disapplying any legislation, including secondary legislation, on the grounds that it offends these general principles.

The general principles of EU law have been critical to a number of legal decisions relating to people’s rights. One of those often cited is the case of John Walker, who brought a case for equal protection in pension rights for his same-sex partner, a claim upheld by the Supreme Court which recognised that prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation was a key principle of EU law. As I apprehend it, without that the case would not have succeeded.

The principle of effectiveness of remedies has also been relied upon. When the Supreme Court struck down employment tribunal fees that disproportionately affected disadvantaged women and low-paid workers, the principle of effectiveness of remedies was relied upon. Cases concerning caps on compensation and equal pay cases have depended upon the general principle that we find in the EU principles. The amendment standing in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, seeks to enable those general principles to continue to have that effect in our law. It is important that they do for a couple of other reasons. Take, for example, something that was raised in the other place. What if there is a principle of EU retained law which is deficient, defective, does not operate properly or is disproportionate? Without being able to rely upon the general principles of EU law, it may be that all the court could do if faced with that would be to say that either that principle or that particular Act or that particular piece of law, though deficient or defective, has to continue to operate because there is no principle by which it can be struck down, and that would be a loss.

The other reason goes back, I am afraid, to the debate that we had last week on the charter and the Government’s assertion that the charter is not necessary because all the rights are otherwise protected under our law. Of course, at the time the charter was drawn up we were still a member and, in many people’s minds at least, were expected to continue to remain a member of the European Union with all that that implied, including the continued application of general principles. But if one looks—

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks]

When we were having the debate about the charter, I specifically asked the noble and learned Lord whether principles which were referred to in the charter were actionable or not, and he said that in his contention, they were not actionable. I am not simply trying to make some forensic point, but I seek clarity from him as to why in that context he said that the principles were not actionable—I can well understand his answer, because principles are rather difficult to identify as regards a clear breach, for example—but he now says that the Bill is wrong and that principles should somehow be actionable.

[Lord Goldsmith]

I am grateful for the question, because it enables me to clarify that point. There are two sorts of principles. I was talking in answer to the noble Lord’s question last week about the principles which are contained in the charter itself. The charter says that it is a charter of rights and principles, and the principles there—it is not that easy to identify which are principles and which are not—are not actionable in themselves. They may become actionable, because as they are aspirational tools, they are then implemented into law and are actionable at that stage. The principles we are talking about here are different. These are the general principles of EU law, which are, for example, the principle of legal certainty, the principle of proportionality, and the principle of non-discrimination. These are different in that sense; they are general rather than specific principles, and they are actionable at the moment. That is why the Walker case I mentioned gives rise to a remedy, as did the other cases where the Supreme Court struck down tribunal fees as being disproportionately high for particular categories of workers.

That is why we believe it is important to keep this. It is one element of the architecture to retain rights. I remind noble Lords that the Prime Minister made it clear that the intention was that rights would continue the same the day after exit as the day before. To remove general principles in this way, and the ability to rely upon them, will fail to keep that promise. This amendment also—it has been referred to already—specifically proposes that the general principles of EU law should include those which are contained in Article 191 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Those are environmental principles of huge importance: the precautionary principle, the principle of polluter pays and the principle for preventive action. Those principles and the others I referred to need to continue to operate to keep in place the rights that people enjoy at the moment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

I always listen with great respect to the Government Chief Whip, especially when he sympathetically allows us to debate these issues after midnight.

In Francovich, workers who suffered damage when their employer became insolvent were entitled to compensation under an EU directive which required member states to secure their protection. Since Italy had failed to implement the directive, the individual workers brought a claim before their national courts for compensation from the state for the damage they had suffered due to this failure, and I think that we would all applaud that, too.

State liability is enforced not through the European courts but through national courts, thus the ECJ stipulated that national procedures should determine how state liability is enforced. The procedures for claiming damages from the state before national courts must comply with the principles of equivalence—that is, with the procedures available for comparable claims for damages—and effectiveness, to secure that EU law as well as national law is respected. As long as it respects these two principles, the member state can prescribe its own procedures for claims as regards, for example, proof and time limits —so it is hardly imposing wicked European ideas on the national courts, since they are left to enforce the principles concerned.

The Francovich principle has led to some significant legal actions; perhaps the best known in the UK is the Factortame litigation, which contained five cases concerning fishing rights.

What is the problem with the Bill? It is confusing. I quote from the summarised views of commentators more expert than me on this subject. It is said that Clause 6(1) removes the right to rely on EU law and obtain a reference to the ECJ after the date of exit. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Schedule 1 plainly remove the ability to rely on EU law or utilise the Francovich principle after the date of exit. Or do they? I ask that because paragraph 27(3) of Schedule 8, which all noble Lords will have been reading carefully in preparation for this short debate, makes it clear that cases begun prior to the exit date are not subject to the restriction that I have described and therefore can continue to rely on Francovich.

As was pointed out by Dame Cheryl Gillan in another place on 14 November last, the Bill is contradictory, in that it both allows continued reliance on Francovich in cases commenced before the date of exit but also removes that right. That appears to mean that a litigant in a case started before the date of exit, and who has a legitimate expectation that the law will not change retrospectively and that he or she will be able to rely on Francovich, will lose that expectation. If I am wrong in that, I am not the only one and I would like a correction, please. All litigants have a legitimate expectation to have their cases heard under the rules applicable not at an arbitrary time, such as the date of exit, but at the time of the breach of the law concerned. This includes EU law at that time, if it was applicable, and on the face of it, the right of a reference to the ECJ if they are dissatisfied. The purpose of the two groups of amendments is to achieve something much simpler, clearer and more just than the conclusion if the complaints I have described are correct.

I respectfully suggest that if a relevant cause of action accrues before the date of exit, the claimant should be able to pursue that cause of action. That would be their normal litigation right, and exit should not retrospectively remove that normal litigation right. As the Bill stands, because of ambiguity there is a risk that some or all Francovich claims, unless they have already been completed, will be extinguished. Surely, that would be an incorrect and unintended consequence. Plainly—and I will deal with this in a moment—there are some concerns about the potential role of the ECJ.

[Lord Faulks]

One of the points I was going to make concerned the continued role of the ECJ, but while I am on my feet, I entirely understand the noble Lord’s points about transitional provisions, but will he clarify to the House whether his support would go as far as the noble Lord, Lord Davies, in having a continuing Francovich?

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

No, I would not go so far as the latter part of the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Davies. I recognise that if we leave the European Union, as we are doing, we have to have the transitional arrangements that were promised and that were referred to by the learned judges in the Supreme Court, on the basis of submissions that may well have been made by the noble Lord himself.

What I suggest to deal with the ECJ problem is one of two alternatives. One is to allow the ECJ jurisdiction to continue for the very small number of cases likely to arise. I recognise, of course, that that will attract political problems that might better be overcome by a more pragmatic solution. The pragmatic solution is to recognise and clarify that the United Kingdom courts, in dealing with such cases, should apply normal, comparative law principles; the sort of thing that we lawyers are accustomed to when we cite, for example, Australian or Canadian cases before the senior courts. This would mean that the courts of the United Kingdom, in dealing with such cases, should have due regard to ECJ decisions on similar and analogous matters. This would fall, as I say, within the ordinary principles of comparative law, whereby the United Kingdom courts give due weight to useful and relevant decisions in other jurisdictions. Thus we would have at least analogous law applied to the residual Francovich cases. We would have a right to make a claim on the basis of the date when the claim accrued, even if it is not yet quantified and not yet pursued, and the unintended consequences of retrospectivity would be avoided. In my view this would accord with sound legal principle.

I urge the Minister, even at this late hour, to say that he will return to the House with suitable and welcome government amendments for the clarification and preservation of what are proper bases for action.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

My Lords, three pretty clear themes are emerging around the House. First, you should be able to use the subordinate legislation to change EU retained law only where it is necessary to make EU retained law work. Secondly, it should affect only technical matters; and thirdly, it should not take away any individual’s rights. So there are three requirements: it must be necessary to make it work, affect only technical matters and not take away anybody’s rights. The argument for being allowed to go further has not been made anywhere, and I would be very interested to hear the Minister say why those three principles should not apply to every piece of subordinate legislation under the Act. If the Government want to go further, primary legislation should be used. Unless there is a case for going further, this Act should be appropriately limited.

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

The Bingham Centre makes the very cogent point that there is no clear analysis so far as to what the body of EU law is in an easily accessible form, so that businesses and individuals can ascertain what applies to them. However, the Solicitor-General said in the other place that there are 12,000 EU regulations currently in force in the UK and around 7,900 statutory instruments implementing EU legislation.

I understand the fears expressed around the House, particularly on the opposite Benches about the feeling that the Government have all sorts of sinister plans to take away rights. They will do so if they feel it necessary, by primary legislation, it is said, but no other way. This amendment would make it very difficult to do anything other than by primary legislation. First, a list of so-called technical provisions has to be established—a considerable challenge. No changes can modify any of the matters which are set out in Amendment 21. Those matters seem to cover more or less everything. What is to say that labelling and packaging is not a matter for consumer standards? Matters of health and safety entitlements, equality entitlements and rights of protection—almost anything can come within those definitions. Similarly, there are environmental standards and protection. I am not talking about fundamental matters such as the working time directive, but a great deal of the various regulations and statutory instruments that come from Europe are relatively trivial. Even those who endorse very much what has come from Europe would accept that not all of it is critical or crucial to our society going forward. That will make it almost impossible to change anything, which may be the desire of members of the party opposite who do not want to leave the European Union—or those all around the House.

That is the effect of this amendment. So far as Amendment 22 is concerned, on “human rights protection”, the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, was very succinct; he did not specify what “human rights protection” meant. We had a debate on the Charter of Fundamental Rights—

[Lord Cashman]

I precisely did not elaborate on the reasons why, as I felt that I did that at some length on Monday evening. But it is precisely because the Government have said that they have no intention of carrying over the Charter of Fundamental Rights, or the right of action based on the general principles. It is precisely for those reasons that we need to protect the aspect of human rights, because it is not contained specifically within the previous amendment.

[Lord Faulks]

The Human Rights Act is expressly preserved as a result of the changes that the Bill is going to bring about. The charter is, of course, ruled out by the Bill at the moment; I suppose, from what the noble Lord says, this is a way in which to bring it back in under the rubric of “human rights protection”—but, of course, “human rights protection” is potentially a varied and wide description.

This amendment is an absolute recipe for confusion and litigation. Although I understand the feelings of insecurity about what a Government might have in mind, it is not consistent with the overall objective of this legislation, which is to provide clarity at the moment when we leave the European Union.

[Lord Pannick]

Given the noble Lord’s objections to the drafting of this amendment, does he sympathise, as I do, with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, with the idea that a way can be found to restrict powers of Ministers by subordinate legislation to change retained EU law? Will he express the hope that the Government will think very carefully about that and bring forward an amendment before Report?

[Lord Faulks]

I am grateful for that intervention. I am certainly receptive to the possibility of some restrictions on what the Government can do, but this is far too much of a restriction—it is a complete straitjacket.

[Lord Bilimoria (CB)]

If I may, I shall just reference the former Attorney-General, Dominic Grieve, who wrote recently:

“Having just spent four months considering the EU (Withdrawal) Bill … I don’t think I have ever seen a piece of legislation that conferred such power on the executive to change the law of the land by statutory instrument … and where the entire structure was so closely interwoven that the same end could often be achieved by different routes”.


We have not yet touched on this, but we had the Strathclyde review from the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde. On 26 October 2015, noble Lords withheld agreements to tax credit regulations and the following day a Motion was moved and narrowly defeated and, therefore, the Prime Minister said that we should review this. The House was criticised for flexing its political muscle and the review said that we should,

“understand better the expectations of both Houses when it comes to secondary legislation and, in particular, whether the House of Lords should retain its veto”.

We built up lots of experience with secondary legislation and, of course, the House of Commons is meant to be primary and its will should not be blocked. As the noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde said:

“It would be regrettable if the Lords simply became a highly politicised ‘House of Opposition’”.


We are not a House of opposition; when that happened, it was a rare occurrence for all of us present, because since 1968 there has been a convention that we should not reject statutory instruments. It has very rarely happened. The rejection of the tax credits regulation broke new ground.

So it is much more complicated. There are so many different types of statutory instruments, including super-affirmative, subject to affirmative resolution procedure, subject to negative resolution procedure, laid instruments and unlaid instruments. The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said that there were already 8,000 statutory instruments in place regarding the European Union. If you look at the number of instruments over the years, it runs into thousands. How many thousand statutory instruments does the Minister predict we will need to implement this Bill?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. I know the Committee will not believe this but the three noble Lords I most want to thank are the noble Lords, Lord True and Lord Faulks, and the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard. I thank the noble Lord, Lord True, for raising my spirits. I love the words “Labour Government”; I will use them again and again. I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, because sometimes when you know what you are talking about, you assume that everyone else does. I had got something wrong and it was not clear. I was not talking about how, under this Bill, the current EU rules will be put into legislation by statutory instruments. We are content with that. We will in due course argue about whether the relevant word should be “necessary” or “appropriate”, but that is not the purpose of this amendment. I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, for giving me the opportunity to say that.

The purpose of the amendment is about looking way into the future and future-proofing what we are putting into UK legislation and to make sure that it cannot then be tampered with by means of statutory instruments. It is not about the current work that many of our colleagues on the statutory instruments committee are about to undertake. We are talking about the future. I again thank the noble Viscount for giving me the opportunity to discuss that.

I say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, that I said at the beginning of this discussion that we would come on to how we deal with the bigger issues involved in this matter. However, today, I want to discuss the human, environmental and consumer rights that we sometimes risk losing sight of when we get into the technicalities of law and how we are going to hold on to those. As I said, I absolutely accept that we may deal with the technicalities later.

The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said that certain bits of retained EU law could possibly be dealt with by statutory instruments and others by primary legislation. Elsewhere in the Bill judges are allowed to deal with measures on a case-by-case basis. But in the case of retained EU law, we have a difficulty as I think he said that he was happy for the Government to decide which measures could be dealt with by secondary legislation. Perhaps that is the nub of the problem.

[Lord Faulks]

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way. I perhaps ought to clarify that I was responding to a question from the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I meant the Government in the course of the Bill rather than the Government simply deciding that they wanted to do it.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

I thank the noble Lord. I apologise for misunderstanding that point.

I am afraid there was an offline conversation between the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, and myself. I do not know whether he referred to that when he spoke but in that conversation he gave a very good description of the aims of the Bill—namely, that after we have examined it and are satisfied that all the stuff is going into UK legislation, everyone should know what the rules are and the Bill should achieve that outcome. That is what this measure is about. It is about whether we leave it to Ministers in the future to decide which bits of retained EU law they can deal with in secondary legislation. As my noble friend Lady Drake said, we need to restrain executive powers as ministerial promises will not suffice. That in a sense is where we are with this issue.

My next point relates to the issue raised by the noble Earl, Lord Listowel—namely, that we as legislators look at something but may forget sometimes to undertake consultation, be it with families or anyone else. That is one of the other great advantages of primary legislation: it is much more out there for people to talk about.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, as always trumps everything I do and comes up with much better arguments. However, I too had not noticed the lack of a time limit in Schedule 8. I am sure that we shall want to return to that.

As we have heard a number of times, the Minister said that there has been no parliamentary scrutiny of the current EU law, so anything we get in future will be better. I remind him that much of that law goes through the Council of Ministers, where we have a Minister, and through the European Parliament, where we have British MEPs. Therefore, the idea that there is no democratic involvement from the Brits is not quite right. We are listening to the concerns of consumers, workers and, indeed, business, about the Bill and I think there will be amendments to it to address some of their concerns. However, we are looking now to future-proof it to ensure that we do not give Ministers rights that we may not want them to have. We will come back to that in the broader discussion. However, for the moment, all noble Lords will be very pleased to know that I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 21.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Goldsmith]

I apologise to both noble Lords. The proposition is that the charter does no more than codify existing rights and principles, so it is not necessary to bring it in. It has been said, for example, by the very distinguished and independent Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law that that proposition is demonstrably not correct. It sets that out in a detailed report that I commend to noble Lords. An opinion of Queen’s Counsel obtained by the Equalities and Human Rights Commission concludes that in fact this would lead to a significant weakening of human rights protection in the United Kingdom. Against those independent statements, it is no wonder that many NGOs and many members of civil society are deeply troubled about the exclusion of the charter. It is not just civil society that is concerned about that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, noted in the last debate, but industries such as the tech industry.

One can find examples of rights that are not protected in the report, which I also commend to noble Lords, by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. In its right-by-right analysis it identifies which rights are already included in our law and which are not. For example, on the very first item in the charter—Article 1 on the protection of human dignity, which many people would regard as the most fundamental human right and the basis of all others—the Government’s right-by-right analysis gives two reasons for saying that that would be continued: first, an unincorporated treaty, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which does not have enforceable effect in this country at all; and, secondly, as a general principle of EU law—but, as noble Lords will know, this Bill seeks to prevent general principles of EU law being given effect or creating any enforceable rights. That is an aspect that we will have to come back to later in the debates on the Bill.

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

The noble and learned Lord identifies the fact that certain rights are no longer protected adequately because the charter contains rights that are not there in the European convention or, presumably, otherwise provided for by law. Could he tell the House why the Human Rights Act was not expanded to take into account the protection of these laws? At no time from 1998 to the time when the Labour Government lost power was there any attempt to include these rights that he now says are a central part of our law.

[Lord Goldsmith]

They were, because the charter provided for them. The Human Rights Act incorporated one set of provisions only, the European Convention on Human Rights, which goes back to just after the Second World War and which provides the classic political and civil rights. The other rights that we find in the charter, which is a much longer document and refers to socioeconomic rights, were not included in the Human Rights Act because they were not included in the European Convention on Human Rights.

The right-by-right analysis demonstrates which of these rights are not included. Given that the Government’s objective, as stated by the Prime Minister, is to ensure that the protections for people in this country are the same the day after exit as the day before, I respectfully suggest that it is not for me to identify why that is not right; it is for the Government to demonstrate why it is. When we have substantial independent bodies such as the Bingham Centre and independent opinions from QCs demonstrating that actually it is not the case that the protections remain the same, the Government need to explain. I shall come on to that further.

Obviously there are examples of rights in the charter that reflect precisely other rights that we have within our law. In particular, there are a number of rights in the charter that are explicitly based on the European Convention on Human Rights; they are the same. Indeed, during the negotiations I went to some pains to try to ensure that they were phrased in the same way so as to prevent lawyers from saying, “It’s written differently so it must mean something different”. However, those are not the only rights that are there. As I noted at Second Reading, the charter is based not just on the European Convention on Human Rights but on principles of EU law and on principles that are commonly accepted by the member states, and those are in a different position from the ECHR rights.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Faulks]

Is the noble and learned Lord telling the House that these principles are going to be actionable on their own?

[Lord Goldsmith]

The noble Lord knows that that is not the position in relation to the principles: they are guidance and aspirational. I am not spending a lot of time on them, although some of the NGOs have. I will give one example. There was a case in which the EU’s proposed legislation in relation to plain packaging of tobacco products was challenged in the courts on the grounds that it contravened freedom of expression. One of the things that the court looking at that noted was that the charter provided for a high degree of public protection in terms of health. I hope that all noble Lords agree with that sentiment, whether or not they agree with the result of the case. That is an example of where the principles come into effect.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Hailsham]

Yes, I know that is what he has said but I ask noble Lords to think about the impact on those who will lose their assets. That is the point I am making. I agree with my noble friend but my point is: what about the position of those who lose their assets?

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords—

[Viscount Hailsham]

I am just going to finish this point and then I will give way. It is at that point that Article 17 of the charter comes into play. As the Committee will know, Article 17 provides that property is to be protected and, furthermore, that rights of compensation are to be paid. This is the protection that this House would be very chary about giving away. I give way to my noble friend.

[Lord Faulks]

My noble friend will know that Article 1 of the first protocol of the European convention does precisely the same thing.

[Viscount Hailsham]

So there is an overlap, and the question is one of remedies. As my noble friend will know, the remedies under the charter are probably more effective than the remedies under the convention, and that is the point that the noble and learned Lord was making.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Cashman (Lab)]

My Lords, I speak as a co-signatory to Amendment 63A, which is also in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness. I will be very brief, especially in a room full, it seems, of Law Lords and lawyers. I come to this in perhaps a very different way from others. As a 67 year-old man, I have spent most of my life not having equality before the law or the equal protection of the law; that is, as a gay man. Most of my rights—the equality I now enjoy—have been achieved largely by dragging legislative changes forcefully from Governments who did not want to give them to us or to many other misrepresented and defamed minorities. When it comes to human rights and civil liberties, you can never have enough belt and braces. Therefore, I do not understand why the exception to the carryover of EU law is solely in relation to the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and the general principles.

I promised to be brief and brief I will be. Tonight has illustrated to me more than any arguments that have come from a swathe of NGOs, such as the Bar Council, the Law Society, the Royal College of Nursing and others, that we cannot bring forward a change of such magnitude as this in a Bill that is supposed to retain all the EU law and then amend it afterwards. If we are to change the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, it should be done with full public scrutiny by both Houses, through primary legislation and the full engagement of civil society.

Let me finish on this. I talked about the rights that I and others have achieved that have had to be dragged. I want people to have easier access to the courts. If the Charter of Fundamental Rights in some way, through one clause or another, achieves that, I will go to wherever I go when I lay my head finally with great peace and rest. Why? Because the European Union was born out of the ashes of the Second World War—the ashes from crematoria that were dotted across Europe because people were taken there because of their difference, their perceived difference. Homosexuals were worked to death in concentration camps alongside trade unionists and many others. Yes, it is emotional but when you are denied and deprived of your human rights, it strikes at the very core of your being. When you are not given the equality that others have under the law, it strikes at your very existence.

These rights have been achieved and enumerated not only in conventions. Sadly, I have heard laughter rained upon people who have tried to defend the charter and the concept of human rights tonight, and I do not take that lightly. These rights that have been achieved have often been forced back against those who have sought them. They have been achieved, often, against the will of Governments and across the sacrifices of generations. Do not put them aside lightly. I urge noble Lords to support this group of amendments. If we are to change anything, let us do it through primary legislation or, at the very least, in the same way that we amend other retained EU law.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am sure that the Committee will be greatly moved by what the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, has said. Everyone is concerned to protect human rights but we must not fall into the trap of saying rights are good and therefore, more rights are better.

The role of the Charter of Fundamental Rights in our law has been an uncertain one. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, has had a great deal to do with it and knows a great deal about its creation; he played a part in its drafting. He got his retaliation in first at Second Reading and today, knowing that it was going to be pointed out to him that he was not initially an enthusiast for the charter because of the apparent disorder it might create in the rights architecture of our law. There is nothing wrong with changing your mind. It is quite a fashionable course for the party opposite to take at the moment. My difficulty is not with the change of mind but the fact that I agreed with his original stance, which was that adding the charter, which was designed for an entirely different purpose, ran the risk of undermining the clarity and cogency of our law.

I have some experience of the way rights are played in court. I was part of the Commission on a Bill of Rights, together with the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, who is in her place. I was also a Minister with responsibility for human rights. I have considerable experience over the past 20 years, following the incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights by the Human Rights Act, of acting for public authorities which have been sued for alleged violations of those rights. Rights are very difficult to interpret, whether they come from a declaration, a charter or a convention. Inevitably they tend to be expressed in general terms and leave a great deal to individual judges to interpret and try to make practical sense of.

Most of the rights contained in the charter—obviously, some of them are inappropriate—are not controversial in what they seek to protect. What is far more controversial is how these rights should be interpreted. My right may be in conflict with your right. The protection of my right may have to be sacrificed or modified by the need to protect others’ rights or the powers that the state may inevitably have which affect or modify those rights. Of course we need to protect children, the disabled and the vulnerable in society, as a number of noble Lords have pointed out. Most of what we do in Parliament is concerned with the definition of circumstances in which individuals’ rights should be protected. A number of noble Lords have identified the right to dignity as being important since it is not reflected precisely in the European convention. We can all agree that it is important that citizens are treated with dignity but how does one translate that into anything meaningful in terms of the courts providing remedies?

The difficulty is that rights are now regarded as trumps and if we are to retain the charter, as seems to be the purport of the amendments in this group, we will have the rather strange situation of existing domestic law, whether it comes from the Human Rights Act or elsewhere, being supplemented by the charter, which will have a particular status. As the Government have made clear, the charter was never supposed to be a source of rights per se but a reflection of the rights that are generally protected by the European Court of Justice. It would be peculiar for our courts to continue to rely on the charter, which was designed to apply to EU institutions in interpreting the scope of EU law, after we have actually left the European Union.

The Advocate-General has occasionally made remarks about the charter. At its highest it has been described as “soft law”. If we need to protect or further protect rights, is that not a matter for Parliament or even judges interpreting the common law? Are we really so impotent as a Parliament that we have to rely on the relatively recent EU charter to provide such protection? Some of the amendments seek to turn soft law into hard law with application after we have left. This Bill is surely to provide clarity and coherence in the law after we have left the EU. Retaining the charter will do precisely the opposite.

I regret that I do not agree with various observations made at Second Reading that the Human Rights Act provides only for declarations of incompatibility. It does in fact provide damages for violations of the convention. I suspect the reason the charter has attracted such vigorous support is the rather egregious way it has been singled out for attention in the Bill. The reason it has been so singled out is the uncertainty of its application by the courts so far, and the Government’s desire to be absolutely clear that in the difficult task of interpreting the law that the judges will face, the charter can safely be ignored.

My amendment, which I come to in conclusion, is an attempt to provide some clarity as to what role, if any, the charter may have in the future. In so far as the charter is part of retained law—I appreciate that the definition of retained law is also the subject of debate—there seems no harm in it having some continued existence, in so far as it is necessary for the interpretation of that retained law; hence my amendment. What I find wholly unconvincing is the argument that it should somehow remain, as a non-native species, providing a free-standing source of rights—as in the Goldsmith amendment—or that it should be grafted on, subject to amendments to the Human Rights Act, as in the Wigley amendment. Who will benefit if the charter remains part of our domestic law after exit day? I fear it will not be those whom we rightly wish to protect; it will be the lawyers, and surely we do not want that.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

My Lords—

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

I stood up before the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, sat down as I knew he was coming to an end. He mentioned, and I accept entirely, his position that the Government may have excluded the Charter of Fundamental Rights because of uncertainty. But for many people it is an indicator of something else: that Conservative Party manifestos over a number of years have promised that the Human Rights Act would be removed. On many occasions, we have heard leading Conservatives say that we should remove ourselves from the European Convention on Human Rights, too. The absence of the Charter of Fundamental Rights from the Bill suggests to many that this is part of a journey taking us out of any international arrangements dealing with the protection of human rights, and that that is the real purpose.

[Lord Faulks]

The Government’s position has been made quite clear: they have no intention of repealing the Human Rights Act. It is perfectly true that the previous Government said that they would consult on the question and bring in a British Bill of Rights, which would not mean departing from the European convention. Of course, I understand that there are those who are suspicious of this Government’s motives—I do not speak for the Government—but if a Government were hell-bent on getting rid of human rights, they would of course be able to get rid of the charter as well. I do not accept the sinister interpretation of the noble Baroness. The intention is simply to achieve clarity; that is what the Bill is about.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

The Conservative manifesto said:

“We will not repeal … the Human Rights Act while the process of Brexit is underway but we will consider our human rights legal framework when the process of leaving the EU concludes. We will remain signatories to the European Convention on Human Rights for the duration of the next parliament”.


When the Minister replies, can he give us an assurance about the long-term commitment of the Conservative Party to the Human Rights Act?

[Lord Faulks]

No Parliament can bind its successor; one would expect every Government to consider human rights as an ongoing process, and how best to protect them.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 63A, which is in my name and has already been spoken to with great passion by the noble Lord, Lord Cashman. He gave an excellent antidote to a debate that has otherwise been an important but nevertheless cerebral examination of the legal position of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Prisons: Careers Guidance

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Wednesday 31st January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I do not have those figures immediately to hand, but I am content to write to the noble Lord, outlining such figures as we have in that regard, and I will place a copy of the letter in the Library.

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

Would the Minister agree with me that one of the encouraging features about jobs and careers for prisoners is the number of times employers from the private sector engage prisoners, while they are still in prison, who turn out to be satisfactory employees who then continue that employment when they leave?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, in response to the question from my noble friend, I agree that there have been notable successes in this area, and we should appreciate the work done by some particular employers in this regard. There is one in particular where present indications are that something like 10% of their workforce are former inmates. If we can encourage other employers to take this step forward, we can help to reduce recidivism in the prison population.

Non-Disclosure Provisions

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Monday 22nd January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the Government have committed to consider the report of the committee that is looking into this issue, and will then determine what further steps should be taken. We would prefer to react to the outcome of that report rather than anticipating it.

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lady Stowell referred to the problem with lawyers. This is a problem that has emerged particularly in Hollywood, where a very powerful industry, which unfortunately has been responsible for exploiting often young women in particular, has allowed them to obtain at least some form of legal advice, but there has nevertheless been a considerable inequality of bargaining power between the two. Does my noble friend not think that the Government ought to be looking at a presumption that unless there is equality of bargaining power, these sorts of agreements should be unenforceable?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am not sure that the introduction of some form of legal presumption is necessary. Thanks to the Employment Rights Act 1996, if an employee is not given independent legal advice, any non-disclosure provision becomes unenforceable.

CPS: Disclosure of Evidence

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Monday 18th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the matter to which the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, alludes was a recent case in which the Crown withdrew and the matter did not proceed. There is to be a joint internal review by the CPS and the police to determine what occurred in that case. With regard to the case that she alludes to, the CPS has acknowledged that its standards may have fallen below what is expected and it has apologised to all the parties involved.

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

My Lords, one of the problems is that there is a great deal more to disclose than there once was in terms of the number of records that are kept. However, does not the obligation go both ways? Not only must the prosecution make sure that everything is available to the defence, but defence lawyers must make sure that every single piece of relevant information is disclosed to them and that it is analysed properly for the benefit of their client, which places a considerable burden on them. Is my noble and learned friend satisfied that adequate resources, by way of legal aid or otherwise, are made available to enable them to do this?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to my noble friend. It is of course important that the defence has the opportunity and the means to consider what requests should be made of the prosecution in the context of disclosure. Indeed, in the context of the case alluded to earlier, that point will be addressed.

Bach Commission: The Right to Justice

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Thursday 14th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Bach, on producing this report and on securing this debate, so that we can discuss in the limited time available some of the recommendations that it makes. During the debate on the Queen’s Speech, I said that I hoped that when the Government looked at LASPO, they would take into account what was said by the Bach commission, and I reiterate that today.

The availability of legal aid was part of the post-war settlement. It enabled many people to have access to legal advice and representation that they had never had before. But successive Governments, of all colours, became alarmed at the growth and level of expenditure. Modest reforms by my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern were followed by the Access to Justice Act 1999. It was brought in by the Labour Government and created, probably inadvertently, a veritable bonanza for litigators and various parasitic organisations, causing a real imbalance in litigation. Somehow legal aid got lost along the way.

The LASPO Bill, introduced by the coalition Government, took heavy fire in Parliament, particularly in your Lordships’ House. I was on the Back Benches and was far from happy with Part 1, which concerned the scope of legal aid. Indeed, it is the only area in which I have voted against the Government in my time in your Lordships’ House. Part 2, on the other hand, was a considerable success, reflecting the Jackson reforms.

There is a great deal to recommend in this report. The provision for exceptional case funding never seemed to make a great deal of sense. I think it was designed to fend off possible attack in Strasbourg. I attempted to probe the scope of that provision in Committee but never got a very satisfactory answer. I also very much agree with the recommendation on early legal help. There used to be a green form scheme, which allowed initial advice to be given at modest rates. So many disputes could be avoided by sensible advice given at an early juncture. It can point people in the right direction, not always—in fact, rarely—towards full-scale litigation but to alternative routes to solving problems. There are also some good points about the proper way to calculate eligibility for legal aid and some powerful points about scope.

However, the report acknowledges—the noble Lord, Lord Bach, referred to this—that the recommendations will cost money. The estimate is £400 million, but of course it will cost a great deal more in due course. I part company with the recommendations at this point. In my view, Parliament and the Government ought to be responsible for spending on legal aid. I appreciate the reference to the desirability of some cross-party consensus on this issue—it somewhat echoes what many people say about the NHS—but these proposals seem significantly to subcontract the whole question of legal aid to a quango, however eminent the members of that quango might be. The commission would have significant powers to ensure the so-called right to justice, including how it is understood; to intervene and assist in individual cases; and to enforce that so-called right to justice. It could effectively tell the Government what to do in a number of areas. Judges, too, would have a power to adjourn proceedings, to issue a certificate stating that legal aid should be made available, and to review the lack of legal aid on the basis that the right to justice has been infringed. The justice commission would challenge government decisions and intervene in individual litigation. In short, it would have very considerable powers.

When it comes to legal aid, the Government—any Government—are subject to scrutiny from all professional bodies, parliamentary committees and, of course, the Opposition. I saw how effective that can be during the progress of the LASPO Bill through Parliament, when many amendments were made. I therefore do not share the view of the noble Lord and his commission that a right to justice or a justice commission would be a substitute for the way the lines of accountability currently work.

There is much to recommend in this report but there are also parts that seem undesirable—they could give undue power to a quango and risk politicising judges. We can make changes to the legal aid system without doing either of those things.

Brexit: Human Rights

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Tuesday 12th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, who is a well-known champion of the protection of human rights. I share with him—and, I am sure, all other noble Lords—a sense of the importance of their continued protection following Brexit. I also, I suspect, share with him a disappointment with the decision taken by the British public to leave the European Union. I am extremely concerned about some of the economic consequences of our so doing, but this evening we are concerned with the human rights consequences and the need to keep them ever at the forefront of our considerations. Although complacency is not appropriate, nevertheless I feel confident that we can protect human rights adequately in the future without being involved in the European Union.

The final shape of any deal—and I profoundly hope that there is a deal—will, I hope, deal adequately with citizens’ rights and the security and criminal justice arrangements that have been the bedrock of our relationship with other European Union countries. The noble Lord, Lord Cashman, spoke about the Charter of Fundamental Rights. His party was not very enthusiastic about that when it was first brought in. Although I think it is a fine statement of general principle, I fear that I am one of those who do not feel that actionable rights per se are necessarily the answer. I have read the government review of the withdrawal Bill in connection with the charter and it does not seem that we are likely to lose any substantial protection if Clause 6(5) becomes law.

As to the Human Rights Act, we still have it. There has been talk—of which I am aware—of a British Bill of Rights. Together with the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, I was on the commission that considered whether that should be the case. The majority thought that it should, although nobody thought that that would result in a diminution of protection; it was a question simply of recalibrating our relationship with the Strasbourg court.

Why am I not unduly concerned about our future protection of human rights post Brexit? It is simply because I believe that our courts, with their historic tradition of respecting human rights, and our Parliament, should be, and have proved, capable of responding to the challenges that human rights issues sometimes pose. I will give two examples. The first is modern slavery. All human rights documents and conventions, quite rightly, outlaw slavery in all its manifestations—but what we needed was a piece of bespoke legislation to deal with the precise problems, subtle yet profound, thrown up by modern slavery. That is what Parliament could do, rather than a broadly based rights instrument.

The second example was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Cashman: the very important equal marriage legislation. That is something that Parliament achieved, notwithstanding opposition within Parliament and considerable opposition outside. It was one of those occasions when Parliament was ahead, I think, of most of the general public, and now we can turn round and say that Parliament should be proud of what it achieved in that respect. It is an irony that many of those who were concerned about it thought that it might offend the Strasbourg court in some way—hence the clever drafting of that piece of legislation to make it proof from any such challenge.

So what are the Government’s priorities post Brexit? I hope and believe that they are to maintain our reputation for protecting and honouring human rights. We belong to innumerable treaties, conventions and the like which do just that. We have an excellent reputation for our protection of human rights. I believe that we will be able to continue to do so. We should not rest on our laurels, of course, but should be active in identifying any potential weaknesses—but human rights are safe with our Parliament and our courts.

Damages (Personal Injury) Order 2017

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Tuesday 18th July 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, and thank him for bringing forward his regret Motion on this order. So much of the detail has been described to the House that I am not going to repeat it, but there can be almost no one who looks at a discount rate of minus 0.75%, even for a risk-free investment, who does not come to the conclusion that the number is simply preposterous. For the Government to implement a result that is preposterous seems to me entirely inappropriate, not just for this Government but for any.

For many years I was a banker. There were times when it was necessary to price instruments, and I would turn to one of the junior bankers who worked with me and ask them to go away, go through the analysis and come forward with a conclusion. You would find one or two who were wedded to a particular formula that had been brought to their attention at some point during their training, and were absolutely certain that by applying the formula they would come to an appropriate result, even though when one looked at the result it was completely inappropriate for the situation and the purpose. That is what we have here: an allegiance to a formula—which was probably the wrong formula from the day that it was brought in but is certainly an inappropriate formula today—that the Government are insisting on applying simply because it is the existing formula. Frankly, I can think of no worse way in which to manage any aspect of finance in this economy.

The Government may take the view that the impact of making a preposterous and inappropriate decision does not matter very much. I think that it does, as I think does most of this House. Of course it is crucial that anyone who has been severely injured and is awarded damages over a long period should not be undercompensated, but there is no rationale either for overcompensation. If I understand correctly, this does not change the award; it is with the translation of the award into a lump sum that the discount rate comes into play.

The impact on insurance premiums matters. I admit that I am less concerned about the profits of insurance companies than about the impact of rising insurance premiums on many of the people who have to take out insurance. The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, referred to young people who are now having to pay significantly more for motor insurance. It has been proposed that the price could be as much as an additional £1,000 a year, a very significant sum. We have already seen a significant rise in insurance premiums, partly due to changes in the Government’s tax regime. I point out to the noble Lord that if you are a young person living in a rural community you may have no choice but to drive if you want to have a job and go to school, as we have cut back on rural bus services, so there is an ongoing impact that is quite significant.

There is also very little discussion of the impact on various different departments. I think that the MoD suffers badly from this change in the discount rate, although I have no idea what the figure is. Presumably the National Health Service is impacted significantly as well. All that rolls back on the taxpayer, so there are real implications of getting the discount rate wrong.

I do not understand why the Government persist in applying a formula that they know is entirely inappropriate and comes up with a preposterous result, particularly when they have almost completed a consultation, with a review to follow which, we hope, will mean that they go back to the drawing board in a matter of weeks to try to right this set of wrongs.

I would become very angry with a junior banker who blindly applied a completely inappropriate formula. When it is a Government blindly applying a completely inappropriate formula, it begins to be unforgivable.

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Hodgson on bringing these matters to the attention of the House. I ought to preface my few comments by declaring an interest: I am a practising barrister and much of my practice is concerned with the application of the discount rate in calculating damages. Some of my clients will benefit from this and others will not, but I hope to be able to stand back to make a few general comments about the appropriateness —or, I fear, the lack of it—of the proposed changes.

As several noble Lords have pointed out, this came about in rather unusual circumstances. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, is quite right: it is adherence to a formula which is inappropriate. There may be some internal mathematical integrity about the exercise, but it bears little relation to the proper approach to the assessment of damages. We approach them on the basis that there should be full compensation, and nothing that I say should derogate from that—we think that claimants ought to be properly compensated—but how do we assess what the compensation should be?

It has always been said that by giving a claimant a lump sum, the one thing you are certain about is that the damages will be inappropriate. Either the sum will be too much, because the claimant dies earlier than expected, or it will not be enough. Either way, that is undesirable. That is one reason why judges often said that it would be much better for there to be periodical payments. From about 1996, periodical payments became part of the picture. With great respect, I rather disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, who seemed rather to distance himself from the advantages of periodical payments. Perhaps he did not—he was referring to the Law Society’s dislike of the overreliance on periodical payments.

If we are to approach the assessment of compensation on the basis that claimants should not be taking too much by way of risk, surely periodical payments offer a significant advantage. For example, the largest head of damage is often the future cost of care for a badly damaged claimant. Most claimants nowadays will seek periodical payments. Sometimes the cost may be £100,000 or even £200,000 for a long life, and life expectation has been increasing, particularly for brain-damaged babies and others severely affected. Periodical payments provide security, but if claimants are now to say, “No, I would prefer to have a lump sum”, they are, as it were, saying, “I do not want the security provided by periodical payments”. What then is the sense of awarding damages on the basis that they are an entirely risk-free investor? That simply does not make any sense.

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, referred to the often somewhat unedifying disputes that exist between claimants’ lawyers on the one hand and insurers on the other. I distance myself from that and concentrate on the position of the NHS. The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, referred to the MoD. The NHS will feel the effects of this measure very considerably. Speaking to a colleague of mine, a schedule of damages was priced before the discount rate operation at £9 million. It is now £23.5 million. Very often a standard brain-damaged baby case might have been on a lump sum calculation £10 million; it is now going to be £30 million. That is partly because life expectation of those claimants has vastly increased, but it is a result of the discount rate alteration.

Prosecutions: Defence Legal Costs

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Wednesday 15th March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I say with respect to my noble friend that it is necessary in this context to have regard to the public interest as well as the private interest of individuals. A balance has to be struck in that context. On the case he referred to of an 82 year-old, as I indicated earlier, the individual in question was offered legal aid having been eligible for it. Had he accepted that offer, he would have recovered his costs.

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

My Lords, the rule used to be far more straightforward. If you were acquitted of an offence, you were entitled to your costs, but the judge had a discretion not to award costs if you had somehow brought the prosecution upon you. Is that not the best way to approach matters?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, there are clearly a variety of ways in which this matter can be addressed. Nevertheless, I fail to understand how someone who has been acquitted could be accused of having brought the prosecution on themselves.