Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Monday 18th November 2013 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Faulks]

20: Clause 1, page 1, line 8, after “conduct” insert “that might reasonably be regarded as”

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

My Lords, we return to considering Part 1 of the Bill, in particular IPNAs. I have already addressed the Committee about my views generally on Part 1, which support the Government, and I have no need to repeat them. However, I acknowledge that concern has been expressed both within the House and outside that the test for what is,

“capable of causing nuisance and annoyance”,

could be regarded as subjective. This would, potentially at least, result in a court ordering an injunction on the basis of some perceived nuisance and annoyance which, looked at objectively, should not be constituted as one.

In fact, the words “nuisance and annoyance”, which have, as we have heard, a considerable pedigree both in terms of the common law in reviewing breach of covenant cases, and in a number of Housing Act statutes, have been considered by a number of judges to carry with them a degree of objectivity. I would expect that they would not be viewed entirely in subjective terms, were a case to reach court. In fact, I very much doubt that either the agencies which were to seek an injunction under this part of the Bill or the courts would come to a different view in any particular case as a result of the insertion of these additional words. However, they would serve to allay some of the anxieties that have been expressed about anti-social behaviour being too subjective a concept, and the amendment should ensure that both the agencies and the court stand back and view the behaviour objectively before deciding whether it can properly be described as,

“capable of causing nuisance and annoyance”,

and whether it is “just and convenient” to grant an injunction. This added safeguard will, I suggest, fit reasonably into the structure of the Bill without weakening the protection that it provides for communities and individuals who are so often beleaguered by anti-social behaviour.

I noted that during the course of the debate, my noble friend the Minister indicated to the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, that he was considering importing the word “reasonable”, as I understand it, into Clause 1(3) in relation to the “just and convenient” element of the judge granting an injunction. I respectfully suggest that the word “reasonable” might be better imported as a description of the relevant behaviour, rather than be imported into the discretion that a judge has in whether or not to grant an injunction. The judge would regard himself as being reasonable in any event when deciding whether it was “just and convenient” to grant an injunction. With respect, I would suggest that it would be better included further on in Clause 1. I beg to move.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

Or even “nuisance or annoyance”?

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords and noble and learned Lords who have taken part in this debate. I am grateful to the Minister for his reassuring noises; he has shown himself, as usual, to be a listening Minister. The expression “nuisance or annoyance” has a pedigree, as I think he said, in the housing context. It is almost a term of art, so widely has it been used over the years in the context of breach of covenant in common law, and it has found its way into statute.

Of course, a particular housing situation is not precisely analogous to anti-social behaviour. Nonetheless, there is a substantial accumulation of case law that the judges will understand and, I suggest, they will interpret it accordingly. I repeat what I said earlier: it seems that in any event the reasonableness is part of the judge’s task in deciding whether or not it is just and convenient to grant an injunction. Reasonableness will be the watchword, as will the obligations that the court has under the Human Rights Act.

Where I suggest it is important to import reasonableness, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, said, is at the stage of defining with some degree of objectivity the nuisance and annoyance so that neither the agencies nor the court are in any way diverted by simply having to accept a subjective interpretation of what counts as anti-social behaviour. I hope that the Minister will reflect on that. I appreciate that this does not in any way weaken the power, but it should reassure those who are naturally concerned about the potential for this power to be used oppressively, and that reassurance would be at least provided, I hope, by an appropriate amendment. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 20 withdrawn.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Tuesday 29th October 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

My Lords, this Bill, in 14 parts, will need a great deal of scrutiny. While I would like to address a number of parts to the Bill, your Lordships will be relieved to know that I do not propose to do so.

As a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, I have had the opportunity to look closely at the Bill. Many noble Lords will have seen a copy of our report, which includes the Government’s human rights memoranda and their lengthy responses to the various questions we posed.

As a committee, we looked at the Bill primarily through the prism of the Human Rights Act, but even if there were no such legislation, it would still be important closely to examine the scope of the Bill where it concerns the tension between civil liberties and the capacity of the police and other agencies to exercise control over anti-social behaviour. Much has been said already—and I expect will be said again—about the need to protect children and vulnerable adults from the potentially oppressive exercise of powers under this Bill, when their liberty can depend upon what is inevitably a subjective interpretation of what constitutes a nuisance and annoyance. This is a source of potential anxiety.

However, it is important to focus on the reason behind the legislation: the acute need to protect the victims of anti-social behaviour. It is in reality the poor, the mentally ill, the aged and the most vulnerable in society who are usually the victims of anti-social behaviour and whose lives can be made intolerable by it. They look to the police and other agencies to protect them. The Bill attempts to improve on existing powers and to provide better protection for them. It was to meet this need that the party opposite introduced ASBOs, and it was significant that during debate in the other place there was no suggestion from any members of any party that powers of this sort were not needed. With respect, Members of the other place, being in touch with their constituents, are in a good position to help on these issues. In fact, the shadow Home Secretary said that she thought that the provisions were “too weak”.

Although there are areas which will need careful examination, I broadly welcome the Bill. Of those areas that cause concern, one is clearly the expression “nuisance and annoyance”. It is considered by many to be too low a threshold, even though it has a pedigree in the housing context. I, along with many other noble Lords, have been lobbied by the Christian alliance, naturists and other not very homogenous groups who are concerned about the potential for their lawful activities to offend someone and thus fall foul of the legislation. The Minister will need to reassure your Lordships about this. The amendment suggested by our committee was not to scrap the clause, as the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, said, but that the definition should be amended so as to refer to conduct that “might reasonably be regarded” as being capable of causing nuisance or annoyance to any person. This imports a degree of objectivity into the definition and might, together with reassurances given by the Minister in the other place, serve to allay some anxieties.

Removing people from their home is a drastic step and the committee was concerned that there were adequate safeguards in this regard. I am not at all convinced of the need for the power to evict those involved in riots. I do not doubt for a moment that rioters such as we had in the summer of 2011 should be dealt with firmly and swiftly—but that is precisely what happened. Evicting them seems a step too far. The current sentencing powers are quite sufficient.

I would like to say something about forced marriage but I will wait until Committee. Similarly, miscarriages of justice and their compensation may benefit from a prolonged debate, which they did not have in the other place. It is an exquisitely difficult problem, which noble Lords will have to confront, that successive courts have tried vainly to come up with a satisfactory definition of a miscarriage of justice. The proposal in the Bill has the benefit of clarity. The question for your Lordships’ House is whether its clarity and simplicity will in fact work an injustice in some cases.

Finally, I come to stop-and-search provisions. It was the committee’s view that the statutory power to stop, question and search travellers at ports and airports was not inherently incompatible with Articles 5 or 8 of the European convention. In our view, the Government had clearly made a case for a without suspicion power to stop, question and search travellers at ports and airports, given the current nature of the threat from terrorism. The question is whether there is a need for more intrusive powers being exercisable without reasonable suspicion and whether these powers should be exercisable only after an examiner or officer reasonably suspects that the person has been involved in terrorism. The Minister will be well aware of the evidence that the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson QC, gave in this regard to the committee. Your Lordships’ House will need to be satisfied that the powers need to be quite as extensive as they are in the Bill.

Nevertheless, I am concerned about a wholesale challenge to the anti-terror powers—those, incidentally, exercised in the Miranda case. I know, as the Minister said, that the Government are awaiting a report on the Miranda case from Mr Anderson. The case that concerns me is one brought by a Mr Malik, who is apparently seeking to strike out these provisions, which originally come from Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, and has obtained permission to go on to a full hearing—this whole-scale challenge being entertained by the Strasbourg court, notwithstanding the fact that the Home Office has made it clear that Schedule 7 examinations have produced information which has contributed to long and complex intelligence-based counterterrorist investigation. We as a committee found that there was a clear case to retain those powers, albeit that their extent might be questioned. Can the Minister reassure us that the Government propose to contest Mr Malik’s case?

There is a great deal to say about this Bill, and there are areas which we covered in our report and will cover in Committee. Your Lordships’ House is well equipped to examine the Bill carefully and I look forward to taking a prominent part, or at least a part, in the process.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Tuesday 19th June 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, this Bill was always likely to be controversial and contributions so far have shown that that is the case. Part 2 has been a particular focus of attention. It is concerned with restricting the disclosure of sensitive material in court proceedings. A number of noble Lords have spoken who are not lawyers, and I entirely agree that the issues that this Bill throws up are not solely the possession of lawyers. I am, however, an advocate and as such am instinctively opposed to any erosion of the principle of natural or open justice. Evidence should be heard and read by litigants and their representatives, and their comments and reactions to it are a fundamental part of what we recognise to be a fair trial, whether that trial is in criminal or civil proceedings.

The Bill involves the extension of CMPs to include civil proceedings. It should be emphasised that CMPs are not of themselves a novelty and exist in a number of different contexts, as the Minister has described. The extension was presaged by the Green Paper, and the Government’s proposals have been much commented on in the media and by various interested parties. The Government have acknowledged the contribution of those who commented on the proposals, not least the JCHR, of which I am now a member, although I claim no credit for that contribution as I was not a member at the material time. I am conscious of some of my distinguished predecessors on that committee. Contributors to the debate even included the Daily Mail, a newspaper that normally causes the party opposite to reach for their collective smelling salts.

In response to representations, the Government have made some important modifications to their original proposals. The most important seems to be that the CMPs will be appropriate only in the disclosure of evidence that would be,

“damaging to the interests of national security”,

rather than in criminal proceedings or disclosure that might damage international relations. I share with the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, some little confusion as to why inquests fall into a separate category. As the noble Lord, Lord Lester, has said, this may be to do with the jurisprudence in Strasbourg about Article 2 and its expanded approach. The questioning in inquests may be rather different than in civil proceedings or judicial review proceedings, or the Government, as a reasonable matter of political expediency, may have responded to public disquiet.

Be that as it may, there appear to me to be certain relevant questions about what remains of CMPs. Have the Government made their case for an extension of CMPs, and if so are there sufficient safeguards in the Bill to minimise any risk to justice? The problem with the current system is that the Government are between a rock and a hard place. They may take the view that in disclosing material that will damage the interests of national security, but using PII if the application is successful, they may not be able to defend proceedings without what may be crucial evidence in their favour. The result may be that there is an inappropriate compromise of a civil claim.

The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, says that the Government are apparently in favour of the settlement of proceedings. This is not what I detect from the anxiety behind this Bill; they are in fact against inappropriate settlements where evidence has not been adduced. On the other hand, if the PII application is unsuccessful and the judge in performing the relevant balancing exercise decides to order the disclosure of material, the Government, consistent with their assessment of the potential damage in disclosure, will be placed in a position where they may have to settle a claim, to which there is if not an actual then at least a potential answer. This cannot be satisfactory and is of itself damaging to the interests of justice. The Government are entitled to justice, too.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, says quite rightly that in the course of looking at the doctrine of PII, judges have developed a range of responses to mitigate the stark choice that is sometimes presented to the Government. The ingenuity of judges includes the redaction of material and anonymisation and other procedures, but sometimes—this has been the case in the past and will be so again—the Government are left with that stark choice, which I understand is the philosophy behind this part of the Bill.

I am naturally concerned by the comments about CMPs that have been made by the special advocates, some of whom I know well. Many of their points seem valid; in particular, I am unsure how a satisfactory assessment of prospects of success can be made in the absence of critical evidence. How, too, can cases settle on the basis of a proper assessment of likely outcome—and here I acknowledge the point made appropriately by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas? How is Part 36 of the Civil Procedure Rules to operate? I am also very sympathetic to their very understandable regard for their clients’ interests, which they feel may be compromised by the lack of a free flow of communication between the special advocates and open advocates and by the risk that some relevant piece of information may remain unchallenged because of this lack of communication.

I am much less convinced, however, by the suggestion that PII is working well. I am entirely sure, as the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, pointed out, that judges are performing the balancing exercises wisely, but for the reasons I have given the operation of PII may on occasion simply fail to deliver a just decision.

The use of CMPs will inevitably be what has been described by the independent reviewer as a second-best solution. However, it is significant that David Anderson QC, in the course of his providing memoranda to the JCHR, was convinced that there was a need to have a CMP available as an option in civil cases, albeit that it might not need to be exercised anything other than very occasionally, and I agree.

Special advocates, whatever their reservations about these procedures, are known to be tenacious in the defence of their clients and in challenging evidence adduced in CMPs. It must be recorded that a number of distinguished judges, not least the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, who is not in his place, have said that CMPs are capable of producing justice and are consistent with it. Other judges, such as the much quoted noble and learned Lord, Lord Kerr, have observed that the lack of informed challenge, based on instructions, may leave the judge with a significant disadvantage in assessing the cogency of relevant evidence.

While in theory that is undoubtedly right, experience of our judiciary tells me that if evidence is adduced under CMPs, judges are likely to be particular rigorous in assessing its value. For example, if what is adduced amounts to double hearsay from a dubious source, that evidence, which could be unchallenged, is unlikely to be of much persuasive value. I simply do not recognise the scenario described by the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, whereby little bits and fragments of assertion are put forward and expected to be relied upon by judges. It seems to me that if the Secretary of State elects to invoke CMPs, he or she is likely to do so only when the evidence is of real cogency. Let us not forget that the Government have lost cases after CMPs.

It is also worth observing that the extension of CMPs relates to civil proceedings involving claims for damages or judicial review, rather than to criminal proceedings, as we were reminded by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell. While all cases should be subject to a full and preferably open hearing, the extension provided by this legislation is not concerned with criminal charges with a potential for loss of liberty.

The relative roles of the judge and the Secretary of State were much discussed in the responses to the Green Paper. It is for the Secretary of State to make the application, and the court must then make an appropriate declaration. However, I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, that under Clause 6(2) one would expect the judge to try and devise strategies and to be interventionist in order to have a mode of trial that can, if possible, avoid CMPs, which are perhaps a last resort—but a necessary last resort.

It is said that Clause 6(5), which provides that the Secretary of State must first consider making a claim for PII, is of very little force. However, I would expect the Secretary of State to need to satisfy a judge that there had been at least consideration of such an option, and an explanation provided as to why PII was not used. The rules of court that are to be made pursuant to Clause 7 require a judge to consider providing a summary or gist of the material that is not damaging, within the definition of the Bill. Presumably, it would enable the claimant to provide some comments on the relevant evidence. This would need to be carefully done, but it would provide a potentially important safeguard.

The role of the Human Rights Act is also of importance. Article 6—the right to a fair trial—is specifically referred to in the Bill and provides another safeguard. In fact, we had well established principles of fair and open justice long before the Human Rights Act came into force. However, if one is to view these provisions in Human Rights Act terms, it should be remembered that Article 2 of the convention places an obligation on the Government, as a public authority, to protect the life of their citizens. In focusing on litigants, we should not forget the rest of the population, whose well-being may well be jeopardised by the disclosure of sensitive material.

Such concerns also colour my approach to the removal of the Norwich Pharmacal remedy in relation to sensitive material. It is vital that we protect the sources of our intelligence and that we maintain the confidence of our allies who provide us with that intelligence. If there was any doubt about that, it was confirmed by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, and the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian. This remedy is concerned with cases in which foreign litigants want to see material that we hold innocently and does not affect cases where the Government are alleged to have been involved in wrongdoing, although I do not particularly like the expression “legal tourism” in this context. While I understand why the Government have chosen a wide definition of sensitive material, I invite the Minister to explain why the definition needs to be quite as wide as it is in the Bill. I do not suppose that it is intended to deny access to what most people might regard as non-sensitive material, but the Bill at least has the potential to allow such an approach.

We have heard a lucid analysis of the Binyam Mohamed case by the noble Lord, Lord Lester; and other noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred to it. It can be seen from an examination of that case law that the courts in fact showed a considerable degree of deference to the security services, and some of the concerns expressed by other countries may be rather lacking in justification. However, it has to be remembered that the Norwich Pharmacal power is unqualified. The Government do not have the choice that they have in relation to the CMPs, and if ordered to produce this material they have to comply with the order.

Whether or not the fears of the United States and other countries are unfounded, it is critical for the safety of our country in these dangerous times that we do not jeopardise that relationship. I appreciate that the Government are placed in a very delicate dilemma, and it seems that we should have profound sympathy with their response, albeit that modifications may be made in the rigour of that test, which will more satisfactorily balance the respective interests.

This Bill will be thoroughly scrutinised by your Lordships’ House—

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

My noble friend may not be aware of the fact that in the Binyam Mohamed case, after the Norwich Pharmacal order was made, the court reserved the question of public interest immunity, but it never had to be decided because he was then released. It would not have been all or nothing. It is quite clear from the judgments that there would have been something. The courts, having decided Norwich Pharmacal, could then have decided on PII. I am not sure whether that is appreciated.

[Lord Faulks]

I entirely appreciate that. It is one reason why I suggest that there may be some modification to the test that we may ultimately arrive at, after having considered this matter in Committee. This Bill will be thoroughly scrutinised in Committee by your Lordships’ House, and it is clearly right that it should be. I hope and trust that we can avoid hackneyed references to Kafka and the Star Chamber. I am sorry that in an otherwise lucid speech by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, he did not resist that temptation. The Government have a duty to protect us. This Bill is situated at the junction between that duty and the need to protect civil liberties and the integrity of the trial process. Please let us not forget the people of this country and those in the security services who labour silently on our behalf to protect them, in the course of our zeal to trumpet our commitment to the rights of litigants.

Abu Qatada

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Monday 30th April 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I cannot give a precise answer on when he will be deported because that matter is in the courts. However, I do not accept what the noble Lord says about there being a shambles last week. It was quite clear from all the advice and all the precedents that the three months for making the referral expired at midnight on 16 April. My right honourable friend made her decision on that basis. We now await to see what the courts are doing.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, on 7 February, the last occasion on which the noble Lord answered Questions about Abu Qatada, he was asked whether the Government could provide a new reassurance that this sort of situation would not recur, and he referred to the fact that the Government were hoping that reform of the Strasbourg court might make it less likely. We have now had the Brighton declaration. Can the Minister tell the House whether the Government think that this is more or less likely to happen again, and if it is less likely to do so, why?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, my noble friend is a lawyer and therefore will know that we can never give an absolutely cast-iron guarantee about what the courts or lawyers might or might not do, but I can say to him that the agreement reached at the Brighton conference represents a substantial package of reforms and marks a significant step towards realising the goals that the Prime Minister set out at Strasbourg.

Abu Qatada

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Tuesday 7th February 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I do not know the answer to that last question on the granting of bail, but the fact is that the court has granted him bail, and that is where we are at the moment. Yes, there is the possibility to appeal to the Grand Chamber. That is something that we are looking at, but I cannot go beyond saying that at the moment. If I hear anything more, I will certainly let the noble and learned Lord know in due course. The only other point from the Statement that I want to emphasise is that my right honourable friend made it quite clear, as has my right honourable friend the Prime Minister, that we will continue to look at the case for a British Bill of Rights, which we think is relevant in these matters, and for reforming the European Court of Human Rights. The Government are right to be taking the leading role in that.

[Lord Faulks]

The Minister has just said that the Government will attempt to reform the European Court of Human Rights. I know that there is great concern about, among other things, the backlog of cases and the insufficient margin of appreciation which ought to be delivered to national courts. Can the Minister help the House with how any such attempts to reform the court might avoid the very situation that we are confronted with now?

[Lord Henley]

I am afraid that my noble friend has probably asked me the hardest question of all, as to how we can deal with that problem and how it can solve our problems. Nevertheless, we want to make it clear that we think that it is right to look at reform of the ECHR. One of the reasons for that was given by my noble friend—that is, the backlog of cases that has built up there and the fact that the court seems to be involving itself in a whole number of relatively small cases that are not necessarily appropriate to it, particularly when one thinks of reforms brought through by the party opposite that have given us something known as the Supreme Court. It seems rather sad that, as soon as we have something called the Supreme Court, we have to announce that there is a court above it in the form of the European Court of Human Rights. As I said to my noble friend, finding a way to reform a court such as the European Court of Human Rights, which has of the order of 47 different members, will be a difficult job—but it is one that this country should continue to pursue.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Tuesday 15th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Newton of Braintree, warned the Minister that those directly behind him were not unanimously supportive of the Government’s position. I have previously warned the Minister that those at a bit of an angle to him are, similarly, not wholly with him.

I wish I had used the example given by the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, when I recently brought some young cousins into the Chamber and attempted to explain the separation of powers. That is exactly what this is about. Recently the Government have sometimes responded to judgments of the courts as though the courts sought to usurp policy-making powers. They are not the first Government to do so. That very response demonstrates the importance of the role of the courts, and the need to demonstrate our integrity as a country for the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Condon, has just explained.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, I have enormous respect for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, for his experience and the consistency of his approach to this issue. I also acknowledge how delicate the situation is, how important the liberty of the individual is and that any powers of this nature ought to be hedged by a great many safeguards. However, a decision of this nature is one that falls to the Home Secretary to take. So far, the judges who have these powers have exercised the right to scrutinise thoroughly in a way that we cannot feel is short of what might be desired. I respectfully submit that it is a power that should belong to the Home Secretary, who makes these decisions, no doubt with great anxiety and the consciousness that any decision that she makes will be looked at very carefully.

A judge will have an opportunity to look at a particular case on an ad hoc basis. However, we should not underestimate the strategic role of the Home Secretary to see an act or potential act of terrorism, or a terrorist, in the wider scope. Notwithstanding all the powerful speeches that have been made, I respectfully submit that this is a question that belongs to the Home Secretary and her alone.

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, we do not feel moved to change our stance on the procedure that is associated with control orders. Therefore, we have a fundamental difference of view with those who have tabled the amendments that we are discussing and, indeed, with all noble Lords bar one who have so far spoken in this debate. The security of our citizens—protecting them from the risk of terrorism of the exceptional kind that we have seen and been under threat from in recent years—is the responsibility of an elected Government through the Home Secretary. It should be a matter for the Home Secretary, who is accountable to Parliament and the electorate, and not the courts, to make an executive decision on whether a TPIM and its associated conditions are needed if she or he reasonably believes, based on the intelligence available, that an individual is involved in terrorist activity that places the security of our citizens at risk. For that reason, we are not able to support these amendments.

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[Lord Pannick]

I support the Government in their decision not to include the relocation power in the Bill. The speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, was notable for what he did not say about relocation powers. He did not mention the central feature of such a power, which makes it particularly intrusive and particularly damaging to the life of the individual who is the subject of it as well as to the lives of all members of their family. That is why such a measure should surely only be available if the Government conclude that it is truly necessary to protect national security. My understanding is that they do not, as the Minister made clear in Committee. I support them in that.

[Lord Faulks]

I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said. I understand the reasons behind this change, yet I have some sympathy for what the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, said. It is reasonable to ask for reassurance about what will be a massive event with security implications. I am sure that the Minister will answer that query. I wonder if there is also an issue in relation to the transition from control orders to TPIMs at the end of this year, as the 28-day transitional period will fall over Christmas and new year. I would be grateful if the Minister would provide some reassurance that the police will be able to manage this transition.

[Lord Judd]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Of course, he is right. That is not the first time he has been right: nor, I imagine, will it be the last. I make one plea to my noble friend. I am concerned that, if the official position of the Opposition and the party which I support—and of which I am a member—is that it is not necessary, as was demonstrated on the last amendment, for action to originate with the courts and judges, this will extend still further the powers that will flow from an executive decision by the Secretary of State. To have such far-reaching powers—whether they are needed at all is a separate issue—without the action having originated in the courts becomes even more disturbing. I hope that my noble friend and his colleagues, in considering future policy over a longer period, will give this serious consideration.

The noble Lord, Lord Phillips, in the debate on the previous amendment, made what for me was the most powerful argument: that is, what are we trying to do? We are trying to promote the security and well-being of the British people. If we are going to do that we must have the maximum possible support for what is being done in all the communities that matter in this context. If that is to be the case, and if people are not to be prone to manipulation by extremists in the midst of their concern and anxiety, it is desperately important to demonstrate that when extensive powers are brought to bear, they have the authority of the courts and are part of the whole tradition of the administration of justice and the rule of law as we have understood it in this country.

Let us make no mistake. The objectives of the extremists are to undermine and destroy our commitment to the rule of law as we have understood it and to destroy the credibility of our claims about the rule of law. We must be careful that we do not play into the hands of the manipulative extremists and put the vulnerable and the impressionable under still more pressure to join their ranks.

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[Lord Judd]

My Lords, personally, I have the unease that in all that we have done with these special arrangements there is a danger that historically we will have proved inadvertently—maybe—to have given a victory to the extremists and terrorists, because we have abandoned in this area of the administration of justice the principles that we hold dear and believe to be fundamental to our whole system of society and law.

It is absolutely essential that the Executive have to demonstrate all the time why such a risk must be taken and why it is necessary to have these exceptional measures. For that reason, the responsibility is always with the Executive to justify what is being done and therefore to review the process at least once a year is the very least that we can settle for.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, consistency has become something and since I opposed this amendment on the last occasion I intend to be consistent in opposing it on this occasion.

Of course, the arguments are extremely beguiling in favour of an annual review. Any provision which threatens the liberty of the subject demands anxious consideration at every level. But there is a difference between what happened in 2005 and what we are confronted with today. I am sure that those who brought in those provisions—those exceptional and extraordinary measures—hoped that they would not be necessary for more than a short period. Unfortunately, that has not proved to be the case. This Bill is the result of a careful and thorough review of counterterrorism and of mature reflection by a number of people that, sadly, powers of this nature need to remain. There have been important modifications to these powers, including the higher threshold for the Secretary of State before deciding that there should be such provisions and the removal of the relocation measures. There has been a degree of sensitivity over how potentially extreme the provisions are, but the legislation has been the result of a mature consideration and has been scrutinised in a thoroughly orthodox way through both Houses of Parliament. It has not been the result of an accelerated procedure.

I respectfully suggest, although entirely appreciating the arguments that such provisions need regular review, this has had a thoroughgoing review. It can be reviewed again after the end of this Parliament, and I respectfully ask the House to consider rejecting the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, expressed a certain weariness when he spoke on this issue in Committee. I do not think that he used the words “ritualistic” or “formulaic” but that may have been what he had in mind when he referred to the way some of the control order debates seemed to be going. I share that concern, but it leads me to say that we should make sure that renewal of this provision is not ritualistic or formulaic. We should take care to avoid that. However, it is not an argument for saying that we should not undertake that renewal.

We will, I am sure, be told by the Minister that we can debate the issue at any time that any of us succeeds in putting down a debate, and that the Government could repeal TPIMs at any time. Neither of those claims is an answer to the points that have been made. I urge the Government, if they lose the Division that is about to come, to turn it into a virtue and explain annually why it is that any renewal is required. The term “trust” was used quite a lot at an earlier stage in this Bill. Trust does need to be renewed, as well as everything else, to take both your Lordships’ and the country with them. The Government should regard this as an opportunity, not something that should be pictured in any way as a defeat.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Tuesday 1st November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

My Lords, I support the amendment. Unlike the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, I do not think it is pointless. We should always remind ourselves that emergency measures have a way of seeping into the legal system as a whole. We have learned that over time. Often, things that are introduced as emergency measures end up remaining on the statute book for far too long. The fact that we come together and annually review a matter—even if we do not manage to persuade the Government—does mean that the matter is before us, and we are still talking about something that is being used as an exception to the rule. I therefore urge those who are listening to see why this is important, and that we do have the annual review that we have always had in the past.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, these provisions followed a lengthy counterterrorism review and represent the views of the Government as to where the line should be drawn between the necessary powers, by way of TPIMs, and the liberty of the individual. This legislation has been through the other place and is going through your Lordships’ House in a thoroughly orthodox way, and the provisions are being carefully scrutinised. TPIMs contain a considerable number of safeguards, which have already been discussed in Committee, and they reflect a considered compromise between the various arguments. The Bill does not represent a response to the immediate crisis, as the 2005 position did, and has not gone through Parliament by way of accelerated procedures; it represents the result of lessons learnt.

The provisions can be repealed by an order-making power or in the way that any other legislation is repealed. It is tempting with extraordinary powers—and I readily concede that they are extraordinary powers—to suggest that they should be under more or less constant scrutiny. But where the Bill represents a considered response, five years is an appropriate time in which Parliament and the Government can consider this particular take on a particularly difficult situation. At that juncture, the Government and Parliament can think again. For the moment, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd suggested, squabbling every year about this would not improve matters, and we should rest with the provisions as they are.

[Baroness Hayman]

My Lords, I cannot agree with the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, that an annual review would simply be squabbling about the provisions of this Bill. I am tempted to speak, despite my resolution not to speak on controversial issues for several months after leaving the Woolsack, because the issue of a sunset clause was one on which in 2005 I abandoned loyalty to my Government and put forward the amendments to have a sunset clause, which eventually transmuted into the annual review of the Prevention of Terrorism Act.

I would be saddened if these measures, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said, are less draconian in some ways than control orders and represent a considered view, were considered the best that we can do. I am not certain about that, but we will have further debates on Report on some of those issues. I wonder whether that exonerates us from the responsibility of devoting what is not a great deal of time every year to looking at these extraordinary provisions in both Houses of Parliament. It seems to me to be a proper recognition of the retreat from some of the processes that we have held dear for centuries in this country in terms of the administration of the criminal justice system. I do not argue against the premise or fact that there is a need or problem that is not easily solved by the normal criminal justice system; I argue that, because of the extraordinary nature of these measures, it is incumbent on us as parliamentarians to keep them under review. I do not think that that is a dreadful burden.

However, I am delighted to see the opposition Front Bench such enthusiastic supporters of measures which I remember they were not quite so enthusiastic about when I proposed them six years ago.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

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Wednesday 19th October 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Eames]

I rise to briefly support the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, but do so from an angle that has yet to be mentioned in the debate this afternoon. I base it on my own experience over the years. Exercising the duties given to me in Northern Ireland, I saw at first hand the burden that successive Secretaries of State had to carry on behalf of the Executive in situations of dire necessity demanding often urgent and serious decisions in a matter of hours. The former Secretaries of State who grace this House—I see the noble Lord, Lord King, in his place—will recognise the roles of the judiciary and the Executive.

The Bill has been thoughtfully carried to this stage, and I am aware from my own contacts of the thought and preparation that have gone into the terms before us. The Minister will obviously want to argue that the right way to do this in the case of urgent and very sensitive issues is through the work of the Executive and their decisions. In his position, many noble Lords would argue the same. However, where in the sensitive and urgent situation of widespread terrorism a whole community is faced with what should be protection by the Executive, there is a tendency not to value the importance of the community’s confidence in how those decisions are made.

In those years to which I referred in my own lifetime of experience, in the discussions to which I was privy and decisions that were taken where my own opinion was sought, there was no doubt of the urgency and necessity of moving as quickly from the level of executive or political decisions to what could be transparently seen as the decisions of the judiciary. The important point I am simply trying to underline is that, in our discussions this afternoon, let us bear in mind the question of the confidence of the community in decisions that are made at this level. I beg to suggest that, where those decisions are made by the judiciary, there is much more acceptance by a hard-pressed community under a situation of terrorism than in the other case. This is not to downgrade the integrity of any executive decision, and I am not doing that; I am simply saying that we must take a broader view. For that reason, I support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd.

[Lord Faulks]

I agree with what my noble friend Lord Macdonald and many other noble Lords said, that we can trust the judges. As the Bill currently reads, they have the task of scrutinising the imposition of measures on judicial review principles. Experience and the dicta of judges suggest that they will be particularly rigorous in this. This area is not generally considered one where Ministers are permitted quite the same sense of discretion as, say, on an issue of economics, but it is one where judges really can get in among the detail and form a view of a matter. They are only too conscious of the potential limitations of closed hearings and special advocates, and the potential risk that these present to those who are potentially the target of these measures.

On the amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, I acknowledge his distinguished pedigree and the pedigree of the amendment, which I think goes back some time to the original control orders, but I respectfully suggest that it is inappropriate. I suggest that the obligation rests on the Home Secretary to protect the security of citizens. It rests upon her shoulders and it is a heavy burden. If one needs to find any emphasis in this from the Human Rights Act, Article 2 provides an obligation on the part of the public authority, the Government, to take measures to protect the life of citizens. Those measures will include appropriate measures to prevent outrages of this sort—that is of course what this Bill is concerned with. In this Bill she has to reasonably believe that an individual is involved in terrorist activity and reasonably consider that a TPIM and its appropriate measures are necessary. That is an exercise that she, with that heavy burden placed upon her, should perform.

As I understand it, this amendment is born out of an outright opposition to TPIMs and their predecessors, control orders. The courts have minutely examined these control orders in a number of cases. They have had various degrees of enthusiasm about them and about the closed hearings and the special advocates, but they said that they could operate unlawfully or they could operate satisfactorily—it would depend on the individual cases. However, they have survived what was a wholesale attack on them as a measure. It was not decided by any court that they were by definition contrary to the rule of law. It was acknowledged by judges in a number of cases that the security of the nation was a potent argument in favour of such orders.

It was not suggested in any of those judgments that it was better for the courts to have the decision in the way that this amendment suggests. I doubt that the courts would really relish such a task. Their job, traditionally, is to scrutinise, to examine the legality of the decision, but not to take upon themselves an essentially executive decision. I suggest that the Secretary of State—knowing, as she will, that her reasonable belief will be subjected to close scrutiny by a process which, correctly, places a heavy emphasis on the freedom of the individual—will exercise that power extremely responsibly, and I suggest that the balance should remain as it is in the Bill.

Finally, I will say something about the question of the standard of proof. If there is a fundamental shift in the way that power is to be exercised, as is suggested by the amendment, and the matter comes to the courts to decide, then it may be that the standard of proof should be the balance of probabilities. That is the test that has evolved over the years to decide civil matters generally. There have been recent decisions that suggest there is no shifting standard, but it remains the standard. It has developed pragmatically because there have to be decisions in civil cases to be distinguished from the higher standard in criminal cases.

However, as I understand the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, should the power remain with the Home Secretary, she should not have the decision based on reasonable belief but on balance of probabilities. I respectfully say that that balance of probability test may be appropriate where there is a judicial process to be undergone, but where we are talking about an executive decision, reasonable belief is much more appropriate than the process of coming to a conclusion on a 51:49 basis, which is far more suitable for a judicial determination other than the decision which at the moment would—and should—rest with the Secretary of State.

[Lord Pannick]

Under the Bill as it is at the moment, the judiciary are involved at the later stage. If they are to conduct a merits review, as the Government intend, they will apply the same test as to standard of proof as the Minister has applied in making the order. If the noble Lord accepts that balance of probabilities is suitable as a judicial test at the end of the process, surely the Secretary of State must apply the same test at the beginning of the process.

[Lord Faulks]

What I endeavoured to say was that the balance of probabilities would be appropriate were the courts to be taking that initial decision in place of the Secretary of State, which I understand to be the burden of the amendment put forward by the noble and learned Lord, whereas I understand that the suggestion made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is that the initial stage and the decision to be taken by the Secretary of State should be on the balance of probabilities, and there I suggest that the current test is more suitable.

[Baroness Hamwee]

Does the noble Lord have any comments on the provisions in Clause 26, which provide for the Secretary of State to take a decision based on the balance of probabilities in the position where the more stringent measures might be applied?

[Lord Faulks]

I have no immediate answer to that, but at this juncture I would suggest that the initial decision-making process is far better on that basis because that is the most important stage: whether or not you decide that it is appropriate to impose, or seek to impose, a TPIM—with the approval of the court, it must be said.

[Lord Neill of Bladen]

My Lords, I wish to add my view. I entirely agree with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, moved by way of an amendment. I fully support that and I also support the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The basic question is one of justice: where should the order be made that leads to these deprivations of liberty? I have been told that you would have to be in a particular residence for a long period of hours. All those things in orders of that type are grave deprivations of privilege. Here, I agree with what the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Eames, said based on his experience, which is borne out by the material that we are reading now as to where the public place their confidence. Perhaps not surprisingly, journalists come at the bottom. I do not know where lawyers come in but it is somewhere not very high up. Yet the judges seem to have the backing of the public as being in the safest and soundest place for judgments to be made. If those judgments involve the liberty of the subject, as I believe they do in this case, that is where we should put our money.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Lord Faulks Excerpts

Wednesday 5th October 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, this Government, like the previous Government, have a duty to respond to the threat of terrorism in a way that strikes a balance between individual freedom and the security of those potentially affected by acts of terrorism. This is and was no easy task. Control orders, introduced by the previous Government, were controversial, as were the various increases in pre-trial detention. However, the threat, principally from al-Qaeda, remains, and it calls now, as then, for extraordinary measures. On pre-trial detention, there is an acceptance that the previous Government probably went too far. However, I do not doubt for a moment the genuineness of their approach to pre-trial detention and the question of control orders, nor that they were reflecting concerns of the public and what they required the Government to do.

It is perhaps a little too easy to seem principled—even heroic—in deploying civil liberties as a trump card in this debate. Although I do not have the debating miles on the clock of some noble Lords, I have followed the debate from outside Parliament, and I never found in the rhetoric the comparisons with internment in the Second World War, control orders under the apartheid regime in South Africa or the regimes in Zimbabwe and Burma at all helpful.

However, as with pre-trial detention, modifications to the control order regime were needed. In bringing forward the Bill, the Government have made some important changes. Is the Bill simply control orders lite? The Secretary of State must now reasonably believe that the individual is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity and reasonably consider that the relevant measures are necessary. That is an important additional requirement. With great respect to my noble friend Lady Hamwee, it is a pretty high hurdle.

The menu of measures contained in Schedule 1 is varied and can be nuanced according to the particular situation where there is someone over whom the measures are appropriately directed. They exclude relocation measures, which previously existed. It is a fine judgment whether that is an appropriate exclusion, but there are sufficient measures to exercise the necessary degree of control without that. As I understand it, the Government were concerned, in so far as it was possible, to allow those who are the target of the measures to lead as normal a life as possible in the area with which they are familiar. Similarly, retaining the means of communication is important to allow them a modicum of a normal life.

Those and other changes may not alter fundamentally what the Secretary of State can do, but they are by no means trivial amendments. It is, of course, of paramount importance that safeguards are provided in a Bill of this sort. The primary one is the effective supervision of TPIMs by the courts. The High Court will consider whether to give the Home Secretary permission to impose a TPIM notice and will later review whether the notice and measures were in fact necessary. Is there any reason to think that the courts will not be rigorous in their approach to TPIMs? I think not. The existing case law about control orders shows how carefully the courts scrutinise measures of this sort. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, that that is the role of the judges, as opposed to the role of the Home Secretary.

In the other place, Hazel Blears said on 7 June 2011, citing a judge with whom she had spoken,

“whenever there’s a decision to be made between liberty and security, I … always err on the side of liberty”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/6/11; col. 97.]

That was an observation of one judge, but my experience of the judiciary is wholly consistent with that observation.

The closed hearings which have to take place to maintain security are certainly unattractive at first sight. The use of special advocates who cannot communicate to their client the whole of the case raises the spectre of the target of one of these orders simply not knowing about the evidence against them. But those who act as special advocates are highly respected and principled lawyers who can be relied on to test the evidence with skill and care on their client's behalf.

The system is clearly far from perfect, but I think we can be satisfied with the courts, as they have shown hitherto in the considerable amount of litigation that has flowed from the predecessor measure, entitled control orders, whether under the auspices of Article 6 of the European convention or according to well established principles of English law.

Why do we need TPIMs at all? I wonder whether there is much dispute in your Lordships' House about the terrorist threat, but the situation is made worse by our inability to deport terrorists or potential terrorists because of the European Convention on Human Rights. Those who face torture or the threat of torture in their country are one thing—Article 3 provides them with protection—but the creative interpretation of Article 8 by the court in Strasbourg and thus in our courts has meant that it is all too easy for someone to resist deportation by raising arguments that they have established links here in a way which the courts have interpreted as their so-called right to family life. I say nothing about terrorists' liking or otherwise for cats.

Inevitably, this will be a compromise. The contribution of Liberty to the debate is something that one always looks at with great interest. I do not always agree with that organisation's observations, but it makes a highly valuable contribution to the debate. I was, however, disappointed with its conclusion and the one-sidedness of the report prepared for the Second Reading, which offered the view that TPIMs,

“will only perpetuate a regime which is unfair and puts us all at risk”.

That seems to me to ignore the risk at which the legislation is directed: the risk from terrorism. The Government have responded by bringing forward the legislation, which represents a compromise. As my noble friend Lord Howard said, of course it is the product of compromise and, no doubt, of intense discussion, with different views within parties and within the coalition. Where matters of security and terrorism are concerned, one hopes that there can be a degree of consensus in your Lordships' House. I am sure that during these debates, some useful amendments may be proposed. I am particularly conscious of the fact that there should be no two-stage process: someone subject to TPIMs who is then to be prosecuted. The Bill does something to preserve the imperative of bringing those people to the courts if at all possible by the duty to consult with the police. Amendments and improvements there may be but I suggest to your Lordships that this represents a good compromise.

I welcome the noble Lord, Lord Henley, to his post and wish him good fortune in steering this Bill, which reflects a considered compromise. It has the benefit of some learnt experience and I suggest that it represents a balance between the protection of the realm and the liberty of the individual.

Identity Documents Bill

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Tuesday 21st December 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and other noble Lords speak with great authority on the Human Rights Act, the convention and our obligation to follow the Human Rights Act. On this issue, there are strong cases to be made on both sides and there are abstentions. The reason why the Government may have decided that the Bill is compatible with the Human Rights Act is simply that the Act is concerned with substantial matters; it is concerned with violation of rights of real value. Whatever one may say about the value of £30, I respectfully suggest to the House that that is not what the Human Rights Act is concerned with. That is one of the reasons why the Human Rights Act has not always been welcomed on all sides of the House.

[Lord Sewel]

I briefly follow my noble friend Lord Howarth on the substantive issue of the Commons reason. This is a sensitive issue and there are clear conventions that we should not in this House criticise the proceedings of another place—and I would not dream of doing so. However, I wonder whether I can take Members of this House back to another period of Conservative government. I recognise that a declining number of Members of this House were in here at the time of the last Conservative Government. Those of us who were used to delight in the tussles between my noble friend Lady Hollis and my friend but, alas, noble opponent at the time, Lord Mackay of Ardbrecknish, on pensions legislation. Frequently, Lord Mackay of Ardbrecknish had to make concessions and was sometimes defeated. The effect of those concessions and defeats was that this House increased government expenditure. That Conservative Government never cried financial privilege.