Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Hamwee
Main Page: Baroness Hamwee (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Hamwee's debates with the Home Office
(10 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have three amendments in this group. Let me take the last one, Amendment 20H, first. I have lifted the wording from the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, and it would provide that the court disregards,
“any act of the defendant”—
I have said “defendant”, although I should have said “respondent”—
“which he or she shows was reasonable in the circumstances”.
That follows neatly from the comments which have just been made, and I agree with what my noble friend said about that. I used the term “defendant” when I tabled the amendment because we think of the respondent as a defendant. This provision would allow the respondent to defend himself or, if you like, respond to the allegations. This goes to the behaviour which my noble friend has just mentioned.
My first amendment would insert the word “a”, and turn “nuisance” into “a nuisance”. This enables me to ask whether “nuisance” in this context is wider and less specific than “a nuisance” in the Housing Act. My second amendment, Amendment 20C, is to leave out “or annoyance” and is not only for the reasons which other noble Lords have given during the course of the afternoon as examples of conduct that each of us undertakes which our colleagues might regard as annoying—in my case probably putting down too many amendments. It is also to understand the distinction between nuisance and annoyance.
I have noticed during the course of the afternoon that many noble Lords have talked as though the clause referred to causing “nuisance and annoyance”. In fact, it is “nuisance or annoyance”. I am sorry to be picky—or, as my noble friend Lord Greaves would accuse me of being, legalistic—but these words are important.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 20GA, which is tabled in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, and is coupled with this group. It seeks to address concerns that the Bill does not adequately take account of the likely impact which these new provisions will have on people with a learning disability. The amendment says:
“Consideration should be given to people with a learning disability in the issuing of an injunction to ensure they are not discriminated against”.
It may not be the most elegant English, finishing with the word “against”, but I think the gist is generally understood. I should also declare my interest as vice-president of Mencap Wales.
As we heard in the debate on the previous bank of amendments, the Bill introduces civil injunctions to prevent nuisance and annoyance—IPNAs as they are called. These may be imposed if the court considers it “just and convenient” to prevent anti-social behaviour. The Joint Committee on Human Rights, in scrutinising the Bill, highlighted that this is a lower test than the test of necessity, as required by human rights law. Furthermore, it considered that the new IPNA definition of anti-social behaviour is broad and unclear.
This has set alarm bells ringing with Mencap and others who work with people with a learning disability, fearing that this will lead to IPNAs being used inappropriately. As many know, people with a learning disability are disproportionately likely to be victims of anti-social behaviour. Mencap's report Living in Fear found almost nine in 10 people with a learning disability had experienced bullying, harassment or some form of anti-social behaviour.
The root of this, of course, is attitudinal and is based on the value that we as a society place on disabled people. In some people's eyes they are different and sometimes regarded, sadly, as dangerous. This was brought into sharp focus by the recent murder of Bijan Ebrahimi. Bijan was a disabled man picked upon for being different on his estate in Bristol. He suffered from low-level harassment before being accused of being a paedophile. He was questioned by the police, who found him innocent, but unfortunately by this point rumours had begun circulating that he was a child abuser and two days later he was brutally murdered.
My concern is therefore that a lower threshold for IPNAs, together with a murky definition of anti-social behaviour, will result in these new injunctions being used out of misunderstanding, fear and ignorance of people with a learning disability, and of behaviour that might be associated with their impairment. It could also lead to a rise in vigilantism and will do nothing to improve people’s understanding of the needs of disabled people.
There is also a fear that victims may in turn be branded perpetrators. For example, a person with a learning disability might be continually verbally abused by a neighbour. What if that victim is at the end of his tether and snaps, so to speak, at the neighbour? Such behaviour might in turn result in an IPNA being placed on that individual. The Bill sets out examples of certain prohibitions and requirements in Parts 1 and 2, and the amendment would include consideration of learning disability at this juncture. Such a step, if backed by robust guidance, would undoubtedly go some way towards meeting these concerns. I hope that the Government might look at this area further, not least because I understand that no equality impact assessment of the Bill has been carried out to date. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s thoughts on these matters.
My Lords, I may be about to surprise the noble Baroness. Well, to some degree—modestly surprise her. With these amendments we return once again to the issue of the test. I understand the concerns that noble Lords have articulated. Some of the arguments are returning to this issue and it is very important that we debate them and get them clear in our minds. I shall start with Amendment 20GA in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins.
This amendment raises the important issue of the proper considerations which must be considered in applications for IPNAs under Part 1 against respondents with learning disabilities. The amendment may not be necessary, because I have already spoken at length about the test for the injunction and the two limbs of the injunction, but I reiterate that, in deciding whether to grant an injunction, the court will consider whether it is fair, reasonable and proportionate to do so. That is within the terms under which a court would consider any injunction. In doing so, the court will be aware of its obligations to prevent discrimination against any respondent and to ensure that a respondent’s human rights are respected. Of course, the court will also ensure that the respondent is capable of complying with the terms of the injunction—indeed, that is specifically mentioned in the guidance. If the noble Lord will look at that section he will find that it is referred to. It is all part of the “just and convenient” part of the test which goes along with the whole business of nuisance and annoyance as being a joint, two-limbed test.
Returning to Amendment 20B, my noble friend Lady Hamwee pointed out that the Housing Act refers to “a nuisance”, not simply “nuisance”. I can reassure her that the test for the new injunction is based on that used for anti-social behaviour injunctions in the 1996 Act. No difference is intended but one of the two usages had to be used in this case to provide that continuity. Similarly, in respect of Amendment 20C, the use of the term “annoyance” in addition to “nuisance” also derives from the Housing Act 1996. The two terms will take their ordinary meaning. The dictionary definitions we have heard from my noble friend Lord Greaves are very interesting, but there is a meaning in law, by precedent, which is clear to the courts and, indeed, the Law Society has made clear that it welcomes that definition. They are commonly used together and may cover a broader range of behaviours than either would alone. We see the benefit in retaining the familiar test that includes both; that was mentioned in previous debates.
My noble friends Lord Faulks, Lady Hamwee and Lady Berridge, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, all made similar points about Amendments 20 and 20H, as, indeed, did the noble Baroness, Lady Smith. The amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Faulks was, of course, one of those recommended by the JCHR. Both amendments seek to add an explicit test of reasonableness to the threshold for making an injunction. The Government are aware of the concerns about the test for the injunction under Part 1 and I listened carefully to those concerns expressed at Second Reading and again today. I agree that it is important that the courts consider reasonableness, fairness and proportionality in deciding applications for injunctions to prevent nuisance or annoyance. The courts will consider these factors as a matter of course as part of the second limb of the test—that it is just and convenient to grant an injunction—as I said in my answer to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. However, the courts will be aware of their obligation to discharge their functions compatibly with the European Convention on Human Rights, an exercise which requires a consideration of necessity and proportionality. However, we will want to consider whether we have done everything necessary to ensure that this is so with the drafting of Clause 1.
That is not to say that we necessarily agree with the amendments as they are drafted. Both would revise the “nuisance or annoyance” test, and I have made it clear that we see the merit in keeping a test that is already familiar to the courts. However, we want to consider whether we can make it clearer in the legislation that the courts must be satisfied that it is reasonable to issue an injunction under Part 1. This is what the amendments seek to achieve and, in that sense, we are not very far apart on this issue, so I will reflect carefully on Amendments 20 and 20H in advance of Report.
In conclusion, the test for the new injunction is tried and tested, it has a long pedigree and I see no evidence that it has given rise to the difficulties that a number of noble Lords have suggested in this and previous debates. The previous Administration sought to recast and strengthen the “nuisance or annoyance” test for an anti-social behaviour injunction back in 2003. This House endorsed that strengthening and on this issue, as I have said before, I am happy to endorse the position then taken by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam. The police, local authorities and others will not act lightly in seeking an injunction. They and the courts must exercise such powers in a reasonable, fair and proportionate manner. As I have said, I am ready to take away Amendments 20 and 20H and explore, without commitment, whether it would be appropriate to introduce into the test an explicit reference to reasonableness. That point aside, for the sake of the victims of anti-social behaviour, who must be at the forefront of our deliberations on the Bill, I would be loath to weaken the effectiveness of the new injunction. I have no doubt that we will return to this matter on Report. I thank noble Lords for speaking to their amendments and I hope that they will be content not to press them.
My Lords, before my noble friend responds, of course let us all think about it, but may I put one further, supplemental thought in the Minister’s mind? He talked about the pedigree of the term “nuisance or annoyance”. If a lot of that pedigree comes from the housing context, then we need to be careful about transposing the words without the constraint around it. That may not be the right word, but we need to consider the reasonableness of the term if we are moving into a different context.
Perhaps I should rely less on the Housing Act and draw attention to other matters such as the abuse of alcohol in public places, for example, which uses a similar test, or the parking of vehicles on highways and the obstruction of highways, which was also mentioned by me in a previous debate. This does not apply just to housing matters; there are other issues that have used the test of nuisance and annoyance. I do not see the problem that my noble friend suggests.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords and noble and learned Lords who have taken part in this debate. I am grateful to the Minister for his reassuring noises; he has shown himself, as usual, to be a listening Minister. The expression “nuisance or annoyance” has a pedigree, as I think he said, in the housing context. It is almost a term of art, so widely has it been used over the years in the context of breach of covenant in common law, and it has found its way into statute.
Of course, a particular housing situation is not precisely analogous to anti-social behaviour. Nonetheless, there is a substantial accumulation of case law that the judges will understand and, I suggest, they will interpret it accordingly. I repeat what I said earlier: it seems that in any event the reasonableness is part of the judge’s task in deciding whether or not it is just and convenient to grant an injunction. Reasonableness will be the watchword, as will the obligations that the court has under the Human Rights Act.
Where I suggest it is important to import reasonableness, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, said, is at the stage of defining with some degree of objectivity the nuisance and annoyance so that neither the agencies nor the court are in any way diverted by simply having to accept a subjective interpretation of what counts as anti-social behaviour. I hope that the Minister will reflect on that. I appreciate that this does not in any way weaken the power, but it should reassure those who are naturally concerned about the potential for this power to be used oppressively, and that reassurance would be at least provided, I hope, by an appropriate amendment. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I say in response to my noble friend’s point about education and training, “Call me legalistic”. The noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, is very bold in raising these important points. He used the phrase “bona fide” several times in his speech, as well as in the amendment. Followers of paganism would say that their religion was bona fide. As the noble Lord was speaking, it occurred to me that a call to prayer at a very early hour is very annoying to some people, but would one challenge that? He raises bold and brave questions.
My Lords, I refer to the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. The examples raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Harris, all seem to relate to the manifestation of somebody’s religious beliefs. The report states that the holding of religious beliefs by any individual is an absolute right under both the European convention and in international law, under Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is only the manifestation of one’s religious or humanist beliefs that can be restricted by a country on certain grounds, as defined in European and international law. Would the Minister please outline why the Bill, as currently drafted, only allows prohibitions and requirements to,
“so far as is practicable … avoid any conflict with the respondent’s religious beliefs”?
It should, surely, be the manifestation of those religious beliefs that the Bill is aimed at.