Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
(11 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Faulks
Lord Faulks (Con)
My Lords, we return to considering Part 1 of the Bill, in particular IPNAs. I have already addressed the Committee about my views generally on Part 1, which support the Government, and I have no need to repeat them. However, I acknowledge that concern has been expressed both within the House and outside that the test for what is,
“capable of causing nuisance and annoyance”,
could be regarded as subjective. This would, potentially at least, result in a court ordering an injunction on the basis of some perceived nuisance and annoyance which, looked at objectively, should not be constituted as one.
In fact, the words “nuisance and annoyance”, which have, as we have heard, a considerable pedigree both in terms of the common law in reviewing breach of covenant cases, and in a number of Housing Act statutes, have been considered by a number of judges to carry with them a degree of objectivity. I would expect that they would not be viewed entirely in subjective terms, were a case to reach court. In fact, I very much doubt that either the agencies which were to seek an injunction under this part of the Bill or the courts would come to a different view in any particular case as a result of the insertion of these additional words. However, they would serve to allay some of the anxieties that have been expressed about anti-social behaviour being too subjective a concept, and the amendment should ensure that both the agencies and the court stand back and view the behaviour objectively before deciding whether it can properly be described as,
“capable of causing nuisance and annoyance”,
and whether it is “just and convenient” to grant an injunction. This added safeguard will, I suggest, fit reasonably into the structure of the Bill without weakening the protection that it provides for communities and individuals who are so often beleaguered by anti-social behaviour.
I noted that during the course of the debate, my noble friend the Minister indicated to the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, that he was considering importing the word “reasonable”, as I understand it, into Clause 1(3) in relation to the “just and convenient” element of the judge granting an injunction. I respectfully suggest that the word “reasonable” might be better imported as a description of the relevant behaviour, rather than be imported into the discretion that a judge has in whether or not to grant an injunction. The judge would regard himself as being reasonable in any event when deciding whether it was “just and convenient” to grant an injunction. With respect, I would suggest that it would be better included further on in Clause 1. I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I have three amendments in this group. Let me take the last one, Amendment 20H, first. I have lifted the wording from the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, and it would provide that the court disregards,
“any act of the defendant”—
I have said “defendant”, although I should have said “respondent”—
“which he or she shows was reasonable in the circumstances”.
That follows neatly from the comments which have just been made, and I agree with what my noble friend said about that. I used the term “defendant” when I tabled the amendment because we think of the respondent as a defendant. This provision would allow the respondent to defend himself or, if you like, respond to the allegations. This goes to the behaviour which my noble friend has just mentioned.
My first amendment would insert the word “a”, and turn “nuisance” into “a nuisance”. This enables me to ask whether “nuisance” in this context is wider and less specific than “a nuisance” in the Housing Act. My second amendment, Amendment 20C, is to leave out “or annoyance” and is not only for the reasons which other noble Lords have given during the course of the afternoon as examples of conduct that each of us undertakes which our colleagues might regard as annoying—in my case probably putting down too many amendments. It is also to understand the distinction between nuisance and annoyance.
I have noticed during the course of the afternoon that many noble Lords have talked as though the clause referred to causing “nuisance and annoyance”. In fact, it is “nuisance or annoyance”. I am sorry to be picky—or, as my noble friend Lord Greaves would accuse me of being, legalistic—but these words are important.
Lord Wigley (PC)
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 20GA, which is tabled in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, and is coupled with this group. It seeks to address concerns that the Bill does not adequately take account of the likely impact which these new provisions will have on people with a learning disability. The amendment says:
“Consideration should be given to people with a learning disability in the issuing of an injunction to ensure they are not discriminated against”.
It may not be the most elegant English, finishing with the word “against”, but I think the gist is generally understood. I should also declare my interest as vice-president of Mencap Wales.
As we heard in the debate on the previous bank of amendments, the Bill introduces civil injunctions to prevent nuisance and annoyance—IPNAs as they are called. These may be imposed if the court considers it “just and convenient” to prevent anti-social behaviour. The Joint Committee on Human Rights, in scrutinising the Bill, highlighted that this is a lower test than the test of necessity, as required by human rights law. Furthermore, it considered that the new IPNA definition of anti-social behaviour is broad and unclear.
This has set alarm bells ringing with Mencap and others who work with people with a learning disability, fearing that this will lead to IPNAs being used inappropriately. As many know, people with a learning disability are disproportionately likely to be victims of anti-social behaviour. Mencap's report Living in Fear found almost nine in 10 people with a learning disability had experienced bullying, harassment or some form of anti-social behaviour.
The root of this, of course, is attitudinal and is based on the value that we as a society place on disabled people. In some people's eyes they are different and sometimes regarded, sadly, as dangerous. This was brought into sharp focus by the recent murder of Bijan Ebrahimi. Bijan was a disabled man picked upon for being different on his estate in Bristol. He suffered from low-level harassment before being accused of being a paedophile. He was questioned by the police, who found him innocent, but unfortunately by this point rumours had begun circulating that he was a child abuser and two days later he was brutally murdered.
My concern is therefore that a lower threshold for IPNAs, together with a murky definition of anti-social behaviour, will result in these new injunctions being used out of misunderstanding, fear and ignorance of people with a learning disability, and of behaviour that might be associated with their impairment. It could also lead to a rise in vigilantism and will do nothing to improve people’s understanding of the needs of disabled people.
There is also a fear that victims may in turn be branded perpetrators. For example, a person with a learning disability might be continually verbally abused by a neighbour. What if that victim is at the end of his tether and snaps, so to speak, at the neighbour? Such behaviour might in turn result in an IPNA being placed on that individual. The Bill sets out examples of certain prohibitions and requirements in Parts 1 and 2, and the amendment would include consideration of learning disability at this juncture. Such a step, if backed by robust guidance, would undoubtedly go some way towards meeting these concerns. I hope that the Government might look at this area further, not least because I understand that no equality impact assessment of the Bill has been carried out to date. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s thoughts on these matters.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 20 was recommended by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its fourth report—a committee on which both my noble friend Lord Faulks and I serve. Amendment 20 is a modest compromise and adds an element of reasonableness or objectivity, giving the test more rigour, and will aid the authorities and other agencies. It will enable them to better explain their refusal to act on behalf of some people who just have different views on what they should have to tolerate from their neighbours and other people in the neighbourhood. I agree with my noble friend Lord Faulks that at this earlier stage, the test should have a reasonableness requirement, as it is at this stage that the officials of the authorities outlined in Clause 4 have to consider that behaviour.
As has already been outlined, reasonableness and proportionality are a requirement that the judiciary has to take into account when granting an injunction. This means that there will be reasonableness applied in the test by the officials and, of course, by the court rather than having a more subjective test by the officials and only later on encountering the reasonableness threshold. I spoke at Second Reading about the inordinate lengths to which witnesses have to go to collect the necessary evidence to get an ASBI or an ASBO. Merely adding after “conduct” the words “that might reasonably be regarded as” does not increase the evidence that has to be gathered and I therefore support this amendment.
Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)
My Lords, I will add a brief word to what has just been said in support of Amendment 20. The words “any person” at the end of Clause 1(2) are rather important; I would have thought that they make it all the more important that the words which the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has suggested are put in. Without that, one would have the very difficult task as a judge of having to assess the evidence of one individual and deciding whether that individual is to be believed. If that individual says that he or she has been annoyed or suffered a nuisance, it would be quite difficult to say that the test was not satisfied. The reasonableness test is the one which would soften this and make it more realistic, and I would have thought that it was compatible with the general aim of the measure.
Lord Greaves (LD)
My Lords, if I sometimes tell my noble friend Lady Hamwee that she is being legalistic, that is a compliment since she is a lawyer and I am not, which means that she sees things that I do not. When it comes to the meaning of words, however, I take a straightforward, common-sense view. Words have meanings and we ought to try to stick to them, but sometimes words have different meanings. A word that may well have a respectable legal background in terms of its meaning may not necessarily mean what ordinary people in the street think it means. I think that that is why “annoyance” is causing a reasonable amount of difficulty in the Bill. It has caused many to ask, “Are we really going to have an injunction just because someone is being annoying?”. I take the view that it is a human right to be annoying to other people from time to time, because if it does not happen there will never be any progress. Perhaps that explains some things. The difficulty, however, is at what level annoyance becomes unacceptable. “Harassment, alarm and distress” are clearly degrees of annoyance but they go rather further than what people nowadays tend to think annoyance means.
In the representations that we have had on this there has been quite a concern among those who are used to ASBOs—civil liberties groups and so on—about the way in which the changes are being made, switching from ASBOs and apparently making it easier to obtain an injunction to prevent nuisance and annoyance, and about the possibility that the words “nuisance” and particularly “annoyance” are far too feeble. On the other hand, the housing associations which have been writing to us in the past two or three days are saying, “No, the existing ASBIs”—which are injunctions—“work very well and those are the words that they use”. They would be very concerned if the test was increased.
One reason for this is that you might live next door to somebody who says something foolish to you or wags their finger at you every time you go out in the morning. If it happens to you one time out in the street, and even if the person is going round doing it to lots of people, it really is no reason to serve an injunction on the person, however daft they may be behaving. But if it happens day after day or every time you go out of your house, it becomes a very serious matter. There is a considerable difference between repeated, annoying, low-level anti-social behaviour which irritates and harasses neighbours and is totally unacceptable in a residential context and the same behaviour out in the street. This is happening partly because, as the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, told us earlier, the Government are bringing lots of different things under the same umbrella.
However, what does “annoyance” mean? Being a fairly boring person and having it on the shelf, I looked in the Oxford English Dictionary, and I found four definitions. These are definitions of the verb “annoy”, but “annoyance” is clearly about annoying somebody. The first definition was “Be hateful to” or,
“Be a cause of trouble to”.
That is a fairly high level of unpleasant behaviour. The second was to,
“be troubled, irked or wearied by”,
which is a much lower level. The third was to:
“Cause slight anger or mental distress to or irritate”,
which seems a very low level. There was another, which was to harm or attack repeatedly, or harass, but it said that that was archaic and the illustration of it was, “A gallant Saxon who annoyed this coast”. Well, I am all in favour of gallant Saxons annoying the Yorkshire coast in the past, otherwise I might not be here, but that is clearly not relevant now.
To bring it up to date, the Merriam-Webster internet dictionary defines it as,
“to cause (someone) to feel slightly angry”,
which is clearly something that we ought not to be legislating about;
“to disturb or irritate especially by repeated acts”,
which might be; and,
“to harass especially by quick brief attacks”,
which probably is anti-social behaviour. That dictionary then said that “annoyance” may be,
“slight anger : the feeling of being annoyed”.
I thought “I’m giving up” but I looked further and it then said it was,
“a source of vexation or irritation”,
and then it defined it as a nuisance, so I thought, “We are going around in circles here”.
Annoyance actually has lots of different meanings, and for most people in this country today it is very low level. If we want it to be higher, the Government ought to make a real effort to define it in the legislation. It is assumed that the words “nuisance” and “annoyance” are in the law already and that everybody knows what they mean. I do not think that they do if the Government mean that they are a sufficiently high level to warrant injunctions against people.
Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)
My Lords, I think that I can be very brief at this point. I have sat in the noble Lord’s place, albeit in the other place, and one thing he will have in his file is a note on the amendment saying, “Resist”. May I tempt him not to on some occasions? Amendment 20 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, seems eminently sensible and reasonable. It actually seeks to put some necessary clarification in the Bill. The Minister said he would look very sympathetically, and I hope he will, at Amendment 20GA in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins. There is a serious issue about people with learning disabilities. It does not mean that they are not capable of causing distress through anti-social behaviour, but the measures by which it can be addressed and dealt with have to take into account any special measures and any learning disabilities that an individual may have. I hope that the Minister can look favourably on both those amendments.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Taylor of Holbeach) (Con)
My Lords, I may be about to surprise the noble Baroness. Well, to some degree—modestly surprise her. With these amendments we return once again to the issue of the test. I understand the concerns that noble Lords have articulated. Some of the arguments are returning to this issue and it is very important that we debate them and get them clear in our minds. I shall start with Amendment 20GA in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins.
This amendment raises the important issue of the proper considerations which must be considered in applications for IPNAs under Part 1 against respondents with learning disabilities. The amendment may not be necessary, because I have already spoken at length about the test for the injunction and the two limbs of the injunction, but I reiterate that, in deciding whether to grant an injunction, the court will consider whether it is fair, reasonable and proportionate to do so. That is within the terms under which a court would consider any injunction. In doing so, the court will be aware of its obligations to prevent discrimination against any respondent and to ensure that a respondent’s human rights are respected. Of course, the court will also ensure that the respondent is capable of complying with the terms of the injunction—indeed, that is specifically mentioned in the guidance. If the noble Lord will look at that section he will find that it is referred to. It is all part of the “just and convenient” part of the test which goes along with the whole business of nuisance and annoyance as being a joint, two-limbed test.
Returning to Amendment 20B, my noble friend Lady Hamwee pointed out that the Housing Act refers to “a nuisance”, not simply “nuisance”. I can reassure her that the test for the new injunction is based on that used for anti-social behaviour injunctions in the 1996 Act. No difference is intended but one of the two usages had to be used in this case to provide that continuity. Similarly, in respect of Amendment 20C, the use of the term “annoyance” in addition to “nuisance” also derives from the Housing Act 1996. The two terms will take their ordinary meaning. The dictionary definitions we have heard from my noble friend Lord Greaves are very interesting, but there is a meaning in law, by precedent, which is clear to the courts and, indeed, the Law Society has made clear that it welcomes that definition. They are commonly used together and may cover a broader range of behaviours than either would alone. We see the benefit in retaining the familiar test that includes both; that was mentioned in previous debates.
My noble friends Lord Faulks, Lady Hamwee and Lady Berridge, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, all made similar points about Amendments 20 and 20H, as, indeed, did the noble Baroness, Lady Smith. The amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Faulks was, of course, one of those recommended by the JCHR. Both amendments seek to add an explicit test of reasonableness to the threshold for making an injunction. The Government are aware of the concerns about the test for the injunction under Part 1 and I listened carefully to those concerns expressed at Second Reading and again today. I agree that it is important that the courts consider reasonableness, fairness and proportionality in deciding applications for injunctions to prevent nuisance or annoyance. The courts will consider these factors as a matter of course as part of the second limb of the test—that it is just and convenient to grant an injunction—as I said in my answer to the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. However, the courts will be aware of their obligation to discharge their functions compatibly with the European Convention on Human Rights, an exercise which requires a consideration of necessity and proportionality. However, we will want to consider whether we have done everything necessary to ensure that this is so with the drafting of Clause 1.
That is not to say that we necessarily agree with the amendments as they are drafted. Both would revise the “nuisance or annoyance” test, and I have made it clear that we see the merit in keeping a test that is already familiar to the courts. However, we want to consider whether we can make it clearer in the legislation that the courts must be satisfied that it is reasonable to issue an injunction under Part 1. This is what the amendments seek to achieve and, in that sense, we are not very far apart on this issue, so I will reflect carefully on Amendments 20 and 20H in advance of Report.
In conclusion, the test for the new injunction is tried and tested, it has a long pedigree and I see no evidence that it has given rise to the difficulties that a number of noble Lords have suggested in this and previous debates. The previous Administration sought to recast and strengthen the “nuisance or annoyance” test for an anti-social behaviour injunction back in 2003. This House endorsed that strengthening and on this issue, as I have said before, I am happy to endorse the position then taken by the noble Lord, Lord Bassam. The police, local authorities and others will not act lightly in seeking an injunction. They and the courts must exercise such powers in a reasonable, fair and proportionate manner. As I have said, I am ready to take away Amendments 20 and 20H and explore, without commitment, whether it would be appropriate to introduce into the test an explicit reference to reasonableness. That point aside, for the sake of the victims of anti-social behaviour, who must be at the forefront of our deliberations on the Bill, I would be loath to weaken the effectiveness of the new injunction. I have no doubt that we will return to this matter on Report. I thank noble Lords for speaking to their amendments and I hope that they will be content not to press them.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, before my noble friend responds, of course let us all think about it, but may I put one further, supplemental thought in the Minister’s mind? He talked about the pedigree of the term “nuisance or annoyance”. If a lot of that pedigree comes from the housing context, then we need to be careful about transposing the words without the constraint around it. That may not be the right word, but we need to consider the reasonableness of the term if we are moving into a different context.
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
Perhaps I should rely less on the Housing Act and draw attention to other matters such as the abuse of alcohol in public places, for example, which uses a similar test, or the parking of vehicles on highways and the obstruction of highways, which was also mentioned by me in a previous debate. This does not apply just to housing matters; there are other issues that have used the test of nuisance and annoyance. I do not see the problem that my noble friend suggests.
Lord Faulks
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords and noble and learned Lords who have taken part in this debate. I am grateful to the Minister for his reassuring noises; he has shown himself, as usual, to be a listening Minister. The expression “nuisance or annoyance” has a pedigree, as I think he said, in the housing context. It is almost a term of art, so widely has it been used over the years in the context of breach of covenant in common law, and it has found its way into statute.
Of course, a particular housing situation is not precisely analogous to anti-social behaviour. Nonetheless, there is a substantial accumulation of case law that the judges will understand and, I suggest, they will interpret it accordingly. I repeat what I said earlier: it seems that in any event the reasonableness is part of the judge’s task in deciding whether or not it is just and convenient to grant an injunction. Reasonableness will be the watchword, as will the obligations that the court has under the Human Rights Act.
Where I suggest it is important to import reasonableness, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, said, is at the stage of defining with some degree of objectivity the nuisance and annoyance so that neither the agencies nor the court are in any way diverted by simply having to accept a subjective interpretation of what counts as anti-social behaviour. I hope that the Minister will reflect on that. I appreciate that this does not in any way weaken the power, but it should reassure those who are naturally concerned about the potential for this power to be used oppressively, and that reassurance would be at least provided, I hope, by an appropriate amendment. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Greaves
Lord Greaves
My Lords, I shall speak also to three other amendments in this group. The amendments are small but useful. The first two refer to IPNAs and the second two to criminal behaviour orders; otherwise they match each other. Clause 1(5) says about IPNAs:
“Prohibitions and requirements in an injunction under this section must, so far as practicable, be such as to avoid … any conflict with the respondent’s religious beliefs … any interference with the times, if any, at which the respondent normally works or attends school or any other educational establishment”.
I want to add “ethical or” to the religious bit and “or training” to the educational bit, so that it reads “educational or training establishment”. The wording in the criminal behaviour order is almost identical, so the amendments are identical.
It is right that people should not have to give up religious beliefs or practices in order to comply with an injunction. There are some people who have strong ethical humanist views that might involve regular attendance at events each week that they would say were equivalent to religious events—they are clearly not religious so do not come under that definition—and it seems reasonable to include those. It is also possible that there may be genuine objections by some people to requirements in an injunction that require them to take part in otherwise excellent facilities or proceedings that are organised by religious groups or particular religious groups. It therefore seems that the word “ethical” ought to be there as well to cater for probably the very small number of people with humanist beliefs who would have these views.
Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 20FA in my name. I appreciate that the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, is seeking to broaden the scope of the potential areas where it may be possible for the courts to limit the prohibitions and requirements of an injunction. I am going to raise some queries about whether or not any of this really makes sense. I do not disagree with anything that the noble Lord has said, but I wonder where we are going when we talk about religion in this context.
Noble Lords will remember that in 2001, 390,127 people put down on their census forms that their religion was “Jedi”. I wonder whether, for the purposes of excluding someone from requirements under one of these new injunctions, saying that you had to follow your religion of Jedi would enable you therefore to say, “I should be allowed to carry on exactly as I wish”. Similarly, are we including in religion Satanism or the proponents of animal sacrifice?
I pose these questions not because I seriously seek to know whether, when the Bill was being drafted, those drafting it were considering proponents of animal sacrifice or even those who consider themselves to be Jedi knights. I am, however, quite clear that I have come across plenty of people who behave in an anti-social fashion who, if they thought that there were some exemption from the requirements of an injunction, would suddenly pronounce that they had all sorts of religious beliefs, beliefs that a normal person—or to your Lordships here, if that is not the same—might consider was not really a bona fide religion. Is there a requirement now for the Government to define what they consider to be a religion? If there is such a definition somewhere, the noble Lord will have it to hand and explain it to me.
My second concern is that, even in an established religion which we would all recognise as bona fide, there are certain norms of behaviour. If, however, you pursue your belief in that religion with an excessive degree of zeal, does that excessive zealotry automatically mean that you can have exemptions from the requirements of an injunction? What is or is not reasonable in pursuit of your religion? We may get advice from one of the right reverend Prelates, although I suspect not.
Many years ago, meetings of the Tottenham Labour Party used to take place on Sunday mornings, next to a black church where the singing of hymns was extremely loud. The church was extremely well attended: far better attended—and probably more fun—than the meetings of the Tottenham Labour Party. However, what constitutes reasonable pursuit of your religious beliefs? For example, is it acceptable that, in pursuit of your religious beliefs, you decide to go into the common parts of an estate and pray extremely noisily every night at 2 am? Some people might claim that was pursuit of their legitimate religious beliefs, but is that reasonable in this context?
My final point is: even if this is the reasonable pursuit of a bona fide religious belief, does that pursuit have a disproportionate impact on other people? I pity the courts that have to interpret this and the local authorities or housing agencies trying to pick their way through it. I hope that, by tabling this amendment, we will get some elucidation from the Minister on what is intended by this phrase. I absolutely support and accept the principle that these injunctions should respect bona fide religious beliefs. However, we will have to define what a set of bona fide religious beliefs is, what the normal extent of practising those beliefs is and in what circumstances their normal practice has a disproportionate impact on other people.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I say in response to my noble friend’s point about education and training, “Call me legalistic”. The noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, is very bold in raising these important points. He used the phrase “bona fide” several times in his speech, as well as in the amendment. Followers of paganism would say that their religion was bona fide. As the noble Lord was speaking, it occurred to me that a call to prayer at a very early hour is very annoying to some people, but would one challenge that? He raises bold and brave questions.
Baroness Berridge
My Lords, I refer to the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. The examples raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Harris, all seem to relate to the manifestation of somebody’s religious beliefs. The report states that the holding of religious beliefs by any individual is an absolute right under both the European convention and in international law, under Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is only the manifestation of one’s religious or humanist beliefs that can be restricted by a country on certain grounds, as defined in European and international law. Would the Minister please outline why the Bill, as currently drafted, only allows prohibitions and requirements to,
“so far as is practicable … avoid any conflict with the respondent’s religious beliefs”?
It should, surely, be the manifestation of those religious beliefs that the Bill is aimed at.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, in standing up and responding I feel like the Jedi knight next to the Jedi master. May the Force be with us all.
Amendments 20F and 22CA raise an important point in respect of the duty on the court to ensure, so far as is practicable, that any prohibitions or requirements attached to an injunction do not conflict with the manifestation—as my noble friend so eloquently put it—of the respondent’s religious beliefs. In line with the Equality Act 2010, reference to religious beliefs should go further than so-called “traditional” religious beliefs. I believe that this can be covered in guidance but I would like to go away and consider further the points made by my noble friend. We can return to the wording of this section if required. I hope my noble friend will accept my assurance that we will further consider this point and those made by the Joint Committee on Human Rights.
I turn to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Harris. I support the words of my noble friend Lady Hamwee: he raised bold and challenging concepts. As I said, in response to an earlier amendment, what may be perceived as perfectly acceptable to one person may not be acceptable to another. The courts are used to considering a person’s religious beliefs and do not need to be told that they can reject beliefs if they are spurious. In addition, to try to second-guess what would, in the words of the amendment, constitute activities “that would normally arise” is very difficult given that two people of the same religion may have different ways of practising their faith. I am a Muslim and there are 73 different denominations within Islam. During Ramadan, the time of your fast can differ depending on where you are. One obviously prefers to be at a place where the fast closes as the sun sets rather than when the sun is set totally. That is a practical illustration from a faith which is widely recognised.
The crucial point here is that, in considering an injunction, the court must avoid, so far as is practicable, any conflict with the manifestation of a respondent’s religious beliefs. If that is not practicable because, for example, avoiding the conflict would result in the respondent engaging in further anti-social behaviour purporting to be religious practice, the court would not be prevented from imposing prohibitions or requirements that it considered appropriate. This is something we can safely leave to the courts; they are more than capable of assessing the bona fide status of a respondent’s religious practice without express provision and, indeed, we have recently seen examples of that.
Amendments 20G and 22CB, tabled by my noble friend Lord Greaves, raise another important point. As we have made clear, the injunction should be available to help turn a troubled person’s life around, especially when they are young and impressionable. As such, it would not be helpful for requirements or prohibitions to unnecessarily stop them engaging in constructive training.
However, what is considered as training by some may not be worthy of special consideration by the court and some will try to use this term to delay the court’s process. Where training is worthy of consideration it is likely to be linked to an educational establishment or even a formalised work placement and, as such, is already provided for in the Bill. My noble friend also raised the issue of different wording in different parts of the Bill. We recognise that Clause 34(3) imports the word “training” whereas Clause 5(1) does not. I will certainly reflect on those two variations and return to them as required.
For the reasons I have given, I hope that my noble friend Lord Greaves will withdraw his amendment and that the noble Lord, Lord Harris—notwithstanding the important issues that he raised—will not press his.
Lord Greaves
My Lords, I am very grateful for that helpful response from the Minister and I look forward to the results of his reflection. To my noble friend Lady Hamwee I say, I am never legalistic; I may sometimes be pernickety, but that is a bit different. I had great sympathy for what the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, said, and had great sympathy for him, having to go to his Labour Party meetings on a Sunday morning. However, that reminded me that in the old days, and perhaps here and there now, there were things called socialist Sunday schools. If lads and lasses were getting out of hand, I am sure that going to socialist Sunday schools might have helped them. I cannot see how it could have done so, but it might well have helped them at least to organise their lives. Therefore, the question of regular events—such as non-religious ethical meetings—is important. I am grateful for the Minister’s comments, and I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 20F.