Budget Statement
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Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for introducing this debate on the Budget Statement. He demonstrated that it was not a boring Budget. Indeed, the Budget was—let us say—revelatory. It revealed that, try as you might, you cannot spin economic failure.
Two weeks ago the Prime Minister declared that,
“there are signs that our plan is beginning to work”.
The reality is that the economy is stuck in recession—or as near recession as makes no difference. Just three months ago the OBR, an organisation that always looks on the brighter side of life, was forecasting growth of more than 1% this year. Now it has had to face up to reality and halve its growth forecast.
The Budget Statement also revealed that austerity does not cut deficits. Despite all the Government’s efforts, the deficit is not falling. Taking out special measures, in 2012 it was £121 billion; in 2013, £120.9 billion—a lot of work must have gone into shaving off that £100 million—and in 2014, £199.8 billion, all within the slightest margin of error. The reason deficits are not falling is obvious to all: no growth in output means no growth in tax revenues and significant pressure on social spending.
There was one further major revelation. This Budget of no growth, stagnant deficit and falling living standards revealed that the Treasury has run out of ideas. It does not have a clue what to do next so it is handing economic policy over to the Bank of England in the hope that it might think of something, even though all the evidence at home and abroad suggests that monetary policy is ineffective in the face of prolonged recession.
The scale of our problems is indeed daunting. They will not be solved by a £3 billion infrastructure programme, postponed for two years. In his Budget speech, the Chancellor boasted that,
“we can provide the economy with the infrastructure it needs”.
The noble Lord has special responsibility for the infrastructure programme. Will he tell us how much was actually spent on infrastructure projects in 2012, and how much will actually be spent in 2013—not allocated, not “in the pipeline”, but actually spent? More generally, will he offer his diagnosis of why the Government’s infrastructure policy has so far failed so dismally?
The growth problem will not be solved by policies, postponed to 2014, designed to pump money into the housing market. The shared equity scheme will only partially offset the deep cuts in capital grants for social housing in the previous spending review, and the new mortgage guarantee, available for new-build and existing properties, is more likely to give a further twist to the house price spiral than provide the major new-build stimulus that the construction industry needs. Perhaps when the noble Lord sums up, he will tell us the Treasury’s estimate of the impact of the guarantee scheme on house prices, how much of the expenditure will be a dead weight loss—funding purchases that would have taken place anyway—and the Treasury’s estimate of the cost of this scheme.
The growth problem will not be solved by the cut in corporation tax to 20%, another measure postponed to 2015. As for business investment, the Government just do not seem to understand that the key stimulus to investment is the prospect of demand for the goods and services that the investment will produce. It does not matter how low taxes or interest rates are if investment does not result in a marketable product for which there is growing demand. Yet, as the Chancellor himself admitted, this Budget does nothing to stimulate overall demand in the economy. The OBR forecasts that real wages will fall in 2013 and not recover for two years thereafter. The continuing squeeze on households severely curtails the prospect of any growth in demand, a fact to which our increasingly devastated high streets are an eloquent testimony.
I return to corporation tax. The Chancellor boasted that “headline” UK corporation tax will be far lower than headline corporation tax in Germany or the United States. Did not this boast give him some food for thought? Has he not noticed that the US economy, despite political problems between President and Congress, has sustained its underlying dynamism through the crisis and has already grown to levels of output way above the pre-crisis peak, while UK output languishes 3% below the peak? Has he not noticed the superior industrial performance of Germany, even among the difficulties of the eurozone? Has he not thought to ask himself, “If their taxes are so much higher than ours, how come they are doing so much better than we are?”.
The British economy is in dire straits. What is needed right now is a radical policy of expanding demand, financial reform and investment in the well-springs of growth. In the housing market, the Chancellor has accepted the argument for a boost to demand. Why has he not followed the logic of his expansionist policies in housing and stimulated demand on a wider canvas by cutting VAT and channelling more funding to the poor, who possess the great economic virtue of spending every pound that they receive?
The financial services industry, the mother of the mess that we are in, remains unreformed. The banking Bill that will come before this House later in the year is all about protecting the banks from themselves. There is nothing in it about the sort of banks that we need for Britain’s future. We need a financial system that channels savings to industry, large and small; we need a financial system that understands the needs of local communities and local industry; and we need a supply-side policy that does not just hope that private finance will be seduced into investment in infrastructure, science and technology and skills but actually gets on with the job. In this country, we are blessed with some of the greatest science-based universities in the world, yet, with just a few notable exceptions, we are steadily losing world share in cutting-edge applications across all industries, large and small, traditional and novel. Reversing that downward trend will require a fundamental rethink of company structures, company finances, supply chains and incentives. We need to learn the lesson from the US, Germany and Scandinavia that partnership and a sense of purpose between government and private industry is the bedrock of sustained growth.
The reaction from the Chancellor to these sorts of proposals is predictable. He said in his Budget speech that such ideas are from,
“people who seem to think that the way to borrow less is to borrow more”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/3/13; col. 934.]
Has he not noticed that it is his policies that are leading to more borrowing and prolonged recession? Did he not read the OBR’s damning assessment of the Budget? It states:
“Given … the fact that the overall net effect of these changes is relatively small, we have not adjusted our overall GDP forecast”.
In other words, the Budget’s contribution to growth is nil and the Budget’s contribution to deficit reduction is nil.
The Prime Minister’s speech on the economy two weeks ago revealed him to be an economic fantasist. The Budget has told us even more about the Chancellor. He declared yesterday:
“We have got a plan to cut our structural deficit. Our … credibility comes from delivering that plan, not altering it with every forecast”.—[Official Report, Commons, 20/3/13; col. 934.]
He cannot admit that no growth and no cut to the deficit is not a forecast; it is reality. He cannot admit failure, face up to the real world and change course.
Albert Einstein defined insanity, as,
“doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results”.
Well, the Chancellor is not mad—far from it. It is just that he has not a clue about what to do next, and he is willing to sacrifice the British economy on the altar of his own political career.
Lord Higgins
My Lords, myths can be important in politics, and there is now a pretty well established myth that last year’s Budget was a bad Budget. In reality, all the good news came out the day before Budget Day and therefore there was nothing left but criticism on Budget Day itself.
I am sorry that the Chancellor does not appear to have learnt the lesson from that. It is vital that we reassert the convention in Parliament that budgetary matters are first announced to the House of Commons. There are good reasons for that. Obviously it is the right of the House of Commons to receive the news first, but it also prevents the risk of market-sensitive information getting into the public domain and someone making a fortune out of it. I was therefore very concerned by the Evening Standard story last night. I have to say that, obviously in a post-Leveson mood, it made an abject apology in later editions for what was on the front page of the first edition, and that is to be welcomed. It emerged very clearly that it was in receipt of an embargoed copy of the speech. I believe that is totally wrong, not least because it discriminates between some journalists and others, and because it endangers the basic principle. I hope the Minister will give me an assurance that he will speak to his right honourable friend the Chancellor and ensure that that practice is abandoned forthwith and that the traditional view—which was exemplified by Hugh Dalton when he resigned as Chancellor when all he did was to have a quick word as he was going into the Chamber—will prevail.
Lord Eatwell
This side totally support the remarks just made by the noble Lord, Lord Higgins.
Lord Higgins
I am grateful to the noble Lord. I think it should be a unanimous view in Parliament.
I believe this is a very good Budget that does a considerable amount to encourage growth. I particularly welcome, first, the help-to-buy proposals, both of them, which will ensure that there is a higher degree of growth than there would otherwise be. The Minister, in a speech that gave the impression that he wrote it himself, rightly said that there are risks here. It is not clear, if one is going to give guarantees to homebuyers—if one is going to subsidise in this way—that they are really able to meet the responsibilities of taking out a mortgage. We do not want to go back to the disasters of Northern Rock and so on, of which many of us in this House bear the scars, but both schemes are very good and greatly to be welcomed.
I very much welcome the proposal about helping small businesses by removing what the Chancellor rightly described as the jobs tax. Many small businesses are reluctant to take on a few more employees because of the up-front costs. I am sure that the employment allowance will be of considerable help to the state of the economy.
I now turn to the main point with which we are all concerned: the deficit. The Minister referred to it. What was clear from the business about the AAA rating and so on is that we have to press ahead. It is very good news that the slogan that had been emerging, “We have cut the deficit by a quarter”, can now be changed to “We have cut the deficit to a third”, but it still means that we are continuing to borrow more at two-thirds of the rate that the previous, disastrous, Labour Government were maintaining. Therefore, we need to look very carefully at what is being said.
If I may make a rather semantic point, in his speech the Chancellor referred to “cutting borrowing”. He should, of course, have said, “We have been successful in cutting extra borrowing”. Total borrowing continues to go up, and that is of serious concern, not least in relation to monetary policy. It is very important that we look at the new relationship that appears to be developing with the Bank of England. I was always very sceptical of what was always hailed as Gordon Brown’s great achievement of giving independence to the Bank of England because it means that we are handing over more and more power to a small group of people who are totally unaccountable with regard to one of the two main levers of economic management. I hope that we can make progress on this.
On the proposals the Chancellor is making, we certainly need to look at the inflation target and at whether other considerations can be taken into account. Having said that, it would be helpful to move now from what was just an interest rate policy for many years after the Gordon Brown change to a policy that is concerned with controlling the money supply, which is what one really means by “a monetary policy”. I remain a strong supporter of quantitative easing despite the unfortunate side-effects, particularly on private sector pension schemes and so on. If one is not able to do anything because of the deficit problem on the fiscal side, we really must have an active monetary policy. In that context, greater co-ordination between the Treasury and new Bank governor will be of crucial importance. As I have said time and again, and I commend this to my noble friend on the Front Bench, it is absurd that the Treasury is working to one set of economic forecasts and the Bank of England to another. We should have a more unified policy on the link between the monetary and fiscal sides of economic management.
Overall, however, the Chancellor has done everything that could possibly have been done to be helpful, to stimulate growth and to ensure that we continue to do so. However, we must continue to do all that we can to cut the deficit. Immediately after the election and the formation of the coalition, I stressed how incredibly difficult this was going to be on both the tax and expenditure sides. I have been proved absolutely right. We have to go on in the same way. Labour still seems to be saying that we are cutting too much too soon. I am afraid that it is absolutely clear that we have not cut enough fast enough. We must therefore press ahead with that.
Bank of England: Monetary Policy
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Lord Newby
My Lords, again, that is a matter for the Bank of England. To the extent that the Chancellor—and the Treasury—wishes to change the way in which the Bank of England operates, he will have an opportunity tomorrow to set out what any changes might be.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, from what the noble Lord has said, the Treasury has clearly been content with the policy pursued by the Monetary Policy Committee over the past three years. Is the noble Lord also content with the impact of that policy on pensioners’ annuities?
Lord Newby
My Lords, the Government’s view is that it is in the long-term interests of everybody, including pensioners and families, that we deal with the deficit and get growth going on a sustainable basis. In the short term, the Bank has taken the view that to keep within the inflation target and, subject to that, to support the economic policy of the Government, including their objectives for growth and employment, it should keep interest rates low.
Inequality: Income and Wealth
Lord Eatwell Excerpts(11 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Eatwell
The noble Lord has made much in his Answer of the proportion of taxation paid by the highest earners. Is not the reason for this that their gross incomes are excessively high compared to those of others in our society?
Lord Deighton
The noble Lord is correct that it is a simple question of arithmetic. At equal changes, they will make the greater contribution. However, if one looks at the distributional analysis—it is to the Government’s credit that at each fiscal event we lay out the distributional analysis, which is a great step forward—it shows that their increase is proportionally greater than the amounts they have.
EU: Eurozone Financial Transaction Tax
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Lord Newby
My Lords, I am sure that many noble Lords share that aim. The question is whether such a tax would have that impact, and the academic work on it is ambiguous at best.
Lord Eatwell
Will the noble Lord explain why the Government are so allergic to the financial transaction tax, which is to be levied at less than 1% of the value of transactions and by many countries, whereas we are quite happy to have stamp duty levied on transactions at 5%, which is effective only here in the UK?
Lord Newby
My Lords, we have some examples of where this kind of thing has been done in the past. In 1989, Sweden introduced its version of an FTT and in the first week the volume of bond trading fell by 85%, even though the tax rate was only 0.003%. The volume of futures trading fell by 98% and the options trading market disappeared. Not surprisingly, Sweden is not now supporting the idea of a Europe-wide FTT.
EU: Budget
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Lord Deighton
In this budget we are talking about over €900 billion, six separate headings of component parts, and an ‘other items’ budget which includes a range of other things. It is a big and complex budget with many different components. There were lots of parts to the negotiation, and these particular transactions are indeed part of it.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, given that the EU budget is being reduced in real terms, can the noble Lord tell us what the consequential reductions are in expenditure in the UK?
Lord Deighton
There were three key things that the Prime Minister wanted to protect in terms of the expenditure coming into the UK. The first was to make sure that our universities were very well positioned to bid for the grants available. That part of the budget has gone up and the rewards are based on excellence, so they should do well there. Secondly, he wished to make sure that our farmers are protected in terms of the environmental programmes that they support, which he did. Thirdly and finally, the structural aid that goes to our less well-off regions has been protected at the existing base level of €11 billion.
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) (Amendment) Order 2013
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Lord Newby
My Lords, the Government have been clear that the attempted manipulation of the London interbank offered rate is completely unacceptable and has no place in the UK’s financial services industry. That is why we moved quickly after the initial revelations emerged to ask Martin Wheatley, the chief executive-designate of the new Financial Conduct Authority, to consider what immediate reforms could be made. The Wheatley review, which was published in September, provides a 10-point plan to reform LIBOR, including recommendations to both government and market participants. The Government welcomed and endorsed the Wheatley review’s recommendations, and have asked all institutions to which they are addressed to implement them without delay.
The Government believe that the banks and the British Bankers’ Association have to take responsibility for their failings and act on Mr Wheatley’s recommendations, including the removal and replacement of the BBA as operational LIBOR administrator. HM Treasury and the BBA have been working together and have made significant progress in laying the foundations for this unprecedented process. The noble Baroness, Lady Hogg, is now leading an independent committee that will recommend an appropriate successor. This builds on the legislative changes that we have already made. Following the Wheatley review, we introduced the following amendments to the Financial Services Act, which are relevant to today’s debate, to enable benchmark activities to be brought within the scope of statutory regulation under FiSMA, and to create a new, distinct criminal offence for making false or misleading submissions in connection with the determination of benchmarks.
Following a period of consultation at the end of last year, the two draft orders that underpin these changes, which we are debating today, were laid before Parliament. Last week they were approved by the other place. The Government plan to bring both orders into force at the beginning of April. This will continue the Government’s approach of taking decisive action to reform LIBOR.
The first statutory instrument amends the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order, to denote that submitting to and administering a benchmark are both regulated activities. The draft order specifies LIBOR as the relevant benchmark. The regulation of these activities will enhance and strengthen the FCA’s ability to make rules on benchmark-setting, as well as its ability to supervise directly and take regulatory action against those involved in benchmark-setting processes. It will also implement a key recommendation of the Wheatley review. Under this order, the banks that submit to LIBOR and the successor to the BBA will be regulated by the FCA.
The draft order provides certain exemptions to these activities to cover information that was not created specifically for the benchmark-setting process. Where a person simply supplies publicly available factual data, such as the stock market closing price, to the administrator of a specified benchmark, their activities will not constitute submission to a benchmark. Similarly, if the administrator of the benchmark happens to subscribe to a general information service such as a newspaper, the provider of that service will also not be carrying out the activity of submitting to a specified benchmark. The draft order includes provisions to ensure a smooth transition to the new regulated regime for those currently involved in the setting of LIBOR.
Finally, the order makes two consequential changes to the definition of “consumer” for the purposes of the FCA’s objectives. These changes ensure that individuals whose rights, interests or obligations are affected by the benchmark are classed as consumers by the FCA in meeting its objectives.
The second order under discussion today underpins the new criminal offences created by the Financial Services Act, as recommended by the Wheatley review. The Government have been clear throughout the ongoing enforcement actions that any organisation or individual found guilty of this sort of wrongdoing must take full responsibility and should be punished, if appropriate, by the civil and criminal law. The Serious Fraud Office has launched a criminal investigation into allegations of LIBOR manipulation under the Fraud Act. However, the Government believe that the FCA should also have the powers to investigate and prosecute this type of conduct in relation to benchmarks in the future. Although the FCA will have powers to investigate misconduct in relation to LIBOR and other benchmarks, none of the offences currently provided for in FiSMA apply to misconduct in relation to the kinds of benchmarks revealed by the recent investigations.
To close this gap, the Government created a new criminal offence specifically related to benchmark misconduct in the Financial Services Act. The Government also took the opportunity to review and expand the existing offences which relate to misleading statements made with a view to inducing the recipient to engage in market activity. These offences are backed up by strong and dissuasive criminal penalties of imprisonment for up to seven years and an unlimited fine.
The draft order specifies the activities, investments and benchmarks to which these offences relate and carries forward the existing law which is needed to support the new offences. Article 3 of the new order specifies the benchmarks to which the new offence applies—specifically LIBOR. Rogue individuals may still attempt to manipulate the rate but if they do, the FCA will have the appropriate powers to investigate and prosecute them.
The amendments introduced to the Financial Services Act last year give the Government the power to regulate benchmarks beyond LIBOR through appropriate secondary legislation. While we have taken swift action to deal with LIBOR misconduct, this does not mean that other benchmarks should go unregulated. We have given serious consideration to whether we should extend regulation to other benchmarks where we believe there to be a risk of manipulation.
The Government consulted on the matter at the end of last year. In answer to the Government’s consultation, respondents argued that an international consensus and framework should be developed under the auspices of the International Organisation of Securities and Commissions, the Financial Stability Board and the European Commission before the scope of benchmark regulation is extended beyond LIBOR. Progress is being made on these international initiatives. The Government agree with the consultation respondents and have decided, for now, to apply those new provisions only to LIBOR. We continue actively to engage in and drive forward the international work on this issue. However, as we have done in the case of LIBOR, we stand ready to move ahead of international work streams and table further secondary legislation to extend the scope should we deem it necessary. I commend these orders to the House.
This group also includes the Uncertificated Securities (Amendment) Regulations, which amend the Uncertificated Securities Regulations 2001 to transfer responsibility for the approval and regulation of operators of securities settlement systems from the Treasury—which had delegated the responsibility to the Financial Services Authority—to the Bank of England. The regulatory arrangements for securities settlement systems have always been modelled on those for recognised clearing houses and recognised investment exchanges in Part 18 of FiSMA. The new powers and other changes to these regulations essentially follow the changes that the Financial Services Act 2012 makes to Part 18. Specifically, the regulations provide the Bank of England with new powers to require reports to be produced by skilled persons in respect of operators, to appoint investigators for the purpose of making inquiries about operators and to publicly censure operators in appropriate cases. In addition, the regulations replace the existing provision regarding the prevention of restrictive practices with provision for the purpose of preventing operators adopting excessive regulatory provision.
The final order in this group is the consequential amendments order. A number of changes to other pieces of legislation are required as a consequence of the regulatory reforms introduced by the Financial Services Act. The majority of these were included in Schedule 18 to the Act. However, a small number of amendments have required further consideration during the Act’s passage and are therefore being made through this instrument. Primarily, it amends references to the FSA’s rulebook in primary legislation, taking into account that both the PRA and the FCA will make rules in the new regulatory system. It also amends references to provisions of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 which have been amended by the Financial Services Act 2012. These orders are all necessary for the effective implementation of the Financial Services Act and, on this basis, I commend them to the Committee.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing these orders. I will take them in reverse order, so to speak, since the major issue of the amendments relating to LIBOR and its subsequent management is the most weighty, and we can take some of the later amendments perhaps more quickly and dispose of them.
First, as the noble Lord says, the consequential amendments refer primarily to the specification of which parts of the FSA rulebook are to be divided between the PRA and the FCA. This seems rather minor but has very significant consequences, because you are taking what was, we hope, an internally consistent document and ripping it apart. The question is therefore whether the consistency that existed in the previous document will be retained in the subsequent two documents. It would be helpful if the noble Lord could elaborate a little on that, particularly in the light of the recent arguments being made by Mr Haldane of the Bank of England, who has argued most strongly that the excessive number of pages of regulation should be significantly reduced in order to reduce complexity. If Mr Haldane’s rule is to be followed, will we end up, when these rulebooks are divided following these measures, with more pages or fewer? A particular element puzzled me in this particular order. In respect of Article 13, which amends the Corporation Tax Act 2009, can the Minister explain how transforming “Insurance Prudential Sourcebook” into “Prudential Sourcebook for Insurers” has any substance whatever?
Uncertificated securities is a very important area and there has been huge growth in electronic exchanges and uncertificated insurances of this type. The order refers at many points to the notion of excessive regulation by the managers or operators of electronic transfer systems. Can the noble Lord elaborate on who is to define “excessive” and, indeed, how it is to be specified? If there is to be some clarity in this law, it would help if the notions of “excessive” and “disproportionate”, which are used at several points throughout the order, were clearly defined. There was one other puzzle, rather like the puzzle I have about the Insurance Prudential Sourcebook, on which the Minister could perhaps help me. In the redefinition of responsibility from the Treasury to the Bank of England, it is clear that “Treasury” is a collective noun while “Bank of England” is singular. Why is that? Is it because the Bank of England is a singular person, namely the governor, whereas the Treasury has responsibility shared out more widely?
I now turn to the meat of the matters before us today, the orders referring to misleading statements and impressions, which essential collect a number of areas which will be responsible if other benchmarks should be developed rather than simply LIBOR, and of course to the major one on regulated activities. First, I was very struck by the list of organisations and responsibilities associated with misleading statements and impressions. In the noble Lord’s description of the creation of those lists, he referred to the possibility of further benchmarks being included within the procedures defined within the Act. He told us that these were now being considered internationally, and that we await international rulings on these matters. It seems that there is a stark contrast between the very prompt action that was taken following the Wheatley report in respect of LIBOR and the effective kicking into touch of all the other areas which are of equivalent importance. Can the Minister assure us that major benchmarks used within the City of London are not today being manipulated? Can he assure us that the delays in international consideration of these matters will not result in some of the same activities as we have seen with respect to LIBOR?
Lord Newby
My Lords, I am extremely grateful to noble Lords who have contributed to the debate and will attempt to answer the questions they have raised. The first questions related to the effect of the tearing up, or bifurcation, of the rulebook and how continuity will be retained. I hope that the cultural commitment which the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, mentioned, pervades those at the head of the new organisations and that it will be carried forward. In formal terms, consistency will be maintained by the operation of the memorandum of understanding between the two bodies, the PRA and the FCA, which we discussed in relation to other orders last week.
This is of course not the first time that there has been an attempt to reduce the number of pages. The FSA at one point consulted on it, but the answer it got back was, “Actually, we do not want the number of pages reduced significantly, because they tell us what to do, and if you reduce the number of pages, that puts more of a requirement on us to exercise our own judgment”. That is the balance that we are grappling with here. On the one hand, everybody wants less regulation, but when the consequence of less prescriptive regulation is that people have to exercise more of their own judgment, sometimes they become less keen.
Lord Eatwell
The noble Lord has put his finger on absolutely the point that Mr Haldane was making, which is that the excessive complexity of regulation these days is actually being trapped in a game between the regulated and the regulators; as the regulated develop yet more complex instruments, the regulator responds with more complex regulation, and then the regulated respond with more complex instruments to evade the regulations that have just been introduced. The whole point of Mr Haldane’s argument was that there should be a much stronger and simpler structure and that chasing complexity was a fundamental mistake. Complexity in regulation just adds complexity in taxation, which is the origin of successful evasion.
Lord Newby
My Lords, I have a lot of sympathy with that view. Of course, one of the reasons why, in a slightly different bit of the forest, we are introducing the general anti-abuse rule is to start moving away from a situation in which the regulator is not only almost institutionally behind the game but responds to problems by having to produce vastly long and complicated legislation, which is why the tax code is as long as it is today.
The noble Lord also asked who defines “excessive”. The use of “excessive” is not new and it follows the existing FiSMA provisions. It means not required by UK or EU law; not justified by reasonable regulatory objectives; or disproportionate to any regulatory objectives. So there is a definition and I am glad that I do not have to administer that.
The noble Lord asked why the Treasury is plural and the Bank of England singular. I am sure he will be interested to know that the Treasury is defined in the Interpretation Act 1978 as,
“the Commissioners of Her Majesty’s Treasury”.
This reflects the fact that, for historical reasons, the Treasury has acted through two or more Lords Commissioners rather than a single Minister. I am extremely pleased to know that there is a rationale for that.
The noble Lord asked, in respect of the misleading statements order and the LIBOR orders more generally, about adding further benchmarks, and whether I can be sure that these are not being manipulated now and that delays will not lead to some of the same activities in respect of the other benchmarks. We do not think they are being manipulated now. By definition with these things, one does not always know until long after the event that people are behaving badly, but there is no indication that by sticking to LIBOR at the moment any illicit activities are taking place. We are putting most of our effort into international discussion on these issues at the moment but the legislation is very clear: we can add additional benchmarks unilaterally by secondary legislation if we feel that we need to do so, but at the moment we do not feel that we are in that position.
The noble Lord asked about interim permission. Interim permission is being given to the person who is administering LIBOR on 1 April and to those banks that are submitting to LIBOR. It is being given so that the new regulatory regime can start without any delay and before the longer-term reorganisation of the LIBOR system is in place.
Lord Eatwell
I see that, but to whom is interim permission being given—by whom and to whom?
Social Security (Contributions) (Re-rating) Order 2013
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Lord Newby
My Lords, I am pleased to introduce the Social Security (Contributions) (Limits and Thresholds) (Amendment) Regulations 2013 and the Social Security (Contributions) (Re-rating) Order 2013 to the Committee. As both the regulations and the order deal with national insurance contributions, I hope the Committee will agree that it is sensible that they be debated together. As a matter of course, I confirm that the provisions in the regulations and the order are compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights.
All the changes covered by these two instruments were announced as part of the Chancellor’s Autumn Statement on 5 December last year. I should confirm from the start that the basis of indexation that has been used to calculate the changes covered by these two instruments is the same as that used for the 2012-13 tax year. In the Budget in March 2011, we announced that, from the 2012-13 tax year, the basis for indexation of most NICs rates limits and thresholds would be the consumer prices index instead of the retail prices index rate of inflation. This is because the Government believe that the CPI is the most appropriate measure of the general level of prices.
I will start with the Social Security (Contributions) (Limits and Thresholds) (Amendment) Regulations. These regulations are necessary in order to set the class 1 national insurance contributions lower earnings limit, the primary and secondary thresholds, and the upper earnings limit for the 2013-14 tax year. The class 1 lower earnings limit will be increased from £107 to £109 per week from 6 April 2013. The lower earnings limit is the level of earnings at which contributory benefit entitlement is secured. However, NICs do not need to be paid by the employee until earnings reach the primary threshold. The class 1 primary threshold will be increased to £149 per week from 6 April 2013. The secondary threshold is the point at which employers start to pay class 1 NICs. In line with the commitment in the Budget in 2011, this is being increased by RPI to £148 per week.
From this April, the personal allowance for people born after 5 April 1948 will be increased above indexation by £1,335, from £8,105 to £9,440—the largest ever cash increase. As part of that increase, the basic rate limit will be reduced by £2,360 to £32,010. This means that the point at which the higher rate tax kicks in will be reduced to £41,450 in 2013-14. As I mentioned, the upper earnings limit is not subject to CPI indexation. In order to maintain the existing alignment of the upper earnings limit with the point at which higher rate tax is paid, the upper earnings limit will be reduced to £797 per week.
The regulations also set the prescribed equivalents of the primary and secondary thresholds for employees paid monthly or annually. There will be no changes to NICs rates in 2013-14. Employees will continue to pay 12% on earnings between the primary threshold and the upper earnings limit, and 2% on earnings above that. Employers will continue to pay contributions at 13.8% on all earnings above the secondary threshold.
The social security regulations set out the NIC rates and thresholds for the self-employed and those paying voluntary contributions. Starting with the self-employed, the order raises the small earnings exemption below which the self-employed may claim exemption from paying class 2 contributions. The exemption will rise in April from £5,595 to £5,725 a year. Many self-employed people choose to pay those contributions to protect their benefit entitlement, even though they may claim exemption from paying class 2 contributions. The rate of voluntary class 3 contributions will also increase, from £13.25 to £13.55 a week.
Today’s measure also sets the profit limits for class 4 contributions. The lower profit limit at which these contributions are due will increase from £7,605 to £7,755 a year, in line with the increase to the class 1 primary threshold. At the other end of the scale, the upper profit limit will be reduced from £42,475 to £41,450 for the 2013-14 tax year. This is to maintain the alignment of the upper profit limit with the upper earnings limit for employees. The changes to the class 4 limits will ensure that the self-employed pay contributions at the main rate of 9% on a similar range of earnings to employees paying class 1 contributions at the main rate of 12%. Profits above the upper limit are subject to the additional rate of 2%, in line with the 2% paid by employees. I commend the order to the Committee.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, these measures are pretty straightforward and I do not have many comments to make, other than that I noticed that in the noble Lord’s introduction, although he made the traditional argument for CPI over RPI, he mentioned particular rates with respect to RPI. Those are clearly elements which are grandfathered within the social security structure. Are those RPI upratings to be maintained over the medium term, or is this a transitional arrangement? I have lost that in the complexity. That is entirely my failing and I should be grateful if the Minister would help me.
Secondly, and more broadly, can the Minister address the issue of entitlements? Both measures refer to securing entitlements, and that is particularly true with respect to the order on contributions. The whole notion of an entitlement is that one has some predictive expectation of returns, but we know today that there is no such predictive entitlement to returns. Governments—I do not say just this Government—change the pension rules upratings with respect to pensions and the pension age. So the entitlement that individuals are acquiring by making those contributions is simply in the hands of this and any future Administration.
Is that an appropriate way of going about that? The whole notion of national insurance was introduced as insurance—as a relationship, therefore, which would be defined between contribution and entitlement. That relationship has now broken down. Should we be rethinking on what basis the relationship between individual contributions and subsequent returns is calculated?
Lord Newby
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his comments. On the first point, perhaps I should have said that the RPI, as opposed to the CPI, is used in respect of the secondary threshold and the upper earnings and upper profit limits. Do the Government intend to maintain that in the medium term or to phase it out? We have said that the RPI increase will be for this Parliament, so we have no immediate intention to phase it out.
On entitlements under national insurance legislation and the fact that the Government change the rules, the problem here, I suspect, is that, as the noble Lord said, the link between paying into national insurance and what one gets by way of benefits from the system is very weak. We have gone a long way from the Lloyd George principle, when it was all very straightforward. Because the situation is much less clear than it was when the system was established, it will be quite difficult for the Government either to link national insurance payments more closely to entitlements or to merge income tax and national insurance into a single payment, which I know that my party and others and the Government have considered. We have ended up with a complicated system which succeeds in generating, broadly speaking, the amount of money required to fund the welfare state. I cannot see in the near future, and certainly not in this Parliament, a fundamental rethink about how we do that.
Economy: Rating Agencies
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Lord Deighton
My noble friend raises the question of monetary policy. We have had a number of debates on creativity to restore a focus on growth and not purely on short-term inflation targeting. All these ideas are welcome and demonstrate the importance of generating growth. We should have the debate but be very focused on sticking to a monetary policy that understands the importance of the medium-term inflation target, while accepting a degree of flexibility around output.
Some specific measures that the Government have taken, such as FLS, were recommended in the Moody’s review as a very positive sign, so other ideas should certainly be debated and considered.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, could the Minister tell the House whether it is better to borrow to fund the fiscal costs of negligible growth or to fund the expansion in investment and growth?
Lord Deighton
My Lords, I am not sure that I accept the specific question of my noble friend. It is better to have an entirely consistent strategy of fiscal consolidation to ensure that we regain our credibility in the financial markets so that we can continue to borrow at these historic low rates. If we have a choice between funding capital spend—let us call it that—and current spend, all other things being equal, I would choose capital spend. We saw that in the Autumn Statement, when the Government switched £5.5 billion, if my memory is correct, into financing capital spending because that yields better to improve the growth process. However, it all needs to be done in the context of balancing other important consumer and political objectives.
Bank of England Act 1998 (Macro-prudential Measures) Order 2013
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Lord Eatwell
My Lords, that was interesting introduction to this order as it spent most of its time discussing measures that are not included. It also began with a preamble that was an extraordinary rewrite of history, referring to a failure to identify macroprudential risks prior to 2008. Will the Minister specify any Government or regulatory document that includes a reference to macroprudential risk before 2008 and before publication of the Turner review? He will be hard put to find it. There are some academic articles on systemic risk but the whole issue of macroprudential risk was simply not on the horizon at that time.
I was also somewhat distressed to find that the Government still believe that following the Basel III approach of using capital related to risk-weighted assets is still at the centre of the approach to the determination of stability, particularly in the banking sector. This is using weapons with which we fought the last war to try to deal with the new war. It is an excessive emphasis on the asset side of the balance sheet to the detriment of the liability side, and indeed has been criticised very strongly recently by the IMF. I hope that the Government will rethink their approach and not continue to rely on this outdated measure.
I want to talk about some of the measures before us rather than some that might appear in the future, although the Minister has tempted me to ask what is happening with the leverage ratio. Leverage collars, which after all apply to the liability side of the balance sheet, have been demonstrated to be far more effective than risk-weighted capital requirements. Do the Government still plan to weaken the Vickers proposal of a leverage ratio of 25:1 and to fix the requirements simply on the Basel minimum of 33:1? When thinking about the leverage ratio, is the FPC planning any distinction between deposits and wholesale funding in the specification of a leverage cap?
In its earlier consideration of these measures, the FPC rejected the adoption of a loan-to-value ratio in mortgage finance, arguing that this was a political decision. In this instrument, though, we find the requirement on financial institutions to maintain additional own funds with respect to exposure to residential property. Will that not have the same effect? Is it not a back-door method of introducing loan-to-value restrictions by the requirement to hold additional capital against residential exposures?
Turning to the sectors specified in this instrument, it is striking that the measures are confined to financial instruments issued by financial sector firms. Why is that? If there were a bubble in the stock market, it could involve predominantly financial instruments issued by non-financial firms. Why is this legislation restricted only to instruments issued by financial institutions?
Another peculiarity of the drafting of this instrument is that it refers only to an increase in requirements of holding of own funds. It refers to “additional funds required” and that the PRA may require additional own funds both by banks and by other financial institutions. How will the PRA reduce the amount of funds required since the instrument only allows it to require additional funds? How will that happen?
I also regret the exclusion of smaller firms, to which the noble Lord referred in his introductory remarks. The Treasury seems to have totally failed to understand that a significant amount of the financial crisis was due to the aggregation of a large number of small firms doing the same thing at the same time, which had the same consequence as a large firm doing the similar thing in terms of the development of systemic risk.
The measures also refer to the requirement to ask or require that banks treat particular exposures as if they give rise to an increased level of risk, which is true not just of banks but also of investment firms. How is this level of risk to be specified by the FPC? Is it as a risk weight or as a modification of the stochastic distribution model used in the calculation of the firm’s value at risk? How is it to be done? If it is with respect to the modelling, does that now mean that the ability of firms to use their own risk models is to be modified and that there is to be a standardisation of risk models used by firms in the calculation of capital requirements?
The noble Lord referred to the use of these measures in what he called a granular way and what in the instrument is referred to as a solo basis. What will the relationship be between the FPC’s requirements of measures and competition policy, in the sense that imposing measures on a single firm would have competition implications? Will the views of the competition authorities be taken into account?
I assume that this is the first of a series of instruments that will implement the various proposals aired in the consultation papers issued by the interim FPC. Perhaps it would be helpful if the Minister gave us some timetable as to when those other instruments will be laid before the House.
Lord Newby
I am grateful to the noble Lord for those extremely thoughtful questions, and I will do my best to answer them. He said that systemic risk was not on the horizon before the crisis. I think that the phrase was first used in academic literature in 1979. Although the phrase was not in common parlance, it was well understood, at least by some people, that a bubble was building up that was capable of creating systemic risk. The first problem was that it took a long time for the authorities and the Government to accept that there was a bubble. The second was that when they realised that there was a problem, and indeed when there was a crisis, it was far too late to forestall it. It was then necessary to deal with a crisis rather than dealing with a problem at an early stage.
The noble Lord said that we rely far too much on Basel III and that it is a weapon of the last war. We are part of an international discussion on Basel III. Although Basel III is part of the armoury that we use, it is only one part. Indeed, the measure that we are looking at today is not a Basel III measure. Even if the noble Lord was correct that Basel III does not deal with every issue that we will be grappling with, it is not the only tool that we are looking at.
The noble Lord asked me about the leverage ratio, and whether we still plan to weaken the Vickers ratio. I do not believe that the Government’s view on this has changed.
Lord Newby
The Government said in response to Vickers that they believed he was going too far, and I do not believe that that view has changed. The noble Lord asked about the loan-to-value ratio and whether that tool would not have the same effect as introducing a loan-to-value ratio. In an aggregate sense, in many ways it does so. However, the advantage of this approach over adopting a loan-to-value limit is that it places an overall requirement on an institution in terms of its lending to the property sector, but still gives that institution the flexibility to provide loans at a high loan-to-value ratio. This might take place, for example, in a minority of cases in which the circumstances of the person to whom the loan is being given makes that loan prudent. In many ways it could have the same overall effect on the sector, but it gives institutions greater flexibility than a prescriptive loan-to-value ratio.
The noble Lord asked why the stock market was not included and why we were not including firms in that sector. The answer is that at this point the FPC believes that the definition of which firms are covered includes those firms that are most likely to cause a problem. The FPC has taken the view that firms in the stock market are not creating an equivalent risk to those elsewhere and those already covered. That is its judgement, which one can take a view on. The noble Lord disagrees, but that is the answer to the question.
The noble Lord asked about the order using the word “increase” and how it is envisaged that any increase might be unwound. When the FPC considers that any increase is no longer required, it will revoke the direction.
Lord Eatwell
Let us suppose that we are in the situation that we are in today, that there is no direction in place and that we wish to reduce the own funds. How do we do that?
Lord Newby
My Lords, I do think that that is an eventuality that the order caters for because, as the noble Lord says, it uses “increase”. If I am wrong on that, I shall let him know but, as he has said, the order is relatively straightforward. It will be for the PRA to decide whether it wants to do that, and it may do so, but obviously I will correct the record if I am wrong. It may require an amendment to the order for it to do that.
The noble Lord asked about the aggregation of a large number of small firms. This issue formed part of the consultation. The strong view came back that the effect that was being sought could be achieved by limiting the order at this point to larger firms. If any evidence built up that a large number of small firms could cause a risk beyond that currently envisaged, it would be for the FPC at that point to make appropriate provision.
The noble Lord asked how the FPC would specify risk. It will be for the PRA to determine capital models allowed by firms within the overall levels set by the FPC.
The noble Lord asked me about the timetable—whether there would be more orders and when they were going to be. There may be more orders, but none is envisaged at the moment. There is not a conveyor belt of other orders that are half-thought of. The view is that these measures are adequate for the time being. It is always open for further orders to be brought forward, but there is no perceived need for any further orders at this point.
There is one issue that I have not dealt with concerning the relationship between the FPC and the competition authorities. I hope that the noble Lord will forgive me if I write to him on that subject.
Lord Eatwell
Before the Minister sits down, perhaps we could go back to how an increased level of risk is to be specified by the FPC. Is that to be specified as a change in risk weights in old-fashioned Basel I structures, or is it to be specified as a modification of the value at risk models used by the financial institutions? If it is the latter, are we moving away from the ability of institutions to use their own value at risk modelling towards a standardised model?
Lord Newby
My Lords, as I said earlier, the PRA will set overall levels; the capital models allowed by firms will, I believe be determined by the PRA.
Lord Eatwell
I am sorry, but the noble Lord contradicts the instrument before us. It states clearly,
“if they gave rise to an increased level of risk specified by the FPC”.
It is not the PRA, it is the FPC that has to specify this increased level of risk.
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (PRA-regulated Activities) Order 2013
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Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for introducing these orders. Like him, I will deal with them altogether. Before doing so, I declare an interest as a non-executive director of a financial services firm as set out in the Register of Lords’ Interests. Turning first to the PRA-regulated activities order, I still am somewhat puzzled as regards the whole definition of the large investment firm. Are we simply relying on the CRD definition expressed as €730,000-odd or is there some broader definition of what is meant by a “large investment firm” which the PRA has in mind?
Also with respect to that, under Article 6.5, what is the procedure if the FCA disagrees with the PRA’s decision to withdraw a designation? The consultation process should form a check on the PRA and not just act as a rubber-stamping on behalf of other bodies. There should be some scrutiny of important decisions that the PRA wishes to undertake, although of course without undermining its powers. What will be the dynamic when there is some form of disagreement and how are those disagreements to be mediated?
The threshold conditions are entirely appropriate but I want to focus on Article 2A about suitability. I found the discussion of suitability as a threshold condition—a very important threshold condition in any regulatory system—to be rather more vague than I would have expected. For example, under Article 2E(e) those who manage the affairs in investment firms have to have “adequate skills and experience”. Who defines adequate? What is meant by adequate? Does adequacy refer to a particular examination standard or standards of experience which might be expected?
In addition, the PRA might be expected to act with probity. Do we need a more precise definition of probity or will we simply regard it as having not yet been caught? How will we determine the conditions of suitability? Should they not be more precise, as individuals who wish to work in the financial services industry surely should have precise conditions and not be turned down on the basis of those rather general statements?
I have rather more questions on the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. Again, I will start with the problem of consultation between the PRA and the FCA. It seems to me that the PRA and the FCA are required to develop rules for access to the FSCS. How will they disclose that? What is the rule-making procedure referred to in this instrument? What will the procedure look like? Will they review the FSCS’s current rules? Presumably, they will. When we have had that review, will there be a transparent report to Parliament of the substance of that review?
There is a relationship between the discussion of mutuals and the FSCS. As the noble Lord will be aware, there has been considerable disquiet, to put it mildly, among mutuals with respect to the contributions that they make to the FSCS relative to those made by banks. I may have missed it, and if I have I apologise, but has there been any development on the levies made on mutuals in their contributions to the FSCS?
Turning specifically to the order before us, are there any substantial changes to the functions of the regulator in relation to mutuals contained in this order, or is it purely a transfer activity? Let us take one example which attracted my attention as I read through the order and raised this question. Paragraph 5 of Schedule 1 states that the FCA has an obligation to,
“maintain arrangements … to determine whether persons are complying with requirements”.
That is pretty vague. What sort of arrangements do we mean? Could there be some clarity as to what is to be implemented here?
Given the Government’s determination to make five regulators where there was once just one, what will happen with respect to consultation between the PRA and the FCA when action is required rapidly; for example, in criminal proceedings? How can we ensure that the consultation procedure will be prompt?
Overall, we are broadly content with the orders. We are concerned specifically about a lack of clarity at various points, to which I have referred, and about the introduction of additional complexity because of the requirement for consultation at various stages between the PRA and the FCA. I would like some reassurance on those points.
Lord Newby
My Lords, if there is a leitmotif running through the noble Lord’s questions, it has to be about how the two bodies work together. This theme ran also through previous debates in your Lordships’ House and gets to the core of arguments about whether the Government were right to split the FSA at all. The view that we took is that we needed to give greater focus to the two elements of regulation. It was very important, having done that, we then set in place ways in which the two regulators would work together. As the noble Lord knows, there are a number of points in the Act where the two bodies are required to establish memoranda of understanding explaining exactly how they are going to work together. The success of the new structure will depend to a very large extent on that working. I know that the bodies as they are establishing themselves are absolutely aware of that and are putting co-ordination and consultation procedures in place.
Perhaps I may deal with some of the specific points that the noble Lord raised. He asked whether the designation of a larger firm was simply the €730,000 capital requirement. The order takes a number of criteria into account, not all of them from the CRD. I read some of them out. The PRA, for example, has to conclude that designation is desirable, having regard to its objectives—this is part of the regulator exercising judgment. That is an additional criterion beyond the €730,000; it is not automatic.
The noble Lord asked what would happen if the FCA disagreed with the PRA’s decision to withdraw designation. This is a decision for the PRA. We expect it to give considerable weight to the views of the FCA, but it is ultimately a matter for the PRA.
The noble Lord asked whether the definitions should be more precise, in particular the definition of “probity”. The Government do not consider that the concept of probity is significantly more subjective than other criteria against which the regulator must make regulatory judgments. Recent conduct and mis-selling scandals have shown more than ever how important it is that firms conduct themselves with probity, and it is right that the regulators can make an assessment on whether this is the case and take action where it is needed. A general question for legislation is how far it attempts to define terms which are in common parlance and have a common understanding. Our view is that in this respect the legislation goes as far as it should do.
The noble Lord asked about mutuals and whether there had been a change in class. This has been a long-standing beef of the mutuals; they feel that they have to bear the burden of the incompetence, folly and recklessness of others. That is a question for the authorities to decide, but for the time being they remain in the same levy class that they have already stayed in.
I shall try to deal with one or two other points. The noble Lord asked about the procedure for FSCS rules. The same procedure applies as for other rules; there is a duty to consult but no duty to carry out a cost-benefit analysis. There are no plans to change the rules as part of the transition. Once the transition has taken place, it will obviously be for the new regulators to decide whether they are happy with them, but we are not planning to do that at the same time.
On the question of consultation between the FCA and the PRA on mutuals functions, the order makes express provision for consultation where it is needed. The general provisions relating to the FCA/PRA MoU, which I referred to earlier and which are set out in Section 6 of the Act, will apply in this area as they will in many others.
I hope that I have answered the majority, if not all, of the questions posed by the noble Lord, and I commend the regulations to the Committee.