Economy: Rating Agencies
Lord Eatwell Excerpts(12 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Deighton
My noble friend raises the question of monetary policy. We have had a number of debates on creativity to restore a focus on growth and not purely on short-term inflation targeting. All these ideas are welcome and demonstrate the importance of generating growth. We should have the debate but be very focused on sticking to a monetary policy that understands the importance of the medium-term inflation target, while accepting a degree of flexibility around output.
Some specific measures that the Government have taken, such as FLS, were recommended in the Moody’s review as a very positive sign, so other ideas should certainly be debated and considered.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, could the Minister tell the House whether it is better to borrow to fund the fiscal costs of negligible growth or to fund the expansion in investment and growth?
Lord Deighton
My Lords, I am not sure that I accept the specific question of my noble friend. It is better to have an entirely consistent strategy of fiscal consolidation to ensure that we regain our credibility in the financial markets so that we can continue to borrow at these historic low rates. If we have a choice between funding capital spend—let us call it that—and current spend, all other things being equal, I would choose capital spend. We saw that in the Autumn Statement, when the Government switched £5.5 billion, if my memory is correct, into financing capital spending because that yields better to improve the growth process. However, it all needs to be done in the context of balancing other important consumer and political objectives.
Public Service Pensions Bill
Lord Eatwell Excerpts(12 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Newby
My Lords, this group contains a large number of technical amendments. Amendment 1 reflects the fact that some of the obligations in the Bill are set in the main clauses and not in scheme regulations. This means that the drafting of Clause 3, which allows only for consequential, supplementary, incidental or transitional changes as a result of provisions in scheme regulations, leaves a theoretical gap in powers that we would like to plug. If such changes were required solely as a result of provisions in the Bill rather than in scheme regulations, we might not be able to do so without making new primary legislation. We do not believe that that would be appropriate, so the amendments in this group seek to address the slight gap in the current drafting.
Of course, this extends the powers to cover only consequential, supplementary, incidental or transitional changes that result from clauses that have been debated at length in both Houses. Parliament is already aware of the desired effects of the Bill. These powers ensure that the effects can be realised. As we discussed on Report, any use of these powers to amend primary legislation could only be for consequential purposes and to Acts that have already been passed. I therefore hope that noble Lords can support this small but sensible amendment.
Amendments 4 and 5 are minor technical amendments. They are simply to provide consistency throughout the Bill in the form of cross-references to Schedule 4 to the Pensions Act 1995. They ensure that the same format is used in Clauses 34 and 35 as is used in Clause 10.
Amendments 8 and 9 are again minor amendments intended to clarify the wording, in this case of amendments I brought forward on Report. Noble Lords will recall that those amendments give schemes flexibility to define pensionable earnings for the purpose of the final salary link, and also safeguard the value of members’ final salary benefits. The safeguard is that the amount of earnings in the new scheme that are pensionable earnings for the purpose of the final salary link must not be materially less than the amount that would have applied had the person been in the old scheme until the point they eventually left service. The amendments simply clarify the safeguard. They make it clear that it applies to what would have been the person’s pensionable earnings had that person been in active service in the old scheme or deemed transfer scheme, rather than the new scheme. They would, of course, not have been in actual active service in those schemes after 2015, since they would have been in active service in the new scheme instead. The amendments do not change the substance of the meaning of the previous amendments in any way, but are just clarificatory.
Amendment 10 is concerned with circumstances where a pension that is calculated in accordance with the final salary link has been put into payment and the person subsequently returns to public service employment. It is designed to allow flexibility for schemes to continue their current treatment of a final salary pension in payment in such circumstances. Our intention is for the final salary link to accord with the rules on final salary benefits in each scheme that are currently in force. Some schemes currently allow the final salary benefits to be recalculated after a period of re-employment. The provisions in Schedule 7 allow this approach to continue where there is continuity of service, as provided for in paragraph 3. However, many schemes currently treat final salary benefits that have already been put into payment as fully crystallised, and consequently unaffected by any future period of employment in scheme service. Our amendment would allow for scheme regulations to provide that this continues to be the case too, if desired. Rules of existing schemes can also continue to provide for some limited aggregation of periods of employment, as some do at the moment. This amendment assists schemes in the implementation of the recommendation of the noble Lord, Lord Hutton, to honour the benefits built up under the current final salary schemes.
Amendment 11 consists of a series of minor, consequential amendments to the Pensions (Increase) Act 1971. It clarifies how the uprating provisions of that Act apply to those with service in both an existing scheme and a new one. The 1971 Act provides for the uprating of pension benefits for deferred and pensioner members of the public service schemes. The intention is that while a person is a member of a new scheme after 2015, and they have also old scheme benefits, those old scheme benefits should be treated for uprating purposes as though they remained an active member. This should remain the case until the member takes the old scheme pension or leaves the new scheme. This means that for those persons whose existing scheme is a final salary scheme, their benefits in that scheme will be uprated through the final salary link provisions in Schedule 7 to the Bill. For those persons whose existing scheme is a career average scheme, their benefits should continue to be revalued as if they remained an active member. This amendment clarifies how the provisions in the Pensions (Increase) Act apply in the circumstances I have just described.
Where people continue in service, the old scheme benefits should not be treated as deferred from 2015. To do so would mean that those benefits would be uprated in line with prices from 2015, which would run counter to the treatment of old scheme benefits recommended by the noble Lord, Lord Hutton.
The final amendment in this group relates to an amendment I introduced on Report to paragraph 30 of Schedule 8. This paragraph amends Schedule 4 to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 to enable those active members of the Legal Services Commission pension schemes to transfer into the Civil Service scheme on 1 April 2014 to have full access to the transitional provisions contained in Clause 18. This subsequent amendment is a minor tweak to paragraph 30 to ensure that, in addition to those active members, deferred members of the LSC pension schemes who rejoin within a five-year period will also benefit from the transition provisions. This is entirely consistent with wider government policy on the treatment of deferred members of public service pension schemes. It will ensure that employees of the LSC are not unfairly disadvantaged by the changes to their pension provision. I beg to move.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for explaining the content of these essentially technical amendments. I particularly welcome the approach, which is in accord with the recommendation of my noble friend Lord Hutton.
I have but one question of the noble Lord, and that is why his remarks were not prefaced by an apology to the House for having put down these amendments as late as 5 pm yesterday afternoon.
Lord Newby
My Lords, I have my apology prepared and I will now give it. I thought it was the next group of amendments about which the noble Lord was particularly concerned.
I apologise to the House for the late tabling of these amendments. There is nothing sinister about it. As noble Lords will have understood, I hope, from my explanation of them, they were extremely minor technical amendments. The reason for the delay was simply to ensure that all legal issues had been adequately addressed in the final drafting. I had hoped we could have done it sooner, but that was the sole reason for the delay in the amendments being submitted. I repeat, I am sorry that we did not do it earlier.
The Lord Speaker (Baroness D'Souza)
I should advise your Lordships that if this amendment is agreed to I cannot call Amendment 3 for reason of pre-emption.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for introducing these amendments, and for reacting as he promised on Report to the issues raised there by me and my noble friend Lord Whitty. His speech was slightly imperfectly drafted as it referred on several occasions to the unlikelihood of negative growth. In fact under this coalition Government negative growth has become an all too common characteristic of our economy. He was, of course, referring to the negative growth of prices and earnings. In that dimension, he may hopefully be more accurate.
Our amendment was put down at 4.30 pm yesterday afternoon because of the absence of any government amendment at that time dealing with this issue. The government amendment appeared half an hour later. In the circumstances we are pleased that the Government have understood some of the important issues raised, particularly by my noble friend Lord Whitty, and have brought forward appropriate amendments to take into account the arguments that he made both in Committee and on Report. I will therefore not move Amendment 3, and will be quite happy to see government Amendment 2 nodded through.
Bank of England Act 1998 (Macro-prudential Measures) Order 2013
Lord Eatwell Excerpts(12 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Eatwell
My Lords, that was interesting introduction to this order as it spent most of its time discussing measures that are not included. It also began with a preamble that was an extraordinary rewrite of history, referring to a failure to identify macroprudential risks prior to 2008. Will the Minister specify any Government or regulatory document that includes a reference to macroprudential risk before 2008 and before publication of the Turner review? He will be hard put to find it. There are some academic articles on systemic risk but the whole issue of macroprudential risk was simply not on the horizon at that time.
I was also somewhat distressed to find that the Government still believe that following the Basel III approach of using capital related to risk-weighted assets is still at the centre of the approach to the determination of stability, particularly in the banking sector. This is using weapons with which we fought the last war to try to deal with the new war. It is an excessive emphasis on the asset side of the balance sheet to the detriment of the liability side, and indeed has been criticised very strongly recently by the IMF. I hope that the Government will rethink their approach and not continue to rely on this outdated measure.
I want to talk about some of the measures before us rather than some that might appear in the future, although the Minister has tempted me to ask what is happening with the leverage ratio. Leverage collars, which after all apply to the liability side of the balance sheet, have been demonstrated to be far more effective than risk-weighted capital requirements. Do the Government still plan to weaken the Vickers proposal of a leverage ratio of 25:1 and to fix the requirements simply on the Basel minimum of 33:1? When thinking about the leverage ratio, is the FPC planning any distinction between deposits and wholesale funding in the specification of a leverage cap?
In its earlier consideration of these measures, the FPC rejected the adoption of a loan-to-value ratio in mortgage finance, arguing that this was a political decision. In this instrument, though, we find the requirement on financial institutions to maintain additional own funds with respect to exposure to residential property. Will that not have the same effect? Is it not a back-door method of introducing loan-to-value restrictions by the requirement to hold additional capital against residential exposures?
Turning to the sectors specified in this instrument, it is striking that the measures are confined to financial instruments issued by financial sector firms. Why is that? If there were a bubble in the stock market, it could involve predominantly financial instruments issued by non-financial firms. Why is this legislation restricted only to instruments issued by financial institutions?
Another peculiarity of the drafting of this instrument is that it refers only to an increase in requirements of holding of own funds. It refers to “additional funds required” and that the PRA may require additional own funds both by banks and by other financial institutions. How will the PRA reduce the amount of funds required since the instrument only allows it to require additional funds? How will that happen?
I also regret the exclusion of smaller firms, to which the noble Lord referred in his introductory remarks. The Treasury seems to have totally failed to understand that a significant amount of the financial crisis was due to the aggregation of a large number of small firms doing the same thing at the same time, which had the same consequence as a large firm doing the similar thing in terms of the development of systemic risk.
The measures also refer to the requirement to ask or require that banks treat particular exposures as if they give rise to an increased level of risk, which is true not just of banks but also of investment firms. How is this level of risk to be specified by the FPC? Is it as a risk weight or as a modification of the stochastic distribution model used in the calculation of the firm’s value at risk? How is it to be done? If it is with respect to the modelling, does that now mean that the ability of firms to use their own risk models is to be modified and that there is to be a standardisation of risk models used by firms in the calculation of capital requirements?
The noble Lord referred to the use of these measures in what he called a granular way and what in the instrument is referred to as a solo basis. What will the relationship be between the FPC’s requirements of measures and competition policy, in the sense that imposing measures on a single firm would have competition implications? Will the views of the competition authorities be taken into account?
I assume that this is the first of a series of instruments that will implement the various proposals aired in the consultation papers issued by the interim FPC. Perhaps it would be helpful if the Minister gave us some timetable as to when those other instruments will be laid before the House.
Lord Newby
I am grateful to the noble Lord for those extremely thoughtful questions, and I will do my best to answer them. He said that systemic risk was not on the horizon before the crisis. I think that the phrase was first used in academic literature in 1979. Although the phrase was not in common parlance, it was well understood, at least by some people, that a bubble was building up that was capable of creating systemic risk. The first problem was that it took a long time for the authorities and the Government to accept that there was a bubble. The second was that when they realised that there was a problem, and indeed when there was a crisis, it was far too late to forestall it. It was then necessary to deal with a crisis rather than dealing with a problem at an early stage.
The noble Lord said that we rely far too much on Basel III and that it is a weapon of the last war. We are part of an international discussion on Basel III. Although Basel III is part of the armoury that we use, it is only one part. Indeed, the measure that we are looking at today is not a Basel III measure. Even if the noble Lord was correct that Basel III does not deal with every issue that we will be grappling with, it is not the only tool that we are looking at.
The noble Lord asked me about the leverage ratio, and whether we still plan to weaken the Vickers ratio. I do not believe that the Government’s view on this has changed.
Lord Newby
The Government said in response to Vickers that they believed he was going too far, and I do not believe that that view has changed. The noble Lord asked about the loan-to-value ratio and whether that tool would not have the same effect as introducing a loan-to-value ratio. In an aggregate sense, in many ways it does so. However, the advantage of this approach over adopting a loan-to-value limit is that it places an overall requirement on an institution in terms of its lending to the property sector, but still gives that institution the flexibility to provide loans at a high loan-to-value ratio. This might take place, for example, in a minority of cases in which the circumstances of the person to whom the loan is being given makes that loan prudent. In many ways it could have the same overall effect on the sector, but it gives institutions greater flexibility than a prescriptive loan-to-value ratio.
The noble Lord asked why the stock market was not included and why we were not including firms in that sector. The answer is that at this point the FPC believes that the definition of which firms are covered includes those firms that are most likely to cause a problem. The FPC has taken the view that firms in the stock market are not creating an equivalent risk to those elsewhere and those already covered. That is its judgement, which one can take a view on. The noble Lord disagrees, but that is the answer to the question.
The noble Lord asked about the order using the word “increase” and how it is envisaged that any increase might be unwound. When the FPC considers that any increase is no longer required, it will revoke the direction.
Lord Eatwell
Let us suppose that we are in the situation that we are in today, that there is no direction in place and that we wish to reduce the own funds. How do we do that?
Lord Newby
My Lords, I do think that that is an eventuality that the order caters for because, as the noble Lord says, it uses “increase”. If I am wrong on that, I shall let him know but, as he has said, the order is relatively straightforward. It will be for the PRA to decide whether it wants to do that, and it may do so, but obviously I will correct the record if I am wrong. It may require an amendment to the order for it to do that.
The noble Lord asked about the aggregation of a large number of small firms. This issue formed part of the consultation. The strong view came back that the effect that was being sought could be achieved by limiting the order at this point to larger firms. If any evidence built up that a large number of small firms could cause a risk beyond that currently envisaged, it would be for the FPC at that point to make appropriate provision.
The noble Lord asked how the FPC would specify risk. It will be for the PRA to determine capital models allowed by firms within the overall levels set by the FPC.
The noble Lord asked me about the timetable—whether there would be more orders and when they were going to be. There may be more orders, but none is envisaged at the moment. There is not a conveyor belt of other orders that are half-thought of. The view is that these measures are adequate for the time being. It is always open for further orders to be brought forward, but there is no perceived need for any further orders at this point.
There is one issue that I have not dealt with concerning the relationship between the FPC and the competition authorities. I hope that the noble Lord will forgive me if I write to him on that subject.
Lord Eatwell
Before the Minister sits down, perhaps we could go back to how an increased level of risk is to be specified by the FPC. Is that to be specified as a change in risk weights in old-fashioned Basel I structures, or is it to be specified as a modification of the value at risk models used by the financial institutions? If it is the latter, are we moving away from the ability of institutions to use their own value at risk modelling towards a standardised model?
Lord Newby
My Lords, as I said earlier, the PRA will set overall levels; the capital models allowed by firms will, I believe be determined by the PRA.
Lord Eatwell
I am sorry, but the noble Lord contradicts the instrument before us. It states clearly,
“if they gave rise to an increased level of risk specified by the FPC”.
It is not the PRA, it is the FPC that has to specify this increased level of risk.
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (PRA-regulated Activities) Order 2013
Lord Eatwell Excerpts(12 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for introducing these orders. Like him, I will deal with them altogether. Before doing so, I declare an interest as a non-executive director of a financial services firm as set out in the Register of Lords’ Interests. Turning first to the PRA-regulated activities order, I still am somewhat puzzled as regards the whole definition of the large investment firm. Are we simply relying on the CRD definition expressed as €730,000-odd or is there some broader definition of what is meant by a “large investment firm” which the PRA has in mind?
Also with respect to that, under Article 6.5, what is the procedure if the FCA disagrees with the PRA’s decision to withdraw a designation? The consultation process should form a check on the PRA and not just act as a rubber-stamping on behalf of other bodies. There should be some scrutiny of important decisions that the PRA wishes to undertake, although of course without undermining its powers. What will be the dynamic when there is some form of disagreement and how are those disagreements to be mediated?
The threshold conditions are entirely appropriate but I want to focus on Article 2A about suitability. I found the discussion of suitability as a threshold condition—a very important threshold condition in any regulatory system—to be rather more vague than I would have expected. For example, under Article 2E(e) those who manage the affairs in investment firms have to have “adequate skills and experience”. Who defines adequate? What is meant by adequate? Does adequacy refer to a particular examination standard or standards of experience which might be expected?
In addition, the PRA might be expected to act with probity. Do we need a more precise definition of probity or will we simply regard it as having not yet been caught? How will we determine the conditions of suitability? Should they not be more precise, as individuals who wish to work in the financial services industry surely should have precise conditions and not be turned down on the basis of those rather general statements?
I have rather more questions on the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. Again, I will start with the problem of consultation between the PRA and the FCA. It seems to me that the PRA and the FCA are required to develop rules for access to the FSCS. How will they disclose that? What is the rule-making procedure referred to in this instrument? What will the procedure look like? Will they review the FSCS’s current rules? Presumably, they will. When we have had that review, will there be a transparent report to Parliament of the substance of that review?
There is a relationship between the discussion of mutuals and the FSCS. As the noble Lord will be aware, there has been considerable disquiet, to put it mildly, among mutuals with respect to the contributions that they make to the FSCS relative to those made by banks. I may have missed it, and if I have I apologise, but has there been any development on the levies made on mutuals in their contributions to the FSCS?
Turning specifically to the order before us, are there any substantial changes to the functions of the regulator in relation to mutuals contained in this order, or is it purely a transfer activity? Let us take one example which attracted my attention as I read through the order and raised this question. Paragraph 5 of Schedule 1 states that the FCA has an obligation to,
“maintain arrangements … to determine whether persons are complying with requirements”.
That is pretty vague. What sort of arrangements do we mean? Could there be some clarity as to what is to be implemented here?
Given the Government’s determination to make five regulators where there was once just one, what will happen with respect to consultation between the PRA and the FCA when action is required rapidly; for example, in criminal proceedings? How can we ensure that the consultation procedure will be prompt?
Overall, we are broadly content with the orders. We are concerned specifically about a lack of clarity at various points, to which I have referred, and about the introduction of additional complexity because of the requirement for consultation at various stages between the PRA and the FCA. I would like some reassurance on those points.
Lord Newby
My Lords, if there is a leitmotif running through the noble Lord’s questions, it has to be about how the two bodies work together. This theme ran also through previous debates in your Lordships’ House and gets to the core of arguments about whether the Government were right to split the FSA at all. The view that we took is that we needed to give greater focus to the two elements of regulation. It was very important, having done that, we then set in place ways in which the two regulators would work together. As the noble Lord knows, there are a number of points in the Act where the two bodies are required to establish memoranda of understanding explaining exactly how they are going to work together. The success of the new structure will depend to a very large extent on that working. I know that the bodies as they are establishing themselves are absolutely aware of that and are putting co-ordination and consultation procedures in place.
Perhaps I may deal with some of the specific points that the noble Lord raised. He asked whether the designation of a larger firm was simply the €730,000 capital requirement. The order takes a number of criteria into account, not all of them from the CRD. I read some of them out. The PRA, for example, has to conclude that designation is desirable, having regard to its objectives—this is part of the regulator exercising judgment. That is an additional criterion beyond the €730,000; it is not automatic.
The noble Lord asked what would happen if the FCA disagreed with the PRA’s decision to withdraw designation. This is a decision for the PRA. We expect it to give considerable weight to the views of the FCA, but it is ultimately a matter for the PRA.
The noble Lord asked whether the definitions should be more precise, in particular the definition of “probity”. The Government do not consider that the concept of probity is significantly more subjective than other criteria against which the regulator must make regulatory judgments. Recent conduct and mis-selling scandals have shown more than ever how important it is that firms conduct themselves with probity, and it is right that the regulators can make an assessment on whether this is the case and take action where it is needed. A general question for legislation is how far it attempts to define terms which are in common parlance and have a common understanding. Our view is that in this respect the legislation goes as far as it should do.
The noble Lord asked about mutuals and whether there had been a change in class. This has been a long-standing beef of the mutuals; they feel that they have to bear the burden of the incompetence, folly and recklessness of others. That is a question for the authorities to decide, but for the time being they remain in the same levy class that they have already stayed in.
I shall try to deal with one or two other points. The noble Lord asked about the procedure for FSCS rules. The same procedure applies as for other rules; there is a duty to consult but no duty to carry out a cost-benefit analysis. There are no plans to change the rules as part of the transition. Once the transition has taken place, it will obviously be for the new regulators to decide whether they are happy with them, but we are not planning to do that at the same time.
On the question of consultation between the FCA and the PRA on mutuals functions, the order makes express provision for consultation where it is needed. The general provisions relating to the FCA/PRA MoU, which I referred to earlier and which are set out in Section 6 of the Act, will apply in this area as they will in many others.
I hope that I have answered the majority, if not all, of the questions posed by the noble Lord, and I commend the regulations to the Committee.
Public Service Pensions Bill
Lord Eatwell Excerpts(12 years, 1 month ago)
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Lord Eatwell
“(c) the Defence Fire and Rescue Service”
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, this amendment refers to the position of the Defence Fire and Rescue Service within the structure of the Bill. Noble Lords will remember that it was revealed in the discussion of the Bill in Committee—the issue had not been discussed in another place—that the Defence Fire and Rescue Service had an anomalous status relative to that of other firefighters within the UK. In particular, while other firefighters within the UK had their retirement age fixed at the age of 60, together with other uniformed services, the Defence Fire and Rescue Service at that time had a retirement age tied to the statutory retirement age. Therefore, it would be 65, rising in accordance with the pattern planned for the increase in the statutory retirement age.
My hypothesis in Committee was that this was simply a slip and a mistake and that people had just happened to miss the fact that a category of firefighters was not covered in the actual language of the Bill. I therefore expected that, once the Minister had taken the matter back—he conceded in Committee that he had not had the opportunity to consider it with any great care—the mistake would be understood and the firefighters would be included with the other uniformed services, having their retirement age fixed at 60, as is the case with the other uniformed services. However, to my considerable surprise, this has not been the case. I understand that the firefighters—and, indeed, the Ministry of Defence Police, to which I will turn in a moment—have met the Minister and that he has turned down this proposition. He has substituted for it the assurance that their pension age would be maintained at 65 and not, perhaps, go up with the statutory pension age, although his assurance was not terribly clear in the sense that it referred to a three-year differential between the statutory retirement age and that for Ministry of Defence firefighters. In due course, when it gets to 68 or 69, as we all live longer, those firefighters would see their retirement age go up—or so I presume; perhaps the Minister can clarify that later on—while that of their colleagues in the rest of their fire service would stay the same, at 60.
The Minister has one fundamental question to answer. It is an answer that not just this House but the firefighters themselves deserve. How does their job differ from that of local authority firefighters? In what way is it less onerous, when they have to work on military establishments, dealing on occasion with extremely dangerous materials, and occasionally also in war zones? How is their job less onerous? In those circumstances, why should we have this situation in which their retirement age is five years higher?
I wonder whether the Minister has taken the trouble to find out when the Defence Fire and Rescue Service members actually retire. If he did take that trouble, he would find out that the majority of them retire before the age of 60. They retire early, with a significantly reduced pension, and they have to do that because they are physically unable to keep going. A study performed by the Civilian Consultant Adviser in Occupational Medicine for the Defence Fire Risk Management Organisation not only produced data but argued that continuing beyond the age of 60 was detrimental to the long-term health of firefighters in the Ministry of Defence Fire and Rescue Service. If the noble Lord had taken the trouble to find out what was actually happening, he would have found out that firefighters in this service are forced to retire early due to their physical condition or because they are unable to pass the regular physical examinations they undergo to ensure that they can perform their duties to the required standard.
Lord Eatwell
Well, my Lords, we got the answer that we all feared. We were told that somehow the unique position of an injustice is such that the injustice should be maintained. We were told that it was not clear how the changes could be implemented. “It’s just too jolly complicated. Our staff aren’t up to it. We haven’t got enough civil servants who can puzzle through all these problems. There is no way through”. That is ridiculous.
We were told that somehow these firefighters would have to be transferred to other pension schemes. I am afraid that that is not the case. Civil Service pension schemes are flexible and perfectly able, as currently structured, to take into account differing retirement ages.
We then heard the proposition that the differential—the unfairness—should be fixed at five years’-worth of unfairness, with the retirement age of MoD firefighters and police being kept at 65. Apparently this is not too difficult to implement. We can find a way to fix the retirement age at 65 but we cannot find a way to fix it at 60. I am afraid that the Minister has significantly reduced the credibility of his own arguments.
He also completely failed to address two fundamental points. He failed to answer the question: in what way do the working conditions of Ministry of Defence firefighters differ from those of local authority firefighters? He failed to take into consideration that the majority of MoD firefighters are forced to retire before the age of 60 because of physical and other health reasons. He also failed to take into account the point made by my noble friend Lord Hutton that this is a fundamental issue of fairness. Given that that is the position, we owe it to Ministry of Defence firefighters and police to agree this amendment. I urge noble Lords to do so and beg leave to test the opinion of the House.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, it may be for the convenience of the House if I refer to the amendments tabled in the name of myself and my noble and learned friend Lord Davidson, since the government amendments are substantially responses to the points that we made in Committee. I want to make it clear why we feel that the situation has, let us say, not moved on far enough.
Let me deal first with Amendments 37, 38 and 39 because they make a proper, logical story. They seek to remove from Amendment 36 the role of the authority in deciding whether an adverse effect on the pensions payable has in fact occurred. In other words, the authority has to decide whether its measures should be challenged in consultation. This is as if, in a game involving Manchester United, penalty decisions against it were to be made by Sir Alex Ferguson. I am sure that he, as a talented football manager, would then make a decision on a reasonable basis. However, with all due respect to that distinguished person, do we think that these decisions would be made in a way which was balanced? I could choose any other football manager, including Mr Wenger, who apparently never sees things that happen on football pitches.
I refer to balance because in Committee the noble Lord, Lord Newby, in setting out the criteria that he applied in these circumstances, said that he wanted to achieve a sensible balance between members’ protection and the role of the authority. It seems that while the proposed new clause in Amendment 36 provides for a significant protection for members of the scheme, it is still not balanced in that it leaves the authority with the responsibility for deciding that its own measures have had an adverse effect on those members. In those circumstances, even the most reasonable person is likely to be reluctant to feel that measures which they are taking have a negative impact upon the scheme. Our amendments simply remove the role of the authority so that the new clause would say,
“containing retrospective provision which appears … to have significant adverse effects”.
In those circumstances it seems to me that the authority, facing the responsibilities that the noble Lord referred to, and without the protection of the statute giving it the decision-making responsibility—a decision-making role or power—would take a more balanced and reasonable view. These amendments are to encourage reasonableness on behalf of the authority.
Moving backwards, our Amendments 22 and 23 refer to what is now Clause 12, which deals with the employer cost cap. The problem with this clause is in subsection (7), where it is recognised that steps to change the cost cap may result in an,
“increase or decrease of members’ benefits or contributions”.
In other words it may decrease members’ benefits so that the action of using the cost cap to encourage efficiency and efficient management of pension schemes may result in the retrospective diminution of benefits which members feel that they have accumulated.
The key question is whether Amendment 36 covers that eventuality. The eventuality that it covers is,
“where … the responsible authority proposes to make scheme regulations containing retrospective provision”.
Changing the cost cap may have retrospective consequences but does not contain retrospective provision. Much as we welcome the general intent of Amendment 36, then, it does not deal with one of the significant cases of retrospection that still deface the Bill. Amendments 22 and 23 are designed to protect the benefits of pensioners against retrospective effect, perhaps unintentional, when there is some change in the cost cap. We are delighted to see the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon, here performing duties that were formerly performed for him.
Those two amendments are necessary unless the Minister can find a way for Amendment 36 to refer not simply to regulations containing retrospective provisions but to regulations that have retrospective consequences. That would be a way, I suggest, to transform Amendment 36 from a rather imperfect structure to one that would deal with retrospection throughout the Bill.
The amendments that I and my noble and learned friend have tabled are in the spirit of Amendment 36 and indeed of the Government’s laudable attempts to remove the retrospective elements—the ones, that is, which are unnecessary and potentially harmful to members; I understand that there are technical retrospective elements that are necessary—but I feel that they have not yet managed to achieve what the whole House wishes to achieve. Our amendments would contribute to that goal.
Lord Flight
My Lords, I should be grateful if the Minister could comment on the extent and the manner to which the Government’s amendments to the ability to make changes and to make retrospective changes affect the fundamental issue of affordability. I apologise for raising this issue yet again but it is fundamental. We start, as everyone knows, from the OBR advising that there will be a cash flow deficit of £15.4 billion by 2016-17. My related question to the Minister is: what is the Government’s estimate of the additional cash flow deficit costs of both increasing longevity and, more particularly, the new single-tier pension proposals made by the DWP? It strikes me that two separate silos have been working on this, with the Treasury in one and the DWP in the other. Precisely what the effects of the loss of employer and employee NI contributions and the ending of contracting out will be on the deficit of pay-as-you-go public sector schemes seems to some extent to be a mystery.
I think it was in Committee that the Minister advised that he felt the estimates I suggested were too high; thus I would be grateful if he would comment on what the Government’s estimates are. My revised estimates, done with the assistance of Michael Johnson, who many noble Lords will know has done significant work on the subject, are that there is an additional cash flow cost from longer longevity of the order of £2 billion per annum, and there may now be an additional £3.4 billion resulting from the loss of public sector employers’ NIC rebates with the ending of contracting out and a further £4 billion per annum as a result of public sector employees continuing to enjoy an enhanced occupational pension as if contracted out while still being entitled to further accruals under the new single-tier state pension, once it appears. In contrast, private sector employers who are contracted out will be permitted to change their scheme rules, effectively to reduce pensions paid, without trustee consent. As I have said, I cannot believe that the prospect of a potential cash flow deficit of some £24 billion per annum will be acceptable to whoever is in power at that stage, given the state of the public finances. Dare I say that it seems that not only the Opposition but the Government are ignoring the affordability issue with regard to this legislation as it passes through both Houses of Parliament?
I would be grateful for a response to the question about to what extent room for manoeuvre is being reduced by the government amendments. Secondly, what is the Government’s revised, post-OBR estimate of the total cash flow deficit cost of the arrangements under the Bill?
Public Service Pensions Bill
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Lord Eatwell
“(3A) A scheme under section 1 which replaces a defined benefit scheme may only be established as a defined benefits scheme.”
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, this amendment, which is a reprise of something that we debated in Committee, derives from a peculiarity of the process through which this Bill has gone, in that many of the measures in the Bill derive from negotiation between the trades unions, other interested parties and the Government. Having reached agreement, the Government’s side seems to appear in the Bill but the assurances given to the other side in the negotiations do not. What we have instead is simply a continuous series of government assurances.
This amendment requires that a defined benefit scheme should be replaced with a defined benefit scheme. This reinforces the Government’s oft-repeated commitment to maintaining the defined benefit structure once the definition of the defined benefit has been changed, in the way that was proposed by my noble friend Lord Hutton. However, Clause 8 still provides that any scheme, once closed, can be replaced by,
“a scheme of any other description”.
Those are the exact words. As I said just now, the Government have continuously sought to give assurance that they would not replace a defined benefit scheme by anything other than a new defined benefit scheme but they have proved peculiarly reluctant to place such a condition in the Bill. This persistent reluctance is becoming quite disturbing and is significantly undermining the confidence of pension scheme members that their rights are going to be protected in the ways that have been suggested.
As I pointed out in Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Newby, further undermined the confidence of members when he said on 19 December that,
“although the Government have absolutely no intention to change the basis of the schemes, it makes sense for a piece of legislation, which we hope has a long life itself, to allow flexibility in the future if there are unforeseen changes”.—[Official Report, 19/12/12; col. 1585.]
Therefore, the Government are making a commitment: they continuously assure members that they will replace defined benefit schemes only with newly constructed defined benefit schemes—but, on the other hand, perhaps unforeseen circumstances mean that they will not.
I feel it is appropriate that the Government keep their side of the deal, which was that the defined benefit schemes would move from a final salary scheme to a salary-averaging scheme, which was a deterioration in the future pension benefits available to scheme members. They accepted that because the other side of the deal was that the Government said that they would commit not to move away from defined benefits. The Minister really has to tell us why the Government are so reluctant to keep their side of the deal. I beg to move.
Lord Newby
My Lords, this is indeed a reprise of a debate which we had in Committee. I believe that the Government have been extremely clear about their position on this issue throughout the legislative process, both here and in another place. Let me explain again why we remain unmoved. At the risk of stating the obvious, the Government have no desire or intention to replace the defined benefit schemes that have been negotiated. Officials, employers and member representatives have worked extremely hard to agree scheme designs that meet the needs of the different workforces and which are fair and affordable.
We believe that the new schemes are fit for purpose. Everyone is now working to implement these schemes from April 2015 for most workforces, but earlier than that in some cases. Draft regulations for the Civil Service scheme have been shared with the House, while the local government scheme in England and Wales has gone out to informal consultation on its own draft regulations.
While each set of regulations remains a work in progress, there can be no doubt that they would establish a defined benefit scheme of the agreed career average design. So when the Government say that we have no other intention than to create defined benefit schemes, those are not mere words—we are putting them into practice. The Government say that we have no intention of replacing defined benefit schemes with other designs, and that intention is underpinned clearly in the Bill by Clause 22.
The extent to which a scheme is a CARE scheme is explicitly one of the protected elements in the clause. That means that for a full 25 years—26 years in some schemes—the defined benefit design could not be easily changed. To do so, the responsible authority would have to consult on the proposed changes with all those affected,
“with a view to reaching agreement”.
That is a higher standard of consultation than in most other statutory consultations. The authority must do more than seek out and consider the views of interested parties; it must engage with them, with the aim of reaching agreement with them. In addition, the authorities must present a case to Parliament, or the devolved legislature, for changing the scheme design from career average, notwithstanding an explicit presumption written into the Bill that it would not be desirable to change the design before 2040.
There is no ambiguity here. Noble Lords and scheme managers can be fully reassured of our commitment to a defined benefit arrangement. It would be misleading and unnecessarily alarmist to imply anything to the contrary. So I say again: there is no prospect of the Government wanting to replace the defined benefit schemes that we are working so hard to develop, and I believe that that is the position of the party of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, also. The noble Lord may say, as he has in the past, that Governments come and go, but the status of the new defined benefit schemes will be protected by the Bill. I therefore urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Eatwell
That was an intriguing reply. The usual reply in circumstances where the Government feel that they have covered all bases is that an amendment is unnecessary, but the Minister did not feel that he could say that. It is striking that, despite his variety of assurances, a simple statement is unacceptable. However, under the circumstances, I will take this away and think about it further. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Whitty
My Lords, this amendment relates to revaluation. Clause 9 appears to allow the Treasury to change yet again the basis of revaluation, this time away from the CPI to something else. We discussed this in Committee and various assurances were given in that respect, although they are not as yet reflected in the Bill. However, no reassurances were given—indeed, the Minister was less than his usual emollient self—in relation to the provision in the Bill that in effect allows for negative revaluation in the light of changes in the CPI. That means that the Treasury can on the one hand amend the index and on the other impose a decrease in the accrued pension without any consultation with those affected, and in a way that, in the case of the LGPS, seriously undermines not only long-established practice but the recent agreement between the LGA and the trade unions.
I have looked at the history of the LGPS over the past 30 years, although it has actually run for a longer period than that, and there was only one point at which the relative index, at that point the RPI, actually fell at the point at which it was evaluated, and that was from September 2009 to the 2010 increase.
There were no precedents at that time. We had to refer back to the Pensions (Increase) Act 1971, which allows for increases but does not allow for decreases. The interpretation at that time was that that Act did not permit a decrease, so the 2010 adjustment was, in effect, zero. That is one aspect.
The other aspect of having the potential for a negative adjustment in revaluation is that it is inconsistent between those who are already receiving pensions or who are entitled to deferred benefits and are therefore governed by the Pensions (Increase) Act 1971, in which case their benefits would not be reduced, and active members who are still contributing to the scheme and who would, at precisely the same time when a negative revaluation could be made under this clause, see their benefits go down. We would therefore be treating active members disfavourably compared with members who have left the scheme or are already drawing their pension.
I am grateful for the assurances on the continuation of the CPI, but the fact is that the sudden and unexpected replacement of long-established RPI by the CPI has left a legacy of distrust in the schemes. Part of that is that if the CPI, as is expected, performs, if that is the word, less substantially than the RPI, there is a greater likelihood or possibility of a negative figure. The recent agreement between the LGA and the trade unions made it clear that past practice would continue to operate, and that if there were a negative change in the index there would be a nil adjustment. The implication of this clause is that it is attempting to override that commitment and agreement, which I think the Minister, and certainly some of his predecessors, would accept got the Government out of a very difficult position on pension reform in general and the LGPS in particular. Therefore, unravelling that aspect of the agreement—there are other amendments I will come to with a similar effect—is not helpful.
Amendment 15 would stipulate precisely what is already past practice and in the agreement: namely, that if there is a negative movement in the index, there will be a nil adjustment. I think the Government should accept the amendment. I appreciate the strong words of the Minister last time that the Government are not prepared so to do, despite the anomalies and distrust it would create. There are alternative amendments on this in this group in the name of my noble friend Lord Eatwell. Perhaps the Government could at least show their good will by accepting that if there were a negative increase, it would have to be subject to the affirmative procedure as provided for in my noble friend’s amendment, which no doubt he will speak to more ably than me shortly.
If the Government do not move at all, we are in some serious difficulty. It is causing considerable upset among employers, among those who have to engage in the new cost-management process within the Local Government Pension Scheme, among the unions and among the members of that scheme. The Minister could assuage those anxieties easily tonight by accepting my amendment or, in default of that, my noble friend’s amendment. It would be wrong for the Government to reject both. We would be on some sort of collusion course, whereas in general the LGPS and the arrangements for it from 2014 are done and dusted in a way that frankly was probably beyond the Government’s dreams only a year or so ago. I think that would be most unfortunate not only for the members of and employers in the scheme but for the Government and for future relations. I genuinely hope that the Government can move on this issue tonight. I beg to move.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I fully support the arguments put forward by my noble friend Lord Whitty, particularly on the complications that would arise with respect to the Local Government Pension Scheme. The amendment in my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Davidson refers to the general proposition in Clause 9(3) that,
“the Treasury may determine the change in prices or earnings in any period by reference to the general level of prices or earnings estimated in such manner as the Treasury consider appropriate”.
The Treasury has a completely free hand to determine the change in prices or earnings to be applied to the structure of the pension scheme. It seems to us on this side that this is really a step too far, so we have proposed that it should be subject not to a negative Commons procedure but to the affirmative procedure so that there can be a truly substantive debate on any particular proposal that might be unreasonable.
In Committee the Minister said:
“Any attempt to exercise this discretion in such a way that did not produce accurate and appropriate estimates”—
I must say as an economist that there is no such thing; there are estimates, but “accurate and appropriate” is something different—
“with reference to a reasonable index of prices or earnings”—
there is no such thing as that either—
“could be challenged by scheme members. Any decision which is not reasonable”—
that is fine—
“even without this amendment … could be challenged by judicial review and struck down by the High Court”.—[Official Report, 15/1/13; col. 608.]
What a cumbersome procedure. The affirmative procedure may be seen as taking somewhat more time and requiring more effort than the negative procedure, but how much better than saying, “Well, if this goes wrong, you’ve got to take it to the High Court”? That really is truly unsatisfactory.
Introducing this very minor amendment will provide an environment for the discussion of changes in the chosen index that can be deemed to be reasonable and to have the confidence of members of the schemes. I feel that this approach, perhaps allied with that suggested by my noble friend, would provide the confidence in the process of revaluation that from time to time can be enormously important in maintaining standards of living, particularly of more elderly pensioners.
Lord Newby
My Lords, as we are debating a group that started with an amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, I shall take this opportunity to answer the question he asked me earlier about whether the administering authority or the employing authority would determine whether an effect is significant. I am extremely pleased that I did not try to reply at the time because the answer is neither. It will be the “responsible authority”, because that is the authority that will be making the scheme regulations. In the local authority scheme, it would be not the employer but the Secretary of State. I hope that answers that question.
We have debated the amendments in this group before, so I shall try to be relatively brief in explaining why I do not believe it would be fair to restrict the revaluation of accruals from directly tracking growth, including when it is negative. Even though negative changes in prices or earnings are exceptionally rare, the Government firmly believe that if there is no revaluation ceiling, it would be unfair to have a revaluation floor to the benefit of members.
This is the sort of unbalanced risk-sharing between members and the taxpayer that the measures in this Bill seek to remove. The report by the noble Lord, Lord Hutton, specifically criticised this “asymmetric sharing of risk”. In addition, such a revaluation floor could lead to the cost cap being breached, to the detriment of future members who simply end up paying for past members’ accruals growing faster than the scheme revaluation rate. For those reasons, I will not be able to support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Whitty.
I am also unable to support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, which would make the annual Treasury revaluation order affirmative rather than negative. As we have said before, this would not be an efficient use of parliamentary time and would be counter to the long-standing convention with other public service pension indexation. The order will be a run of the mill piece of legislation, and it would be incongruous for it to be subject to the affirmative procedure in each and every year.
However, I hope that I can go some way to meeting noble Lords’ concerns. In the years when the values in the order are negative, there will be a strong expectation that the Government of the day should ensure that there is a full parliamentary debate on the changes, not least because they would be so rare. Perhaps we can go further than that general statement and look at whether to require the affirmative procedure when, as unlikely as these events will be, the order sets out a negative figure. It seems that this would strike the appropriate balance between parliamentary scrutiny and sensible regulation-making.
I would therefore be willing, if the noble Lords were able not to press their amendments, to take this away to consider it further, with a view to returning to the matter at Third Reading with an amendment that would require any annual order to come before the House for affirmative procedure if the CPI index slipped into negative territory. I therefore hope that the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark
I think the noble Lord is absolutely right that there is a difference in fitness. That is the problem. A regime could be put in place for people when they first come as recruits. By accepting my amendment, the Government could set the age in scheme regulations, whereas at the moment the age would normally be 60. I beg to move.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, there are also in this group a pair of amendments in my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Davidson, both of which seek to add flexibility and that famous characteristic, future-proofing, to the Bill. It is a laudable objective of the Government to have a common movement—a standard process—that can be seen as fair and generally acceptable across the entire structure of public service pensions. However, it is an objective which will, inevitably, from time to time, run up against reality. We have already seen it run up against reality in the case of the uniformed services, which we discussed earlier. It could also run up against reality in a whole series of other circumstances where the best would be the enemy of the good. In other words, the commitment to uniformity would produce elements of unfairness and, perhaps, elements of unsatisfactory performance because individuals were staying in employment longer than they ought to in some circumstances.
We need a degree of flexibility and Amendment 19 relates flexibility to a scheme-specific capability review. These reviews are now becoming quite common within public services, as they already are in private industry. They are designed in some circumstances to relate to the capabilities of individuals with respect to age. If there were to be a thorough review which a Government at the time accepted, this amendment would give the Government the flexibility to amend the pension ages set out in Clause 10(1) and (2). This would provide a degree of flexibility and that is all it is intended to do.
I questioned the noble Lord in Committee about a number of reviews that are currently under way. He pointed out to me that those reviews were not considering issues of pension age and I accept that entirely. However, this does not mean that considering pension age relative to capability will not occur or is not likely to occur. On the contrary, it is highly likely to occur over the next 10 years or so. Amendment 19, therefore, provides the Government with the necessary flexibility to respond to scheme-specific capability reviews.
Amendment 20 would incorporate into the Bill a proposition directly taken from my noble friend Lord Hutton’s excellent report. He argued at the time that the relationship between the state pension age, which is the sort of anchor of the whole structure, and the structure of pension ages in the public sector should be reviewed from time to time. This amendment incorporates my noble friend’s proposition.
In Committee, the Minister said:
“The DWP White Paper published yesterday says that we intend to hold a review every five years, so the link will be reviewed when a review is announced”.—[Official Report, 15/1/2013; col. 621.]
He got a bit muddled there but we know what he meant. That is fine, but could he tell us what is going to happen to this DWP White Paper? Is it the forerunner of some legislation? If so, when will that legislative proposition appear? Would it not be comfortable, given the structure of this Bill, to include Amendment 20, taken from the Hutton report, to achieve the goal he declares to be the Government’s goal, as set out in that DWP document?
I entirely understand the commitment to having a standardised, clear, comprehensible system, but there will always be anomalies which have to be appropriately addressed. I believe that these two amendments provide flexibility and would ensure that the Government could do exactly that.
Lord Eatwell
“(4B) The link between the state pension age and a person’s normal or deferred pension age shall be regularly and independently reviewed to ensure that the link remains appropriate in light of scheme members’ longevity.”
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, the Minister has said that, with respect to the notion of the review, the Government will have reviews, because the DWP White Paper says so, but they are not quite sure what those reviews would be—it is all too complicated at the moment and they have not worked it out. Therefore, they cannot include it in the Bill. That is pretty unsatisfactory. On the one hand, they are prepared to make an assurance that there will be reviews but, on the other hand, they are not sure what form those reviews might take, who might be involved or what sort of procedures there might be. They are not willing to back up that assurance in the Bill. Finally, we are told that legislation does not matter very much and that it is just as good as an assurance. That is entirely unsatisfactory.
The issues that have been raised by the noble Baroness need to be considered on another occasion, and we will need to return to this issue at Third Reading.
Banking: LIBOR and EURIBOR
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Lord Deighton
My Lords, with respect to the sanctions and penalties, I would point out that there are ongoing criminal investigations with the Serious Fraud Office. Three arrests were made at the beginning of the year, so it is clear that we are determined to follow through on picking up on criminal activity where that can be proven to have taken place.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, before asking my question, I wonder if the noble Lord could clarify part of his answer to the noble Lord, Lord Bates, where he referred to the “attempted” manipulation of LIBOR. Is he saying that the manipulation failed? Turning to the Question, when I was a member of the Regulatory Decisions Committee of the Financial Services Authority, discounts on penalties were offered for early settlement only in cases where either the firms had reported their own failings or they had offered exceptional levels of co-operation. Did either of these circumstances apply in this case to British banks prior to measures taken by the American authorities?
Lord Deighton
With respect to the noble Lord’s question on whether the attempt was successful, I think that is actually the issue. The FSA’s review found that it was unclear whether the manipulation did result in a change of rates, so that is an open question. On the degree of co-operation shown by the firms under investigation, I understand that the firms were entirely co-operative. Of course, they are all under new management and, effectively, are the new brooms trying to sweep clean. I am afraid that I cannot layer together the timing of that co-operation vis-à-vis the application of the US penalties, but I am happy to look into that and get back to the noble Lord.
Taxation: Tax Collection
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Lord Newby
My Lords, HMRC has a target of answering 90% of calls. It was more than achieved in the third quarter and was certainly a better performance than that achieved in some earlier parts of the year. An example of the challenge that HMRC finds itself facing in this respect is that the number of calls that it gets per day ranges from 86,000 to 3.2 million on a peak day. Either a very small number or a very large number of people phone, and it is unsurprising that on a small number of days it is impossible to reach the 90% target. However, HMRC has put more resource in. It has upgraded the equipment and, as I said, the 90% target has been more than met in the last quarter.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, when he assumed office, the Chancellor of the Exchequer commissioned a study on the creation of a general anti-avoidance regime. The committee that performed that study reported two years ago. When are the Government going to do something about it?
Lord Newby
I am surprised that the noble Lord does not know that the Government are committed to introducing a general anti-abuse rule in this year’s Finance Bill.
Economy: Growth
Lord Eatwell Excerpts(12 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Eatwell
My Lords, it is a particular pleasure for me to welcome the noble Lord, Lord Deighton, to the Dispatch Box and to congratulate him on his appointment to the Treasury team. It is always a special delight to see one’s former pupils do so well. When I marked his economic essays back in the mid-1970s, I never imagined—nor do I suppose did he—that we would find ourselves in this situation. I think it is appropriate to report that his essays were typically examples of excellent economic analysis, and I hope and believe that he will put those skills to good use in re-educating the Treasury. It certainly needs it.
Today, he has been placed in an extraordinarily difficult position. It is rather difficult to defend the Government’s growth record when there is none—growth, that is. The latest figures are truly awful, with no growth at all in 2012, despite the heroic efforts of the noble Lord, Lord Deighton, and his team at the Olympics.
Taking the longer view, since the Government’s spending review in the fourth quarter of 2010, when it might be said that coalition policies replaced Labour policies, the UK economy has grown by just 0.4% over that entire period. Over the same period, the USA has grown by 4.2%, Germany by 3.6% and France by 1.5%. Accordingly, while the UK economy is now still over 3% below its pre-crisis peak, the USA is 2.5% above and Germany is 2% above.
The question before us today is: in the situation in which we find ourselves, what is to be done? How can we get Britain back on to a secure growth path? Should we follow the recommendations of the Chancellor of the Exchequer that we stick with austerity, accepting his declaration that “Britain is on the right path”? Let us call this plan A. Or should we adopt plan B, following the advice of Adam Posen, former member of the Monetary Policy Committee, and particularly of Olivier Blanchard, chief economist of the IMF, who said last week,
“if things look bad at the beginning of 2013—which they do—then there should be a reassessment of fiscal policy … We think that slower fiscal consolidation in some form may well be appropriate”.
That is the IMF view on Britain.
The answer to our question, “What do we do?”—the fundamental issue in this debate—rests on a consideration of three issues. First, how did the Government get into this mess and are they tackling it in the best way? Secondly, what is necessary to restore the UK economy to growth? Thirdly, what is there to prevent us following this path of restoration?
So, first, how did we get into this mess? As the noble Lord said, the Government inherited the terrible economic consequences of the international financial crisis—everyone agrees about that. These consequences were and are particularly severe for a country as dependent on financial services as we are. But then the crucial question is: in the past two and a half years, have the coalition’s policies made things better or worse?
The previous Chancellor, my right honourable friend Alistair Darling, had been battling the crisis since 2008, and by the spring of 2010 he had succeeded in beginning to turn things around. Recovery was under way at a similar rate to that in the US and Germany, so that George Osborne inherited an economy growing at an annual rate in excess of 2%. He killed that recovery stone dead. He destroyed business confidence by preaching the coalition dogma of austerity and by foolish and demeaning comparisons with the plight of Greece and other eurozone countries without their own currency and exchange rate; he slashed public investment so that in the past three years the Government have spent £12.8 billion less in capital investment than Alistair Darling had planned; and, with savage glee, the coalition set about shrinking the state and impoverishing the poor. This is all justified in terms of the Tory manifesto commitment to eliminate the deficit in one Parliament—a commitment, by the way, which will not be kept, for the deficit is not falling.
Recent figures published by the Office for National Statistics show that public sector net borrowing in the first nine months of fiscal 2012-13 was about £107 billion compared with £99 billion in the same period last year—a rise of 7.3%. I repeat: the deficit is over 7% up on the equivalent period last year. So the answer to the first question is that the coalition inherited a very difficult but recovering economic situation and proceeded to make it much, much worse.
What should be done to turn the position around again and to set the economy on a new growth path or, to put the question in a more practical fashion, how can businesses be encouraged to invest? Firms invest because they are reasonably confident in the future demand for their products. Without demand, if they are shackled by a framework of fiscal discipline, as referred to by the noble Lord, it does not matter how much cheap money there is, as no one will invest. That is why monetary policy is not working. Interest rates can go no lower and the first positive announcement effect of quantitative easing has now worn off. Quantitative easing may be inflating asset prices and ruining pension funds but cheap money will not encourage investment when the Government are intent on slowing the growth of demand.
However, if there is a prospect of growing demand then, to invest, firms need finance and access to the very best skills and technologies to secure markets in a competitive world. Demand is the key to making all the measures that the noble Lord referred to as his fourth pillar work.
That is why my right honourable friend Ed Balls has proposed a temporary cut in VAT to boost family incomes, together with the boost to demand and capacity that would result from bringing forward infrastructure investment, including building thousands of affordable homes. Enhanced demand prospects would then be underpinned by a British investment bank to boost lending to small businesses, complementing fundamental regulatory reform of the banks. To sustain confidence there should be a compulsory jobs guarantee for the long-term unemployed and, further up the employment chain, investment in skills and in transformational science and technology. That is plan B.
Why cannot this be done? “Because”, cry the coalition, “it’s a policy for borrowing more when debt is the problem”, and we heard a similar statement from the noble Lord today. But hang on, at the moment, as we all know to our cost, spending cuts are resulting in a growing deficit. How can this be happening? The IMF has provided the answer and it, at least, has acknowledged its earlier mistaken commitment to austerity.
The answer lies in the relationship between changes in spending and the overall performance of the economy. This is measured by what, in the economics jargon that the noble Lord and I used to discuss, is called the multiplier. If a cut in government spending of, say, £2 billion results, for whatever reason, in a fall of output of just £1 billion, then the multiplier is a half. That is what the IMF believed the multiplier to be back in 2009. The share of taxes in output is about 40%, so if government spending is cut by £2 billion and output falls by £1 billion, tax revenues fall by about £400 million. The fall in tax revenues is much less than the cut in spending, and so the deficit falls by £1.6 billion. That was the policy that the Government thought they were implementing.
However, what if the multiplier happens to be bigger than that? Supposing that it is as large as 2.5, the cut in spending results in a fall in tax revenue of exactly the same amount. You can go on cutting taxes until the cows come home and there will be no change in the deficit at all. All that will happen is that the economy will be driven further and further into the mire of depression.
In acknowledging a previous error, the IMF estimated the multiplier to be a bit less than two, so a £2 billion cut in government spending will drive the economy down by about £4 billion and, when cuts in revenue are taken into account, the deficit will fall by only £400 million. Throw in a depressed European Union and you arrive at our current miserable situation: ever bigger cuts and a growing deficit. But the good news is that what goes down can also go up. What if government spending is increased by £2 billion and the multiplier, optimistically, is 2.5? The economy then grows by £5 billion and the increase in tax revenues pays for the extra spending; there is no extra borrowing at all. I repeat: increased spending results in no extra net borrowing. Plan B is a strategy to cut government spending. And there is more. The government cuts—particularly those disastrous cuts in government investment—not only reduce output now by cutting demand; as the OBR has pointed out, they also cut future output by reducing the real productive capacity of the economy.
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
My Lords, I am a simple lad. Can the noble Lord tell me what the difference is between his party’s policy and that of the government Front Bench? He gave the figure of £2 billion as the extra borrowing and the extra expenditure that would be required. In quantitative terms, what separates the Opposition from the Government? How much money are we talking about?
Lord Eatwell
The figure of £2 billion was purely for illustrative purposes; it was a simple number. I thought that people could do the arithmetic in their heads. The issue is directly whether we continue with a policy of cutting government expenditure or whether we are committed to an increase in expenditure, particularly on infrastructure. Your Lordships will note that the noble Lord did not say that his infrastructure plans fell outside the tight vice of austerity policy. That vice must be unwound. That is what I am talking about today.
As I was saying, there is more to it than that. As the OBR has pointed out, government cuts in investment cut future output by reducing the real productive capacity of the economy. This long-term loss of output brings with it a long-term reduction in tax revenue, in addition to the medium-term effect that I have just outlined. In other words, the Government are not just failing to cut the deficit now; they are increasing deficits for years to come. By contrast, if the IMF is right, the measures proposed by my right honourable friend will be substantially self-financing in the medium term and will stimulate tax revenues in excess of spending in the longer term. This point has also been argued by the Harvard professor and former US Treasury Secretary, Larry Summers.
Before we sign up to plan B, however, another issue must be confronted. Today, any Government’s finances can be devastated by a loss of confidence in the international bond markets. The noble Lord referred to this. After a particularly violent example of sovereign bond market hysteria, James Carville, the political adviser to President Clinton, famously remarked,
“I used to think if there was reincarnation, I wanted to come back as the President or the Pope … But now I want to come back as the bond market. You can intimidate everybody”.
Well, the bond market certainly seems to have intimidated the coalition. Whenever its destructive policies are challenged, it argues that unless the vice on Britain is tightened, the financial markets will lose confidence, interest rates will rise and any prospect of recovery will be destroyed.
There are three things wrong with that argument. First, no one is suggesting a spending spree. Plan B is a cautious expansion to begin the task of building the foundations for growth. Secondly, it is austerity that is now undermining market confidence. All three of the main credit rating agencies—Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch—have put Britain on “negative outlook”, citing concerns over the weak recovery and the public finances.
Thirdly, let us consider the experience of the United States, which lost its AAA rating last year. Would you rather have our AAA rating and zero growth or the lower US rating and 3% growth in the last quarter? I know which I would prefer.
The noble Lord, Lord Deighton, outlined in his speech a number of desirable measures that the Government can take to help to build productive capacity—the structural measures to which he devoted the majority of his speech. However, the Chancellor’s commitment to cutting demand and shrinking the state—less Bullingdon Club, more Tea Party—is eliminating any significant impact of those worthy measures. The Government’s attempt to stimulate growth has been a failure; the Government’s attempt to cut the deficit is a failure; and, if informed predictions are correct, even the Government’s attempts to preserve Britain’s AAA rating in the markets will prove to be a failure.
The coalition is now responsible for the longest slump in the British economy in the past century—longer than the great depression—yet last week George Osborne said something truly chilling. He said:
“We can either run away from these problems or we can confront them and I am determined to confront them”.
What is it in the word “failure” that George Osborne does not understand? For the sake of this country’s economy, it is time for him to run away. He is the living embodiment of plan A and must accept responsibility for its failure. Perhaps I may suggest that an excellent replacement as Chancellor would be my former pupil, the noble Lord, Lord Deighton.
Public Service Pensions Bill
Lord Eatwell Excerpts(12 years, 2 months ago)
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Lord Eatwell
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I will speak also to Amendments 118ZA, 118B, 118C and 119A in this group, which in my name and that of my noble and learned friend Lord Davidson. Clause 20(1)(b) is about consultation and reporting in the context of the responsible authority proposing,
“to make scheme regulations containing retrospective provision which appears to the responsible authority to have significant adverse effects in relation to members of the scheme”.
We are particularly concerned that “significant” is not defined and could be open to interpretation. We do not want the responsible authorities to, let us say, be let off the hook when it comes to consulting on changes that might have an adverse effect on members, especially given that the provision relates to that continuous bugbear in this Bill, retrospective changes. In particular, the protections that are present in Clause 20 do not apply to adverse retrospective changes to any of the non-protected elements of public service schemes—they only kick in if the adverse effect is deemed significant. Amendment 116A would ensure that the protections in Clause 20 apply to any proposal to make an adverse retrospective change.
There are only three protected elements in Clause 20(5): the extent to which the scheme is a career average defined benefit scheme—the main purpose of the Bill—members’ contribution rates and benefit accrual rates. However, this means some very important elements of a pension scheme are not protected, most notably the definition of pensionable earnings, early retirement rights and ill-health benefits. If a responsible authority decides to make adverse retrospective changes to something as important as ill-health retirement benefits, or indeed to the definition of pensionable earnings, which will of course knock on to the final pension provision, it is unacceptable for such adverse retrospective changes to be excluded from the protections in Clause 20.
When this issue was addressed in another place the Minister complained that the effect of the amendment would be to make any,
“adverse change to member benefits subject to the additional protections in clause 20, regardless of how minor that change might be”.
He then said that,
“we believe that almost all retrospective changes will either be minor or technical in nature, or beneficial to members”.—[Official Report, Commons, Public Service Pensions Bill Committee, 20/11/12; col.407.]
That is a welcome belief but it is not knowledge: it is merely a belief. Having members’ protections over such things as ill health and pensionable earnings hanging on a belief is entirely unsatisfactory. Given that the Minister has already made concessions or, to put it better, positive statements about the way in which he will bring forward amendments to the insidious retrospective measures in the Bill, I ask him whether the measures on retrospection will also apply to this matter.
Amendment 118ZA in my name adds to the definition of the “protected period”, as it is called, to accommodate the different closure date of the local government pension scheme. Clause 16 closes the local government pension scheme on 1 April 2014, but all other schemes are closed on 5 April 2015, one year later. However, Clause 20 defines the protected period as one of 25 years beginning on 1 April 2015. This means that there is a window of a year in which the protections under Clause 20 will not apply to the local government pension scheme. This amendment would correct what seems to be a drafting error by ensuring that there is no such peculiar window in which the protected elements of the local government pension scheme are not, in fact, protected, as the Government clearly seem to intend, by Clause 20. By aligning the protected period for the local government pension scheme with the other schemes in the Bill, they will all come to an end and all be dealt with and covered at the same time.
The Minister in the other place was sympathetic to this argument. I am therefore somewhat surprised that the Minister here is not reflecting that sympathy by tabling an appropriate amendment to this oversight in the non-alignment of the two schemes.
Amendment 118B again refers to protection. As we have said, Clause 20 lists various protected elements of the scheme. This amendment would overcome some of the deficiencies that we have already indentified by adding the definition of pensionable earnings, ill-health benefits and retirement rights to the protected list. This overcomes the problem of their being subject to the significant adverse consequences of retrospection. This would be a simpler advantage to dealing with some of the issues to which I have referred.
The Minister in another place argued that his rejection of an amendment like this rested on wishing to maintain flexibility in the arrangements. I do not think that that is a very satisfactory argument. Flexibility is often an attractive characteristic of legislation, but not when it is achieved by undermining the pension rights of members of a pension scheme. Let us remember, these are some of the less well paid members of our community who serve us through a variety of public services. Achieving flexibility by reducing their rights does not seem to me to be a very respectable activity.
Retrospection again rears its ugly head as regards Amendment 118C. The amendment seeks to leave out Clause 20(6), which provides that all the “protected elements” under Clause 20 will not be so protected if a change is required by or as a consequence of a change in the employer cost cap. When we last discussed cost caps, we saw that the definition of the cost cap was entirely in the hands of the Treasury. Therefore, it would be quite possible to place the cost cap at such a position as would lead to a consequential loss of protection under Clause 20.
Once again, the Minister has made a lot of sympathetic noises about the perhaps unfortunate consequences that the current definition and specification of changes in the cost cap bring to this Bill. I hope that his earlier commitment to doing something about the cost cap will carry through to Clause 20 and the various protections that it provides.
Finally, given that we are continuing the same theme into Clause 21, Amendment 119A again refers to the incorporation of “significant” with respect to “adverse effects”. The point is that “significant adverse effects” are designed in the Bill to trigger the use of an affirmative resolution procedure for any changes to scheme regulations. In particular, Clause 21 provides:
“Scheme regulations are subject to the affirmative procedure”,
only,
“if … they amend primary legislation, or … contain”—
and here we go again—
“retrospective provision”,
which would,
“have significant adverse effects in relation to members of the scheme”.
Given the way that retrospection runs continuously through this Bill, creating major uncertainty among members of these schemes, the very least we can expect is that any adverse effects should be subject to an affirmative procedure.
Returning to Amendment 116A about the use of “significant” in defining “adverse effects”, I beg to move.
Lord Flight
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 117A, which—if I may put it thus—heads somewhat in the other direction from the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell. As I understand it, Clause 20 says that for 25 years you will not be able to make any changes other than as a result of consultation and agreement among the various parties. The clause refers to the changes containing a provision which,
“changed the protected elements of the scheme”—
defined as where,
“the scheme is a career average revalued earnings scheme”,
in relation to contribution rates and to “benefit accrual rates”, or where the “responsible authority” proposes to make scheme regulations containing retrospective provision which appears to the “responsible authority” to have “significant adverse effects” in relation to members of that scheme. As I said, the protected period is defined as 25 years. My understanding is that although this clause may not cover every detail, it is in effect saying that other than by agreement, no changes can be made which come under the two defined areas for 25 years.
My amendment to reduce that period to 12 years was not entirely random: it was basically part of a previous amendment suggesting a post-2006 review by the OBR of fiduciary valuations. However, the fundamental point is that whatever Government are in power, they will be obliged to make major amendments. We started off with a cash-flow deficit of £15.4 billion by 2017. However, the ONS has advised that the longevity assumption is six years shorter than it ought to be, so that adds another £7.2 billion; and now that we have the government single pension proposals, the public sector pension schemes will not get the contracted-out NI contributions, which worsens the cash flow by about another £5 billion. So, we are going to have a cash-flow deficit per annum of approaching £30 billion.
If anyone thinks that that is sustainable in the present environment of deficits which are well above maintainable levels, they are not seeing reality. I repeat: whoever is in power in the next five years will be obliged to review the whole aspect of public sector pensions if the cash-flow deficits turn out to be at the sort of levels that now look likely. Limiting the protected period to 12 years is hopeful—not being able to change any of the key elements for 25 years is just unrealistic.
Lord Newby
My Lords, this is a rather disparate group of amendments. I will start with government Amendment 117. Amendment 117 is part of the wider package of amendments that seek to meet the desire of the Northern Ireland Executive to be removed from the provisions of the Bill. The provisions in question would have required a report to be laid in the Northern Ireland Assembly, should the responsible authority have sought to make changes to the protected elements in the schemes for which Northern Ireland has devolved competence. Given that this is consequential and in line with many other amendments relating to Northern Ireland, I hope that that amendment will be uncontroversial.
I will now speak to government Amendment 118 and Amendment 118ZA. Government Amendment 118 recasts the timing of the 25-year period of protection. The amendment will ensure that all schemes made under the Bill benefit from this protection until 31 March 2040. It is currently intended that the new Local Government Pension Scheme will be in place earlier than April 2015. Concern was expressed in another place—which the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, expressed here today—that the scheme would lack the protection in this clause until 1 April 2015 had passed. The amendment seeks to deal with this concern. Although the Government have no intention of making changes to the core elements of the new Local Government Pension Scheme in its first year, we are happy to rectify the situation. The amendment will ensure that all schemes, even those that might be implemented before 1 April 2015, receive the full protection from Clause 20 for 25 years.
Amendments 116A and 119A would increase the required levels of consultation and parliamentary process for all scheme regulations that make adverse retrospective changes to members’ benefits. As the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, says, we have debated the issue of retrospection a number of times in your Lordships’ House. As discussed when we were considering the potential amendments laid to Clause 3, the Government are aware of the concerns on this issue and intend to bring forward their own amendments in this area. I plan to have a draft amendment available in advance of Report stage and I hope that it will meet the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell.
Amendment 117A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Flight, would, as he said, end the protection set out in Clause 20 after 12 years. It would require a review of the effectiveness of the cost cap to be conducted by the Office for Budget Responsibility, and that review would determine whether the clause’s protections would be extended beyond 2027.
Although I understand the noble Lord’s reluctance to bind subsequent Administrations for 25 years to a more onerous process, I must reiterate the Government’s position on the new 2015 schemes. First, we believe that if the cost cap is necessary, it will work. If it does not, the solution does not lie in reducing the consultation and reporting requirements that govern fundamental changes to public service pension schemes. To make this amendment would risk causing unjustified concern and uncertainty to scheme members about the commitments that the Government have given in the context of negotiating the important reforms made by this Bill. I am very happy in that respect to repeat the statements of my right honourable friend the Chief Secretary to the Treasury when he described the new schemes as,
“a deal that can endure for at least 25 years and hopefully longer”.—[Official Report, Commons, 2/11/11; col. 929.]
We have committed that this belief should be enshrined in the primary legislation governing these schemes. We do not share the gloom of the noble Lord, Lord Flight, as to their unaffordabilty. Therefore, I hope that he will not press his amendment.
Amendment 118B was discussed in another place, and there the Government set out their belief that the elements of the new pension scheme designs which have been designated as “protected” are the right ones. It is right that members and their representatives should seek reassurance from the Government over their commitment to the new schemes that have been negotiated. However, these schemes must work in the real world. Public service pension schemes require regular tweaking to keep them in line with all kinds of other legislation, and the processes in Clause 20 are not designed for such changes. The protected elements, which have been included by the Government in Clause 20, are those which form the core of the new schemes. The kind of regular, purely administrative, changes that are made to the regulations of public service pension schemes are unlikely to touch on these aspects of design. If they ever do, it would be right for scheme members to be reassured about the impact of such changes through the procedures in Clause 20. Those elements suggested by the amendment go beyond this. These are aspects of design which are likely to require administrative changes, and so the proper consultation requirements which should apply to them are those set out in Clause 19. It is not as though the changes are not consulted on at all.
It may be of benefit to the House if I give a couple of examples of the kind of changes to the three heads under the noble Lord’s amendment that have been made in a couple of years, which demonstrate the kind of thing that we are talking about. In respect of pensionable earnings, for example, we are about to remove all references to primary care trusts in connection with their role in establishing pensionable earnings for practitioners. That is a small administrative change to reflect the fact that PCTs are on the way out. On ill health benefits, we have made changes that allow scheme medical advisers to determine that a member can satisfy the severe ill health condition for the purposes of the Finance Act 2004. It is a small administrative change. In respect of early retirement, changes made from 1 April 2010 required that an employer should pay the costs of the early payment of a mandatory retirement lump sum, paid to a member retiring on the grounds of redundancy. So, again, it is a small administrative change.
In view of the reassurance that I have, I hope, been able to give the noble Lord, and my attempt to clarify the way in which the clauses work, I hope that he will feel able not to press his amendments.
Having given reassurance to the noble Lord, Lord Flight, that we believe that the cost caps will work, I am afraid that I cannot support Amendment 118C. This amendment cuts across the provisions relating to the cost cap mechanism set out in Clause 11. As discussed in another place, that mechanism already contains a number of its own consultation requirements. Indeed, the arrangements in Clause 11 are actually more stringent than those set out in Clause 20. It may be to the benefit of the House if I read it out. The Bill says that,
“scheme regulations may provide for … a procedure for the responsible authority, the scheme manager … employers and members (or representatives of employers and members) to reach agreement”.
So there is a requirement in the Bill that they have to reach agreement, whereas Clause 20 requires only consultation with a view to reaching agreement.
Lord Eatwell
The noble Lord is very kind to read out that little piece from the earlier clause. However, it uses the word “may”, and “may” is not a requirement.
Lord Newby
My Lords, we are back to the “may” and “must” issue here. Clause 11(6) states:
“For cases where the cost of the scheme would otherwise go beyond the margins, scheme regulations may provide for—”.
It then lists several things that may be provided for. This is one of those cases where in reality the difference between “may” and “must” is not only negligible, it does not exist. The schemes will include those provisions; that is exactly why they are in the Bill. Having another process for consultation, as the noble Lord suggests, is unnecessary. I hope, therefore, that he will feel able to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for those comments. I am particularly pleased with government Amendment 118, which achieves what we were attempting to achieve through Amendment 118ZA in a very satisfactory and comprehensive manner. Regarding the other amendments which we have proposed, as I have said on numerous occasions, we look forward to the Minister’s amendments with respect to the retrospective measures in this Bill.
I wish to comment on his rejection of Amendment 118B, which seeks to include the scheme’s definition of pensionable earnings, ill-health benefits and early retirement rights under the so-called protected elements in Clause 20. The examples he gave were indeed administrative, but they were not in the least reassuring. The fact that there was a series of administrative changes does not mean that future changes will also be of such limited significance, because the clause allows for greater changes. It is like saying that it might not be very significant if one player on a football team has a shirt that does not quite match those of the others. It is very significant if he is then not allowed on to the pitch. Giving us these so-called reassuring examples is an exercise in which I hope we will not indulge in the future, because it does not address the nature of the argument. However, at this time I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 116A, which deals with the issues of retrospection that we will discuss on Report.
Lord Eatwell
“Scheme participation
The Treasury shall commission an independent review into the appropriateness of increased pension contributions if, following the full implementation of the increases in employee contributions announced in the Government’s 2010 Spending Review, the number of members opting out of any public service pension scheme increases by more than 5 per cent compared with the drop-out rate in the 12 months immediately before any contribution increases were implemented.”
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, the purpose of this proposed new clause is to evaluate scheme participation. I am sure all of us are very concerned that members should participate fully in the pension scheme that is available with their employment. Some of the new measures which will be introduced this year are complex but it will typically be in members’ best interests to remain in their defined benefit scheme—in this case, their average earnings defined benefit scheme.
The role of the proposed new clause is to require the Government to assess the attrition of membership of public sector pension schemes consequent upon the increase in contributions which will take place following the 2010 spending review. The purpose of the amendment is to determine whether the number of members opting out of any public service pension scheme in consequence of the increase in contributions exceeds by 5%—this is an arbitrary number—the drop-out rate immediately before the contribution increases. Therefore, it seeks to pick up what the consequence of contribution increases and the various changes which the Bill will introduce might be.
The amendment is not a challenge to the appropriateness of the contributions but merely seeks to provide the sort of information that the Government, employers who are members of the various schemes and, indeed, the members themselves need in order to understand the dynamics of what is going on in public sector pensions. Providing that information to all those groups would be beneficial and would lead to a better informed debate and better informed consideration in future of the development of public sector schemes. I beg to move.
Lord Newby
My Lords, it is probably sensible to remind ourselves why the increases in employee contributions were felt to be necessary. The noble Lord, Lord Hutton, was clear when he said in his interim report that,
“there is clear rationale for increasing member contributions to ensure a fairer distribution of costs between taxpayers and members”.
He sets this in the context of the cost of public service pensions having risen by a third over the past decade to £32 billion and of those increases having fallen mostly on the taxpayer. Subsequently, in 2010, the Chancellor announced a proposed increase in member contributions of 3.2 percentage points, to be phased in progressively over three years from April 2012. Let me be clear: the Government stand behind the justification for these increases and fully expect them to be implemented and carried forward into the new schemes. Proposed scheme final agreements clarify this. The noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, is right to raise the issue of participation, and I welcome the opportunity to set out what we are doing to maximise this.
First, we have protected the lowest earners from the increases. We know that they are those most likely to opt out, so there will be no increases for those earning under £15,000, and limited increases for those earning under £21,000. Secondly, we have split up each year of proposed increases so that we can assess the impact, particularly on opt-out, of year one, before finalising the approach for the next. As a result, I am pleased to be able to say that following the increases in contributions in April 2012, scheme data show that there has been no discernible increase in opt-out. This perhaps should not come as a surprise. Union representatives at the Bill’s evidence session in the other place unanimously stated that they would continue to advocate membership to their members.
We should also remember that the auto-enrolment policy—begun by the Opposition but implemented by this Government last year—will further encourage pension participation more generally. Therefore, given the clear rationale for rebalancing costs fairly, and the specific steps that the Government have taken to minimise opt-out, we do not intend to revisit the contribution increases after their implementation.
Of course, the Government will closely watch what is happening in practice. We monitor opt-out as a matter of course. In the unlikely eventuality that opt-out rates dramatically rise, naturally we will have to consider the best way forward. However, we think that this is highly unlikely, and the evidence bears that out.
We do not, however, believe that a statutory, independent review of the appropriateness of the increases would be right or necessary. We believe that increasing contributions is appropriate and that it will leave public service workers with pensions which remain the envy of many in the private sector. Introducing a statutory review mechanism would be misleading to members about the intended permanence of these increases.
The Government will continue the implementation of the increases and will continue to monitor opt-outs from schemes, but we cannot agree to this amendment to provide for a formal review, as, in our view, this would set an unrealistic expectation that the increases might be reversed.
Lord Eatwell
It would have been very nice if the Minister had addressed the actual amendment instead of the fictional one that he seems to have been discussing. There is no suggestion in this amendment of looking at the “appropriateness”, as he put it, of higher contributions. The intention is simply an information exercise; we want to know what is happening and we want it to be clearly revealed. The various measures that he described to maximise participation are very appropriate and desirable, but will they work? We are told, “We believe they’re going to work”, but some people believe in fairies.
Lord Newby
My Lords, I suggest to the noble Lord that it is not a question of hoping, thinking or believing; it is a fact that the increases have been implemented and there has not been a discernible increase in the opt-out rate.
Lord Eatwell
The point is that, if there is a proper review available to all—which the noble Lord is not relying on; I presume that he is relying just on the evidence provided by his officials—we will be able to assess the consequences of the increases.
Finally, I think that when the noble Lord was discussing the measures to prevent opt-out, he mis-spoke. It is not correct that somebody earning less than £15,000 a year is not subject to higher contributions. I think he will find that part-time workers earning less than £15,000 per year are subject to higher contributions.
However, given what we heard, which was clearly a misunderstanding of the purpose of the amendment, for the moment I beg leave to withdraw it.
Lord Eatwell
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, this amendment refers to Clause 28(10)(b) whereby the Treasury may by order,
“add any body or office to it”—
that is, to Schedule 10, which lists the various schemes that are the subject of the Bill.
The Government have made a couple of amendments to the clause, particularly regarding the provisions dealing with devolved authorities, on which we spoke earlier, but the Treasury is still given the power to amend quite drastically any career average or other defined benefit scheme relating to a public body simply by adding that body to Schedule 10 at the flick of a pen. That is rather reminiscent of the most notorious part of the Public Bodies Act, which noble Lords will remember, whereby public bodies could just be added to the list of those to be abolished or otherwise changed at will. This House was not willing to accept that position. Similarly, I do not think that the House should be willing to accept this particular situation in which, without any by your leave whatever, public sector schemes or other arrangements in a public body that is not part of our consideration should be simply added at will. Surely there should be a degree of consideration before that is done.
The amendment suggests that paragraph (b), which refers to adding any body or office to Schedule 10, should be left out. The Treasury can remove any body or office from Schedule 10 and the issue relating to devolved authorities will also stand. We cannot rely on a flick of the pen to incorporate bodies into the Bill. We need to know the list that will be incorporated. I appreciate the difficulties that exhaustive lists create but we are dealing with people’s pensions, which is an aspect of life about which people are most nervous and insecure. We cannot say that one day somebody will decide that a fund that was previously not part of these conditions now will be, and that the issue will not be debated—that there is nothing anyone can do and it will just be done by fiat. That is not appropriate. I beg to move.
Lord Newby
My Lords, the Government have always been clear that pension reform should extend to all public service pensions. Clause 28 and Schedule 10 are the means by which that work will be continued, even after enactment of the Bill. To date, the Government have focused their resources on reforming the largest public service pension schemes as these affect the vast majority of public service employees. As such, pension reform for the smaller public bodies is not as advanced as the reforms to these major schemes. Noble Lords may be reassured to know that reform of these smaller schemes is anticipated to be completed by 2018, after the reforms to the larger schemes are operational in 2015.
The Government’s policy with regard to these schemes is clear: any public body whose defined benefit pension scheme needs to be reformed is listed in Schedule 10 or may be added to it. Members of these schemes should be well aware that their pensions are in scope of the reforms. However, the arrangements surrounding some of these pension schemes are complex and it may be unnecessary to include them in Schedule 10 if they are able to reform on their own initiative. If so, they will not need to be listed.
To date, we have worked hard to ensure that all the public bodies that operate pension schemes eligible for reform by the powers under Clause 28 have been listed in Schedule 10. However, we are trying to be realistic with this provision: of the more than 400 public bodies that provide pensions to their employees or officeholders, some may not yet have been identified appropriately. That said, I can assure the noble Lord that the vast majority of public bodies that provide pensions through one of the major public service schemes will be reformed by Clause 1, so the number of public bodies that may have to be added will be extremely low. However, if we need to include such schemes, the Bill needs to provide for the Treasury to add them via Schedule 10.
I note what the noble Lord says about draconian powers but it is worth noting that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee did not express any concerns whatever about this power as currently drafted. It is a sensible way of dealing with the addition of a small number of public bodies to the universal principles of public sector reform. I hope therefore that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Eatwell
My Lords, perhaps the Minister will clarify for my edification his reference to schemes reforming themselves and then not needing to be incorporated into Schedule 10. What will be the criteria of satisfactory reform and who will do the judging?
Lord Newby
My Lords, the criteria for satisfactory reform is that we want all public bodies to adopt schemes which are in line with the provisions of the Bill. So, if the schemes do that, that is fine. There are a number of schemes, some of which are listed already and some of which may need to be listed subsequently, when the Government and the Treasury believe that the process will be helped if they are formally listed in the Bill or under the Act.
Lord Eatwell
I thank the Minister but this is unsatisfactory. It leaves an area of uncertainty hovering over smaller schemes, which may be in or may be out. I presume, therefore, that the Treasury will make a judgment as to what it thinks in its wisdom is right. I do not think that is a proper way to go forward and may return to this issue later. For the moment, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.