State Pension: Age Increase
Lord Davies of Brixton Excerpts(1 week, 2 days ago)
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Lord Davies of Brixton
To ask His Majesty’s Government what preparations they are making to inform people born on or after 6 April 1960 about the increase in their state pension age from 66 to 67 which will be implemented over the period 6 April 2026 to 5 April 2028.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)
My Lords, the Government recognise that information about the state pension age is crucial to retirement planning and are committed to communicating planned state pension age changes effectively. The department undertakes a range of activities, including awareness campaigns, digital tools such as “Check your State Pension age” and sending personalised letters. We are developing our strategy to communicate information and assessing the most effective ways to raise awareness about state pension age changes.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
I thank my noble friend for her Answer. I remain concerned that we are only 17 months away from when people discover that they are not able to retire at the date that they thought they would. We know where this ends up: a finding of maladministration by the ombudsman and mass discontent. I urge the noble Lord, the noble Minister, the Baroness, to make sure that a mass campaign is initiated soon. Many people have an aversion to opening brown envelopes; we need this to be highlighted in the press for the next 17 months.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I answer to anything really. The Government have already used an array of methods to communicate state pension age changes, including leaflets, advertising campaigns, digital tools and directly writing to everybody affected. Between December 2016 and May 2018, DWP wrote to all those in the group my noble friend is talking about—that is, those born between 6 April 1960 and 5 April 1961, which includes me—who have state pension ages between 66 and 67. In 2016, DWP launched a tool “Check your State Pension age” on GOV.UK and also “Check your State Pension forecast”. More than 31 million digital forecasts have been done plus another 1.5 million paper forecasts. I think it is working. The 2021 Planning and Preparing for Later Life survey talked to exactly those people and found that, of those with a pension age between 66 and 67, 94% either correctly identified their state pension age or overestimated it.
Social Security Advisory Committee: Winter Fuel Payment
Lord Davies of Brixton Excerpts(1 week, 2 days ago)
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Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, the situation is different in different parts of the country. In Scotland, it is complicated by the fact that this is the first year it is devolved, so we have had to legislate in a different way to enable us to do that for Scotland but not for elsewhere in the UK. The Government have sought to make sure, by writing, across the piece, to 12 million pensioners, that we are directly engaging and that people are as aware as possible. There are also campaigns going on with partners in local government and voluntary organisations, as well as a media campaign on radio, television and social media. I will certainly check, go back and review that, and if I have any concerns that it is not being done appropriately in some parts of the United Kingdom, I will very happily come back to the noble Lord.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
As my noble friend says—I will get it right this time—we now have the letter from the Secretary of State. I am sorry to have to press her on this, but the Government consistently fail to answer the first question raised by the committee. I asked the same question in a Written Question during the recess and, again, it was not answered. The committee wants to know,
“the offsetting cost of different levels of additional Pension Credit take-up”.
I too asked that question, and saying that the OBR has signed off the figures is not an answer.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I understand that the OBR listed certified costings if nobody claimed pension credit, and costings on the assumption, which was also our assumption, that there would be a five percentage-point increase in that. It seems to me that that gives the entire range, and between that, presumably one could do the sums. I think that that does answer the question.
Pension Credit
Lord Davies of Brixton Excerpts(2 weeks, 5 days ago)
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The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)
My Lords, the Government want all eligible pensioners to apply for pension credit. The Government have written to pensioners providing advice about claiming pension credit following the change to the winter fuel payment, alongside a range of other creative media campaigns. We are engaging directly with pensioners as well as with stakeholders, including devolved Governments, councils and charities, in a joint effort to raise awareness through our combined networks and channels.
Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)
I say to the noble Lord: feel free. Having run a pension credit campaign, I can understand what the Minister is undertaking. Do the Government intend to guarantee that the DWP has the capacity to deal with what could well be a rapid uptake of applications for pension credit—with all the extra administration needed to process the claims —after this Government’s shameful decision to deprive pensioners who need it most of their winter fuel payment?
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I was so with the noble Lord for the first 20 seconds—all the way. I am grateful for his congratulations to the department, and I shall take them back to my colleagues, who are doing a brilliant job on this front. We have written to around 12 million pensioners about the change to the winter fuel allowance, so a lot of work has been done out there to encourage people to apply—and it is having an effect. We have seen a 152% increase in pension credit claims received by the DWP in the eight weeks following the announcement on the winter fuel payment compared to the eight weeks before, and that will be updated towards the end of the month.
On the costs at the end, obviously, a lot of these claims have to be processed and we will not know for some time down the road. However, it is very clear that the DWP wants everybody who is eligible to do so to claim pension credit. As I have said before, if we end up with more people claiming the money to which they are entitled, that is a good thing. Pensioners deserve the money to which they are entitled.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
My Lords, I apologise to the House and to the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, for jumping in too quickly. My noble friend the Minister gave the figure of 500 additional staff in an Answer to a Written Question from me earlier in the Session. What was not clear from her reply was when the 500 extra staff would be in post and fully trained to provide the service required to achieve the take-up of pension credit that we all want to see.
Women’s State Pension Age: PHSO Report
Lord Davies of Brixton Excerpts(3 weeks, 5 days ago)
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Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, if I could persuade—with some trepidation—the noble and learned Baroness to share the details with me, I would be very happy to look into that.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
My Lords, the ombudsman made it clear that these women suffered from maladministration and that they are entitled to redress. I ask my noble friend to recognise the case for urgency, particularly because the delay is leaving the people affected prey to scammers, who are offering to assist them in making claims. This issue needs to be resolved as quickly as practical.
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for raising that last point. To be absolutely clear, because there has been no response to the report, there is no compensation scheme. Anyone claiming to offer it is scamming and nobody should touch it—please can that message go out loud and clear. I understand my noble friend’s general point, and I know he will understand the position that this Government are in. At the risk of boring myself, never mind the House, all I can do is repeat that the Government are looking very closely at the findings of the ombudsman and will respond as soon as is practicable.
Pensions Regulator Defined Benefit Funding Code of Practice 2024
Lord Davies of Brixton Excerpts(1 month ago)
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Lord Davies of Brixton
That the Grand Committee takes note of the draft Pensions Regulator’s Defined Benefit Funding Code of Practice 2024, laid before the House on 29 July.
Relevant document: 2nd Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
I always appreciate a challenge, and I was quite interested to note that our Whips have got the idea that this debate will last half an hour, but I will not take up the whole 30 minutes.
First, I have to declare an interest: I am a fellow of the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries, or IFoA as it is now. Many members of the institute provide advice on funding of defined benefit or DB schemes, and they will be significantly affected by the code that is before us. However, I add with some emphasis that I no longer practise as an actuary, hence nothing of what I say must be regarded as constituting actuarial advice. It might sound like actuarial advice, but I assure those here that it is not; noble Lords have to get their own advice rather than take it from me. Nevertheless, I speak from experience as a scheme actuary who has undertaken scheme valuations including, in the past, under the Pensions Regulator or previous iterations.
We are talking about the regulator’s defined benefit code of practice—the code—issued under Part 3 of the Pensions Act 2004. I very much welcome the opportunity to make a few remarks about the code and to ask my noble friend the Minister some questions.
TPR has been producing codes of practice on funding going back to 2006, but it is worth pointing out that it first consulted on this iteration of the funding code more than four years ago, in March 2020, with a second attempt in December 2022. This version was published for consultation in March this year, so its final form comes after years of waiting and four Prime Ministers; the whole Covid epidemic; a significant shift in the financial position of many defined benefit schemes, with increased investment returns in particular; considerable discussion about how these funds should be invested in the light of the Mansion House reforms under the last Government; the pension review under this Government; and, not least, an increased appreciation of the risks to defined benefit schemes from climate change. So much has happened and the code has, in effect, had to hit a moving target. Unfortunately, I would argue that even this version has not really caught up with developments and events.
The new code, together with the Occupational Pension Schemes (Funding and Investment Strategy and Amendment) Regulations 2024, which we discussed in this Room last March and which came into force in April, gives trustees and advisers most of the tools and processes to follow for DB funding valuations with a valuation date on or after 22 September 2024. There has been a bit of time-shifting going on here, but it is not a concern. It is clear that there will be specific areas of the code where further clarification is required, which will be found out only in practice.
I will not repeat everything I said in March, but I want to emphasise my main point. I was talking about the regulations, but it applies to the code as well:
“The regulations are patently too prescriptive. The details that they require are not directed at the objective of protecting members’ benefits but are about establishing a system where box-ticking will take priority over the longer term and broader interests of scheme members”.—[Official Report, 26/3/24; col. GC 165.]
This version may well be better than earlier drafts but, given that the code is already in effect in practice, it should be understood that it is only one stage of the longer-term reassessment that is required, given the continued pace of developments in this sphere. We should not be under the delusion that this constitutes a job done.
There are positives that I want to recognise. The DWP tells us that the draft code has been revised to strike a balance between setting clear funding standards and maintaining flexibility for scheme-specific approaches. The move to a more principle-based rather than prescriptive approach to areas such as the low dependency investment allocation and assessment of the covenant is helpful and gives the trustees some flexibility. Other commentators have welcomed the redefinition of what constitutes significant maturity; clarification of what happens when the valuation is based on notional investment rather than actual investment; greater clarity on how to assess the employer covenant; and—this is particularly important—what applies when there are surplus assets. It is to be welcomed that the final version includes a section for open schemes, collating the guidance that is relevant to them across the code.
Nevertheless, the code remains a work in progress. The IFoA has said:
“The totality of the changes being introduced by the new code remain complex”,
and that there are still a few more steps on the journey to take. It says that it hopes
“the regulator will adopt a pragmatic approach when considering the first valuations under the new regime, due to the short implementation period for the final rules”,
emphasising the point that this is a work in progress.
My major concern remains that here we have 100 pages of detailed instructions and rules, albeit with quite a lot of repetition, not just on how to undertake a valuation under the terms of the legislation for a defined benefit scheme but about how such a fund should operate, particularly in the field of investment. It passed through my mind to go through the document quoting the minutiae that is dealt with—for example, telling us that we have to use a Macaulay duration calculation. I have resisted that temptation—I do not wish to delay people too much—but I have no doubt that the requirements, while well intentioned, are excessive. Although there are references to proportionality, what will happen in practice is that the code will suffer from what is described as procedural drift, where individuals become overreliant on routine processes, potentially leading to reduced understanding of the overall decision: failure to see the wood for the trees.
The underlying belief, as far as I can tell, is that detailed prescriptions and requirements are better than general principles. I do not know what evidence there is for such a belief. Is it true that detailed prescriptions and reporting requirements along the lines set out in the code make it any more likely that members will receive their benefits? I doubt it. As an overriding principle, given the inherent uncertainty about any attempt to forecast the future, there is no reason to believe that making an algorithm more complex improves the outcome.
One problem that concerns me, which I raised in the debate in March, is how the code reacts with Technical Actuarial Standard 300: Pensions. TAS is set by the Financial Reporting Council and lays down how any actuary in the UK should undertake technical actuarial work required by legislation to support decisions on funding, contribution requirements and benefit levels. I have the latest version here; it came into effect in April. The point is that the actuary who undertakes the valuation at the request of the trustees must comply with the professional standard. However, we are in the peculiar position where the code makes no reference to TAS, and TAS refers only by implication to the requirements of the code in an appendix.
It is a matter of concern that the 18 pages of TAS, only four of which refer to scheme funding, make more sense than the 100 pages in the code. What exactly in the code achieves anything that is not already achieved by those four pages in TAS 300? We are told that in its review of TAS 300, the Financial Reporting Council has deferred consideration of the provisions on funding and financing until the new legislation on funding and TPR’s revised code of practice are in place. I am not convinced that this will work. There must be a real question about who is responsible for setting technical standards on funding DB schemes—the Financial Reporting Council or the Pensions Regulator. Judging by the record, my vote goes to the Financial Reporting Council.
Having made that general point, to which I will no doubt return in future, I have three specific questions about how the code will deal with continuing developments in DB pensions. First, there must be a question of whether the code deals with whatever comes out of the first stage of the pensions review. We have been told that the first stage is due to report in the next few months and will consider further measures to support the pensions Bill. It will take account of the need to prioritise gilt market stability, liquidity and diversity. The objective, we are told, is to boost investment, increase saver returns and tackle waste in the pensions system. The problem is that this objective is not reflected adequately in the code. How and when will these issues be reconciled? How will what comes out of the pensions review be reconciled with what has been established in the code?
The second question arises from the improved state of DB funding, which has led to more schemes being run on—continuing rather than moving quickly to buyout. Because schemes will be running on and must, under the code, have the objective of being fully funded, this raises a question: when schemes move into surplus, what rules apply to that surplus? In discussions that people have initiated since we have seen the improvement in scheme funding, it has been suggested that schemes with a material surplus may invest in a greater allocation to growth assets. This aligns with the policies I have just referred to—of both the previous and the new Governments—which emphasise investing for UK growth. That objective is not adequately reflected in the code. In addition to the issue of investing surplus, there are other possible results of improved financial conditions for DB schemes. Not least of them is the possibility of improvements in members’ benefits, either through trustees exercising the discretionary powers that many of them have or through rule changes.
In the same way, some people are talking about the possibility of powers being used to refund sponsoring employers or to use the surplus in the scheme to cover the cost of accruing benefits. Unfortunately, the Pensions Regulator appears to have given insufficient thinking to such developments and to how its powers will be exercised when confronted with such issues. The code does touch on the issue, talking about covenant leakage but in a way that is clearly inadequate when faced with the challenges that will arise from these moves. Will the Government press the Pensions Regulator to give the issues that arise from the potential existence of scheme surplus further thought and more adequate thinking? I have already complained that the code is too complex. I am not suggesting that this should be in the code, which is complex enough, but it is an area to which the Pensions Regulator has to give considerably more thought, so that we know where it is coming from when confronted with these issues.
The third issue, which I will cover swiftly as we will debate it again on Thursday, is the impact of climate change. The code touches briefly on the issue, in paragraph 23 of the application module, but it is an issue on which the Pensions Regulator has to take much more of a lead. Will the Government encourage the regulator to pursue what needs to be done to enable schemes to confront the challenge of the greater risks that face the financial system, including defined benefits schemes, as a result of global warming?
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
I thank the Minister for her long and detailed response. I think I need to use the formula used by Ministers: “I will read the entry in Hansard”. There was so much information in it, for which I thank her. I also thank noble Lords who came for the debate on Russian sanctions; I hope they found it informative to hear about pensions.
The phrase that had particular resonance with me was that used by the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann: “spurious accuracy”. When I was a trainee actuary, we were told specifically that making calculations more complex and difficult did not make them any better. Trying to forecast the future is difficult enough. Making complex calculations does not improve the outcome for members.
My major point is that current developments in pensions will require the code to be kept under review in any event, whether they are an increasing appreciation of the risks of climate change or the development of pension scheme surpluses. I welcome the remark about that. These changes accumulate and I hope that the Minister will enjoy further debates and discussions. I look forward, in particular, to the pensions Bill. Not many people say that, but I think we will have some interesting debates.
Motion agreed.
Social Fund Winter Fuel Payment Regulations 2024
Lord Davies of Brixton Excerpts(2 months, 1 week ago)
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Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
My Lords, these regulations are a mistake and I want my concern on the record. I want to make it clear from the start that the financial mess inherited by our Government is a result of 14 years of austerity and financial mismanagement, and I reject any suggestion that public sector workers are benefiting at the expense of pensioners. That is simply a crude attempt to divide working people, and we should reject it as such. I will therefore vote against the cynical regret Motion from the Official Opposition, and I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, that she does herself no favours attaching her name to the Motion.
There are several key points I wish to make. First, even if the case for austerity measures were accepted, the cut in winter fuel payment was not a necessary element in the July package; it was a choice. Secondly, whatever steps are taken to increase the take-up of pension credit, millions of the poorest pensioners will still suffer from an increase in fuel poverty—Age UK came out yesterday with a figure of 2.5 million. Thirdly, the effect of the triple lock should not be double counted and, in any event, it will fail to offset the effect of the cut in the winter fuel payment over the lifetime of the current Parliament. I urge the Government, even at this late hour, to hold back on any change, pending full consultation on an alternative approach to tackling fuel poverty, while retaining the advantages of a universal benefit.
It is important to understand more about why the Government wanted to include the measure in the July package, despite its obvious political downside. Unlike other possible options, it achieved in-year savings and used an existing structure for means testing the benefit, rather than having to create a new structure. However, they failed to appreciate the two adverse consequences of using the pension credit means test. First, it has a ceiling that everyone agrees is far too low. Secondly, there is no form of marginal relief, as it is not relevant for the purposes of means testing pension credit.
In response, the Government—my Government—have attempted to head off the widespread opposition to the regulations. First, they have argued that the winter fuel payment had to be cut as part of the July package to make the figures balanced. Secondly, they have argued that the impact would be offset by increasing the take-up of pension credit and, thirdly, that the impact would be ameliorated by the existence of the triple lock on the state pension. All of these arguments, regrettably, fail.
First, the cut was not necessary, even as part of the July package. There is of course a debate to be had about the need for austerity, particularly as an instant response. However, even if the need for the July package were to be accepted, the question as to whether it had to include the cut in the winter fuel payment is a separate issue. Posed in those terms, it is obvious there is no a priori reason that it had to be a necessary element of the package. Whatever risks the Government faced, they were addressed by taking the package as a whole and not by its individual elements. Despite the Government’s protestations about tough choices, there is no avoiding the fact that it was, nevertheless, a choice, thereby raising concerns about their attitudes to universalism and pensioners in general.
The second issue is pension credit, which other speakers have addressed. We know that the increase in the take-up of pension credit will be limited. It is important to acknowledge what the Government are doing to increase the take-up of pension credit, but, regrettably, there is a long history of ineffective take-up campaigns for means-tested benefits, going back to the 1940s, for national assistance, and beyond. There is no evidence that we now know more than they did in the past about how to overcome the intractable problems arising from stigma, complexity and a lack of knowledge. I am sure other speakers will go into detail on that.
My third point is about the triple lock, which does not offset the impact of the cut in the winter fuel payment. The Government suggested—not today but in other commentaries—that the triple lock increases to the state pension over their term in office would
“outstrip any reduction in the winter fuel payment”.
Unfortunately, this is an obvious case of double counting. I have done the sums, and almost all the pension increases that will occur over the coming five years are required to protect pensioners against the impact of inflation. Pensioners cannot spend that money twice, covering both increases in the cost of living and at the same time replacing the winter fuel payment. The purpose of the triple lock is to protect pensioners against inflation, keep state pensions in line with general living standards and nudge the pension gently upwards. I have calculated that, based on the latest OBR assumptions, the impact of the triple lock, taken by itself, means that the new state pension and the basic state pension will be barely 1% higher than they would have been, even with the statutory minimum increases. This is less than the winter fuel payment, which pensioners are losing because of this measure.
In all the debates on the cut in the winter fuel payment, I am not aware of anyone arguing that there is no case for change. The winter fuel payment is and always was an anomalous benefit, particularly as it affects high earners. A payment that, in practice, recipients can choose to spend as they wish should always have been included in taxable income. The fact that it was not is a historical accident, arising from how and when it was introduced, rather than a clear policy decision.
I therefore agree with the 2015 Labour manifesto, which said:
“We will stop paying Winter Fuel Payments to the richest five per cent of pensioners”.
That was the right policy then, and something like it is the right policy now. In other words, those with the broadest shoulders should bear the burden of the cut, rather than the millions of the poorest pensioners who struggle to make ends meet. Given the case for change, the Government at this late stage should hold back on the cut to the winter fuel payment, pending a full consultation on an alternative approach to tackling fuel poverty while retaining the advantages of a universal benefit.
Lord Desai (CB)
My Lords, there seems to be rather a hurry to embrace economic rationality on the part of the new Government. We know what economic rationality always says: cutting income tax for the rich is good policy because that encourages growth, and cutting the benefits of the poor is good policy because that balances the budget. All through economics—the science that I teach—there has always been this root. The poor must be made to suffer because, as Malthus pointed out, if you give them more money, they will only breed more children. That is no good. Giving money to the poor is a loss, but give money to the rich and the rich will benefit.
I imagine that there is an idea that a big hole in the fiscal accounts was suddenly discovered. I do not think so: I think we all knew there was a fiscal hole. We have all been through the pandemic and through the last 15 years, when the economy has had a very low growth rate—in fact, practically no growth rate. We know all that. We also know the public accounts numbers that were available giving us the ratio of deficit to GDP. None of this was a surprise. If you want to really tackle the deficit, you need a 10-year horizon to do it. Do it rationally; do not do it quickly, do not do it in a haphazard fashion and do not just immediately say, “Oh, I have to make a very tough decision”. As soon as a politician says “tough decision”, you know the poor are going to suffer.
Pension Credit
Lord Davies of Brixton Excerpts(2 months, 2 weeks ago)
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Lord Davies of Brixton
To ask His Majesty’s Government how many people (1) claimed, and (2) were eligible to claim, Pension Credit in each of the past three financial years.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Baroness Sherlock) (Lab)
My Lords, in answer to the first part of the Question, the numbers of people claiming pension credit were: in 2019-20, 1.49 million, in 2021, 1.41 million, and in 2021-22, 1.35 million. In answer to the second part, we cannot know precisely how many people are eligible to claim pension credit because we do not hold data on their circumstances, but we make estimates based on surveying pensioners and extrapolating from there. On that basis, we estimate that in 2019-20, 2.26 million were eligible. No figures are available for 2020-21 because the pandemic restricted the number of face-to-face interviews that could be done, and that were necessary to collect the data. In 2021-22, there were 2.15 million.
Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)
I thank my noble friend for her Answer and express my great pleasure at seeing her in her place. But, her Answer makes it clear that many of the poorest pensioners—not just those who fail to claim credit, but those with an income slightly higher than that—will suffer from the cut to the winter fuel payment. Does she agree that seeking a replacement for the anomalous tax-free cash payment should only follow a thorough and detailed review, rather than this rushed, information-lite and damaging decision?
Baroness Sherlock (Lab)
I thank my noble friend—for everything up to the “But”. The Government are having to take what is a difficult decision at this time for the very simple reason that we inherited a £22 billion pressure on public finances.