Afghan Special Forces Relocation Review

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Tuesday 15th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

In answer to the noble Lord’s last question, we have not informed people directly that their case is being reviewed. We think that the best way to support those who may have their claim reassessed and allowed is to follow that course of action. In terms of the assessment of their safety, again we believe in not informing a generality that there is a reassessment going on, although people can of course read the newspapers. Not informing people directly that their case is being reassessed will mean that there is not a whole wave of speculation taking place, which could unsettle individuals and their families.

To reassure the noble Lord, as soon as a change is made, the individual is informed immediately and arrangements are put in place very swiftly for them to be taken out of the country and into Pakistan. The noble Lord, Lord Reid, is right to mention all of those who have made possible the review and the outcomes we have seen. He was also quite right to mention our noble friend Lord Browne for all he has done with respect to this, and it was remiss of me not to do so in the first place.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I appreciate what the Minister has just said, but I fear that the noble Lord, Lord Browne, has unfairly maligned the previous Government. He will know that we did exempt eligible Afghans from the Rwanda policy. That was read into the record twice on the last day of debate. Having said that, I also 100% congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Browne, on making us do it, and I appreciate that.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I have nothing further to add to that but, on a slightly lighter note, I say to noble Lords that my days of talking about Rwanda have hopefully passed.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (Risk of Being Drawn into Terrorism) (Revised Guidance) Regulations 2024

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Friday 24th May 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

We support the extension. It is important to highlight that this statutory instrument simply extends the guidance to Scotland. Although counterterrorism legislation is a reserved matter, the delivery of the Prevent programme is for the devolved Administrations, so this is therefore necessary with respect to Scotland. I have only one question: why 19 August? We wondered why it could not be immediate. Is there a particular reason for that? Notwithstanding that, we fully support the SI.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank both noble Lords for their support. Given that this is my second-to-last outing from the Dispatch Box, I am delighted to be able to answer that question: I have not the faintest idea.

Licensing Act 2003 (UEFA European Football Championship Licensing Hours) Order 2024

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Friday 24th May 2024 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, this summer the UEFA European Football Championship will take place in Germany. Happily, both the England and Scotland men’s national teams have qualified to take part. Therefore, I am before your Lordships today to propose the extension of licensing hours if either England or Scotland, or indeed both, reach the semi-final on 9 and/or 10 July and the final on 14 July.

The Secretary of State is allowed, under Section 172 of the Licensing Act 2003, to make such an order to relax opening hours for licensed premises to mark occasions

“of exceptional international, national, or local significance”.

As I hope your Lordships will agree, the progression of England and Scotland, or both, to the late stages of the competition would represent just such an occasion. Should that happen, people will want to come together in celebration and support of the home nation teams.

The extension will apply to premises licences and club premises certificates in England and Wales, which license the sale of alcohol for consumption on the premises. These premises will be allowed to remain open until 1 am without having to notify the licensing authority via a temporary event notice, as would usually be the case. This contingent order only covers sales for consumption on the premises after 11 pm. It does not cover premises that only sell alcohol for consumption off the premises, such as off-licences and supermarkets. Premises that provide late-night refreshment—the supply of hot food or hot drinks to the public between the hours of 11 pm and 5 am—but do not sell alcohol for consumption on the premises will not be covered by the order. Such premises will only be able to provide late-night refreshment until 1 am if their existing licence already permits this.

The Home Office conducted a public consultation, which ran for 12 weeks. Over 80% of respondents agreed with the extension on the three proposed dates and that it would apply to England and Wales. The consultation received responses from numerous trade organisations that were in favour. However, it would be remiss of me not to mention that the police are not in favour of extending licensing hours, given the potential for increased disorder. Police deployments and resources are of course operational matters, but I am sure that forces will, as they have in the past, put in place plans to minimise the risk. It is also worth pointing out that this is a limited two-hour extension to licensing hours, which is a proportionate approach to mark these events.

I will make two further points before concluding. First, because licensing is a devolved matter, if either England or Scotland is successful in reaching either the semi-final or the final, the extension will only apply to licensed venues in England and Wales. Secondly, if neither of the teams reaches the semi-final, normal licensing hours will apply on 9 and 10 July. If either or both teams reach the semi-final, but neither team is in the final, normal licensing hours will apply on 14 July. There will be great interest in the upcoming tournament, which is why we have brought forward this order. Finally, I wish both the England and Scotland teams the very best of luck. I beg to move.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, we support the SI. I will make just one suggestion to the Minister—that he make sure that the Prime Minister is fully aware of the contents, to avoid any further embarrassment in the future.

The other point that I would like to make is that I think that the Government are making a proportionate response. It is an important relaxation of licensing laws in very particular circumstances. I join the noble Lord in wishing both England and Scotland all the very best in the tournament in a few weeks’ time.

I also take this opportunity, since this is the last time I will be speaking, to thank the Minister for his co-operation in everything that he has done. I thank former Ministers who are also present, too, for the work that they did, as well as others on other Benches. I very much appreciated that. I am glad that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is here. I have been very pleased to receive the numerous legal representations and to be informed how that all works, including understanding the difference between “minor” and “more than minor”, if he remembers.

The serious point is that there is much division, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hazarika, said in her excellent maiden speech. There are political differences, but there are also many things that we can provide for the benefit of the country by working together, which is what we all wish to see. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, for the way he has conducted himself with his fellow Ministers. I wonder if he would be so good as to pass that on to the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, who before she became Government Chief Whip was also an excellent Minister. It would be remiss of me not to finish with that.

I have greatly appreciated the way in which the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, has conducted his affairs. He is exemplary of how a government Minister should operate. Many of the Bills he has been involved with have been extremely difficult, and were I to be in his position—you never know—I suspect that others would turn round on me many of the questions that I have asked and I would then appreciate some of the difficulty in delivering a policy that we all agree needs careful attention. With that, I will finish, but I again thank the Minister very much for the way he has conducted himself. I appreciate the way in which he has conducted government business, as I know do my noble friend Lord Ponsonby and other noble Lords who have worked with him.

Illegal Migration Act: Northern Ireland

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Wednesday 15th May 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Can the Minister confirm that, if this Belfast judgment stands, we will be in the chaotic and damaging situation of asylum seekers having different levels of protection in different parts of the UK? How on earth have the Government let it come to this? What assessment has been made of that discrepancy in the movement of asylum seekers across the UK?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I start by expressing the Government’s disappointment at this judgment. We continue to believe that the policy is lawful, that our approach is compatible with international law and, specifically, that the Illegal Migration Act proposals are compatible with Article 2 of the Windsor Framework. The Government will take all steps to defend their position, including through an appeal. We have consistently made clear that the provisions in the Belfast/Good Friday agreement referred to in the Windsor Framework were developed specifically against the background of Northern Ireland’s unique circumstances. They do not concern, and should not be brought into, the complex debate on illegal migration.

Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Tuesday 14th May 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lady Lister and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, on bringing these regret Motions. Before I start, let us remind ourselves that the net migration figures stand at 672,000, a figure that, as the noble Lord, Lord Empey, mentioned, I think we could all agree needs to be reduced.

The changes to the Immigration Rules are intended to reduce immigration and encourage UK employers to invest in the resident workforce—a laudable aim that we could all support. There are numerous changes to various thresholds with respect to immigration, but we have no idea whether they will work, and neither does the Minister—he has not got a clue, either, because the evidence is not there. I will tell you what I think has happened. The report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee should be compulsory reading for every single Member of your Lordships’ House on how not to do a Bill or a piece of secondary legislation. It is absolutely shocking. We should remind ourselves that this was published on 24 March, saying, “Where’s the impact assessment? Where’s the equality impact assessment? Where’s the evidence for what the Government are doing?”

The Minister was called before the committee. I cannot remember the date off the top of my head, but he had to go and explain what was going on, to the best of his ability. I think the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, is absolutely right: I can only imagine that there been a furious row in the Home Office between the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, I would guess, and others, where the noble Lord said, “I’ve got to go to this committee and this Chamber to defend the policy, but you won’t give me the impact assessment”. I absolutely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, that they said, “We can’t publish the impact assessment in the way that it’s done because it actually doesn’t support what we’re doing”. If that is not the case, perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, could explain what the impact assessment says and why on earth the Government would not publish it, if it supports what they are doing. That would completely undermine what my noble friend Lady Lister, the noble Lords, Lord Kerr and Lord German, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and I have all said. I have no idea what has gone on.

I will ask the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, a basic question: does the Home Office care that it put a Minister before the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee to explain why it had not published an impact assessment? I believe the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, does care and that he has been sold a pup on this one, so let us depersonalise this: does the Home Office care? Why has the Home Office not published it? Does it not care about what the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee has said? Does it not care that the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, made various commitments to the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, when he was called before it, about the need to publish that? We then read that an impact assessment has been produced, but it is not to be published. What on earth is going on?

The point made in this Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee report is that the Home Office is a serial offender. This happens time and time again. I have to say that the regret Motion simply sets out and gives us the opportunity of saying to the Government, “It can’t go on like this”. How on earth can you produce 289 pages and expect any scrutiny of all the various changes that are made, without any evidence for us to look at and understand?

These are massive changes. Noble Lords heard the personal examples that the right reverend Prelate, the noble Lord, Lord Empey, and others gave about the very real impact this has. Yet the Government say, “We’re doing it because we believe it’s the right thing to do and it will have some sort of impact”. I will read out a couple of examples. I do not know whether people have read this, but the Minister gave a figure of 300,000 for what the impact of these particular changes would have been, looking back. Where has that come from? Where was the evidence for it? If it was looking back, the Government presumably have some estimate looking forward. So I do not understand it, and neither did the chair of the committee, because he asked the Minister to explain it—and, if I remember right, the Minister asked the official. It would be handy to know where 300,000 has come from. It was looking back, so what about looking forward?

Let us have a quick look. The various thresholds have been increased. The threshold for the skilled worker visa is up from £26,200 to £38,700. How big a reduction is that going to make? The minimum income requirement, which is the income required for British citizens and entitled residents to bring a partner to the UK, goes up from £18,600 to £29,000. How big a reduction will that produce—and on who? The Government say that they will reduce dependence on imported skilled labour and encourage training of the resident workforce. That is a laudable aim, but where is the evidence for that? How is the training going to take place, and what happens to the transition? You cannot just say that we will get rid of skilled migrants coming to this country and replace them with a resident workforce. It is not like turning a tap on—so what is going to happen in the transition? What happened to the consultation when the care sector said that it would end up with problems? What was the Government’s response to the care sector in that regard?

Can the Minister explain why the child element of the threshold, contributing to the minimum income requirement, was abolished? That contradicts the stated policy aim of ensuring self-sufficiency—again, that is unclear. Was the Minister himself happy with the consultation that took place, given the fact that there was none? Why was there no particular consultation? What happened to it?

Why is there no equalities impact assessment? The noble Lord, Lord German, read out the consequences of having one threshold for the whole of the country. It makes a huge difference whether you live in the north-east, London or wherever. What do the Government think about that? Are they not bothered about it? Is it just something that they can brush off and say it does not really matter?

Who signed all this off? I do not believe it was the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, so which Minister signed it all off? Who said that this was all fine to do? Who has made the decision to say, “We can do all of this without an impact assessment; we don’t care—and I’m sorry, Lord Sharpe, but you’ve got to go and do the regret Motion. We’re still not going to publish it, and it will just happen”? That is not the way to do business. It is unacceptable. The Government and the Home Office need to take responsibility for it. At the very least, let this be the last time that we get major legislation through an SI done like this, without an impact assessment. It is not good enough. It has an impact on a huge number of people’s lives. I do not blame the Minister, but the Home Office is to blame for this. It is a totally unacceptable way in which to conduct business.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have contributed to the debate. Before I get to do the “bad cop” thing, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Empey, to send me Mr Ferguson’s details, and I will of course happily look into his case.

Before getting on to the detail of the regret Motions, can I set out some background about the decision to raise the minimum income requirement, to which I shall henceforward refer as the MIR? It is important that we put these issues into context. As the noble Lord, Lord Empey, pointed out, net migration is too high; we have to get back to sustainable levels. In the year to June 2023, as has been noted, it was estimated to be at 672,000. Last year, we announced a series of robust measures to bring those numbers down, including tightening the rules on care workers, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, mentioned, as well as on skilled workers, and making sure that people can support family members they bring to the UK.

Far from being a “Get out of the UK” policy, as was somewhat intemperately alleged by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, the approach that we are taking is firm but fair. It is designed not only to bring numbers down substantially but to address the injustice of a system which, if left untouched, would reward employers seeking to recruit cheap labour from overseas at the expense of British workers and put unsustainable pressure on our most vital public services. As I think the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, would concede, that is a laudable aim. The decision to raise the MIR is a key part of our plan to reduce overall migration levels. Taken together, the changes that we are implementing will mean that the 300,000 people who came to the UK last year would now not be able to come.

I turn to the specifics of the regret Motions. First, I want to provide clarity on the objective of raising the MIR. The MIR was first introduced in July 2012 to ensure that family migrants could be supported at a reasonable level, so that they do not unreasonably become a burden on the British taxpayer, as well as to help to ensure they can participate sufficiently in everyday life to facilitate their integration into our society. It has not been increased in line with inflation or real wages since its introduction—nor has it been adjusted in light of rising numbers of migrants using the route. It is in that context that we have reviewed the threshold and taken the decision to raise it to match the level of income needed for somebody to come here as a skilled worker, which is currently at £38,700 per year. That ensures that migration policy supports our wider ambition for the UK to be a high-wage, high-productivity, high-skill economy.

Bringing the family income threshold into line with the new minimum general salary threshold for skilled workers will ensure that people bring to the UK only those dependants whom they can support financially. It will also encourage them to maintain the financial independence of all family members once they settle and who would otherwise gain full access to the benefit system.

Modern Slavery National Referral Mechanism: Waiting Times

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Monday 13th May 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The public order disqualification is part of the Nationality and Borders Act, which has also been discussed extensively from this Dispatch Box and over a number of debates. It provides a definition of public order which makes it operationally possible to withhold the recovery period in certain circumstances, in line with Article 13 of the European Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. All decisions are made on a case-by-case basis.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, can the Minister explain why the last annual report on modern slavery, as required by the Modern Slavery Act, was published in 2021? When will the Government publish the next annual report? Would that not help us to understand the statistics?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I have already highlighted that a lot of statistics have been published. I do not know specifically when the next report is due to be published, but I will find out.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I go back to an earlier answer I gave, that these are extraordinarily complex cases and, therefore, the guidance has to be refined in light of those cases periodically. I do not know to what specifically the noble Baroness is referring but, as far as I am aware, it does not make it any more complicated.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I should have referred to my interest as a trustee of the Human Trafficking Foundation, as laid out in the register, at the beginning of my question. I apologise for that.

Rural Crime

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Thursday 9th May 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Again, the noble Lord makes some very good points. As he will be aware, operational decisions are taken locally, so that is a matter for chief constables in conversation and association with their police and crime commissioners. But plenty of national resources are available, as I have already highlighted.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, notwithstanding the figures that the Minister just gave us, the National Farmers’ Union Mutual says that 80% of its members have reported disruption from crime in their areas. One specific ask from the National Farmers’ Union Mutual is for improved protection to be given by extending the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act to include GPS theft from farmed vehicles. Will the Government consider doing that as a matter of urgency?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

That is a very good point. We still have to commence the Equipment Theft (Prevention) Act, as he knows, and a call for evidence went out last summer seeking views on the secondary legislation, as required. That would be the appropriate place for making these points and discussing this. It has been targeted at agricultural and construction sectors—manufacturers, dealers, retailers and so on. I wait to see what the results of that call for evidence deliver, but I think the noble Lord makes a very good point—and, going back to the story about Kent that I referenced earlier, it was because of a GPS tracker that these people were caught.

Family Reunion Visas: Gaza

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Wednesday 24th April 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I take the noble Baroness’s point—but, as I say, we keep all existing pathways in response to events under review.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I join the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, in the tribute that she made to our noble friend Frank Field—I am sure that we all join with that.

Judicial review has found that the family of a Palestinian refugee can apply for a visa without the use of biometrics. The Home Office has said that it is complying with that, so can the Minister outline to the Chamber how it is complying, and whether that applies to all those who should seek a visa application from Gaza?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord asks an important question. The judgment was handed down a couple of weeks ago; obviously, we have received the outcome and officials will provide advice very shortly to Ministers on how it will impact ongoing and future operations.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Consideration of Commons amendments
Tuesday 16th April 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to say how much I support the remarks of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, with respect to slavery, and my noble friend Lady Lister’s comments with respect to children. We will also support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, on his amendment, should he test the opinion of the House. We think it is a very sensible amendment; it simply seeks reports saying that the things that are required to be implemented have actually been implemented. One has only to look at the International Agreements Committee report, which lists out 10 things in particular that it feels should be implemented before you can say that Rwanda is safe. As the noble and learned Lord has pointed out to the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, there has been no answer from the Government, other than some vague platitudes as to progress being made and steps being taken to ensure that these things will happen, rather than that they have happened.

Similarly, we support the point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has made with the second part of that amendment: to actually reflect on what happens in the future should, for whatever reason, changes happen in the environment with respect to Rwanda—political or whatever—that would require Parliament to reconsider its original decision that it was safe. We very much support the amendment that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, has put before us.

I congratulate my noble friend Lord Browne on his amendment, and say how much we support it. The case was made in the Sunday Telegraph, as my noble friend pointed out, with 13 military and diplomatic leaders putting forward the case for exempting those who have served this country from the provisions of the Bill. This is something that we as a country should embrace without any debate or controversy at all. I say that because it is important that we support my noble friend Lord Browne’s amendment, but also that the size of the majority is such that the other place is forced to reconsider the bland statement it made: “Don’t worry. We’ll revisit this at the end of the deliberations we are having”. There is no certainty in what the Government are saying.

It is so important that my noble friend Lord Browne’s amendment is in the Bill. What it requires, and what the people of this country want, is not some reconsideration of the policy in future but a certainty that those who have served with our Armed Forces, or served us in whatever circumstances, can be assured that the promises made to them are adhered to and kept.

I cannot believe that we as a country would turn our back on those who have served with us. It is unbelievable that we should be in this situation. I say to the Minister and others who may feel it important that they vote with the Government that we are talking about men and women who have served our country, stood alongside our Armed Forces and served with us to deliver the objectives of His Majesty’s Government. How on earth can we think it appropriate that the provisions of this Bill and the treaty should apply to them? It is simply unacceptable. As such, my noble friend Lord Browne’s amendment gives us a way of saying to the Government: “Think again. We believe it should be on the face of the Bill”. I hope that noble Lords will support my noble friend when he tests the opinion of the House.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, once again I am very grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. To restate for the record, the Government’s priority is obviously to stop the boats. Although we have made progress, more needs to be done. We need a strong deterrent; we need to operationalise this partnership with Rwanda. Only by applying this policy to everyone without myriad exceptions will the deterrent work. We are not diminishing our responsibilities to provide support to those who are vulnerable, and we have ensured that the necessary support will be provided in Rwanda. We are sending the clearest signal that we control our borders, not the criminals who charge migrants exorbitant amounts to come here via illegal routes on unsafe small boats.

I will endeavour to deal with all the points that have been raised. I turn first to the points of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. I restate for the record that as part of the process, upon arrival individuals will be treated as an adult only where two immigration officers assess that their physical appearance and demeanour very strongly suggest that they are significantly over 18 —I emphasise “significantly”. This is a deliberately high threshold, and the principle of the benefit of the doubt means that where there is doubt, an individual will be treated as a child, pending further observation by a local authority, which will usually be in the form of a Merton-compliant age assessment.

I turn to Amendment 3E from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. As he correctly pointed out, Clause 9 clearly sets out that the Bill’s provisions come into force when the treaty enters into force. The treaty enters into force when the parties have completed their internal procedures. Furthermore, the Government maintain periodical and ad hoc reviews of countries’ situations, including Rwanda’s, and that will not change.

One of the things we have discussed in previous debates on this subject is that there will be a real-time enhanced monitoring phase by the monitoring committee. The enhanced phase will ensure that the monitoring and reporting takes place in real time, so that the monitoring committee can rapidly identify, address and respond to any shortcomings, and of course identify any areas of improvement or urgently escalate issues that may place a relocated individual at risk of real harm. This enhanced phase is dealt with in paragraphs 106 to 112 of the policy statement, and I say to my noble friend Lord Hailsham that, of course, if the facts change, this means that the Government would not be obligated to remove individuals under the terms of the treaty. That may very well prompt the parliamentary occasion to which he referred. I am afraid I cannot say quite what form such an occasion may take; if I have anything to do with it, it will definitely include alcohol.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Consideration of Commons amendments
Wednesday 20th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, we are very pleased to say that should the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, wish to test the opinion of the House with respect to Motions B1 and B2, we would be very supportive of them as well. I just say to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, that the change he has made in Motion B1 from “is” to “will be” is a very significant change, and indeed goes to the heart of the problem that this House has considered on many occasions; namely, that the Government’s declaration in the Bill is that Rwanda is safe and in the treaty that it will be safe should the mechanisms contained within the treaty be put in place. I find it incredible that the Government cannot accept what is basically a very simple amendment, which in a sense puts into practice what the Government themselves have accepted.

I will just reinforce to the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, the point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, made, that the Minister in the other place implied that there was something to think about here and that the Government needed to think about how they responded to Amendments 2 and 3—as they were then—that had gone to the other place. That is why it is really important. Again, it goes back to what I said in the initial part of this debate: when the other place just dismisses amendments, it also denies itself the opportunity to properly reflect on a Bill and how it might improve it. This debate that we are having very much proves the point that we need to pass the amendments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. The Government may wish to adapt part of it to make it more consistent with what they themselves think. None the less, it is a really important amendment. As I say, we would be happy to support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, should he choose to test the opinion of the House.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful for the contributions of noble Lords to this debate. I am grateful in particular to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for the very gracious way he introduced his amendments, as ever.

It is unnecessary, however, to record on the face of the Bill the position the Bill already sets out in Clause 9. This Act comes into force on the day on which the Rwanda treaty enters into force. The treaty sets out the international legal commitments that the UK and Rwandan Governments have made, consistent with their shared standards associated with asylum and refugee protection. It also commits both Governments to deliver against key legal assurances in response to the UK Supreme Court’s conclusions.

I am very grateful to my noble friends Lord Howard, Lord Lilley and Lord Horam for pointing out, perhaps rather gently, that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is placing not much faith in the safeguards that the real-time monitoring committee will offer. We believe that this will be much more effective than any other form of scrutiny. My noble and learned friend went through the monitoring committee’s terms of reference in the last group, and I will not repeat those. I will say that the enhanced monitoring that has been discussed—the enhanced phase—will take place over the first three months on a daily basis. An enhanced phase will ensure that monitoring and reporting take place in real time, so that the independent monitoring committee can rapidly identify, address and respond to any shortcomings or failures to comply with the obligations in the treaty and identify areas for improvement, or indeed urgently escalate issues prior to any shortcomings or breaches placing a relocated individual at real risk of harm. That will include reporting to the joint committee co-chairs within 24 hours in emergency or urgent situations. I could go through the various minimum levels of assurance that have been agreed by the monitoring committee, but I fear I would lose the patience of your Lordships.

I have made it crystal clear that the Government will ratify the treaty in the UK only once we agree with Rwanda that all necessary implementation is in place for both countries to comply with the obligations under the treaty. We have assurances from the Government of Rwanda that the implementation of all measures within the treaty will be expedited, and I am grateful for all the work that continues to be done by officials in the Government of Rwanda.

Just to conclude, again I agree with my noble friends Lord Lilley and Lord Howard, that the proper parliamentary response to any changes is of course to change the legislation, either by amendment or appeal. On that basis—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord German, and I very much agree with the remarks he made. The Government has got themselves into a right mess with respect to this flagship Bill—partly caused by the fact that they have simply not been listening to the very serious and constructive amendments that noble Lords have tabled to it.

I ask again, because I did not get an answer from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart: what happened to the Government’s plan to discuss this Bill next Monday in the other place and then bring it back on a further round of ping-pong next Tuesday? What happened to that particular plan? The Government are delaying their own legislation and people keep asking me why they are doing it. I do not know, so I am asking the Minister. Why are the Government delaying it until after Easter, when they could have brought it back next Tuesday? Were the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, asked about it? Did they put their views forward or is it simply something that came out of the blue? I know that government Members were asked to be here next Tuesday and then it was stopped. I do not know the answer and people keep asking me. So, I am asking the Government again: what has happened with this flagship, emergency piece of legislation, such that the Government have delayed it themselves? The only defence they have is to turn around and blame us for blocking it, when we have said all along that we will not block it.

I ask again because I need to know the answer, since Conservative Members keep asking me and I say, “Well, ask your own Front Bench”—mind you, those here will not know the answer either. Somewhere along the line, there is a serious point to be made on why the Government are delaying their own Bill by not providing time next week.

I support the remarks of my noble friend Lady Lister on Motion E1 and her very serious points about age assessment. I welcome the anti-slavery amendment tabled by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, in her Motion G1. I make no apologies for saying again that I am astonished that Conservative Members of Parliament in the other place, Conservative Peers and others are driving a coach and horses through the Modern Slavery Act, an Act that as a proud Labour Minister I call one of the proudest achievements of a Government who happened to be a Conservative Government. It was flagship legislation that has been copied all over the world, but, in Bill after Bill over the last couple of years, we have seen a gradual erosion of some of the fundamental principles that drive it. I will not repeat the points made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—I should say that I am a trustee of the Human Trafficking Foundation, as mentioned in the register of interests—but I find that incredible. I hope that noble Lords will take account of the further amendment that the noble and learned Baroness has tabled.

I congratulate my noble friend Lord Browne on his Motion H1. I am incredulous that the Government could not accept his amendment in the other place. I think it astonished not just this side of the House but all sides of the House that, even if they did not accept his amendment, they could not find a way when considering it a few days ago of ensuring that this country met its debt to those people who had fought with us when we needed them to. Many of them have been excluded from that support. That is a stain on our country and should have been resolved as soon as possible. The Government had it within their power to do that last week but, as with the other nine amendments, they turned it down. I simply do not understand that.

I accept the words of the Minister, which he will have said in good faith, that this will be revised, looked at and brought forward in due course, and that regulations and secondary legislation will be used. However, there is absolutely no excuse for the Government of the day not standing up in here—they did not do it in the other place—and saying, “We will honour those who honoured us by ensuring that they are protected, and to do that we will accept Lord Browne’s amendment”. They could have done that today, and it would have meant that we had it in the Bill.

Notwithstanding that the Government clearly will not do that, I hope that noble Lords in vast numbers will support my noble friend’s amendment so that when it goes back to the other place to be considered—whenever that will be—Members there will have the opportunity to honour the debt that we owe to those who fought with us in our time of need in the war in Afghanistan. We owe it to them. As the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, who is not in his place, said, in other conflicts to come, when we need support and help, what are we to say to translators, lorry drivers, interpreters and those who are fighting with us? Do we say, “Don’t worry, this country will support you in the aftermath of it?” They will look back at what we have done in Afghanistan and wonder whether we can be true to our word. We should resolve this and support the amendment. I hope that we do so in vast numbers.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful once again to noble Lords for their contributions and acknowledge the points that have been made. However, the Government are unable to accept these amendments.

It is worth me starting by again reading into the record Article 3(4) of the treaty for the avoidance of further doubt. It states that:

“The Agreement does not cover unaccompanied children and the United Kingdom confirms that it shall not seek to relocate unaccompanied individuals who are deemed to be under the age of 18. Any unaccompanied individual who, subsequent to relocation, is deemed by a court or tribunal in the United Kingdom to either be under the age of 18 or to be treated temporarily as being under the age of 18, shall be returned to the United Kingdom in accordance with Article 11 of this Agreement”.


The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, acknowledged, as I have from this Dispatch Box, that assessing age is challenging. That is why the National Age Assessment Board, which I went into in some detail in my opening remarks, was launched in March 2023. I will repeat some of those remarks.

The board was launched to achieve greater consistency in quality of age assessments, to reduce the incentives for adults to claim to be children and to reduce the financial and administrative burden of undertaking assessment on local authorities. The aim of achieving accurate age assessment is its primary consideration. The NAAB consists of expert social workers whose task is to conduct full Merton-compliant age assessments upon referral from a local authority or the Home Office. Local authorities also retain the ability to conduct age assessments. This is not some perfunctory nod in the direction of those who are obviously in a difficult position; it is a very comprehensive age assessment process. Let me make it clear that if an age-disputed individual requires a Merton assessment, they will be relocated to Rwanda only if determined to be an adult after that Merton assessment.

In terms of numbers of people, it was suggested that there were not very many. I will go through those again as well. Between 2016 and September 2023, there were 11,977 asylum cases where age was disputed. Of those, 5,651 were found to be adults. That is over 800 per year. I argue to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, that it would be a mistake to put those people into a system that is designed for children. I was quite surprised to hear the noble Lord, Lord German, suggesting the opposite. Those are the statistics that I recognise.

As I have previously set out, we cannot allow legislation to pass that would enable those who are to be removed to Rwanda to be treated differently from those removed to another country. The purpose of the IMA and this Bill is to ensure that anyone arriving illegally in the UK will be promptly removed to their home country or a safe third country to have any asylum or human rights claims processed. I will of course make sure that the comments of the noble Lords, Lord Browne and Lord Coaker, are carefully scrutinised over the coming weeks. I apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, for being unable to comment on the individual case that she cited.

The Government of Rwanda have systems in place to safeguard relocated individuals with a range of vulnerabilities, including those concerning mental health and gender-based violence. Rwanda has a proven track record of working constructively with domestic and international partners including the UNHCR, the International Organization for Migration and other non-government organisations to process and support the asylum seeker and refugee population. By temporarily accommodating some of the most vulnerable refugee populations who have faced trauma, detentions and violence, Rwanda has showcased its willingness and ability to work collaboratively to provide solutions to refugee situations and crises.

We need to focus on getting flights off the ground to Rwanda to create the reality that everyone who enters the UK via a small boat will not be able to stay but will be swiftly removed. This will help us to continue to stop illegal immigrants from taking dangerous journeys across the channel and to save lives at sea.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Can the Minister answer the question that I put to him and to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart? What happened to the Government’s plans to do this next week? It was due to go to the other place on Monday and come back here on Tuesday. What happened to those plans and why have they been ditched?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, the noble Lord will not like my answer, but the scheduling of business is a matter for business managers.

Former Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration: Reports

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Wednesday 6th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Yes, I can give that assurance. I would also reassure the House that Border Force facilitated 132 million passenger arrivals last year and 96% of passengers were processed within service standards. Significant progress has been made since that report was commissioned on increasing the number of officers who are trained appropriately.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister gave us an updated figure—that 118 children are still missing. That is truly shocking: the state has lost 118 children. What was lacking in the Minister’s answer was any description of what the Government are doing to try to find those children. What effort is being made to locate them? What liaison is taking place with police, social services and children’s services across the country? I say again to the Government: they have lost 118 children. If the state were a parent, it would be prosecuted.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord has made that point before. Of course, we are unable to detain anybody, so when he characterises them as being lost, they have left as much as anything else. When they go missing from hotels, a multiagency missing persons protocol is mobilised, alongside the police and local authorities, to establish their whereabouts and ensure they are safe. Many of those who go missing are subsequently traced and located. The Home Office continues to review and improve practices around preventing children going missing, including work with the National Police Chiefs’ Council, which is publishing, and has published, guidance on missing migrant children. I say again: the vast majority of these were aged 16 and 17. Only 18 are still aged under 18.

Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (Remedial) Order 2023

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Tuesday 5th March 2024 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, this order was first laid before Parliament for consideration on 20 March 2023. It was laid again on 18 October 2023, and sat for 60 days. It was debated in the other place on 23 January 2024. As noble Lords will be aware, it is a top priority for the Government to maintain our national security and keep the public safe. The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 provides robust privacy safeguards in relation to investigatory powers.

The United Kingdom’s investigatory powers regime is world-leading and provides the international standard on transparency, privacy, redress and oversight to accompany the exercise of these critical powers. This House recently considered the Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill, on which noble Lords provided expert scrutiny. I am hopeful that today’s debate will be approached in the same spirit.

This instrument will make necessary and important amendments to the IPA following the May 2021 judgment from the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Big Brother Watch and others v the United Kingdom, which I will refer to as BBW. The ruling from the Grand Chamber related to the United Kingdom’s bulk interception regime under the legislation which preceded the IPA—the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. The Grand Chamber found that certain aspects of that regime were not compliant with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, on respect for private and family life, and Article 10, on freedom of expression. While most of the incompatibilities identified by the Grand Chamber were addressed through the introduction of the IPA, there was one outstanding issue which requires an amendment to the IPA. This relates to journalistic safeguards, which I will come to later.

I will first briefly explain how the bulk interception regime operates, so that it is clear how these additional safeguards will be applied. The main purpose of a bulk interception warrant is to acquire overseas-related communications. That material is then retained for the minimum amount of time necessary for the authorised purposes. Criteria are used to search through that material to find material which is useful in support of operational purposes. Useful material is then retained for the minimum amount of time necessary for the authorised purposes.

Section 154 of the IPA covers the journalistic safeguards for bulk interception. Presently, it requires only that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner be informed if material thought to contain confidential journalistic material or sources of journalistic material is retained, following examination, for a purpose other than its destruction. There are additional safeguards in the interception code of practice. The code requires that the relevant intelligence agency seek the agreement of a senior official within a warrant-granting department before the agency may select material for examination, in order to identify or confirm a source of journalistic information.

The purpose of this remedial order is to amend the IPA to strengthen the existing journalistic safeguards for bulk interception under Section 154, which is not possible through the delegated powers provided for within the Act. It does this by requiring that approval from the Investigatory Powers Commissioner is obtained before any criteria are used where the purpose is to select material for examination that is confidential journalistic material or a source of journalistic material, or where it would be highly likely to do so. The retention of confidential journalistic material or sources of journalistic material must also be authorised by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. There is also an urgency provision, which I will come on to later. It is necessary that the Government introduce this reform to ensure that our intelligence agencies can maintain their ability to carry out bulk interception in line with the convention and the Human Rights Act 1998.

Bulk interception is an important operational tool which is used by intelligence agencies to identify threats to the national security of the United Kingdom—it was recognised by the Grand Chamber as such—as well as in tackling serious and organised crime and maintaining the United Kingdom’s economic well-being. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner already provides oversight of the acquisition, examination and retention of confidential journalistic material and sources of journalistic material obtained under bulk interception. Legislative change is needed so that these safeguards are expressly set out within the legislation. Failure to amend the IPA would mean that the UK’s bulk interception regime would continue to be in breach of Article 10 of the convention.

This remedial order introduces amendments to Section 154, the creation of a new Section 154A and a minor consequential amendment to Section 229(8). The amendment to Section 154 will introduce enhanced safeguards relating to the criteria used to select material for examination that will identify confidential journalistic material or identify or confirm sources of journalistic material derived from material acquired through bulk interception. The permission of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner will be required before such material can be purposefully selected for examination or knowingly retained for a purpose other than destruction.

Permission from the commissioner is also required before such material may be retained. The commissioner will make that decision on the basis of whether it is in the public interest to retain the material. The commissioner may impose conditions on the retention of the material. The creation of the new Section 154A introduces an urgency process for dealing with requests for authorisations out of hours. These authorisations will be subject to subsequent judicial approval and any search activity must cease if approval is refused, so urgent applications will still be subject to rigorous independent scrutiny. The judicial commissioner will make their decision on the basis of whether it is in the public interest to approve the use of the search criteria.

The amendment to Section 229(8) is a consequential amendment which includes reference to the new functions of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner in Sections 154 and 154A so that they are treated consistently within the IPA. Sections 229(6) and (7) require judicial commissioners to not act in a way that is contrary to the public interest, national security, the prevention or detection of serious crime or the economic well-being of the UK. Section 229(8) then disapplies that requirement when the judicial commissioner is exercising various functions such as considering whether to approve the authorisation of a bulk interception warrant. Subsection (8) is amended by this instrument to include decisions by the judicial commissioner under new Sections 154 and 154A. This is consistent with similar judicial commissioner functions in other parts of the IPA and ensures that the judicial commissioners can exercise their functions properly.

This remedial Order will ensure that the United Kingdom fulfils its obligations under Article 10 of the convention by making the necessary changes to the bulk interception regime under the IPA in order to be compliant with the findings of the Grand Chamber in BBW. These changes will further strengthen the world-leading safeguards within the IPA, which is a crucial tool in the ongoing effort to protect the United Kingdom and its citizens. I therefore commend the draft Order to the Committee.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his helpful introduction.

This SI concerns the selection for examination and retention of confidential journalistic material which has been collected under a bulk interception warrant. Big Brother Watch brought a challenge to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, the predecessor of IPA, and the courts found several incompatibilities with the ECHR. Most of those incompatibilities were resolved by the introduction of the IPA in 2016. One issue remained—where an intelligence agency seeks to select confidential journalistic material for examination obtained under a bulk interception warrant or identify sources of journalistic material, the selection criteria used should be subject to prior independent authorisation. Where they are found during the examination of bulk data, their retention must be independently authorised.

In its report on the draft version of this instrument, the JCHR made three recommendations. Two have been accepted by the Government and integrated in this SI. However, the Government have not fully accepted the third recommendation, which was that security agencies engage with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner so that they can review journalistic material which had been retained before this SI is implemented. The Government responded that notification of the IPC is already required for an application for the retention of confidential journalistic material and that a judicial commissioner also must consider the application. Additionally, the IPC audits statements submitted for retention applications. However, if the Government accept that there is a need to change the law, surely they accept that there is a need to create an additional review in cases that will not be captured by the new regulations?

I have some questions which may be helpful for those who read these proceedings. Can the Minister explain why these changes have not been brought about as part of the Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill, given that it is still going through Parliament? New Sections 195 and 195A were inserted into the Investigatory Powers Act on Report in this House. They create additional safeguards for journalistic material for bulk equipment interference. Why is this being introduced separately? Can the Government provide more details on why they have not fully accepted the third recommendation of the JCHR?

In Article 2 of the SI before us, the Government talk about

“Additional safeguards for confidential journalistic material etc”,


and state that the two bodies that can investigate or seek approval are the Investigatory Powers Commissioner or a senior official. The Minister knows that I will ask who the senior official is. How senior does the senior official have to be? In what circumstances would you go not to the IPC for approval but to the senior official? I know the Minister tried—I expect that he thought that people would ask what “urgent” means—but can he say a little more about urgency, even though he included some of that in his remarks?

Does the senior official have to report every decision to the IPC, as outlined in the substituted Section 154A? Does the senior official have to inform the IPC within days or weeks of any decision that they have made? What happens if the IPC does not approve of the decision made by the senior official, given that, presumably, in the interim the Security Service will have acted as though it had permission? I hope that is clear: presumably a senior official can give permission, then for a few days the Security Service can operate as though it had permission, then the IPC turns around and says, “I don’t think that was the right decision and you do not have permission”. How does it function in the interim, if that is clear? You have a gap between the senior official giving permission and the IPC turning it down, which may be a few days. Does the Minister have anything to say about that?

Does the IPC or the senior official have to record their reasons for believing that the public interest in obtaining the information outweighs the public interest in maintaining confidentiality? In other words, do they have to be transparent about their reasons for coming to their conclusion? Similarly, under new subsections (6), (7) and (8), does the IPC or the senior official have to record the reason why the public interest in retaining the information outweighs the public interest in destroying the information that has been obtained? Again, it is the test about public interest and the conflict between confidentiality and openness and transparency. I wonder whether the Minister has anything to say about that.

However, I understand the need for the SI. I think some clarity around some of those questions would be helpful for those who read our deliberations but, with that, we support the SI.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for his participation and support in the debate today. As I set out earlier, the changes that we are seeking to make to the Investigatory Powers Act will bring the bulk interception regime in line with the requirements of the European Court of Human Right’s Grand Chamber judgment in the case of Big Brother Watch. As I set out, it will ensure that the UK meets its obligations under Article 10 of the convention concerning confidential journalistic material and sources of journalistic material. Prior independent authorisation will be required where the purpose of the use of criteria to select material for examination is to identify confidential journalistic material or to identify or confirm a source of journalistic material. Prior independent authorisation will also be required for the retention of such material for purposes other than its destruction.

The noble Lord asked why this amendment was not taken forward as part of the Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill. That Bill was announced in the King’s Speech on 8 November 2023 and was introduced into the House of Lords on the same day. The Home Office was not able to pre-empt the contents of the King’s Speech and there was no guarantee that the Bill would be brought forward in the fourth Session. The judgment in the BBW case was handed down in May 2021 and, as a considerable time has passed and with no guarantee of a suitable legislative vehicle, the Home Office felt it was necessary to remedy the incompatibility as soon as possible. A remedial order was therefore the most appropriate course of action; essentially, it was timing.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I know it sounds like dancing on the head of a pin, but what “senior” means is quite important, so I ask the Minister to clarify that.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I take the point. I absolutely will clarify it, if possible.

I would love to read the Committee my last answer, but I cannot read the writing, so I am sorry, and I apologise to whoever wrote it. Whatever it says, I will write to the noble Lord—or, rather, type—when I have deciphered it. I am very grateful for his contribution in this debate. As I set out, the changes we are seeking to make will ensure that the UK’s bulk interception regime meets its obligations under Article 10 of the convention and strengthens existing safeguards for journalists. I therefore commend this order to the Committee.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Report stage
Monday 4th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, we very much support Amendments 9 and 12, which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has led on. They would allow the presumption that Rwanda is a safe country to be rebutted by credible evidence presented to decision-makers, including courts and tribunals. If he were to test the opinion of the House, we would support him.

I will refer to my Amendment 29, which I hope gives some evidence of the need for the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson. Amendment 29 would take out Clause 4(2). I tabled it because Clause 4(2) says that

“subsection (1) does not permit a decision-maker”—

however that is defined, whether it is the Secretary of State, a court or a tribunal—

“to consider any matter, claim or complaint to the extent that it relates to the issue of whether the Republic of Rwanda will or may remove or send the person in question to another State in contravention of any of its … obligations”.

In other words, an individual cannot put before the court or a tribunal not that they “may” be refouled but, using the Government’s own words in Clause 4(2), that they “will” be refouled. I could just about understand it if it had “may”, but if an individual cannot even argue that they “will” be then I would find that quite astonishing. Therefore, I suggest that my Amendment 29 highlights why Amendments 9 and 12, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, are needed.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. I will turn first to Amendment 39, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett. As I set out in Committee, we do not consider it necessary to make this amendment.

Clause 1 sets out the obligations that the Government of Rwanda have committed to under the new treaty. The addition the noble Lord proposes does not reflect the arrangements under the treaty. Enabling persons whose claims are successful in Rwanda to return to the UK would be entirely inconsistent with the terms and objectives of the treaty. Those relocated to Rwanda are not intended to be returned to the UK, except in limited circumstances. Article 9 of the treaty clearly sets out that Rwanda shall process claims for asylum in accordance with the refugee convention and this agreement.

Since the partnership was announced, UK officials have worked closely with the Government of Rwanda to ensure that individuals relocated under the agreement will be safe and that their rights will be protected. Human rights have been a key consideration throughout this work, including the treaty, to confirm the principles for the treatment of all relocated individuals in an internationally binding agreement and strengthened monitoring mechanisms to ensure practical delivery against the obligations. For example, individuals, once relocated, will have freedom of movement. They will not be at any risk of destitution, as they will be accommodated and supported for five years. They will have access to a generous integration package so that they can study, undertake training and work, and access healthcare.

For those who are not registered as refugees, Rwanda shall consider whether the relocated individual has another humanitarian protection need. Where such a humanitarian protection need exists, Rwanda shall provide treatment consistent with that offered to those recognised as refugees and permission to remain in Rwanda. Such persons shall be afforded equivalent rights and treatment to those recognised as refugees and shall be treated in accordance with international and Rwandan laws. For those relocated individuals not recognised as refugees or granted protection, Article 10 of the treaty provides that Rwanda shall regularise their status in the form of a permanent residence permit and provide equivalent treatment as set out in Part 2 of Annex A.

It is the Government of Rwanda, and not the UK Government, who will consider asylum or protection claims and who will grant refugee or protection status to those relocated to Rwanda under the treaty that will underpin the migration and economic development partnership. As is made clear in the agreed terms of the treaty, those relocated will not be returned to the UK except in limited specified circumstances. Obtaining refugee status in Rwanda does not grant that person any rights within the UK, as would be the case for any other person granted refugee status in Rwanda who had not been relocated from the UK. Anyone seeking entry to the UK in the future would have to apply through legal routes, such as the work or family route, with no guarantee of acceptance.

Amendments 9 and 12 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and Amendment 19 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, seek to qualify the requirement for decision-makers, including courts and tribunals, to conclusively treat Rwanda as a safe country, thus allowing individuals to challenge removal decisions on the grounds that Rwanda is not a generally safe country.

The treaty, the Bill and the evidence together demonstrate that Rwanda is safe for relocated individuals and that the Government’s approach is tough but fair and lawful. The Government are clear that we assess Rwanda to be a safe country, and we have published detailed evidence that substantiates this assessment. This is a central feature of the Bill, and many of its other provisions are designed to ensure that Parliament’s conclusion on the safety of Rwanda is accepted by the domestic courts. The conclusive presumption in the Bill that Rwanda is generally a safe country is not, as the noble Lord suggested, a “legal fiction”.

The courts have not concluded that there is a general risk to the safety of relocated individuals in Rwanda. Rather, the Supreme Court’s findings were limited to perceived deficiencies in the Rwandan asylum system and the resulting risk of refoulement should any lack of capacity or expertise lead to cases being wrongly decided. As we have repeatedly set out, the treaty responds to those key findings. The assurances we have since negotiated in our legally binding treaty with Rwanda directly address these findings by making detailed provision for the treatment of relocated individuals in Rwanda, ensuring that they will be offered safety and protection, with no risk of refoulement.

We have been clear that the purpose of this legislation is to stop the boats, and to do that we must create a deterrent that shows that, if you enter the UK illegally, you will not be able to stay. We cannot allow systematic legal challenges to continue to frustrate and delay removals. It is therefore right that the scope for individualised claims remains limited, to prevent the merry-go-round of legal challenges and enable us to remove from the UK individuals who have entered illegally. We cannot allow illegal entrants to be able to thwart their removal when there is a clear process for the consideration of a claim based on a risk of serious and irreversible harm. We cannot allow the kinds of spurious legal challenges we have been seeing for far too long to continue.

It is for this reason that I cannot accept Amendments 23 and 27 tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, which seek to lower the threshold for a claim or appeal brought on the grounds that Rwanda is unsafe to succeed. These amendments undermine the core principle of the Bill, which is to limit challenges brought against the safety of Rwanda. The Bill makes it clear that Rwanda is generally safe and that decision-makers, as well as courts and tribunals, must treat it conclusively as such. This reflects the Government’s confidence in the assurances of the treaty and in Rwanda’s commitment and capability to deliver against these obligations. As I have set out, the UK Government and the Government of Rwanda have agreed and begun to implement assurances and commitments to strengthen Rwanda’s asylum system.

Following on from my previous point with regard to relocated individuals in Rwanda being offered safety and protection with no risk of refoulement, I now turn to Amendments 11, 14, 15 and 29 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. I consider these amendments to be unnecessary. As I have just stated, yes, the Supreme Court did find deficiencies in the Rwandan asylum system that meant there was a risk that those relocated under the terms of the previous memorandum of understanding with Rwanda could be refouled. However, the UK and Rwanda have since worked closely together to address the court’s conclusions.

As noble Lords are aware, the Supreme Court could consider evidence only up to summer 2022, which was not reflective of the current evidential position. Not only could the court not consider additional work undertaken with the Government of Rwanda to build capacity in the Rwandan asylum system, but it had not had the opportunity to consider the terms agreed under our new legally binding treaty with Rwanda. The treaty makes very clear that no one relocated to Rwanda will be returned to another country, except, in very limited circumstances, back to the UK. This expressly addresses the court’s conclusions by eliminating the risk of refoulement.

As I have said previously, and as I stated in my letter to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, following the debate on this matter in Committee, the treaty contains, among other provisions, a definitive undertaking from the Government of Rwanda that they will not remove any person relocated under the MEDP, except to the UK, in accordance with Article 11(1).

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, as we come to the end of today’s consideration of the Bill before us, I start with the important point that the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, mentioned. I raised it in debate on the first group of amendments, when I said that the constitutional position is that the Government have the right to get their Bill through, but the House of Lords also has a constitutional position, which is the right for it to expect that its views and the amendments that it passes are considered properly by the Government. Unless I got it wrong, the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, was saying—it is certainly what I think—that our belief is that the Government are simply saying, “We’re not going to change the Bill at all. We don’t mind what the amendments are or what inconsistencies are brought forward, or how illogical what we are saying is. Such is our determination that we are going to drive this through and use our electoral majority to do it”. To that extent, the Government are undermining the constitutional conventions on which our Parliament is based.

I have been lectured, as many of us on this side of and across the House have been, on the Government’s right to get their Bill through. Indeed, the Home Secretary was at it again this morning in a newspaper, warning of the consequences of us not allowing the Bill through. Why would the Government simply ignore what the House of Lords is saying, which appears to be the intention? It may not be the intention of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, or the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, but it will be interesting to see what amendments, if any, the Government make in response to what has happened in your Lordships’ House in Committee and, more importantly, in the votes that have taken place today.

I would appreciate us having some understanding of the Government’s view of what is being done here. As the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, mentioned, and as I am sure many other noble Lords feel, we have a right to be heard—and, at times, for our amendments to be acted upon—rather than simply ignored and dismissed as people who do not understand the problem and are simply trying to get in the way of dealing with the boats.

I started with that important point, notwithstanding the fact that some really important points reflecting on the Bill have been made on this group of amendments, as with many other groups. This group of amendments deals with individual claims and exemptions that may be made with respect to the general principle of the law. As somebody who has great respect for the law, although not a lawyer myself, it has always been my understanding that not many good laws do not have exemptions within them. A good law may have a generality of application to the population—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, will know this better than me, in his current position—but it will have exemptions within it because the impact of a general law on an individual may be such that justice is not served. Because of that, law therefore has to have exemptions built into it. As it stands, the Government are simply not able to have any exemptions within this. There is a blanket application of the law to particular individuals, whatever their circumstances.

We heard three very passionate and moving speakers leading on these amendments. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, supported by my noble friend Lord Cashman, outlined the circumstances that may occur with a particular social group. My noble friend mentioned the LGBT community, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, will also appreciate that. Does that need to be considered within the Bill? We will have to see, but it appears to be another thing that the Government will just dismiss.

We heard from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, about her amendments with respect to victims of modern slavery and trafficking. People who are trafficked have no choice. They do not say “Yes, traffic me”. That is different; that is smuggling. We are talking about people who are trafficked and have no part in the decision. The Government’s Bill just does not care about that. Those people will be subject to automatic deportation or going to Rwanda. As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said, quite rightly, surely that could be considered for exemption under the terms of the Bill.

My noble friend Lord Browne’s amendment, supported by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, and others, pointed out that a consequence of the Bill as it stands will be that people who served this country and put their lives on the line for us will simply be treated as illegal and deported to Rwanda. Does the Minister think that is right? Does he actually agree with that? It would be interesting to know whether he thinks that somebody, as my noble friend Lord Browne pointed out, who has fought for this country, served this country and put their life on the line, and who has had to come because of the situation in Afghanistan that my noble friend outlined, should be deported. Who in this House thinks that they should be deported to Rwanda? I do not believe the Government Front Bench think that. It is a rhetorical question; I will save the Minister from answering it. If they do not think that, then they should sort it out.

We are not playing at this; these are things that affect real people’s lives. The point the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, made, is really important. What credibility will this country have if it finds itself in a similar situation in the future and says, “Work with us because we will ensure that you are protected”? What possible credibility would we have as a country or as part of an alliance? If we said to people, “If you serve with this country, do not worry about the consequences of it, because you will be protected”, what will we be able to say to them when, as the noble and gallant Lord pointed out, they simply turn around and say, “That is not what happened with those who served in Afghanistan”? Many of them were forced to stay and the consequences of that for some of them have been very severe.

The Government need to act on my noble friend Lord Browne’s amendment. We do not need warm words such as, “Yes, we need to consider this and think about it. It is a very important, interesting point that has been made”. The Government make the law. With respect to this, they should change the Bill to make sure that those people are protected and they should change the Bill in the way the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, has outlined, with respect to victims of modern slavery and trafficking. As my noble friend Lord Cashman and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, said, the Bill needs changing with respect to LGBT people—although I note my noble friend’s Amendment 33, which we will consider on Wednesday, may be a way of doing that. We will leave that for Wednesday.

This is a very important group of amendments dealing with individual claims and exemptions. This is not only about the law; it is about the way that justice works in this country. Justice demands these changes and I hope the Government respond.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, these amendments go to the issue of whether it is safe to relocate a person to Rwanda for particular individuals. It remains the Government’s view that these amendments are not necessary. I will again set out the Government’s case. Before I do, on the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, regarding amendments from noble Lords, obviously I cannot pre-empt what the other place will do or what that will prompt. I am sure that noble Lords will understand that.

Amendments 22, 24, 26, 28 and 30, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, would undermine one of the core principles of the Bill, which is to limit the challenges that can be brought against the general safety of Rwanda. The Government do not accept that these amendments are required to safeguard claims against removal to Rwanda on the basis of an individual’s LGBT identity, or indeed for any other characteristic, such as religious belief. These amendments would unnecessarily and significantly broaden the Bill’s provisions.

The Bill provides appropriate safeguards to ensure that decision-makers will make a case-by-case decision about the particular circumstances of each case. The Bill also allows decision-makers and the courts to consider certain claims that Rwanda is unsafe for an individual person due to their particular circumstances, despite the safeguards in the treaty, if there is compelling evidence to that effect.

As in all cases, decision-makers will make case-by-case decisions about whether the particular circumstances of each case would mean that an individual would be at real risk of harm were they to be relocated to Rwanda. That consideration would include an assessment of whether individuals faced a real risk of harm as a result of their sexuality. Furthermore, for LGBT individuals, that consideration would include any assessment of any compelling evidence reviewed in line with the principles outlined by HJ (Iran)—to which many noble Lords referred—that being LGBT would mean that Rwanda was not safe for them in their particular circumstances.

Immigration Rules and Border Security

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Wednesday 21st February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, there is yet more chaos at the borders as we learned yesterday of a failure to check hundreds of high-risk flights for the obvious threats of trafficking, serious crime and terrorism. The Government dispute the figures, so let me give them an opportunity to say whether all the high-risk flights were checked. What are the figures that the Government believe, not only for London City Airport but across the UK, and are they all properly checked?

Instead of getting a grip, the Government sacked the inspector immediately when he was being forced to leave next month anyway. Some 15 of his reports remain unpublished, including revelations of visa failures in the care sector, with 275 such visas issued to a non-existent care home. When will these 15 reports, being sat on by the Home Office, be published, and when will there be a new independent inspector to oversee our borders and immigration arrangements? Border security is too important for confusion, delay and incompetence but, too often, that is what we get from this Government.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for his questions, and I will do my best to answer them all. I can reassure anyone from the public who happens to be watching: Border Force performs checks on 100% of scheduled passengers arriving in the UK and risk-based intelligence-led checks on general aviation. It is disturbing that information with no basis in fact was leaked by the independent chief inspector to a national newspaper before the Home Office had the chance to respond. As a consequence, Mr Neal lost the confidence of the Home Secretary, as he pointed out in his WMS yesterday. I cannot really improve on his words:

“I have terminated the appointment of David Neal, the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, after he breached the terms of appointment and lost my confidence”.


In terms of the checks at London City Airport, Mr Neal was very aware of a specific issue with the recording of data there that meant that a large proportion of flights recorded as high risk should have been reclassified as low risk. As I have already mentioned, all notified general aviation flights are categorised as high risk or low risk based on a number of factors. These are primarily related to persons on board, but additional factors can relate to intelligence about the aircraft and other matters. A flight may be remotely cleared when it has been assessed using the risk assessment as low risk, and for high-risk flights in certain circumstances only. A remote clearance requires, as a minimum, a digital record check on Home Office systems for all passengers. Where we are notified of a general aviation flight, we clear 100% of high-risk and low-risk flights remotely or in person, in accordance with the general aviation guidance.

I am not sure when the new replacement will be recruited. It is a very important position, and an appointment will be made following robust competition in accordance with the Governance Code on Public Appointments. As regards the publishing of the other reports, it is undeniably unfortunate that circumstances have delayed the publication of certain inspection reports. I will say that the one that was leaked was well within the time limit, and the Government had not been given an opportunity to respond and were still fact-checking, for the reasons I mentioned earlier. These will be published as soon as possible.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Committee stage
Monday 19th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

No, but I think that the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, summed up the Government’s position rather well, and probably better than I can. I am afraid that we will have to return to the first question asked by the noble and learned Lord in a later group.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Before the Minister sits down, I have a practical question. He says that this will apply retrospectively—what is the Government’s assessment of the numbers of people that this applies to?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I appreciate that the noble Lord asked me about this in the debate last week as well. I will not give him a precise answer at this moment, but will come back to him.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Committee stage
Monday 19th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I do not have the precise number. I will find it and write to the noble Lord. As I say, the fact is that the scheme is uncapped. In a perfect world, we would not send anyone to Rwanda because the deterrence would work. Surely that is the point, as alluded to by my noble friends Lord Lilley and Lord Murray, and indeed by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, who pointed out that deterrence is entirely a binary argument. The Government take one view and others take another.

I think I have answered most of the questions—or at least I have tried to, although I appreciate not necessarily to all noble Lords’ satisfaction. We will have more to say before Report. The Bill buttresses the treaty. Alongside the evidence of changes in Rwanda since the summer of 2022, it enables Parliament to conclude that Rwanda is safe and provides Parliament with the opportunity to do so. For the reasons I have outlined, the amendments are not necessary, and I therefore respectfully ask noble Lords not to move them.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I do not often say this to the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, but that was a really disappointing response, partly because the Committee is seeking numbers and information and numbers were there none. The Government will have assumptions about what is happening. The other place has spent months and months debating Rwanda and this place has spent months doing so too; we have spent weeks on this Bill, including three days in Committee.

What I was asking with Amendment 67—and I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Purvis, for their support—was what the Government’s assumption is about the number of people who are going to go to Rwanda. It is no answer to say that the numbers are uncapped. That is a Civil Service response; it is what you say when it is difficult to answer and you do not want to do so.

Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Committee stage
Monday 12th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a great privilege to wind up on this group for His Majesty’s Opposition. The quality of the contributions has been truly outstanding. I start by saying to the noble Lords, Lord Green and Lord Howard, that whatever our views on the various amendments in this and the other groups, we are fundamentally and totally opposed to the whole Bill and have voted against it at all stages. That lays out our position fairly clearly.

It was helpful for the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, to lay out as we start Committee that this debate is not about whether to stop illegal migration or reduce immigration, but how we do it. This Bill is not the way to do it, so he was right to remind us of that.

We support the thrust of Amendments 3 and 7, as did many noble Lords, including the noble Lords, Lord Anderson, Lord Hannay and Lord Kerr, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Southwark and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti—I will come back to her lead amendment in a moment—because they go to the heart of the Bill. Clause 1(2)(b) replaces a judicial finding of fact with Parliament simply declaring that Rwanda is safe, irrespective of the Supreme Court judgment. I will not go into the legal niceties we have heard, but it seems remarkable to me that Parliament should make a judgment that the court has got it wrong and just change it without reference to the court.

There is a missing word in that paragraph which gives great credibility to many of the contributions made this afternoon:

“this Act gives effect to the judgement of Parliament that the Republic of Rwanda is a safe country”.

As many noble Lords and the committees that have reported on this Bill have said, this paragraph says that Rwanda is safe now, not that it will become safe. The Supreme Court said that that is the point of difference between them. It has not said that the Government cannot act in this way—I would have thought they would be pleased and say, “Look, the Supreme Court says that what we’re doing conforms with international law”—but that they cannot say that Rwanda is safe now. The Government are saying: “Don’t worry about that; we’ll just pass a law saying that it is”. That is the point of conflict, as it flies in the face of the Supreme Court, the International Agreements Committee and many others.

The contribution of the noble Lord, Lord Tugendhat, was remarkable in its honesty and openness. He said that, as a member of the Conservative Party for decades—I apologise if I get his wording wrong—he was disappointed by the Government coming forward with legislation such as this, which he felt flew in the face of the party’s traditions. He said that Margaret Thatcher herself would have refused it because it flies in the face of her belief that Governments have to act in accordance with the law, or the constitution would be at stake. Many of these amendments seek to reassert the principle that this country has always operated on—that this Parliament operates according to the law. Parliamentary sovereignty is paramount and Parliament can pass what it wants, but as part of that, under our unwritten constitution, there is a belief that it will always operate according to the law even while recognising its sovereign power.

We broadly support much of my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti’s lead amendment. To answer the noble Lord, Lord Howard, my noble friend, in the spirit of Committee, said that if she has not got the amendment completely right, it might need to be changed. That is the whole point of Committee; she accepted that he might have a point and that making the UNHCR the sole body advising the Government or preventing them from acting might not be the best way forward.

Many noble Lords, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, drew attention to a point in Amendments 1 and 2. This may be flowery language that Governments put at the front of Bills—I am sure that we did it in government and may well do it again when, I hope, we are in government in future—but Amendment 1 would add

“the purpose of compliance with the rule of law to that of deterrence”,

and Amendment 2 says:

“The second purpose is to ensure compliance with the domestic and international rule of law”.


That is the fundamental point. Any Bill we pass into law should be compliant with international law. That is why our country has such standing across the world. What on earth are we doing? The UNHCR has said that the Bill is not compliant with the refugee convention, and that is why Amendments 1 and 2 are so important. Do we not care that the UNHCR has said that? Is it of no consequence to us? Have we gone beyond caring? Are we not bothered? Are we saying it is simply an irrelevance? If that is so, I honestly cannot believe that that is the way we want our country to go.

What are we doing? Ministers have stood at the Dispatch Box and said, with respect to Putin and Ukraine, that we are not going to stand for someone driving a coach and horses through the international rules-based order. That is what the country has always stood for and what we are proud of. Therefore, we are going to continue that tradition. We are right to do so. Why are we taking action against the Houthis in the Red Sea? Last week, I heard the Minister, the noble Earl, Lord Minto, say that it was because are not going to allow a group of terrorists to hold the world’s trading system to ransom and break every single rule of the international rules-based order.

These are the rules we adhere to and conventions we have signed. As a sovereign Parliament, we took the decision that, in certain areas of international life, it is better to pool sovereignty and stand together; that is the way to overcome common problems, not to retreat into your own country. That is why the compliance with international law is important. The amendments in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, the most reverend Primate the Archbishop of Canterbury, the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and others, seek to say—as a point of principle—that a Bill dealing with migration, refugees, asylum or whatever should comply with international law.

I am astonished and astounded and find it unbelievable that His Majesty’s Government have to be reminded that we want our Government to comply with international law. I would have thought that was a statement of the obvious. I would have thought it was something around which we could unite, no matter our party or faith. We could have stood together and said that is why we are proud of our country.

What are we going to say when we go to the United Nations, the Council of Europe, the Commonwealth, the EU—if we still have talks with it—NATO or any other part of the world where there is an international organisation? How on earth can we lecture those people about conforming to the international rules-based order when we are prepared to drive a coach and horses through it ourselves? That is why much of what the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and many others have said in their amendments is so important. The Government may dismiss it, but they will not win the argument on this one.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in the debate. The overriding purpose of the Bill is to ensure that Parliament’s sovereign view that Rwanda is a safe country is accepted and interpreted by the courts to prevent legal challenges which seek to delay removals and prevent us from taking control of our borders.

Amendments 3 and 7, in the name of my noble friend Lord Hailsham, suggest that the legislation is replacing a judicial finding of fact. The Government respect the decision of the Supreme Court in its judgment. However, the judgment was based on information provided to the court on Rwanda up until summer 2022. Their Lordships recognised, explicitly and in terms, that those deficiencies could be addressed in future.

In response, the Home Secretary signed a new, internationally binding treaty between the United Kingdom and the Government of Rwanda, which responds to and resolves the concerns raised by the court. Alongside the treaty, the Government have also introduced the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill, which buttresses the treaty, and supports the relocation of a person to Rwanda under the Immigration Acts.

It is our view that Parliament and the Government are appropriately equipped to address the sensitive policy issues involved in this legislation and, ultimately, tackle the major global challenge of illegal migration.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, my Amendments 64 and 65 seek to address the problem that all noble Lords have been seeking to address: Clause 1(2)(b), which basically says that Rwanda is a safe country. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, was quite right, when moving his Amendment 6, to point out that the word “is” is absolutely fundamental to the meaning of the Bill and is why there is such a debate among your Lordships.

The Government are stating that Rwanda is safe, but all the evidence points to it perhaps becoming safe in the future or, in the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, “working towards” being safe. That is not the same as “is” safe, which is the fundamental dilemma. I say to the Government that if something is completely and utterly wrong—such as the use of the present tense when it should be a future tense—it does not matter what you do, you simply cannot answer the questions that are being put. Two and two has to make four, yet the Government are arguing that two and two is three. It is ridiculous, it is nonsense, and it will not stand up.

I do not mind if my Amendments 64 and 65 are not legally watertight. I accept that. I am not sure the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, is the best amendment, though I am sure it will be legally watertight. The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has proposed an independent reviewer. There can be a debate between us as to which is the best option, and there may be other, better options. I would prefer that the whole Bill was opposed and defeated, but we have said we are not going to block or delay it. I know it is disappointing to some, but that is the reality of where we are.

What we are seeking to do, therefore, is to work with others to mitigate the impact and improve the Bill. However, the Government’s response so far has been to say that all the criticisms are not correct and Rwanda is safe because we are legislating to say it is; the rest of the debate and the very reasonable points that are being put forward are dismissed. I am sure when the Minister replies, he will—unless I am mistaken —have a brief which says that the monitoring committee has established in Article 15 of the treaty and there is no need for any of this to be included.

That way lies a legislative impasse. We are asking the Government to listen to what is being put forward. The real question of the debate is not whether Amendment 6, 16 or 64 is better, but what are the Government going to do in response to the legitimate criticisms being made? We want some sort of mechanism to understand how the Government are going to implement the treaty and ensure that implementation is successful. What happens if it is not? What happens if the obligations are put forward but not achieved?

The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, asked: if Clause 1(2)(b) is right, why do you need Clause 1(3)? The Minister could not answer her question because Clause 1(3) sets out the future obligations on Rwanda, whereas Clause 1(2)(b) says that there is no need for those obligations because it is already safe. The Bill contradicts itself, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, pointed out. However, all the Government say is that we are wrong and they are right and so they are going to carry on. That is no way to legislate. The Government want their Rwanda Bill, so they are going to get their Rwanda Bill. The least they can do, however, is listen to what people are saying and make the Bill make sense and actually do what it says it will.

As for my Amendment 64, I am perfectly willing to look and see whether other amendments are better or whether there is a better way of doing this. The real question is: are the Government simply going to dig in and refuse any amendment or appeal to them to make the Bill more logical than it currently is? I say to the Minister that we will have to come back to this on Report. It is clearly important for us, in deciding how we do that, to hear what the Government have to say.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for speaking in this group, and in particular the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for his introduction.

The UK and Rwanda entered into the migration and economic development partnership with a commitment to develop new ways of managing flows of irregular migration by promoting durable solutions, and so breaking the existing incentives that make people embark on dangerous journeys to the UK. The UK and the Government of Rwanda have a shared vision regarding the necessity for the global community to enhance international protection for asylum seekers and refugees, underlining the importance of effective and operational systems that provide protection to those most in need.

This partnership is part of a suite of measures to tackle illegal migration and builds on wider collaboration with Rwanda on many shared issues. As I have set out previously, we have assurances from the Government of Rwanda that the implementation of all measures within the treaty will be expedited. The treaty itself will follow the usual process with regards to scrutiny and ratification. I say to the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Norwich that I am afraid I cannot improve on that, and I will continue to defer to the Home Secretary.

I would like to provide reassurance to noble Lords that the treaty enhances the role of the previously established independent monitoring committee, which will ensure that obligations under the treaty are adhered to in practice and will be able to take steps to address any concerns at an early stage. Therefore, the Government argue that the amendments in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, are not necessary, although I of course take his points about words. As the noble and learned Lord said, the Bill reflects the strength of the Government of Rwanda’s protections and commitments given in the treaty to people relocated to Rwanda in accordance with the treaty. It addresses the point made by the Supreme Court that Rwanda’s systems could be strengthened, on the basis of the facts before the Supreme Court at the time.

Amendment 14 in particular would impose a requirement for the joint committee for the migration and economic development partnership to provide a declaration to the Secretary of State confirming that the mechanisms specified in Article 2 of the treaty have been implemented. Without such a declaration, the effect of the amendment would be that the treaty could not be regarded as fully implemented. This is unnecessary. We have assurances from the Government of Rwanda that the implementation of all measures within the treaty will be expedited.

I turn to Amendments 15, 16, 77, 83 and 88 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and Amendments 64 and 65 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. The monitoring committee is independent of both the UK and Rwandan Governments. It was established under the memorandum of understanding that originally underpinned the partnership. The treaty enhances the monitoring committee’s role. Article 15 of the treaty provides that the UK and Rwanda must establish and maintain a monitoring committee for the duration of the term of the agreement. This means that both parties are obliged to ensure that the monitoring committee continues in operation for the life of the agreement, and this obligation is binding in international law.

The Government have already established robust reporting mechanisms. The monitoring committee’s terms of reference and enhanced monitoring plan are available publicly on GOV.UK. They set out that, during the period of enhanced monitoring, the monitoring committee will report to the joint committee, which is made up of both UK and Rwandan officials—as set out in Article 15(4)(b)—in accordance with an agreed action plan, which will include weekly and bi-weekly reporting as required.

It would be helpful to go into more detail on this. The treaty includes enhanced provisions to provide real-time independent scrutiny of Rwanda’s asylum procedures, aimed at preventing the risk of mistreatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR before it has the chance to occur. This addresses the findings in the Supreme Court proceedings that under the previous arrangements, as set out in the memorandum of understanding, the work of the monitoring committee would necessarily be retrospective.

In addition, the new provision of the monitoring committee’s own complaints system will allow relocated individuals and their legal adviser to make direct and confidential complaints regarding any alleged failure to comply with the obligations in the agreement. That enhanced phase will ensure that monitoring and reporting take place in real time, so that the monitoring committee can rapidly identify, address and respond to any shortcomings or failures to comply with the obligations in the agreement, identify areas for improvement, or urgently escalate issues prior to any shortcomings or breaches placing a relocated individual at risk of real harm. That will include reporting to the joint committee co-chairs within 24 hours in emergency or urgent situations.

As per Article 15(4)(c) of the treaty, the monitoring committee will make any recommendations to the joint committee that it sees fit. The monitoring committee will otherwise produce a formal written report for the joint committee on a quarterly basis over the first two years of the partnership, setting out its findings and making any recommendations. Following notification to the joint committee, the monitoring committee may publish reports on its findings as it sees fit. At least once a year, it will produce a summary report for publication. We consequently consider these arrangements, which have been carefully agreed with the Government of Rwanda and will be binding in international law, to be sufficient to ensure continued compliance with all the terms of the treaty.

Finally, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, for his Amendments 8 and 72. Clause 1 sets out the obligations to which the Government of Rwanda have committed under the new treaty. The proposal in these amendments does not reflect the arrangements under the treaty. Requiring persons whose claims are successful in Rwanda to be returned to the UK would be against the spirit and intention of the treaty and the partnership. Those relocated to Rwanda are not intended to be returned to the UK, except in very limited circumstances.

It is the Government of Rwanda who will grant refugee status to those relocated to Rwanda through the treaty, which will underpin the migration and economic development partnership, not the UK Government. The grant of refugee status in Rwanda does not confer on that person any rights in the UK, as would be the case for any other person granted refugee status in Rwanda who had not been relocated from the UK. Anyone who wishes to come to the UK in future would have to apply through legal routes—through a work or family route. However, there would be no guarantee that they would be accepted.

As my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth noted, relocating asylum seekers to a safe third country to process their claim is compliant with the UK’s obligations under the refugee convention, as confirmed by the High Court and the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court did not disturb that finding.

Emergency Services Network: Critical Communications System

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Monday 29th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I suppose this could have been spotted earlier, but the fact is that Motorola’s dual role in it arose as a result of the company acquiring Airwave at the same time as it was awarded the contract for ESN, so the Home Office’s options at that point were limited. We sought to agree measures to protect the delivery of ESN and, when it became clear that those measures were insufficient, the Home Office raised its concerns with the Competition and Markets Authority. As for future suppliers, the contracts will be awarded later this year, and I shall make sure that the noble Lord’s concerns are reflected.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, the Government are supposed to be introducing a new emergency services network, but, as my noble friend pointed out, what the Minister has said leaves us all still bewildered about the actual implementation date. Perhaps he can tell us. The original date was 2017, but the implementation date is what everyone wants to know. When is it going to be working? When are we going to know that we have a new emergency services network? From what I could see, the Home Office stated that it would be 2029. Is that still correct? In other words, when can we actually have the new emergency services network promised by the Government?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I obviously cannot answer that question as precisely as the noble Lord would like. Yes, 2029 is an aspiration, partly because of the functionality of Airwave, to which I have already referred. However, some aspects of ESN are already live. Three ESN products have gone live in the past two years: 4G data connectivity for vehicles, which is called Connect; push-to-talk and messaging capability on smartphones, Direct 1 and Direct 2; and a device that can monitor and assess coverage on the move. Significant work has gone into the EAS, which is blanket coverage across the country, while much of the hardware has already been put in place. The noble Lord draws far too bleak a picture.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Report stage
Tuesday 23rd January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his continued engagement with us on all aspects of this important Bill. I would be grateful if he could pass that on to his officials as well. I wish the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, well with her knee, and I hope she will soon be able to make do without the crutch.

I very much support what my noble friends Lord West and Lord Murphy said about the amendments moved by my noble friend Lord West regarding the ISC. I look forward to the Minister’s response. I will come to my amendments in a moment, but it goes to the heart of what many of us have been saying—that the Intelligence and Security Committee is extremely important. Part of the problem is that, when the Minister responds to us on these points, he often says, “Don’t worry: there’s ministerial oversight”. However, what my noble friends have talked about is that this is not the same as parliamentary oversight. There is an important distinction to be made. I hope that the Minister can respond to that.

I turn to the noble Lord, Lord Fox, and his amendments. Again, we thank the Government for the communication we have had regarding Amendments 1 and 7. As I have intimated before, we support the noble Lord, Lord Fox, on his Amendments 1 and 7. With the addition of the low/no datasets authorisation and third-party data warrants to the bulk personal datasets warrants regime, and the extension of powers that this represents, it seems appropriate that additional safeguards are put in place to ensure the judicial commissioner is informed as quickly as possible of the use of these urgent warrants. Importantly, that does not change how long the judicial commissioner has to consider the warrant, and to revoke access if necessary; it is just on the importance of notification as quickly as possible. If urgent powers, as the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, has pointed to, need to be used, nobody is suggesting that they are not used; the suggestion is that the notification to the judicial commissioner should be made as soon as possible and, with respect to the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Fox, within 24 hours.

I turn to my Amendment 47. This amendment aims to try to get the Minister to put some of this on the record, rather than to seek to divide the House on it. Amendment 47 seeks to ensure that the Government report on the potential impact of the Bill on the requirement to maintain data adequacy decisions from the EU. The adequacy agreement is dependent on the overall landscape of UK data protections. Although the UK protections are currently considered adequate, deviations from this under this legislation could put our current status at risk. Losing this designation would have serious consequences for digitally intensive sectors, such as telecommunications and financial services as well as tech services. In his response, could the Minister provide some reassurances on this particular aspect of the legislation and say whether any specific analysis has been done on the impacts of the Bill on the data adequacy agreement?

I turn to my Amendment 5, which, just for clarity, is a probing amendment but is extremely important. The Minister will know that I have raised this point again and again on various pieces of legislation over the last year or two. To be fair, the Minister has said that he will raise it with the appropriate people, and I am sure that he has done that—I am not questioning that at all. As the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, said, and the Intelligence and Security Committee said in its report of 5 December 2023—hence my Amendment 5 to probe this—no meeting between the Prime Minister of our country and the Intelligence and Security Committee has taken place since December 2014. I am pleased that we have the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, here—not present in the Chamber now, but here within your Lordships’ House—because he was the last Prime Minister that met with the committee. I find it absolutely astonishing that that is the case.

We are informed by the committee that many invitations have been made to various Prime Ministers to attend the Intelligence and Security Committee. I do not want to go on about this—well, I will to an extent—but it is incredibly important. I cannot believe—people say that it cannot be right, and I show them the report—that it has been 10 years since a Prime Minister has gone to the body, which has been set up by Parliament to ensure there is liaison between Parliament and the intelligence and security services. Obviously, matters can be discussed in that committee. Some of those cannot be discussed in the open, but that is one way in which it is held to account.

Can the Minister explain what on earth is going on? Why is it so difficult for the Prime Minister to meet the committee? I am not intending to push this amendment to a vote, as I say, and I am sure the Minister will try to explain again, but it is simply unacceptable that the Prime Minister of this country has not met the ISC for 10 years. For the first 20 years of its existence, and my noble friend Lord West will correct me if I am wrong, I think it was an annual occurrence that the Prime Minister met the ISC—my noble friend Lord Murphy is nodding—yet that has not happened since 2014. That is unacceptable, and my Amendment 5 seeks to ask the Minister what on earth we are going to do to try to get the Prime Minister to attend. I would not have thought that was too much to ask.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I have listened with interest to the points made in this debate. As noble Lords will be aware, we have considered carefully the amendments that have been debated. I place on record my thanks to the noble Lords, Lord West, Lord Coaker and Lord Fox, for their constructive engagement in the run-up to today’s debate on these issues and various others that will be debated later today.

I turn first to the topic of oversight of the new Part 7A regime containing bulk personal datasets, BPDs, where there is low or no expectation of privacy. Alongside the proportionate set of safeguards set out in Part 7A, the Bill currently provides for executive political oversight and accountability by requiring the heads of the intelligence services to provide an annual report to the Secretary of State about Part 7A datasets. The intention of the report is to ensure that there is a statutory mechanism for political oversight, given that the Secretary of State will not have a role in Part 7A authorisations. That is set out in new Section 226DA in Clause 2 of the Bill.

The Investigatory Powers Commissioner will continue to provide full, independent and robust oversight of the investigatory powers regime, including this new part. Nevertheless, the Government have listened to the points made by noble Lords and colleagues in the other place, and we understand their concerns about increasing parliamentary oversight. Government Amendment 4 therefore recognises the important role of the ISC in providing parliamentary oversight of the intelligence services. It places a statutory obligation on the Secretary of State to provide the ISC with an annual report containing information about category authorisations granted under the Act during the year. The amendment will ensure that the ISC is proactively provided with information about the operation of Part 7A on an annual basis. That will support the ISC in continuing to fulfil its scrutiny role and will enhance the valuable parliamentary oversight the committee provides.

It is appropriate for the ISC to be privy to certain information relating to Part 7A in the exercise of its functions, and that a statutory obligation be placed on the Secretary of State to provide it. This obligation is intended to be consistent with the provisions set out in the Justice and Security Act, and due regard will be had to the memorandum of understanding between the Prime Minister and the ISC when meeting it. It is likely that Amendments 2 and 3, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, which would require that the report provided to the Secretary of State be also shared with the ISC, would not be in step with that. The information required by the Secretary of State to fulfil their responsibilities in respect of the intelligence services will not necessarily be the same as that which would assist the ISC in performing its functions. The report will almost certainly contain information about live operations, which is outside the scope of the ISC’s remit, as well as other information that it may not be appropriate to share with the ISC and which the Secretary of State could properly withhold from the ISC were the ISC to request it.

For that reason, we think it more appropriate that a report be written to meet the ISC’s functions that the Secretary of State will send to the ISC. This will provide the additional parliamentary oversight the committee is seeking and would be akin to the existing arrangements in place for operational purposes.

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[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for giving way, because this is an extremely important point. He mentioned with respect to my Amendment 5 that somebody will formally reach out. Does that mean that the Prime Minister will formally reach out to the ISC and meet with it, so that we get a resolution to this non-meeting?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I cannot say whether or not that someone will be the Prime Minister at the moment.

As I said, the Government are clear that the MoU review is the correct forum to discuss relevant potential changes to the agreement between the Prime Minister and the ISC. But the Government do not believe a report of this kind is appropriate or necessary and do not support the amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has already answered the question from the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, and all I can say from the Dispatch Box is that I will try again.

I turn to the second of the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, Amendment 47, which would require the Government to publish a report assessing the potential impact of this legislation on the EU’s data adequacy decision. The Government are committed to maintaining their data adequacy decisions from the EU, which play a pivotal role in enabling trade and fighting crime. The Home Office worked closely with the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology when developing the proposals within this Bill to ensure that they would not adversely impact on the UK’s EU data adequacy decisions. As the European Commission has made clear, a third country is not required to have the same rules as the EU to be considered adequate. We maintain regular engagement with the European Commission on the Bill to ensure that our reforms are understood. Ultimately, the EU adequacy assessment of the UK is for the EU to decide, so the Government cannot support this amendment.

I turn to the amendments retabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, on urgency provisions for individual authorisations under Part 7A and third party dataset warrants under Part 7B. The Government remain opposed to these iterations of the amendments for the following reasons. Urgency provisions are found throughout the IPA and the Government’s approach is to mirror those provisions in the regimes in new Part 7A and new Part 7B. Making the proposed amendment solely for these parts would reduce consistency—as the noble Lord, Lord Fox, predicted—and ultimately risk operational confusion where there is no good reason to do so.

It will always be in the interests of the relevant intelligence service—as the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham- Buller, said; I add my comments to those of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, about a speedy recovery—to notify a judicial commissioner of the granting of an urgent authorisation or the issuing of an urgent warrant as soon as is reasonably practicable. These urgent instruments are valid only for five working days. A judicial commissioner must review and decide whether to approve the decision to issue or grant the instrument within three working days. If the judicial commissioner refuses to approve the decision within that time, then the instrument will cease to have effect. It would be counter- intuitive for an intelligence service to make untimely notifications, as this increases the risk of the urgent authorisation or warrant timing out because the judicial commissioner is left without sufficient time to make a decision.

In an operational scenario where the urgency provisions are required, such as a threat to life or risk of serious harm, or an urgent intelligence-gathering opportunity, it may not be practical or possible for the intelligence services to ensure completion of paperwork within a 24-hour period, as the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham- Buller, explained rather more eloquently than I have done.

The intelligence services work closely with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office to ensure that the processes for reviewing decisions are timely and work for judicial commissioners. For those reasons, I ask that the noble Lord, Lord Fox, does not press his amendments.

This group also includes the two modest but worthwhile government amendments, Amendments 8 and 9. These make it clear beyond doubt that the new third party BPD regime will fall under the oversight of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. The robust oversight that IPCO brings will ensure compliance, ensuring that robust safeguards are in place when information is examined by the intelligence services on third parties’ systems. I hope that noble Lords will welcome these amendments and support them.

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[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I do not have much to add to the debate. From these Benches, we fully support the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord West, and the excellent way in which he presented them. They have the support of the whole ISC, which in this respect has done a great service to us all in taking forward the discussion. These amendments certainly improve the Bill.

The point that the noble Lord, Lord West, made is exceptionally important—the fact that this has to be in the Bill, and that we need it to guide us in how we take this forward. For those who read our proceedings, it is important to repeat that what we are discussing here is the interception of communications of parliamentarians, and the fact that the triple lock was introduced to give additional protection to that. The role of the Prime Minister becomes crucial in that, for obvious reasons.

I join others in thanking the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for the way in which he has presented his arguments, and the discussions and debates that have gone on in this Chamber and outside it. He has done a great service to all of us by tabling what seems on the face of it a simple amendment—simply changing one word, from “unavailable” to “unable”—but is actually of huge significance. We have concerns about it, which we have expressed in this Chamber and elsewhere— indeed, the noble Lord, Lord West, explained them. Notwithstanding the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and others, we are worried about where it takes us with respect to conflicts of interest, and who decides that there is a conflict of interest for the Prime Minister in circumstances in which the Prime Minister themself does not recognise that there is a conflict of interest. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, and others, that there may be a need for this discussion to continue—but who decides whether the Prime Minister has a conflict of interest, if the Prime Minister themself does not recognise that, is an important discussion to have. In the end, the system rests on the integrity of the Prime Minister.

The way in which the ISC has tried to bring forward some conditions to what “unavailable” means is extremely important, and we support that, as indeed we support the amendments that try to ensure that those who take decisions are those various Secretaries of State who may be designated under the Bill to take decisions, should the Prime Minister be unavailable. It is extremely important for those Secretaries of State to have experience of the use of those warrants. Again, the amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord West, deal with that, and we are very happy to support them.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I offer my thanks to the noble Lords, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, Lord Fox, and Lord West of Spithead, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for their amendments and for the points that they have raised during this debate. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Evans, for his perspective, and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, for supporting the Government, which obviously I hope becomes a habit.

I have discussed the triple lock at length with noble Lords and many others in Parliament and across government. We are all in agreement that this is a matter of the utmost importance, and it is imperative that we ensure that the triple lock operates correctly. That means that the triple-lock process, when needed urgently, has the resilience to continue in the most exceptional circumstances, when the Prime Minister is genuinely unavailable, while ensuring that the alternative approvals process is tightly and appropriately defined.

On Amendment 40, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for the valuable engagement he has taken part in with my ministerial colleagues, Home Office officials and me regarding this amendment. I take this opportunity to explain why the Government do not support this amendment. The expressed intention of the noble Lord’s amendment is twofold: first to tighten the requirement in the current clauses, which use the word “unavailable”; and, secondly, to introduce a potential provision for dealing with a conflict of interest, as one of the circumstances in which the alternative approvals process could be used.

There is certainly merit in limiting the circumstances in which the alternative approvals process may be used. However, the noble Lord’s amendment introduces the requirement for a judgment to be made on the Prime Minister’s ability to consider a warrant application, for any number of reasons, including conflict of interest. This raises a number of challenges.

The first challenge is that “unable” draws into the legislation the principle of ministerial conflict of interest. This poses a constitutional tension and a challenge to Cabinet hierarchy. The inclusion of “unable” would allow for someone other than the Prime Minister to decide whether the Prime Minister is subject to a conflict of interest in a particular scenario, which goes against clear constitutional principles regarding the Prime Minister’s powers. This would be a subjective decision on the Prime Minister’s ability, rather than an objective decision on his availability.

As such, rather than strengthening the current drafting, the amendment as proposed could be considered to constitute a watering down of the triple lock, in that it was always designed to be exercised by the Prime Minister. Someone else making a decision about whether the Prime Minister is able to make a decision, given they can be said to be available and therefore technically able to consider an application, risks the intention of the triple lock. As drafted, the original clauses require a binary decision to be made about whether the Prime Minister is available or not, whereas, in deciding whether the Prime Minister may have a conflict of interest, a judgment must be made which is not binary and therefore has much less legal clarity.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, asked me if it is right that the Government believe that it is proper for the Prime Minister to consider a warrant application relating to the Prime Minister’s own communications. The best answer I can give is that the Bill is intended not to tackle issues relating to Prime Ministerial conflicts of interest, but rather to improve the resilience of the warrantry process. Conflict of interest provisions and considerations relating to propriety and ethics are therefore not properly for consideration under this Bill. The Prime Minister is expected, as are all Ministers, to uphold the Nolan principles in public life. For these reasons, the Government cannot support this amendment.

The Government have, however, recognised the concerns expressed by Members of both Houses, and the seeming consensus that a more specific, higher bar should be set with relation to the circumstances in which the alternative approvals process may be used. This high bar is of particular importance because of the seriousness of using these capabilities against Members of relevant legislatures. We accept that we are not above the law and it is appropriate for it to be possible for us to be subject to properly authorised investigatory powers. However, it is right that the significance that this issue was given in the original drafting of the Investigatory Powers Act is respected, and the communications of our fellow representatives are properly safeguarded.

I therefore thank the noble Lord, Lord West of Spithead, for his amendments, and for the close engagement on this Bill which I, the Security Minister and my officials have had with the members and secretariat of the Intelligence and Security Committee. Following engagement with Members of both Houses on these amendments, it is clear that there is good consensus for these measures, and the Government will not be opposing them today. While they will reduce the flexibility of the current drafting somewhat, the Government agree that these amendments strike an important and delicate balance between providing the flexibility and resilience that the triple-lock process requires, while providing the legal clarity and specificity to allow for its effective use. The amendments will also provide further confidence to members of relevant legislatures, including those of this House, that the protection and safeguarding of their communications is of paramount importance.

I should note that the Government do not quite agree with the precise drafting of these amendments, and we expect to make some clarifications and improvements in the other place, particularly to the references to routine duties under Sections 19 and 102 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, but I am happy that we seem to have reached broad agreement today.

Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2024

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Thursday 18th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for opening the debate today clearly and concisely, and I agree with much of what the noble Lords, Lord Polak and Lord Purvis, said.

Today’s proscription order is underpinned by the exceptional men and women who serve in our intelligence and security services, in government and in our police. They work tirelessly to keep our country safe. We are extremely fortunate to have them. Keeping our country safe is the first duty of government and a common cause that we share and all treat with the utmost seriousness. On that basis, it is vital, as the Minister knows, that the Government and His Majesty’s Opposition work in the national interest on these crucial issues.

As the Minister laid out, this order will amend Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000 to add Hizb ut-Tahrir to the list of proscribed organisations. Doing so will make it a criminal offence to belong to Hizb ut-Tahrir, to engage in activities such as attending meetings, to promote support for the group or to display its logo. After years of serious and increasing concern about Hizb ut-Tahrir’s activity in the UK, His Majesty’s Opposition strongly support its proscription. It is a necessary step to effectively counter its hateful extremism and divisive rhetoric, which threatens the safety and security of our country. As the Minister outlined, proscription of this international terrorist organisation comes after other countries, including Germany, have already banned it.

Hizb ut-Tahrir has been proscribed now because of its escalating activity in the aftermath of Hamas’s barbaric terrorist attack on Israel. Unlike the condemnation of these attacks by the vast majority of Muslims here in the UK, who are just as horrified as the rest of us, Hizb ut-Tahrir Britain glorified as heroes the Hamas terrorists who revelled in acts of indiscriminate violence against civilians. Again, unlike the deep sorrow and outrage the British people shared with the Israeli people in the aftermath of 7 October, Hizb ut-Tahrir boasted of its euphoria on the news of this appalling and tragic loss of life.

There is no place on Britain’s streets for vile anti-Semitism. There is no place on Britain’s streets for those who incite violence and glorify terrorism. There is no place on Britain’s streets for Hizb ut-Tahrir. This terrorist group peddles hate, glorifies violence and is hostile not only to our values but to the common sense of humanity. As the noble Lord, Lord Polak, mentioned, there is nothing new about its divisive and poisonous rhetoric, which has been widely recorded for over two decades in the UK, long before the horrific attacks of 7 October. Organisations such as the Community Security Trust, the Antisemitism Policy Trust and the Union of Jewish Students have long raised serious concerns about Hizb ut-Tahrir’s anti-Semitism, alongside its misogynistic and homophobic hate speech, which provides a channel for extremism. We have already heard that that is why previous Prime Ministers, Home Secretaries and Security Ministers have considered proscribing Hizb ut-Tahrir, but its activities were not recognised as sufficient under the definition of terrorism in Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 until now.

Given for how long these matters have been debated and considered, I would be grateful if the Minister could answer some questions when he responds. To start with, does he think that there are lessons to be learned regarding the length of time it has taken to proscribe this organisation? Does he believe that the current proscription process is robust enough to counter threats to our national security, and can he say when it became a proportionate response in this case as well as in others? Can he say whether other bodies, as we have heard, are under consideration for proscription, given the various global threats we face? Is the speed of decision-making up to the task? In particular, and he will know that we have asked for this, does he agree that a bespoke proscription mechanism for state-sponsored organisations is now required—something that, as I say, His Majesty’s Opposition, along with others, have called for?

Countering threats to our national security requires joined-up government working, but the counter-extremism strategy has not been updated since 2015, with important elements of policy around community cohesion now the responsibility of the Levelling-Up Secretary. Given the significance of these matters, can the Minister tell the House when the Government will bring forward a new definition of hateful extremism? Can he confirm whether his department will update the counter-extremism strategy, as my right honourable friend the shadow Home Secretary has called for?

To conclude, proscribing Hizb ut-Tahrir is the right thing to do for our national security. For too long, the public have been exposed to its extremist ideology, its glorification of terrorist activity and its core aim of overthrowing our democratic system of government to replace it with an Islamist theocracy. If left alone, extremism can and will spread insidiously and spread deceit deep into our national conversation. No Government must ever relent in their determination to ensure that we are always one step ahead of those who seek to harm or to undermine our way of life. We must always be on the side of the public we seek to serve and protect. That is why we strongly support the Government’s actions in taking forward the proscription order before us.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the three noble Lords who have contributed to the debate. I would very much like to associate myself with the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, thanking our security services and our police forces, and those in government—many of whom are, as noble Lords will be aware, in the Home Office—who are very engaged in this subject, and who keep us safe.

I shall do my best to address as many as possible of the points that have been made. If I miss anything, I will, of course, commit to write—and just to reassure the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, I can say that a letter is on its way.

I shall briefly give the House some key facts, in terms of the number of organisations proscribed in this country. There are currently 79 proscribed terrorist organisations, in addition to the 14 Northern Ireland-related terrorist organisations that were proscribed before 2000, and 38 terrorist groups have been proscribed since 2010—a very depressing statistic indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, noted. The most recent proscription order came into force in September 2022, when the Wagner group was proscribed. I think all the noble Lords here participated in that debate.

Of course, the Government will always consider the full range of powers available to tackle threats on our soil or against our people and interests. We will continue to make use of our counterterrorism powers, including the proscription tool, where appropriate, to tackle the modern threats we face. The work on that is ongoing. I acknowledge the bespoke proscription tool for state threats, as asked for by the noble Lord. Obviously, I cannot comment on that, but the National Security Act, which came into force last year, provides robust powers to deal with the complex state threats that the UK faces in a broader context. I am aware of his ongoing interest in this, and I am sure I will continue to engage in discussion with him about it.

The barriers for proscription, and the qualifications and tests, are robust. As I said in my opening remarks, they are governed by the Terrorism Act 2000, and it might be worth going through them for the record. The Home Secretary may proscribe an organisation if he believes it is concerned in terrorism, and this means that the organisation

“commits or participates in acts of terrorism … prepares for terrorism … promotes or encourages terrorism (including the unlawful glorification of terrorism); or … is otherwise concerned in terrorism… If the statutory test is met, there are other factors which the Home Secretary must take into account when deciding whether or not to exercise the discretion”.

Those factors include

“the nature and scale of an organisation’s activities … the specific threat that it poses to the UK … the specific threat that it poses to British nationals overseas … the extent of the organisation’s presence in the UK; and … the need to support other members of the international community in the global fight against terrorism”.

The Home Secretary will exercise his power to proscribe only after thoroughly reviewing the available evidence on an organisation. This includes information taken from both open sources and sensitive intelligence, as well as advice that reflects consultation across government.

That brings me to the question asked by my noble friend Lord Polak, which is: why has it taken so long? I have explained how the Home Secretary must believe that an organisation is concerned in terrorism and, as the House has heard, since the 7 October attack HuT has promoted and encouraged terrorism, and celebrated and praised the 7 October terrorist attacks by Hamas, including in an article that referred to the killing of Jewish tourists by an Egyptian police officer, which I referred to in my opening remarks, as a simple example of what should be done to the Jews.

Elsewhere, HuT has frequently referred to Hamas as the heroes of Palestine, in articles on its website. As has been noted, it has a long history of praising and celebrating attacks against Israel and attacks against Jews more widely. This vile anti-Semitism cannot be decoupled from the statements recently attributed to HuT encouraging and promoting terrorism. But of course, the facts changed after 7 October. I think that explains the decision to act now. When the facts change, we change our minds.

On religious communities, obviously I agree with all noble Lords that the growth in anti-Semitism is extraordinarily concerning. A number of my friends are affected by it and have said that they are now afraid to walk the streets in certain circumstances.

Immigration Detention: Brook House Inquiry

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Thursday 11th January 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, the new contract with Serco to run the Gatwick IRC commenced in May 2020 and runs for an eight-year period. The contract provides increased staffing levels, improved use of modern technology and enhanced investment in resident activity and welfare services. We have strengthened our capacity to provide assurance and oversight of service provision at Gatwick and the rest of the removal estate, including action, as I have just said, to refresh and reinforce whistleblowing arrangements, improve information flows and analysis of complaints and address incidents and use of force. As regards the drugs point, the Government will be responding to the report in due course.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, in his original Answer, the Minister said that the Government are carefully considering the Brook House inquiry report and will respond in due course. Why has the Minister therefore told us that they have already come to the conclusion that they will ignore what the Brook House inquiry said, namely that there should be a 28-day limit on immigration detention? As my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti pointed out, that means that so-called immigration offenders are treated worse than terrorists.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

That is not what I said; I said that the Government are considering the report. The cross-government working group, chaired by the director of detention services at the Home Office, is considering the report and all the recommendations, including those with wider applicability across the detention estate. As regards the 28 days, I go back to what I said earlier: in particular, we think that this would impair our ability to remove those who have breached immigration laws and refused to leave the UK voluntarily. That would particularly place the community at risk, especially if foreign national offenders were released into the community. As I say, though, the vast majority are released within 28 days anyway.

Refugees: Notice Period for Home Office Accommodation

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Monday 18th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, there are a number of things that we are doing. We have local authority liaison officers who provide a specific point of contact for local authorities, particularly for urgent discontinuation-related inquiries. There are significant improvements in train to ensure that local authorities receive early notification of those who are being granted and leaving Home Office accommodation and supporting those customers through the move-on process following a positive decision. Following notification of a service decision, accommodation providers will notify local authorities within two days. We also share relevant data in the form of heat maps and various other macro data, if you will, to ensure effective planning.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, notwithstanding what the Minister has just told us, the reality for many refugees with newly granted status is that they are required to leave their accommodation, often within seven days from being given a notice to quit. That means they are forced to go to their local authorities and many of them are homeless or on the streets. That is the reality, and it is the result of government policy. All the Minister tells us is that everything is fine, but it is not. It needs sorting out.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord is right that they get seven days from the notice to quit, but they get 28 days from the issue of the biometric residence permit, so it is not quite right.

Pakistan: Afghans Eligible for Resettlement in UK

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Monday 18th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Baroness is right that that policy has been suspended for the time being. I do not have the number of visas issued but, as of the end of September 2023, the total number of arrivals from Afghanistan or a third country was around 24,600. A lot have arrived in the last few weeks, so I do not know the final numbers, which are still provisional.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I think the Minister said that the Government do not give a running commentary on the figures. However, the Minister for the Armed Forces said in the other place:

“There are around 2,000 people in Afghanistan who we need to move out and around 1,800 left in Pakistan who we need to bring in”.—[Official Report, 11/12/23; col. 635.]


Can the Minister comment on those figures? Will the schemes we are discussing deal with those 3,800 people? As the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, said, they need urgently to be brought back to this country because they served with us.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord is quite right. I did not say that we do not give a running commentary; I said that the information is operational and changes on a regular basis. The Minister for Veterans’ Affairs stated that we aimed to relocate 2,800 ARAP-eligible Afghans before the end of 2023; I am pleased to be able to say that we are on course to achieve that.

Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Committee stage
Wednesday 13th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am happy to acknowledge that the noble Lord is right: their powers have expanded, as have their influence and celebrity over the years. I do not have an answer now, but I will come back to the noble Lord on that.

The objective of these clauses is to provide greater resilience in the process. It is critical that we do not undermine this from the off. I therefore hope noble Lords feel reassured by the explanations given, and the information set out in the draft code of practice, which is the appropriate place to set out the detail of this alternative process.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

May I say to the noble Lord that the answer he gave to me with respect to the Mail on Sunday story was a really good answer? I am seeking transparency, which we will come on to in the next set of amendments, where Ministers can provide it without compromising operational security, as the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, rightly pointed out. The Minister went as far as he could to say that the story needs to be looked at, it raises particular issues and I can pursue those outside of the Chamber. That was an extremely helpful comment and shows what I am trying to get at with respect to transparency—rather than just dismissing it and saying we cannot talk about it. I am very grateful for the response and thought it was very helpful.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to government Amendments 56, 59 and 60. As I set out in my letter to all noble Lords on 4 December, these small amendments will ensure that the legislation works effectively.

Government Amendment 56 amends Schedule 3 to the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 to provide exceptions for disclosures of intercepted materials to inquiries or inquests in Northern Ireland and Scotland into a person’s death. This will create parity with existing provisions for coroners in England and Wales by putting relevant coroners in Northern Ireland and sheriffs investigating deaths in Scotland on the same footing as their counterparts in England and Wales. Where necessary in the interests of justice, intercepted materials can be considered in connection with their inquiry or inquest.

Government Amendments 59 and 60 will maintain the extent of the IPA 2016, as set out in Section 272 of that Act. They amend this existing power to ensure that the measures in the 2016 Act, as amended by this Bill, can be extended to the Isle of Man or the British Overseas Territories, thus ensuring consistency across the legislation. If the Government sought to extend any provision to the Isle of Man or any of the British Overseas Territories, this would require an Order in Council and the Government would, of course, consult the relevant Administrations well in advance. I ask noble Lords to support these amendments.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendments 57 and 58. They are obviously probing amendments but may generate a little discussion because they are none the less important.

Let me begin by saying that I accept absolutely what the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, said about the important of ensuring the secrecy of much of what our security services and others do. That is an important statement of principle, and it was reinforced by my noble friend Lord Murphy when he recounted, as far as he could, some of the responsibility he had in his posts, particularly as Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. It is important to establish that I accept that principle.

Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Codes of Practice) (Revision of Codes A, B, C, D and H and New Code I) Order 2023

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Tuesday 12th December 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his introduction to these revisions to the PACE codes. He outlined the reasons for the changes, which reflect the various provisions of the National Security Act 2023 and the Public Order Act 2023. As such, the various rights and wrongs of the provisions have been debated, and they have been included in primary legislation. There is no need to rehearse these debates, but I will ask some questions about the resulting changes to the PACE codes.

PACE Code A is to be changed to include provisions to improve community relations and data collection. Given the importance, as we heard from the noble Baroness, of confidence and trust around suspicionless stop and search in particular, can the Minister say what these changes are and whether they help deal with issues such as disproportionality and the maintenance of community trust, which we all wish to see in the code? The changes say that they do that, so it would be interesting to know how.

More generally, is there any difference under these codes in the treatment of children or do they apply to everyone regardless of age? Some clarification on that would be helpful. Although the Minister said that these changes come from the National Security Act and the Public Order Act, given some of the questions around the use of stop and search, could other changes be made using this as a vehicle? One example mentioned here is strip-search. We have guidance for strip-search here, but we know what controversy there has been around it. I sometimes wonder whether the machine says, “We’ve had the National Security Act and the Public Order Act, so we need these changes to the PACE code that flow from that”, but there may be a missed opportunity to reflect more widely on some of the issues around what is sensible.

I think the Minister did so, but can he confirm that the stop and search powers in Sections 10 and 11 of the Public Order Act are now fully covered by these revised PACE codes?

The revised codes also include a date for the start of the serious violence reduction order pilot. When will this start and, given that it is a pilot, where will it take place? The Minister in the other place said that this was an updated start date. What caused the delay in the first place? I think the original intention, according to the statement of the Minister in the other place, was for it to start this April.

We support the various changes in the amended codes and the introduction of the new Code I, following the National Security Act 2023. As the Minister helpfully pointed out, the consultation showed that there was general support from not only the police and the CPS but the independent reviewer for the various revisions to the codes in terms of how persons are detained and treated when arrested under terrorism legislation.

Given that terrorism legislation is not devolved, but these PACE codes deal with England and Wales, will the Minister say what discussions have taken place with Northern Ireland—I presume with officials there—and Scotland, and how the PACE codes have been updated? The Minister spent some time talking about the welcome changes that were made to the PACE codes with respect to terrorism, but these codes refer to England and Wales and not to Scotland and Northern Ireland. How has that been dealt with? It would be interesting to hear from the Minister about what has happened there.

PACE Codes A and D are amended so that an officer does not have to give their name in the case of inquiries linked to national security. I understand that—it is for sensible and obvious reasons, as the Government said—but how would it work if somebody wanted to complain or get a review of their treatment? I appreciate that the name should not be given, but could a number be given, or is there some other method by which anonymity could be protected while recognising that sometimes issues arise and somebody may wish to complain or take forward something that has occurred in an interview? They may have been interviewed and perhaps even arrested and then released and wish to make some complaint about it. How will that be dealt with?

We accept these changes and recognise the importance of striking the balance between individual rights and security. Public confidence and trust are everything, even in challenging circumstances. I urge the Government to do everything in their power to ensure that we maintain that confidence and trust with respect to the implementation of this order. We do not oppose these important codes, but some clarifications would be helpful for us all.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their contributions. I will do my best to deal with the points raised.

The noble Lord finished on the subject of whether it is proportionate, in effect, to allow police officers to not give their names in inquiries linked to national security, as per Codes A and D. The Government have amended Codes A and D to exempt officers from having to give their name in cases of inquiries linked to national security, which extends the approach currently taken towards terrorism investigations. It is a crucial change to protect police officers from being obliged to reveal their identity to state actors who may be highly trained and seek to use such knowledge to conduct harmful activity against them. It is difficult to see how an individual might write a complaint against an officer who is interfering with them, but I will look into it, and if I can find anything useful to enlighten the noble Lord, I will come back to him.

The noble Lord also asked whether we have been consulting the devolved Administrations. The answer is yes. We have been consulting them extensively. When PACE Northern Ireland will be published is a matter for the Northern Ireland Executive. However, they are undertaking a review of the PACE Northern Ireland codes of practice and are apparently about to revise them. As soon as I have those revisions, I will let the noble Lord know.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Given that the Executive and the Assembly are not functioning, does he mean that officials are doing that?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I assume so, but I will find out and come back to the noble Lord.

The Government also obtained concurrence from the Lord Advocate for the part of this that applies to Scotland. We engaged with the Scottish Government and Scottish policing throughout the process of creating this code. I believe that one or two of the changes made reflect Scottish policing’s comments on it.

On disproportionality, which was raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, as well as the noble Lord, of course I understand the concerns around disproportionality and the impact of stop and search, particularly on members of the black community. Nobody should be targeted because of their race. Extensive safeguards such as statutory codes of practice and body-worn video exist to ensure this does not happen.

It is worth pointing out that, although disparities in the use of stop and search remain, it is positive that they have continued to decrease for the past four years. The proposals set out in these changes, such as the communication of the suspicionless stop and search authorisation will, in my view, improve the relationship between black and ethnic minority groups and the police. Of course, the phraseology behind that—“where operationally beneficial” in particular—was very carefully considered to sort out this issue.

It is also worth saying that the Home Office now publishes more data than ever before on police powers, including the use of stop and search. As part of the inclusive Britain strategy, the Home Office Race Disparity Unit and Office for National Statistics have worked to improve the way stop and search data is reported and to enable more accurate comparisons to be made between different police force areas. The proposed change on data in this updated code would reflect the power given to the Home Secretary under Section 44 of the Police Act 1996, but this data is collected and published online as part of a statistics bulletin.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked about protections for children. There are safeguards in this code as well. Children detained will have to have an appropriate adult assigned to represent their best interests.

The noble Lord also asked whether there was a delay—there was. It was supposed to be rolled out on 17 January this year but ended up commencing on 19 April. The reason for that was the difficulty of getting the training in place in time. The four pilot areas are the West Midlands, Thames Valley, Merseyside and Sussex.

With that, I think I have answered the questions that were asked of me. I reiterate that the updated and new PACE codes of practice will help the police to use their powers in a proportionate and consistent manner in accordance with the primary legislation. As such, I commend this order to the Committee and thank both noble Lords for their support.

Immigration (Health Charge) (Amendment) Order 2023

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Tuesday 12th December 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank both noble Lords for their contributions to this shortish debate. I will do my very best to answer all their questions and commit to write if there are any that I cannot answer.

Those who move to a new country expect to pay towards healthcare. Countries around the world have a range of systems in place to do this, in line with individual healthcare models. It is right that we continue to prioritise the sustainability of the NHS and that temporary migrants make a financial contribution to NHS services available to them in the UK. Payment of the health charge provides near-comprehensive access to our health service, regardless of the amount of care needed, even for those with pre-existing health conditions.

I shall try to address all the issues raised. The health charge should broadly reflect the cost of treating those who pay it. However, the rates for students and their dependants, applicants to the youth mobility scheme and children under 18 will remain discounted. The increased rate of the health charge is comparable to the cost of private medical insurance here and abroad, which is a common requirement for individuals wishing to migrate to many other countries.

I think both noble Lords referred to the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. We thank it for considering the order and providing a detailed report on the legislation. Before I go into the methodology, I reassure the Committee that the Government have undertaken robust and detailed analysis of the annual cost to the NHS of treating health charge payers to determine the increased cost of the health charge. Increases to the health charge are based on the most recent data representing charge payers’ use of NHS services, more accurately determining the current cost to the NHS of treating health charge payers. The Government acknowledge the delay in providing responses to the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. Unfortunately, this was unavoidable, due to factors such as the changes in ministerial teams and the need for assurances of the responses between departments.

I turn to the methodology and the DHSC calculation. As set out by the Chief Secretary to the Treasury on 13 July, the health charge rates have remained unchanged for the last three years, despite high inflation and wider pressures facing the healthcare system. The increases to the charge reflect the higher costs in healthcare budgets since 2020. Additionally, the assumptions for how intensively charge payers use healthcare services in different settings have been revised to use more recent and representative data intended to better reflect migrants’ use of these NHS services. While the health charge is increasing, it is still considerably lower than the comparable average cost per capita of providing healthcare for the average UK resident, which currently stands at approximately £2,700 per person per annum.

I am aware of concerns around the combined cost of the health charge and visa fees and the impact that this may have on families and young people. The draft order maintains the reduced health charge rate for children, but the Government remain clear that migrants must pay the health charge when they make an immigration application and should plan their finances accordingly. The cost of the health charge and application fees are available online and should not come as a surprise. However, it is also recognised that, in some instances, people who are required to pay the health charge may not be able to afford it. In such instances, on family and human rights immigration routes and where it is backed by clear and compelling evidence provided by the individual, the health charge may be waived.

Where a fee waiver application is successful, the application fee and the health charge will be waived. Migrants who are granted a partial fee waiver are required to pay the application fee only; the health charge is waived in full. All the information about fee waiver applications is publicly available on GOV.UK and has been for a long time.

Evidence suggests that migrants are aware of the fee waiver process due to the volumes of migrants on eligible routes utilising fee waiver applications. For example, in the year ending September 2023, there were 46,470 visa fee waiver applications, which I would argue does not constitute “hardly any”. The Government are also committed to supporting vulnerable cohorts; there are a range of exemptions from the payment of the health charge, including for individuals in protected cohorts. That includes asylum seekers, looked-after children and victims of modern slavery and trafficking. This draft order extends the range of exemptions to migrants applying to the statelessness immigration route and to the Ukraine regime. In answer to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, about the statelessness route, it is basically for migrants who are unable legally to reside in any other country—so very similar to refugees.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The Minister has just correctly defined statelessness and protected cohorts. To those who wrote the Explanatory Memorandum, all this is perfectly obvious, but for people like me and many others who read it, it would be extremely helpful if, instead of putting “protected cohorts”, they could add “such as” and do the same for “statelessness”. It would be helpful if that was done sometimes in an Explanatory Memorandum.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord makes a very strong case for footnotes, and I hope that my officials are paying attention to that.

On the questions raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, about the deterrent effect on migrants, the UK continues to welcome talented individuals from around the world who want to study and work here. It is difficult to isolate the impact of the health charge increase on visa demand, due to the 2020 increase coinciding with the Covid pandemic and EU exit, but evidence from visa applications over the period following the increase to £624 does not suggest any significant impact on application volumes. Visa application volumes are monitored and there remains a substantial demand for visas across the majority of the immigration routes. All fee levels across the immigration system, including the health charge, are kept under review and evaluated where appropriate.

The Government’s science and technology framework sets out 10 key actions to achieve the goal of becoming a science and technology superpower by 2030. The global race for science research, technology and innovation is becoming increasingly competitive. The Government are committed to making the UK the best place in the world to work for top scientists, researchers and innovators, and we are delivering the biggest increase in public R&D investment, including training our next generation of doctoral and post-doctoral RDI talent, having already committed to investing £20 billion in R&D in 2024 and 2025.

Strikes (Minimum Service Levels: Border Security) Regulations 2023

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Wednesday 6th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, maintaining services at our borders is essential to our security and prosperity as a nation. We depend on skilled professionals to ensure that, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, our borders are strong and effective. The Government assess that, in the event of strike action by those charged with securing our borders, there are significant risks to the safety of our communities. Criminals may seek to take advantage of strike action to enter our country or to move illicit commodities through our ports and airports. People smugglers may seek to exploit gaps in our patrol activity to land illegal migrants on our shores.

We are focused on making the hard but necessary long-term decisions to deliver the change the country needs to put the United Kingdom on the right path for the future. It is for this reason that the Government have decided to include border security within the scope of the Strikes (Minimum Service Levels) Act 2023. These new regulations have two purposes: to make provision for minimum service levels in relation to strikes as respect to relevant border security services and to define those relevant border security services.

The regulations set out that border security should be provided at a level that means they are no less effective than if a strike were not taking place. The regulations also set out that passport services as are necessary in the interests of national security are provided as they would be if the strike were not taking place on that day. The relevant border services that must be provided are now defined as

“the examination of persons arriving in or leaving the UK; the examination of goods imported to or exported from the UK; the examination of goods entered for exportation or brought to any place in the UK for exportation; the patrol of … ports … the sea and other waters within the seaward limits of the territorial sea adjacent to the UK; the collection and dissemination of intelligence for these purposes; the direction and control of”

those engaged in providing those services; and such passport services as may be necessary for national security reasons.

As the employer for Border Force and HM Passport Office, it will be the Home Office that issues work notices to trade unions during strike action. A work notice is, to recap, a notice given in writing that identifies the members of the workforce who are required to work on a strike day and the work they are required to do to deliver the levels of service as set out in the minimum service regulations. It is important to note that the Act forbids an employer, when setting a work notice, from having regard to whether an employee is a member of a trade union or has taken part in trade union activities or used their services in the past. The trade union must then take reasonable steps to ensure that members of theirs who have been identified in a work notice do not take strike action. If the union fails to take reasonable steps, it may lose its legal protection from damages, claims and injunctions. I will return to that at the end of my speech.

The regulations stipulate that border security services can be provided only by employees of the Home Office, which will mean those who already provide border security services or the relevant passport services required in the interests of national security. This means that we will no longer need to rely on outside resource to provide cover. In the past, we have used other civil servants working elsewhere and members of the Armed Forces. We acknowledge and appreciate the efforts of those who have provided cover previously, but this cannot be a long-term solution.

We recognise that restricting the ability to strike, even in the way we are proposing, means that we need to ensure that compensatory measures are in place. The Government are therefore committing that they will agree to engage in conciliation for national disputes in relation to border security, where the relevant unions agree that this would be helpful. This is a significant and appropriate commitment that balances the ability of workers to strike with the safeguarding of our borders.

I note the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. I respectfully say that we have responded to the recommendations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. Its 27th Report of Session 2022-23, which was published on 2 March 2023, made two recommendations on what became the Strikes (Minimum Services Levels) Act. The first was that

“the House may wish to press the Minister to provide an explanation of how the power to set minimum service levels … is likely to be exercised”.

The second was that

“the House may wish to press the Minister to provide an explanation of how the power to define ‘relevant services’ … is likely to be exercised”.

I respectfully submit that both recommendations have now been addressed through the regulations and in this debate.

I also respectfully disagree that the regulations are too prohibitive. This brings me to the Motion tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and to the findings of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee in its 3rd Report of the Session 2023-24, published on 23 November 2023. As I have set out, we are bringing forward these regulations to establish a fair balance between the ability to strike and enabling people to go about their daily life in the confidence that on a strike day our borders will still be secure.

Our recent experience of industrial action saw staffing levels of around 70% to 75% being delivered by Border Force. This enabled Border Force to carry out the essential functions listed in the regulations. Our estimate of the impact on HM Passport Office is that around a dozen or so personnel may be required to work. We none the less recognise that these new measures may mean that members of staff may not be able to strike. It is for that reason that we have made a commitment regarding conciliation, and I think this commitment is significant.

Turning to the question of trade unions’ liabilities, I would simply say that unions that continue to comply with trade union law are completely unaffected by this change, and therefore the issue of liability will not arise.

I call on Members of your Lordships’ House to reject the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and the Motion tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. I beg to move.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his introduction, although I disagree with much of it. We have heard in earlier debates from my noble friends Lady Merron and Lord Collins the general view that we have about these regulations. The law is not a substitute for proper negotiation. It is the failure of the Government to negotiate properly and reasonably with so many groups of workers that has led to this. Instead of addressing this failure of public policy, the Government have sought to undermine the right of people to take industrial action to protect their interests. Indeed, on the contrary, following the Act, regulations are put in place with huge consequences for unions and their members and workers if they fall foul of often ill-defined and ambiguous legislation. We will repeal them if we win the next election and will have no hesitation in doing so. The legislation that was outlined by the Minister to the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee should properly have been in primary legislation, which is one of the points that the committee made and which the Minister did not answer or point out in his remarks.

I turn briefly to the regulations with respect to border security and the reasons we regret them. Can the Minister confirm that because the regulations involve employment law, they do not apply to Northern Ireland? It is important to understand what assessment the Government have made of a situation in which there was to be industrial action in Britain under these regulations but not in Northern Ireland, where, presumably, existing law applies.

Can the Minister also explain why the Explanatory Memorandum spoke—as the Minister did here—of the impacts on UK immigration, UK territorial waters and UK border security staff? He will know that the UK includes Northern Ireland but these regulations are about Britain and so do not include Northern Ireland. Can he explain why the Home Office cannot distinguish between the terminology of the UK and the terminology of Britain with respect to these regulations?

Can the Minister explain why the measures have been extended to cover HM Passport Office? This appears, whatever the Minister says, to be a last-minute addition to the legislation, going beyond the earlier indications and debates that were had with respect to the Act—hence the amendment that I have put. The impact assessment says that a small number of HM Passport Office staff—the Minister talked of 12—will be affected. Can he outline what roles that will be and whether the passport staff in Belfast, in Northern Ireland, will be affected? Presumably they will not, so what will happen? When was the decision made to extend the regulations to HM Passport Office? Why were the trade unions not consulted about that change?

The border security regulations allow an employer to serve a work notice that requires border services to be

“no less effective than they would be if the strike were not taking place on that day”.

—see Regulation 3(1). The very real question that results, as trade unions point out, is to what extent there is any reason for anyone to strike if it is not supposed to have any impact at all. How is that proportionate? That is why we regret these regulations before us.

The TUC points out how strict this short but powerful set of regulations with respect to border security is. The Government say that, to ensure the minimum service levels that they have outlined, this SI necessitates 70% to 75% of border staff working. How on earth is it proportionate to effectively deny three-quarters of the workforce the right to strike? How on earth is it reasonable or proportionate that, in many cases, only one in four workers in border security will have the right to strike? Hence, I tabled the regret amendment.

In many small ports, because of the minimum service levels, there will effectively be no right to strike at all. Can the Minister also explain, notwithstanding the points he has made about conciliation, what the conciliation process will involve? How will it actually work? Will there be frank and open discussions with the trade unions about it to ensure that a system is put in place that works?

The Government make considerable play of doing this in the interests of the public, but millions of trade union members are members of the public. Is the noble Lord sure that these regulations, interfering with the right to strike to such an extent, are consistent with our legal duties? Of course, we rightly praise our border staff and others for the important and crucial work that they do. However, in wage negotiations and conditions-of-service talks, they have been disappointed that this praise is not turned into acceptable offers when it comes to their pay and conditions. In those circumstances, and subject to a ballot, trade unions should have the right to strike. The proposed restrictions are not proportionate and can never replace fair and open negotiations based on mutual respect, even when that is difficult. It is for those reasons that I have tabled my amendment to the Motion.

Amendment to the Motion

Immigration and Nationality (Fees) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2023

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Monday 4th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Lister for her regret Motion, the moving and articulate way in which she put her case and the very serious questions that she raised and points that she made. We owe her a debt of gratitude for bringing it forward.

As many noble Lords have pointed out, we have before us a very important SI of many pages, which raises many significant issues for us to think about and discuss. It is only with a regret Motion that this Chamber gets this opportunity to do that—and there is a wider question for us about how secondary legislation has huge impacts on our country and the people in it.

Many noble Lords have made significant and important points. The noble Lord, Lord Moylan, logically and methodically pointed out the distinction between the naturalisation process and the process of citizenship. I know that the Labour Government to whom he referred tried to address that in the British Nationality Act 1948, which became law in 1949. It was in reference to that that I was nodding. He made the important point that the Minister will have to look at how the Government are distinguishing between those two things—or are they just ignoring it?

My noble friend Lady Primarolo logically and movingly put the case for what citizenship means, the rights of someone born here, and how that generates citizenship rights that we should respect. She talked about the difference between that and somebody going through the other process, which the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, mentioned. That is a very important matter, which we look forward to the Minister explaining to us. I congratulate my noble friend on that—and, to be fair, the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, who brought it up as well.

As has been pointed out, this policy of immigration fees has been used for many years, but that does not mean that the proportionality and fairness of, or the rationale for, these significant rises in fees payable for most immigration services cannot be questioned or debated. The fee increases that we are looking at have been very significant, with a 15% or 20% increase for most fees and many facing a much bigger increase. For example, there is a 35% increase for student visa fees, for applications made outside the UK. There are also arrangements for a new electronic travel authorisation for all non-British or Irish passengers visiting or transiting through the UK who do not need a visa, who have to obtain permission first and pay a fee of £10. It is important for the Government to say whether they will assess the impact of that new ETA arrangement. Although the immigration health charge increase of 66% is not included in this instrument, can the Minister update us on any progress with it?

The Home Office tells us that the rationale for changes is to

“significantly increase the income generated through immigration and nationality fees for the purpose of meeting costs within the wider migration and borders system”.

Can the Minister explain that in more detail? Can he also say why the overall increase is well above the rate of inflation? The Home Office justification is to say “Well, we haven’t raised them significantly since 2018”. Why have a policy of small increases for a number of years followed by a huge increase in another year? Why not increase them proportionately, rather than have the massive increase that we see this year?

What assessment have the Government made of the various groups affected by these changes? A number of noble Lords made that point. In other words, what is the human cost of the changes that the Government are bringing forward? Can the Minister clarify, for the avoidance of doubt, another question that has been asked: how much do fees currently raise? What is the unit cost for the processing of an individual application compared with the fee charged? How much additional income will the rise in fees actually raise? What is the total cost of the system this year and the predicted cost next year? It is very difficult to find, in any of the information I have looked at, the exact figures the Government are using to justify the fees and the overall cost of the system.

Given the impact of fees on various migrants, how many applicants are currently covered by the fee waiver scheme and what numbers are predicted in future? This was another point made by a number of noble Lords.

As the noble Lord, Lord German, and others pointed out, the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee makes considerable criticism of the Home Office for breaking the 21-day rule by bringing the SI into force on 4 October—19 days after the laying of the instrument rather than 21 days. I think your Lordships can understand why a proper process is so important, given the interest in this debate. I point out to the Minister that 21 days is not a maximum but a minimum, so that noble Lords can discuss this. Can he explain why this happened, given that it is, I think, the third time it has happened? Which Minister signed it off, and have they been told that it is unacceptable? The Minister will get up and say, “We’re very sorry and we need to do something about it”, but it is a process that seems to be happening time and again. It is simply not good enough.

Alongside that, can the Minister explain why the Explanatory Memorandum and the equalities impact assessment were not published in time to go alongside this SI? They have now been published but they were not published at the appropriate times. These failings of process are happening time and again. I think the Minister will agree, because I know he understands the importance of process and frankly, to be fair to him, does his best to ensure that the proper process is followed, that this is extremely important given the various points made in this debate.

As we discuss this important SI, there has been yet another statement on migration. Are the Government sure that their assessment of the impacts on vulnerable migrants is accurate? Are they sure that these fee changes will not have an adverse impact on skills shortages for UK businesses, including in the NHS and in care sectors, for example? As I said, fees have long played a part in the overall immigration systems, but they need to do so in a fair, principled and proportionate way, which means that many of today’s questions need full and frank answers from the Government.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Lister of Burtersett, who tabled this debate and has given us the opportunity to discuss these important issues. Before I address the points raised, I will summarise how fees are set and the role of Parliament in setting fees for immigration and nationality applications.

It is important to emphasise that the Home Office cannot set or amend fee levels without obtaining the approval of Parliament. This ensures that there are checks and balances in place and full parliamentary oversight of the fees regime. Immigration and nationality fees can be set only within the limits specified by the Immigration and Nationality (Fees) Order, which include the maximum fee levels that can be charged on each application type or service. This is laid in Parliament and subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.

Individual fee levels are calculated in line with Managing Public Money principles and the powers provided by the Immigration Act 2014. Specific fees are set out in regulations, which are then presented to Parliament and subject to the negative procedure. The regulations laid by the Government in September increased fees across a number of immigration and nationality routes, including those for people seeking to visit the UK as a visitor and the majority of fees for entry clearance and for certain applications for leave to remain in the UK, including those for work and study.

Noble Lords are aware of the Government’s intention that those who use and benefit from the migration and borders system should contribute to its funding. In that, I agree with my noble friend Lady Altmann. The burden of operating the system should not unduly fall on the UK taxpayer. To answer directly the noble Baroness, Lady Blower, that is not profiteering—it is protecting the interests of the British taxpayer.

The increases that came into effect in October were, in the majority of cases, the first substantial increases made since 2018. They are proportionate when considered against wider price trends in the intervening period, to answer the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. At a time of high inflation and record migration, it is important to ensure that the system is sustainably funded. The recent increases have led to the raising of some concerns in the House around the impact on the UK economy and the potential for people to be deterred from visiting, working in and studying in the UK. As I have already set out, the Government’s policy is that the cost of operating the migration and borders system is to be funded by those who use it. This policy is at the heart of the decision to increase fees.

The Government have published an economic impact assessment—I will come back to this—alongside the regulations, setting out their potential impacts. The Government keep fees under review and will continue to monitor the position, but there is limited evidence to date that fee increases have impacted on the number of people coming to visit, work in and study in the UK. In answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, the best interests of the child were considered in the economic impact assessment.

The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, also raised concerns about the potential for people to fall out of lawful immigration status and face significant debt and precarity. Those who are in the UK on family and human rights routes can be assured that these regulations made no changes to the provision of existing waivers and exceptions from the need to pay application fees in a number of specific circumstances. That includes affordability-based waivers for entry clearance and leave to remain on family and human rights grounds, which ensures that families unable to afford the fee are not prevented from making an application to enter or remain in the UK. Additionally, for children seeking to register as a British citizen, an affordability waiver was introduced in 2022 and has improved access to British citizenship for children who may face issues in paying the application fee. I say to my noble friend Lord Moylan that I will come back to this subject in a second.

These provisions ensure that the Home Office’s immigration and nationality fee structure complies with international obligations and wider government policy. We believe it represents the right balance between protecting the integrity of the department’s funding model and helping to facilitate access to immigration and nationality products and services, including for the most vulnerable. I note the concerns raised about the potential for these fee increases to increase the operational burden on the Home Office. We acknowledge that the recent increase may see more people seeking a fee waiver, but the Home Office has an obligation to ensure that the integrity of the migration and borders system’s funding model is maintained. I hope that provides at least some reassurance that those who cannot afford the fee will not be prevented from making an application to enter or remain in the UK on human and family rights grounds.

As I said earlier, in recent years the Government have taken steps to ensure that the fee for children seeking to register as British citizens is not a barrier to them making an application, through the provision of the waiver on the basis of affordability and the fee exception for children who are looked after by local authorities. Adult registration applications do not have a waiver available, but most of the applications for registration are made by children.

On the breach of the 21-day rule, I say to the noble Lord, Lord German, that—in comparing this with discussions about the treaty—there is a significant difference between primary and secondary legislation. On this particular rule, I regret that it was late. The scheduled date of commencement of fee increases was 4 October, in view of a planned laying date of 13 September, with the commencement date used as the basis for wider communications and delivery planning activity. However, late amendment to the regulations meant that this was not possible. Given that delaying the commencement date would have cost the department an estimated loss of additional revenue of about £2 million—a significant amount, which would have impacted priority functions—and that further changes to updated front-end systems would be needed at some additional cost and delay, it was determined that the original commencement date should be maintained.

Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Wednesday 29th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what plans they have to proscribe the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organisation.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, the Government continue to take the threat of the IRGC very seriously and to condemn its actions. The Government will always consider the full range of powers available—including our robust counterterrorism powers, such as the proscription tool, where appropriate—to address the threat posed by Iran and the IRGC.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, there is a compelling case for proscribing the IRGC. Scotland Yard says that since the start of 2022, Iran has made 15 attempts to kidnap or even kill British and UK-based people. The director-general of MI5 has warned of Tehran projects posing a threat to the UK. Would not such a proscription be in the interests of national security at home and abroad, as well as peace and security in the Middle East, as highlighted by the current conflict? With the USA and the UK’s Countering Extremism Commissioner now calling for the proscription of the IRGC, what possible reason is there for the Government to delay in outlawing a terrorist organisation that threatens security both at home and abroad?

Net Migration

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Wednesday 29th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I just alluded to that. The ONS is operationally independent of government—its work is overseen by the UK Statistics Authority—so any decision around that methodology would be for the ONS. Its definition of a long-term migrant aligns with the UN definition and is anyone who comes to the UK for 12 months or more. Students who remain in the UK for less than 12 months will not, at present, be counted in the ONS estimates. However, I am happy to associate myself with the noble Lord’s remarks about how higher education is a massive export industry for this country. Of course, it delivers enormous soft power benefits too.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, how has it come to the point at which net migration is three times the level of 2019, when the Government promised to reduce it? It has taken four years for the Government to come up with any sort of plan, but we do not know what it is because members of the Cabinet are fighting among themselves about what it should be. Can I make one suggestion? Do the Government agree with us that the unfair wage discount, allowing overseas recruits to be paid 20% less than the going rate, should be ended and replaced with proper training and fair pay in the UK?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord is referring to the shortage occupation list. The Migration Advisory Committee is clear that immigration can be a sensible solution to occupations that are in shortage, at least in the short term, but the Government believe that no occupation should be on the list for ever. Sectors must therefore present a realistic strategy to end their reliance on migration before such jobs can be added to the list, and compelling evidence that they should remain. We asked the Migration Advisory Committee, as part of its recent review, to consider whether the discounts should be stopped. The Government are considering the recommendations of that review and will respond in due course.

Metropolitan Police Reform

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Monday 27th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My noble friend raises an interesting subject. It has been raised with me at this Dispatch Box 14 times over the past two years. I am afraid that my answer is not going to change. It will remain consistent across those 14, now 15, answers: the Government have no plans to interfere in this.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, made an important point about serious misconduct, as did the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. The Minister said that he was going to take it back. This is of extreme urgency. If the Metropolitan Police is to command confidence and trust, it will take two years to deal with the approximately 1,000 police officers who are suspended or on restricted duties. The public have to know that those 1,000 officers and however many are uncovered by the commissioner will be dealt with quickly and speedily according to new misconduct regulations because the current ones seriously do not work. Can the Minister tackle this as a matter of urgency?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I agree with the noble Lord that it is a matter of urgency—of course it is—but it is also urgent that we get it right and make sure that all the possible unintended consequences are dealt with well in advance of implementing what are in some cases new, pretty draconian regulations, particularly with regard to how police officers might lose their careers. It deserves careful thought rather than coming back to the Dispatch Box and unpicking mistakes that might be made because we acted in haste.

Rwanda: Asylum Arrangements Treaty

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Tuesday 21st November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, that gives me an opportunity to reflect again on what the court said:

“changes and capacity-building needed to eliminate the risk”—

of refoulement—

“may be delivered in future, but they were not shown to be in place when the lawfulness of the policy had to be considered in these proceedings”.

The fact was that those proceedings considered one day —14 June 2022. Much has changed since then, so I think we should wait to see what the legislation says.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, yesterday, the Minister could not answer a number of questions regarding the proposed treaty ratification process—its consents legislation —despite his usual courtesies. Was he aware that the same day he was speaking, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was pictured carrying the returns (removal to Rwanda) Bill into Downing Street with the date of 19 November on it? I think we could do with knowing whether the Minister was aware of the contents of that Bill. Can he confirm that the Bill will have a proper, full ratification process, not contain suggestions such as the Falkland Islands, which we have heard about, as a fallback position, and also respect international law—or does he need to consult the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, before he answers?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I would also note that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, asked me an incredibly unhelpful question on another subject yesterday, so that is a win double. Actually, I was not aware of any of the contents of whatever may or may not have been in the folder of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

Policing of Marches and Demonstrations

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Monday 13th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, on this I am very happy to defer to the noble Lord’s extensive experience of policing protests of this type. It is self-evident that if you wade into a crowd, there is a chance that you will inflame tensions. The police are operationally independent and I will not judge what they did, but their approach makes some sense to me in that context.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, as the right reverend Prelate did, I thank the Metropolitan Police and all the officers who were on the streets of London ensuring that Armistice Day events were not disrupted, facing disgraceful far-right violence and assaults while working to pursue appalling, vile anti-Semitism—as the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, pointed out to us—and other hate crimes. Does the Minister agree that it would have been helpful in the run-up to these events to have had a Home Secretary who calmed tensions rather than using language that inflamed some of the protests and policing that we saw? Above all, despite the Minister’s points to this House, will the new Home Secretary ensure that never again do we have a situation in which a Home Secretary of this country seems to question the operational independence of the police? Is it not one of the fundamental parts of our democracy that the police can police without fear or favour?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I agree with the noble Lord. It is, as he knows, governed by a pretty rigorous protocol. I went into the details of that protocol last week, and I can do it again if anybody wants to hear it—I suspect they do not.

The previous Home Secretary is no longer in post, so debating what she did or did not say seems moot. As regards the new Home Secretary, I have not spoken to him and I do not know what he is thinking.

Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (Risk of Being Drawn into Terrorism) (Revised Guidance) Regulations 2023

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Tuesday 24th October 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I pay tribute once again to the work of the police, security and intelligence services. It is difficult but it saves lives and, as I know the Minister will agree, it helps to keep us safe. Extremism is a stain on our society. It feeds on fear, which seeks to drive us apart, and is perpetuated in the name of one extreme ideology or another. All of us on this Committee and beyond are opposed to that.

We have seen a terrorist attack on Fishmongers’ Hall, close to London Bridge, the awful attack at a concert in Manchester and the brutal murders of Jo Cox and Sir David Amess, among other shocking events, such as the bomb attack at the Dover Border Force centre. Was it not a bad mistake for the Shawcross review not to include that last incident as one of the examples of attacks listed in that report, given that it was not Islamist? It could have been included, because it took place months before the publication of the original review. The Minister will know that one of the criticisms of the review and worries about it is its supposed bias.

Ongoing threats are thwarted and ongoing action is taken by the police and security services. Can the Minister outline their view of these guidelines, as well as those of others who have to implement them, such as local authorities or education providers—schools and so on?

Prevent is extremely important, as is its purpose of early intervention to prevent radicalisation, extremism and, ultimately, terror. We, like others, support its actions in that regard. However, the strategy is seen by some as contentious and many feel that it is one-sided. How are the Government going to restore confidence and trust across the community in their work on Prevent and the broader counterterrorism strategy?

For example, we have seen the criticisms from the former head of counterterrorism police, Neil Basu, as well as others such as Amnesty International, of the Shawcross review. Is public confidence not increasingly important, given the current awful international situation in the Middle East and the domestic challenges it gives rise to in the UK? Have the Government reflected on these current events? Given the horror we all feel at what we have seen, is the guidance as up to date as it needs to be to reflect the current situation? Might further amendments be required in due course? Is anything planned?

As the Minister pointed out in his helpful introductory remarks, the independent review of Prevent contained 34 recommendations. Last month the Secretary of State announced that the Government had completed 10 of these, and we learned from the Minister today that 29 of them will be completed within a year. Have I understood that correctly? Does that mean the calendar year, or the end of 2024? It would be helpful to have clarification on that. That leaves five that are not going to be ready by the end of the year. Can the Minister tell us which five they are and why they will not be done over the same timeframe as the others?

One in five people arrested for terrorist offences in 2022 was aged under 18—a fourfold increase in just three years. How will the guidance contribute to combating this rapid growth in child terrorist suspects? Beyond the guidance, what else are the Government doing? Will they join us in committing to placing mental health practitioners in schools to help combat vulnerabilities that can make young people more susceptible to extremist narratives? What assessment have the Government made of Jonathan Hall’s recommendation on legislation regarding young terror suspects? How is the Home Office working with other departments to combat, for example, the terrorist threat posed by artificial intelligence, which is new but an increasing threat to us all, as we know?

Four of the nine declared terrorist attacks in the UK since 2018 were perpetrated by serving or newly released prisoners, but the review found that

“there have been delays to staff beginning Prevent training and to extremist prisoners beginning rehabilitative programmes. These delays are attributed to staffing and resourcing issues”.

Given the seriousness with which we should regard four out of nine of the declared terrorist offences having been committed by serving or recently released prisoners, what action has the Secretary of State taken since the independent review to address this and combat radicalisation in prisons?

The Minister will probably agree that Prevent is obviously just one part of a wider counterterrorism and counterextremism strategy. It is just one pillar, as the Minister mentioned, of the Contest strategy. None the less, the review and the Government’s response focus at points on targeting those most likely to commit terrorist acts, but also on wider non-violent extremism. Given that there is some confusion about the central objectives of Prevent, as outlined in this guidance, that could also lead to confusion among those implementing the guidance on what the true focus needs to be. Does the guidance make this clearer than the independent review and the government response earlier in the year—is the focus on individuals who may commit terrorist acts, or on combating wider non-violent extremism? Can the Government clarify where their emphasis and the balance lies? The counterextremism strategy as a whole has not been updated since 2015. Will the Government now confirm that this will take place? What else are the Government going to do to look beyond Prevent to combat extremism?

In February of this year, the Government stated that the ministerial Prevent oversight board would be “refreshed”, having not met since 2018. Has this refresh happened and has the board now met, or are we still waiting for it to meet?

The building of consensus is crucial, particularly around a voluntary engagement programme. The scourge of extremism, as we have seen, whether it be anti-Semitism, Islamism, or the extreme right—whatever it is—is one we all wish to see tackled. There are still very real questions to be asked and challenges for any Government to meet. But the defeat of terrorism and extremism, in whatever form they take, and doing all we can to prevent individuals and communities becoming involved in terrorism or suffering from the threat of terrorism or extremism, is in all our interests and something we all want our Government to succeed in—whichever Government we have.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his contribution. He has asked a number of questions and I will do my best to answer to them all.

Before I do that, I join the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, in applauding the work of the security services and the various agencies that keep us all safe, and thank them for it. I include in that the officials in the Home Office, who are often rather overlooked when we are handing out praise to our security services, but who do a considerable amount of work and of thinking about how best to apply these rules in an operational situation. I re-assert that the core objective here is to strengthen the Prevent system, which is a vital component of the counterterrorism apparatus, and in giving my answers I will endeavour to explain why.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked me about public confidence and trust in the system and raised the issue of the Dover attack. Of course, the Independent Review of Prevent was led by Sir William Shawcross. He was an independent reviewer, so he decided on the content of the report. I am unable to comment on why he made that decision or what prompted it.

It is perhaps worth digressing and looking at the state of play regarding the extreme right-wing threat we face, because that does feed into this subject. We have accepted the Independent Review of Prevent’s recommendation to ensure that a consistent and proportionate threshold is in place across all the Prevent workstreams. Prevent is now guided by the principles of the new security threat check, which is recommended in the IRP. This series of principles informs our strategic approach, which asks us to consider whether actions are proportionate against the UK’s current terrorism and extremism threat picture. That means that the Home Office approaches and products clearly show how they are relevant to meeting Prevent’s objectives and responding to the threat of terrorism.

We are also rolling out updated training so that practitioners can better understand the threat and in particular the ideological causes of terrorism. The Home Office has undertaken research on Prevent referrals to better under understand them and to improve how they are recorded. Better understanding of the threat, strengthened training and improved processes ensure that we tackle disparities.

However, the primary domestic terrorist threat comes from Islamist terrorism, which accounts for approximately 67% of attacks since 2018, about three-quarters of the MI5 case load and 64% of those in custody for terrorism-related offences. The remainder of the UK domestic terrorist threat is driven almost exclusively by extreme right-wing terrorism, which amounts to approximately 22% of attacks since 2018, about one-quarter of the MI5 case load and 28% of those in custody for terrorism-connected offences.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I am sorry to interrupt; I meant to include something else in my remarks. What the Minister is saying is very helpful. Can he comment—as far as he is able to—on the Home Secretary’s meeting with the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police regarding how existing laws may be used with respect to what we have seen on our streets?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will get to that, if the noble Lord will bear with me.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Of course; my apologies.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As on previous occasions, there are likely to be Prevent referrals related directly to this conflict and from across the ideological spectrum. In direct answer to the noble Lord’s question about whether the Government are thinking about this, guidance has been issued on the appropriate thresholds. We have written to partners to ensure that they are aware of the escalating risks and that there is appropriate management of their Channel intervention programme case loads. Community tensions and the appropriate responses will be nuanced in each area. Prevent is continuing to work closely and intensively with local authorities and other partners, including DfE, DLUHC and CTP, to spot local risks and bolster community resilience, including encouraging interfaith dialogue.

On the Home Secretary’s meeting with Sir Mark, I was not there so I cannot give any personal reflections on what was discussed. Of course, I have seen what was in the papers with regard to Sir Mark’s cause. We are working with the police to ensure that hate crime and the glorification of terror are met with the full force of the law. Hamas is a proscribed organisation responsible for the biggest massacre of the Jewish people in one day since the Holocaust—we should not forget that. Support for it is a criminal act which carries up to 14 years in prison. The DfE’s counterextremism team is actively gathering from media sources and contributions from the CST information on claims of student group support for Hamas, and we are collaborating with the Office for Students to ensure the exchange of information regarding compliance-related issues, particularly those related to Prevent duties, and to address concerns about preventing unlawful speech on campus. It would be unwise of me to speculate on Sir Mark’s specific comments, but a raft of laws is already available to the police.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked me about the number of recommendations in the Shawcross report. We have completed 15 of the 34 recommendations and 83 of the 120 tasks, but, as I said in my opening remarks, the Government have accepted all the recommendations of the independent review. We expect to have implemented at least 29 of the 34 within a year of publication—February next year—and the rest shortly thereafter. I am afraid that I do not know which five we will have to wait for.

The Prevent duty guidance supports several of the recommendations we have implemented, and we have introduced the new security threat check to ensure that decision-making is always informed by a proper consideration of the current threat picture. Updated training has been provided for public sector staff subject to the Prevent duty, and a further update on the implementation of the independent review of Prevent will be delivered one year after publication, in February 2024, when the majority of the recommendations will already have been implemented.

The noble Lord raised the subject of young people and what we are doing for them. One in 15 cases involves people under the age of 18, so protecting children from the risk of radicalisation sits alongside wider safeguarding duties, including tackling harms such as drugs, gangs and sexual exploitation. Prevent seeks to intervene early to support children and young people before they go too far down a road towards violence and criminality. It is not about punishment, making people suspects or placing them under surveillance, and it is not designed to impede a person’s prospects; it is designed to improve them. In line with previous statistics, we continue to see an upward trend in young people being referred to Prevent, demonstrating how vital the education sector is as part of the wider safeguarding duties to prevent young people being radicalised. The Government provide a range of support, including guidance, online training and a public-facing website to support schools in their responsibilities under the Prevent duty.

As the threat of radicalisation evolves, we have updated our training for front-line professionals to help equip them with the skills and knowledge to spot the signs of radicalisation and make a referral where appropriate. Prevent is implemented in a proportionate manner that considers the level of risk, and the Government take the threat from all forms of terrorism seriously. All referrals are assessed very carefully by experts to ensure that there is a radicalisation risk before they receive support through the Channel process, meaning that Channel provides support only to those who genuinely need it. Friends and family are often the first people to notice the changes in someone close to them that may be a sign of radicalisation, so more information is available on the police’s ACT Early website and the Educate Against Hate website. I hope that goes some way to answering the noble Lord’s questions.

The noble Lord also asked me about the fact that four out of nine incidents since 2018 have involved released prisoners. HMIC’s report recognises the significant steps taken by the sector to uplift our capabilities since the attacks of 2019-20. It shows that we have truly stepped up our counterterrorism efforts and that we are working more effectively than ever before to protect the public from terrorism, thanks to the joint work of prison, probation and police staff. The central intelligence hub co-ordinates quicker and better intelligence sharing, vastly improving our assessment of the threat from terrorists of all ideologies. Thanks to that, we can now share previously confidential and sensitive information with parole boards, so that they can make fully informed decisions about whether to release terrorist offenders from prison. On release, terrorist and terrorist-risk offenders are subject to robust risk management and stringent controls that severely limit their activity. Finally, we have also strengthened joint counterterrorism Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements—MAPPA—which assess, manage and mitigate the risk of offenders.

The noble Lord is right that Prevent is only one part of the broader counterterrorism strategy. The report set out a robust approach to tackling extremism and made a significant contribution to the Government’s thinking on counterextremism, including a manifesto commitment to protect practitioners who stand up to extremists. We have carefully considered the recommendations, as outlined in our letter to Dame Sara Khan, the previous commissioner for countering extremism, and they have made a significant contribution to the Government’s thinking on tackling extremism. We have clear laws, and the police have extensive powers to tackle hate crime and the support of terrorism. In addition, we have strengthened the Prevent duty guidance to tackle permissive spaces for radicalisation, which is with Parliament for approval. We have also strengthened our approach to identifying and disrupting high- harm groups that operate below legal thresholds that radicalise others. So, we have robust laws in place on terrorist organisations and we are doing more to tackle radicalisation.

On 18 July, the Home Secretary launched Contest 2023, which is a refresh of the UK’s counterterrorism strategy. Contest 2023 outlines how we are reflecting on and adapting to the findings and recommendations of inquests, inquiries and reviews into terrorist attacks and our counterterrorism approach, and will continue to do so. It also describes the transformational updates we will make to our CT efforts to ensure that we adapt to an ever-evolving landscape.

The noble Lord asked about the ministerial oversight board. We agreed with the IRP’s assertion that that there is a need for stronger oversight of Prevent, including greater co-ordination and communication between secondary oversight boards and committees, so we committed to reinvigorate the prime ministerial oversight board. The refreshed ministerial oversight board will be chaired by the Security Minister and will begin convening later this year. The board will be attended by Ministers from key cross-Whitehall departments and senior leads from operational partners. The purpose of the board is to provide scrutiny and oversight of all Prevent work, including implementation of the IRP’s recommendations. The board will convene for the first time later this year and be chaired by the Security Minister. It is meant to meet biannually but can be convened outside that rhythm if required.

I am getting towards the end, and I apologise for the length of my response. The noble Lord asked me what action is being taken to tackle those who use artificial intelligence. The Contest strategy, which was published this year, noted that new technologies present both threats and opportunities for counterterrorism efforts. The impact of generative AI on terrorists’ and extremists’ ability to radicalise others online is yet to be fully established. The Home Office is firmly committed to understanding this risk better and to ensuring that any policy development in this area is thoroughly informed by evidence. We obviously know that bad actors could exploit generative AI to radicalise susceptible individuals to carry out attacks, so the Home Office is continually monitoring these risks to ensure that our CT system is able to respond.

AI also brings huge opportunities to better enable our counterterrorism response to terrorism activity and online radicalisation, so we are taking steps to build our knowledge of risks and to consider appropriate mitigations. That will include bringing together partners from across industry, academia and civil society. The Government are hosting an AI summit next week. The rapidly evolving nature of AI means that broad consultation will continue to be essential so that it can be guaranteed to advance in a safe, responsible and fair way.

I think I have answered all noble Lords’ questions, and I hope I have been able to do so satisfactorily. As I have set out, the new guidance will enhance the Prevent system and bolster our ability to counter terrorism and keep the country safe. I commend the instrument to the committee.

Afghan Interpreters

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Wednesday 18th October 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Of course I accept that, and I absolutely take my noble friend’s point.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, let us remind ourselves once again, as other noble Lords have done, that this scheme is for those Afghans and their families who risked their lives working with and for the British military in exposed or meaningful roles, as the Minister outlined. Can the Minister therefore explain why, according to evidence given to the Foreign Affairs Committee inquiry yesterday, many occupations such as mechanics and others who helped our troops in Afghanistan are often not deemed eligible, despite their being threatened or indeed killed by the Taliban? As the policy stands, the consequence for many of those desperate people and their families will be being isolated, facing the terror of the Taliban on their own. Does the Minister not agree with me that those who stood with our troops deserve better than that?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I absolutely agree with the noble Lord that those who stood with our troops deserve the best we have to offer. I go back to the point I made earlier: the definition of people who are eligible for ARAP is those who served in exposed or meaningful roles. I cannot precisely define what those terms mean, but I think we can all imagine it. I will do more to find out whether mechanics and other job descriptions match these criteria, as I cannot answer that.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Consideration of Commons amendments
Wednesday 18th October 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I start by echoing something that the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, said: overall, we all believe that this is a good Bill. It is a step forward, and we welcome the changes that the Government have made over a number of months to improve it, and that they have listened to the various points that have been made. It would be churlish not to say that to the Minister at the outset, but that does not alter the fact that the amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, seek to address two omissions where, even at this late stage, the Government could act to further improve the Bill. I say to both that should they choose to test the opinion of the House, we certainly will support them in the Lobbies to do that.

I will not repeat the arguments. It was interesting; sometimes, when you are constrained by time, the argument distils down to its essence. I think that what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Agnew, Lord Eatwell and Lord Wallace, really summed it up with respect to his amendment. As he said, the failure to prevent bribery offence applies to everyone; there is no opt-out or exemption. The Government do not think that that is too burdensome for anyone. As he also said, no company is too small to be exempted from the failure to prevent tax evasion offence. But on this particular emphasis, the failure to prevent fraud, the Government come forward and say: “We need to protect a certain number of businesses”.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, has moved amendment after amendment to try to come closer to the Government’s position. As the noble Lords, Lord Agnew and Lord Eatwell, have just said, if you took that to its extreme, you would impose no costs on business at all, and they used the seatbelt argument. So we are very happy to support the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, should he choose to test the opinion of the House.

I shall pick out one aspect of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. It was a feature of all our debates and discussions that we wanted law enforcement to take tougher action against those who committed fraud. We believed that the state could and should take more action, that the amount of money lost with respect to fraud was enormous and that we need to do something about it. What I picked out from what the noble Lord said was about reducing the possibility of action not being taken by law enforcement agencies because they were frightened of the possibility of costs —not on the merits of the case that they might seek to pursue but simply because they were frightened that they may incur costs. As such, both amendments are simple but important ones that would do what this House, and I believe the public, expect Parliament to do, which is to give as much power as possible within the Bill to tackle the problem of fraud, which is what we all want.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this relatively short debate. Like my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier, I am in danger of sounding like a cracked record on this subject, so I will keep my remarks brief. I reassure my noble and learned friend that I still find his joke funny and I am glad he keeps making it. I thank him for being incredibly gracious although we continue to disagree on these matters. I have to say I do not believe the Bill is a dog’s dinner or that these arguments are dog’s-dinnery. We are not in a sticky hole on this; it is a difference of opinion, and I will make a couple of the arguments that I have rehearsed before in support of that.

I shall deal with my noble and learned friend’s amendment by first reminding him and the House that this may be a relatively small number of companies but, as I have said many times before from this Dispatch Box, they account for 50% of economic output in this country. The heart of the argument comes down to why there is a threshold for this offence but not for the offences of failing to prevent bribery or the criminal facilitation of tax evasion. As I have reminded the House on numerous occasions, the Law Commission has identified the disparity here: it is easier to prosecute smaller organisations under the current law, which this failure to prevent offence will address. The new offence is less necessary for smaller firms, where it is easier to prosecute individuals and businesses for the substantive fraud offence. The Government therefore believe it would be disproportionate to impose the same burden on them. The fact is that this is not an exemption from the law; the law applies in a different way to these smaller companies, as we have tried to explain on a number of occasions. I think I will leave that there.

On Motion B1 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, I do not think that this represents a tender approach to fraudsters. As we have said and made the case on a number of occasions, fundamental changes are being proposed here, and the review that we have proposed seems like a fair way of assessing precisely the implications of making those changes.

I thank my noble friend Lord Wolfson for highlighting some of the complexities in this area in his particularly acute legal way, which I am not equipped to follow. However, I can perhaps answer the question about the difference in introducing the cost protection amendment for civil recovery compared with unexplained wealth orders. This issue has come up in previous debates as well. The fact is that the difference between the changes made to the unexplained wealth order regime by the first Economic Crime Act last year and what is proposed in this amendment is that unexplained wealth orders are an investigatory tool that do not directly result in the permanent deprivation of assets, whereas the civil recovery cases covered by the amendment could do so. There could therefore be a host of serious unintended consequences of such a change to the wider civil recovery regime, so the Government cannot support the amendment. A review is the appropriate way to look at this issue. As I tried to make clear in my opening remarks, that may well be a very good idea, but we would like to be convinced of that and to do the work before we actually accept it.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for generously accepting that we have made significant improvements to the Bill through its passage. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, that we have engaged extensively with all noble Lords in this House on the Bill. I thank him for his explanation of how he believes a revising Chamber should operate. The fact is that we are not sufficiently persuaded of the arguments against this, so there is a genuine difference of opinion. I do not think the noble Lord would mean to imply that this House should necessarily have a veto where there is such a difference of opinion. I think that is a fairly straightforward argument and a perfectly respectable one.

Throughout the passage of this Bill, the Government have worked hard to ensure the right balance between tackling economic crime and ensuring that the UK remains a place where law-abiding businesses can flourish without unnecessary burdens. The Motions tabled by the Government today achieve that balanced and proportionate approach. I therefore urge all noble Lords to support them.

Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (Amendment) Order 2023

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Tuesday 19th September 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all three noble Lords for their contributions to this important debate. A number of interesting points have been made. I will attempt to address them but, first, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and the Labour Party for their support. Obviously, I regret the fact that the Liberal Democrats are unable to support this important public health and safety measure.

The Government disagreed with independent experts on this matter, as was noted by all the speakers in the debate. Turning to questions about that decision, we are of course grateful to the ACMD for its detailed report. ACMD advice is an essential part of our decision-making and we continue to have complete faith in its quality and rigour. However, the Government are entitled and expected to take a broader view, taking into account other relevant factors, which was necessary in this case. The ACMD referred to reports of increased neurological and social harms, such as drug driving and littering, associated with nitrous oxide misuse. This is alongside its widespread availability for illegitimate use and high usage, including among children and young people; I referred in my opening remarks to the large canisters that are now readily available.

As the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, noted, anti-social behaviour and visible drug use are issues of significant public concern, and we know that the harms of nitrous oxide misuse are being felt by communities. For that reason, the Government decided to go further than the ACMD’s advice to protect the public and seek to control nitrous oxide under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 as a class C drug. This will provide law enforcement with more tools to take action against illegitimate supply and use. As the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, helpfully pointed out, this is not the first time that a Government have disagreed with the ACMD: in 2014, for example, khat was controlled under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 contrary to the ACMD’s recommendations. I am also grateful to the noble Lord for mentioning the 2008 decision that reclassified cannabis as a class B drug against the advice of the ACMD; I applaud his decision then.

The Government consulted on this issue. We fulfilled our statutory consultation requirement to seek the views of the ACMD and considered its report carefully. However, as I just said, the Government are entirely permitted to take a broader view; the reasons for this are set out in our response to the ACMD, published on 27 March, which outlined the clear health and social harms associated with nitrous oxide use that led the Government to control the substance under the Misuse of Drugs Act.

The Government also undertook a public consultation to ascertain the nature and scale of legitimate use of nitrous oxide before formulating this policy, the results of which were published on 5 September. Provisions to enable legitimate drug use will be set out in a following SI that will come into force at the same time as this order, which is the normal legislative process for controlling a substance under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. So, in answer to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, there will be no gap.

On police support, we have heard from some in front-line policing who welcome these new powers. The National Police Chiefs’ Council is also supportive of this ban.

With regards to the treatment aspect, I could not agree with the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, more. It is never an either/or situation; it is a “both” situation. In relation to access to treatment, I refer Members to the Government’s drug strategy, From Harm to Hope, which was published in December 2021. It is clear about our ambition to achieve stigma-free treatment, providing the full positive effect of treatment services for those seeking help. Through this strategy, we are investing more than £2.8 billion over three years to support people through treatment and recovery; it includes support for those who have used a range of drugs, including nitrous oxide, and are suffering health harms. In the light of the reported rise in harms to individual users and society associated with heavy nitrous oxide use, we believe that it is necessary to take action also to restrict access to this harmful drug and reduce its misuse by, as I said, classifying it as a class C drug.

As regards legitimate use—obviously, those were legitimate questions from noble Lords—we are conscious of the need to ensure that our approach enables the continued use of nitrous oxide for legitimate and lawful purposes, of which there are many. The Government accepted the ACMD’s recommendation to consult on legitimate uses, as I said. We published our response on 5 September. That information is now being used to design the regime that will enable lawful use for legitimate purposes.

The exact proposals are still being drawn up and will be set out in a subsequent statutory instrument, as I said. However, it is worth repeating that the order we are debating today will come into effect at the same time as the accompanying amendments to the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 2001, so there will be no gap between the control of nitrous oxide under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and provisions enabling its legitimate, lawful access.

The noble Earl, Lord Russell, asked about the risk of criminalising young people. That is a perfectly valid concern: will it result in the overcriminalisation of young people in particular given that the drug is so prevalent among those aged 16 to 24? However, we can assure the Committee that the Government seek a proportionate approach, in answer to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. We entrust that task to law enforcement agencies, which have a range of powers at their disposal to enforce the law—including out-of-court disposals, which are non-criminal sanctions, where they judge those to be proportionate and effective.

It is also our intention that the ban should have a preventive effect so that, over time, it reduces the number of users, in particular children and young people. We will update education resources for schools, directly accessing the children who may be at risk of becoming users. Those resources will describe the harms of drug taking and will communicate the new law to children. I also talked to the director of communications at the Home Office this afternoon before coming here; he assures me that work on this is well under way and, indeed, innovative.

I finish by saying to the noble Earl, Lord Russell, that the damage to their life prospects—

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I am sorry to interrupt but the point that the Minister just made is really important; I know that other noble Lords are waiting for the next SI. If you are talking about young people and the director of communications at the Home Office is talking about innovative work, it is no good putting a press release out to the BBC. It must be on all the various platforms that young people look at. I am sure that the director of communications is on top of that but can the Minister ensure that this is on social media, whatever that means now, and is not just a press release to the BBC?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am very happy to reassure the noble Lord on that point because I asked him the same question. He said, “Yes, absolutely, of course it will be. There is no point in shoving something through their letterbox”. I agree with him; we need to find alternative letterboxes, I suppose.

As I was saying to the noble Earl, Lord Russell, the damage to children’s life chances is certainly not as lasting as the neurological damage that they may suffer.

In answer to my noble friend Lord Hayward, I do not believe that the ban will provide criminal gangs with an opportunity to profiteer from supply; it will only shrink the space for them to do so. Nitrous oxide is already being supplied illegally for misuse by lone dealers and criminal gangs. These measures will give the police and enforcement agencies greater powers to stop illegal supply.

My noble friend also asked me about a possible review of the Misuse of Drugs Act. There are no plans to conduct a review of that that I am aware of. However, in July 2022, the Home Office launched a consultative White Paper—Swift, Certain, Tough: New Consequences for Drug Possession—which proposed new policies to reform the way the criminal justice system deals with adult drug possession offences, particularly tackling so-called recreational drug use. That consultation closed in October 2022. An analysis of the responses is under way.

The outcome of this analysis and the responses provided will obviously help to inform future policy direction in dealing with low-level position offences. A government response to the consultation will be published in due course. Of course, the Government keep drug legislation under review and will reconsider the status of particular substances where it is appropriate to do so, obviously while continuing to take into account advice from the ACMD.

All three noble Lords asked me about the expected costs of the policy, in particular its effect on prison places. As has been noted, the central estimate for custodial sentences is 200 per year. We are confident that there will be capacity for this potential increase given that prison occupation is already at 99% capacity. When we estimated the impact on prison places, we also looked at the average custodial sentence length and considered that alongside the volume of custodial sentences estimated per year. It results in an annualised estimate of 26 prison places across the UK. We are taking action to reduce the pressure felt on the prison estate, including expanding capacity by an additional 2,400 places beyond the 20,000-place build programme since September 2022, so we will always have the capacity to serve the needs of the courts.

Noble Lords asked about the increasing cost of the policy. I cannot really go into detail on that because there are so many variables in working out impact assessments of this type, as will be obvious. However, there are record numbers of police officers operating in this country now—more than there have ever been before—and I certainly believe that they have the capacity to deal with this.

In closing, I hope that I have answered all the relevant questions. I once again offer my thanks to all who participated. I am grateful for the insights and the challenge that has been brought to bear on this debate. This is an issue that must be confronted and dealt with before it gets worse. Public health and public safety are vital, as is the effort to tackle anti-social behaviour.

Before I commend this order to the Committee, I have just remembered that I have forgotten to say one thing, which is about an ongoing review. On 16 June, we committed to a post-implementation review of the control of nitrous oxide under the 1971 Act, as outlined in the Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire’s response to recommendations 2 to 7 of the ACMD’s updated harms assessment. That was published on GOV.UK. I am quite sure that noble Lords will remind me if that is not forthcoming but, for now, I commend the order to the Committee.

Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2023

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Thursday 14th September 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord makes a good point. He reminds me that I should have commented on his comments about a very specific country, which of course I am not really able to do in detail. I am sure that diplomatic efforts and overtures are ongoing. I am certainly happy to write to the noble Lord in as much detail as I am able to.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I was concerned when I read the Foreign Affairs Select Committee report about the 81 individuals who had been identified as linked to Wagner and how only a quarter had been actively sanctioned by the Government. Can the Minister update us on what is happening with that? If not, perhaps he can write to me and put a copy in the Library.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, will not expect me to comment on live or ongoing situations. I will find out what it is possible to say and certainly have a conversation with him or place a letter in the Library, depending on what I am able to say.

I offer thanks to all who have participated in this debate. Through this proscription, the UK will again demonstrate that we will not waver in our support for Ukraine and will hold Russia to account for its aggression. We condemn Wagner’s role in Russia’s war. Its wider activities have consistently been linked to human rights violations. Through this action, we are sending a message loud and clear that the United Kingdom will never stay silent in the face of injustice or stop fighting terrorism. Finally, in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, about Wagner’s future, I sincerely hope that it does not have one. I commend this order to the House.

National Crime Agency: Fraud and Economic Crime

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Monday 11th September 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord will be aware, from other conversations that we have been having around the various aspects of the Bill that will go through the House this afternoon, that the agencies tell us they are appropriately resourced. I cannot account for the small number of UWOs that have been issued, but I will continue to keep it under review and report to the noble Lord.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Browne made a really good point about the number of people investigating fraud, because people generally feel that fraud is given a very low priority. The Government themselves have said that in recruiting people there is a particular need to understand that the type of person with the sorts of skills that need to be recruited may be different from the normal crime-fighting model that we have. They have also said that they are taking steps to address that, particularly in respect of cybercrime. Can the Minister update us on what the Government are doing to recruit people with the necessary skills in this area?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord makes a good point, and I think he is aware of my opinions on this subject. Clearly, it is a difficult area for the entire economy—not just the agencies responsible for fighting crime but those who are involved in the online world where, of course, much of this crime takes place. I have referred to the large number of new officers being recruited; as far as I understand it, they are on track to be recruited according to the timescales that have been set out. I cannot really comment any more on the recruitment process itself, but I will certainly ask the question and come back to the noble Lord.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Consideration of Commons amendments
Monday 11th September 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, we have been pleased to support the legislation, which overall we think is very good, and we have said that to the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe. Indeed, the Government have listened, as have all the Ministers on the Bill, and made significant changes. Now we are left with just two amendments, put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, which deal with two issues that remain outstanding but are of significant importance and deserve our support and consideration.

I want to reference one or two points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, because he made them particularly well. It is a proportionate and reasonable amendment to ask of the Government. There are all sorts of regulations and legislation—the noble and learned Lord referenced them—to which we say small businesses should be subject to, because we believe that it is the right thing to do and the right climate in which those businesses should operate. When it comes to the failure to prevent, the Government point out that 50% are covered by their legislation, which of course leaves 50% that are not.

Throughout the passage of the Bill, many of us have sought to ensure that the failure to prevent—which is a good step forward—applies, as far as possible, to as many businesses as it possibly can. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, asked why we would exclude many small businesses when they are not excluded from other legislation that may be seen as a burden. The argument is hollow and does not cut through. For that reason, and because the noble and learned Lord has put forward an amendment that takes into account what was said in the Commons, it deserves our support. Should he put it to a vote, as I think he suggested he would, we will support him.

Similarly, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, notwithstanding the correction he made to the amendment, brings forward a very important point indeed. One of the great criticisms that is often made about dealing with fraud is that somehow law enforcement agencies are frightened of taking on the people who are committing fraud. I always thought it should be the other way around; the fraudster should be frightened of the law enforcement agency. Yet, for some bizarre reason, it is that way around—that cannot be right. It is not something that any of us want to be the case. Through his amendment, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has tried yet again to push the Government to do better and to do more than what is currently in the Bill. His amendment says to the Government, “Surely we should do better”. Indeed, the Treasury itself should be confident in the work of the law enforcement agencies. Some have suggested that those agencies should be indemnified against any costs they may incur.

I go back to two simple points. First is the point in the amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier: why should small businesses be excluded from this legislation, other than the micro-businesses to which he referred, when we do not exclude them from other legislation that we think is important? Small businesses adhere to that legislation in the same way as other businesses. Secondly, the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, gives us an opportunity to turn the tables and ensure that, rather than the law enforcement agencies being frightened of costs they may incur in ensuring that fraudsters are brought to book, the fraudsters are frightened. That is why, if the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, put their amendments to a vote, we will certainly support them.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I will respond relatively briefly; I think I have rehearsed the majority of the arguments widely and frequently, and there is not much point in saying more to some of them. However, the precise point I was trying to make in my opening remarks is, in essence, about proportionality. My noble friend Lady Noakes referred to that extremely eloquently.

My noble and learned friend Lord Garnier oftens points out that 99.5% of business is exempted, but I repeat that this is very much a judgment call because 50% of economic activity is captured. My noble friend Lady Noakes referred to the opportunity cost and the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, suggested that perhaps this is about businesses not checking whether they in some way have the right procedures in place to prevent fraud, but it is not about that. It is about many other factors that do not involve the business at hand, as my noble friend Lady Noakes referred to. Those other burdens are obviously partially financial, but not fully.

National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Consideration of Commons amendments
Tuesday 4th July 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I begin by saying how much we support the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. I am glad that the Government have listened and come to an amicable agreement with the noble Lord which takes us forward. I thank the Minister for the way he has done that and for the concession that the Government have made on the updating of the memorandum of understanding, although clearly issues remain between the ISC and the Government, hence Motion B1 tabled by my noble friend Lord West, which we support. Aside from the Motion itself, it will allow continuing discussions, and indeed perhaps negotiations, around how the memorandum of understanding can be revised or replaced, including by negotiation, hence its importance.

I think it is really significant that still, even at this late stage of the Bill, my noble friend Lord West, speaking on behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee, which gives parliamentary oversight of the activities of the security services, is not happy with where we have arrived at. I think it is incumbent on the Government to reach an agreement with the ISC. Clearly, as we have heard from my noble friend Lord West this afternoon, we are not in a situation where that has occurred. There are all sorts of issues that remain between the Government and the ISC, as has been evidenced by various things that have happened today, and the Government need to respond to those.

I will add just a couple of other points. One is that the Government gave a commitment during the passage of the Justice and Security Act 2013 and the Minister gave assurances to Parliament that the memorandum of understanding was a live document that would be regularly reviewed and updated. Are the Government of today completely ignoring that commitment that was made to Parliament? If so, we are in a really difficult situation, because it means that parliamentary oversight is undermined by the fact that Ministers making pledges to Parliament can just be ignored in the future by the Government. I say—we often say, all of us say—that we will not press an amendment, on the basis that the Minister, speaking from the Dispatch Box, makes commitments that are read into the record. That is an important part of parliamentary scrutiny. Ministers are asked to do that and Members of Parliament in the other place and noble Lords withdraw amendments. But here we have an example of where the Intelligence and Security Committee is saying that pledges and commitments were made to Parliament that the memorandum of understanding would be regularly updated and the Government have not done that or are still not in agreement with the ISC. I think that is a really important point.

For the avoidance of doubt, I remind your Lordships again that I do not seek to compel the Prime Minister to go to the Intelligence and Security Committee. I shall just say what I believe, and your Lordships will have to make up their own minds. Given that the Intelligence and Security Committee is the oversight body for this Parliament, I would have thought that if the ISC were regularly asking the Prime Minister to attend, the Prime Minister would go—not because he is compelled to go but because it is an important part of that parliamentary oversight and the Prime Minister of our country negotiating and liaising personally with the Intelligence and Security Committee is of real importance. So I say to noble Lords, as others have heard me say before, that all of us would be surprised by the fact that no Prime Minister has been since 2014; nearly 10 years. It has been nine years, in case I am quoted as not being accurate, since a Prime Minister has been. So I gently say that, while I do not seek to compel the Prime Minister, I politely ask the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, whether the Home Office has suggested to the Prime Minister that, in his diary, he might consider going to see the Intelligence and Security Committee when he can.

My noble friend Lord West’s amendment raises several important issues, but the most significant is that we need to send a message through supporting it that the ISC is still not at one with the Government. That is a serious issue and needs somehow to be resolved. I believe that supporting my noble friend’s amendment will continue to put pressure on the Government to ensure that they come to an arrangement with the ISC in the end, such is its importance. If my noble friend chooses to test the opinion of the House, we will be happy to support his Motion B1.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, very much for his words and his engagement on a number of matters throughout the Bill, and for not pressing his Motion. I also thank other noble Lords who have participated in this very short debate, including my noble friend Lord Leigh of Hurley, who brought a very useful perspective on the current state of play with regard to political party donations. I gently remind the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, that donations from foreign powers are already illegal and suggest that the word “consult” means that all political parties will be consulted.

On Motion B, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said that he does not seek to compel the Prime Minister to come to the ISC. That is certainly not the tone of the remarks he has made in a number of debates in this House. It seems to me that he does seek to compel the Prime Minister to attend the ISC. He will know that I have answered before the question as to whether the Home Office and No. 10 Downing Street have had discussions on this subject. I will not answer it again. I have nothing else to say on Motion B, as I have already spoken to it. I ask this House not to insist on its Amendment 122B and to agree with the House of Commons in its Amendment 122C.

Cybersecurity

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Monday 3rd July 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I agree with my noble friend that it is difficult for Governments to keep up with the pace of technological change, but I also reflect on the fact that much of the legislation going through your Lordships’ House at the moment contains many efforts to future-proof it in this area. As I said, I do not agree that this is glacial. I know that the Act is old. The report was delivered only earlier this year and the discussions are very complicated, as I just highlighted.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, if it is not glacial, it is very slow. The point we have heard from both noble Lords is that Sir Patrick Vallance made nine recommendations; the Government have accepted them. We know that cybersecurity is a real problem—the Government accept that—but what everybody is waiting to hear is what the Government intend to do and the timescale.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am trying to answer this question. Sir Patrick Vallance reported in April; it is now July. I do not think that is glacial or particularly slow. The fact is that these are complicated matters that need to be considered very carefully. They involve all sorts of different implications for us all.

Nottingham Incident

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Thursday 15th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, first, I express my deepest sympathy for the families of Grace O’Malley-Kumar, Barnaby Webber and Ian Coates. Our thoughts and prayers are with them, their families and friends and all those affected. I also express my sympathy to the three others who were injured, one of whom I believe remains in critical condition, and obviously I wish them all a very speedy and complete recovery.

I acknowledge the close connections of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, with the city of Nottingham and the fact that he is actively involved with Nottingham University. I ask him to personally convey the thoughts and sympathies of the whole House and the Government Front Bench on this. I took his points very much to heart, and what he said about Nottingham was very powerful, but of course it goes beyond Nottingham: it unites all of us, not just one city, notwithstanding the fact that I thoroughly endorse the sentiments behind Nottingham Together.

The noble Lord asked me a number of questions, particularly around police resourcing for this investigation, and so on. He will know that I am unable to comment on ongoing operational matters. I note that the police have been granted an extra 36 hours to question the suspect following an application to magistrates, and the Home Secretary is of course being regularly updated by the police and other agencies on the ground. That really is as much as I can say about the ongoing investigation, as I am sure he will appreciate, and I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, that I am afraid I cannot speculate as to the nature of the suspect.

The noble Lord also asked me about the victims and the victim support that is available to the families. The families of all the victims are being supported by specially trained officers. Perhaps I could digress from my brief for one moment to say that I watched the fathers of the two deceased 19 year-olds speak, and I do not know how they did it. I commend their bravery. The university is supporting the students’ families and friends as well as staff and the student body. It is working closely with the authorities on the ongoing investigation into the incident.

The Department for Education remains in regular contact with all the various education settings in Nottingham that have been directly impacted by this horrific attack. It has offered its full and ongoing support. Immediate help and support is vital in ensuring that the community can begin to cope and recover. We thank the Nottinghamshire Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner, as well as Nottinghamshire Victim Care and the local community for their calm and proactive response in the wake of the incident.

To go further on the noble Lord’s points, I say that Nottinghamshire Victim Care is currently offering support to anyone who has been negatively impacted by this incident. In addition, the Ministry of Justice-funded Homicide Service was formally stood up to offer its major criminal incident support. From 1 June, the Homicide Service was expanded to include support for those bereaved. Obviously, as the investigation is ongoing, it is entirely possible that other agencies may become involved but, again, I cannot speculate beyond that.

Finally, I join the noble Lord in paying tribute to the police and other emergency services. As far as I understand, it was a very rapid response, and obviously they are doing their very best to bring this investigation to a successful conclusion. I would again like to align myself with all the remarks that have been made.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I very warmly thank the Minister for his remarks.

Illegal Migration Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Committee stage
Wednesday 14th June 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, the answer lies in the words the Home Secretary used this morning in front of the Home Affairs Select Committee. She said:

“We will be publishing it in due course”.


I am sorry to repeat those words again. She added:

“The issue is that there are many unknown factors … upon which the Bill’s success is contingent … For example, … the delivery of our Rwanda agreement. We are currently in litigation and those timelines are out of our control. We need to conclude our litigation relating to our Rwanda agreement. Once we have a clear view of the operability of Rwanda confirmed by the courts, then we will be able to take a very firm view about the economic impact of this Bill. … I would also say that to my mind it is pretty obvious what the economic impact … will be. We will stop spending £3 billion a year on … asylum cost”.


The Bill

“will lead to the cessation of 45,000 people in hotels and £6 million a day. To my mind, those are savings that we cannot ignore”.

I am afraid that I am unable to improve on that.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

The Minister has just asserted that he cannot improve on those words. I put on the record, on behalf of His Majesty’s Official Opposition—other noble Lords can speak for themselves—that that is disgraceful.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am sorry to upset the noble Lord opposite, but that is the best I can do.

Amendment 138, again put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, is similar to his earlier amendment on returns agreements. It anticipates the debate we will come to later today about action to tackle people smuggling. As I do not want to pre-empt my noble and learned friend’s response to later amendments, I will keep my remarks brief at this stage. Suffice it to say that I support the broad intent of this amendment—namely, the need to strengthen the cross-border law enforcement response to modern slavery and people trafficking—but you do not advance such co-operation by setting out in a public document the UK’s negotiating strategy to agree co-operation agreements with other countries.

Moreover, there are also existing established channels which the NCA and others use when working with their counterparts to tackle human trafficking. Where new bilaterals or multilaterals are needed, we will pursue these, but, as I have said, there are well-established mechanisms which already support cross-border co-operation in this area.

In answer to the noble Lord’s questions about specific figures, I am afraid that I do not have those to hand; I will make those available to him later.

Amendment 135, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, looks to the Government to publish an assessment of the likely impacts of the Bill on the use of contingency asylum accommodation and the costs associated with any necessary increase in the use of contingency asylum accommodation. The Home Office is committed to ending the expensive use of hotels for asylum seekers, costing nearly £7 million a day. We recognise the need to take urgent action and will look at all available options for looking at reducing the use of hotels, including alternative sites and vessels. Asylum seekers will be in basic, safe and secure accommodation appropriate for this purpose, while providing value for money for the taxpayer. We are working closely to listen to the local communities’ views and to reduce the impact of these sites, including through providing on-site security and financial support.

Amendment 139, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, effectively seeks to transfer responsibility for the UK asylum system—the national referral mechanism, which considers and provides safe and legal routes and other similar functions—to the FCDO. She acknowledged that this is a probing amendment and put her case. I suspect that the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, gave a rather better explanation than I will give, but I will attempt to explain the status quo. The Home Office is responsible for all aspects of control of the UK border. Managing and controlling legal and illegal migration into the UK, including processing asylum claims and the designation and operation of safe and legal routes, are part and parcel of this strategic function. Different parts of the system cannot, and should not, be considered and managed in isolation.

To take one example, as we have previously debated, our capacity to admit people to the UK through safe and legal routes is impacted by the level of illegal migration, so hiving off aspects of immigration policy and operations to a separate department is a recipe for confusion, disjointed policy-making and ineffective operations. The migration and borders system is highly complicated and this change would serve only to add unnecessary complexity. However, I assure the noble Baroness that the Home Office already works closely with other government departments, including the FCDO, on all cross-cutting matters to ensure that relative interests are considered accordingly during the development and implementation of immigration and asylum policy, and it will continue to do so.

Former Chief Constables: Gross Misconduct

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Monday 22nd May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Many noble Lords have raised similar, very good points in recent debates. I shared this opinion with my noble friend Lord Lexden when we met last week. Having said that, there have been four inquiries into this case and all concluded that there was nothing more to do. However, I heard my noble friend Lord Howell’s concerns and will reflect them back to the department.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I join other noble Lords in congratulating the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, and my noble friend Lord Bach, who have been campaigning on these issues for a considerable period of time. The Minister’s answers are simply not satisfactory. The noble Lord, Lord Lexden, has raised time and again the misconduct of Mike Veale, the former chief constable. The Minister simply comes back with a list of regulations, sends up smoke and does not answer the question. This is a really serious matter that deserves the highest priority from the Government, but we are not getting it. When will the Minister give us the answers that the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, is demanding?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I hope very soon. The noble Lord is also aware that there are a large number of things that I absolutely cannot say—a point I have reinforced from the Dispatch Box on a number of occasions. That will remain the case until this is concluded.

National Crime Agency Investigation: Javad Marandi

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Wednesday 17th May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, the National Crime Agency investigation into the Azerbaijan laundromat is extremely serious, with an alleged $2.9 billion in stolen money laundered through UK companies. An individual with alleged links to this is also being investigated—an individual who gave three-quarters of a million pounds to the Conservative Party and who got an OBE and access to government Ministers. Can the Minister confirm whether this is accurate? In the other place, the Minister said that the National Security Bill is to be considered again in the Lords on ping-pong, as we know, and we may see it return to us. In the light of this investigation, what amendments are the Government going to support in the Lords, or what amendments are they going to bring forward themselves, in order to deal with this and ensure that we all have confidence that there is no dirty money in our politics and that this issue will be addressed at last?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

The noble Lord will be aware that I cannot comment on ongoing investigations; no Minister at the Dispatch Box would. With regard to Mr Marandi’s status in the United Kingdom, he is a citizen of this country, as I am sure the noble Lord is aware, and his honours and so on are a matter of public record. As for political donations, UK electoral law already sets out a robust regime of donations and controls to ensure that only those with a legitimate interest in UK elections can make political donations, and that political donations are transparent. It is an offence to attempt to evade the rules on donations by concealing information, giving false information, or knowingly facilitating the making of an impermissible donation. I think this structure is pretty robust already, and a large number of various Bills, strategies and so on have recently been published which contribute to this debate.

Coronation: Policing

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Thursday 11th May 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

We all supported the actions of the police in enabling the Coronation to take place and praised them for it yesterday, but we also said that certain questions arose. I did not ask yesterday who decided that the Home Office was the appropriate authority to write letters to individual protesters warning them of the consequences of the Public Order Act and telling them what it was about. The Minister always makes a great play of the operational independence of the police, and that it is Parliament that makes the law. What happened with respect to the Home Office doing that? Who signed the letters to individual protesters? Is this a new tactic? Can we now expect the Home Office to write letters to protesters, rather than it being a matter for the police, which I thought it would have been?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I understand it, an operation called the Police Powers Unit wrote to five protest groups to inform them of the changes to public order legislation. It is obviously right that people who may fall foul of changes in legislation should be warned. As to who signed it and where that unit sits, I am afraid I do not know but I will find out.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Committee stage
Thursday 11th May 2023 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Migration and Borders (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for this amendment. Of course, the Government take the compensation of victims of economic crime very seriously, as it is crucial for limiting the harm of these ruthless crimes.

The noble Lord referred to the fraud strategy. I will come back to that in a second. Of course, the object of that exercise, as well as going after stolen money, is to prevent it happening in the first place. So this has to be considered in the round. These are obviously anti-crime measures, as well as enforcement and mitigation measures.

I completely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Fox: fraud is an attack on growth and we should bear in that in mind. Fraud and the reimbursement of fraud, as we know, costs the banks many billions a year already under the existing arrangements, which I will come back to. Clearly, somebody has to pay for that and it is not easy for society to bear, never mind the banks themselves.

Asset recovery powers under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 already provide the court with the ability to prioritise the payment of compensation orders to victims. We have had extensive conversations on all manner of asset seizures and reimbursements, including on the Ukraine question, to which the noble Lord, Lord Fox, just referred. I have absolutely no doubt that those conversations will continue. We are looking at the situation that he described, which developed, as I understand it, overnight. I do not know the details—we will find out.

The Government are legislating, through the Financial Service and Markets Bill, to remove any regulatory barriers to the Payment Systems Regulator making reimbursement mandatory for victims defrauded through the faster payments system. We are therefore already taking active steps to improve compensation routes and consider that there are already means of redress available.

Having said that, I also point to the fraud strategy, which the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, referred to. There is only one relatively small paragraph on this but if he goes to page 24, he will see that the City of London Police

“are also working with the private sector on a limited pilot to explore whether civil debt recovery and other powers can recover more of victims’ money. As this pilot develops, we will review whether there are further civil enforcement powers that could be applied to fraud”.

I will come back to that in more detail, obviously, but clearly it is very much at the pilot stage at the moment. That is explicit in the text. But the interests of victims are being actively considered via the fraud strategy. Again, there is more to be said on that, which I will do shortly.

As I have said before in Grand Committee, victims’ interests are at the heart of the new powers introduced by Part 4 of the Bill, which will allow applications for stolen crypto assets or funds in accounts to be released to victims at any stage of civil forfeiture proceedings. This will ameliorate the negative impacts of criminal conduct, including economic crime.

More widely, and I have referred to this from the Dispatch Box in the Chamber, victims need to have the confidence and trust to come forward to report fraud and to know that their case will be dealt with. That is why we are providing £30 million to the City of London Police to upgrade Action Fraud, which, as noble Lords will know, has not been widely applauded in this House. The new service will use the latest technology to drastically improve reporting and support for victims and provide far greater intelligence to policing, which will allow greater prevention and disruption at scale. The upgrade is already happening. It will be fully operational in 2024 and we are implementing consistent support for victims across England and Wales by expanding the National Economic Crime Victim Care Unit, to which I have also referred.

Where there are overseas victims in bribery, corruption and economic crime cases, the Serious Fraud Office, Crown Prosecution Service and National Crime Agency compensation principles have committed law enforcement bodies to ensuring that compensation is considered in every relevant case, and to using whatever available legal mechanisms to secure it where appropriate.

The Government are also fully committed to utilising suitable means to return the proceeds of corruption to their prior legitimate owner and/or to compensate victims, in line with international obligations under the UN Convention against Corruption. This is set out in detail in the Government’s Framework for Transparent and Accountable Asset Return.

Of course, the private sector also has responsibility for the protection of its customers, and we are increasing that further. Victims of unauthorised fraud, where payment has been taken without the victim’s permission, are already reimbursed by payment service providers. The contingent reimbursement model code has improved the reimbursement by payment service providers of victims of authorised fraud where a fraudster has manipulated the victim into approving the payment.

On the subject of PSPs, the right reverend Prelate made a good point about consumers becoming more savvy. I recently read in a briefing—I cannot remember whether it comes from the Fraud Strategy or some other current initiative—about the level of information sharing by PSPs, which will enable potential victims to identify the platforms that tend to be the most used. If they can be appropriately savvy when looking at those platforms and, perhaps, a little more suspicious and questioning, that will help enormously in stopping this happening in the first instance. I will come back with more detail on that, because I cannot quite remember under which regime that sits.

On the contingent reimbursement model, in 2021, £583 million was lost to APP scams. According to UK Finance data, the faster payment system was used in 97% of APP scams by volume in 2021. Under the contingent reimbursement model code, which is the voluntary scam reimbursement code signed by several major banks, the level of reimbursement is just over 50% of total APP scam losses for those signatory firms. Following PSR action, we expect that consumers will be reimbursed more consistently and comprehensively.

I realise that there is a lot more work to do on this. Clearly, the picture is fast evolving, as I am sure all noble Lords would acknowledge. There is clear intent on the part of the Government to make sure that victims are front and centre in the current regimes and all future planning. With that, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, feels reassured and able to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for that response. I am somewhat reassured, because I believe he has his own personal commitment to this. However, as with many amendments that we have discussed here, you get the feeling that it needs a bit of a boost a surge of urgency.

There is clearly a lot of good will and a lot of good government policy. There is nothing in particular wrong with the Fraud Strategy, which has some really good stuff in it, but the example that the Minister gave from page 24, which was perfectly reasonable, is a pilot. It does not say, “We will change the law”, but “we will review” what the pilot tells us, whereas, if you go back to the much stronger commitment at the beginning of the Fraud Strategy, it gives you some expectation that something will happen. It does not say, “We will review” but “We will ensure”—which is the sort of language that people want to hear—that

“victims of fraud are reimbursed and supported”.

It does not say, “We will review the law” but

“We will … Change the law so that more victims of fraud will get their money back”.


I get what the Minister said—that it is a pilot and a review, which is good—but a pilot and a review is not the same as what is promised in paragraph 7 on page 4 of the Fraud Strategy. We are talking about colossal sums of money and, as the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans pointed out to us, people are embarrassed; large numbers do not know what their rights are under the current law and cannot get their money back. That is the reality. The simple question for the Government, who I am sure want to improve it—there is no doubt about that—is: what five practical things will it mean? We cannot change the past, but we could do something about the future.

I also take the Minister’s point that this is about prevention, too. I absolutely accept that; we need double authentication and so on. I thank the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans for his support and helpful comments in this short but important debate. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for reminding us that businesses and enterprises are also subject to fraudulent activity and that this is about them too. That was an important point to make.

To conclude, I thank the Minister for his response but ask him to speak to his department about how we get that surge of energy into the Bill and make what the Fraud Strategy says a reality so that we make a real difference. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I was not going to say very much but I have been provoked by what the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, have said.

I very much support the thrust of what the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said. One wonders why transparency is such a difficult notion for the Government. I suspect that the Minister will send up smoke by saying that we are all in favour of freeports, that they are a great way of generating employment, and so on. It is certainly what I would say if I were him—that freeports are a great thing for creating jobs and that we should not stand in the way of free enterprise, which is developing enterprise zones in some of the most difficult and challenging areas in the country. However, this is not about that—it is about transparency and knowing how this is funded—so I hope that the Minister does not send up smoke. The issue is transparency; the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, was right to point that out.

I will not repeat the list from the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, of concessions and allowances made to ensure that businesses can operate—perhaps in an area that they would not operate in—as that is something for the Minister to discuss.

On what the noble Lord, Lord Agnew, said, has the Minister had discussions with the noble Lord, Lord Johnson? Is it right that the Government are considering some concessions? Is that what the Minister is going to tell us—that he is going to go away and talk to the noble Lord, Lord Johnson, about what we have just been informed about? Is there hope for this amendment or will the Minister just reject it? Is it something that we will hear more about as we go to Report? Will we get a government amendment on transparency around this issue, if not from the Minister then from the noble Lord, Lord Johnson?

With those questions, I will listen to the Minister with care.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the four noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I also thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for her Amendments 106EC and 106ED. Amendment 106EC would require an overseas entity to apply for registration in the register of overseas entities if it is operating in a freeport. Amendment 106ED would require an overseas entity to apply for registration in the register of overseas entities if it is operating in an investment zone tax site. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his eloquent support for freeports.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Can I clarify that I was saying what I thought the Minister would say, not what I think?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

It was spot on so I suspect that the noble Lord has nobbled my notes at some point.

The economic merits of and progress in delivering freeports and investment zones remain at the heart of the Government’s levelling-up agenda, and good progress is being made. However, that is not quite within the scope of this Bill, so I will focus on the core points raised in relation to corporate transparency and illicit finance. I will endeavour to answer the questions asked of me while noting, as my noble friend Lord Agnew has, that this is not necessarily my specialist subject.

Turning first to Amendment 106EC, I am assured that, throughout the bidding prospectus and subsequent business case processes, freeports were required to set out how they will manage the risk of illicit activity. I will go into this in some detail because it is important and, as I am not a specialist in this subject, I asked for extra detail. These plans were approved by officials in the Border Force, HMRC, the NCA and other relevant crime prevention bodies, including the Home Office, the police, the Department for Transport and DLUHC.

At business case stages, freeports are required to commit to further requirements to mitigate risk. That includes commitments to the OECD’s code of conduct for clean free trade zones and they were required to establish robust local governance structures in place to monitor risk and ensure effective co-operation between relevant bodies with remits to prevent illicit activity. In most cases, that included most of the bodies I have already referenced—the police, NCA, and so on. Those plans were approved by officials who have responsibility for security and preventing illicit activity across government, and they are also required to carry out an annual audit of security each year to ensure that these structures remain effective and the risk mitigations remain robust and relevant. These audits will be reviewed by the Government annually.

Freeport status in no way undermines or weakens existing port security arrangements. Special customs status, which has been noted, builds on, rather than radically departs from, facilitations available elsewhere in the UK, and is available only on specific customs sites within the wider freeport footprint. These are secure sites administered by a specially authorised customs site operator—CSO. CSOs are required to obtain AEO or equivalent authorisation from HMRC, an international gold standard for safety and security, and remain subject to robust ongoing oversight from HMRC. Freeport customs sites therefore uphold the UK’s high standards on security and preventing illicit activity and should not be conflated with some entirely different international free trade zones.

I hope I have been clear that the Government require each freeport governance body to undertake reasonable efforts to verify the beneficial ownership of businesses operating within the freeport tax site. As I have said, freeports uphold the UK’s high standards on security, safety, workers’ rights, data protection, biosecurity, tax avoidance and evasion, and the environment. They are subject to the same legislation and regulation to protect them as the rest of the country. To impose additional requirements on businesses investing in freeport tax sites would directly undermine the objective of freeports: to facilitate investment and regenerate some of the most deprived areas of the UK. The Government therefore do not think it is proportionate to impose this additional cost and administrative burden on freeports compared to elsewhere in the UK, which would also risk acting as a disadvantage for bringing in investment.

I turn to investment zones. The Chancellor announced in the Autumn Statement that the investment zones programme was being refocused to catalyse the development of clusters in areas in need of levelling up in order to boost productivity, growth and jobs. At the Spring Budget, the Government announced eight areas in England that it had identified to co-develop an investment zone proposal with the Government, with a view to agreeing proposals by the end of the year, subject to requirements being met. The Government will work with these places to co-develop proposals, ensuring that the same high standards that are required for freeport tax sites are met for any investment zone tax sites designated.

Given the early stages of policy development on investment zones, it is too early to set out the governance arrangements in any detail. However, I am clear that businesses within investment zone tax sites will need to comply with the same laws and high standards regarding transparency as any other business investing in the UK. I am also afraid that both amendments would duplicate existing requirements on UK-registered businesses. If a business in either a freeport or an investment zone, once established, is a UK-registered company, it is already bound by the requirements to report its people with significant control to Companies House. This information is publicly available on the Companies House register.

It would also partially duplicate the requirements of the register of overseas entities. Any overseas entity owning, buying or leasing land or property in a freeport or an investment zone, once established, would be required to give information about their beneficial owners to Companies House. This information is also available to the public and would help law enforcement track down those abusing freeports for money laundering or other nefarious purposes. In both cases, all information held by Companies House is available to law enforcement, even information which is not publicly available; for example, the information about trusts.

I also draw noble Lords’ attention to the far-reaching impact of the amendments, which refer to “businesses operating” in free ports and zones. A “business” goes beyond companies and similar corporate entities and includes, for example, sole traders; “operating” is also an imprecise term. Let us imagine a truck of goods arriving at a freeport: the amendment would require the freeport governance board to determine the beneficial ownership of the haulage company owning the truck as well as the beneficial ownership of every business whose goods are being carried on that truck. One company may own the truck and another the trailer, both are caught. Under this scenario, even the delivery driver bringing sandwiches to the businesses located in the zone would be impacted by the amendment. I am sure that was not the noble Baroness’s intention and she will say that it could be improved at the drafting stage, but it is worth pointing that out.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th May 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am certainly happy to take my noble friend’s concerns back but, as regards targets, that would invite me to stray into operational matters, which I will not do.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for his reply, although I also share that disappointment. I should have thought that the focus of the noble Lord, Lord Young, speaking on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier—as I am speaking on behalf of my noble friend Lord Hunt—was to ask the Government to bring a report, even if that is not the appropriate way of doing it, and say to them that the operation of UWOs is simply not working as they expected. It is perfectly reasonable for a Minister of the Crown, while of course not interfering with the operational independence of the police or any other law enforcement agency, to look at the legislation and see whether it is working as the Government expected. Clearly, it is not, so it would be a perfectly reasonable response to say that nine applications, four cases and the odd bit since is simply not what anybody would have thought acceptable or thought would happen.

This happens with legislation; even if we had the Government of our dreams, laws would be passed that did not function or operate in the way we would want—but that is the purpose of Committees such as this. This is where, to be frank, Ministers listen to what is said and respond that they will take the matter back and that it is unacceptable, rather than come off saying that it is one tool in the box of government in dealing with the issue.

The Minister had a pop at me. I was only using the facts that are available in a government document called Fact Sheet: Unexplained Wealth Order Reforms. If the facts I am giving the Minister are wrong then, frankly, the Government should have updated the facts, because this is what all of us use in these debates. I have not made it up—I have read the Government’s material. The Minister then turns around and says that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has not got it right, because the up-to-date figures are X, Y and Z against POCA. It might have been helpful to have the key facts.

Again, I read out,

“the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 is a complex and technical Act and reform requires careful consideration and consultation”.

Then the Minister had a go at me and laid out four Acts of Parliament that have been done since. Why were they not included in the key facts? It would have been helpful to everyone to understand the way in which it had been reformed to see whether it is now working and functioning as the Government want it to. I do not have five floors of civil servants providing me with a brief that says there are four pieces of legislation which have updated and improved it. The serious point is that, when I and other members of the Committee depend on the government document setting out the key facts in relation to what we are discussing, it should be up to date. That is the only point I want to make.

I do not know whether the figure that I was going to use is out of date. A number of members of the Committee made the point to the Minister that, if it is hundreds of millions that have been recovered over a number of year, that is peanuts. The reason I say it is peanuts—the Minister will correct me if I have got this wrong—is that Fact Sheet: Unexplained Wealth Order Reforms says under the heading “Key Facts”

“Serious and organised crimes … for example”—


and lays out various things—

“are estimated to cost the UK economy £37 billion per year”.

That is not my figure. The key facts document published by His Majesty’s Government says it is £37 billion a year. I should have thought that the response to what are clearly probing amendments about reports would be, “It is £37 billion a year, we are getting a few hundred million there, we are getting £100 million there, £50 million there”. Why are we not making more of a dent into what we all, including the Minister, regard as simply and utterly unacceptable? The Minister will think it is unacceptable that we have that.

Of course, I shall not move the amendments, but I hope the Minister will take back the bureaucratic point about ensuring that the key facts documents that we use in our deliberations are updated. I hope that he will also talk about the point that unexplained wealth orders were brought in as a way for the Government to address the problem, which the noble Lord, Lord Young, and others mentioned, that huge sums of money surround individuals who have no legal way of explaining how on earth they got them.

I shall raise one other point, because it drove me mad when I was a Member of Parliament and before that a local councillor. On estate after estate, on housing area after housing area, it drove people who went to work mad to look down the road and see somebody who did not go to work driving a Ferrari, or something like that. At an individual level, that is exactly what all of us feel more generally about what is happening nationally and internationally, where people are playing the system. The vast majority of law-abiding business men and women and businesses conform to the law, pay their taxes and do their best—but £37 billion a year is lost to fraud. In answer to the noble Lords, Lord Fox and Lord Young, and me, the Minister talked about getting £10 million here and £100 million there. I am pleased that we got that, but it is peanuts compared to the amount of money that we are talking about. I hope the Minister can take that back—

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As the noble Lord has drawn on the key facts document, it is important for me to provide a bit of clarification. It was published on 4 March 2022 for the previous Bill, not this Bill. Those numbers were correct at the time of publication. On UWOs, they have been applied for—I have said how many times—and two of the applications have been made since the Government reformed the UWO regime last week, which I should have said while I was answering noble Lords. Perhaps that provides a bit more clarity. On the key facts, the three floors of civil servants are in the clear.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Does that committee do an annual report? How often does it meet?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I do not know. I will find out and write to the noble Lord. For now, I hope he will accept that it is not the role of the Government to set up parliamentary committees and so will not seek to press his amendment.

I turn now to Amendment 106EB concerning the Serious Fraud Office. Once again, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for tabling this amendment, which would require the Government to lay in Parliament an annual report on the Serious Fraud Office. The effectiveness of the agencies tasked with fighting economic crime, including the SFO, is of critical importance and of interest to both Houses. That is why the SFO annual report and accounts—these set out much of the information in which the noble Lord is interested—are routinely laid in Parliament.

The law officers of England and Wales superintend the SFO. They oversee the performance of the SFO, including steps that they can take to improve that performance. Through the superintendence process, the law officers identified the need to expand the SFO’s pre-investigation powers, a change that appears in Clause 185 of this Bill. The law officers take steps to ensure transparency, including participating in Attorney-General’s Questions in the other place; publishing summaries of minutes from SFO ministerial strategic boards online; and addressing issues promptly through Written Ministerial Statements.

This is complemented by the work of HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, which inspects the SFO and publishes its findings alongside a set of recommendations. HMCPSI recently published an inspection of the SFO’s case progression—that is, the organisation’s ability to deliver its cases efficiently and effectively. Given our previous discussions, the tone of the debate and the views expressed, I understand that the intention of this amendment is to probe the Government on the resourcing of the SFO.

The noble Lord, Lord Faulks, made a very interesting point; he may have noticed that I wrote my note on the wrong page when I referred to it earlier. I am coming back to it now; it is an interesting idea and I will definitely take it back. There is a process in place to recruit a new director-general of the SFO. I would imagine that acute matters, human resources and future resources are a part of the remit for that person but the noble Lord certainly makes an interesting point. To go back to a conversation during a debate that the Lord, Lord Browne, and I had last week, my personal point of view is that it is about time we all sat down and started to think about recruitment in law enforcement more generally.

[Lord Agnew of Oulton (Con)]

Given that my noble friend the Minister is going to take the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, on recruitment back, I encourage him to look at the report by Andrew Cayley KC, Chief Inspector of the Crown Prosecution Service, who has also done a report recently. Some of the problems in the SFO are case workers not being paid enough, churn and so on, which led to the collapse of the case against G4S. There is big piece of work there that we could be doing stuff with.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

What is the Government’s view on whether the SFO is working?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Those are good questions; I will come on to them.

Funding and resourcing is a subject that is covered in the fraud strategy. I will not go over the details. At the most recent spending review, the SFO received an uplift to its core budget that is supporting its operations. In addition, the SFO continues to have access to reserve funding to fund specific high-cost cases if needed. This enables the SFO to obtain additional funding for any case that exceeds 4% of the core vote funding for the year.

My noble friend Lord Agnew and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, referred to the G4S case. Obviously, it is always disappointing when a case has to be brought to an end before it is concluded but, like other agencies, the SFO is right to end an investigation or prosecution when it is no longer in the public interest. The SFO has acknowledged that there were disclosure challenges in the case that was closed earlier this year, R v Morris, Preston and Jardine. The SFO has made good progress on implementing the disclosure changes recommended by Sir David Calvert-Smith and Brian Altman KC in their independent reviews, published last year. The Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate, the agency that inspects the SFO, has been asked to expedite a planned review of SFO disclosure, which will provide further independent assurance of the SFO’s processes.

Further to that, in Economic Crime Plan 2, which was published on 30 March, the Government set out their intention to explore reforms to the disclosure system to ensure that it supports a fair criminal justice system because cases that are lost on procedural grounds are, as noble Lords have noted, a loss to victims, taxpayers and, of course, society.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, just asked me whether the Government have faith in the Serious Fraud Office. The answer is yes.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Is it working?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I would say that it is the same thing; perhaps we can debate that as well.

The Serious Fraud Office investigates and prosecutes the most complex cases of fraud, bribery and corruption. That is a very challenging remit. It has delivered some outstanding outcomes. For example, last year, it secured the conviction of Glencore for bribery and corruption in five countries, with the company ordered to pay £280 million—the highest ever ordered in a corporate criminal conviction in the UK—as well as eight convictions for five cases of fraud and bribery worth more than £500 million. It consistently recovers some of the largest amounts of proceeds of crime, despite being a fraction of the size of many other national agencies.

It is also important to note the SFO’s role in fighting economic crime globally. In the last financial year, the SFO took steps to assist overseas jurisdictions in their investigations by working on more than 60 incoming money-laundering requests. I think that the statistics answer the question—yes, we have faith, and yes, it is working. I hope that my explanations have provided some reassurance. I therefore ask the noble Lord not to press his amendment.

I turn to the final amendment in this group, Amendment 106EA, again tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. I come to this amendment last as it seeks to bring into one amendment much of what the other amendments in this group also attempt. I will not repeat myself too much here, especially considering how long I have gone on so far. The amendment would require the Government to issue a report on the performance of agencies and departments in tackling economic crime. However, I can assure noble Lords that this is already being done. As I have mentioned, the Government, regulators and law enforcement already regularly give evidence to parliamentary committees. The National Crime Agency is required under the Crime and Courts Act to publish an annual report and lay it before Parliament, further adding to the available scrutiny of operational bodies. The Government already conduct a range of threat and risk assessments to develop our understanding of economic crime. The NCA’s national strategic assessment assesses the economic crime threats facing the UK on an annual basis. As required under the money-laundering regulations, the UK also conducts periodic national risk assessments of money laundering and terrorist financing, which provide an overview of the risks and likelihood of an activity occurring. We have already discussed in detail the establishment of a fund to tackle economic crime so I will not repeat that debate again.

Regarding the amendment’s calls for a strategy on tackling economic crime, this March, the Government published Economic Crime Plan 2. Through 43 actions, it sets out how the public and private sectors will work together to transform the UK’s response to economic crime. Obviously, the fraud strategy is a part of that overarching economic crime strategy.

As regards the quality of the data in the fraud strategy, which was referenced by the noble Lord, Lord Browne, I have just had a quick flick through and it is more recent than six years. I should also reassure the noble Lord that one of the commitments in the fraud strategy is to improve the quality and collection of data, so this can be regarded as a baseline.

There are numerous ways in which the Government report on their performance with regard to tackling economic crime. This amendment is duplicative of them and therefore unnecessary. I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Committee stage
Thursday 27th April 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I said everyone on the Committee —with the possible exception of the noble Lord. I was talking about how people feel about the Bill as drafted, with the carve-out for small and medium-sized enterprises. The noble Lord was referring to something that might include not the small but the medium, and that is a matter for debate, but the general view of the Committee was that the Government’s current carve-out is not acceptable. Where you put the threshold—whether you apply to a little sweet shop at the end of the road with a turnover of a few thousand pounds the same regulation you apply to a multinational company—could be sorted out in regulations, and if we saw them, we could suggest that they take into account the small sweet shop to which the noble Lord referred.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords—too numerous to mention—who have participated in this debate, and I shall try to address all the points put to me, but I apologise if I do not name everybody individually.

I feel I should declare an interest: I have owned and been a director of small businesses, not all of them successful—like my noble friend, Lord Leigh—and to my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier, I declare an interest as a tall man.

I will start with the amendments linked specifically to failure to prevent offences. I welcome the broad support today for the government amendments, which would, I emphasise, cover all sectors, and that includes telecoms companies. I hope that they deliver most of what the other amendments intend. However, I have noted that concerns remain. Obviously, I listened to the debate very carefully, including on the scope and reach of the new offence.

Before I turn specifically to the amendments, I reassure my noble friend Lady Morgan that the fraud strategy really is imminent. She is absolutely right: I am really keen to see it. I say to my noble friend Lord Leigh that his point about accounting principles was very interesting, but the design of the definition of large companies comes from the Companies Act 2006.

I note the wider offence lists put forward in Amendments 96, 97, 98 and 99, tabled in the names of my noble and learned friend, Lord Garnier, my noble friend Lord Agnew, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. In particular, noble Lords seek to ensure that money laundering is covered by the new failure to prevent offence. The Government have consulted with law enforcement and prosecutors, and we are satisfied that all the priority offences have been included.

We have carefully examined the wider offence list and determined that they are not appropriate to include because they would duplicate existing regimes, cause repetition with other existing offences, are too broad or relate to preparatory offences. It is also worth noting that the Law Commission report published in June 2022 agrees with this. It highlighted that Part 2 of Schedule 17 to the Crime and Courts Act 2013, as Amendment 98 suggests, while a good starting point for considerations, would be too broad.

I turn to the proposed failure to prevent money laundering offence, as in Amendment 99, tabled by my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier. The UK already has a strong anti-money laundering regime which requires regulated sectors to implement a comprehensive set of measures to prevent money laundering. Corporations and individuals can face serious civil and criminal penalties if they fail to do so.

A failure to prevent money laundering offence would duplicate the systems, controls and penalties of the existing regime. Furthermore, it would extend anti-money laundering obligations to organisations with very low risk, which would be disproportionate. Any necessary anti-money laundering measures can be implemented through the existing regime. The Law Commission agreed with this point, noting that any offences to cover breaches of money laundering would create additional positive duties on organisations which would overlap with the duties under the anti-money laundering regime.

The Government’s review of the UK’s anti-money laundering regime, published in June 2022, concluded that existing regulatory requirements allow for businesses to take a risk-based approach to their obligations, meaning their compliance activities can be targeted at areas of highest risk of money laundering and terrorist financing. The review also committed the Government to further analysis and public consultation to identify the best path for reform of the anti-money laundering supervisory regime. Further improvements to the UK’s anti-money laundering framework are therefore best targeted by strengthening and improving the existing regime, rather than by the creation of a new parallel regime. The Government have already committed to undertake further consultation on the anti-money laundering supervisory regime and continue to review the anti-money laundering framework.

Amendment 99 in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Garnier also proposes a failure to prevent sanctions evasion offence. The UK can already impose a range of criminal and civil penalties against corporations and individuals for breaches of UK sanctions. Powers were strengthened last year when we moved civil penalties for financial sanctions on to a strict liability basis. Introducing a failure to prevent offence would duplicate the existing regime. On the scope of the offences, government Amendment 84B contains a power in secondary legislation to update the list when required.

I turn to Amendments 84AA, 84CA, 84CB and 84CC, on the threshold for the new offence, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Fox. I thank him for talking me through his concerns last week and I note that most other noble Lords have supported its intention. I will endeavour to set out the Government’s position on this. Our analysis shows that small businesses would be disproportionately affected by the costs of complying with a failure to prevent fraud offence. The total cost to small and medium-sized enterprises would amount to billions of pounds in year one and hundreds of millions in each subsequent year. This would significantly increase the cost of the measure, which is £98.5 million per annum with the threshold included. An affirmative power—

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[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, given the time of day, I shall make a brief comment. I agree with Amendments 91 and 94. On Amendment 94, spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, I ask the Minister directly: why would he not ensure that this Economic Crime and Transparency Bill currently before Parliament did exactly what Amendment 94 suggests? It just does not seem logical. If the Minister and the Government do not do it, this will have been a missed opportunity, and we will come back to this issue and ask why we did not do it now. The amendment is reasonable and makes perfect sense and no doubt the Minister agrees with it, but it needs the Government to say, “We’re going to do it”. If it is flawed then the government lawyers can sort it out, but it is a perfectly reasonable amendment and, in my view, the Government should have no difficulty in accepting it. With that brief comment, I will sit down.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, and my noble friend Lady Morgan of Cotes for their amendments on failure to prevent economic crime, and all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate.

I hope that my comments during our debate earlier today will have provided some reassurance on the Government’s ambitions to take action in this area, including the introduction of a new offence of failure to prevent fraud. These amendments obviously cover some of the same ground so I will seek not to repeat myself too much on issues such as the scope and threshold of the Government’s amendments but to focus more on what I understand to be the wider thrust of Amendments 91 and 94.

Before I get on to that, I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, that the fraud strategy is a couple of hours closer. I remind noble Lords that there is an all-Peers drop-in session on 9 May to discuss the three Bills that are currently under way through Parliament: this Bill, the Online Safety Bill and the Financial Services and Markets Bill. That will bring some of the discussions together, as suggested by my noble friend Lady Morgan. I refute the allegation that the Government are not doing very much. Those three Bills themselves prove that we are indeed intent on fixing many or all of the problems that have been identified—the Government of course take these problems seriously.

I turn to the amendments in this group. The Government’s offence does not extend to services that facilitate fraud—that is, companies whose services are misused by third parties to carry out fraud. Examples include social media and telecoms companies whose services are used to promote fraudulent schemes, as has been pointed out, and banks and crypto exchanges, which fraudsters use to process the payments. If these companies or their employees commit fraud, they will be in scope, but not where their services are misused by others.

The Government agree that companies that facilitate fraud, even if they are not complicit in the offending, must do more to prevent and detect it. In doing so, they can protect their customers and the wider public from fraud, which, as has been discussed at length, causes significant damage to wider society and individuals —we must not forget them. However, we intend for this to be achieved by seeing through existing plans for regulatory and voluntary activity, rather than by creating a new offence which risks duplicating those existing approaches.

Amendment 91, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, proposes a regulatory duty to prevent economic crime, enforced by regulators. In relation to organisations that commit fraud, we can achieve a similar effect that incentivises organisations to put fraud controls in place through the Government’s approach: an offence enforced by law enforcement. Our approach allows all sectors to be in scope, not just regulated bodies, and is less resource-intensive for business and the public sector than establishing new regulatory approaches. In relation to the facilitation of fraud, I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, that action is already under way to tackle this. I will address some of the sectors mentioned in today’s debate and Amendment 91, which I hope will provide some further reassurance.

The Online Safety Bill will require all in-scope tech companies, including social media companies, to take action to tackle fraud where it is facilitated through user-generated content or via search results. They must put in place systems and processes to prevent users encountering fraudulent content through their platforms and to swiftly remove any such content available through their platform. Without wishing to single out any particular company for attention, I reassure my noble friend Lady Morgan that Airbnb, which she referenced, would of course be in scope.

Additionally, there will be a duty on the largest social media and search engines requiring them to prevent fraudulent adverts appearing on their services. The Bill gives Ofcom, as regulator, robust enforcement powers, allowing it to impose significant financial penalties on services that do not fulfil its duties. Ofcom will publish codes of practice to set out further details on what platforms must do to meet their duties under the Online Safety Bill.

The “failure to prevent” offence operates in a similar way to the Online Safety Bill, by setting out reasonable steps to be taken, with the ability to fine companies that fail to fulfil their duties. Expanding the “failure to prevent fraud” offence in the ECCT Bill to cover facilitation of fraud would create duplication for tech companies, which would have to follow two parallel regimes in relation to facilitation of fraud, potentially creating confusion for businesses.

Noble Lords also raised the role of telecoms companies, including the content of messages passed over their networks. The telecoms industry is already extensively regulated by Ofcom, which is active in encouraging the industry to tackle scam calls and texts, including through regulation and guidance. This includes new measures that will take effect shortly to tackle the spoofing or disguising of UK telephone numbers from overseas. As it should be, the telecoms industry has been an active partner in the fight against scams, with broadband and mobile providers signing up to the Home Office’s Telecommunications Fraud Sector Charter and committing to work with the Government to reduce the use of their networks by criminals.

However, it is important to recognise that telecoms operators are not able to view the content of messages passing over their networks. While they employ sophisticated algorithms to identify and block hundreds of millions of fraudulent or scam messages and calls, the rapid evolution of threats creates challenges to pre-emptive action. This means that a facilitation offence could potentially have a disproportionate effect on the industry and the operation of telecommunications in the UK.

Amendment 91 also references the Financial Conduct Authority. The FCA is working closely with banks and other financial institutions to reduce the role they play in facilitating fraud and to identify further controls that can be put in place to protect the public from scams. In addition, the Payment Systems Regulator is introducing new requirements for financial institutions to reimburse fraud victims, which will create strong incentives to improve fraud controls, as noted by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux.

In respect of the Solicitors Regulation Authority, noble Lords will be aware from Tuesday’s debate that Clause 183 of the Bill already inserts a regulatory objective in the Legal Services Act 2007, focusing on promoting the prevention and detection of economic crime. This measure affirms the duties of the regulators, the Legal Services Board and the regulated communities to uphold the economic crime agenda.

The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, also referenced the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales. Amendment 91 also references that organisation and other relevant regulators of accountants. As I said, I am aware that several noble Lords have declared their association with that organisation.

As noble Lords will be aware, ICAEW is a professional and supervisory body for chartered accountants. Its work in areas regulated by law—for example, audit, anti-money laundering, local audit, investment business, insolvency and probate—is monitored by oversight bodies such as the Insolvency Service, the FCA, the Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision, the Civil Aviation Authority and the Legal Services Board. ICAEW has been proactive in the industry fight against fraud, leading the sector in negotiating and delivering the Accountancy Fraud Sector Charter, published in 2021, and is an active member of the counter-fraud community, contributing to all levels of governance across the threat landscape. It is a co-signatory to the Economic Crime Plan and associated actions.

As I set out in our earlier debate, the offence introduced via the Government’s amendments covers fraud and false accounting, while keeping money-laundering responsibilities contained under the existing regulatory regime. That ensures that the offence is targeted, focused on offences most likely to be committed by corporations and where prevention can have the most impact and not duplicative of existing regimes.

I note the wider offence lists put forward under the noble Baroness’s amendment, but—as we debated at length earlier today—we are satisfied through discussions with law enforcement and prosecutors that all the priority offences have been included. There is a power in secondary legislation to update the list when required. We have also touched on the issue of the threshold in the government amendment that means it applies—at least initially—only to large organisations. As I set out earlier, this is to avoid disproportionate burdens on small and medium-sized enterprises and ensure our economy encourages people to open and grow businesses. Of course, we encourage small organisations to take steps to prevent fraud and there are, as I mentioned in an earlier group, existing powers to prosecute small organisations and their employees if they commit fraud, but we need to keep the total regulatory burden in check.

There have been cross-party calls for the Government’s failure to prevent fraud offence both in this House and in the other place, as well as across civil society. The Government have listened and introduced amendments. In addition to the legislative measures proposed, the Government continue to work closely with regulators and wider sectors to tackle fraud and set out the actions expected of industry. I am afraid that the Government therefore view these amendments as duplicative of measures already being taken forward—

Corruption

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Wednesday 26th April 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

When put in numbers like that, no. However, as I have just said, the fraud strategy is due to be published next week. That is a multiagency approach to tackling fraud. It will be outlined in considerable detail.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, can the Minister answer the question put by my noble friend Lord Hain? Why has the UK slumped to its lowest ever score in Transparency International’s global corruption index? How has that happened and what are the Government going to do about it?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I think I have already said what the Government are going to do about it. In terms of analysis, the data indicated that the drop is likely due to two factors. The first is heightened criticism on issues of public sector integrity, which I have already dealt with. The second is criticism of the public procurement processes during Covid. As the noble Lord will be aware, the Procurement Bill currently on Report is dealing with many of those issues. I could go on at significant length about PPE and so on if he wishes.

Licensing Act 2003 (Coronation Licensing Hours) Order 2023

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Wednesday 19th April 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, we too support these sensible measures. The Minister was right in his helpful opening comments to say that the Government are seeking to help people support a hugely significant national event. We warmly welcome the proposals that the Government have brought forward and thank the Minister for them.

On the consultation, I take the general point about health and alcohol, but on this specific occasion the key for me was to look at what the Local Government Association and the National Police Chiefs’ Council said. My understanding, from looking at the Explanatory Memorandum, is that both those organisations were in favour. I take the more general point that the noble Lord made, but on this specific proposal for the weekend of celebration, this is one of those occasions when we can perhaps understand the health risks but allow people to celebrate.

I have a couple of points. First, can the Minister clarify the position of village halls? You can imagine a circumstance where, in a rural village, somebody decides that the village hall would be a good place to have a celebration. I know village halls that just apply to the local authority and off it goes. Are they covered, or will they need an alcohol licence to not be excluded? I am not sure that some of the village halls and community centres often used on special occasions would have the necessary licences, so can the Minister clarify that point?

Secondly, this applies to England and Wales, but can the Minister say something about Scotland and Northern Ireland, particularly with reference to the border? There are other points about that, but I will leave it to the Minister to comment on what has happened with that.

Having said that, we warmly welcome this very good thing to do to celebrate a significant and historic occasion.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords very much for taking part in this brief debate. I am greatly reassured by the broad consensus that His Majesty the King’s Coronation is an occasion of national significance for the purposes of Section 172 of the Licensing Act 2003.

I join my noble friend Lady McIntosh in welcoming a measure that ought to provide some relief to an industry which has been very hard-pressed over the last few years, and I hope that the industry is in a position to make the most of it.

On the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Rennard, I do not have much input in the design of consultations. However, I have heard his points and I will certainly take them back with a view to come back to the issue in more detail in future consultations—there is not much point in raking over the dust on this one.

I think that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, answered the question of why the order falls within the responsibility of the Home Office, as opposed to the Department of Health, rather better than I probably will. This is very much a subject of interest to the police and local government. It is obviously a relatively short extension and therefore the public order considerations are probably rather more paramount under these special circumstances than the health ones—which is not in any way to diminish the longer-term health effects that we all know that alcohol can have.

On the question from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on village halls, I reiterate that the order allows regulated entertainment to continue from 11 pm on Friday, Saturday and Sunday until 1 am the following morning only where a premises licence is already in place.

My noble friend Lady McIntosh asked why Monday is not included. I expect that she will be out until 1 am on the Sunday, so I am amazed—and impressed, if I may say—by her resilience in wanting to get out back on the lash on the Monday. Of course, the following day is a workday, so I look forward to seeing her bright and breezy on the Tuesday morning.

I turn to Northern Ireland and Scotland. In the case of Northern Ireland, this is a devolved issue, and, as I understand it, the Northern Irish Government have chosen not to pursue it. In Scotland, this is matter for local councils to decide. In answer to the question as to whether police forces were consulted, I can say that individual forces were not, but the National Police Chiefs’ Council was, and, as I stated in my opening remarks, it is content with the arrangements as they sit. I really cannot say whether or not the process with local councils in Scotland has concluded, but it is a local matter.

With that, I commend the order to the Committee.

Hong Kong Military Veterans: Settlement

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Wednesday 29th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for those warm words. He is quite right: we met 35 years ago in a small place called Tsim Bei Tsui. Luckily, we have aged so well that we recognised each other immediately.

The estimated number is difficult to arrive at because records were not particularly well kept back in those days. However, the Hong Kong Military Service Corps Association estimates about 1,000 people, which includes dependants. As I said, forms will be available in the autumn. To forestall muttering of “Why so long?”, I am afraid that it is because the necessary changes to the Immigration Rules have to be made first before this can be put into action. Applications will need to be made online at GOV.UK.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I join the Government and others in welcoming the statement that the Minister has made today. I congratulate the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, and I join the noble Lord, Lord Lancaster, in pointing out that I know how much this means to the Minister, from his experience. He deserves a lot of congratulation on this. As we go forward, will the Government ensure that we can have clarity in the statement around terms such as “eligibility” and “families”?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord very much for his warm words. I guarantee that we will commit to providing the clarity he seeks in due course.

Public Order Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Consideration of Commons amendments
Tuesday 28th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I apologise if I misunderstood my noble friend. I was basing my answer on the fact that a report was published yesterday by the Children’s Commissioner that specifically related to young people and strip search. If I misunderstood, I apologise. With regard to stop and search, I would argue that all the criteria for establishing the cordon and the area and so on would mean that the circumstances described by my noble friend would be highly unlikely.

With regard to the Casey report, as I have already said, both the Government and the Met police are taking it very seriously. These are rules that we expect to be followed.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his response and also thank all noble Lords who have participated in this further discussion between us on this incredibly important matter. For the avoidance of doubt, I will be testing the opinion of the House on my amending Motion A1.

At the very beginning, I said to the Minister that one of the things he would do in his remarks was send up smoke. What did he do in his reply? He sent up smoke. What on earth has praying in aid that 14,900 weapons were seized under existing legislation got to do with the legislation we are currently debating? I am delighted that 14,900 weapons have been seized under stop and search powers—as every single Member in this Chamber will be—but they are nothing to do with suspicionless stop and search under Clause 11; I guess they are probably to do either with stop and search with reasonable suspicion, or with Section 60 suspicionless powers, where needed. I said that I support those powers, and I suspect that nearly everybody, if not everybody, here supports them. What I object to, and what is wrong, is using that to somehow speak against my amendments, because it is irrelevant: we are talking not about weapons or terrorism but about protests and using suspicionless stop and search with respect to protests.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, that we lost the debate about taking Clause 11 out: it is in the Bill. So the things that he wants to do—confiscate without suspicion various objects that are used for protest—are not what this debate is about: people continue to be able to do that. We lost that debate: we agreed it here, but it was put back in in the other place, and, given that we respect the will of the elected House, I revised what we were doing to seek to mitigate. That is what my amendment seeks to do: to mitigate this further. It does not stop it in any way.

However, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, that the bigger problem is that the police do not have the confidence to use the existing powers to do the things he wants. Nobody in this House supports the protests we have seen on our streets in the last couple of years. But the Government put up this sort of mirage of “This is what people who oppose what we are suggesting are for”. So people who are for the sort of amendment I am talking about are somehow on the side of protesters who are stopping ambulances, or on the side of people who want to take protests too far. That is a nonsense. What I am against is allowing the unmitigated use of Clause 11 without the safeguards needed.

Every single report from the inspectorate, the police complaints authority or whoever says that, if you are going to use this sort of power, which is the most severe power you can give the police, to stop people without suspicion going about their lawful business—that is the power you are going to give to these people—you have to build in safeguards. My contention is that, even with the concessions that the Minister made, the Government’s safeguards are not sufficient and need to be in the Bill. Why do I say that? I use the evidence in the Casey review. I do not just make it up and say, “Oh, that’d be a good idea”; I use the evidence from somebody who has researched and understood this, talked to people, been out to communities, and said, “This is what needs to be included. If you don’t, you risk carrying on with some of the problems that we’ve got”. The noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, talked about disproportionality, and my noble friend Lady Lawrence and others with experience of this are here. The disproportionality is, frankly, a scar on our society, and now we are now going to extend that suspicionless power, with all that that may entail, without the necessary safeguards in the Bill.

It is not people like you and me who will be stopped and searched; it will be some of the most deprived people in some of the most difficult communities, who already have problems with trust and confidence in the police. We have the opportunity here, through the Casey review, to draw a line in the sand and set the agenda to support our police by saying that we will help them regain the trust and confidence they need. But we cannot do that if the Government are hiding behind saying, “Oh well, we are in favour of getting weapons off the street and stopping these awful protests”. We are all in favour of that, but this is an overreach of legislation which will potentially have very serious consequences for our society.

My amendment simply seeks to mitigate the impact of the suspicionless stop and search power. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that it should not be in the Bill anyway, but, as we have lost that argument, all we are seeking to do is to mitigate its impact. That is a perfectly sensible and reasonable thing to do.

I finish by saying that we are giving our police the most severe power that they can be given: suspicionless stop and search. Just by walking down the street, you could be stopped and searched. We have said that the power is fine with respect to terrorism—but even there we have mitigated it—and we accept that it is fine if it stops murder, gang warfare and all those sorts of things. But it is a totally different set of circumstances to talk about using suspicionless stop and search for protests. That is a step too far and, as such, we should at least mitigate its impact by supporting the amending Motion I have put forward.

National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

3rd reading
Monday 13th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to all noble Lords across the House for their interest in this Bill and for their valuable contributions and co-operation so far. Debate has been consistently informative and constructive. I am extremely grateful for the diligent approach that noble Lords from across the House have taken to ensuring that this vital legislation has received full scrutiny ahead of returning to the other place.

I am particularly grateful for the positive engagement and support of various noble Lords. From the Benches opposite, I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Coaker, Lord Ponsonby and Lord West; from the Cross Benches, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, and the noble Lords, Lord Evans, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile; from the Liberal Democrat Benches, I am grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Marks; and I am also grateful to my noble friends Lady Noakes and Lord Leigh. I hope all noble Lords will join me in thanking the Bill team, policy teams and legal teams in the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice for their hard work in getting the Bill to its current position. They worked phenomenally hard, particularly in relation to FIRS. It is always invidious to single out anyone in particular, but I would very much like to thank the following: Emer Smith from my private office, and Laura Weight, Jack Joseph, Sebastian Graves Read, Grace Bennett, Joe Marshall, Grace Lucas, James Dix and, last but by no means least, Louise Holliday from the Bill team.

I also place on record my thanks to our law enforcement and intelligence agencies, both for their contributions to this Bill’s development and for their enduring work in keeping us all safe every day. It is vital that they have the tools they need to fulfil such a challenging task. The measures in the Bill seek to ensure they are well equipped to tackle the wide range of modern threats that we face in the UK today. I beg to move.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I start by thanking the Minister for his constructive engagement, along with his colleagues, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Bellamy, and the noble Lord, Lord Murray, and others, including his Bill team. The Bill has had significant changes made to it, showing the way this Chamber can improve legislation. That can happen only when a Minister and the Government listen. All of us, I think, appreciate the way the Minister has engaged and made significant changes to the Bill to improve it. We are all grateful to him for that.

I also pay due respect to the contributions of many noble Lords across the House. I pay my respect to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, who we have just heard from on the previous group of amendments, and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, who I am pleased to see in his place. I think the contributions from the noble Lords, Lord Alton, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Pannick, have been significant and have helped to improve the Bill.

The Minister paid tribute to the intelligence and security services, as we all do, because we all have an interest in the security of our nation. We should note that the noble Lord, Lord Evans, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, have attended virtually the whole of the proceedings on this Bill. That says everything about the contributions they have made, but also it also sends a signal to the intelligence and security services to know that two former directors-general have spent all their time contributing to the Bill and advising people both in the Chamber and outside of it. That is of huge significance, not only to this Chamber but to our country. They deserve recognition for that.

I also thank my noble friends Lord West and Lady Hayter for their contributions throughout the Bill, which have helped our thinking as well. I thank my noble friend Lord Ponsonby for his—as I often say now—calming support to my more excitable personality. That helps me enormously in more ways than you can imagine. I also thank—I know they are not here—the noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Marks, for their input, which helped to improve the Bill.

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[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I hope the Chamber will indulge me. I forgot to thank Ben Wood, who is our adviser. I apologise to him for that.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

While the House is indulging, I also forgot to thank my colleagues, my noble friends Lord Murray of Blidworth and Lord Davies of Gower, so I would like to place that on record. I also thank my noble and learned friend Lord Bellamy at the Ministry of Justice.

Bill passed and returned to the Commons with amendments.

National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Report stage
Tuesday 7th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

My Lords, Section 41 of the Terrorism Act 2000—hereafter referred to as TACT —confers a power on a police officer to arrest a person whom they reasonably suspect to be a terrorist. Under Section 41, officers are able to detain someone before charging or releasing them. The Section 41 detention clock allows them to do so for a maximum period of up to 14 days. It is possible for a person to be arrested under Section 24 of PACE then subsequently rearrested under Section 41 of TACT. This might happen, for example, when information comes to light during the investigation indicating that the offence of which the individual is accused has a terrorist connection. Under the current position, the time spent in detention under Section 24 would, in theory, not be counted towards the initial 48-hour permissible period of detention under Section 41. Though counting this time is, in fact, current operational practice, the Government are clear of the need to codify this practice and ensure that the safeguard continues to apply in all future cases. This is what this amendment does, while aligning the power relating to foreign power threat activity contained in Part 1 of this Bill.

Schedule 5 to TACT contains a power under which an officer of at least the rank of superintendent may, by a written order, give to any constable the authority which may be given by a premises search warrant issued by the court for the purposes of a terrorist investigation. The authorising officer must have reasonable grounds for believing that the case is one of great national emergency and that immediate action is necessary. We are seeking to amend Schedule 5 to TACT to create an ex post factum judicial authorisation safeguard. This will require the police to apply to the court for a warrant in relation to any relevant confidential journalistic material seized during the search that they need to retain for the purposes of a terrorist investigation. In the interests of national security, it is right that confidential material should be accessible in cases where the police can show that the action is necessary, proportionate and satisfies the legal tests in these provisions, while pursuing a terrorist investigation.

However, the Government also recognise that press freedoms are extremely important. Therefore, when such material is seized during a search that has been authorised under this urgent procedure, it is right that a warrant must be sought from a judge for its continued retention, and that an application for retention can be ex post factum, after the search itself has taken place. This approach reflects recent case law and ensures that the provisions provide appropriate protection for journalists. This amendment will also align this aspect of Schedule 5 to TACT with the equivalent urgent premises search power found in Schedule 2 to this Bill.

I turn to Amendment 192, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. This amendment seeks to impose on the Secretary of State a duty to implement the recommendations of the Intelligence and Security Committee’s report on Russia. As noble Lords will be aware, the Government published their response to the Russia report on the day the report itself was published, 21 July 2020. Although the report did not itself enumerate specific recommendations, all the recommendations that could be identified in the report were addressed in the government response. A majority of the ISC’s recommendations had already been implemented by the Government before the report was published—for example, those covering co-ordination of HMG’s Russia work, close working with international partners and continued exposition and attribution of malign Russian activity. The then Home Secretary reiterated this in a Statement made to the House on 17 January 2022.

The Government’s response made our approach to tackling the recommendations in the report clear. By introducing effective new tools and powers for the police and security and intelligence agencies, this Bill can rightly be seen as delivering on commitments that the Government made in their response. Noble Lords will also be aware that the Government implement the vast majority of all ISC recommendations. However, there may be occasions when, for reasons including national security, we may not be able to take forward specific recommendations. We do not consider further reporting nor this amendment necessary, given the actions that the Government have already taken in response to the report.

Amendment 193, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, seeks to impose a duty on the Prime Minister to update the memorandum of understanding between the Government and the Intelligence and Security Committee to reflect the changes to the Government’s intelligence and security activities as a result of the Bill. Section 3(2) of the Justice and Security Act 2013 already provides for the ISC to make reports

“as it considers appropriate concerning any aspect of its functions”.

That already gives the ISC the ability to report on matters that fall within its remit so far as is consistent with the MoU—for example, to seek to avoid duplicating the work of other committees. Amending the Bill as proposed might be taken to imply that the ISC required explicit legislative nomination to propose changes to the MoU in relation to changes in intelligence and security arrangements brought in by Bills, which is not the case.

I turn to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire. I am aware that there are concerns about how the now closed tier 1 investor route operated—in particular, concerns that the route was used by those relying on funds that had been illegitimately acquired and those who may have posed a wider risk to the UK’s national security. It was because of those concerns that we committed to a review of visas issued under the route between 2008 and 2015. The Home Secretary made a Written Ministerial Statement on 12 January setting out the findings of that review, including that the review had identified a minority of individuals connected to the tier 1 investor visa route who were potentially at high risk of having obtained wealth through corruption or other illicit financial activity, or being engaged in serious and organised crime.

The Statement of 12 January represents the Government’s substantive response to the commitment to undertake a review and publish our findings. I am aware that some noble Lords would have preferred that the published review had included more information about specific individuals. However, we have had to act responsibly with regard to the UK’s national security. We have sought to strike the right balance between setting out the broad findings of the review and the constraints on disclosing sensitive details, which must be withheld at the request of our operational partners to protect our border, and the vital work of our law enforcement agencies.

I stress that this Government have already acted decisively regarding the risks posed by the tier 1 investor route to the UK’s national security when we closed the route on 17 February 2022. The Government have also been clear that any future visa programme in the investment space must operate on a fundamentally different premise from the previous one, with a far greater focus on skills and impacts, rather than just cash in the bank. I beg to move.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, this is the first opportunity I have had to join other noble Lords in thanking the Minister for the various significant changes the Government have made to the National Security Bill and the improvement they have brought.

I shall speak to my Amendments 192 and 193. Again, I thank the Minister for his various amendments in this group, which are also an important step forward. I will leave the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, who has signed my Amendment 192, to speak to his Amendment 194.

Amendment 192 deals with the recommendations of the July 2020 ISC Russia report. The Minister has addressed some of those but I have one or two questions to ask him before I turn to Amendment 193, which is the real priority for me in this group. The report highlighted the fragmentation of the various bodies. The Minister has spoken about how the Government seek to address that, but we would all like to know how the supposed co-ordination of the government response to the Russia report is being monitored to ensure that it is taken forward, and that what the Government say about the need for co-ordination to tackle fragmentation is made a reality.

The report highlighted again the prominence of dodgy Russian money in London. The Government will say, quite rightly, that they have at last taken action on that. How is that progress being monitored, so that we know how effective it has been, particularly in light of Ukraine? Similarly, can the Government reassure us that the various threats to democratic processes that the report highlighted are being addressed? I do not intend to press Amendment 192 to a vote—I am really just asking about the progress made since the report was published. As the Minister said, the Government’s response was published on the same day, but the question is how we maintain the progress that we all want to see on the various issues raised.

I will try to be as brief as possible on Amendment 193. The ISC’s annual report, published on 13 December 2022, clearly laid out the need to update the memorandum of understanding. That is what my Amendment 193, on which I will test the opinion of the House, seeks to do: to update the MoU the ISC operates under to reflect the changes made by the Bill and those made over the last few years. The Minister himself referenced the various government departments that now have responsibility for different aspects of security and intelligence, a point I will come to in a moment.

Let us remember that the ISC was set up in 1994 to allow for greater parliamentary oversight of these important matters, while respecting the obvious need for national security—an issue brought into sharp focus by the excellent Saunders report on the horrific Manchester Arena attack. The current MoU is out of date. The commitment made by the Security Minister in 2013 during the passage of the Justice and Security Act—that the MoU is a live document that is easily changed—needs to be honoured.

Who oversees the increasing devolution to policy departments of intelligence and security activities? How can parliamentarians scrutinise those when only ISC members with the necessary security clearance can access classified information? The Select Committees supposedly tasked with these various oversight roles are not suitable for that reason, rather than for any reason of capability. They simply do not have the security clearance to look at classified information.

The following departments and bodies are mentioned in the Saunders recommendations: the Department for Education, the Crown Prosecution Service, the Law Commission, the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice—and that is the open part of the report; for obvious reasons, we will not know what is in the closed part. If the ISC oversees all this, as it is perhaps expected to do in light of the recommendations, how will that work with regard to the Department for Education and the various other departments?

Our committee says that the outdated MoU is a real problem, but the Government say it is not. The ISC says it is a problem, but the Government simply dismiss it and say it is not. Can the Minister explain how members of a Select Committee—let us use BEIS as an example—can oversee classified information that informs the work of a body they are responsible for if they cannot see that information? Pages 42 and 43 of the Intelligence and Security Committee annual report lists numerous departments that have various security and intelligence functions they are supposed to oversee, but they will not be able to see the classified information because they do not have the security clearance. The ISC itself cannot oversee this because that is not part of the memorandum of understanding under which it works.

The committee was told, as I said, that the Government do not feel bound by statements made by the Security Minister to Parliament in 2013. So what weight should we give to any Ministerial Statements the Minister makes if, in a few years’ time, the Government can simply say, “We don’t give any weight to what was said in 2013”? Parliamentary Statements by Ministers of the Crown are supposed to be justifications of policy. We all rely on them. Courts rely on them. Many amendments to this Bill were withdrawn earlier because of what the Minister said at the Dispatch Box and the reassurances he gave, yet the Government are saying that they no longer agree with the 2013 assurances given by then Security Minister, so they will ignore them. We are talking not about policy—I understand how policy works—but about process and the need to update it. As I say, that is very disappointing, to say the least.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Before the noble Lord moves on to a different amendment, can he answer my question? How can Select Committee members, who do not have the necessary security clearance, possibly look at and scrutinise classified material on Parliament’s behalf?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

If they do not have the necessary security clearances, they obviously cannot, but, as I said earlier, that is part of the full consideration of the MoU and the various changes to the machinery of government that is currently under way.

National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Report stage
Wednesday 1st March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to say that we very much support Amendment 51 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile; were he to push it to a vote, we would certainly support him in that Division.

I do not want to repeat much of what has been said by my noble friend Lady Hayter and the noble Lords, Lord Carlile, Lord Wallace, Lord Evans and Lord West. However, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Evans, was right to say that, although this is a modest amendment, its consequences are quite serious. There is no doubt that people are concerned about some of the issues that they have read about in the papers around foreign interference in elections and the funding of political parties. One of the things that we often debate in this House is confidence in our democracy and democratic system, including the threats to them and the erosion of that confidence. Sometimes, these may be small steps but they are important ones that can contribute in our trying to do all we can to protect our democracy. People are worried about foreign interference in elections and the integrity of our democratic system.

It is right to point out, as the noble Lord, Lord Evans, did, that, through this Bill, we are requiring significant steps to be taken by businesses, organisations, industry, financial services and all sorts of other bodies to ensure that they conform to certain regulations that protect our national security. It would be right for them to ask, “Why is there one rule for us but another for political parties?” It is quite right that this amendment is supported; I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, will seek to test the opinion of the House and that his amendment is supported by the majority of Members, because it is an important step in protecting the integrity of our democracy in the way that noble Lords, particularly my noble friend Lady Hayter on the Labour Benches, pointed out.

Having said that, I want to ask one practical question with respect to many of the amendments that the Government have brought forward, which, by and large, we support. I want to deal with Amendment 49, the explanatory statement for which says:

“This amendment adds to the definition of ‘political processes’ the activities of groups such as all party parliamentary groups.”


I understand the bit about all-party groups but the implication there is in “such as”. Are the Government saying that the amendment is relevant to other groups? If so, can the Minister explain that to us?

With that, as I say, I very much support Amendment 51 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, because it is very important.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken on this group.

I will start, if I may, by addressing the question from the noble Lord, Lord West, by repeating something that I said in my opening speech; I think it goes some way to answering him. The majority of what we wish to capture in relation to interference with Parliament will be covered by the effect in Clause 14(1)(b)—the limb relating to public functions—as MPs and other officials in Parliament will be exercising their public functions. It is right that we seek to criminalise activity where, for example, somebody is acting for a foreign power and threatens violence to affect how a person exercises their public functions. I hope that answers his question.

In answer to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, about Amendment 49, let me say that he is completely right. The reference to

“the activities of an informal group”

in this amendment is, as I think noble Lords know, designed to capture interference activities in APPGs by foreign powers. We are seeking to capture interference whether or however any person participates in the activities of these informal groups. We expect that to cover MPs and people external to Parliament and government who participate in the actions of such groups, but we also envisage informal groups to include things such as “friends of” groups. The use of the term “acting in that capacity” ensures that we do not capture things such as parliamentary book clubs but instead focus on those caught, such as the 1922 Committee, although they could also be covered by the public functions limb of the test. I hope that clears this up.

I know that Amendment 51 is a duplicate of a previous amendment, now tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. The Government do not believe that this amendment is necessary, I am afraid. I was going to quote myself and say again that UK electoral law already sets out a stringent regime of controls, but I am slightly more reluctant to do so after hearing the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Evans. However, we believe that our regime ensures that only those with a genuine interest in UK elections can make political donations and that political donations are transparent.

I will go into more detail on this point, if I may, because I believe that the noble Lord’s ethical matrix is already in existence. It is already an offence to attempt to evade the rules on donations by concealing information, giving false information or knowingly being involved in an arrangement to facilitate the making of an impermissible donation. This provides a safeguard against impermissible donations via the back door. Political parties must already report all donations over a certain value to the Electoral Commission; these are then published online for public scrutiny. Political parties are by law required to undertake reasonable steps to verify whether a donor is permissible and obtain their relevant details for the reporting requirements. Donations that do not meet the permissibility tests or are unidentifiable must be reported and returned to the Electoral Commission, which also produces guidance outlining how the recipient of a donation can undertake these checks.

As I say, UK electoral law already sets out a regime of donation and spending controls to safeguard the integrity of our democratic processes, so only those with a genuine interest in UK electoral events can make political donations; they include UK-registered electors, UK-registered companies, trade unions and other UK-based entities, as well as otherwise eligible donors such as Irish citizens who meet prescribed conditions and can donate to parties in Northern Ireland. Parties and other campaigners are prohibited from accepting donations that are not from a permissible or identifiable donor. The failure to return such a donation either to the donor or, as I just described, to the Electoral Commission within 30 days of receipt is an offence; any such donations must also be reported to the Electoral Commission. The Elections Act 2022 introduced a restriction on ineligible foreign third-party campaigning above a £700 de minimis threshold.

The transparency of electoral funding is obviously a key cornerstone of the UK’s electoral system. All political parties recognise that third-party campaigners and candidates must record their election spending and report it to the Electoral Commission or their local returning officer; that information is publicly available. For transparency, all donations to political parties and campaigners must be recorded and certain donations must be reported to the Electoral Commission; as I said, these include donations from impermissible donors and donations from the same permissible source that amount to over £7,500 in one calendar year. To ensure transparency, donation reports are published online by the commission for public scrutiny.

To register as an overseas elector, a British citizen has to present ID. However, it is a long-standing principle first introduced by the Committee on Standards in Public Life in 1998 that, if you are eligible to vote for a party in an election, you are also eligible to donate to that party. We believe that overseas electors are important participants in our democracy, but it is only right that they should be able to spend in UK elections in the same way as other UK citizens registered on the electoral roll.

I think that this is a reasonably comprehensive set of rules. There may be some debate as to whether it qualifies as a stringent regime but the fact is that donations to political parties from foreign powers, whether they are made directly or through an intermediary, are illegal. Political parties already have a legal duty to check that all donations they are offered are permissible.

In closing, I very much thank noble Lords for engaging so constructively in this debate. I ask the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, not to press his amendment in this group and ask noble Lords to support the Government’s amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I could not agree more with the noble Lord, and that is why it is so incredible that no Prime Minister has discussed that with the committee since 2014. I say this in relation to my noble friend Lord West’s points about the failure of discussion and people’s failure to involve the committee at an early stage. Had that been done, we would have avoided much of the debate and controversy over Clause 30 or, now, government Amendment 66. My noble friend Lord West mentioned this on behalf of the committee, and I mentioned and highlighted yet again the failure of the Prime Minister to meet it since 2014, which is simply and utterly unacceptable. Something needs to be done about it, and the Prime Minister needs to hear this—I know that the Minister will take this forward.

This is a really serious matter. I could not believe it when I read it, and I do not believe that many noble Lords here would either, as the noble Lord, Lord Beith, reminded us. According to the report, this was a regular occurrence:

“Since its establishment in 1994, and for 20 years thereafter, the Committee met annually with the Prime Minister to discuss its work”.


But, despite repeated requests for suitable dates, we are yet to receive a response. This is unacceptable, and it is why we get the sort of situation that we had with Clause 30.

Notwithstanding that, I thank the noble Lord the Minister and the Armed Forces Minister for their engagement in bringing forward Amendment 66, which is a considerable improvement on what went before. I note the change from automatic exemption to the reasonableness defence. No doubt the Minister can address the issues and questions that my noble friend Lord West raised on proportionality and other areas. It is important that the point of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, is also addressed. With that, we welcome Amendment 66, but we also look forward to the reassurances that my noble friend Lord West seeks on behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who spoke in this debate on Clause 30, the Serious Crime Act 2007 amendment. Before getting into the detail, I very much thank the noble Lords, Lord Beith, Lord West, Lord Ponsonby and Lord Purvis, and the noble Baroness, Lady D’Souza, for their amendments tabled in advance of today’s proceedings. I also thank the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, who have consistently shared their time and expertise with me and my team, across a range of national security matters.

I also extend my gratitude to the Intelligence and Security Committee, which recently took the time to write to the Home Office on this measure and cast a keen and critical eye, with officials, over the Government’s amendment tabled for today. I carefully noted the comments of the noble Lord, Lord West, as did my right honourable friend the Security Minister, who sat on the steps when he made them. I will obviously make sure that we reflect on that internally. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that my noble friend the Leader of the House heard his comments, and I am sure he will reflect them back to the Prime Minister, but I am not responsible for the Prime Minister’s diary, so I cannot go further than that at this point. However, we will return to this subject in group 12, when the ISC MoU will be debated.

The Government’s shift in approach on the SCA amendment reflects our maintained commitment to ensuring that individuals working for UKIC and the Armed Forces are protected when conducting their proper activities in service to this country. The Government’s amendment replaces Clause 30 with a new clause that provides a defence for acts that are offences under Part 2 of the SCA by virtue of the extraterritorial provisions in Schedule 4. This defence would apply to those carrying out the functions of UKIC and the Armed Forces in supporting activities overseas; that is, it will be a defence for a person to show that their act was necessary for the proper exercise of a function of an intelligence service or the Armed Forces. I will shortly go into more detail on the Armed Forces, at the behest of my noble friend from the Ministry of Defence, so please bear with me.

As noble Lords will be aware, the current reasonableness defence in Section 50 of the SCA would cover encouraging or assisting crimes domestically. We believe that it is right that this new defence is limited to where UKIC and the Armed Forces are supporting activity overseas. The territorial applicability of this measure is identical to that of the original clause. This is because the acute issue caused by the SCA offences, and therefore justification for this amendment as presented to the ISC, relates to support to key international partners’ activity overseas.

The defence provides UKIC and the Armed Forces with more reassurance than the current reasonableness defence, in that the defence is based around the proper exercise of the functions of UKIC and the Armed Forces, rather than the more subjective requirement of proving “reasonableness”. We must remember that the tasks we ask these individuals to undertake, and the operational arrangements we have with our international partners, are ever more complex.

We still do not think it is appropriate that a potentially junior member of the agency or Armed Forces should be faced with the legal burden of proving that their activities were reasonable. Instead, the new defence imposes an evidential burden of proof on the individual to raise the defence. Once the defence has been raised, the legal burden would be on the prosecution to disprove it. It must be remembered that this amendment does not change the position for an individual who acts outside of those proper functions; they would remain liable for any wrongful acts. I believe that this strikes the right balance of providing appropriate protection while also having a clear route by which there can be proper legal consideration of any potential wrongdoing.

Noble Lords will now see an explicit responsibility on the heads of agencies and the Defence Council to ensure that their respective organisations have in place arrangements designed to ensure that acts of a member of their service that would otherwise be an offence under the SCA by virtue of Schedule 4 are necessary for the proper exercise of their functions. To be clear, that means that an act could not be considered within the “proper” exercise of a function of an intelligence service if it does not comply with the “arrangements” set by the relevant heads or the Defence Council.

In addition, the Government propose that there is ministerial responsibility for these arrangements; that is, the relevant Secretary of State must consider that the arrangements put in place by the heads of agencies and the Defence Council are satisfactory. Nothing in this proposed defence will change the current compliance and oversight arrangements, such as the Fulford principles and Overseas Security and Justice Assistance guidance, which is monitored by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office—

Prostitution

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Tuesday 21st February 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I think that the noble and learned Baroness is absolutely right; it is something we need to be aware of. Again, a lot of this comes down to reducing demand for sexual services. It is worth point out that the improved guidance has highlighted that Section 53A of the Sexual Offences Act makes it illegal to pay for the sexual services of a prostitute subjected to

“force, threats … or any other form of coercion, or … deception.”

That is a strict liability offence, meaning that it is not a valid defence that the defendant did not know that the prostitute had been subject to force or coercion. That should probably be more widely known.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister has already mentioned the Government’s own report from the University of Bristol published in 2019, which said that “a substantial proportion” of women engaging in sex work did so for financial reasons, with the decision often influenced by

“caring responsibilities, … lack of access to … benefits and support services”,

and lack of access to health services. From the Minister’s responses to previous questions, it is clear that, since 2019, the Government have not done anything—or have they? If so, can he tell us what it is?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, as I tried to explain earlier, part of the problem is that the gathering of evidence to support any particular course of action is proving very difficult. The 2019 review conducted by the University of Bristol had the strengthening of the evidence base as one of its remits, which was one of the Select Committee’s recommendations. But the nature of prostitution makes it very difficult to estimate the prevalence accurately, and the research was unable to identify a single estimate. The nature of this work is evolving and changes completely, and has done over time.

Public Order Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Report stage
Tuesday 7th February 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank my noble friend Lord Anderson for that important point.

My example is that around Parliament Square, we have a designated area. Your Lordships, passing through it, can be stopped. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, has often mentioned that sometimes you have no idea that you are in such an area. I know that all your Lordships would co-operate—we have clarified that it must be an officer in uniform, so we would all stand there. However, if it was tourists who could not speak English, then good luck with that. It may be a young student with no idea that they are being stopped. That would happen. It is in the Bill that it is an offence to resist, and so it goes on. It is a complete overreaction and a disproportionate proposal that the Government are making.

To bring it home, let us think of it on Parliament Square. That is not some obscure place in the back end of London somewhere, or Manchester or wherever. Let us bring it right to our doorstep. When somebody says, “Who made it happen?”, the answer will be that Parliament made it happen, unless it is stripped out of the Bill. Unless it is changed or taken out, it is us.

We have heard from numerous noble Lords today objection after objection to the Bill. I have many objections to it. However, if you hone it down, there cannot be many more pernicious examples than Clause 11. Stopping and searching without suspicion for protests—honestly. Good luck to the Minister in justifying it. I know that his brief will give him all sorts of good arguments but at the bottom, it is a baseless piece of proposed legislation that seriously undermines the right to protest. It will have a chilling effect on many people who are simply protesting in the way that they have always done. I will divide the House when it comes to Amendment 47 and ask your Lordships to stand against Clause 11, to send it back to the other place and say that the Government must think again. It is a disproportionate reaction to a problem which they may perceive and it should be thrown out of the Bill.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, seeks to remove the suspicion-led stop and search measure from the Bill, while that tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, seeks to remove the suspicionless stop and search measure. I understand the strength of feeling expressed by all noble Lords today when speaking to these amendments, but I do not support the removal of these provisions.

Stop and search is a vital tool used to crack down on crime and to protect communities. It is entirely appropriate that these measures are extended to tackle highly disruptive protest offences. The extension of stop and search powers will enable the police to proactively tackle highly disruptive protest offences by searching for and seizing prohibited items which are made, adapted or intended to be used in connection with protest-related offences, such as glue, chains and locks. We know that stop and search has a strong deterrent effect. These measures can prevent offenders from carrying items for protest-related offences in the first place because of the increased chance of getting caught. This was highlighted in the HMICFRS report on the policing of protests, where it was noted that suspicionless search powers can act as a deterrent when circumstances justify use of these powers. I hope that noble Lords will forgive me for repeating this, and there is a difference of opinion with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, but as I explained in Committee, His Majesty’s Inspector, Matt Parr, from HMICFRS reaffirmed his support for the suspicionless measure at the Bill’s evidence session in June.

It is vital that the police are given the powers that they need to reflect the operational reality of policing. In the fast-paced context of a protest, it can be challenging to assert the appropriate level of suspicion needed for a suspicion-led search, which is why the Bill includes the suspicionless provision. The suspicionless power will be usable only if certain conditions are met and in cases where, as we have heard, a police officer of or above the rank of inspector authorises its use in a specified locality for a specified period. This power uses a similar framework to that found within Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 to ensure consistency in police powers and safeguards.

When this House considered the suspicionless power during Committee, much discussion focused on the execution of the search, so I thought it might help to set that out in detail here. As I noted above, this power uses a similar framework to that found in Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. An authorisation for a Section 60 suspicionless order may be given only by an officer of the rank of inspector or above and can be in place for a maximum of 24 hours. The Section 60 order can be extended for a further 24 hours, to a maximum of 48 hours, by an officer of or above the rank of superintendent, but it cannot be in place for more than 48 hours. It is for the authorising officer to determine the geographical area of the order, which will depend on the situation that led to the order being authorised.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, we support the amendment moved by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti and if she divides the House, we will support her in the Division Lobbies. As the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said, a free press is the hallmark of a democratic society; we should remind ourselves of that. In doing so, I reflect again on the really important point made by my noble friend. The amendment is not concerned with the police using their powers proportionately, where appropriate, if criminal behaviour is taking place. It states:

“A constable may not exercise any police power for the principal purpose of preventing a person from observing or otherwise reporting on a protest”.


It is not saying that there is carte blanche for anybody who is observing to do anything they want around a protest, to exploit it for their own reasons and to conduct criminal activity, or that it would prevent the police doing anything about that; far from it. It seeks to allow reporters and others to observe and report to the wider public, to different sections of the country and beyond, who may not even be there or understand what the protest is about. That is important, and this must be an unfettered, protected power. That is why we support the amendment, which is extremely important, among the many other extremely important amendments we are discussing today.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I apologise for my slightly tardy arrival.

Amendment 54, tabled by the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Boycott, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, seeks to establish a specific safeguard for journalists and bystanders during protests. It follows the wrongful arrest and detention of the LBC journalist Charlotte Lynch in November. May I reassure the House that it is not okay? I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, that it is absolutely not okay to arrest a journalist who is doing their job.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, for tabling this amendment, and agree with the need for journalists and innocent bystanders to be adequately safeguarded during protests. The Government are clear that the role of members of the press must be respected. It is vital that journalists be able to do their job freely and without restriction. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and my noble friend Lord Cormack that a free press is the hallmark of a civilised society.

The police can exercise their powers only in circumstances where they have reasonable grounds to do so. Hertfordshire Constabulary has accepted that its wrongful arrests of journalists on the M25 were unlawful. Noble Lords will be aware that an independent review was conducted into Hertfordshire Constabulary’s arrest of journalists during the M25 protests. With your Lordships’ indulgence, I will go into a little of the detail on that. Cambridgeshire Constabulary’s report specifies that:

“The power of arrest is principally governed by PACE 1984 and to be lawful, the arrest must be necessary by reference to statutory powers set out within PACE 1984. Code G provides additional rules and guidance on the use of the power of arrest. Of particular relevance to this operation, it is important to observe the judgement laid out following O’Hara v Chief Constable of Royal Ulster Constabulary 1996—an officer cannot exercise the power of arrest based on instruction from a superior officer. In order to satisfy the requirements under section 24 of PACE 1984, the superior officer must convey sufficient information in order for the arresting officer to develop reasonable grounds.”


I went into that in some detail because Section 24 —“Arrest without warrant: constables”—is very clear. A constable may arrest without warrant

“anyone who is about to commit an offence; anyone who is in the act of committing an offence; anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be about to commit an offence; anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be committing an offence. If a constable has reasonable grounds for suspecting that an offence has been committed, he may arrest without a warrant anyone whom he has reasonable grounds to suspect of being guilty of it.”

Under those criteria, I struggle to see how the primary purpose of being a journalist, which the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, referred to, and reporting on a protest, would ever constitute reasonable grounds.

Going back to the Cambridge case, the constabulary also specified that code G of PACE 1984 gives some separate guidance on necessity criteria:

“The power of arrest is only exercisable if the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that it is necessary to arrest the person.”


It is very clear. We are all protected by those rules and that includes journalists. The review revealed that the issue was one of training and proposed several recommendations to fix this, including ensuring that all public safety officers and commanders carry out the College of Policing and National Union of Journalists awareness training. The constabulary has promptly implemented these recommendations. This is not an issue of law but one of training and guidance, which is already being addressed.

Hillsborough Families Report: National Police Response

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Thursday 2nd February 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, 97 people lost their lives as a result of what happened at Hillsborough on that terrible, awful day 34 years ago. We must never forget what followed: a shameful cover-up of the truth by the police and others, and decades of families, their supporters and the community having to fight and campaign to uncover what actually happened. We again salute their courage. Five years after Bishop Jones’s report, The Patronising Disposition of Unaccountable Power: A Report to Ensure the Pain and Suffering of the Hillsborough Families is not Repeated, why is there still no government response? Can the Minister give us a categoric statement today? When will we get that government response and end the shameful and unacceptable wait for a response to the bishop’s recommendations?

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord that Hillsborough was an awful and devastating tragedy, and its impact is still felt today, especially by the families and the bereaved. My thoughts are with them.

As regards the report, the noble Lord is right: it was published a number of years ago. For the first four years there were criminal proceedings ongoing, and it was felt that it would be inappropriate to publish a response while those proceedings were ongoing. My right honourable friend in the other place, the Policing Minister, yesterday committed that the Government’s response will be published in full in the spring—he has not yet been more specific than that. He has also committed to speed up the work being done on this, and there are still ongoing consultations with the bereaved families.

Metropolitan Police: Criminality

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Wednesday 1st February 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am happy to give that undertaking.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, given the important Question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Lexden, which concerns us all, and the concerns that have been raised in this Chamber, how on earth is it possible to read in the papers this morning the headline: “Retired rogue police invited to come back and fill vacancies”? Reported figures show that 99 recently retired officers who had retired under investigation for misconduct had been invited back; and 253 officers who had received warnings at misconduct hearings were invited to return. How on earth does that restore public confidence in the police?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I have not read the story to which the noble Lord refers, so I cannot comment specifically, but certainly superficially, I agree it does not restore confidence.

National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, with the greatest respect, this is a different Government and we have moved on. The ISC very much has the respect of certainly this part of the Government. If I may say so, I have answered the principal question that was being asked: the Prime Minister will indeed consider the proposed changes in due course.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I understand that the Minister is saying that the Prime Minister will review it, but does he agree with me that it would help if the Prime Minister actually met the ISC? The Intelligence and Security Committee annual report states:

“Since its establishment in 1994, and for 20 years thereafter, the Committee met annually with the Prime Minister to discuss its work, report on key issues … However, the Committee has not had a meeting with a Prime Minister since December 2014. In the previous Annual Report, we stated that we would seek a meeting with the Prime Minister this year; unfortunately, despite requests for suitable dates, we are yet to receive a response from the Prime Minister. The Committee urges the Prime Minister to meet with it as a priority.”


May I ask the Minister to take that message to the Prime Minister? If he is looking at reviewing the MoU in due course, it might help him to meet with the committee.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord makes a very fair point. I will certainly make sure that that message is conveyed. As I have said, the Government do not think it would be appropriate at this point to mandate the Prime Minister to update the MoU as proposed, therefore we cannot support this amendment.

I now turn to Amendment 113. The Committee will be aware that the Government committed to a review of visas issued under the route between 2008 and 2015. The Home Secretary made a Written Ministerial Statement on 12 January setting out the findings of that review, including that the review had identified a minority of individuals connected to the tier 1 investor visa route who were potentially at high risk of having obtained wealth through corruption or other illicit financial activity and/or being engaged in serious and organised crime. The Government have set out the findings of the review of the operation of this route and acted to close it. I think it was in February 2022. I therefore submit that the amendment is not necessary.

I note that the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, was selectively quoting back to me various aspects of the WMS. I might selectively quote back to him—I suppose I am quoting myself here. I also said:

“Given the importance of ensuring the independence of the law enforcement process I am unable to say more on the operationally sensitive work being taken forward in this area. Whilst unable to comment specifically due to operational sensitivity of work - as an example of the range of actions we are taking I can say that we have already sanctioned 10 oligarchs who had previously used this route as part of our extensive response to Russian aggression in the Ukraine.”


I think that gives answers as to why we have perhaps not commented in the detail the noble Lord would like.

The noble Lord, Lord Wallace, has also accused me of not talking enough about certain states and talking too much about our allies. He, I think, suggests that this is for party-political reasons. I am disappointed that the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, would think so little of the Government Front Bench in this House. I gently remind him that, when I am talking about our allies, I am usually responding to questions he has asked me.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, that I am afraid I do not have all the stats he asked for about Russian money, but I will endeavour to find them. I do not know if they sit within the Home Office, but I will find out where they are, and I will happily write to him.

Banks: Forged Customer Signatures

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Monday 16th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I have just said, I am afraid that I am unable to comment on individual cases. I do not know the circumstances of this particular case, but I will find out more.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, these victims of fraud by banks have been waiting nearly four years, following the initial statement from the Minister and others that they would look into this issue. One can only say that, if the banks were the victims of fraud, they would act a lot more quickly than they do when it comes to acting on behalf of their customers who are alleged to be the victims of fraud. I think what they want to hear from the Minister is what “imminently” means? Does it mean next week? Does it mean next month? Does it mean next year? These victims have been waiting too long for justice. It is about time the Government told the banks to get a move on.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, it is not the banks which need to get a move on. As I said earlier, the decision has been communicated to some of the complainants, but the Treasury Select Committee, certain remaining complainants and other relevant parties are not yet aware of the outcome. We should expect all necessary persons to be notified in the appropriate manner; beyond that, it would be unwise of me to comment on operational matters.

National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I start by saying that if the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, is a pupil barrister, I do not know what on earth that makes me. We shall see.

I start with a comment that I know will be supported by all members of the Committee: if the story on the front page of the Sun is accurate, it reminds us of the debt of gratitude that we owe to the security services. They seem to have foiled a plot to import uranium at Heathrow this morning. If that is accurate, it is something that we in this Committee should note, because I know that the security services and those who work on our behalf in all these areas read our proceedings, and they should not mistake or confuse the very real debate that is going on here about the best way for us to go forward, and the best legislative context for us to have for our Armed Forces and our intelligence services, with any sense in which we underestimate or do not respect them fully for the work they do across the world in our interests.

I have objected to Clause 28 standing part of the Bill, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, for his support, because, as it stands, the clause is unacceptable. The Government themselves have said in the other place and in previous debates that they are considering whether the clause needs amending and, if so, how. We all wait with bated breath to see where that has got to. The ISC has said it needs to change, and we know that even with the further closed briefings from the intelligence services to the ISC, it still believes that the clause needs amendment.

Amendment 63A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, and Amendment 64 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, are welcome and important statements of how the Government may deal with the many concerns raised in both Houses. The excellent contributions we had in support of them challenged the Government to say, if they are not the way forward, what is. The Minister’s response to these amendments will be very important and it will be interesting for all of us to know whether the Government are actually listening. Are these amendments to be accepted by the Government and, if not, why not? If they are not, can we expect a government amendment in good time for us to consider it before Report?

Questions that arise for the Minister if the Government do not accept these amendments are clear. The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, as he explained,

“would ensure that the immunity provided to Ministers and officials who assist or encourage crimes under the Serious Crime Act 2007 does not cover torture, murder or sexual offences.”

Indeed, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, mentioned the issue of torture. If this is not to be accepted by the Government, can the Minister clearly and without any qualification say that none of this behaviour would ever be allowed if the clause were to be passed unamended? Remember, we are referring to murder, unlawful killing, torture or sexual offences. A clear and categoric ministerial statement, on the record, with no qualification or prevarication, would help the Committee enormously with respect to that amendment.

Amendment 64 would ensure—as I read it, and the explanatory statement confirms this—that high-level ministerial authority is fundamentally important. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, made the excellent point that high-level ministerial authority must be maintained for the authorisation of the doing of such acts, rather than the weakening or even, as most of us believe, the exclusion of such authority, as Clause 28, as drafted, allows. Is that not the case? Why would the Government object to the maintenance of such ministerial authority, ensuring, in a democracy proud of its traditions, the importance of proper political accountability for decisions that are made? Again, this is a point that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and, I think, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, made. Just as important, if not even more so, is that such ministerial authorisations would be under the supervision of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office—IPCO. This, under Clause 28, now seems not to be the case, whereas independent oversight and accountability seem to me, and I am sure to most of us in the Committee, to be an essential part of such a process.

We know the phrase in the clause as it stands,

“the proper exercise of any function”,

has also caused concern. What does it mean? Who decides whether it is proper or the breadth and potential scope of the phrase? If there is no independent oversight, as required by Amendment 64, who provides it and how? Something as sensitive and crucial as this cannot be left to a few individuals in a closed meeting in an office away from any public gaze or scrutiny. That is unacceptable in a democracy. As it stands, the clause is not acceptable and these amendments seek to improve it. As I and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, have said, we will have to come back to this on Report, either to push an amendment or to agree or disagree a government amendment.

Very serious concerns have been raised about Clause 28 that cannot and should not be ignored by the Government. The ISC has said that the clause needs amending because it is unacceptably broad. Will the Government listen to it, if no one else? Even with the additional briefings, as I have said, it does not believe that Clause 28 is the way forward, even if it accepts that there is a problem that needs fixing.

In justifying Clause 28 as it stands, can the Minister answer some of the following questions? There are currently safeguards, such as ministerial authorisation, the reasonableness test so eloquently outlined for us by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, under Section 50 of the Serious Crime Act and the fact that the DPP must be satisfied that a prosecution is in the public interest, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, properly reminds us time after time. I am grateful that he does so, because that point is lost; it is about not only whether a conviction can be secured but whether it is in the national or public interest for such a prosecution to be pursued. I have faith in the system. I believe that in most cases, if it is not in the public interest, it will not be pursued. That is an open decision that we can question to see whether we agree with it. Why have these safeguards been swept away with respect to such behaviour conducted abroad?

Can the Minister clarify what it means in Clause 28 for something to be necessary for the proper function of the UKIC or the Armed Forces, with no proportionality required? Why have the Government diminished the role and accountability of Ministers in the decision-making structure? As the noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Beith, asked, why does Clause 28 extend this immunity to the Armed Forces? If I have read it right, the Armed Forces have protection under Section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act. Have I got that wrong? Can the Minister clarify why Clause 28, as drafted, appears to extend these immunities to the Armed Forces? As the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, asked, will he give an example of conduct that is the proper exercise of any function of the services but is currently subject to the chilling effect of the 2007 Act and would therefore now be allowed under this Bill? Why can it not be authorised under Section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994 as it stands?

This is an incredibly serious debate, as we have heard from the many contributions from noble Lords. We also know that a huge cross-section of Members of Parliament in the other place expressed their concerns, many with great personal experience. Dan Jarvis MP, Kevan Jones MP, Maria Eagle MP and David Davis MP made excellent speeches asking why the change is necessary and, if it is, why we cannot have something that deals with the perceived problem and commands support, including from our parliamentary oversight committee, the ISC. The ISC was set up specifically to be allowed closed briefings, so that it could advise us on what was appropriate for these difficult matters. How on earth can the Government command the respect and support of this Chamber if the ISC, the committee we set up to have oversight on these matters, does not agree with Clause 28? Why do the Government set themselves against what the ISC is saying and then wonder why we have doubts?

The excellent House of Lords briefing highlights the many comments expressing doubts, particularly the belief that immunity from prosecution for serious crimes committed abroad would be made much more likely and possible under this clause. As Jeremy Wright MP asked, can the Minister explain the difference between acting reasonably under Section 50—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, made this point—and acting in the proper exercise of a function, as this clause requires?

We are rightly proud of the work of our intelligence services and Armed Forces, but we also have a responsibility as a democracy to set a legislative framework that sets, and is seen to set, high standards. Openness, transparency and accountability are part of the price of our democracy. As drafted, Clause 28 undermines these principles and needs at the very least to be seriously amended.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to a fascinating and wide-ranging debate. If the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, is not sure where it leaves him if the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, is a pupil, I am under absolutely no illusions where I am left.

I turn to Clause 28, the Serious Crime Act 2007 amendment. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his advance notice of interest in this measure and the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, for our discussions to date on this Bill. I also very much thank the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, who provided advance notice of their intention to table this amendment and have generously shared their time and expertise with me and the team on this measure, as the critical friends to the national security world that the Committee knows them to be.

I will speak to the purpose of the SCA amendment and the amendments tabled by noble Lords. Respectively, they seek to remove the SCA amendment in Clause 28 from the Bill and replace it with an amendment to Section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994, or ISA, and to add to Clause 28 to ensure that exemption from liability for individual Ministers and officials who assist or encourage crimes under the SCA would not cover torture, murder or sexual offences. However, before I come to that, it is right to express our thanks to those who work tirelessly to keep us safe, as the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Coaker, did, while recognising that we should carefully examine any changes to the law which might regulate or enable their activities.

I will briefly tell noble Lords why Clause 28 is in the Bill and why the amendment to the SCA is necessary. In essence, it is vital that we solve an unintended consequence of the SCA which currently exposes those acting for our intelligence and security agencies—MI6, MI5, GCHQ: the UK intelligence community, which I will henceforth call UKIC—and our Armed Forces to potential legal jeopardy and limits their operational agility. This can limit their ability to keep the UK safe, including through our international collaboration with trusted partners, which is vital in the modern world.

The SCA creates offences when an act is done which is capable of “encouraging or assisting” an offence and the person intends or believes their act may encourage or assist an offence. These offences are complex and were predominantly introduced to ensure the police could tackle those directing serious organised crime—for example, capturing those who knowingly directed violence or the importation of drugs but distanced themselves from criminal conduct. There is no minimum level of contribution to the offence which may be encouraged or assisted; the contribution can be small and indirect and there is no need for an offence to be ultimately committed. I will come back to the noble Lords’ amendment, but say here that these are obviously not circumstances that always lend themselves well to pre-authorisation.

Clause 28 focuses on this very specific area of criminal law which is having an operational impact to the detriment of the UK’s security. It is not a general immunity and it would not change the application of all other criminal law offences. It does not make it legal to encourage or enable torture or rendition or solicit murder and does not limit the offence of misconduct in public office. In addition, Clause 28 does not remove civil liability or change either the UK’s international law obligations or UKIC’s or the Armed Forces’ rigid adherence to these obligations. I will come back to that in a moment.

At present, UKIC and the Armed Forces are required to carefully apply the provisions of the offences, sometimes at fast pace and in critical scenarios, as has been noted, and some of which may have life or death consequences—all while they work with our international partners to help protect the UK. We are talking, for example, about sharing intelligence to combat terrorist attack plots. Delays and limits on activity arise solely due to SCA risks when otherwise seniors are clear that there is no wrongdoing and that the activity represents a proper function of the organisation. The offences in the SCA are therefore creating a “chilling effect”, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, referred to, across UKIC and the Armed Forces in the delivery of their mission, and impacting on their ability to keep our country safe.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I do not believe that there is immunity for that, but I will clarify that if I am incorrect.

Moving on, caution when considering the legality of support to our partners is of course correct and will continue. However, the current impact of the SCA offences means that vital intelligence-sharing opportunities have been delayed or missed, even when UKIC and the Armed Forces are fully compliant with other legal and policy requirements, such as the Fulford principles and the overseas security and justice assistance guidance, which ensure, for example, that support to international partners is in line with our human rights obligations. I have the principles and guidance to hand. If anybody would like me to go through them in detail, I will, but they are long so it will delay proceedings. I will await an intervention, if any noble Lord wishes me to do that.

UKIC’s and the Armed Forces’ adherence to and compliance with the principles are monitored by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office—IPCO—via regular inspections, and they are also routinely scrutinised by the Intelligence and Security Committee. Ministers are directly accountable for the work of the agencies and the legality of their operations. When things go wrong, it is entirely right that there is scrutiny of and accountability for the organisations’ activities, and I commend the important work that the ISC and IPCO undertake in this space. Meanwhile, any individual found to be working beyond the proper functions of the security and intelligence agencies or the Armed Forces will remain personally liable for those actions. This is right and fair.

However, I have heard the views of the House about this clause. The Government are in close consultation with the Intelligence and Security Committee, UKIC and the Armed Forces, and we are carefully reflecting on the views expressed and considering whether a change in approach is appropriate. It is important to note that those who have seen the very sensitive information which is relevant to this issue have agreed that there is a problem to solve—including the ISC, which has seen specific examples—and I am committed to us reaching a consensus on this matter.

Turning directly to the amendment in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Anderson and Lord Carlile, Section 7 of the Intelligence Services Act allows the Secretary of State to give authorisations for acts outside the British Isles, provided that the acts are done as necessary for the proper function of SIS or GCHQ—though not MI5 or the Armed Forces—and that the nature and consequence of the acts will be reasonable. These authorisations are clearly not currently available in all the circumstances in which SCA risks arise. I understand that this amendment seeks to address that gap and provide a solution to the application of the SCA offences. It also seeks to utilise an existing power for ministerial authorisation which is overseen by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. These are obviously legitimate and valuable objectives. Section 7 authorisations provide a carefully used route by which the agencies can seek ministerial approval in advance of planned activities. They require Ministers to consider, in relation to specific acts, whether they are necessary and whether the consequences are reasonable. Once authorised, they can remove criminal and civil liability for those acts.

There will invariably be instances where the SCA risk does not manifest itself initially and becomes apparent only much later. Where a risk is not identified in advance, a Section 7 authorisation would not be sought to cover it. In these cases, those acting for UKIC or the Armed Forces would not be adequately protected should concerns about SCA offences arise later. Further, this scenario could lead to an unintended consequence of seeking to use Section 7 authorisations for hypothetical risks, creating an unhealthy reality in which more conduct is approved than would be otherwise without providing meaningful consideration of those risks. I am sure the House shares our desire to find a targeted solution to that problem. It would be a perverse outcome indeed if this well-intended amendment were to lead to less consideration of the SCA risks rather than more. Whether it is a class authorisation or a targeted one, as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, the reasons why Section 7 authorisations are inappropriate remain the same.

In short, the Government do not believe that Section 7 authorisation is the best solution to the specific operational issue and do not believe it would improve the clarity of the application of the SCA offences to all the complex operational scenarios that arise in ongoing, carefully considered but agile international collaboration. It is more desirable to remove this risk in a targeted way as per Clause 28, avoiding the burden of potentially missing, and/or the overuse of, Section 7 authorisations for SCA risks.

The noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Beith, talked about criminal conduct and authorisation of this for covert human intelligence sources. I think they may have conflated this with the issue at hand. No amendment is being proposed to the criminal conduct authorisation regime which governs the action of agents. We are concerned here with support for our international partners’ activities, so I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Evans, and the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, who articulated this point very well.

I now turn to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, which aims to table provisions which explicitly state that Clause 28 does not cover torture, murder or sexual offences. Again, it is a legitimate attempt to clarify Clause 28. However, it is one which the Government deem unnecessary for reasons that I have partly outlined already but will continue to set out.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Coming back to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, gives me the opportunity to return to an earlier comment from the Minister. Did he say in answer to the question from the noble Lord that he did not think we could assist others if they were conducting operations which involved torture, et cetera—that we could not support that activity? Was he going to clarify that and write to us, or clarify it later on the Floor of this Chamber?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am going to do it right now: there is no immunity for inciting or assisting others to kill or torture.

Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (Codes of Practice) (Revision of Code A) Order 2022

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Tuesday 10th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I start by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who made some important and interesting points. I agree with many of them and I look forward to the Minister’s response.

The Chamber will wish to know that we did not oppose the Motion for this pilot in the other place, but there are also important points that I wish to pose to the Minister to add to those made by the noble Lords, Lord Paddick, Lord Moylan and Lord Hogan-Howe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in another sense, in that this also gives us in this Chamber the opportunity to discuss knife crime, which is clearly an important matter.

We are all horrified by knife crime and the horrific murders, sometimes of young people by other young people, in the most shocking of circumstances—in full public view. Can the Minister start by telling us what the latest figures actually tell us with respect to knife crime? I looked for them before this debate, and some are impacted by the pandemic or use different years as a baseline. What are the actual official figures for knife crime and knife-related murder, and not just in London but across the country? Clearly, whatever the figures are, they are too high, and the fundamental question for this debate is how serious violence reduction orders are expected to help. The noble Lord, Lord Moylan, made the point that knife crime prevention orders were backed as the answer to tackle knife crime back in 2019. They have not even started yet. Why is that, and when will they start?

On the issue of disproportionality, the pilot is for two years. However, supposing that problems emerge around disproportionality before the two years—a point the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, made—is there a mechanism for an earlier review within that two-year period to look at data as it emerges? The Minister in the other place says he is open to this. What does that mean: an interim review after, say, six months, or a year? What does the Government being “open to looking at this” mean?

Can the Minister explain the transition period of six months and how that will work in practice? In particular, how will it impact on an individual given such an order as regards its length? Are all orders for only a six-month duration or just those issued on the last day of the two-year pilot, hence the six-month transition period? It is not clear to me at all, because if you are given an SVRO on the last day of the two years, it can last only for a maximum of six months. If you are given it on the first day of the two-year period, can you be given it for two years, or two years and six months, or can you be given it for six months, then another six months and another six months? Some clarity about who can and cannot be given SVROs is needed.

On the issue of territorial extent, the SVROs will be able to be used only in the four areas—the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, made a good point about how the areas were chosen, why certain other areas were not and why the number four was alighted on, and I think the Chamber could do with some explanation of that from the Government. These four areas are the areas where the orders can be given but, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, mentioned, the concern is that the police power will be applied across England and Wales. How will the data be shared by these four areas with forces across the country? What about Scotland? If somebody who is subject to such an order went to Scotland, what happens with respect to that? How will a police officer be able to know that the individual is subject to an order? Again, the noble Lord, Lord Hogan- Howe, made that point, although I understand that his point was that you would expect it to be on the police database and shared in that way. However, it would be interesting to see how that will work and what the Government’s response would be.

In other debates, we have talked about stop and search, including whether only a uniformed officer can use this power; again, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has made this point forcefully before. With respect to this order, can only a uniformed officer use this stop and search power—particularly given that, as noble Lords will appreciate, it is stop and search that can be done without suspicion? How many officers have now received the College of Policing training on stop and search, and will they be updated with respect to this order?

On the question of pilots, can the Minister look at ensuring that, if, for whatever reason, a future pilot contains one part that is focused on a small number of areas and another part that is to be applied nationally, this is clearly explained—particularly in this case where, as the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, have pointed out, this pilot came about as a result of a concession made by the Government because of the concerns about serious violence reduction orders raised by many noble Lords?

Can the Minister say something to inform us how this pilot will be evaluated by Ecorys? How is it going to do that? What criteria is it going to use to determine whether this pilot has been successful? Will it be fully independent of government? Also, are the Government open to the fact that these pilots may fail and not work? In those circumstances, would the Government be prepared to say that they will not carry on with them? The evaluation is particularly important given the concerns around disproportionality with respect to gender and ethnicity. If the evaluation shows that there are problems, the Government should consider other measures.

We all want to tackle knife crime, whatever its level; there is no difference between us on that. There are real issues for us as a society to deal with, as the Minister in the other place said. I want to point out one statistic that the Minister in the other place used so that noble Lords can see how difficult this is, whatever the level of knife crime. He said that

“young black people are 24 times more likely to be murdered using a knife than those from other communities.”—[Official Report, Commons, Ninth Delegated Legislation Committee, 13/12/22; col. 8.]

We all want something to be done about that. We all accept that that figure is too high. The issue for the Government is how on earth knife crime prevention orders are going to tackle that and other issues related to knife crime across the country. Can the Minister say what else the Government are doing to tackle this problem?

We have this new order alongside other orders designed to tackle knife crime and serious violence. We all hope that they work. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and others pointed out, targeting hot spots, having police on the streets in neighbourhoods, prevention, community engagement and support are also crucial. Many lives, often very young ones, are still being lost. Many families are still affected. Many communities are still affected. Orders such as this one may help, but they must be part of a wider ongoing effort by the police and communities if they are to have the impact that we all want.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have made valuable contributions to this debate.

First, I will address the concerns expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in relation to the territorial extent of the SVRO pilot. I want to clarify that, as I said earlier, SVROs are being introduced on the basis of a pilot in Merseyside, West Midlands, Sussex and Thames Valley police forces. They will be issued only in these four pilot police force areas. However, as the revised PACE Code A sets out, the stop and search powers are enforceable by all constables across England and Wales; the “all constables” point answers the question of whether they will be in uniform, I think, but obviously they would have to identify themselves as such. This is aimed at supporting an operational response across police force areas, allowing constables from non-pilot forces to stop and search individuals subject to SVROs if they travel outside of the pilot area.

The noble Lords, Lord Hogan-Howe and Lord Coaker, asked why we are piloting in those force areas and not with larger forces, where the prevalence of serious violence—

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I am sorry to interrupt; I apologise to the Minister for being rude. I am not clear what he means about whether or not an officer using this stop and search power must be in uniform. This is an extremely important point. I am sorry if it is just me and I did not understand, but I wonder whether the Minister can clarify that point.

Police: Employment and Discipline

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Monday 9th January 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid that I do not know the answer to that; I will have to write to my noble friend.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, the Minister will know that the majority of our police officers do a great job, often in the most difficult circumstances. However, we have seen a number of high-profile cases that have undermined the public’s trust and confidence in our police—cases such as that of Sarah Everard or even of the head of the police watchdog himself having to resign over historic allegations. Is not the question for the Government: what are they going to do to work with the police to restore the necessary public trust and confidence in our police?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I join the noble Lord in agreeing that we owe our police officers—the vast majority of whom do an excellent job—our thanks and praise. He will also be aware that there have been a number of reports published on these subjects. The police forces will be coming back imminently with their responses to the HMICFRS report, to which I referred earlier. As I said, I think the report specified that it will be within 56 days. It is absolutely incumbent on the Government to work with all police forces to ensure that they deliver the highest possible standards.

National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Committee stage
Wednesday 21st December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, we very much welcome Clauses 13 and 14—or however they are now numbered, given the Government’s amendments—as they introduce new offences of foreign interference, given the potential impact on our democratic processes at every level. That is a further reflection of the way that the Bill takes account of the new national security environment and the changing and emerging threats that we face.

As the Minister helpfully outlined, the main effect of the Government’s amendments will be to broaden the offences to include when a person acts recklessly. It appears that that has been brought in to reflect references to “recklessness” in other offences in the Bill and following debate in the Commons. That is very welcome. Can the Minister explain why it was not part of the original Bill, and what has caused the change of thinking in the department for it to bring forward these amendments?

I will also reflect on some of the discussion from the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Purvis, and others, on what is meant by proposed new subsection (2)(e), which refers to

“causing spiritual injury to, or placing undue spiritual pressure on, a person”.

For the benefit of the Committee, it would be helpful if the Government could say more about what they intend, what that encompasses and the thinking that lies behind it. That would be helpful to the Committee in the light of the various comments made.

We also support Amendment 43 from the noble Lords, Lord Purvis and Lord Wallace. We very much support the concept of an annual report on how these clauses protect the integrity of the UK’s democratic processes. I also understand and appreciate, as I think the Committee does, the Minister’s comment about how this is about protecting the country’s democratic processes from foreign interference, not from the normal democratic and political discourse that one would expect. I am particularly grateful for that, having been accused of being a communist and a member of the Revolutionary Socialist Party—I do not know whether anyone ever came across that in my file. More recently, for the new heads of various bodies, I have been called a traitor for my views on the EU referendum. So I stand here accused of being a communist on the one hand—in my younger days, it has to be said—and then having moved to being a traitor for my views.

The serious point I am trying to make, in a humorous way, is that political discourse takes place, as do debate and argument. It is really important for us to understand the difference in the Bill’s intention that the Minister pointed out. For that to be read into the record is really important so that it is not misunderstood; it is clearly not what the Government intend.

Amendment 44, in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Wallace, and of my noble friend Lord Ponsonby, is really important. It was very well articulated by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and the noble Lord, Lord Evans, said that he supports it. There are a lot of arguments for this amendment, but my view is the same as the point the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, made—a really important point, particularly at the current time when there is some disillusionment. Accepting Amendment 44 as part of the Bill would help enormously to instil public confidence, to ensure that people understand that our political parties not only are free from foreign interference through political donation but are seen to be free of it from their statements. Instilling public confidence on that is really important.

I move on to my Amendment 45, which is a probing amendment. I say to the Government that it is not necessarily intended to be added to the Bill, but it deals with an important aspect of this discussion. It is how to deal with the issue of informing the public about what we seek to do and the new threats that they face, and how we raise their awareness of them. There is also the crucial question of how this could be done in real time.

I use the example of Canada to cause us as a Committee to think. Canada has a Critical Election Incident Public Protocol, which lays out a clear and impartial process by which Canadians can be notified of a foreign threat to the integrity of an election. That includes provisions for informing candidates, organisations or election officials whether they have been the known target of an attack. It has processes which state how decisions are made, and by whom, and as to whether a public announcement should be made to alert people to the threat.

As I said, this is a probing amendment, and I am not an expert on the protocol. I am trying to understand the Government’s view. If we were to believe that foreign interference was taking place, at what point would they think it appropriate, relevant or consistent with the security of our nation for the public to be informed of that? I think the public have a right to be involved, potentially in live time.

I think this raises real difficulties. Let me create a scenario: a general election takes place—let us not use the next year or two; let us say in 10 years’ time—and the Government find that that election is being compromised by foreign interference. What happens? How does the Bill deal with that scenario? We are in Committee, which is when we look at detail. I think there is an important question for the Government about public involvement with respect to their knowledge and awareness of the potential for interference that may take place and what they have a right to know if the Government or the services come to a conclusion that there is foreign interference and that it may be compromising an election, whether it be a general election, a local election or some other part of the democratic process. I think that is an important part of this discussion. I think that, far from it being a weakness for the Government of the day, with the security services and others, to say that they are protecting the integrity of the democratic processes such is their importance, alongside that, should it be necessary for them to alert the public, they should have a system, or protocol to which they can refer, dealing with what the consequences of that would be.

This has been an interesting debate at the heart of another important series of amendments because they seek to protect our democratic processes from the foreign interference the Minister pointed out in his introduction. I look forward to his reply to not only my remarks but to the remarks of other noble Lords.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the notably unrevolutionary noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his support for these amendments. I will address his precise question on whether the amendments on recklessness represent a change in government policy and why they are being introduced now. It was always our intention to capture malign foreign interference activity in all its forms with this offence. After the completion of the Bill’s passage in the other place and in light of the comments made in the Public Bill Committee on the lack of an offence that could be committed recklessly, we retested the offence against the operational and policy requirements and we saw that there were examples of conduct, such as where a person’s intention was not to cause an effect but rather to improve their status within relevant organisations of a foreign power, that were at risk of not being in scope for the offence. I hope that answers the question on why it is being done now.

The noble Viscount, Lord Stansgate, asked three specific questions about why recklessness is present in only one of these offences. The fact is that there are three different ways to commit the offence. New subsections (1) and (2)—inserted by Amendment 38—relate to a person’s intention, and only subsection (2) deals with recklessness.

Amendment 43 seeks to introduce a requirement for the Secretary of State to lay a yearly report, from the date of the National Security Bill gaining Royal Assent, assessing the impact which Clauses 13 and 14 have had on protecting the integrity of the UK’s democratic processes. This amendment duplicates one tabled in the other place. We do not consider it to be appropriate to introduce reporting requirements on the subject in isolation from the existing work on democratic integrity or in isolation from wider consideration of oversight and review mechanisms for the Bill.

Amendment 45 seeks to introduce a mechanism to alert the public to threats to the integrity of elections. We do not consider this to be necessary. Clauses 13 and 14 ensure that there are appropriate criminal sanctions for foreign interference. These provisions sit alongside other non-legislative activity. In advance of democratic events, His Majesty’s Government stand up an election cell to monitor and respond to any emerging issues during the election period. The election cell is led by the Cabinet Office and brings together government departments, the intelligence agencies, the devolved Administrations and external partners to ensure a holistic understanding of risks and to drive any necessary mitigations. The National Cyber Security Centre also meets regularly with the UK’s parliamentary parties and works closely with those responsible for core parts of the UK’s electoral infrastructure. Finally, formally established in 2019, the defending democracy programme is a cross-government programme with the overarching objective to safeguard elections and referendums and related democratic processes in the United Kingdom.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am dredging my memory a little bit here, but I remember the Security Minister about a month ago outlining much more about defending democracy. I will have to refer back to the comments he made in the other place, but I am pretty sure they deal with the questions that have just been raised by the noble Lord.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I think this is a really important point about informing and alerting the public in live time. I would be grateful if the Minister could come back having reflected on that for us.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I will certainly have to read all the various information that I can find on the defending democracy programme, which I am pretty sure deals with most of the issues that have just been raised. If I am wrong on that, of course I will make that clear.

Amendment 44 was spoken to by the noble Lords, Lord Coaker, Lord Carlile, Lord Purvis, Lord Evans and others. The amendment seeks to enhance checks on the source of political donations in two ways. First, it seeks to introduce a requirement for political parties to release a policy statement to ensure the identification of donations from foreign powers. Secondly, it requires political parties to include in their annual statement of accounts a statement detailing their risk management approach to donations and the measures in place to prevent the acceptance of impermissible donations. While I understand the intent behind this amendment, let me be clear that UK electoral law already sets out a stringent regime of controls on political donations to ensure that only those with a legitimate interest in UK elections can make political donations and that political donations are transparent. Given that it has been spoken to by most speakers, I am going to go into a bit more detail on this, with the indulgence of the Committee.

Only those with a genuine interest in UK electoral events can make political donations. That includes registered UK electors, including registered overseas electors, UK-registered companies, trade unions and other UK-based entities or otherwise eligible donors, such as Irish citizens meeting prescribed conditions who can donate to parties in Northern Ireland. Parties and other campaigners are prohibited from accepting donations which are not from a permissible or identifiable donor. Failure to return such a donation, either to the donor or the Electoral Commission within 30 days of receipt is an offence and any such donations must be reported to the Electoral Commission. Furthermore, the Elections Act 2022 introduced a restriction on ineligible foreign third-party campaigning above a £700 de minimis threshold.

It is an offence to attempt to evade the rules on donations by concealing information, giving false information or knowingly being involved in an arrangement to facilitate the making of an impermissible donation. This provides a safeguard against impermissible donations via the back door. Political parties must already register donations over a certain value to the Electoral Commission; they are then published online for public scrutiny.

By requiring political parties to detail publicly their approach to mitigating the risk of impermissible donations, proposed new subsection (3) of the noble Lord’s amendment has the effect of providing such donors with the details of mitigations they need to overcome to make an impermissible donation. I am sure that is an unintended consequence, but it is important to oppose this amendment on the grounds that not only do the existing rules mitigate these risks but the amendment itself risks undermining the already strong rules.

National Security Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Committee stage
Monday 19th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

That is quite right. As I said, the problem with the Bill is that there is no indication of what else may be covered by the “safety or interests” of the state, or what the limits of those terms might be. As I have been arguing, and as others have said, as well as the prevention of terrorism and espionage, they could extend to policies on energy, national infrastructure, the protection of water, power, food, health services, transport, law and order, organised crime and immigration controls. The extent of the powers that may be taken in the Bill could be used in relation to a wide range of state interests, not just state interests related to national security or to the defence of the realm. The interests of the state clearly are ensuring that we have enough energy, but should that be covered by a National Security Bill? These are questions that the Minister needs to answer, and it will be interesting to hear his answer.

I will make a couple of final remarks. Like many, I am somebody who has never read the Official Secrets Act 1911, but in preparation for Committee—and knowing the depth of knowledge, experience and wisdom that we have around—I thought it was necessary to make sure I was quoting. The Official Secrets Act 1911 says under “Penalties for spying”:

“If any person for any purpose prejudicial to the safety or interests of the State—”.


The Official Secrets Act 1911 says that it has to be for a purpose “prejudicial” to the interests of the state. Logically, should not defendants or people have the right also to argue that their act was not prejudicial to the state? The Act says that your act has to be prejudicial, so surely you have a right and a responsibility to prove that it was not prejudicial. That argument could take place within the courts or wherever. This argument about someone’s actions in relation to the safety or interests of the state, and whether they were prejudicial, needs some sort of definition. Without it, how on earth do we know whether somebody is going to commit an offence under this Act? It would be for somebody to interpret.

Can the Minister clarify what the Government mean by “safety or interests” of the state? Who determines what they are? How can anybody act against that in a way which does not break the law, whether it be through protests or actions? If I take action outside of an RAF base, protesting against it and trying to disrupt things going in or out, or if I am at the peace camp at Faslane, will that be classed as a protest? Where does it become something that falls foul of the Bill? In other words, where do you draw the line? That is an important question for the Government to answer.

My amendment and those put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, and others say to the Government that it is not good enough just to say the “safety and interests” of the state. What does that mean? People have challenged that over the decades. They have stood up and said that the safety and interests of the state are something that they challenge or do not agree with. Through history, that is how progress and reform have taken place. At the time, those protesting, taking action or conducting various activities have sometimes been accused of undermining national security or acting against the interests of the state.

We do not want to pass a law which leads to more confusion or a greater inability for Parliament to say that these are the sorts of actions we mean. That is the whole point of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Marks, which I support. It says that if it does not relate just to defence and national security, where is the grey zone that the noble Lord, Lord Evans, mentioned? Where do we draw the line? As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, keeps reminding us, we should not abrogate our responsibility on that. It is our fundamental responsibility to try to answer that question.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, once again, this was a helpful debate, as noted by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker. I thank all those who participated. These amendments seek to limit the “interests” element of the “safety or interests of the United Kingdom” test which applies to many of the clauses in Part 1. As noted by many noble Lords, this concept was explored extensively in the other place.

The majority of these amendments change the “interests” element to cover only security or defence interests. This moves away from the safety or interests of the UK test that already exists and is understood in current espionage legislation. Indeed, the Law Commission noted its support of the Government’s decision to retain this term. At the oral evidence session to the Public Bill Committee, it noted that

“safety or interest of the state is consistent with a lot of the wording that already exists within the Official Secrets Act”—

those of 1911 and 1920—and

“avoids what might risk being an unduly narrow focus on national security”,—[Official Report, Commons, National Security Bill Committee, 7/7/22; col. 52.]

as the noble Lord, Lord Evans, noted.

The experience of the Government and the Governments of allied states is that espionage is frequently targeted at and can result in significant damage to all sorts of national interests, some of which may fall outside the scope of security or defence interests. Indeed, any attempt to narrow or define the interests to the UK risks creating a test that is quickly outdated, as the UK’s interests naturally and properly evolve.

A number of noble Lords referred to the Chandler v Director of Public Prosecutions case that was heard in this House in 1964. It concluded that the interests of the state meant the objects of state policy, determined by the Crown on the advice of Ministers. That is noticeably distinct from protecting the particular interests of those in office. I heard what the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, and others said in relation to the 2001 case. However, in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, the Government do not think it can be defined in legislation. It needs to retain flexibility for future threats as they evolve.

For this reason, it would also not be appropriate for the Secretary of State to attempt to define the UK’s interests in a Statement to Parliament, as in the proposed amendment to Clause 1. Notably, these amendments do not include economic interests, interests related to public health, as the noble Lord, Lord Purvis, noted, or interests related to preserving our democracy—to name just a few areas that would be overlooked by them. We know that these areas are targeted by hostile actors, and they should rightly be protected.

I was asked what safeguards are in place to prevent the Government using this legislation inappropriately—

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group relate to the new offences of obtaining or disclosing trade secrets. We support these new offences and agree that the Government should safeguard against threats to the UK’s trade policy. We see them as important amendments. None the less, we have had an interesting and important debate today. As the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has outlined, Amendments 8, 9 and 10 are about trying to understand why the Government believe that the offences need to have such a wide scope and whether narrowing them down would really have the unintended or bad consequences that the Government believe they would.

I have a couple of specific questions for the Government. The Bill says that there has to be a direct link to a foreign power, but suppose somebody obtains information such as a trade secret and sells it not to a foreign power but to a competitor business. Is that covered under the legislation? Is it the case that, under the Bill, to prosecute there would need to be a link from the individual to a foreign power and not just to a competitor within the UK?

The measures in Clause 2(4) to (7)—I think the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, referred to this in his Amendment 11—are really quite important. Why can the offence take place only outside the UK if it is in respect to possession by a UK national, as opposed to a UK national and/or a UK resident, or any other description of persons? Having talked about a narrow definition, I wonder why the Government have restricted the measures in subsections (4) to (7) to a UK national. I would be interested to hear the Government’s answer to that.

An interesting discussion and debate has taken place within the Committee about the JCHR recommendation. It is an interesting point that we will all want the Government to clarify. What is the Minister actually saying to the points from the noble Lords, Lord Carlile and Lord Marks, and the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford? The JCHR quite clearly states that:

“The theft of trade secrets that pose no risk to national security is more properly governed by the offence of theft (and other breach of confidence and intellectual property rules) than through new espionage offences.”


It would be interesting to understand whether the Government think the JCHR is wrong or whether it has a point. If the JCHR is wrong, why do the Government believe it is wrong? Maybe the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, have greater relevance with respect to this Bill. With those few remarks, I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have participated in another lively and entertaining debate. Amendment 8 seeks to add a “safety or interests of the UK” test to Clause 2. Amendments 9 and 10 seek to narrow the definition of a “trade secret” so that it captures only information which is actually subject to measures to protect it. Amendment 11 seeks to expand the scope of a “UK person”. The Government reject these amendments and I will try to explain why.

The offence of obtaining or disclosing trade secrets targets threats designed to undermine our economic prosperity, tackling the whole-state approach to national security adopted by state actors. The Government believe that economic prosperity and national security are inherently linked. You cannot have one without securing the other, and Clause 2 seeks to protect both.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I am not going to disagree with the Minister, but on the question of the letter—and I am pleased that he is writing to me—could he put it in the Library, and do that with respect to all the letters, so that every noble Lord can see his answers to the various questions?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Yes, I am happy to give that reassurance. This is just me flying somewhat solo, so I shall clarify that, but I can think of a number of circumstances where it would very much depend on the corporate. But I shall seek official clearance on that. In light of all those answers, I respectfully ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

Public Order Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th December 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I will respond to the noble Lord. If I, in any way, gave the impression that I underestimated the significance or seriousness of what happened to Charlotte Lynch, that was certainly not my intention. I hope that most noble Lords can see the vehemence with which I support doing something about what happened to Charlotte Lynch and using that—if that is the right way of putting it—as a way of ensuring that the Government respond in a way that protects journalistic freedom across our country, whatever the circumstances.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, before I begin responding to the debate, I start by thanking the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for his most gracious apology, which I am obviously very happy to accept. I also acknowledge that the debate in question was long, free-ranging and somewhat tortuous.

I thank all noble Lords for their contributions on Amendments 117 and 127A. I completely agree with much of the sentiment that has been expressed when speaking to the amendments, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and to which the noble Baronesses, Lady Boycott and Lady Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, have added their names. As I made clear during the debate on the first day in Committee, I share the concerns about the recent arrest of journalists reporting on the Just Stop Oil protests on the M25. The Government are absolutely clear that the role of members of the press must be respected. It is vital that journalists can do their job freely and without restriction, so I agree completely with the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, and my noble friend Lord Deben, that it is a vital part of our democracy that journalists must be able to report without fear or favour.

On the specific case of the arrest and detention of the journalists at Just Stop Oil’s M25 protest, I was pleased to see the independent review into the arrest and detention of the journalists that concluded on 23 November. The statement issued by Hertfordshire Constabulary confirmed that the arrests were not justified and that, going forward, changes in training and command would be made. It acknowledged that it was the wake-up call to which the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, referred. The review has proposed a series of recommendations which Hertfordshire Police has confirmed it is acting on. They include:

“A further review to ensure that any Public Order Public Safety officers and commanders who have not yet carried out the College of Policing National Union of Journalists awareness training are identified and do so within 30 days; Directions to ensure that all commanders have immediate access to co-located mentors”,


to the policemen who are logging activity,

“and public order public safety tactical advisors throughout operations”

and:

“An immediate operational assessment of the number and experience of the Constabulary’s cadre of Public Order Public Safety commanders.”


I hope that the noble Baroness was somewhat reassured by that statement and the confirmation from the constabulary that it clearly got it wrong in that case, as well as the mitigations in place to ensure that it does not happen again.

In answer to the noble Lords, Lord Faulks and Lord Coaker, the police make mistakes. We agree that it was wrong, but we do not legislate for instances where it was clearly a false arrest and, therefore, unlawful.

More widely, I seek to assure noble Lords that the police cannot exercise their powers in any circumstance unless they have reasonable grounds to do so. It is highly unlikely that simply recording a protest creates sufficient grounds for the use of powers. The College of Policing’s initial learning curriculum includes a package of content on dealing effectively with the media in a policing context. In addition, the authorised professional practice for public order contains asection on the interaction of the police with members of the media, including the recognition of press identification.

Both the noble Baronesses, Lady Fox and Lady Boycott, referenced SDPOs, to which we will return later. The noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, specifically asked whether attending two or more events might give cause to one. The answer is no, because they would not be causing or contributing to serious disruption. However, as I said, that is a debate to which we will return.

Therefore, I support the sentiment behind the noble Baroness’s amendment, but I do not think that it is necessary and respectfully ask her to withdraw it.

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Obviously, I defer to the noble Lord’s expertise on matters custodial, but—I am flying solo a little bit here—I imagine that, whatever the erroneous reasons given for the arrest, the custodial sergeant or whoever was in that position felt that some investigation was required.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Does the noble Lord not realise how disappointing his response is in many ways? As the noble Lord, Lord Deben, just said, what happened in Hertfordshire was a real challenge to us to respond to something which seems to threaten journalistic freedom to report on protests. All of us are saying that, for the Government to turn round and say, “Don’t worry: it was a rare occurrence and it won’t happen again—no need to worry” with a shrug of the shoulders is just not the sort of response that one would hope to get from the Government. As I said, I do not believe we live in a totalitarian state, but every now and again a challenge emerges which threatens to undermine aspects of our democracy, and in this case it is journalistic and broadcasting freedom.

I think that we, certainly I, would expect the Government to reflect on what the movers of the amendment said and on some of the many moving speeches, including from my noble friend Lady Symons, and whether there is a need for the Government to act in order to protect one of the cherished freedoms that we have. I think that is what people in this Chamber—if I read again what the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said; the noble Baroness, Lady Boycott, made the point through her amendment; and I have tried to do it through the words that I have said—are expecting from the Minister, rather than simply, “Well, it was just one of those things that happened and it won’t happen again.”

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[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid that I do not know the answer. I will write to the noble Lord with the detail. Regarding the specials, as long as they are trained, surely that is the point.

Chief officers are responsible for demonstrating that they can appropriately mobilise to a variety of public order policing operations at a force, regional and national level in accordance with the national mobilisation plan. The College of Policing sets consistent standards across England and Wales to ensure consistency across forces, allowing officers from different forces to operate in tandem when deployed to other force areas.

The required capacity for public order capabilities is informed by the assessment of threats, harm and risk from the National Police Coordination Centre, as agreed by the National Police Chiefs’ Council. Officials and Ministers in the Home Office regularly probe the National Police Coordination Centre on its confidence that forces can respond to disorder. At present, it assesses that forces are able to meet current protest demands. Forces have been able to use public order resources to respond to incidents including the awful disorder in Leicester in August and September, as well as Just Stop Oil’s recent disruptive campaign on the M25.

Amendment 142A seeks to ensure that statutory guidance issued under Clause 30 is subject to the affirmative scrutiny procedure, rather than the negative procedure, as the Bill currently allows. This follows a recommendation from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, as explained by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, and the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher. I thank the committee for its consideration of the Bill. I hope, but am afraid I doubt, that noble Lords will forgive me for echoing the arguments made in the Government’s response here. SDPOs do not represent a new concept. Successive Governments, dating back at least to 1998 and the creation of anti-social behaviour orders in the Crime and Disorder Act, have legislated for civil preventive orders of this kind, which can impose restrictions on liberty, backed by criminal sanctions. Many of these preventive order regimes include similar provision to that in Clause 30 for the Secretary of State to issue guidance which was not subject to the draft affirmative scrutiny procedure. Guidance issued for serious violence reduction orders is subject to the negative scrutiny procedure. Having said that, I listened very carefully to the speech by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, and I will write to him with an attempt to unravel some of the discrepancies that he mentioned.

We therefore see it as entirely appropriate that the guidance is subject to the negative scrutiny procedure and respectfully encourage noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, the last remark the Minister made, about writing to my noble friend Lord Rooker, was useful. Reflecting in the letter on the comments by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, might be helpful as well.

I will focus on my own amendment. I thank all noble Lords who contributed on it. The reason for it was the need for co-ordinated and updated guidance. I am grateful to the Minister for saying that the updated guidance will come at the beginning of 2023.

You can see why there is a need for clarification. An article in the Daily Telegraph just yesterday, quoting the chief constable of Greater Manchester, Stephen Watson, said:

“criticism of officers by the public for being too slow to clear the protesters was ‘not an unreasonable judgment’.”

He went on to say:

“The public has seen us reacting too slowly, less assertively than they would have liked.”


That is the second-most senior police officer in the country saying that the police should have acted more quickly with respect to the protesters. He goes on—and I am not a trained police officer, just reflecting on what the chief constable said in a national paper:

“I think fundamentally, if people obstruct the highway they should be moved from the highway very quickly. The so-called five stage process of resolution can be worked through”


quickly. He goes on, and here is the point that the guidance needs to clarify. Is the chief constable of Greater Manchester right, or are the other officers? The article says that his argument is that

“officers spent too much time building a ‘copper-bottomed’ case for prosecuting people for offences such as public nuisance rather than arresting them for the lesser crime of obstruction.”

I do not know whether that is right or wrong, but somewhere along the line there needs to be clarification through the guidance package, which we hope will come at the beginning of 2023. It should say that, to deal with protests quickly and robustly but according to the law, these are the options available in coming to any decision. The chief constable of Greater Manchester is clearly saying that the police could have done better by using the lesser offence of obstruction. Is he right or wrong? The guidance may be able to sort that out for us. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I will make a couple of brief comments in support of the amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, forcefully made the arguments for Amendment 150, and I will not repeat them. I also support my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti’s amendments —she also made the arguments.

I will add one thing to the amendments of my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester—obviously spoken to by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Chelmsford. Amendment 147 talks about the “vetting, recruitment and discipline” of specialist officers. It is especially important that these amendments have been tabled. I know that the Government will be as worried, concerned and appalled as the rest of us in the week where we have seen the resignation of Michael Lockwood as the director-general of the Independent Office for Police Conduct due to a criminal inquiry. My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti made a point about vetting. I have no idea what the process or procedure was when Mr Lockwood got the post, but one wonders about the vetting that took place, and this raises the question yet again. We will not have a big debate about all this, but I think that what my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti’s amendments get at is that, if we are to restore public confidence, we have to address some of these issues. Unfortunately, at the moment, we seem to have one thing after another which undermines the valuable work that so many of our officers do.

I will raise one other point about commencement. The noble Lord, Lord Carlile, raised the issue of Section 78 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022. Talking about the commencement of the Bill, he was worried about Section 78’s definition of

“Intentionally or recklessly causing public nuisance”


and how it related to the provisions in Bill. Before the commencement of the Act, as it will be, some clarification of how it relates to Section 78 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 would be helpful for our police forces as they interpret the law.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for tabling their amendments; I absolutely understand the sentiment behind them. It is obviously important that the measures passed in the Bill are continually subject to inspection, reporting and scrutiny by the relevant bodies, such as HMICFRS. However, I remind noble Lords that the use of police powers is already carefully scrutinised by public bodies such as HMICFRS and the Independent Office for Police Conduct. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, will forgive me for not referring to the ongoing case against the departing chief.

Independent Cultural Review of London Fire Brigade

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Tuesday 29th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, female firefighters groped and beaten, a black firefighter having a noose put on his locker, and a Muslim firefighter having sausage and bacon sandwiches stuffed in his pocket—these are all awful examples, among many more, from the appalling report on the culture of the London Fire Brigade published yesterday. The report says that such abuse was shockingly often dismissed as being just banter. Do the Government agree that this has to be a watershed moment? How are the Government going to work with the London Fire Brigade commissioner, Andy Roe, to deliver the much-needed cultural change quickly? What evidence is there that this is a much wider problem than just London, and what are the Government going to do about that? Being shocked is one thing, but what is needed is action.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

I agree with the noble Lord; the report written by Nazir Afzal makes for deeply troubling reading indeed. The London fire commissioner, Andy Roe, commissioned this review due to his significant concerns about the culture in his own service. The review also followed the tragic suicide of Jaden Matthew Francois-Esprit, a trainee firefighter; my thoughts and sympathies are obviously with his family. I know that all noble Lords will share our sadness and shock at the testimony of those who shared their experiences for this review, to whom I pay tribute for their courage. I assure the House that the Government have taken and continue to drive action in this area. The London fire commissioner has accepted all 23 recommendations in the report, also stating that he will be fully accountable for improving culture. We will take a very close interest in how he intends to implement this.

Counterterrorism: Martyn’s Law

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Wednesday 23rd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I agree with my noble friend that the campaign has been conducted in a very dignified manner. Of course, I express my sympathies with all the victims and their families. As I say—I cannot improve on this answer—the legislation will come forward as soon as parliamentary time allows.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, we are not going to let the Minister off the hook with that. My noble friend Lord Harris has been campaigning with Martyn’s family on this issue for years. It has been five years since the Manchester Arena bombing. It is not good enough for the Minister to say that this will be done as soon as possible, “We are trying to do it expeditiously”, et cetera. When will we see this legislation put into practice to honour the memory of those who died at Manchester and elsewhere?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am sorry to disappoint the noble Lord again, but I will have to stay on the hook. The fact is that it will be as soon as parliamentary time allows. I cannot improve on that answer.

Public Order Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Committee stage
Tuesday 22nd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. In answer to the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, about the duration of the previous debate, we are of course a self-regulating House.

We believe that stop and search is a vital tool to crack down on crime and protect communities. The Bill extends both suspicion-led and suspicionless stop and search powers, enabling the police to proactively tackle highly disruptive protest offences by searching for and seizing items which are made, adapted or intended to be used in connection with protest-related offences, such as glue, chains and locks. The powers can also act as a deterrent by preventing offenders carrying items for protest-related offences in the first place because of the increased chance of being caught.

The suspicion-led powers in Clause 10 will help the police manage disruptive protests more effectively, as police officers will have the power to stop and search anyone they reasonably suspect is carrying items that could be used for locking-on, obstruction of major transport works, interference with key infrastructure, public nuisance, obstruction of the highway and the tunnelling offences.

The suspicionless powers in Clause 11 build on the Government’s plan to give the police the powers they need to prevent serious disruption at protests from happening in the first place. In high-pressure, fast-paced protest environments, it is not always possible for officers to form reasonable suspicion that individuals may be about to commit an offence. That is where suspicionless powers are important, and reflect the operational reality of policing.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked about the wording in Clause 10(g). Of course,

“intentionally or recklessly causing public nuisance”

are legally well-understood terms which are found in much other legislation.

The suspicionless stop and search power will be usable only if certain conditions are met, and in cases where a police officer of or above the rank of inspector authorises its use in a specified locality for a specified period. This power uses a similar framework to that found in Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 to ensure consistency in police powers and safeguards. The rank of inspector aligns with existing stop and search powers to ensure consistency.

In answer to the earlier question of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, a Section 60 order cannot be extended beyond 48 hours. PACE Code A is also clear that a suspicionless stop and search should be reasonable and no bigger than needed.

In terms of the size of the area that designations would cover, as I said earlier, our intention is to mirror the approach used in Section 60. The geographical extent of a Section 60 order depends on the situation that led to the order being authorised, so it is for the authorising officer to determine. PACE Code A states that the authorising officer should specify a fixed location for the boundary of the search area, whether that is a street name or a divisional boundary, and not make the area wider than is necessary for the purpose of preventing these suspected offences.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Will the Minister reflect on his remarks about a specified locality and his analogy with Section 60? That deals with terrorism. Suspicionless stop and search may well encompass a huge area, as this Parliament has accepted on the basis that a terrorist may travel hundreds of miles to target people. This is about protest and protesters. Is the Minister saying that the Government see that as analogous? I find that difficult to comprehend.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The fact is that the search area should not be wider than necessary for the purposes of preventing the potential offences. I do not believe it is analogous to terrorism, but that is quite clear.

The noble Lord also asked how the geographical extent of a no reasonable suspicion stop and search order is communicated. It is for police forces to determine how and whether to communicate the geographical extent of such an order under Section 60, and this will be the case for the new suspicionless powers in the Bill. But although forces are no longer required to communicate whether a Section 60 order is in place, many continue to do so where they judge it to be operationally feasible, to help deter criminals and enhance community trust and confidence. It is very common for forces to use their social media channels or websites to communicate the extent of a Section 60 order.

The noble Lord also asked about officers in plain clothes. This power only extends to those in uniform. 

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I think I explained, we are basing these powers on Section 60.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

Is the Minister telling this Chamber that a plain clothes officer in the middle of Lambeth, Manchester, Newcastle or Cardiff can stop a car without suspicion, without anybody knowing that there is a suspicionless stop and search operation going on?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Our intention is to mirror the approach used in Section 60. I said that very clearly earlier. I have already explained its geographical extent.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am afraid I cannot.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

This is extremely serious. It is exactly the point that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is making and what we are trying to clarify. When can a non-uniformed officer use these powers and when can they not?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I apologise to the noble Lords, but I have nothing more to say on the subject. I have tried to explain how this relates to the Section 60 powers. Our intention, I say again, was to mirror that approach.

Public Order Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Committee stage
Wednesday 16th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

That is captured. As I say,

“A person commits an offence if they have an object with them in a place other than a dwelling with the intention that it may be used in the course of or in connection with the commission by any person of an offence under section 1”.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

On this issue of intent, Clause 6 creates a criminal offence of obstructing “major transport works” but the Constitution Committee notes that unlike Clause 1, 3, 4 and 7, intent or recklessness are not required for an act to constitute an offence under Clause. Can the Minister explain why?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Not at this point, I will have to write to the noble Lord.

Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (Consequential Amendments) (No. 2) Regulations 2022

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Tuesday 8th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, we opposed the clause in the Act that sought to extend the power of the Secretary of State to deprive citizenship without giving a reason or telling a person that it has happened. We voted to remove that clause, as we were not convinced by the Government’s arguments that the power they were seeking was just and proportionate. However, we supported significant amendments, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has just pointed out, which were accepted by the Government, to add safeguards to the process. I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, for his leadership on those amendments. As far as that is the case, we accept that the regulations before us today comprise one of those necessary and proportionate safeguards being implemented.

I remind the Chamber that the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, restricted the range of circumstances in which notice can be withheld, introduced various judicial safeguards and said that the Secretary of State should review those safeguards. The Explanatory Memorandum states:

“This instrument is the first stage in establishing”


the process of application to SIAC and:

“Once the procedure rules are made … applications … can commence.”


We would like to know the timeline for this. How many other stages are there, given that the Government say this is the first stage and given the controversy there was about the introduction of this power and the fact that the House voted for the inclusion of these safeguards, which enabled the clause to be passed? When are all these safeguards going to be put in place? Can the Minister explain what the current procedure is? Is there any use of this power at the moment without these safeguards?

With those brief comments, we support this SI as proposed by the Government.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful for this short debate. I appreciate the strength of feeling about deprivation of citizenship, but I feel I need to repeat what I said earlier: maintaining our national security is a priority for this Government. On the specific point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, this is very much about the mechanics of how a deprivation decision is conveyed to the individual concerned, and it recognises that it may not be possible to give notice in certain exceptional circumstances. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked specific questions about when it starts. I cannot answer him at this moment, so I will write on that point, and to explain more clearly exactly how it happens now, if that is acceptable.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister. Given the importance of this issue, will he place a copy of that letter in the Library? I think all noble Lords would like to know those answers.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Absolutely; I am very happy to do that.

Given that we seem to have arrived at a conclusion, to finish, this instrument is the first step in creating the important safeguards which will hold the Government to account in relation to decisions to deprive a person of citizenship without giving them notice. As I said earlier, a separate instrument amending the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (Procedure) Rules 2003 will be laid in due course, but for now I beg to move.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 (Offensive Weapons Homicide Reviews) Regulations 2022

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Tuesday 8th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I join the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in thanking the Minister for the withdrawal of the SI with respect to serious violence prevention orders. He is to be commended for that, and we are very grateful that he has thought again about it.

We supported these provisions to extend homicide reviews to offensive weapons cases during the passage of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act and we welcome that the provisions are being piloted before being rolled out. We also welcome the fact that the Act requires the Secretary of State to report to Parliament on the operation of the pilot before a further rollout can take place. Again, that is a very sensible way forward for this legislation.

To build on some of what the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked, the Explanatory Memorandum states:

“It has been estimated that 72 OWHRs may take place across the pilot areas throughout the 18 month pilot.”


It would be interesting to know how the Government have worked that number out, and again, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked, how the various pilot areas have been identified by the Government.

On funding, the Explanatory Memorandum states that the number of anticipated reviews

“includes a 20% optimism bias to ensure funding for all necessary reviews is available. Costs to the Home Office per review have been estimated as £1,222 to each of the three relevant review partners (totalling £3,666) and £8,688 for an independent chair.”

Again, how have those figures been arrived at? For clarity, can the Minister confirm that the review partners will be fully funded by the Home Office for their work on such reviews, and does that include staffing costs?

One of the issues raised during the Bill’s passage was that recommendations made in existing reviews, such as domestic homicide reviews or indeed the under-18 reviews that the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, just referred to, are too often not acted on or shared as they should be to force change and create improvement. That is the whole point of the reviews: to inform practice and for people to learn.

I know that the Government intend to establish and fund the Home Office oversight board to oversee the introduction of the offensive weapon homicide reviews and to monitor and implement recommendations. The Explanatory Memorandum references the funding of the oversight board. However, can the Minister give us any other details about the crucial point? Once the review has happened and various recommendations have been made, how are those recommendations to be followed through so that the learning from the review is implemented by all the various partners? It would also be interesting if the Minister could say a little more about what the membership of that oversight board is likely to be and whether there are any functions that he could share with us. On relevant review partners, they can appoint a lead agency or an independent chair to take forward the review. Will all relevant review partners involved in a particular case be required to agree to this course of action?

I will address just a couple of specifics from the legislation—I know it is unusual in the Chamber, but this is effectively an SI that would normally be in Grand Committee. Part 2 of the legislation deals with the duty to arrange an offensive weapons homicide review. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made a really important point: who triggers the review? It is not clear to me from reading Part 2 of the legislation who does it. It just talks about all the various partners. However, somebody has to say that there should be a review and seek to have one take place. I do not know whether the noble Lord or any other Members of your Lordships’ House noticed that, but I could not see it. Unless I have misread it, not understood it or not seen it somewhere, I cannot see who triggers that review. That is important for the reason that the noble Lord mentioned. If it is a chief police officer, what happens if, bluntly, they do not want to, or it is the local authority and it does not want to, or it is the health body, which is the other statutory partner, and it does not want to because it is not in its interests?

For reasons of transparency, the difficult questions sometimes need to be asked. People would rather they were not asked, and it is not clear to me from reading Part 2 who has the duty to do that and what happens if they do not fulfil that duty when other partners think they should. It would be helpful if the Minister could explain that to us.

As I said, given that this is equivalent to what would normally take place in the Grand Committee room, I want to ask about the conditions that may trigger a review obligation. The conditions are that

“one of the following has been located— … the body of the person who died”;

I understand if the body of the person who died is located, but, for the second trigger, it says,

“or part of the body of a person who died.”

I am not trivialising this, but what do we mean by a part of a body? Without going into detail, fairly obviously, there is a difference between the whole of a top half and a toe. Again, I am not trivialising this, but it would be helpful for our understanding of the legislation to know what a “part” means.

I join the Minister and, no doubt, every Member of your Lordships’ House, in saying that we all want a reduction in the level of homicides, for whatever reason. Hopefully, a review of what has happened with respect to homicide through the use of offensive weapons will inform practice in future which will lead to a reduction in the number of homicides. On that, can the Minister tell us what is the trend at the moment for the number of homicides using offensive weapons, so that we have some understanding of the scale of the problem?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Once again, I thank noble Lords for their thoughtful contributions and questions, and I shall do my very best to answer all the points raised.

Both noble Lords asked about the pilot areas. It will perhaps help if I clarify what the areas are and how they were chosen. In London, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, highlighted, they are the boroughs of Barnet, Brent, Harrow, Lambeth and Southwark. In the West Midlands, they are Birmingham and Coventry, and in Wales it is the South Wales Police force area, which includes Swansea, Neath, Port Talbot, Bridgend, Rhondda, Merthyr Tydfil, Cardiff and the Vale of Glamorgan. The pilot is being focused on the local authorities within those three areas that, combined and based on historical data over the past five years, it is estimated may expect approximately 50 to 75 homicides of adults involving an offensive weapon during the pilot. I fear I cannot answer the question of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about coterminous borders with police and crime commissioner areas, but I will endeavour to find out whether there is an answer and, if there is, I shall write to him.

As for the proportion of homicides, that is a very good question. In 2021-22, there were 709, so it is up to about 10%, notionally, covered by the areas of the pilots. I would say that the homicide levels of recent years have been affected by the pandemic, and the numbers are skewed by mass victim incidents, to some extent. In 2020-21, obviously Covid-affected, there were 568 homicides. In 2019-20, there were 716, but 39 of those involved the lorry in Essex. The numbers are a bit confused in that way. I will endeavour to find out how many involved serious weapons, because, unfortunately, I do not know the answer—I apologise.

Both noble Lords asked about the relevant review partners and how they were identified. As I said, homicide reviews are intended to be an important tool in helping local partners tackle serious violence and homicide. When a death occurs in an area, it is right that the review partners in that area are involved in the review of the death. They will provide the local intelligence and help spot local patterns and trends and identify opportunities to intervene and prevent future deaths. Local partners are most likely to be involved in the lives of those involved in the death, to have information relevant to the question of whether a review is required and to identify opportunities for interventions in future.

We therefore think it important that the responsibility for establishing and conducting these reviews rests with local partners. By reducing ambiguity as to who those partners are, we are ensuring that the reviews begin as soon as possible following the death, while Section 29 of the Act provides the assurance that, if individuals involved in the death live or lived in other areas, an input is required from those other areas; that relevant information can be disclosed to them for the purpose of the review.

In terms of what happens if one of the review partners refuses to conduct a review, again, I am afraid that I will have to write to noble Lords because I am not quite sure of the answer.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

That is a really important point, so I thank the Minister for referring to it, but who starts the process? The Minister talked about somebody refusing to take part, but who kicks the process off? Who says, “We should have a review”? Is it any of them? I do not understand the process for that.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I understand the question. I will write to the noble Lord on that, if I may, to make sure that I do not get it wrong; I think I have the answer, but I would not want to give incorrect information.

Both noble Lords asked how the Home Office oversight board will work. It will be a non-statutory committee composed of experts in safeguarding, homicide, serious violence and public protection. They will oversee the local delivery of the offensive weapons homicide reviews, monitor the implementation of any findings and support the dissemination of learning both locally and nationally. We are currently in the process of appointing the chair and first member of the board with the final six members due to be in place for early 2024, ready for when the first OWHR reports are received.

The purpose of the oversight board is to oversee the local delivery of the reviews; to ensure consistency in criteria and approach by reviewing and assessing completed reviews; to draw together the reviews at a national level to assess and disseminate common learnings, themes, issues in service provision and areas of good practice at set intervals; to monitor the regional and national application of learning and the implementation of recommendations in policy, approach and delivery; and to share best practice and wider insight through learning events and opportunities. The membership will include representatives from areas such as local government, public health, the police, education, the voluntary and community sectors, probation services and the Crown Prosecution Service, as well as a representative from one of those areas with experience of working in Wales.

Both noble Lords asked about the funding for the reviews. The Home Office will provide the funding for the relevant review partners and the work they carry out to deliver an offensive weapons homicide review during the pilot. It will also meet the cost of the oversight board that I have just described. If the policy is rolled out nationally, the funding arrangements will be confirmed after the pilot. The costs of a homicide review vary as every homicide has a unique set of circumstances; each review will have to account for these. Based on existing reviews, we estimate that a homicide review will have an average cost of £12,354. We also anticipate that the Home Office oversight board will cost approximately £230,000 over the course of the 18-month pilot. Review partners will receive funding to cover the cost of work that they carry out in establishing and running these homicide reviews during the pilot, and details of how the budget will be allocated will be confirmed as the pilot is designed with local partners.

I think I have answered the questions I am able to—

Police: Vetting, Misconduct and Misogyny

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Wednesday 2nd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker]

To ask His Majesty’s Government how they plan to respond to the report of His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services on vetting, misconduct, and misogyny in the police service.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for his Question. This report contains extremely concerning findings about policing culture and vetting processes, which are falling short of the standards expected and damaging public confidence in the process. Forty of the recommendations in the report are for policing itself to adopt, for chief officers and the College of Policing respectively. Chiefs have committed to addressing the recommendations in full and the Home Office will consider and respond to its three recommendations in due course.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for the reply, but today we learned from the police inspectorate’s report of extraordinary failures in the vetting of applicants to join the force. Is it true that at a time when confidence in the police is being undermined, hundreds, indeed thousands of officers are on our streets who are guilty of serious offences? How has that happened and when was the Home Office aware of it? Is it acceptable that officers with convictions for robbery, indecent exposure and domestic abuse, and links with serious and organised crime, have been accepted? How is it possible that we read of unwarranted stops of women by officers as a result of the so-called booty patrols? This is happening now. It is not historic—it is not “Z Cars” or “Dixon of Dock Green”—so the need for action is urgent. What are the Government, with the police, going to do in practice? The time for reviews is over. It is action that is needed, is it not?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

It is, and I agree with the noble Lord entirely that it is completely unacceptable to have those people in our police forces. The fact is that the chiefs need to take immediate action to ensure that vetting is prioritised in their forces and the public can therefore have confidence in them. It is the responsibility of the individual police forces; they are responsible for their own vetting decisions, which they should take in accordance with guidance from the College of Policing. Frankly, I agree with the noble Lord: it is incredibly disappointing—worse than disappointing —that, despite some progress, previous warnings about vetting have not been acted upon. Chiefs must make clear to the vetting units the high standards they expect from them. There is no excuse for poorly recording the rationale in the vetting decisions.

Police and Crime Commissioners and Panels

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Monday 31st October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank my noble friend for his helpful question. It is of course up to the Government, and we talked about last week’s Casey review at some length in the Chamber. The Government are doing a lot to restore confidence in the police, and of course the police also have a responsibility to do so, as Sir Mark Rowley has said.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Dobbs, said, is there not example after example, across the country, of police and crime panels failing to hold chief constables and commissioners to account? Instead of the Government having review after review, is it not about time that police and crime panels were given the teeth to hold commissioners to account and, in that way, restore confidence to policing? If the Minister is so confident of the work of the police and crime panels, will he place in the Library a list of examples of where they have worked?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The Government are confident that the panels have the appropriate powers—agreed by Parliament, as I said—to effectively scrutinise the actions and decisions of PCCs and enable the public to hold them to account. Through the review process, we agreed that this scrutiny was inconsistent in some cases, and significant measures have been taken to do something about that. These include extensive engagement with members of the panels, which has proved popular; indeed, there are requests for more of that engagement.

Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Wednesday 19th October 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

That is exactly the point. I do not know whether that means that somebody coming from Iran would be eligible. That is the point the noble Lord, Lord Horam, made, which I was agreeing with. So it is either yes or no, and I just do not know from that answer.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My reading of it is that it does, but I accept that my reading may not be entirely accurate. I will also say that, obviously, women in Iran should seek safety in the nearest available safe place, and that is the point of what we are talking about to a large extent.

All this is to underline that we remain committed to helping the world’s most vulnerable and oppressed people. This country has a long-standing tradition of extending the hand of friendship to those fleeing conflict, tyranny and persecution, and that record will continue.

The noble Lord, Lord Hylton, asked me a number of very specific questions which I will do my very best to answer in full. He talked about legal aid for refugee family reunion and whether that may or may not be available under the exceptional case funding scheme. It is where failure to provide legal aid would mean there is a breach, or a risk of a breach, of the individual’s human rights and it is subject to means and merits tests. In 2019, we amended the scope of legal aid so that separated migrant children are able to receive civil legal aid for applications by their family members and extended family members. This includes entry clearance and leave to enter or leave to remain in the UK made under the Immigration Rules or outside the rules on the basis of exceptional circumstances or compassionate and compelling circumstances.

The noble Lord, Lord Hylton, asked why the safe route for people from El Salvador has closed. Since 11 May 2022, Salvadorean nationals have been required to obtain a visa prior to entering the UK as a visitor. The decision to impose a visa regime was taken solely for migration and border security reasons. Over the preceding five years there had been a sustained and significant increase in the number of UK asylum applications from Salvadorean nationals at the UK border: up 1,750% since 2017. While this change requires Salvadorean nationals to obtain a visa entry clearance in advance of travel, it does not close the safe and legal routes available to Salvadorean nationals to enter the UK.

The noble Lord also asked whether, under the two existing Ukraine schemes, there is any progress in getting professional and technical qualifications recognised in the country. The Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities is working with the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, other government departments and the UK Centre for Professional Qualifications to clarify and promote the process for converting professional qualifications into comparable UK equivalents. That will help Ukrainians to keep up employment in their chosen professions or industries and make the most of their opportunities to use their skills and knowledge while they are living in the UK.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked about asylum wait times. As he noted, the asylum system has been under mounting pressure for several years. Increased and sustained intake, and a growing number of people awaiting a decision, have led to significant delays. We are currently concentrating on deciding older claims, high-harm cases, those with extreme vulnerability and those of children. I am afraid I am unable to offer specific timescales at this time, but I commit to notifying the noble Lord as and when I can. I will pursue that particular statistic.

Before I finish, I will talk about the practicalities and practice. They were noted by a number of people, including the noble Lords, Lord Hylton and Lord Horam. To some extent this informs the debate about Iran. Who are we talking about, coming across in small boats? That is essentially the nub of this. In 2022, 87.7% have been male. Between 2019 and 2021, 89.7% were male—it is pretty consistent. The top five countries of origin for small boat arrivals this year, bearing in mind that most of the migrants are men, are Albania, Afghanistan—where there is a safe and legal route—Iran, Iraq and Syria. I am not diminishing those people’s reasons for wanting to be in this country, but I question whether Albania is really the right source for asylum claims. It has been noted that some of them have chosen not to seek asylum, with the deterrent effect of the policy around Rwanda. I also point out that of those men—I did the numbers this morning—approximately three-quarters are between the ages of 18 and 39.

A couple of noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, pointed out that there has been persistent criticism of France. I am not here to do that. I am here to commend France, because since July 2020 we have made more than 500 arrests, dismantled 21 organised crime groups and prevented more than 23,000 crossings. So I thank our French friends for their efforts in that regard. I hope they continue and perhaps improve. Who knows? There may be room for improvement.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked me a bit about Rwanda in relation to women from Iran. With the exception of unaccompanied children, any individual who has arrived in the UK through dangerous, illegal and unnecessary methods since 1 January 2022 may be considered for relocation to Rwanda. But decisions will be taken on a case-by-case basis and nobody will be reallocated if it is unsafe or inappropriate. Everyone considered will be screened and have access to legal advice. I cannot be more unequivocal than that, but I take the noble Lord’s point and will certainly raise it in discussions. I hope that satisfies him.

This is a very complex subject. It is a global phenomenon, influenced by multiple and complex factors. I am sure noble Lords are aware of the horrifying statistics of displaced persons around the world. I think this country is trying to do its bit but, obviously, we cannot take all of them. That is just not possible, as my noble friend Lord Lilley noted.

I close my remarks by again thanking noble Lords for their contributions throughout this debate. I understand this remains an emotive issue, obviously. The Government are committed to upholding our domestic and international obligations through safe and legal routes while also securing our borders, upholding our immigration laws and preventing unnecessary and dangerous journeys to the UK. We do not concede that the legislative changes and policy intentions behind differentiation are insufficient or problematic, as proclaimed in the regret Motion. We therefore cannot agree with the stated position of the regret Motion advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Hylton.

Crime (International Co-operation) Act 2003 (Designation of Participating Countries) (England, Wales and Northern Ireland) Order 2022

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Tuesday 18th October 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the Labour Benches support the order. I have a couple of questions. Luxembourg was the latest country to ratify the second additional protocol in 2021. When did the other states in this order ratify it? Is there any reason why we have waited until now to designate them?

Brexit impacted some of the collaboration we had on criminal matters with Switzerland, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, mentioned, and the statutory instrument will rectify that. Were there any other consequences on international co-operation from Brexit? Have they also been rectified? Are there any other countries apart from Russia—I totally agree with what the Minister said—we wish to designate but are unable to at present? If so, which are they?

The order refers to Sections 47 and 48 regarding prisoner transfer if consent is given. What happens if consent is refused, if a prisoner does not agree? What then takes place? Is there a process or are there other ways by which a prisoner can be moved between countries? Are all the arrangements outlined in this protocol reciprocal? How many requests do we typically make under this Act each year? One of my favourite questions: this order relates to England, Wales and Northern Ireland; will the Minister explain how Scotland operates with respect to this protocol?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I should say I thank all noble Lords, but I can be specific: I thank the noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Paddick, for contributing to this debate. As I set out at the start, this instrument will enhance mutual legal assistance with these six countries and strengthen the UK’s overall ability to combat transnational crime. Mutual legal assistance is a critical tool in tackling cross-border criminality and promoting a pathway to justice here in the UK and overseas. As we have all said, this form of international co-operation has never been more important. Not only does it help to ensure that borders are not barriers to justice, but it allows us better to defend our public safety interests.

To go on to the specific points that have been raised, I am grateful to both noble Lords for supporting the non-designation of Russia at this time. I will have to come back to the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, on his question about other countries that may have been non-designated in the past, because I do not know the answer. I will find out.

The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked about Switzerland and the EU and why we are redesignating Switzerland. Its designations for certain sections of the 2003 Act were removed following the UK’s departure from the EU, as the co-operation agreement between the European Community and its member states on the one part, and the Swiss Confederation on the other part, to combat fraud and any other illegal activity to the detriment of their financial interests, also known as the Swiss agreement, no longer applied. However, Switzerland remains a signatory to the 1959 European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and its additional protocols, so it has been determined that it should be redesignated for the relevant provisions of the 2003 Act. Inasmuch as that relates to the EU, the question is correct: our departure from the EU meant that we had to redesignate Switzerland. Switzerland is obviously an important partner in the fight against cross-border crime and it is important legally and operationally for the UK to seek and provide effective assistance.

I hope I can reassure the noble Lord on whether there has been any capability gap between the UK and Switzerland in the period since the 2019 regulations and this order. We are unaware of any requests which have not been facilitated while these additional Swiss designations have not been in place.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am reluctant to comment on the Explanatory Memorandum, simply because I have not read it. It sounds like it is, from what the noble Lord has said. I will seek clarification on that.

Both noble Lords asked why these countries are being grouped together. To be honest, it is in the spirit of efficiency and maximising the use of parliamentary time. It was decided that one instrument should be used to make a number of designations, rather than designating Switzerland and the other countries listed through separate instruments.

The countries that have ratified the second additional protocol to the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 1959 since the previous designation in 2013 are those that we have listed. I will not run through them again, but the most recent country to ratify was Luxembourg, which did so in 2021.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked for the total number of outgoing MLA requests sent to all countries over the past few years. I can run through them in detail. In 2017, the number of outgoing requests was 346; in 2018, it was 350; in 2019, it was 320; in 2020, it was 235; and in 2021, it was 371, making a total of 1,622. I can go into much more detail on incoming requests if the noble Lord wishes me to, but I hope he does not. I will also more than happily come back to him on the reciprocal question that he asked because I do not have the information on that to hand.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I also asked about Scotland.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

The noble Lord is quite right and is just in time. Scotland will need to make its own order as this power is delegated. Officials from the Scottish Government and the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service are in the process of preparing parallel legislation. I had forgotten that question—my apologies.

To conclude, mutual legal assistance is a key tool in the UK’s fight against international criminality. This form of judicial co-operation enables the UK to seek and provide various forms of assistance to ensure that regardless of where a crime is committed perpetrators can be bought to justice. The instrument we have considered today helps to achieve this outcome and in turn to protect the British public and the wider international community. I therefore commend the order to the Committee.

Terrorism Act 2000 (Alterations to the Search Powers Code for England and Wales and Scotland) Order 2022

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Tuesday 11th October 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, first, I thank both noble Lords for their warm welcome; I hope that we continue to operate in total agreement.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I am not sure about that.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am not sure about that either, but we will try.

On the specific points that both noble Lords raised, to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, we will be happy to provide a tracked change version as he requested, and I will make sure he gets that as soon as possible. That was the easy question.

Moving to the questions of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, I shall try to deal with them in order. He asked about the extent of the code of practice and why it is confined to Great Britain. A separate code exists for stop and search powers under the Terrorism Act in Northern Ireland—a fact that the noble Lord alluded to. The Northern Ireland Office is responsible for that. We continue to work with colleagues there and offer them support in updating their equivalent code in Northern Ireland, which they have advised is likely to happen next year.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I just ask, because this is a very important point. The new power exists with respect to Northern Ireland, but the code of practice under which it operates is separate, legislated for under a different Act and in a different way. Is that correct—the power is a new power to be extended to Northern Ireland?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

As I understand it, it could be extended to Northern Ireland, but the Northern Ireland Office is, of course, responsible for the application of such things in Northern Ireland. I may not be entirely correct on that, so I will come back to the noble Lord if I am not.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I am sorry to labour this point, but it is so important. I may be wrong, but I understood the Minister to be saying that a different code of practice applies to Northern Ireland, hence this is called a code of practice for England, Scotland and Wales—in other words, Britain. For Northern Ireland, there is a separate code of practice. Given that the new power extends to the whole of the UK, one presumes that the police and others in Northern Ireland will have the ability to stop and search without reasonable suspicion a terrorist out on licence, where that is part of their licence. Is that the case or not?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

To clarify—I think this does—the new search power applies UK-wide, but there are two separate codes. Does that make sense?

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

That makes absolute sense. It is not what I understood the Minister to say in the first place, but I was just trying to clarify that. If I had realised that, I would have made different remarks, because it is a quite interesting extension of power with respect to Northern Ireland, for obvious reasons.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

Understood. The noble Lord asked me how it is determined who qualifies under the new code. To go back to the point I made in my opening remarks, in most cases the Parole Board determines whether it is appropriate for the offender, when released, to have their licensing condition expressed as a part of the conditions of their release. Its assessment is based on a contemporary assessment of the offender’s risk profile, including whether they are judged to represent a high or very high risk to the public.

How is it determined which terrorist offenders should have licence conditions permitting the search imposed on them? As I say, it is imposed on offenders convicted of terrorism or a terrorism-connected offence and assessed as posing a high or very high risk of serious harm. In those cases, it may be imposed where there is a concern that the offender may carry a weapon or to provide an additional protection for staff—for example, where they are subject to polygraph testing, a search can be carried out prior to the examination for the safety of the examiner. I hope that clarifies that.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked about the sex of the searching officer. The answer to his specific question is no: a same-sex officer is not required unless the individual being searched requests one. The noble Lord also referenced the data that is collected. I can assure him that it will be extensive. He asked about age as well. I will come back to him on that; I do not have a specific answer. The notes I have deal only with the 18 year-old point.

In closing, I reiterate that this order provides for alterations that the Government have made to the code of practice for the exercise of search powers conferred by the Terrorism Act 2000 to be brought into force. I think I have covered the rest of the information requested, and as such I commend this order to the Committee.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Report stage
Tuesday 8th March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have participated in this relatively brief debate. I will start by addressing Amendment 77, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, regarding settlement fees for non-UK members of our Armed Forces.

The Government highly value the service of all members of the Armed Forces, including Commonwealth nationals and Gurkhas from Nepal, who have a long and distinguished history of service to the UK here and overseas. That is why there are special immigration rules in place for our Armed Forces personnel that put them in a favourable position compared to other migrants, as I detailed last month during Committee. However, we recognise that the fees attached to settlement applications place a financial burden on our non-UK personnel, should they choose to remain in the UK after leaving the Armed Forces. That is why, last year, the Government consulted on waiving these fees altogether in some circumstances.

Following this, the Home Secretary and Defence Secretary announced on 23 February this year that the Government have decided to waive settlement fees, including administrative costs, for non-UK personnel in our Armed Forces who have served for six years or more, or are discharged due to an illness or injury attributable to their service, regardless of length of service. We are also extending the settlement fee waiver to undocumented veterans currently living in the UK who meet these criteria.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked me why it is six years, not four. I hope he will forgive the lengthy digression. Careful consideration was given to the number of years that should be used for the eligibility criteria. The initial policy proposal was for those who had served at least 12 years at the point of discharge, as the noble Lord acknowledged, but following the public consultation Ministers agreed that the eligibility criteria should be reduced to six years.

When considering the number of years’ service for the fee waiver, a balance rightly has to be made between value for money for the taxpayer and acknowledgement of the service of the individual. For example, it costs approximately £92,000 to train a soldier. Those costs cannot be discounted. Therefore, it was considered appropriate to set the eligibility criteria to those non-UK service personnel who have served for at least six years and wish to settle in the UK following service, given the significant outlay already invested by the taxpayer.

Four years is the minimum term of service that personnel must serve before applying for a discharge. It is important to note that there is no intention to change the option available to non-UK service personnel to make a paid application for settlement in the UK on discharge, as long as they have served a minimum of four years.

We recognise the strength of feeling from parliamentarians, service charities and the public about this issue, which is why it was decided to reduce the required length of service to be eligible, as I just said. It is estimated that the fee waiver may affect around 80% of non-UK service personnel. The Home Office is rightly focused on implementing this new policy at the earliest opportunity, the aim being for it to come into effect on 6 April this year.

I will digress again, because noble Lords also raised the issue of dependants. The Government believe that it is right and fair that fees and policies for non-UK family members of Armed Forces personnel are not more generous than those for dependants of British citizens and are applied consistently. Any decision to relax the fees or policies for non-UK family members of Armed Forces personnel could undermine current fees and the rules would be discriminatory.

Non-UK family members of Armed Forces personnel can apply for settlement once they have spent an initial five-year period in the UK with limited leave. The fees and policies that apply to the dependants of non-UK members of the UK Armed Forces are closely aligned with those that apply to dependants of British citizens and other settled persons under the standard family rules. Furthermore, reducing the fees for dependants of both non-UK and British Armed Forces personnel would be similarly discriminatory and unfair to those in other professions, many of whom face similar concerns and are contributing to the UK in other ways.

There is additional support for families in planning for the cost of visa fees. That is provided by things such as the Joining Forces credit union service for the Armed Forces. That was launched under the Armed Forces covenant in 2015, and it offers savings and loans schemes at fair rates through the payroll scheme. The issue raised by this amendment has largely been addressed by the recently announced government policy, which is due to be implemented in the near future.

I turn next to Amendment 78, tabled by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, regarding citizenship and settlement rights for British-Hong Kong veterans. I know he will listen to me extremely carefully, as indeed will those Hong Kong veterans watching live.

The Government remain extremely grateful for the contribution made by former British-Hong Kong service personnel. That is why the Minister for Safe and Legal Migration announced to the House of Commons on 7 December last year that the Home Secretary has identified an option that will enable our Government to treat this group of personnel in a similar way to other non-UK service personnel who were based in Hong Kong before the handover.

I appreciate that the noble and gallant Lord wants reassurance that the Government are taking concrete steps to further support British-Hong Kong veterans where possible. I can confirm that the Government will update Parliament by the end of June and implement any changes by the end of this calendar year. The Government remain committed to implementing a solution to the issue of British Hong-Kong veterans before the end of this calendar year, but I respectfully ask the House to give us the necessary space to do so.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I will let the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig, talk about Amendment 78 when we come to it, but, as one of the signatories, it would be churlish not to recognise the way the Government have moved on that issue.

With respect to Amendment 77, I appreciate that the Government again have made some movement on this but I do not think it is enough. It should be four years; that is what the demand is. I do not understand or accept the point the Minister made about the exclusion of dependants. Dependants should be included in any scheme we take forward. As such, I wish to test the opinion of the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I join other noble Lords and various noble Baronesses from across the House in welcoming Amendment 83, as tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and my noble friend Lady Lister. There is universal agreement that fees should not be a barrier to citizenship. I think the Government probably agree with that, so the only plea I make is that they act on it to make sure that fees do not act as a barrier. The Government have the power to do something about this. They can hear what people think about the importance of citizenship as a social glue in our society, and the reverence we all have for it, yet a barrier is placed because of the fee. The Government have it in their power to resolve it. Let us do it.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lady McIntosh for tabling Amendments 83 and 84, concerning the fees that may be charged in relation to registration of British citizenship. Please be in no doubt that we recognise the strength of feeling on this subject, which I know is of particular importance to my noble friend, as well as the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. I say at the outset that the Government recognise that the acquisition of British citizenship is a significant life event and offers particular value to those able to obtain it, particularly children. All noble Lords agree with this point and have observed it.

Apart from allowing a child to apply for a British citizen passport, British citizenship gives them the opportunity to participate more fully in the life of their local community as they grow up. It also offers specific practical, legal and intangible benefits, including the right to vote on reaching adulthood, of course, and the particular sense of identity and belonging that results from knowing that the country that you have grown up in is your own.

Please let me also reassure the House that the Government are actively considering fees in this space. Following the Court of Appeal judgment in the case brought by the project for the registration of children as British citizens last year, the Secretary of State committed to reviewing the fee in line with her duties under Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009. While I recognise that the House has been very patient, waiting for the outcome of that review as though waiting for Godot, it is the Government’s view that it was important to allow the Supreme Court to give its view on the questions raised by a separate ground in this case, which considered fundamental questions around whether the powers that underpin the setting of fees had been lawfully applied, before concluding that work. Following the Supreme Court judgment of 2 February, the Secretary of State is currently considering her policy response to the review, and I hope to update the House by early May. I cannot give a specific date.

Furthermore I reiterate that, as regards the new routes introduced by the Bill to correct instances of historical legislative unfairness, it remains the Government’s intention not to charge in instances where there has been historical unfairness and/or discrimination. This is in line with our approach to other instances of historical unfairness, where waivers and exceptions were introduced in fee regulations, as is appropriate for provisions of this nature. The Government are currently exploring options in this regard for the routes introduced by the Bill. I hope that this reassures my noble friend to some extent.

However, it is important to consider the legislative history of the fee-setting regime, and the intent that has underpinned it. Since the establishment of the current nationality regime in the British Nationality Act 1981, registration of British citizenship for those who either have an entitlement under the provisions of that Act or who are applying on a discretionary basis under Section 3(1) has been contingent on payment of a fee. Current fee-setting for British citizenship is underpinned by the powers set out under Section 68(9) of the Immigration Act 2014 which, as the Supreme Court has affirmed in its recent judgment, were explicitly authorised by Parliament and empowered the Secretary of State to set fees at a level that reflected the costs of exercising the function, the benefits that accrue to an applicant as a result of acquiring that British citizenship, and the wider costs of the borders and migration system. Parliament also explicitly authorised the maximum amount that may be charged in relation to an application for British citizenship registration at £1,500, through the Immigration and Nationality (Fees) Order 2016, which sets the framework for the current fees set out in secondary legislation.

The wider application of these principles and the powers to set immigration and nationality fees have underpinned the Government’s policy over the last decade of moving the borders and migration system to an increasingly self-funded basis, reducing the reliance on the UK taxpayer. Accordingly, fees across several routes, including nationality, have increased to support those broader funding objectives.

However, it is important to be clear on the role that these fees play in supporting the essential work of the border and migration system and particularly in funding the critical activity that supports and safeguards the interests of the people in the UK. These activities, which include ensuring that the UK’s borders are secure from threats and illegal activity, the effective operation of resettlement schemes to support those who are in greatest need and the management of a visa system that attracts the best and brightest to contribute to the UK’s prosperity, are essential to the delivery of the department’s wider mission and objectives.

Any reduction in income from fees must therefore be considered in terms of its impact on these activities, with the likely result being that activity in those areas will be reduced or income must be recovered through other means. This funding includes support for front-line operations that keep the country safe. A need to secure funding through other means may impact on fees for economic routes where the department’s objective is to attract visitors and skilled individuals to support the UK’s economy, which in turn benefits all those who live in the UK, or it will place an increased reliance on the taxpayer to fund these activities, which may in turn reduce the funding available for other important government work.

As such, there is a complex balance of considerations that the Secretary of State must take into account when setting fees, and, in line with the charging powers established by Parliament through the 2014 Act, these have informed the current fees structure. Fees charged are kept under review, as they are in other countries, and, as I have stated, there are ongoing considerations regarding fees charged for citizenship registration specifically, the outcome of which we will share in due course.

Additionally, I emphasise that elements of the amendment, such as the requirement to except fees for children in local authority care, although of course well intentioned, would more appropriately be set out in fees regulations and should not be introduced in primary legislation. In addition, it is not appropriate for a duty to have regard to the need to promote British citizenship in primary legislation that is setting fees. I therefore request that the noble Baroness withdraw her amendment for the reasons that I have outlined.

Ukraine: Visa Restrictions for Refugees

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Monday 28th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I think most people in this country will be baffled by the response of the Minister and upset by the fact that the Government have not got a grip of the refugee crisis that faces Europe. We have been proud of the way our Government have acted to support Ukraine, but hundreds of thousands of people are fleeing across the border and the Minister has simply turned round and said that there is no safe route for them to get here. It is not good enough. Families need a reunification programme, and we should set an example to the rest of Europe—the way we have done with the rest of the Ukraine crisis. It is not good enough. The Government need to get a grip and give us something to be proud of.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for that. On the family side, we are allowing Ukrainian family members, settled persons or British nationals to come to or remain in the UK where they would otherwise not meet the core requirements of the family rules. We will make applications under the family rules fee-free for this cohort. This will mean applicants will be exempt from the immigration health surcharges, as well as visa fees. There will be a pathway to settlement if they are unable to return to Ukraine when their leave expires, and department officials will be reaching out to the Ukrainian diaspora in the UK, seeking their support to house and support Ukrainian family arrivals. This is one of the most generous family reunion offers that we have ever made to any country in the world, demonstrating our firm commitment to the people of Ukraine.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 10th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I will add my voice of support to my noble friend Lady Ritchie. It is good to have the perspective that she brings to this Committee. Our institutional memory in Parliament, in this place and the other place, with respect to Ireland is not as great as it was. It is a perspective that needs to be brought here more often, so this is an important little debate. I think the noble Viscount, Lord Brookeborough, will agree.

I say to the Minister that, whatever the rights and wrongs of all this—and I agree with what my noble friend said—it plays into the narrative that the Government do not have a grip with respect to Ireland. The consequences of that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, pointed out, are absolutely and potentially really difficult. Even if people are non-British or non-Irish, if they have to have an ETA to cross the border, how on earth is that going to work? Practically, at the end of the day, if it is worth having, somebody will have to check it. I know that it does not apply to British and Irish citizens, but suppose, as a British man, I have an American wife or a French girlfriend; we go to Northern Ireland and somebody checks it—with the history of the police and security forces checking documents. The Government have to wake up to this. Unless the Minister can get up and say, “We’re going to sort this and this is what’s going to happen”, it will drift on and on and the consequences will be potentially really difficult.

It is no wonder that the Irish Government and various organisations across the whole of the UK and Ireland are saying that the Government need to get a grip on this. It is ludicrous. I gave an example. The noble Viscount, Lord Brookeborough, will know far better than me. What about somebody who for years has lived a mile across the border, has a mixed marriage in terms of nationality—somebody who is a British or Irish citizen married to an American—and wants to go shopping or to a hotel four miles down the road that happens to be in Northern Ireland? Do they need an ETA?

This is one of those things about which people outside Parliament say, “Do you know what you are doing?” Frankly, this is something that is so serious, and all the time we are looking at it we are trying to resolve it. It is difficult. It raises issues that you do not appreciate. If only you understood how difficult it is. Well, I do understand how difficult it might be, and I also understand this: the border, for reasons that we all know, whether it is drawn in Ireland or down the Irish Sea, has consequences that are enormous for the people of Ireland and for people here.

The Government have to sort this out in a way that commands respect and agreement from all communities. The amendment that my noble friend Lady Ritchie has brought before us is important, but I implore the Government: whatever the rights and wrongs of getting into Shannon Airport, whoever is right about whether it is seen as a back-door way of getting into the UK, et cetera—and I should say that the Irish Government have visa requirements as well, which will influence how people come in, so that may be one of the answers —it just has to be resolved. There has to be more than a ministerial, “We understand the importance of this and the difficulties, and that it needs to be sorted out”. The frank reality is that the time for sorting it out was yesterday, not today or tomorrow. It is about time that the Government got a grip of this, otherwise there will be very serious consequences further down the road.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords very much for participating in this short but powerful debate. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick, and second the point of view of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, that you bring—I said “you” again; I am very sorry—an interesting and unusual perspective to this debate. I thank her for that. In answer to the noble Baroness’s question about the letter to my noble friend Lady Williams of Trafford, the noble Baroness will have a reply in a week that will outline the details she asked for.

The Government are clear: there will continue to be no routine immigration controls on journeys to the UK from within the common travel area, and none whatever on the land border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. That will remain the position when the ETA scheme is introduced.

It may be helpful if I explain that all individuals, other than British and Irish citizens, arriving in the UK, including those crossing the land border into Northern Ireland, already need to enter in line with the UK’s immigration framework. I think this goes some way to answering the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, about the hypothetical American wife or French girlfriend. I think it also deals with the point made by my noble friend, Lady Neville-Rolfe. For example, visa nationals are required to obtain a visa for the UK when travelling via Ireland, otherwise they are entering illegally. We are therefore applying the same principle to individuals requiring an ETA who enter the UK via Ireland without one.

The noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, referenced Article 2 of the protocol. The Government consider that the ETA scheme is compliant, and they will continue to consider their obligations under the protocol with regard to this. I want to reassure the noble Baroness that the process for obtaining an ETA will be quick and light touch. I am told that it will be not dissimilar to acquiring an American ESTA, which I am sure many noble Lords are familiar with. As many people will know, that is very straightforward and easy. Once granted, an ETA will be valid for multiple journeys over an extended period, minimising the burden on those making frequent trips, including those across the Northern Ireland border. I perhaps should have said that I have had considerable experience of crossing that border on numerous occasions.

In terms of the specific questions on the CTA, as far as I am aware, it has nothing to do with Brexit. It predates Brexit does it not? It goes back to 1923 and partition I think, from my dim and distant memory. I am sure I will be corrected if I am wrong. All CTA members are firmly committed to protecting the common travel area. I will reiterate this point: even with the introduction of ETAs, there will be no routine immigration controls on arrivals to the UK from elsewhere in the common travel area—only intelligence-led controls with no immigration controls whatever on the Ireland/Northern Ireland land border. Given the tone of the debate, I hope noble Lords will allow me to keep reiterating that point.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the noble Viscount—sort of. There will be no hard border. As I said, there is not going to be a hard border in Northern Ireland, and within the CTA there is effectively no change.

In answer to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Suttie, about enforcement, which was brought up subsequently as well, I have said it three or four times now: there will be no routine border controls on journeys from within the common travel area, which goes some way to answering the Yorkshire example. There will be none at all on the land border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. Everyone entering the UK, regardless of where they enter from—again, as I have said—is required to meet the UK’s immigration framework. In answer to “What’s the point of having it, then?”, anyone entering the UK without an ETA, or any form of immigration permission where required, will be entering illegally and may be subject to enforcement if encountered during intelligence-led operational activity.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I say gently to the Minister that he has to be really careful with language on things such as conforming to immigration policy and the UK border. The historic context of some of the language that he used means that he has to be really careful when talking about moving across borders or even saying that there will not be a border control but talking about complying with UK immigration policies.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Report stage
Wednesday 12th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I have listened carefully to this short debate and the points made by the noble Lords, Lord Blencathra and Lord Paddick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. It will be interesting to hear what the Minister has to say about placing the College of Policing on a statutory basis. I also listened to the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and it would be interesting if there were a long debate about pre-charge bail.

However, it is important to say something about the schedule that is mentioned in the amendment. We strongly support the provisions in the Bill on pre-charge bail. The House is aware that the changes that have been brought forward are known as Kay’s law, after Kay Richardson, who was murdered by an abusive ex-partner after he was released when he was under investigation, rather than placed on pre-charge bail. Our concern, picking up the point rightly made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, is that the guidance under Part 6 of Schedule 4 should be clear and effective and should accurately reflect the necessary changes made to the use of pre-charge bail under the Bill.

We understand that this was brought forward as Kay’s law, and all of us will have abhorred the horror of what happened. Notwithstanding that, it will be interesting to hear the Minister’s response to all of that.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Blencathra for explaining the amendment, which in substance relates to the power conferred on the College of Policing to issue guidance about pre-charge bail. I recognise that my noble friend has made a wider point about the appropriateness of the College of Policing in its current guise issuing any operational guidance to the police.

The set of reforms in Schedule 4 to the Bill, known collectively—as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, mentioned —as Kay’s law, aims to establish a pre-charge bail system which is fairer and more efficient, with the removal of the presumption against bail and changes to pre-charge bail timescales. My noble friend’s amendment would require the College of Policing to be placed on a statutory footing before it can issue guidance on pre-charge bail. In practical terms, this would mean that the guidance, and therefore the whole pre-charge bail reform package, would need to be delayed while an appropriate legislative vehicle was found for this fundamental change to the college’s status.

Guidance to underpin these changes is essential to secure the effective implementation of the reforms, and I think I should stress again that the guidance is about pre-charge bail, not court-ordered post-charge bail. Policing partners have made it clear throughout the drafting of the provisions that clear statutory guidance aimed at operational experts is required to build a system which is consistently applied across all forces.

I understand that my noble friend’s amendment probes the issue of the College of Policing’s status, but it is important to note that a number of the college’s functions have statutory underpinning. Among other things, Sections 123 to 130 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 enable the college to issue codes of practice for chief officers and guidance about the experience, qualification and training of police staff. The provisions in Schedule 4 to the Bill enabling the college to issue guidance about pre-charge bail would thus be an extension of these existing powers.

As the college is the professional body for policing, the Government consider it entirely appropriate that it should be able to issue guidance which police officers are required to have regard to when exercising functions to which the guidance relates. The Government do not believe that the fact that the college is not a body established by statute alters that fact. It is relevant, however, that the guidance to be issued under Part 6 of Schedule 4 is subject to the approval of the Home Secretary, who is, as my noble friend Lord Blencathra said, accountable to Parliament, and must be laid before Parliament. It is therefore open to either House to scrutinise the guidance at any time.

The college does hold the long-term aim of achieving royal charter status, as my noble friend noted, but the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, asked whether its status was being considered in any other ways. It is. The college chair, my noble friend Lord Herbert of South Downs, is currently undertaking a fundamental review of the college, which may include recommendations about its status. Obviously, the Government will consider the recommendations flowing from the review when it is published, but I am afraid I do not know when that will be, to pre-empt any questions.

As I indicated, regardless of the college’s legal status, we believe it is entirely proper that it should be able to issue guidance of this kind to which police officers must have regard. I should reiterate that the practical effect of this amendment would be unacceptably to delay the implementation of these necessary reforms, which, as the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, noted, have wide support and would better help protect the victims of crime. It is crucial that Kay’s law is delivered in a timely way, supported by robust guidance issued by the professional body for policing, and the current provisions do exactly that.

I am afraid that I cannot answer my noble friend Lord Blencathra’s specific question about when space may be found to alter that. I would be surprised if that answer surprised him, but I hope that, having had this opportunity to debate the role and status of the College of Policing, he will be content to withdraw his amendment.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Committee stage
Wednesday 24th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I reiterate that the Government agree with the noble Lord. I can only repeat what I said earlier: we are working at pace and I commit to updating him before we get to Report. I hope that there will be a helpful outcome.

Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, has Amendment 292U on metal theft. This is an important subject and one that my noble friend Lady Williams recently discussed with the noble Lord, as he acknowledged. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Birt, for his contribution and his examples. I shall say a bit more about that meeting in a moment.

The Government recognise the impact of metal theft on infrastructure companies, including theft of cable from railway projects, construction companies and solar farms, as well as from heritage and community assets such as churches. The Scrap Metal Dealers Act 2013 was introduced to tackle the metal theft that was affecting many people’s day-to-day lives at that time. Under Section 12 of the 2013 Act, it is already an offence for a scrap metal dealer to pay for scrap metal using cash. The 2013 Act also places requirements on scrap metal dealers to hold a licence, verify the identity of those supplying scrap metal and retain records of metal bought and sold. These elements, together with powers for the police and local authorities to enter and inspect the premises of scrap metal dealers, make the Act an effective tool to tackle the sale of stolen metal.

The noble Lord’s amendment seeks to extend the provisions in the 2013 Act to make it an offence for anyone to sell scrap metal for cash. Although I understand the intention behind this amendment and the desire to have additional powers to tackle those who see metal theft as a profitable crime, the Government do not consider this amendment to be needed. The amendment would broaden the remit of the 2013 Act beyond the responsibilities placed on scrap metal dealers. Should an offender encourage, assist or incite the cash purchase of stolen metal by a scrap metal dealer, they could be found guilty of an inchoate offence under the Serious Crime Act 2007.

I will set this in a broader context. The noble Lord and my noble friend Lady Williams had a very productive meeting, as he acknowledged, on 9 November to discuss this important subject. They were joined by members of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Metal, Stone and Heritage Crime: the noble Lord, Lord Birt, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Bristol and Andrew Selous MP, together with a representative from the British Metals Recycling Association. I understand that it was a constructive discussion and I hope that the noble Lord was left in no doubt as to the seriousness with which the Government view this crime.

At that meeting it was agreed that enforcement of the 2013 Act is key to tackling metal theft. The Government are committed to supporting partners to increase the enforcement of the Act. The Home Office provided £177,000 of seed-corn funding in the last financial year to establish the National Infrastructure Crime Reduction Partnership. The partnership is spearheaded by the British Transport Police and was set up to better co-ordinate police forces and other agencies to tackle metal theft from rail, telecoms and utilities companies.

At the meeting on 9 November, concerns were also raised about the disparity between metal theft figures published by the Office for National Statistics and figures held on the police national computer. We are looking into this and my noble friend Lady Williams—who, by the way, expressed to me that she would have liked to answer the noble Lord’s amendment—will write to the noble Lord when we have clarification on this. However, let me be clear: no one is trying to play down the problem or argue that statistics somehow show things are not as bad as some suggest.

The all-party parliamentary group agreed to provide the Government with a paper setting out its recommendations for tackling metal theft. My noble friend looks forward to receiving this and we will give it careful consideration. The right reverend Prelate and Andrew Selous, who is a Church Commissioner, agreed to see what more could be done to gather data and intelligence about thefts from churches, particularly of lead roofs. That is something that I welcome. I am sure that your Lordships all share my concern about these attacks on our heritage and recognise the particular vulnerability of churches, many of which are in isolated and remote areas. We look forward to continuing to work with the noble Lord and others who have contributed to the work of this all-party group. I hope that he is in no doubt of our commitment in this respect.

In the light of my comments and the undertaking to give sympathetic further consideration to Amendment 292S, I invite the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, in thanking the Minister for his reply, I will make a couple of comments about the two amendments not in my name. First, I think that we all heard clearly, in answer to my noble friend Lord Bassam and his amendment, that the Government agree with him. The question that my noble friend then posed was: when will the Government act to implement the amendment that he put forward and that the Government say they agree with? That is the key question.

I take the Minister’s point that he will do something before Report—unless I have misrepresented him—or consider it before Report. That is where we start to get into difficulty, because he has moved from doing something to considering it. If the Minister agrees with it, something needs to be done. We have gone past considering it; it is time for action. That is what my noble friend Lord Bassam was saying and I very much agree with him.

I am sure that my noble friend Lord Faulkner will have heard the remarks about dealing with scrap metal, which—irrespective of whether it should have been in this group—is an issue. I think that he will be pleased that the Minister sought to answer those points.

With respect to my amendment, which of course I will withdraw—and I will come to a couple of the points made by other noble Lords—I think that schools will be interested that the Minister says powers are already available to them, notwithstanding the way in which he moved on to powers that we are yet to discuss. Of course, if everyone agrees with them, it will all be solved—that is for another debate later on. The Minister specifically said that powers are already available to schools, should they wish to deal with this issue. That is not how they feel. They feel as though it takes an inordinate amount of time to get anything in place. That is the whole point of what this amendment seeks to do. The Government need to consider how they reassure schools that those powers are available to them to deal quickly with problems that occur.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti for their support for the amendment, in the sense of their recognition that it is a two-way street. I accept that it is not unbridled, unqualified support, but it is important.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Monday 22nd November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I note the work that the noble Lord, Lord McColl, has done on modern slavery over many years, and thank him for it. It is right for us to acknowledge that in speaking to this amendment.

I want to draw particular attention to the section of the noble Lord’s amendment that covers something that is often not recognised to the degree it should be when it comes to county lines gangs’ operations and the way cuckooing works. Proposed new sub-paragraph (ii) talks about when a person

“is unable to give free and informed consent”.

That is the crucial bit. Too often, people are asked, “Why have you allowed this to happen? Why have you let them take over your property?” It is almost as though they have given their consent. But they are sometimes so frightened that they give their consent because, if they do not, the consequences will be such that they live in fear. Somehow, the law does not seem to recognise that.

Proposed new paragraph (c)(ii) refers to someone being unable to give “free and informed consent”. This is absolutely crucial to stopping the offence of cuckooing. People sometimes appear almost as though they have left a property of their own free will, saying, “Here you are. Come into my property. Use it for drugs and county lines operations.” Then, sometimes—not always, but sometimes—the police say, “Well, what did you do about it? Why didn’t you stop it?” That does not reflect the real world. People are terrified; they are frightened. They are told, “If you don’t let us use your property and get out of it, or if you tell anyone about it, we are going to do X, Y or Z to you or to your family.” That is sometimes not recognised, but it is the crucial part of what the noble Lord’s amendment gets at. If we want to stop cuckooing, we must understand that people are coerced into giving their consent; often, the law seems to treat them as though they have given their consent willingly. If we are to stop cuckooing, we must understand the context in which it occurs. I hope that the noble Baroness will be able to reflect on that.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am sorry to disappoint the noble Lord.

I am grateful to my noble friend Lord McColl for introducing this amendment which seeks to provide for a bespoke criminal offence to tackle what is known, as he pointed out, by the evocative name of “cuckooing”. I assure noble Lords that this Government take all forms of exploitation seriously and we are determined to tackle it. I fully sympathise with the intentions behind this amendment, as we recognise that these unscrupulous exploiters often target the most vulnerable in our society to control their homes and, as my noble friend argued most powerfully, against their will to perpetrate a range of crime types. This practice is often associated with drug dealing, which is a feature of county lines offending, but also encompasses other forms of exploitation types such as sex work, which not only devastates the lives of the victim but impacts the local community in which they live.

While I support the sentiments behind this amendment, we remain to be persuaded that a new offence is needed. There are existing powers that can be and are being used to disrupt cuckooing, including the use of civil preventive orders, such as closure orders and criminal behaviour orders, breach of which is a criminal offence. As to the criminal law, there are offences under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 which may be charged, specifically those under Section 4 relating to the supply of controlled drugs and under Section 8 relating to the occupier of premises knowingly permitting the production or supply of drugs from their property. The offence of participating in the activities of an organised crime group in Section 45 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 may also be relevant. That said, this is an area of the criminal law which we continue to examine.

Moreover, I am sure my noble friend would agree that were there to be a new offence, Section 1 of the Modern Slavery Act is not the proper place for it. That section deals with offences where a person exercises control over another person to hold them in slavery or servitude, or requires them to perform forced or compulsory labour. The focus is on controlling another person and not their property or belongings. Having said all that, we recognise the seriousness of this phenomenon, and we will continue to look into it and support law enforcement partners in their efforts to tackle this malicious crime. In the light of this assurance, I hope my noble friend will be content to withdraw his amendment.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Monday 8th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, it is good to be back from the Armed Forces Bill to join you all again for this group of amendments. I start with a comment that the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, made about the haphazard nature of the amendments before us. This is the last set of amendments on Part 5 of the Bill on road traffic offences yet, despite being haphazard, some really important amendments have been proposed. That demonstrates to the Government that there needed or needs to be a new road traffic Act, which would bring together all the various comments that have been made plus numerous others that people would make. We heard on a previous group about a review of existing traffic offences: some are out of date, and some that did not exist a few years ago should have offences against them. I make that opening remark to the Minister, as he might wish to say that to his colleagues.

My noble friend Lord Berkeley did us a favour by bringing forward these amendments. It is easy to scoff at railway bridges, but we have heard that there are seven incidents a day and that 50% of drivers do not know the height of their vehicles. An issue raised by these amendments clearly needs to be considered. The least we want from the Minister is that he takes away these comments and speaks to his colleagues at the Department for Transport or wherever about them.

The noble Earl, Lord Attlee, is also right in saying that, in trying to solve one problem, you do not want to unfairly penalise another group—in this instance, lorry or other drivers. You have to be careful about the way that legislation is drafted and unintended consequences, so his amendments are important as well.

This is yet another serious amendment that has been put forward to deal with a very real problem, to set against all the other amendments that have been put forward which deal with serious issues on our roads. The legislation needs to be updated. This is a Christmas tree of a Bill. Part 5 on road traffic needs a separate Bill, as has been demonstrated by the debate this evening. I hope, at the very least, that the Minister will take that back to his colleagues.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, and my noble friend Lord Attlee for explaining these amendments. I reassure them and other noble Lords that the Government take this issue seriously and think it important. We recognise the serious risk to the travelling public that results from drivers striking and damaging bridges.

It is my understanding that this amendment seeks not to create a new offence but instead to create a new and specific penalty, for striking guided transport system structures, most notably railway bridges, to be applied to broader offences such as careless driving. I do not think that is needed. The penalties available for the offences for which a driver can already be charged in these circumstances are adequate to reflect the seriousness of the offence. The offences include careless, inconsiderate and dangerous driving or, where appropriate, drink-driving or drug-driving. For example, an offence of careless driving attracts an endorsement of three to nine penalty points on the driver’s licence, an unlimited fine, and a discretionary disqualification from driving for such period as the court thinks fit. Damage to property is a factor in the sentencing guidance indicating greater harm, which can lead to a higher sentence. If a driver were found to be under the influence of drink or drugs, the penalties available would include custodial sentences, unlimited fines and driving disqualifications.

As my noble friend will be aware, warning and regulatory signs already exist to indicate low bridges and to ensure that drivers are given information about alternative routes in time to adjust their journeys. I take my noble friend’s points about routes and so on, which he made most forcefully. Those signs are prescribed in the Traffic Signs Regulations and General Directions 2016 and can be used by local authorities without reference to the Department for Transport. Local authorities are responsible for placing traffic signs on their roads, and the Department for Transport provides advice to them on the use of these signs in the Traffic Signs Manual. Disobeying a regulatory sign indicating a low bridge is already an offence that attracts an endorsable fixed penalty notice and may lead to the disqualification of the driver. Network Rail can reclaim some of the cost of repairing any damage from the insurer of the vehicle that hits the bridge. The Government are satisfied that the existing offences, penalties and route to a claim for damage are sufficient.

I am afraid that I cannot answer the questions from the noble Baroness, Lady Randerson, about why this happens so frequently. I imagine there are a whole variety of factors. As to the concerns from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, I will of course take those back; we need at least to understand this issue a little better, so I will commit to doing that. That being the case I urge the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, to withdraw his amendment.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Coaker and Lord Sharpe of Epsom

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Monday 1st November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for his amendment. I have a very brief comment for the Minister. The Explanatory Notes say:

“Section 64A of PACE confers a power on the police to take photographs from a person who has been detained in a police station and/or arrested. If a person is arrested, charged or convicted without a photograph being taken, there is no power to require them to attend a police station later for this to be done, although there is such a ‘recall’ power in … PACE relating to taking of fingerprints and DNA samples.”


There are so many important things in this Bill, and this is yet another. The noble Lord is quite right to point this out. Therefore, why was it thought not to be necessary to include the taking of photographs in the original legislation but now is thought to be necessary? What is the evidence for the change in legislation to include photographs?

Also, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made the very important point about the extension of that power to overseas offences. Does that extension of power include not only photographs but fingerprints and DNA samples?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for explaining what he described as probing amendments.

Clause 48 amends the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to allow the police to require certain persons to attend a police station at a stipulated date and time for the purpose of taking their photograph. Comparing facial images, along with DNA and fingerprints, is a key tool for police to quickly identify and eliminate suspects. Under existing legislation, people who are arrested are taken to a custody suite to have their fingerprints, DNA samples and photographs taken straight away. If this is not done, there is a recall power to require those who have been arrested, charged or convicted to attend a police station so that their fingerprints and DNA samples can be taken. However, this power does not cover photographs and Clause 48 will address this omission, which I hope goes some way to explaining the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Coaker—I think it was an omission rather than being deliberate—and bring consistency.

As things stand, opportunities to take photographs are being missed—

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I am sorry to interrupt, but is the Minister saying that it was a mistake? It was an omission; was it a mistake?

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I am saying it was an omission. I am not saying it was a mistake, because I do not know whether it was, but it was an omission. I think there is a difference.

As things stand, opportunities to take photographs are being missed. This means that matches to crimes the person may have committed in the past or may commit in the future are not made. As the noble Lord explained, these amendments specifically intend to probe the necessity and proportionality of the provisions in proposed new subsections (1H) and (1I) of Section 64A of PACE. These provisions cover occasions when the police have been notified of a conviction in another country that has an equivalent offence in England and Wales. Where there is no photograph on file, or it is of poor quality, police will now be able to ask an individual to attend a police station to have one taken for the purposes of preventing or detecting a crime. To ensure appropriate oversight, this will require authorisation at the minimum rank of inspector.

As I said at the start, these provisions simply align the police’s ability to take photographs in certain circumstances with provisions that already exist for DNA and fingerprints. In that sense, we are therefore not breaking new ground. We are dealing here with individuals who have been convicted of a criminal offence, albeit in another country. In the interests of protecting people in this country, it is right that the police should be able to take and retain a photograph of a convicted person in these circumstances. I hope that the noble Lord agrees, particularly given the existing precedent in PACE, that this a necessary and proportionate power, and that he will therefore be content to withdraw his amendment.