Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (Remedial) Order 2023

Tuesday 5th March 2024 Grand Committee

Considered in Grand Committee

17:44

Moved by

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom]

That the Grand Committee do consider the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (Remedial) Order 2023.

Relevant document: 1st Report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord Sharpe of Epsom) (Con)]

My Lords, this order was first laid before Parliament for consideration on 20 March 2023. It was laid again on 18 October 2023, and sat for 60 days. It was debated in the other place on 23 January 2024. As noble Lords will be aware, it is a top priority for the Government to maintain our national security and keep the public safe. The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 provides robust privacy safeguards in relation to investigatory powers.

The United Kingdom’s investigatory powers regime is world-leading and provides the international standard on transparency, privacy, redress and oversight to accompany the exercise of these critical powers. This House recently considered the Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill, on which noble Lords provided expert scrutiny. I am hopeful that today’s debate will be approached in the same spirit.

This instrument will make necessary and important amendments to the IPA following the May 2021 judgment from the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Big Brother Watch and others v the United Kingdom, which I will refer to as BBW. The ruling from the Grand Chamber related to the United Kingdom’s bulk interception regime under the legislation which preceded the IPA—the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. The Grand Chamber found that certain aspects of that regime were not compliant with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, on respect for private and family life, and Article 10, on freedom of expression. While most of the incompatibilities identified by the Grand Chamber were addressed through the introduction of the IPA, there was one outstanding issue which requires an amendment to the IPA. This relates to journalistic safeguards, which I will come to later.

I will first briefly explain how the bulk interception regime operates, so that it is clear how these additional safeguards will be applied. The main purpose of a bulk interception warrant is to acquire overseas-related communications. That material is then retained for the minimum amount of time necessary for the authorised purposes. Criteria are used to search through that material to find material which is useful in support of operational purposes. Useful material is then retained for the minimum amount of time necessary for the authorised purposes.

Section 154 of the IPA covers the journalistic safeguards for bulk interception. Presently, it requires only that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner be informed if material thought to contain confidential journalistic material or sources of journalistic material is retained, following examination, for a purpose other than its destruction. There are additional safeguards in the interception code of practice. The code requires that the relevant intelligence agency seek the agreement of a senior official within a warrant-granting department before the agency may select material for examination, in order to identify or confirm a source of journalistic information.

The purpose of this remedial order is to amend the IPA to strengthen the existing journalistic safeguards for bulk interception under Section 154, which is not possible through the delegated powers provided for within the Act. It does this by requiring that approval from the Investigatory Powers Commissioner is obtained before any criteria are used where the purpose is to select material for examination that is confidential journalistic material or a source of journalistic material, or where it would be highly likely to do so. The retention of confidential journalistic material or sources of journalistic material must also be authorised by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. There is also an urgency provision, which I will come on to later. It is necessary that the Government introduce this reform to ensure that our intelligence agencies can maintain their ability to carry out bulk interception in line with the convention and the Human Rights Act 1998.

Bulk interception is an important operational tool which is used by intelligence agencies to identify threats to the national security of the United Kingdom—it was recognised by the Grand Chamber as such—as well as in tackling serious and organised crime and maintaining the United Kingdom’s economic well-being. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner already provides oversight of the acquisition, examination and retention of confidential journalistic material and sources of journalistic material obtained under bulk interception. Legislative change is needed so that these safeguards are expressly set out within the legislation. Failure to amend the IPA would mean that the UK’s bulk interception regime would continue to be in breach of Article 10 of the convention.

This remedial order introduces amendments to Section 154, the creation of a new Section 154A and a minor consequential amendment to Section 229(8). The amendment to Section 154 will introduce enhanced safeguards relating to the criteria used to select material for examination that will identify confidential journalistic material or identify or confirm sources of journalistic material derived from material acquired through bulk interception. The permission of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner will be required before such material can be purposefully selected for examination or knowingly retained for a purpose other than destruction.

Permission from the commissioner is also required before such material may be retained. The commissioner will make that decision on the basis of whether it is in the public interest to retain the material. The commissioner may impose conditions on the retention of the material. The creation of the new Section 154A introduces an urgency process for dealing with requests for authorisations out of hours. These authorisations will be subject to subsequent judicial approval and any search activity must cease if approval is refused, so urgent applications will still be subject to rigorous independent scrutiny. The judicial commissioner will make their decision on the basis of whether it is in the public interest to approve the use of the search criteria.

The amendment to Section 229(8) is a consequential amendment which includes reference to the new functions of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner in Sections 154 and 154A so that they are treated consistently within the IPA. Sections 229(6) and (7) require judicial commissioners to not act in a way that is contrary to the public interest, national security, the prevention or detection of serious crime or the economic well-being of the UK. Section 229(8) then disapplies that requirement when the judicial commissioner is exercising various functions such as considering whether to approve the authorisation of a bulk interception warrant. Subsection (8) is amended by this instrument to include decisions by the judicial commissioner under new Sections 154 and 154A. This is consistent with similar judicial commissioner functions in other parts of the IPA and ensures that the judicial commissioners can exercise their functions properly.

This remedial Order will ensure that the United Kingdom fulfils its obligations under Article 10 of the convention by making the necessary changes to the bulk interception regime under the IPA in order to be compliant with the findings of the Grand Chamber in BBW. These changes will further strengthen the world-leading safeguards within the IPA, which is a crucial tool in the ongoing effort to protect the United Kingdom and its citizens. I therefore commend the draft Order to the Committee.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his helpful introduction.

This SI concerns the selection for examination and retention of confidential journalistic material which has been collected under a bulk interception warrant. Big Brother Watch brought a challenge to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, the predecessor of IPA, and the courts found several incompatibilities with the ECHR. Most of those incompatibilities were resolved by the introduction of the IPA in 2016. One issue remained—where an intelligence agency seeks to select confidential journalistic material for examination obtained under a bulk interception warrant or identify sources of journalistic material, the selection criteria used should be subject to prior independent authorisation. Where they are found during the examination of bulk data, their retention must be independently authorised.

In its report on the draft version of this instrument, the JCHR made three recommendations. Two have been accepted by the Government and integrated in this SI. However, the Government have not fully accepted the third recommendation, which was that security agencies engage with the Investigatory Powers Commissioner so that they can review journalistic material which had been retained before this SI is implemented. The Government responded that notification of the IPC is already required for an application for the retention of confidential journalistic material and that a judicial commissioner also must consider the application. Additionally, the IPC audits statements submitted for retention applications. However, if the Government accept that there is a need to change the law, surely they accept that there is a need to create an additional review in cases that will not be captured by the new regulations?

I have some questions which may be helpful for those who read these proceedings. Can the Minister explain why these changes have not been brought about as part of the Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill, given that it is still going through Parliament? New Sections 195 and 195A were inserted into the Investigatory Powers Act on Report in this House. They create additional safeguards for journalistic material for bulk equipment interference. Why is this being introduced separately? Can the Government provide more details on why they have not fully accepted the third recommendation of the JCHR?

In Article 2 of the SI before us, the Government talk about

“Additional safeguards for confidential journalistic material etc”,


and state that the two bodies that can investigate or seek approval are the Investigatory Powers Commissioner or a senior official. The Minister knows that I will ask who the senior official is. How senior does the senior official have to be? In what circumstances would you go not to the IPC for approval but to the senior official? I know the Minister tried—I expect that he thought that people would ask what “urgent” means—but can he say a little more about urgency, even though he included some of that in his remarks?

Does the senior official have to report every decision to the IPC, as outlined in the substituted Section 154A? Does the senior official have to inform the IPC within days or weeks of any decision that they have made? What happens if the IPC does not approve of the decision made by the senior official, given that, presumably, in the interim the Security Service will have acted as though it had permission? I hope that is clear: presumably a senior official can give permission, then for a few days the Security Service can operate as though it had permission, then the IPC turns around and says, “I don’t think that was the right decision and you do not have permission”. How does it function in the interim, if that is clear? You have a gap between the senior official giving permission and the IPC turning it down, which may be a few days. Does the Minister have anything to say about that?

Does the IPC or the senior official have to record their reasons for believing that the public interest in obtaining the information outweighs the public interest in maintaining confidentiality? In other words, do they have to be transparent about their reasons for coming to their conclusion? Similarly, under new subsections (6), (7) and (8), does the IPC or the senior official have to record the reason why the public interest in retaining the information outweighs the public interest in destroying the information that has been obtained? Again, it is the test about public interest and the conflict between confidentiality and openness and transparency. I wonder whether the Minister has anything to say about that.

However, I understand the need for the SI. I think some clarity around some of those questions would be helpful for those who read our deliberations but, with that, we support the SI.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I thank the noble Lord for his participation and support in the debate today. As I set out earlier, the changes that we are seeking to make to the Investigatory Powers Act will bring the bulk interception regime in line with the requirements of the European Court of Human Right’s Grand Chamber judgment in the case of Big Brother Watch. As I set out, it will ensure that the UK meets its obligations under Article 10 of the convention concerning confidential journalistic material and sources of journalistic material. Prior independent authorisation will be required where the purpose of the use of criteria to select material for examination is to identify confidential journalistic material or to identify or confirm a source of journalistic material. Prior independent authorisation will also be required for the retention of such material for purposes other than its destruction.

The noble Lord asked why this amendment was not taken forward as part of the Investigatory Powers (Amendment) Bill. That Bill was announced in the King’s Speech on 8 November 2023 and was introduced into the House of Lords on the same day. The Home Office was not able to pre-empt the contents of the King’s Speech and there was no guarantee that the Bill would be brought forward in the fourth Session. The judgment in the BBW case was handed down in May 2021 and, as a considerable time has passed and with no guarantee of a suitable legislative vehicle, the Home Office felt it was necessary to remedy the incompatibility as soon as possible. A remedial order was therefore the most appropriate course of action; essentially, it was timing.

18:00

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked about the Joint Committee on Human Rights requesting IPCO to order a review of material selected for examination. Following the JCHR’s recommendation, the department engaged with IPCO to determine whether a review of any journalistic material which is being retained or remains retained is required in accordance with Article 10. I cannot really improve on what I said earlier. IPCO’s view was that it already had a process in place to apply a public interest test for all retained confidential journalistic material, so in the light of that, the department, IPCO and the operational community did not feel it necessary to propose that IPCO undertake another review of confidential journalistic material, as this will already occur as part of the current process.

As regards the urgency provision, when reading the BBW judgment with other case law, it is clear that the court was not seeking to exclude urgency procedures where there are appropriate safeguards. On the contrary, it was confirming that, with the appropriate safeguards, the use of an urgency procedure is compatible with the convention, so it would not be practical to implement a 24/7 process for urgent authorisations. The safeguards ensure that if the judicial commissioner does not approve the activity, it has to cease.

These urgency procedures were not part of the initial remedial order because the introduction of the urgency provision was deemed critical when it was raised as a representation during the first 60 days as it would provide extra resilience for operational requirements. If there was no urgency provision, there would be a situation where it was necessary to use search criteria that related to journalistic material and all sources in order to protect life or prevent serious harm, but it was outside of the standard working hours, so the result of this could be disastrous, as it could lead to loss of life, serious harm or lost intelligence collection opportunities. Therefore, in the interests of national security and in threat-to-life situations, there must be a process for authorising activity outside these periods. The Home Office engaged with IPCO and UKIC ahead of laying the remedial order in March 2023, and the requirement for an urgency procedure crystallised only during the first 60-day period and was deemed necessary for operational agility.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked what we mean by “a senior official”. It basically means a senior civil servant. I am not quite sure what the grade is. I believe it is deputy director or above, but if I am wrong, I will come back and let him know.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I know it sounds like dancing on the head of a pin, but what “senior” means is quite important, so I ask the Minister to clarify that.

[Lord Sharpe of Epsom (Con)]

I take the point. I absolutely will clarify it, if possible.

I would love to read the Committee my last answer, but I cannot read the writing, so I am sorry, and I apologise to whoever wrote it. Whatever it says, I will write to the noble Lord—or, rather, type—when I have deciphered it. I am very grateful for his contribution in this debate. As I set out, the changes we are seeking to make will ensure that the UK’s bulk interception regime meets its obligations under Article 10 of the convention and strengthens existing safeguards for journalists. I therefore commend this order to the Committee.

Motion agreed.

Committee adjourned at 6.03 pm.