Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Lucas

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th February 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, I wanted to wait until the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, had spoken, because I wanted the chance to agree with her amendment, which raises the same question that I was raising in Amendment 192. Why do you have to be locked into these subs? Why can you not be asked to resubscribe, if that is what you want to do? Why can we not give consumers a right to approach things that way and get to know a product before they know that they want it every year?

I echo what my noble friend Lady Stowell of Beeston said on newspapers. I would want to get to know the Daily Telegraph well enough to know that I want to pay for it every day. To be able to buy it once a week would be nice, but that is not an offer at the moment. Allowing consumers to get used to a product benefits business. As the noble Baroness demonstrates in her amendment, it also benefits the consumer. It should not just be a year’s subscription or nothing. We should encourage businesses to provide something in between. We certainly should not make renewal the only option that businesses look for. We should make them earn that renewal by providing a good product for a year so that customers do not want to have to be bothered with renewing it every year. That is a situation that one happily gets into with a number of charities. You know that you want to support them. They provide a good service and you just let it tick over. I do not think that anyone should be entitled to that position. They have to earn it; they have to prove it. To have a system where you do not have to tie yourself in at the beginning is estimable.

That said, I have a great deal of sympathy for what my noble friend Lord Black said. I would prefer to see a lot of this in secondary legislation. I understand that when someone cancels a subscription, the business wants a chance to correspond with them and have an argument, although I find it a huge irritant in my relationship with a business when I suddenly discover that it would do business with me on much better terms but only if I threaten to withdraw. I wish it would value me as a continuing customer and offer me good terms, rather than only benefiting discontented customers.

I think that there is a lot of good in all the amendments in this group. I echo what the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, said about the amendment tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville. I look forward to seeing that in the next Bill. I just draw his attention to the likes of Ancestry.com. Its business is the accumulation of everything that everyone has added to it. You subscribe to it, but all the time you are adding information that is then available to other people. Businesses should be allowed to retain the information that you have added, if that is appropriate. I can quite see that you might want your photographs returned from Flickr, but something like Ancestry or an app about building up information about history, ecology or whatever else it might be properly retains information that individuals have contributed and it ought to be possible for an app to have that in its terms.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I am glad to follow the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, because having supported a number of amendments in this group I saw harmony rather than discord. The noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, had it absolutely right: the provisions here are both too vague and too detailed. Where the Bill should be detailed, it is vague; where it is vague, it should be—and so on. That is the essence of it.

Between us, we have a pretty good idea—I hope that it does not involve sitting in a locked room thrashing this out—of what good looks like. That is the important thing. The problem is that in this group we are debating the beginning of a contract, the reminder and the termination in one fell swoop, so it is easy to misunderstand exactly what we are talking about. The amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, are extremely good, because this is all about having information at the beginning of the contract. What you do not want is too much elaboration. As long as you know up front what to expect and the kind of contract that you going to enter into, that seems to me to a sensible way forward. It is about getting the basics right and I do not think that the Government have got the basics right.

Many people think that the process by which the original consumer regulations were put together was perfectly sensible, so I disagree with the noble Baroness about whether secondary legislation would be appropriate after consultation. I think that that would be a perfectly proper way forward, rather than this rather clunky way of doing it with secondary legislation and schedules setting out so much detail. That seems a rather extraordinary way of going forward. It also seems to clash somewhat with the Government’s reluctance in other areas. No doubt the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, will speak in the next group about a lack of regulation in certain quarters—which way is a matter of mutual interest. That seems a bit paradoxical. We have to get the basics right.

The noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, made an interesting speech. He was almost suggesting that there needs to be friction at the end of a contract so that there is an excuse to engage. I am not entirely convinced by that. Luckly, he did not put an amendment down, so I do not have to disagree with that at the end of the day.

The amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Black, are sensible. There is an issue about how many communications a consumer sees, but the important amendment is the one regarding qualification of “by any means”. Clause 258 is pretty extraordinary. What if a trader gets a Twitter message but they are not on Twitter? How are we expected to accept a notice given “by any means”? The qualification suggested by the noble Lord seems entirely sensible.

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[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, we move from a very new problem to a very old problem. My Amendment 215B asks that the Government restore to us the protection we used to have from double-glazing salesmen. There used to be a cooling-off period. That got swept away by EU regulations. Now that we have Brexit, we have the opportunity to give consumers back the protection that they once had. At the moment, double-glazing can claim to be made to the consumer’s specification but, actually, it is not. It is a standard product, and you just tweak it a bit. There is plenty of room when you are providing double glazing, fitted kitchens or anything like that to allow consumers proper time to step back and ask themselves whether they want to go in for such an expense and whether it is something they really want to do. We ought to restore that to consumers, there being no good reason not to.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak first to Amendment 215C and then come to Amendment 202. I am very much indebted to the Fair Standards Alliance for raising the issue of standard-essential patents. I thought I knew a fair bit about intellectual property and the digital world, but I was in a state of relative ignorance when the world of standard-essential patents came to me. I have had quite an extensive briefing from the Fair Standards Alliance, which has revealed the importance of standard-essential patents, particularly in the context of competition and licensing.

These patents are necessary to implement an industry standard, such as for wifi or 5G. As the market is locked into a standard, to prevent abuse of the market power, SEP owners are required to license their SEPs on fair terms. Unfortunately, there is widespread abuse of this monopoly power by SEP holders that often, I am told, do not abide by their voluntary commitments and instead seek to abuse their market dominance to force product manufacturers to sign up to unfair terms. SEP holders are regularly seeking and securing excessive licence fees from technological innovators by leveraging the threat of injunctions, which forces firms in the UK either to accept high licence fees or to exit the market. This is to the detriment of those businesses and to the wider UK economy.

Most prospective licensees cannot afford the cost of litigation or exclusion from the UK market. The recent High Court decisions in InterDigital v Lenovo and Optis v Apple demonstrate how SEP owners exploit SMEs and make excessive royalty demands that only large, well-resourced litigants can afford to challenge. Apparently, the costs of the recent SEP licensing trial in the InterDigital case were over £31 million. That is pretty breathtaking, even to one with my background as a commercial lawyer.

The costs can be ruinous to many businesses. This tactic not only threatens innovation by UK businesses but represents a strategic risk for UK priorities, such as 5G infrastructure, diversification and smart energy network security, by limiting the competing players. The availability of injunctions for SEPs gives foreign SEP holders the ability to prevent others in the UK entering, succeeding and innovating in those markets.

The Government have been considering SEP reform— I noticed the Minister nodding vigorously, earlier—for several years and have received evidence showing the abuse that businesses in the UK face. The Intellectual Property Office’s SME survey suggests that UK businesses face excessive licence fees for SEPs. SMEs are concerned by the threat of market exclusion by court-ordered injunctions and a lack of transparency about the cost of and need for the SEPs being offered.

British companies are predominantly SEP licensees. The majority of SEPs are held by companies from China, the EU and the US, with no major SEP licensors based in the UK. This means that, when SEP holders hold up innovative UK manufacturers during licence negotiations and extract excessive licensing fees, they are taking value that would otherwise be available to fund further innovative developments in the UK and are increasing costs to UK consumers.

The UK’s innovative SMEs are especially affected across all sectors, as they cannot afford expensive legal battles against large, international SEP holders. As I said, the costs were over £31 million in the InterDigital case. The problem is widespread and the Government themselves have already accepted that SEPs are an issue; for instance, in their 5G Supply Chain Diversification Strategy of 2020 and in DSIT’s wireless infrastructure strategy last year. Recent High Court decisions have independently confirmed that position. A court determined that licence rates have been significantly lower than those demanded by the SEP holders. Our judges have concluded that SEP holders are able to exert significant unfair pressure to get the deal they want.

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I entirely agree that it is a question to be asked. Of course, there is the general principle of transparency. If you look at the amendment, you will see that it talks about content “whether assisted or generated” by AI. It could be partly or wholly generated by AI but, in transparency terms, just the knowledge that at least some of the elements were created by AI is important. The consumer can then take it or leave it, basically. If they like the sound of AI music—believe me, some of it is pretty dreadful—that is fine, but it is an acquired taste.

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

Will we have musicians confessing on stage that the electronics under the stage are adjusting the sound of their voice?

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

It all depends on how sober the audience is, I suspect.

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly in support of the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones.

It is unfortunate that this comes at the end of our debate rather than the beginning, as it is a really important aspect of it. We have been talking about the digital world throughout our six sessions, but it is increasingly apparent that the digital world cannot meet all the emotional needs of society. It is not the perfect substitute for everything that we do in person in the physical world—for our social, shopping and other needs. If we try to make it so, it will have considerable impact on mental health.

We must strive to keep a lively, prosperous physical world in front of us on the high street, as the noble Baroness outlined. Much of this talk about taxation is above my pay grade—you always get wrapped on the knuckles by your spokesperson if you start proposing tax reform or whatever it may be—but there is no doubt that my party certainly supports business rates reforms in a variety of different ways. It also believes that the settlement on the digital taxation side through the OECD agreements has been far too modest in its impact on the major digital players. The imbalance between physical and digital traders has been far too great and has advantaged the digital players far too much. I am in total sympathy with what the noble Baroness said.

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on that last point. It is really important that we keep at the question of how we tax digital businesses. One can no longer rely on the Irish national statistics because they are so distorted by profit shifting, a lot of it from this country—profit going abroad and being taxed at a very low rate in Ireland when it should be taxed here.

I know that this is an international matter, but we absolutely must keep the pressure up. We are getting more and more digital, so we need to have an international tax system where profits are taxed where they arise and not where Governments wish to shift them to. I know that this is hard, but I am unimpressed by the progress that the world has made in this direction. I really hope that the Government will get behind the continued efforts on this. We suffer a great deal from it.

At the other end of the scale, the Government could also do a lot better. I am sure that my noble friends will remember that HMRC made a horrendous mess of VAT in the Channel Islands in the early 2000s. Whole businesses grew up in the Channel Islands on the idea that you could ship records out to them, then they would come back VAT-free to the person in the UK who bought them because the consignment was under a certain value.

HMRC eventually dealt with that, but now there is monstrous and recurring fraud through the likes of Amazon and eBay, involving “Chinese” sellers—there is no reason to think that they are of that nationality in particular, but they are certainly Far Eastern—who HMRC does not pursue. HMRC does not effectively collect the tax that is due. It says, “Oh, it’s too hard. Oh, it’s in lots of little bits. Oh, these people move around with great velocity”. Yes, they do, but by not collecting it, HMRC not only does not get the tax but damages the UK businesses that should be able to compete on a level playing field with those overseas sellers. It is delinquent; it is an issue at the root of HMCR that we have never managed to deal with effectively, but we really must.

It is so important that HMRC realises that it should focus not only on operational efficiency in terms of how much it costs to do things and whether it gets the money back that it is investing in this, or a sufficient multiplier of it, but on whether it is doing its bit for the structure of the UK economy and the ability of businesses to start and flourish here. I pay great credit to Retailers Against VAT Abuse Schemes, which has been active these last 20 years. I hope that it will eventually be successful, but golly, it could do with more help.

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Lucas

Committee stage
Monday 5th February 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, I have one amendment in this group, Amendment 110A, which will be echoed in subsequent groups as part of a general concern about making sure that trading standards are an effective body in the UK and are able to do what they are supposed to do to look after consumers.

As the Minister will know, because we were part of the same conversation, the CMA is concerned that trading standards may have been reduced to the point where they are not as effective as they ought to be. Looking at some of the local cuts—in Enfield, for instance, four officers have been cut down to one—and listening to various people involved in trading standards, there is a general concern that, as they are set up and funded at the moment, they are not able to perform the role that they should be. Given the importance that enforcers have in the structure that the Government are putting together, I am asking in this amendment that the Government review that effectiveness, take a serious look at the structures that they have created and their capability of performing as they would wish under the Bill and report within a reasonable period.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I entirely support what the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, had to say in her probing amendment. It takes us back to the Online Safety Bill debate. The final question that she asked is crucial: if not here, where? We must have a means of being able to prevent the sale of these products. She has highlighted it and I hope that the Minister has a satisfactory reply, so that, in short order, we can make sure that these products are not for sale in these online marketplaces.

I also entirely support the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas. It will become clearer and clearer as we move through the groups that adequate resources are required for trading standards. We impose a large number of duties on them, yet we appear not to give them the resources. In fact, their resources have dwindled over the years, as I know that the noble Earl, Lord Lindsay, and my noble friend Lady Bakewell would have outlined if they had been present. In respect of their amendments, which I will come on to later, I am the understudy’s understudy, because the noble Earl, Lord Lindsay, cannot be here today, I gather, nor can my noble friend Lady Bakewell. It falls to me to make a fist of talking to Amendments 112 all the way through to 127, which I will attempt. The noble Lord, Lord Bassam, will be making an even better attempt in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Crawley, as I understand. Hopefully, the Minister will take on board what we have to say when the time comes.

Very briefly, I want to speak to Amendments 111 and 122, which relate to increasing the scope of the monetary penalties under the Bill. Amendment 111 applies this to Clause 157 for court enforcement orders when the public designated enforcer, such as the CMA, considers that a person is engaged or is likely to engage in a commercial practice that constitutes a relevant infringement and the court makes such an enforcement order on the public designated enforcer’s application. Amendment 222 applies this to CMA final infringement notices under Clause 181, for when the CMA imposes an infringement notice after an investigation into suspected infringements.

Current drafting limits the penalties to

“£300,000 or, if higher, 10% of the total value of the turnover (if any) of the respondent”.

However, a respondent may have made a huge profit as a result of infringements. Fines of a mere £300,000 are unlikely to incentivise good behaviour. In circumstances where 10% of the total value of the turnover is higher, our legal advice is that the UK would typically follow current EU practice, unless something in UK legislation specifically allowed it not to do so, such as we propose in these amendments. In the EU, the fine has to relate to the turnover of the activity in issue and its duration, which, in practice, makes it a much smaller number. To get to group worldwide turnover requires evidence of head office involvement. It should be made clear that to calculate the penalty amount the CMA and the court are able to take into account the profit made by the respondent.

Penalties are supposed to provide an incentive not to break the law, which raises the real question: why are fines related to turnover at all? To ensure good behaviour, they should strip the lawbreaker of the profits gained from lawbreaking. Where a platform can harm millions and only a few take it to task if it pays off the fee, breaking the law pays back handsomely. Authorities could be given the power to directly award exemplary damages of this type in these circumstances. In practice, fines are a fraction of turnover and profits. The largest fine to date was the €4.3 billion imposed on Google in respect of its Android device restriction, which is a long way ahead of other recent fines, but Google makes something of the order of $70 billion a quarter in turnover.

This amendment would also focus on the abusive practice, not the abuse only in relation to effects in one market. For example, Google changed its algorithm in 2007 to promote its own products at the top of its search results. It does so for news, maps, images, shopping and things such as flight booking. That pushes more relevant and better businesses down the rankings so that they get less business and competition is distorted. The practice is governed by an algorithm called universal search. The EU Commission had the resource only to investigate shopping; the fine was €204 billion. Google carries on discriminating in all areas but shopping. A fine could and should be calculated in relation to the abusive practice, of which shopping is an example; otherwise, breaking the law pays and behaviour does not change. Seeing the fine in relation to the profit gained from the practice would be fair. It would deprive the wrongdoer of the gains from breaking the law and is likely to change behaviour. An account of profits could easily be done.

I turn to Amendments 112 to 120 in the names of the noble Earl, Lord Lindsay, my noble friend Lady Bakewell and the noble Baroness, Lady Crawley. As I said, unfortunately none of those proposers is able to be present today, but all their amendments relate to widening the scope of how appropriate court action can take place and they all come under the banner of consumer protection and enforcement, especially for a level playing field to operate in the current marketplace.

Amendments 112, 113 and 114 are about consumer protection orders and undertakings under Clause 159 and cover applications to the appropriate court for an online interface order or an interim online interface order. Clause 159 extends the court’s online interface powers to the enactments, obligations and rules of law categorised as domestic infringements and it is to be welcomed. The Explanatory Notes to the Bill give examples of where online interface orders could be useful, especially in the area of underage sales products. This has been thrown into sharp relief by the Government’s proposals on banning the selling of vapes to underage children and young people. In relation to weights and measures, it is possible that, in order to avoid local inspection systems in the UK, an online supply of short-weight goods would need urgent follow-up with an application for an online interface order against the third-party overseas website where rogue traders are mis-selling to UK consumers.

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[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 124A and to speak to Amendments 124B and 124C. These are all small amendments aimed at making trading standards a bit more effective in practice. Amendment 124A would allow trading standards to seize, as well as the suspected counterfeit goods, articles—for instance, clothing used by the trader that puts them at the scene of the crime. At the moment, trading standards do not have the right to seize such articles of evidential value and they would very much like to have it, since it would make it easier to convict rogues.

As for Amendment 124B, at the moment, trading standards are not allowed to open a vehicle if that is where the goods are being stored, because it does not fall within the definition currently used in the Bill—or at least they believe that is the case. They would like, should all the goods concerned be in a van, to be able to open the van.

As for Amendment 124C, sometimes these can be big crimes of hundreds of thousands of pounds. Level 3 just does not meet the case; it is just a bit off the profit. They would like to see the judge able to set the level of the fine to accord to the crime—Gilbert and Sullivan would have approved.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, once again, with the indulgence of the Committee, I will speak on behalf of my noble friend Lady Bakewell to Amendments 125, 126 and 127.

Before doing so, I say that I support the amendments of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, which strike me as extremely practical. It must be extremely frustrating when faced with some of the restrictions. This point about vehicles seems to me a particular irritant for trading standards officers—a vehicle being defined as premises. What era are we living in?

We need to bring the powers of trading standards officers up to the 21st century, which is very much the spirit in which Amendments 125, 126 and 127 have been tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Lindsay, my noble friend Lady Bakewell and the noble Baroness, Lady Crawley. Amendment 125 would delete paragraph 17 of Schedule 5 to the Consumer Rights Act, which at present requires trading standards officers to exercise physical powers of entry to premises—this is in the digital age—before accessing information and the seizing of documents that may be needed in criminal proceedings. Accepting this amendment would be an opportunity to finally update the powers of trading standards in this respect. It would have the effect of changing their information-gathering powers to enable documents requested in writing without the need for physical entry to be used in criminal proceedings. This means also relieving the undue burdens placed on businesses and trading standards officers.

For legitimate businesses there is presently the burden of having to interrupt their normal business to provide the requested documents there and then, whereas, under what is proposed in this amendment, if the request is made in writing rather than physically, they will have more time to source the required documents and even seek legal advice should they wish to. For the small band of trading standards officers, the requirement to exercise physical powers of entry across the country to seize documents they may need to use in criminal proceedings is not cost-effective for their cash-strapped local authorities. If a local authority in, say, my noble friend’s Somerset had to deal with a case in Cumbria, it would simply not be viable for this to happen. The criminal activity could go unpunished and the public and consumer would still be at risk from rogue-trader activity.

In the impact assessment for the Bill, it is accepted that:

“Consumer rights must keep pace with market innovations, so that consumers remain confident engaging with businesses offering new products and services”.


That is a good statement, but for this sort of consumer confidence to become more robust, the enforcement powers of trading standards need to be seriously updated and not inhibited by the present inflexibility.

Amendments 126 and 127 propose to substitute the words “England or Wales” and “Scotland” for the words “United Kingdom” in paragraph 44(3) and 44(2) of Schedule 5 to the Consumer Rights Act. The effect of these amendments would be to add a new paragraph to Schedule 16 to the Bill, which would give new powers to trading standards officers to operate across UK national borders where necessary. Cross-border activities should be included in the Bill; current legislation does not make it clear that trading standards officers in England and Wales can exercise their powers across the border with Scotland, or vice versa, even though consumer protection is a reserved power. In fact, the current legislation implies that this cross-border enforcement activity is not permitted, and we are told that, currently, trading standards officers err on the side of caution. Who can blame them in the circumstances? For the success of these new powers and the Bill to take root, trading standards officers should be able to pursue and enforce across the whole of the United Kingdom.

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 130 I will speak also to Amendment 135, which is another amendment in the names of the noble Earl, Lord Lindsay, my noble friend Lady Bakewell and the noble Baroness, Lady Crawley. This is an opportunity to remedy the long-standing, unaddressed market practice of misleadingly similar packaging of consumer products—that is, packaging which mimics that of familiar branded products. Amendment 130 would introduce a strengthened brand practice in Schedule 19.

Misleadingly similar parasitic packaging, otherwise known as copycats or lookalikes, adopts the distinctive features of familiar branded products to dupe shoppers into believing that it has the same qualities, reputation and/or origin as the brand when it does not. Shoppers buy the copy based on these mistaken assumptions and can pay more than they would were the product distinctively packaged. Such packaging is extremely prevalent in the grocery market. It inflates consumer prices and prevent shoppers making informed, accurate decisions.

The evidence I have seen is convincing that packaging mimicry misleads consumers in substantial numbers and distorts buying decisions. The similar packaging plays on shoppers, exploiting the fact that they self-select products from the shelf. Stores stock so many products that decision-making must be, and is, fast—typically around two seconds per choice. Labels are not studied closely. Colour and shape are more powerful stimuli than words and prompt shoppers to buy a product that they did not intend to buy, to pay more and to believe that products have similarities. I have a whole string of assessments here from research such as a UK IPO study, neuroscience research and a 2023 study called The Psychology of Lookalikes.

In 2008, the Competition Commission considered such packaging an issue for consumer protection. During consultations and the debate on the Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008, the then Government stressed that public enforcement would be effective. This has not proved to be the case. There has been only one successful enforcement action by trading standards in the past 15 years—in 2008 itself—and no enforcement by the CMA.

IP rights are insufficient. Copiers tend to design around registered IP rights, such as trademarks, designs and copyright, to avoid infringement. A passing-off action is impractical, as proving consumer confusion to a court’s satisfaction is complex, particularly when a copier argues that the use of a different product name avoids misrepresentation. The evidence that IP rights are ineffective can be seen in the persistent prevalence of such copies on the market, with two large retailers adopting it as a business strategy largely unchallenged. Affected branded businesses are unprotected, as there is a gap in IP protection. The original copied brand is no longer distinctive; it is devalued, sales are lost and costs increase. Overall, return on investment in innovation, reputation and quality is reduced. Other products in the same category may lose sales if shoppers switch to the copy, assuming leading brand quality at a lower price, potentially leading to delisting.

For the unlawful copier, sales are boosted as shoppers buy their products by mistake or trust them unduly. They can also charge higher prices; the evidence shows that this could be by as much as 10%. The ultimate solution, of course, is not for offending products to be removed from the market, just that they be repackaged distinctively. This would preserve shopper choice, strengthen competition and reduce prices. Amendment 130, as proposed, would benefit many thousands of shoppers and branded companies of all sizes, particularly SMEs, wherever in the UK they are based.

I now turn to Amendment 135 and should say that the next group contains an amendment, Amendment 137, that is also on fake reviews, so this is a bit of a foretaste of what is coming down the track in the next group. Amendment 135 would add two more practices to the list in Schedule 19 of 31 commercial practices that are in all circumstances considered unfair and bad practice. The two additions are, first, a new paragraph 32:

“Stating or otherwise creating the impression that reviews of a product are submitted by consumers who have actually used or purchased the product without taking reasonable and proportionate steps to check that they originate from such consumers”;


and, secondly, a new paragraph 33:

“Submitting, or commissioning another legal or natural person to submit, false consumer reviews or endorsements, or misrepresenting consumer reviews or social endorsements, in order to promote products”.


How often do we all look to see what people have said about a product or service or, indeed, a bed and breakfast before we commit to buying? I suspect that young people are particularly vulnerable to wanting to participate in something that has a good review and appears to be popular.

The Government propose adding fake reviews to the list of practices in the future, but there is no logical reason why they should not be included now. Adding fake reviews to this important list would make them both criminal and civil breaches, as we understand it. Trading standards see the widespread practice of giving fake reviews as clearly fraudulent in nature, and therefore it should be a criminal offence. Fake reviews appear to be particularly prevalent for health supplements, where a single course of some miracle ingredient will cure your arthritis for ever—that resonates with me. Large sums of money can be invested by those suffering constant pain in an effort to get some relief, only to find that they have wasted their money.

I understand that there is a proposal. The Smarter Regulation response was quite clear that there is considerable demand for this. That response contains a great deal of other material as well and is very useful. I think the latest version is dated 24 January this year, so it is hot off the press, essentially. There is this proposal to add fake reviews in the future via a separate statutory instrument, but why should they not be included in the Bill at this stage? The language has been proposed by the Government. This is a growing distortion of the online marketplace. It is unfair to legitimate businesses and completely deceives consumers who may rely on accurate information to validate their choices. I very much hope that the Minister will say that on Report it will be perfectly viable to include language on fake reviews in the Bill. I beg to move.

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 131 in this group. It is my understanding, and of course the Minister may correct me, that the investment that a student makes in their university course comes under the Bill—that the relationship is one between consumer and provider. Indeed, since this is the largest purchase that a student will make before they buy a house, it seems entirely appropriate that the sort of safeguards in this Bill should apply to university courses. If that is the case, then paragraph 29 on page 362 forbids universities marketing their courses to children, and that does not seem quite right. I would like to understand how the Government see the confluence of those two factors.

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[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, the Committee may get a slight feeling of déjà vu when it comes to my Amendment 137 but we were assured that it covers a different topic and it is therefore perfectly legitimate to have it in a different group. However, there are other aspects—in particular Amendment 143, which I want to speak to in moving Amendment 137. I will be brief.

As we have heard, the Minister is positive about discussions on how we will enshrine fake reviews. As we know, the Government’s response was designed to improve consumer price transparency and product information for consumers. We very much share that intent. They have highlighted how legislation will tackle fake reviews. Any lack of criminal enforcement would be a major concern so I hope that that will be part of the subject we will discuss.

Of course, we know the impact of fake reviews. Amendment 137 is a different way of dealing with the issues. Fake reviews have been identified by the Federation of Small Businesses as one of the three primary problems experienced by smaller firms when trading on digital marketplaces, so preventing the proliferation of fake reviews will support both consumers and businesses; that is a point we should make. This should be added to the Bill.

The one question I have is this: have the Government had discussions with Trustpilot? It would like to see the Government’s proposed wording extended, particularly to the hosting issue. I do not know whether the Minister has a brief on that. I was quite impressed by the Trustpilot briefing and the evidence it gave. It has concerns about other parts of the wording but, for me, the most powerful aspect is making sure that those who host fake reviews are penalised. I hope that the Minister has an answer to that.

Amendment 143 is where I am again the sorcerer’s apprentice. This is an amendment to Clause 288. It seeks further to protect consumers from rogue traders and their unfair practices. It is something that I know the Chartered Trading Standards Institute is keen to see put into practice. It is a breach of Clause 225 of the Bill for a trader to engage in a commercial practice that is a misleading omission, meaning the practice omits material information. That is defined as

“information that the average consumer needs in order to take an informed transactional decision”.

There is much discussion in the consumer field about what information is needed by a consumer and what is merely desired. For instance, there is no specific requirement for a trader to give his or her name and address. Clause 228 adds an additional breach of omitting material information from an invitation to purchase; it states that there are a number of specific matters that are considered to be material and where it could be an offence if the information is not provided to the consumer, so surely things can only get better. However, an invitation to purchase is currently defined in the Bill as

“a commercial practice involving the provision of information to a consumer … which indicates the characteristics of a product and its price, and … which enables, or purports to enable, the consumer to decide whether to purchase the product or take another transactional decision in relation to the product”.

The point that the Chartered Trading Standards Institute and trading standards officers are making in this context is that, in their day-to-day experience, many rogue traders targeting vulnerable consumers, often in their own homes, do not give a price when offering to do work. If they do not give a price, they will not come under this new obligation in the legislation and will get away with their shoddy work or criminal activity, hence the opportunity in this amendment to remove price from the definition of an invitation to purchase. It would automatically mean that the practice is not an invitation to purchase and, therefore, that the information listed in Clause 228 is not considered material information.

To sum up, removal of price in the definition of invitation to purchase would increase consumer protection, as it would automatically make such things as price, the identity of the trader and his or her address become material information. It would therefore be a breach to provide this information to the consumer. I look forward to what the Minister has to say in respect of those two amendments.

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, I have a clutch of amendments in this group. Amendment 138A continues the series of improvements to trading standards regulations. Before we came under EU regulation, we had considerable freedom to deal with pricing abuses. As one of the many advantages from Brexit, I do not see why we should not go back to the situation we used to have.

Amendment 138B looks at the rights that consumers have and what happens when a business ignores them. At the moment, if a business is denying or ignoring rights, trading standards has to take action under the Enterprise Act 2002 by way of a court injunction. It is slow and expensive, so I cannot see why that should not be dealt with under the scope of this Bill.

I hope that Amendment 140 will draw out from the Government an understanding of what information ought not to be omitted. If, for instance, a trader knows that a particular product has a series of adverse and well-informed reviews or has resulted in poor consumer experience, do they have to share that information? If they have it, they will probably be disinclined to be open with it, but do they have to provide it? How far should a trader go to share information of which they are aware and which they know exists but which they would not normally include in marketing their product? Some elucidation of the limits of this would be much appreciated.

Amendment 145B comes back to trading standards. At the moment, the time limit in the Bill is one year. Trading standards operates an intelligence-led approach: it lets information build up for a while before it takes action to make sure that it is acting in cases of consistent abuse rather than one-off problems. Time is then taken to investigate and it takes more time to get to court, so it is very easy to exceed that one-year time limit—particularly in relation to the earlier offences in a group of offences. Two years would be a better expression of the practical length of time that it takes trading standards to bring cases to court.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

I shall be clearer after reading my noble friend’s remarks.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

I thank the Minister for his reply to this disparate group of amendments. I thought the discussion about information raised by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, was crucial because this is so important to the consumer, particularly the vulnerable consumer. I look forward to seeing the Minister’s letter of clarification, or whatever it is that he will come up with, in due course.

I thank the Minister for his response to Amendment 137, which was, in a sense, rehearsed in the previous group. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for her support. She raised some important aspects about timescale and criminal offences. I am assuming that how the whole fake review aspect is dealt with predicates whether we can also have criminal liability. If it is added to Schedule 19, it gets criminal liability, but if it is dealt with in another way, it may not. Clarification of this is important because only two areas, I think, in Schedule 19 are excluded from criminal liability. All the rest get criminal liability. Therefore, it is important that the Minister can give that assurance when we have these discussions that that will be the case.

On the guidance that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, talked about, I hope the Minister’s reply was that that will be part of what we deliver. The unfair practices guidance will be really important. Just today, the Minister clarified, for example, the brands issue, saying that it is covered by paragraph 14, or whatever it was, of Schedule 19, and that it is not necessary to add that wording. This is all part of important guidance, I suspect, in the end. Expecting people to read the Minister’s words in Committee in the House of Lords might be slightly unreasonable, so I hope that the guidance will nail down the interpretation of some of these aspects of Schedule 19, which will clearly be important legislation.

I think there will be great disappointment about the response to Amendment 143. There was a kind of circular argument that it is going too far—but going too far in what respect? The classic “unintended consequences” were raised as well. There is a set of buzz phrases that one can produce in these circumstances, and “unintended consequences” is one of them, but I did not hear a convincing reason why pricing should not be excluded from an offer to purchase. It strikes me that trading standards officers are correct that this could be a potential loophole. There was perhaps a bit of “not invented here” as well, particularly regarding the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, on “properly inform”, which I thought were rather good compared to the existing wording. However, we will, no doubt, continue these discussions. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Lucas

Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 13th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for that tour de force. This group is an extraordinary collection of different aspects such as research trusts and professional privilege. He even shed light on some opaque amendments to opaque parts of the Bill in dealing with Amendments 86A, 86B and 86C. The noble Lord, Lord Griffiths, was manful in his description of what his amendments were designed to do. I lost the plot fairly early on.

I thank the Minister particularly for his approach to the research aspect. However, we are back again to the recitals. I would be grateful if he could give us chapter and verse on which recitals he is relying on. He said that without the provisions of the Bill that we find unsatisfactory, research would be crippled. There is a view that he is relying on some fair stretching of the correct interpretation of the words “scientific” and “historical”, especially if it is to cover the kinds of things that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, has been talking about. Many others are concerned about other forms of research, such as cyber research. There are so many other aspects. TechUK does not take up cudgels unless it is convinced that there is an underlying problem. This brings us back, again, to the question of recitals not being part of the Bill—

[Lord Lucas]

I support the noble Lord on this. Coming back to his earlier example, if you were told a sandwich was solely made of vegetable, the Minister is saying that that means it has not got much meat in it. This is Brussels language. I do not think it is the way in which our courts will interpret these words when we have sole control of them. If, as I am delighted to learn, we are going to implement our 2017 manifesto in its better bits, including Brexit, this is something we will have to face up to. This appears to be another occasion where “scientific” does not bear the weight the Bill is trying to put on it. It is not scientific research which is happening with the NPD. It is research, but it is not scientific.

[Lord Clement-Jones]

I agree with that. Again we are relying on the interpretation in whichever recital the Minister has in his briefing. It would be useful to have a letter from him on that score and a description of how it is going to be binding. How is that interpretation which he is praying in aid in the recitals going to be binding in future on our courts? The recitals are not part of the Bill. We probably talked about this on the first day.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Lucas

Monday 13th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, I rather hope that the Minister has not been able to persuade noble Lords opposite. Certainly, I have not felt myself persuaded. First, on the point about “solely”, in recruiting these days, when big companies need to reduce a couple of thousand applications to 100, the general practice is that you put everything into an automated process—you do not really know how it works—get a set of scores at the end and decide where the boundary lies according to how much time you have to interview people. Therefore, there is human intervention—of course there is. You are looking at the output and making the decision about who gets interviewed and who does not. That is a human decision, but it is based on the data coming out of the algorithm without understanding the algorithm. It is easy for an algorithm to be racist. I just googled “pictures of Europeans”. You get a page of black faces. Somewhere in the Google algorithm, a bit of compensation is going on. With a big algorithm like that, they have not checked what the result of that search would be, but it comes out that way. It has been equally possible to carry out searches, as at various times in the past, which were similarly off-beam with other groups in society.

When you compile an algorithm to work with applications, you start off, perhaps, by looking at, “Who succeeds in my company now? What are their characteristics?”. Then you go through and you say, “You are not allowed to look at whether the person is a man or a woman, or black or white”, but perhaps you are measuring other things that vary with those characteristics and which you have not noticed, or some combinations. An AI algorithm can be entirely unmappable. It is just a learning algorithm; there is no mental process that a human can track. It just learns from what is there. It says, “Give me a lot of data about your employees and how successful they are and I will find you people like that”.

At the end of the day, you need to be able to test these algorithms. The Minister may remember that I posed that challenge in a previous amendment to a previous Bill. I was told then that a report was coming out from the Royal Society that would look at how we should set about testing algorithms. I have not seen that report, but has the Minister seen it? Does he know when it is coming out or what lines of thinking the Royal Society is developing? We absolutely need something practical so that when I apply for a job and I think I have been hard done by, I have some way to do something about it. Somebody has to be able to test the algorithm. As a private individual, how do you get that done? How do you test a recruitment algorithm? Are you allowed to invent 100 fictitious characters to put through the system, or should the state take an interest in this and audit it?

We have made so much effort in my lifetime and we have got so much better at being equal—of course, we have a fair way to go—doing our best continually to make things better with regard to discrimination. It is therefore important that we do not allow ourselves to go backwards because we do not understand what is going on inside a computer. So absolutely, there has to be significant human involvement for it to be regarded as a human decision. Generally, where there is not, there has to be a way to get a human challenge—a proper human review—not just the response, “We are sure that the system worked right”. There has to be a way round which is not discriminatory, in which something is looked at to see whether it is working and whether it has gone right. We should not allow automation into bits of the system that affect the way we interact with each other in society. Therefore, it is important that we pursue this and I very much hope that noble Lords opposite will give us another chance to look at this area when we come to Report.

[Lord Clement-Jones]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who spoke in the debate. It has been wide-ranging but extremely interesting, as evidenced by the fact that at one point three members of the Artificial Intelligence Select Committee were speaking. That demonstrates that currently we live, eat and breathe artificial intelligence, algorithms and all matters related to them. It is a highly engaged committee. Of course, whatever I put forward from these Benches is not—yet—part of the recommendations of that committee, which, no doubt, will report in due course in March.

Data Protection Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Lucas

Monday 30th October 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I suspect that if you scratched half the Members of this House, they would have to declare an interest. I will just add a bit of non-Oxford variety as chair of the council of Queen Mary University of London. I express Front Bench support for my noble friend’s amendment and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Royall.

There is no doubt about the interaction of article 6 and the unfortunate inclusion of universities in the Freedom of Information Act definition, and there is no reason that I can see—we have heard about the alumni issues and the importance of fundraising to universities—why universities should not be put on all fours with charities, which can take advantage of the exemption in article 6. I very much hope that the Minister, who was nodding vigorously throughout most of the speeches, is prepared to state that he will come forward with an amendment, or accept this one, which would be gratefully received.

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, perhaps I may say a word on behalf of the victims. I very much hope that we will be given the right to ask the college to cross our name off.

I very much enjoyed my time at Oxford. It took Oxford 37 years to cotton on to the idea that, having spent three years doing physics there, perhaps I was interested in physics and it might offer me something in continued involvement other than students being pestered into asking me for money twice a year. That is not a relationship; that is not a community; that is a one-way suck. It is a Dyson vacuum cleaner designed to hoover money in on the basis of creating some sort of obligation. It was a contract 40 years ago, for goodness’ sake: create something now or keep something going.

Fundamentally, I have very little sympathy with the idea—

Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill

Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Lucas

Wednesday 16th January 2013 Grand Committee

[Lord Lucas]

My Lords, in moving the amendment, I wish to speak also to Amendment 28B.

Since I tabled these amendments, we have had a Christmas present from the ministry. On 20 December, the Secretary of State was kind enough to announce a package of intentions to reform copyright which entirely supersedes my Amendment 28B. Therefore, I will not trouble the Committee by addressing that because clearly we will see this in a proper and thought through form when we come to the Bill that will follow the announcements made by the Secretary of State. However, we have a small cameo performance on copyright now before we go to bed. I would be grateful if the Minister could confirm that the 28th of this month will be the next day in Committee, since clearly this stage of the Bill is now going to go into 10 sittings. If there is any suggestion that there will be a day in between, will we all receive an e-mail notification rather than having to spot that something has changed on the Order Paper?

It seems to me that copyright is aptly described by Macaulay. A lot of people speak as if copyright is a god-given possession of creative people. It is not; it is a deal done between those who consume copyright material—I both produce and consume copyright material—and those who produce it. In order that it should be produced, those who consume are prepared to let the copyright owners have a limited monopoly on it, but that monopoly is not without terms. It is given in order that it should be available for consumption. The way in which people want to consume copyright material is therefore an important part of negotiating and renegotiating the bargain between users and producers of copyright material.

My firm view, which, to judge from his 20 December announcements, is shared by the Secretary of State, is that we should look at copyright as a means of increasing national wealth, not just of producing a nice little rose garden to enable creative people to live comfortably and have everything exactly the way that they want it. It is a bargain between two sides. It is an agreement to use something that is essentially an evil—a monopoly—in order to enable something good to happen. My view, like that of the Secretary of State, which is covered in Amendment 28B, is that we must from time to time look at the way in which copyright functions in this country and ask whether it is serving the interests of users as well as those of the people who create it. In the case of fair use, quite clearly the rules had begun to fall well short of the way in which people wanted to use copyright material. We all own a reasonable variety of devices. If we buy a copy of Beethoven’s ninth symphony by the London Symphony Orchestra, we ought to be able to listen to it on various devices; we do not want to have to buy separate copies for separate devices. Therefore, we must make it possible for users to do that because that is the way that users want to consume material and that is part of the modern bargain.

Amendment 28A covers something that the Secretary of State has not touched on but which others will be aware of. In the days of books—and long may they continue—when you bought a book, you owned it. You could pass it on to other people, you could sell it second-hand, you could leave it in your will—it was a possession. Now if you buy a book for use on your Kindle it remains the property of Amazon, which can remove it at any time—and does. Amazon strips people of their whole libraries or removes individual books if something has gone wrong with the licensing. You do not own a book; you just have the right to consume it for a while. That is a fundamentally undesirable position when it comes to the relationship between the creator and the user.

Something that is for personal consumption ought to be a personal possession; it ought to be something that we can pass on to other people. We should not allow the position to persist where the balance has been shifted. We have allowed the change in technology to change the balance between the old regime that existed in the case of books, of ownership as a result of payment to one of leasing as a result of payment. We should encourage people to have libraries and pass on intellectual works they have created to other people. That is the right balance between users and creatives. I want to restore the balance in the case of modern technology to where it was in the case of the old technology. Although I know I will not achieve anything this time with this amendment, I hope we will see something, if not from this Secretary of State then a future one. It is certainly a matter I will raise when we next debate this Bill. I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones]

My Lords, it would be a shame not to savour the final quarter-hour of Committee today—although I have probably learnt more about agriculture than I ever wished to. I see that the noble Lord, Lord Whitty, is still here; he is clearly incredibly versatile in all these matters. Seeing him and the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, I am afraid that I am reminded of the passage of the Digital Economy Bill, which may or may not be a good thing. As we know from that, the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, is never knowingly underprovocative, particularly on the question of intellectual property rights, and I am not going to enter the lists with him on the issue of the format-shifting exception that was the subject of the Christmas present he mentioned.

Amendment 28A is an incredibly sweeping amendment that would have a massive impact on the cloud computing industry in the UK, which is forecast to grow from something like £2 billion to £6 billion. It would have an incredibly damaging effect, which makes it highly undesirable for various commercial reasons. Quite frankly, it also happens to be in contravention of the existing EU directive on computer software, which gives the exclusive rights to copyright owners in those circumstances. Of course, there are issues about the ownership of digital content, but this is not the way to deal with them. There are issues about who owns what you have on your iPad or tablet from other manufacturers, but this is an incredibly sweeping way to do it. In the way the amendment is phrased, I doubt whether it will cure the issue by itself.