Procurement Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Baroness Noakes

Report stage
Wednesday 30th November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 130 to government Amendment 129. Many of us will be pleased that the Minister has decided to put the new online system for procurement information on the face of the Bill. At the same time, however, we need some assurance that it will be fit for purpose and achieve the objectives set for it, otherwise the Government seem to have carte blanche to construct whatever system they see fit to inflict on the vendor community, without any required standards or reporting duty. Let us face it: even the modest database under the Subsidy Control Act is subject to a form of reporting duty, and this system will be of far greater significance.

The amendment in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Fox is designed to provide assurance but in very simple terms. There would be the requirement for a report, first, on the performance standards expected and, secondly, on the standards achieved in the relevant period, including metrics on satisfaction and the accessibility experience of stakeholders. This is a modest proposal; how can the Minister possibly argue against it?

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I support the single digital platform which is now covered by government Amendment 129 in this group, but I have one caveat. The benefits of the platform, in terms of efficiency—having all the procurement details in one place—will be undermined if contracting authorities are required also to publish tender information in other ways. That is what lies behind my Amendments 166 and 168 in this group. Like some of the amendments I spoke to on our first day in Committee, these have been suggested by the Local Government Association. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Moylan for adding his name to them.

These amendments propose two additional repeals within Schedule 11, the repeal schedule. Subsections (4)(b) and (5) of Section 89 of the Transport Act 1985 require local authorities to issue notices of tender individually to anyone who has given written notice that they wish to be notified. Amendment 166 would repeal that, because it should no longer be necessary. Amendment 168 would repeal Regulations 4 and 5 of the Service Subsidy Agreements (Tendering) (England) Regulations 2002 so that information on tenders will no longer be required, for example, to be published locally, including in local newspapers.

I hope my noble friend will see these two amendments as supporting the importance of the digital platform. I also hope that she will be able to assure the House that the Government will ensure that later legislation will not be allowed to undermine the platform by adding new and additional requirements, once it is up and running.

Procurement Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Baroness Noakes

Committee stage
Monday 24th October 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I would be very happy if the Minister introduced my amendment, but in moving it I will also speak to Amendment 243A and Clause 40 stand part. My noble friend Lord Fox will speak to other Liberal Democrat amendments in this group that are in the names of my noble friends Lord Wallace and Lady Brinton. I know that my noble friend Lord Fox has congratulated the Minister already but it is the first time that I have spoken since I saw her on the Back Benches in our previous proceedings. I must congratulate her on her seamless move to the Front Bench—again.

Given the controversy surrounding these direct contracts, the removal of Clause 40 on direct awards would, pending greater transparency and equity for SMEs, be the preferable course. But these are specific amendments to Clauses 40 and 42, which would prevent direct awards being used within framework agreements and instead open all such awards to competition. This issue is seen all the time within the G-cloud framework; it prevents proper competition from British SMEs and simply reinforces the dominance of certain key foreign players in the market. These amendments would provide the opportunity to redress the balance and help support UK SMEs.

We will debate the role of frameworks later, but these amendments seek to highlight the blurring of direct award rules by smuggling in large, uncontested contracts within framework agreements. The notion that there is a ceiling above which such awards must be competed for, and below which they can be awarded directly, is theoretically sound if it is rigorously adhered to. We on these Benches would argue that the threshold of £250,000 is too high and that a figure of £100,000 would be more appropriate. I seek the Minister’s view on thresholds and how they are arrived at. However, thresholds are pointless if they are ignored or bypassed, which is what seems to be happening.

One very good example of where this system has completely gone off the rails is cloud computing. This important service is central to the Government’s digital plans. It seems that rarely is the ongoing cloud service bid seen as a separate service; rather, it is wrapped in a package being competed for through a framework agreement by the consulting giants. These consultants always seem to partner with one or other of the dominant, non-UK cloud services companies.

This has gradually led to a disproportionate level of awards to these companies. For example, in 2012-17, one company, Amazon Web Services, was awarded £25.5 million-worth of contracts from a total market worth £381.7 million—a market share of 7%. By 2018-22, its market share had ballooned to just a shade under 40%. In the current financial year alone, 2022-23, AWS has seen £87.7 million-worth of contracts from a total market of £137.6 million—a market share of 64%. The US federal Government estimate that the UK public cloud market was worth $12 billion in 2020 and growing, so AWS can expect a healthy $5 billion-plus, with Microsoft Azure not far behind. Almost none of this would have been opened up to competition.

Of course, in the UK, a company is deemed to have monopoly power if it holds more than 25% of the market. At the same time, the SME share of the market has fallen from more than 50% to just 20% in the last five years, and barely 10% this year. It simply reinforces the dominance of certain key foreign “hyperscalers” in this market. To be clear, it seems that these services are available from UK-based suppliers. We are not asking for preferential access for these UK suppliers, just that they are not locked out by the use of framework agreements in this way and the awards of direct contracts under them.

The Government talk about building a UK digital future, yet they systematically underwrite the development of non-UK businesses by ignoring their own rules. The Procurement Bill is supposedly designed, according to the Queen’s Speech, so that

“Public sector procurement will be simplified to provide new opportunities for small businesses.”


On top of this, the Crown Commercial Service’s own guidance on direct awards suggests that the procedure is suitable only for low-value, low-volume commodity products. In the case of AWS, some of the contracts, such as the Home Office contract, top £100 million in value, so they cannot be considered low-volume or low-value, nor can cloud hosting be considered a commodity, given the proprietary nature of the service and the consequences of that.

If the Government are true to their word, they will accept these amendments to ensure that the balance is redressed and UK SMEs are given a chance to compete on a level playing field. I beg to move.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 236 in this group. It probes the relationship between direct contract awards and framework contracts.

Direct awards are allowed under Clause 40 if they satisfy one of the justifications in Schedule 5, paragraph 8 of which allows them if they are similar to existing contracts for goods and services that have been entered into in the previous five years and in which the initial tender set out the intention to use the direct award justification. My amendment would change those five years to four years, specifically to probe the differences between a repeat direct award under Clause 40 and an award under a framework contract, as covered in Chapter 4 of Part 3.

Clause 45 says that a framework contract has a maximum duration of four years other than for defence and utilities contracts. Doubtless this is my ignorance speaking but I hope that my noble friend the Minister can explain to me the rationale for allowing five years for direct awards under Chapter 3 as opposed to four years for framework contracts under Chapter 4. My question is pretty simple: is there a substantive distinction between direct awards and awards under framework contracts, where the justification for the direct award is in paragraph 8 of Schedule 5?

It seems to me that this is another example of how the designers of this new procurement system have lost sight of simplicity and underlying principles in designing the system. However, there may be a good reason for that, of course; I look forward to my noble friend the Minister explaining it.

Advanced Research and Invention Agency Bill

Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Baroness Noakes

Committee stage
Monday 22nd November 2021 Grand Committee

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

If ARIA does not exist until the Act is commenced, how can there be a framework agreement that involves ARIA being a party to the agreement to be tabled before the commencement of the Act?

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I do not need to do very much more. My noble friend is finishing this symphony of a Bill Committee con brio, with metaphorical charabancs, mystery and magic. What more do we need at the end of a Bill stage?

I point out that the equivalent UKRI document of 2018 runs to 60 pages and 16 chapters. It covers a huge range of information: the purpose of UK research and innovation, its powers and duties, its aims, the partnership principles, and the responsibilities of the CEO. It then goes on to deal with devolution and relationships with other bodies, public appointments to UKRI, reviews of boards and committees, and so on. There is some really important content in the UKRI framework document, and I am sure that the ARIA document will not be very different. I very much hope that the Minister will reconsider the decision. On the arrival of the CEO, the Minister said that it followed the Treasury’s standard template. Even something in draft, which does not have to be agreed by the CEO, would seem fundamental to our understanding of what ARIA is going to do.

National Security and Investment Bill

Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Baroness Noakes

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th March 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, it follows from the speeches of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, who introduced Amendments 29 and 72 so well, and the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, who has taken us very carefully through subsection (8), that Clause 8 is a strange beast. It is a mixture of the absolutely specific and then the rather vague in its different cases, which contrast extraordinarily. I have signed Amendment 29, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, which tries to deal with the vagueness in subsection (6) because the scope of that trigger event—the third case—is very broad and unclear, as he described.

It is not clear precisely what resolutions govern

“the affairs of the entity”

as set out in subsection (6). It could potentially capture typical minority investor veto rights or negative protections, which would not give rise to national security concerns. The amendment put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, and supported by me, would narrow the scope, while ensuring that where a person can pass or block resolutions that cover matters akin to those covered by, say, ordinary and special resolutions under the Companies Act 2006, the ability to secure or prevent those resolutions would still be caught—even where the thresholds for passing those resolutions differ from the thresholds for passing ordinary and special resolutions under the Companies Act.

If shareholders of an overseas company can amend the company’s constitution, or wind up the company by passing a resolution with a threshold of 60% of the votes, any shareholder that increases their shareholding from less than 60% to 60% or more will be caught by the third case, if this amendment is accepted. At the moment, that subsection really repays some attention and I very much hope that the Minister will reply positively on this.

Amendment 72, also put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, and explained clearly by him, would

“give investors certainty that any divestment or unwinding order will not render their contractual arrangements unenforceable”,

so they could contractually anticipate the consequences of an unwinding order. That is extremely important. If you cannot do that and everything is void, then you cannot make arrangements that stick after the voidness.

A long time ago when I knew some law, I think we talked about severable contracts. One would find that part of a contract was void but provisions that applied to circumstances in which the contract was void, or voided, would still subsist. It is important that those provisions continue after the voiding decision has been made and I very much hope that the Bill can be amended accordingly; otherwise, many companies trying to anticipate its impact will be absolutely confounded. They will have no way through what will be, in any event, a pretty difficult commercial situation.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I put my name down to speak in this group to support my noble friend Lord Lansley’s Amendment 97, which he has not spoken to. I shall speak to it in this group anyway in case he had no further intention of speaking to it when it comes up later as we go through the amendments on the Marshalled List.

Amendment 97 would remove former spouses from the list of connected persons who are defined in Schedule 1. I was fairly sure that this was a novel and unwelcome addition to the normal scope of connected persons found in legislation. In my view, it is not a common-sense interpretation of what a connected person is. For example, if I had had a brief marriage in my youth, Schedule 1 would continue to count my long-gone husband as a connected person of mine for ever, which is just not sensible. It also includes former cohabitees, so the possibilities of connected persons seem to be endless.

My view of the definition of connected persons was compatible with tax law, company law and even money laundering rules, but I discovered that this wider definition, extending to former spouses, is in the Insolvency Act 1986, which was a surprise to me. That definition was later picked up by the Pensions Regulator. The fact that precedents have somehow managed to find their way into the statute book or into regulations does not make it right, and I will support my noble friend Lord Lansley’s Amendment 97 if he chooses to propose it at some stage in the future.