(1 week, 1 day ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, Amendment 138 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and Amendment 141, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and the noble Lord, Lord Knight, would both require the ICO to publish a code of practice for controllers and processors on the processing of personal data by educational technologies in schools.
I say at the outset that I welcome this debate and the contributions of noble Lords on this important issue. As various noble Lords have indicated, civil society organisations have also been contacting the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology and the Department for Education directly to highlight their concerns about this issue. It is a live issue.
I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Knight, who talked about some of the important and valuable contributions that technology can play in supporting children’s development and guiding teaching interventions. We have to get the balance right, but we understand and appreciate that schoolchildren, parents and schoolteachers must have the confidence to trust the way that services use children’s personal data. That is at the heart of this debate.
There is a lot of work going on, on this issue, some of which noble Lords have referred to. The Department for Education is already exploring ways to engage with the edtech market to reinforce the importance of evidence-based quality products and services in education. On my noble friend Lord Knight’s comments on AI, the Department for Education is developing a framework outlining safety expectations for AI products in education and creating resources for teachers and leaders on safe AI use.
I recognise why noble Lords consider that a dedicated ICO code of practice could help ensure that schools and edtech services are complying with data protection legislation. The Government are open-minded about exploring the merits of this further with the ICO, but it would be premature to include these requirements in the Bill. As I said, there is a great deal of work going on and the findings of the recent ICO audits of edtech service providers will help to inform whether a code of practice is necessary and what services should be in scope.
I hope that we will bear that in mind and engage on it. I would be happy to continue discussions with noble Lords, the ICO and colleagues at the Department for Education, outside of the Bill’s processes, about the possibility of future work on this, particularly as the Secretary of State has powers under the Data Protection Act 2018 to require the ICO to produce new statutory codes, as noble Lords know. Considering the explanation that I have given, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, will consider withdrawing his amendment at this stage.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response and all speakers in this debate. On the speech from the noble Lord, Lord Knight, I entirely agree with the Minister and the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, that it is important to remind ourselves about the benefits that can be achieved by AI in schools. The noble Lord set out a number of those. The noble Lord, Lord Russell, also reminded us that this is not a purely domestic issue; it is international across the board.
However, all noble Lords reminded us of the disbenefits and risks. In fact, the noble Lord, Lord Knight, used the word “dystopian”, which was quite interesting, although he gets very close to science fiction sometimes. He said that
“we have good reason to be concerned”,
particularly because of issues such as the national pupil database, where the original purpose may not have been fulfilled and was, in many ways, changed. He gave an example of procurement during Covid, where the choice was either Google or Microsoft—Coke or Pepsi. That is an issue across the board in competition law, as well.
There are real issues here. The noble Lord, Lord Russell, put it very well when he said that there is any number of pieces of guidance for schools but it is important to have a code of conduct. We are all, I think, on the same page in trying to find—in the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron—a fairer and more equitable set of arrangements for children in schools. We need to navigate our way through this issue; of course, organisations such as Defend Digital Me and 5rights are seriously working on it.
(1 week, 3 days ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, in carrying on on this group, I will speak to the question that Clause 78 stands part, and to Amendments 107, 109, 125, 154, 155 and 156, but to start I support Amendment 87 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. We had a masterclass from him last Tuesday and he made an extremely good case for that amendment, which is very elegant.
The previous Government deleted the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights from the statute book through the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023, and this Bill does nothing to restore it. Although references in the UK GDPR to fundamental rights and freedoms are now to be read as references to the ECHR as implemented through the Human Rights Act 1998, the Government’s ECHR memorandum states:
“Where processing is conducted by a private body, that processing will not usually engage convention rights”.
As the noble and learned Lord mentioned, this could leave a significant gap in protection for individuals whose data is processed by private organisations and will mean lower data protection rights in the UK compared with the EU, so these Benches strongly support his Amendment 87, which would apply the convention to private bodies where personal data is concerned. I am afraid we do not support Amendments 91 and 97 from the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, which seem to hanker after the mercifully defunct DPDI.
We strongly support Amendments 139 and 140 from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. Data communities are one of the important omissions from the Bill. Where are the provisions that should be there to support data-sharing communities and initiatives such as Solid? We have been talking about data trusts and data communities since as long ago as the Hall-Pesenti review. Indeed, it is interesting that the Minister herself only this April said in Grand Committee:
“This seems to be an area in which the ICO could take a lead in clarifying rights and set standards”.
Indeed, she put forward an amendment:
“Our Amendment 154 would therefore set a deadline for the ICO to do that work and for those rights to be enacted. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, made a good case for broadening these rights in the Bill and, on that basis, I hope the Minister will agree to follow this up, and follow up his letter so that we can make further progress on this issue”.—[Official Report, 17/4/24; col. GC 322.]
I very much hope that, now the tables are turned, so to speak, the Minister will take that forward herself in government.
Amendments 154, 155 and 156 deal with the removal of the principle of the supremacy of EU law. They are designed to undo the lowering of the standard of data protection rights in the UK brought about by the REUL Act 2023. The amendments would apply the protections required in Article 23.2 of the UK GDPR to all the relevant exceptions in Schedules 2 to 4 to the Data Protection Act 2018. This is important because data adequacy will be lost if the standard of protection of personal data in the UK is no longer essentially equivalent to that in the EU.
The EU’s adequacy decision stated that it did not apply in the area of immigration and referred to the case of Open Rights Group v the Secretary of State for the Home Department in the Court of Appeal. This case was brought after the UK left the EU, but before the REULA came into effect. The case is an example of how the preservation of the principle of the supremacy of EU law continued to guarantee high data protection standards in the UK, before this principle was deleted from the statute book by the REULA. In broad terms, the Court of Appeal found that the immigration exception in Schedule 2 to the Data Protection Act 2018 conflicted with the safeguards in Article 23 of the UK GDPR. This was because the immigration exemption was drafted too broadly and failed to incorporate the safeguards prescribed for exemptions under Article 23.2 of the UK GDPR. It was therefore held to be unlawful and was disapplied.
The Home Office redrafted the exemption to make it more protective, but it took several attempts to bring forward legislation which provided sufficient safeguards for data subjects. The extent of the safeguards now set out in the immigration exemption underscores both what is needed for compatibility with Article 23.2 of the UK GDPR and the deficiencies in the rest of the Schedule 2 exemptions. It is clear when reading the judgment in the Open Rights case that the majority of the exemptions from data subject rights under Schedule 2 to the Data Protection Act fail to meet the standards set out in Article 23.2 to the UK GDPR. The deletion of the principle of the supremacy of EU law has removed the possibility of another Open Rights-style challenge to the other exemptions in Schedule 2 to the Data Protection Act 2018. I hope that, ahead of the data adequacy discussions with the Commission, the Government’s lawyers have had a good look at the amendments that I have tabled, drafted by a former MoJ lawyer.
The new clause after Clause 107 in Amendment 154 applies new protections to the immigration exemption to the whole of Schedule 2 to the DPA 2018, with the exception of the exemptions that apply in the context of journalism or research, statistics and archiving. Unlike the other exemptions, they already contain detailed safeguards.
Amendment 155 is a new clause extending new protections which apply to the immigration exemption to Schedule 3 to the DPA 2018, and Amendment 156 is another new clause applying new protections which apply to the immigration exemption to Schedule 2 to the DPA 2018.
As regards Amendment 107, the Government need to clarify how data processing under recognised legitimate interests are compatible with conditions for data processing under existing lawful bases, including the special categories of personal data under Articles 5 and 9 of the UK GDPR. The Bill lowers the standard of the protection of personal data where data controllers only have to provide personal data based on
“a reasonable and proportionate search”.
The lack of clarity on what reasonable and proportionate mean in the context of data subject requests creates legal uncertainty for data controllers and organisations, specifically regarding whether the data subject’s consideration on the matter needs to be accounted for when responding to requests. This is a probing amendment which requires the Secretary of State to explain why the existing lawful bases for data processing are inadequate for the processing of personal data when additional recognised legitimate interests are introduced. It requires the Secretary of State to publish guidance within six months of the Act’s passing to clarify what constitutes reasonable and proportionate protections of personal data.
Amendment 109 would insert a new clause, to ensure that data controllers assess the risk of collective and societal harms,
“including to equality and the environment”,
when carrying out data protection impact assessments. It requires them to consult affected people and communities while carrying out these assessments to improve their quality, and requires data controllers to publish their assessments to facilitate informed decision-making by data subjects and to enable data controllers to be held accountable.
Turning to whether Clause 78 should stand part, on top of Clause 77, Clause 78 would reduce the scope of transparency obligations and rights. Many AI systems are designed in a way that makes it difficult to retrieve personal data once ingested, or understand how this data is being used. This is not principally due to technical limitations but the decision of AI developers who do not prioritise transparency and explainability.
As regards Amendment 125, it is clear that there are still further major changes proposed to the GDPR on police duties, automated decision-making and recognised legitimate interests which continue to make retention of data adequacy for the purposes of digital trade with the EU of the utmost priority in considering those changes. During the passage of the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill, I tabled an amendment to require the Government to publish an assessment of the impact of the Bill on EU/UK data adequacy within six months of the Act passing; I have tabled a similar amendment, with one change, to this Bill. As the next reassessment of data adequacy is set for June 2025, a six-month timescale may prove inconsequential to the overall adequacy decision. We must therefore recommend stipulating that this assessment takes place before this reassessment.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their consideration of these clauses. First, I will address Amendment 87 tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and the noble and learned Lord—sorry, the noble Lord—Lord Clement-Jones.
We should take them while we can. Like the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, I agree that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, made an excellent contribution. I appreciate this is a particularly technical area of legislation, but I hope I can reassure both noble Lords that the UK’s data protection law gives effect to convention rights and is designed to protect them. The Human Rights Act requires legislation to be interpreted compatibly with convention rights, whether processing is carried out by public or private bodies. ECHR rights are therefore a pervasive aspect of the rules that apply to public and private controllers alike. The noble and learned Lord is right that individuals generally cannot bring claims against private bodies for breaches of convention rights, but I reassure him that they can bring a claim for breaching the data protection laws giving effect to those rights.
I turn to Amendment 91, tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, Amendment 107, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the question of whether Clause 78 should stand part, which all relate to data subject requests. The Government believe that transparency and the right of access is crucial. That is why they will not support a change to the language around the threshold for data subject requests, as this will undermine data subjects’ rights. Neither will the Bill change the current expectations placed on controllers. The Bill reflects the EU principle of proportionality, which has always underpinned this legislation, as well as existing domestic case law and current ICO guidance. I hope that reassures noble Lords.
Amendments 97 and 99, tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, and the noble Lord, Lord Markham, relate to the notification exemption in Article 14 of the UK GDPR. I reassure noble Lords that the proportionality test provides an important safeguard for the existing exemption when data is collected from sources other than the data subject. The controller must always consider the impact on data subjects’ rights of not notifying. They cannot rely on the disproportionate effort exemption just because of how much data they are processing—even when there are many data subjects involved, such as there would be with web scraping. Moreover, a lawful basis is required to reuse personal data: a web scraper would still need to pass the balancing test to use the legitimate interest ground, as is usually the case.
The ICO’s recent outcomes report, published on 12 December, specifically referenced the process of web scraping. The report outlined:
“Web scraping for generative AI training is a high-risk, invisible processing activity. Where insufficient transparency measures contribute to people being unable to exercise their rights, generative AI developers are likely to struggle to pass the balancing test”.
The Minister said there is a power to amend, but she has not said whether she thinks that would be desirable. Is the power to be used only if we are found not to be data-adequate because the immigration exemption does not apply across the board? That is, will the power be used only if we are forced to use it?
I reassure the noble Lord that, as he knows, we are very hopeful that we will have data adequacy so that issue will not arise. I will write to him to set out in more detail when those powers would be used.
When does the Minister anticipate that the ICO will produce that report?
I do not have the detail of all that. Obviously, the call for views has only recently gone out and he will need time for consideration of the responses. I hope the noble Lord will accept that the ICO is on the case on this matter. If we can provide more information, we will.
May I ask the Minister a hypothetical question? If the ICO believes that these are not desirable, what instruments are there for changing the law? Can the ICO, under its own steam, so to speak, ban them; do we need to do it in primary legislation; or can it be done in secondary legislation? If the Minister cannot answer now, perhaps she can write to me.
Of course I will write to the noble Lord. It will be within the ICO’s normal powers to make changes where he finds that they are necessary.
I move to Amendment 160, tabled by noble Lord, Lord Lucas, which seeks to create a new exemption for advertising performance cookies. There is a balance to strike between driving growth in the advertising, news and publishing sectors while ensuring that people retain choice and control over how their data is used. To exempt advertising measurement cookies, we would need to assess how intrusive these cookies are, including what they track and where data is sent. We have taken a delegated power so that exemptions to the prohibition can be added in future once evidence supports it, and we can devise appropriate safeguards to minimise privacy risks. In the meantime, we have been actively engaging with the advertising and publishing sectors on this issue and will continue to work with them to consider the potential use of the regulation-making power. I hope that the noble Lord will accept that this is work in progress.
Amendment 161, also from the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, aims to extend the soft opt-in rule under the privacy and electronic communications regulations to providers of auto-enrolment pension schemes. The soft opt-in rule removes the need for some commercial organisations to seek consent for direct marketing messages where there is an existing relationship between the organisation and the customer, provided the recipient did not object to receiving direct marketing messages when their contact details were collected.
The Government recognise that people auto-enrolled by their employers in workplace pension schemes may not have an existing relationship with their pension provider, so I understand the noble Lord’s motivations for this amendment. However, pension providers have opportunities to ask people to express their direct mail preferences, such as when the customer logs on to their account online. We are taking steps to improve the support available for pension holders through the joint Government and FCA advice guidance boundary review. The FCA will be seeking feedback on any interactions of proposals with direct marketing rules through that consultation process. Again, I hope the noble Lord will accept that this issue is under active consideration.
Amendment 162, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would create an equivalent provision to the soft opt-in but for charities. It would enable a person to send electronic marketing without permission to people who have previously expressed an interest in their charitable objectives. The noble Lord will recall, and has done so, that the DPDI Bill included a provision similar to his amendment. The Government removed it from that Bill due to the concerns that it would increase direct marketing from political parties. I think we all accepted at the time that we did not want that to happen.
As the noble Lord said, his amendment is narrower because it focuses on communications for charitable purposes, but it could still increase the number of messages received by people who have previously expressed an interest in the work of charities. We are listening carefully to arguments for change in this area and will consider the points he raises, but I ask that he withdraws his amendment while we consider its potential impact further. We are happy to have further discussions on that.
My Lords, we have had a really profound and significant debate on these issues; it has been really helpful that they have been aired by a number of noble Lords in a compelling and articulate way. I thank everybody for their contributions.
I have to say at the outset that the Government want data protection rules fit for the age of emerging technologies. The noble Lord, Lord Holmes, asked whether we are addressing issues of the past or issues of the future. We believe that the balance we have in this Bill is exactly about addressing the issues of the future. Our reforms will reduce barriers to the responsible use of automation while clarifying that organisations must provide stringent safeguards for individuals.
I stress again how seriously we take these issues. A number of examples have been quoted as the debate has gone on. I say to those noble Lords that examples were given where there was no human involved. That is precisely what the new provisions in this Bill attempt to address, in order to make sure that there is meaningful human involvement and people’s futures are not being decided by an automated machine.
Amendment 110 tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Knight, seeks to clarify that, for human involvement to be meaningful, it must be carried out by a competent person. Our reforms make clear that solely automated decisions lack meaningful human involvement. That goes beyond a tick-box exercise. The ICO guidance also clarifies that
“the human involvement has to be active and not just a token gesture”;
that right is absolutely underpinned by the wording of the regulations here.
I turn next to Amendment 111. I can assure—
My Lords, I was listening very carefully. Does “underpinned by the regulations” mean that it will be underpinned?
Yes. The provisions in this Bill cover exactly that concern.
The issue of meaningful human involvement is absolutely crucial. Is the Minister saying that regulations issued by the Secretary of State will define “meaningful human involvement”, or is she saying that it is already in the primary legislation, which is not my impression?
Sorry—it is probably my choice of language. I am saying that it is already in the Bill; it is not intended to be separate. I was talking about whether solely automated decisions lack meaningful human involvement. This provision is already set out in the Bill; that is the whole purpose of it.
On Amendment 111, I assure the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, that controllers using solely automated processing are required to comply with the data protection principles. I know that he was anticipating this answer, but we believe that it captures the principles he proposes and achieves the same intended effect as his amendment. I agree with the noble Viscount that data protection is not the only lens through which AI should be regulated, and that we cannot address all AI risks through the data protection legislation, but the data protection principles are the right ones for solely automated decision-making, given its place in the data protection framework. I hope that that answers his concerns.
On Amendment 112, which seeks to prohibit solely automated decisions that contravene the Equality Act 2010, I assure the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Knight, that the data protection framework is clear that controllers must adhere to the Equality Act.
Amendments 113 and 114 would extend solely automated decision-making safeguards to predominantly automated decision-making. I assure the noble and learned Lord Thomas, the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, that the safeguards in Clause 80 are designed to protect individuals where meaningful human involvement is lacking. Predominantly automated decision-making will already include meaningful human involvement and therefore does not require these additional safeguards.
On Amendments 114A and 115A, tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, many noble Lords have spoken in our debates about the importance of future-proofing the legislation. These powers are an example of that: without them, the Government will not have the ability to act quickly to update protections for individuals in the light of rapid technology developments.
I assure noble Lords that the regulation powers are subject to a number of safeguards. The Secretary of State must consult the Information Commissioner and have regard to other relevant factors, which can include the impact on individuals’ rights and freedoms as well as the specific needs and rights of children. As with all regulations, the exercise of these powers must be rational; they cannot be used irrationally or arbitrarily. Furthermore, the regulations will be subject to the affirmative procedure and so must be approved by both Houses of Parliament.
I assure the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that one of the powers means that his Amendment 123 is not necessary, as it can be used to describe specifically what is or is not meaningful human involvement.
Amendment 115A, tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, would remove the reforms to Parts 3 and 4 of the Data Protection Act, thereby putting them out of alignment with the UK GDPR. That would cause confusion and ambiguity for data subjects.
I am sorry to interrupt again as we go along but, a sentence or so ago, the Minister said that the definition in Amendment 123 of meaningful human involvement in automated decision-making was unnecessary. The amendment is designed to change matters. It would not be the Secretary of State who determined the meaning of meaningful human involvement; in essence, it would be initiated by the Information Commissioner, in consultation with the Secretary of State. So I do not quite understand why the Minister used “unnecessary”. It may be an alternative that is undesirable, but I do not understand why she has come to the conclusion that it is unnecessary. I thought it was easier to challenge the points as we go along rather than at the very end.
My Lords, we would say that a definition in the Bill is not necessary because it is dealt with case by case and is supplemented by these powers. The Secretary of State does not define meaningful human involvement; it is best done case by case, supported by the ICO guidance. I hope that that addresses the noble Lord’s point.
That is slightly splitting hairs. The noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, might want to comment because he wanted to delete the wording that says:
“The Secretary of State may by regulations provide that … there is, or is not, to be taken to be meaningful human involvement”.
He certainly will determine—or is able to determine, at least—whether or not there is human involvement. Surely, as part of that, there will need to be consideration of what human involvement is.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her very detailed and careful response to all the amendments. Clearly, from the number of speakers in this debate, this is one of the most important areas of the Bill and one that has given one of the greatest degrees of concern, both inside and outside the Committee. I think the general feeling is that there is still concern. The Minister is quite clear that the Government are taking these issues seriously, in terms of ADM itself and the impact in the workplace, but there are missing parts here. If you add all the amendments together—no doubt we will read Hansard and, in a sense, tick off the areas where we have been given an assurance about the interpretation of the Bill—there are still great gaps.
It was very interesting to hear what the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, had to say about how the computer said “no” as he reached the gate. A lot of this is about communications. I would be very interested if any letter to the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, was copied more broadly, because that is clearly one of the key issues. It was reassuring to hear that the ICO will be on top of this in terms of definitions, guidance, audit and so on, and that we are imminently to get the publication of the records of algorithmic systems in use under the terms of the algorithmic transparency recording standard.
We have had some extremely well-made points from the noble Viscounts, Lord Colville and Lord Camrose, the noble Lords, Lord Lucas, Lord Knight and Lord Holmes, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron. I am not going to unpack all of them, but we clearly need to take this further and chew it over before we get to Report. I very much hope that the Minister will regard a will write letter on stilts as required before we go very much further, because I do not think we will be purely satisfied by this debate.
The one area where I would disagree is on treating solely automated decision-making as the pure subject of the Clause 80 rights. Looking at it in the converse, it is perfectly proper to regard something that does not have meaningful human involvement as predominantly automated decision-making. I do not think, in the words of the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, that this does muddy the waters. We need to be clearer about what we regard as being automated decision-making for the purpose of this clause.
There is still quite a lot of work to do in chewing over the Minister’s words. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones; let me consider it a marker for future discussion.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for coming to my rescue there.
I turn to the Clause 81 stand part notice tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, which would remove Clause 81 from the Bill. Section 62 of the Data Protection Act requires law enforcement agencies to record their processing activities, including their reasons for accessing and disclosing personal information. Entering a justification manually was intended to help detect unauthorised access. The noble Lord was right that the police do sometimes abuse their power; however, I agree with the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, that the reality is that anyone accessing the system unlawfully is highly unlikely to record that, making this an ineffective safeguard.
Meanwhile, the position of the National Police Chiefs’ Council is that this change will not impede any investigation concerning the unlawful processing of personal data. Clause 81 does not remove the strong safeguards that ensure accountability for data use by law enforcement that include the requirement to record time, date, and where possible, who has accessed the data, which are far more effective in monitoring potential data misuse. We would argue that the requirement to manually record a justification every time case information is accessed places a considerable burden on policing. I think the noble Lord himself said that we estimate that this clause may save approximately 1.5 million policing hours, equivalent to a saving in the region of £42.8 million a year.
Yes, we could not see the noble Lord’s raised eyebrows.
Turning to Amendment 124, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, for raising this important issue. While I obviously understand and welcome the intent, I do not think that the legislative change is what is required here. The Information Commissioner’s Office agrees that the Data Protection Act is not a barrier to the sharing of personal data between the police and the CPS. What is needed is a change in the operational processes in place between the police and the CPS that are causing this redaction burden that the noble Baroness spelled out so coherently.
We are very much aware that this is an issue and, as I think the noble Baroness knows, the Government are committed to reducing the burden on the police and the Home Office and to exploring with partners across the criminal justice system how this can best be achieved. We absolutely understand the point that the noble Baroness has raised, but I hope that she could agree to give space to the Home Office and the CPS to try to find a resolution so that we do not have the unnecessary burden of redaction when it is not necessary. It is an ongoing discussion—which I know the noble Baroness knows really—and I hope that she will not pursue it on that basis.
I will address Amendments 126 to 129 together. These amendments seek to remove parts of Schedule 8 to avoid divergence from EU legislation. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, proposes instead to remove existing parts of Section 73 of the Data Protection Act 2018. New Section 73(4)(aa), introduced by this Bill, with its bespoke path for personal data transfers from UK controllers to international processors, is crucial. In the modern age, where the use of such capabilities and the benefits they provide is increasing, we need to ensure that law enforcement can make effective use of them to tackle crime and keep citizens safe.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response on this group, which was, again, very detailed. There is a lot to consider in what she had to say, particularly about the clauses beyond Clause 81. I am rather surprised that the current Government are still going down the same track on Clause 81. It is as if, because the risk of abuse is so high, this Government, like the previous one, have decided that it is not necessary to have the safeguard of putting down the justification in the first place. Yet we have heard about the Sarah Everard police officers. It seems to me perverse not to require justification. I will read further what the Minister had to say but it seems quite extraordinary to be taking away a safeguard at this time, especially when the Minister says that, at the same time, they need to produce logs of the time of the data being shared and so on. I cannot see what is to be gained—I certainly cannot see £42 million being saved. It is a very precise figure: £42.8 million. I wonder where the £800,000 comes from. It seems almost too precise to be credible.
I emphasise that we believe the safeguards are there. This is not a watering down of provisions. We are just making sure that the safeguards are more appropriate for the sort of abuse that we think might happen in future from police misusing their records. I do not want it left on the record that we do not think that is important.
No. As I was saying, it seems that the Minister is saying that there will still be the necessity to log the fact that data has been shared. However, it seems extraordinary that, at the same time, it is not possible to say what the justification is. The justification could be all kinds of things, but it makes somebody think before they simply share the data. It seems to me that, given the clear evidence of abuse of data by police officers—data of the deceased, for heaven’s sake—we need to keep all the safeguards we currently have. That is a clear bone of contention.
I will read what else the Minister had to say about the other clauses in the group, which are rather more sensitive from the point of view of national security, data sharing abroad and so on.
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their consideration of the issues before us in this group. I begin with Amendment 134 from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I can confirm that the primary duty of the commissioner will be to uphold the principal objective: securing an appropriate level of data protection, carrying out the crucial balancing test between the interests of data subjects, controllers and wider public interests, and promoting public trust and confidence in the use of personal data.
The other duties sit below this objective and do not compete with it—they do not come at the expense of upholding data protection standards. The commissioner will have to consider these duties in his work but will have discretion as to their application. Moreover, the new objectives inserted by the amendment concerning monitoring, enforcement and complaints are already covered by legislation.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lucas for Amendment 135A. The amendment was a previous feature of the DPDI Bill but the Government decided that a statement of strategic priorities for the ICO in this Bill is not necessary. The Government will of course continue to set out their priorities in relation to data protection and other related areas and discuss them with the Information Commissioner as appropriate.
Amendment 142 from the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, would remove the ICO’s ability to serve notices by email. We would argue that email is a fast, accessible and inexpensive method for issuing notices. I can reassure noble Lords that the ICO can serve a notice via email only if it is sent to an email address published by the recipient or where the ICO has reasonable grounds to believe that the notice will come to the attention of the person, significantly reducing the risk that emails may be missed or sent to the wrong address.
Regarding the noble Viscount’s Amendment 143, the assumption that an email notice will be received in 48 hours is reasonable and equivalent to the respective legislation of other regulators, such as the CMA and Ofcom.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for Amendment 144 concerning the ICO’s use of reprimands. The regulator does not commonly issue multiple reprimands to the same organisation. But it is important that the ICO, as an independent regulator, has the discretion and flexibility in instances where there may be a legitimate need to issue multiple reprimands within a particular period without placing arbitrary limits on that.
Turning to Amendment 144A, the new requirements in Clause 101 will already lead to the publication of an annual report, which will include the regulator’s investigation and enforcement activity. Reporting will be categorised to ensure that where the detail of cases is not public, commercially sensitive investigations are not inadvertently shared. Splitting out reporting by country or locality would make it more difficult to protect sensitive data.
Turning to Amendment 145, with thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, I agree with the importance of ensuring that the regulator can be held to account on this issue effectively. The new annual report in Clause 101 will cover all the ICO’s regulatory activity, including that taken to uphold the rights of children. Clause 90 also requires the ICO to publish a strategy and report on how it has complied with its new statutory duties. Both of these will cover the new duty relating to children’s awareness and rights, and this should include the ICO’s activity to support and uphold its important age-appropriate design code.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for Amendments 163 to 192 to Schedule 14, which establishes the governance structure of the information commission. The approach, including the responsibilities conferred on the Secretary of State, at the core of the amendments follows standard corporate governance best practice and reflects the Government’s commitment to safeguarding the independence of the regulator. This includes requiring the Secretary of State to consult the chair of the information commission before making appointments of non-executive members.
Amendments 165 and 167A would require members of the commission to be appointed to oversee specific tasks and to be from prescribed fields of expertise. Due to the commission’s broad regulatory remit, the Government consider that it would not be appropriate or helpful for the legislation to set out specific areas that should receive prominence over others. The Government are confident that the Bill will ensure that the commission has the right expertise on its board. Our approach safeguards the integrity and independence of the regulator, draws clearly on established precedent and provides appropriate oversight of its activities.
Finally, Clauses 91 and 92 were designed to ensure that the ICO’s statutory codes are consistent in their development, informed by relevant expertise and take account of their impact on those likely to be affected by them. They also ensure that codes required by the Secretary of State have the same legal effect as pre-existing codes published under the Data Protection Act.
Considering the explanations I have offered, I hope that the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Lucas, the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, will agree not to press their amendments.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that response. If I speak for four minutes, that will just about fill the gap, but I hope to speak for less than that.
The Minister’s response was very helpful, particularly the way in which she put the clarification of objectives. Of course, this is shared with other regulators, where this new growth duty needs to be set in the context of the key priorities of the regulator. My earlier amendment reflected a nervousness about adding innovation and growth duties to a regulator, which may be seen to unbalance the key objectives of the regulator in the first place, but I will read carefully what the Minister said. I welcome the fact that, unlike in the DPDI Bill, there is no requirement for a statement of strategic priorities. That is why I did not support Amendment 135A.
It is somewhat ironic that, in discussing a digital Bill, the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, decided to go completely analogue, but that is life. Maybe that is what happens to you after four and a half hours of the Committee.
I do not think the Minister covered the ground on the reprimands front. I will read carefully what she said about the annual report and the need for the ICO—or the commission, as it will be—to report on its actions. I hope, just by putting down these kinds of amendments on reprimands, that the ICO will take notice. I have been in correspondence with the ICO myself, as have a number of organisations. There is some dissatisfaction, particularly with companies such as Clearview, where it is felt that the ICO has not taken adequate action on scraping and building databases from the internet. We will see whether the ICO becomes more proactive in that respect. I was reassured, however, by what the Minister said about NED qualifications and the general objective on the independence of the regulator.
There is much to chew on in what the Minister said. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
(2 weeks, 2 days ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I share the confusion of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, about the groupings. If we are not careful, we are going to keep returning to this issue again and again over four or five groups.
With the possible exception of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, I think that we are all very much on the same page here. On the suggestion from the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, that we meet to discuss the precise issue of the definition of “scientific research”, this would be extremely helpful; the noble Baroness and I do not need to repeat the concerns.
I should declare an interest in two respects: first, my interests as regards AI, which are set out on the register; and, secondly—I very much took account of what the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, and the noble Lord, Lord Markham, had to say—I chair the council of a university that has a strong health faculty. It does a great deal of health research and a lot of that research relies on NHS datasets.
This is not some sort of Luddism we are displaying here. This is caution about the expansion of the definition of scientific research, so that it does not turn into something else: that it does not deprive copyright holders of compensation, and that it does not allow personal data to be scraped off the internet without consent. There are very legitimate issues being addressed here, despite the fact that many of us believe that this valuable data should of course be used for the public benefit.
One of the key themes—this is perhaps where we come back on to the same page as the noble Lord, Lord Lucas—may be public benefit, which we need to reintroduce so that we really understand that scientific research for public benefit is the purpose we want this data used for.
I do not think I need to say much more: this issue is already permeating our discussions. It is interesting that we did not get on to it in a major way during the DPDI Bill, yet this time we have focused much more heavily on it. Clearly, in opposition, the noble Viscount has seen the light. What is not to like about that? Further discussion, not least of the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, further down the track will be extremely useful.
My Lords, I feel we are getting slightly repetitive, but before I, too, repeat myself, I should like to say something that I did not get the chance to say the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, and others: I will write, we will meet—all the things that you have asked for, you can take it for granted that they will happen, because we want to get this right.
I say briefly to the noble Baroness: we are in danger of thinking that the only good research is health research. If you go to any university up and down the country, you find that the most fantastic research is taking place in the most obscure subjects, be it physics, mechanical engineering, fabrics or, as I mentioned earlier, quantum. A lot of great research is going on. We are in danger of thinking that life sciences are the only thing that we do well. We need to open our minds a bit to create the space for those original thinkers in other sectors.
Can the Minister say whether this will be a Bill, a draft Bill or a consultation?
We will announce this in the usual way—in due course. I refer the noble Lord to the King’s Speech on that issue. I feel that noble Lords want more information, but they will just have to go with what I am able to say at the moment.
Perhaps another aspect the Minister could speak to is whether this will be coming very shortly, shortly or imminently.
Let me put it this way: other things may be coming before it. I think I promised at the last debate that we would have something on copyright in the very, very, very near future. This may not be as very, very, very near future as that. We will tie ourselves in knots if we carry on pursuing this discussion.
On that basis, I hope that this provides noble Lords with sufficient reassurance not to press their amendments.
My Lords, I welcome the noble Viscount to the sceptics’ club because he has clearly had a damascene conversion. It may be that this goes too far. I am slightly concerned, like him, about the bureaucracy involved in this, which slightly gives the game away. It could be seen as a way of legitimising commercial research, whereas we want to make it absolutely certain that that research is for the public benefit, rather than imposing an ethical board on every single aspect of research which has any commercial content.
We keep coming back to this, but we seem to be degrouping all over the place. Even the Government Whips Office seems to have given up trying to give titles for each of the groups; they are just called “degrouped” nowadays, which I think is a sign of deep depression in that office. It does not tell us anything about what the different groups contain, for some reason. Anyway, it is good to see the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, kicking the tyres on the definition of the research aspect.
I am not quite sure about the groupings, either, but let us go with what we have. I thank noble Lords who have spoken, and the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, for his amendments. I hope I am able to provide some reassurance for him on the points he raised.
As I said when considering the previous group, the Bill does not expand the definition of scientific research. The reasonableness test, along with clarifying the requirement for researchers to have a lawful basis, will significantly reduce the misuse of the existing definition. The amendment seeks to reduce the potential for misuse of the definition of scientific research by commercial companies using AI by requiring scientific researchers for a commercial company to submit their research to an ethics committee. As I said on the previous group, making it a mandatory requirement for all research may impede studies in areas that might have their own bespoke ethical procedures. This may well be the case in a whole range of different research areas, particularly in the university sector, and in sectors more widely. Some of this research may be very small to begin with but might grow in size. The idea that a small piece of start-up research has to be cleared for ethical research at an early stage is expecting too much and will put off a lot of the new innovations that might otherwise come forward.
Amendment 80 relates to Clause 71 and the reuse of personal data. This would put at risk valuable research that relies on data originally generated from diverse contexts, since the difference between the purposes may not always be compatible.
Turning to Amendment 67, I can reassure noble Lords that the concept of broad consent is not new. Clause 68 reproduces the text from the current UK GDPR recitals because the precise definition of scientific research may become clear only during later analysis of the data. Obtaining broad consent for an area of research from the outset allows scientists to focus on potentially life-saving research. Clause 68 has important limitations. It cannot be used if the researcher already knows the specific purpose—an important safeguard that should not be removed. It also includes a requirement to give the data subject the choice to consent to only part of the research processing, if possible. Most importantly, the data subject can revoke their consent at any point. I hope this reassures the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, and he feels content to withdraw his amendment on this basis.
My Lords, when the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, opened his speech he said that he hoped that noble Lords would be made of strong stuff while he worked his way through it. I have a similar request regarding my response: please bear with me. I will address these amendments slightly out of order to ensure that related issues are grouped together.
The Schedule 4 stand part notice, and Amendments 73 and 75, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, and supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, would remove the new lawful ground of “recognised legitimate interests” created by Clause 70 and Schedule 4 to the Bill. The aim of these provisions is to give data controllers greater confidence about processing personal data for specified and limited public interest objectives. Processing that is necessary and proportionate to achieve one of these objectives can take place without a person’s consent and without undertaking the legitimate interests balancing test. However, they would still have to comply with the wider requirements of data protection legislation, where relevant, ensuring that the data is processed in compliance with the other data protection principles.
I say in response to the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, that the new lawful ground of recognised legitimate interest will apply from the date of commencement and will not apply retrospectively.
The activities listed include processing of data where necessary to prevent crime, safeguarding national security, protecting children or responding to emergencies. They also include situations where a public body requests that a non-public body share personal data with it to help deliver a public task that is sanctioned by law. In these circumstances, it is very important that data is shared without delay, and removal of these provisions from the Bill, as proposed by the amendment, could make that harder.
Amendment 74, tabled by noble Lord, Lord Scriven, would prevent health data being processed as part of this new lawful ground, but this could have some unwelcome effects. For example, the new lawful ground is designed to give controllers greater confidence about reporting safeguarding concerns, but if these concerns relate to a vulnerable person’s health, they would not be able to rely on the new lawful ground to process the data and would have to identify an alternative lawful ground.
On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, about which data controllers can rely on the new lawful ground, it would not be available to public bodies such as the NHS; it is aimed at non-public bodies.
I reassure noble Lords that there are still sufficient safeguards in the wider framework. Any processing that involves special category data, such as health data, would also need to comply with the conditions and safeguards in Article 9 of the UK GDPR and Schedule 1 to the Data Protection Act 2018.
Amendment 78A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would remove the new lawful ground for non-public bodies or individuals to disclose personal data at the request of public bodies, where necessary, to help those bodies deliver their public interest tasks without carrying out a legitimate interest balance test. We would argue that, without it, controllers may lack certainty about the correct lawful ground to rely on when responding to such requests.
Amendment 76, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would remove the powers of regulations in Clause 70 that would allow the Secretary of State to keep the list of recognised legitimate interests up to date. Alternatively, the noble Lord’s Amendment 78 would require the Secretary of State to publish a statement every time he added a new processing activity to the list, setting out its purpose, which controllers it was aimed at and for how long they can use it. I reassure the noble Lord that the Government have already taken steps to tighten up these powers since the previous Bill was considered by this House.
Any new processing activities added would now also have to serve
“important objectives of … public interest”
as described in Article 23.1 of the UK GDPR and, as before, new activities could be added to the list only following consultation with the ICO and other interested parties. The Secretary of State would also have to consider the impact of any changes on people’s rights and have regard to the specific needs of children. Although these powers are likely to be used sparingly, the Government think it important that they be retained. I reassure the Committee that we will be responding to the report from the Delegated Powers Committee within the usual timeframes and we welcome its scrutiny of the Bill.
The noble Lord’s Amendment 77 seeks to make it clear that organisations should also be able to rely on Article 6.1(f) to make transfers between separate businesses affiliated by contract. The list of activities mentioned in Clause 70 is intended to be illustrative only and is drawn from the recitals to the UK GDPR. This avoids providing a very lengthy list that might be viewed as prescriptive. Article 6.1(f) of the UK GDPR is flexible. The transmission of personal data between businesses affiliated by contract may constitute a legitimate interest, like many other commercial interests. It is for the controller to determine this on a case-by-case basis.
I will now address the group of amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, concerning the purpose limitation principle, specifically Amendments 83 to 86. This principle limits the ways that personal data collected for one purpose can be used for another, but Clause 71 aims to provide more clarity and certainty around how it operates, including how certain exemptions apply.
Amendment 84 seeks to clarify whether the first exemption in proposed new Annexe 2 to the UK GDPR would allow personal data to be reused for commercial purposes. The conditions for using this exemption are that the requesting controller has a public task or official authority laid down in law that meets a public interest objective in Article 23.1 of the UK GDPR. As a result, I and the Government are satisfied that these situations would be for limited public interest objectives only, as set out in law.
Amendments 85 and 86 seek to introduce greater transparency around the use of safeguarding exemptions in paragraph 8 of new Annexe 2. These conditions are drawn from the Care Act 2014 and replicated in the existing condition for sensitive data processing for safeguarding purposes in the Data Protection Act 2018. I can reassure the Committee that processing cannot occur if it does not meet these conditions, including if the vulnerability of the individual no longer exists. In addition, requiring that an assessment be made and given to the data subject before the processing begins could result in safeguarding delays and would defeat the purpose of this exemption.
Amendment 83 would remove the regulation-making powers associated with this clause so that new exceptions could not be added in future. I remind noble Lords that there is already a power to create exemptions from the purpose limitation principle in the DPA 2018. This Bill simply moves the existing exemptions to a new annexe to the UK GDPR. The power is strictly limited to the public objectives listed in Article 23.1 of the UK GDPR.
I now turn to the noble Lord’s Amendment 89, which seeks to set conditions under which pseudonymised data should be treated as personal data. This is not necessary as pseudonymised data already falls within the definition of personal data under Article 4.1 of the UK GDPR. This amendment also seeks to ensure that a determination by the ICO that data is personal data applies
“at all points in that processing”.
However, the moment at which data is or becomes personal should be a determination of fact based on its identifiability to a living individual.
I turn now to Clause 74 stand part, together with Amendment 90. Noble Lords are aware that special categories of data require additional protection. Article 9 of the UK GDPR sets out an exhaustive list of what is sensitive data and outlines processing conditions. Currently, this list cannot be amended without primary legislation, which may not always be available. This leaves the Government unable to respond swiftly when new types of sensitive data are identified, including as a result of emerging technologies. The powers in Clause 74 enable the Government to respond more quickly and add new special categories of data, tailor the conditions applicable to their use and add new definitions if necessary.
Finally, I turn to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that would remove Schedule 7 from the Bill. This schedule contains measures to create a clearer and more outcomes-focused UK international data transfers regime. As part of these reforms, this schedule includes a power for the Secretary of State to recognise new transfer mechanisms for protecting international personal data transfers. Without this, the UK would be unable to respond swiftly to emerging developments and global trends in personal data transfers. In addition, the ICO will be consulted on any new mechanisms, and they will be subject to debate in Parliament under the affirmative resolution procedure.
I hope this helps explain the Government’s intention with these clauses and that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank the Minister. She covered quite a lot of ground and all of us will have to read Hansard quite carefully. However, it is somewhat horrifying that, for a Bill of this size, we had about 30 seconds from the Minister on Schedule 7, which could have such a huge influence on our data adequacy when that is assessed next year. I do not think anybody has talked about international transfers at this point, least of all me in introducing these amendments. Even though it may appear that we are taking our time over this Bill, we are not fundamentally covering all its points. The importance of this Bill, which obviously escapes most Members of this House—there are just a few aficionados—is considerable and could have a far-reaching impact.
I still get Viscount Camrose vibes coming from the Minister.
(3 weeks, 2 days ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I am not sure whether I should open by saying that it is a pleasure to take part in the passage of the third iteration of this Bill, but, as I said at Second Reading, this is an improvement. Nevertheless, there are aspects of the Bill that need close scrutiny.
The noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, explained his approach to this Bill. Our approach is that we very much support the use of data for public benefit but, at the same time, we want to make sure that this Bill does not water down individual data rights and that they are, where necessary, strengthened. In that spirit, I wish to ask the Minister about the general nature of Clause 1, rather than following up on the amendments tabled by the noble Viscount.
The definition of “business data” seems quite general. A report that came out yesterday, Data On Our Minds: Affective Computing At Work, highlighted the kinds of data that are now being collected in the workplace. It is a piece of work sponsored by the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust, the Trust for London and the Institute for the Future of Work. They are concerned about the definition of “business data”. The Minister probably will not have an answer on this matter at this stage but it would be useful if she could write in due course to say whether the definition of excludes emotional data and neurosurveillance data collected from employees.
This is very much a workplace question rather than a question about the customer; I could ask the same question about the customer, I suppose, except the report is about workplace data collection. I thought I would opportunistically take advantage of the rather heavy de-grouping that has taken place and ask the Minister a question.
First, let me say what a pleasure it is to be back on this old ground again, although with slightly different functions this time round. I very much support what the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, said. We want to get the wording of this Bill right and to have a robust Bill; that is absolutely in our interests. We are on the same territory here. I thank the noble Viscount and other noble Lords for expressing their interest.
On Amendments 1 and 2, the Government consider the terms used in Part 1, as outlined in Clause 1, necessary to frame the persons and the data to which a scheme will apply. The noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, mentioned the powers. I assure him that the powers in Part 1 sit on top of the Data Protection Act. They are not there instead of it; they are another layer on top of it, and they provide additional rights over and above what already exists.
In relation to the specific questions from the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, and the noble Lord, Lord Markham, smart data schemes require suppliers or providers of goods, services or digital content to provide data. They are referred to as “traders” in accordance with recent consumer legislation, including the Consumer Rights Act 2015. The term “data holder” ensures that the requirements may also be imposed on any third party that might hold the data on the trader’s behalf. That is why these additional terminologies have been included: it is based on existing good legislation. I hope noble Lords will recognise why this is necessary and that this explains the rationale for these terms. These terms are independent of terms in data protection legislation; they have a different scope and that is why separate terms are necessary. I hope that, on that basis, the noble Viscount will withdraw his amendment.
Does the Minister have any thoughts about where smart data schemes might be introduced? I am sure that they are being introduced for a purpose. Is there a plan to issue a policy document or is it purely about consulting different sectors? Perhaps the Minister can give us a glimpse of the future.
The noble Lord is tempting me. What I would say is that, once this legislation is passed, it will encourage departments to look in detail at where they think smart data schemes can be applied and provide a useful service for customers and businesses alike. I know that one issue that has been talked about is providing citizens with greater information about their energy supplies—the way that is being used and whether they can use their energy differently or find a different supplier—but that is only one example, and I do not want people to get fixated on it.
The potential is enormous; I feel that we need to encourage people to think creatively about how some of these provisions can be used when the Bill is finally agreed. There is a lot of cross-government thinking at the moment and a lot of considering how we can empower citizens more. I could say a lot off the top of my head but putting it on the record in Hansard would probably be a mistake, so I will not be tempted any more by the noble Lord. I am sure that he can write to me with some suggestions, if he has any.
I will, of course, write to the noble Baroness.
Was the Minister saying that in view of the current duties of the ICO, Amendment 50 is not needed because public authorities will have the duty to inform the ICO of the information that they have been passing across to these identity services?
Again, I will have to write to the noble Lord on that. I think we were saying that it is outside the current obligations of the ICO, but we will clarify the responsibility.
My Lords, I am not quite sure whether to be reassured or not because this is terra incognita. I am really struggling, given the Minister’s response. This is kind of saying, “Hands off, Parliament, we want the lightest touch on all of this, and the Secretary of State will decide”.
I should first thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, for her support. I thought that the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, made an extremely good case for Amendment 35 because all of us want to make sure that we have that interoperability. One of the few areas where I was reassured by the Minister was on the consultations taking place.
I am sure that the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, was right to ask what the consultations are. We need to be swimming in the right pool for our digital services to be interoperable. It is not as if we do not have contact with quite a number of these digital service providers. Some of them are extremely good and want a level of mandation for these international services. There is a worrying lack of detail here. We have devil and the deep blue sea. We have these rules on GOV.UK which are far too complicated for mere parliamentarians to comprehend. They are so detailed that we are going to get bogged down.
On the other hand, we do not know what the Secretary of State is doing. This is the detailed trust framework, but what is the governance around it? At the beginning of her speech, the Minister said that governance is different from certification and the conformity assessment service. I would have thought that governance was all part of the same warp and weft. I do not really understand. The Secretary of State has the power to refuse accreditation, so we do not need an independent appeals body. It would be much more straightforward if we knew that there was a regulator and that it was going to be transparent in terms of how the system worked. I just feel that this is all rather half baked at the moment. We need a lot more information than we are getting. To that extent, that is the case for all the amendments in this group.
The crucial amendment is Amendment 37 tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, because we absolutely need to bring all this into the light of day by parliamentary approval, whether or not it is a complicated document. Perhaps we could put it through an AI model and simplify it somewhat before we debate it. We have to get to grips with this. I have a feeling that we are going to want to return to this aspect on Report because no good reason has been given, not to the DPRRC either, about why we are not debating this in Parliament in terms of the scheme itself. It is a bit sad to have to say this because we all support the digital verification progress, if you like. Yet, we are all in a bit of a fog about how it is all going to work.
I very much hope that the Minister can come back to us, perhaps with a must-write letter that sets it all out to a much more satisfactory extent. I hope she understands why we have had this fairly protracted debate on this group of amendments because this is an important aspect that the Bill is skeletal about. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I am grateful to the noble Viscount for joining me in my enthusiasm for NUAR. He is right: having seen it in practice, I am a great enthusiast for it. If it is possible to demonstrate it to other people, I would be very happy to do so, because it is quite a compelling story when you see it in practice.
Amendment 56, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, would place a duty on the Secretary of State to consult relevant private sector organisations before implementing the NUAR provisions under the Bill. I want to make clear then that the Geospatial Commission, which oversees NUAR, has been engaging with stakeholders on NUAR since 2018. Since then, there have been extensive reviews of existing processes and data exchange services. That includes a call for evidence, a pilot project, public consultation and numerous workshops. A series of in-person focus groups were completed last week and officials have visited commercial companies with specific concerns, including LinesearchbeforeUdig, so there has been extensive consultation with them.
I suppose one can understand why they feel slightly put out about NUAR appearing on the scene, but NUAR is a huge public asset that we should celebrate. We can potentially use it in other ways for other services in the future, once it is established, and we should celebrate the fact that we have managed to create it as a public asset. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, that a further consultation on that basis would provide no additional benefit but would delay the realisation of the significant benefits that NUAR could deliver.
Moving on to the noble Lord’s other amendments, Amendments 193, 194, and 195, he is absolutely right about the need for data interoperability in the health service. We can all think of examples of where that would be of benefit to patients and citizens. It is also true that we absolutely need to ensure that our health and care system is supported by robust information standards. Again, we go back to the issue of trust: people need to know that those protections are there.
This is why we would ensure, through Clause 119 and Schedule 15, that suppliers of IT products and services used in the provision of health or adult social care in England are required to meet relevant information standards. In doing so, we can ensure that IT suppliers are held to account where information standards are not implemented. The application of information standards is independent of commercial organisations, and we would hold IT companies to them. Furthermore, the definition of healthcare as set out in the Health and Social Care Act 2012, as amended by the Health and Care Act 2022, already ensures that all forms of healthcare are within scope of information standards, which would include primary care. That was one of the other points that the noble Lord made.
As an add-on to this whole discussion, the noble Lord will know that the Government are preparing the idea of a national data library, which would encourage further interoperability between government departments to make sure that we use it to improve services. Health and social care is the obvious one, but the members of the Committee can all think of all sorts of other ways where government departments, if they collaborated on an interoperable basis, could drive up standards and make life easier for a whole lot of citizens in different ways. We are on the case and are absolutely determined to deliver it. I hope that, on that basis, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
I am sorry to interrupt the Minister, but she has whetted our appetite about the national data library. It is not included in the Bill. We talked about it a little at Second Reading, but I wonder whether she can tell us a little more about what is planned. Is it to be set up on a statutory basis or is it a shadow thing? What substance will it actually have and how?
Well, details of it were in our manifesto, in as much as a manifesto is ever detailed. It is a commitment to deliver cross-departmental government services and create a means whereby some of the GDPR blockages that stop one department speaking to another can, where necessary, be freed up to make sure that people exchange data in a more positive way to improve services. There will be more details coming out. It is a work in progress at the moment and may well require some legislation to underpin it. There is an awful lot of work to be done in making sure that one dataset can talk to another before we can progress in any major way, but we are working at speed to try to get this new system up and running.
I thank the Minister for that, which was very interesting. We were talking about medical health IT and “GDPR blockages” almost has a medical quality to it. The embryonic national data library will obviously get some more mentions as we go through the Bill. It is a work in progress, so I hope that we will know more at the end of the Bill than we did at the beginning.
The Minister talked about datasets talking to each other. We will have to get the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, to use other phrases, not just “Netflix in the age of Blockbuster” but something equally exciting about datasets talking to each other.
We support this service, of course—we can see the potential for expanding it further if we get this measure right—but I have to tell noble Lords that the current service is not in great shape in terms of its technology. It has suffered from insufficient investment over time and it needs to be improved before we can take it to the next stage of its potential. We consider that the best way to address this issue is, first, to upgrade its legacy technology, which is what we are operating at the moment. I realised that this is a problem only as I took over this brief; I had assumed that it would be more straightforward, but the problem seems to be that we are operating on ancient technology here.
Work is already under way to try to bring it all up to date. We are looking to improve the current service and at the opportunities to extend it to more of government. Our initial task is to try to extend it to some of the government departments that do not recognise it at the moment. Doing that will inform us of the potential limitations and the opportunities should we wish to extend it to the private sector in future. I say to the noble Lord that this will have to be a stage process because of the technological challenges that we currently have.
We are reluctant to commit to a review and further expansion of the service at this time but, once the service is updated, we would absolutely be happy to talk to noble Lords and revisit this issue, because we see the potential of it. The update is expected to be completed in the next two years; I hope that we will be able to come back and give a progress report to noble Lords at that time. However, I have to say, this is what we have inherited—bear with us, because we have a job to do in bringing it up to date. I hope that, on that basis, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment, albeit reluctantly.
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the AI and creative sectors are both essential to our mission to grow the UK economy. Our goal is to find the right balance between fostering innovation in AI while ensuring protection for creators and our vibrant creative industries. This is an important but complex area and we are very aware of the need to resolve the issues. We are working with stakeholders to understand their views and will set out our next steps soon.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply, but the Prime Minister, in a recent letter to the News Media Association, said:
“We recognise the basic principle that publishers should have control over and seek payment for their work, including when thinking about the role of AI”.
Will the Minister therefore agree with the House of Lords Communications and Digital Committee and affirm the rights of copyright owners in relation to their content used for training purposes on large language models? Will she rule out any widening of the text and data-mining exception and include in any future AI legislation a duty on developers to keep records of the material and data used to train their AI models?
My Lords, I pay tribute to the Lords committee that has considered this issue. We are keen to make progress in this area but it is important that we get it right. The previous Government had this on their table for a long time and were not able to resolve it. The Intellectual Property Office, DSIT and DCMS are working together to try to find a way forward that will provide a solution for creative media and the AI sectors. Ministers—my colleagues Chris Bryant and Feryal Clark—held round tables with representatives of the creative industries and the AI sector recently, and we are looking at how we can take this forward to resolve the many issues and questions that the noble Lord has quite rightly posed for me today.
(1 month, 4 weeks ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, this order was laid before the House on 9 September this year. The Online Safety Act lays the foundations of strong protection for children and adults online. I am grateful to noble Lords for their continued interest in the Online Safety Act and its implementation. It is critical that the Act is made fully operational as soon as possible, and the Government are committed to ensuring that its protections are delivered as soon as possible. This statutory instrument will further support the implementation of the Act by Ofcom.
This statutory instrument concerns Ofcom’s ability to share business information with Ministers for the purpose of fulfilling functions under the Online Safety Act 2023, under Section 393 of the Communications Act 2003. This corrects an oversight in the original Online Safety Act that was identified following its passage.
Section 393 of the Communications Act 2003 contains a general restriction on Ofcom disclosing information about particular businesses without consent from the affected businesses, but with exemptions, including where this facilitates Ofcom in carrying out its regulatory functions and facilitates other specified persons in carrying out specific functions. However, this section does not currently enable Ofcom to share information with Ministers for the purpose of fulfilling functions under the Online Safety Act. This means that, were Ofcom to disclose information about businesses to the Secretary of State, it may be in breach of the law.
It is important that a gateway exists for sharing information for these purposes so that the Secretary of State can carry out functions under the Online Safety Act, such as setting the fee threshold for the online safety regime in 2025 or carrying out post-implementation reviews of the Act required under Section 178. This statutory instrument will therefore amend the Communications Act 2003 to allow Ofcom to share information with the Secretary of State and other Ministers, strictly for the purpose of fulfilling functions under the Online Safety Act 2023.
There are strong legislative safeguards and limitations on the disclosure of this information, and Ofcom is experienced in handling confidential and sensitive information obtained from the services it regulates. Ofcom must comply with UK data protection law and would need to show that the processing of any personal data was necessary for a lawful purpose. As a public body, Ofcom is also required to act compatibly with the Article 8 right of privacy under the European Convention on Human Rights.
We will therefore continue to review the Online Safety Act, so that Ofcom is able to support the delivery of functions under the Act where it is appropriate. That is a brief but detailed summary of why this instrument is necessary. I should stress that it contains a technical amendment to deal with a very small legal aspect. Nevertheless, I will be interested to hear noble Lords’ comments on the SI. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her introduction and for explaining the essence of the SI. We all have a bit of pride of creation in the Online Safety Act; there are one or two of us around today who clearly have a continuing interest in it. This is one of the smaller outcomes of the Act and, as the Minister says, it is an essentially an oversight. I would say that a tidying-up operation is involved here. It is rather gratifying to see that the Communications Act still has such importance, 21 years after it was passed. It is somewhat extraordinary for legislation to be invoked after that period of time in an area such as communications, which is so fast-moving.
My question for the Minister is whether the examples that she gave or which were contained in the Explanatory Memorandum, regarding the need for information to be obtained by the Secretary of State in respect of Section 178, on reviewing the regulatory framework, and Section 86, on the threshold for payment of fees, are exclusive. Are there other aspects of the Online Safety Act where the Secretary of State requires that legislation?
We are always wary of the powers given to Secretaries of State, as the noble Viscount, Lord Camrose, will probably remember to his cost. But at every point, the tyres on legislation need to be kicked to make sure that the Secretary of State has just the powers that they need—and that we do not go further than we need to or have a skeleton Bill, et cetera—so the usual mantra will apply: we want to make sure that the Secretary of State’s powers are proportionate.
It would be very useful to hear from the Minister what other powers are involved. Is it quite a number, were these two just the most plausible or are there six other sets of powers which might not be so attractive? That is the only caveat I would make in this respect.
(1 month, 4 weeks ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, these regulations were laid before the House on 12 September this year. The Government stated in their manifesto that they would
“use every government tool available to target perpetrators and address the root causes of abuse and violence”
in order to achieve their
“landmark mission to halve violence against women and girls in a decade”.
Through this statutory instrument, we are broadening online platforms’ and search engines’ responsibilities for tackling intimate image abuse under the Online Safety Act. More than one in three women have experienced abuse online. The rise in intimate image abuse is not only devastating for victims but also spreads misogyny on social media that can develop into potentially dangerous relationships offline. One in 14 adults in England and Wales has experienced threats to share intimate images, rising to one in seven young women aged 18 to 34.
It is crucial that we tackle these crimes from every angle, including online, and ensure that tech companies step up and play their part. That is why we are laying this statutory instrument. Through it, we will widen online platforms’ and search engines’ obligations to tackle intimate image abuse under the Online Safety Act. As noble Lords will know, the Act received Royal Assent on 26 October 2023. It places strong new duties on online user-to-user platforms and search services to protect their users from harm.
As part of this, the Act gives service providers new “illegal content duties”. Under these duties, online platforms need to assess the risk that their services will allow users to encounter illegal content or be
“used for the commission or facilitation of a priority offence”.
They then need to take steps to mitigate identified risks. These will include implementing safety-by-design measures to reduce risks and content moderation systems to remove illegal content where it appears.
The Online Safety Act sets out a list of priority offences for the purposes of providers’ illegal content duties. These offences reflect the most serious and prevalent online illegal content and activity. They are set out in schedules to the Act. Platforms will need to take additional steps to tackle these kinds of illegal activities under their illegal content duties.
The priority offences list currently includes certain intimate image abuse offences. Through this statutory instrument, we are adding new intimate image abuse offences to the priority list. This replaces an old intimate image abuse offence, which has now been repealed. These new offences are in the Sexual Offences Act 2003. They took effect earlier this year. The older offence was in the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. The repealed offence covered sharing intimate images where the intent was to cause distress. The new offences are broader; they criminalise sharing intimate images without having a reasonable belief that the subject would consent to sharing the images. These offences include the sharing of manufactured or manipulated images, including so-called deepfakes.
Since these new offences are more expansive, adding them as priority offences means online platforms will be required to tackle more intimate image abuse on their services. This means that we are broadening the scope of what constitutes illegal intimate image content in the Online Safety Act. It also makes it clear that platforms’ priority illegal content duties extend to AI-generated deepfakes and other manufactured intimate images. This is because the new offences that we are adding explicitly cover this content.
As I have set out above, these changes affect the illegal content duties in the Online Safety Act. They will ensure that tech companies play their part in kicking this content off social media. These are just part of a range of wider protections coming into force next spring through the Online Safety Act that will mean that social media companies have to remove the most harmful illegal content, a lot of which disproportionately affects women and girls, such as through harassment and controlling or coercive behaviour.
Ofcom will set out the specific steps that providers can take to fulfil their illegal content duties for intimate image abuse and other illegal content in codes of practice and guidance documentation. It is currently producing this documentation. We anticipate that the new duties will start to be enforced from spring next year once Ofcom has issued these codes of practice and they have come into force. Providers will also need to have done their risk assessment for illegal content by then. We anticipate that Ofcom will recommend that providers should take action in a number of areas. These include content moderation, reporting and complaints procedures, and safety-by-design steps, such as testing their algorithm systems to see whether illegal content is being recommended to users. We are committed to working with Ofcom to get these protections in place as quickly as possible. We are focused on delivering.
Where companies are not removing and proactively stopping this vile material appearing on their platforms, Ofcom will have robust powers to take enforcement action against them. This includes imposing fines of up to £18 million or 10% of qualifying worldwide revenue, whichever is highest.
In conclusion, through this statutory instrument we are broadening providers’ duties for intimate image abuse content. Service providers will need to take proactive steps to search for, remove and limit people’s exposure to this harmful kind of illegal content, including where it has been manufactured or manipulated. I hope noble Lords will commend these further steps that we have taken that take the provisions in the Online Safety Act a useful further step forward. I commend these regulations to the Committee, and I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her introduction. I endorse everything she said about intimate image abuse and the importance of legislation to make sure that the perpetrators are penalised and that social media outlets have additional duties under Schedule 7 for priority offences. I am absolutely on the same page as the Minister on this, and I very much welcome what she said. It is interesting that we are dealing with another 2003 Act that, again, is showing itself fit for purpose and able to be amended; perhaps there is some cause to take comfort from our legislative process.
I was interested to hear what the Minister said about the coverage of the offences introduced by the Online Safety Act. She considered that the sharing of sexually explicit material included deepfakes. There was a promise—the noble Viscount will remember it—that the Criminal Justice Bill, which was not passed in the end, would cover that element. It included intent, like the current offence—the one that has been incorporated into Schedule 7. The Private Member’s Bill of the noble Baroness, Lady Owen—I have it in my hand—explicitly introduces an offence that does not require intent, and I very much support that.
I do not believe that this is the last word to be said on the kinds of IIA offence that need to be incorporated as priority offences under Schedule 7. I would very much like to hear what the noble Baroness has to say about why we require intent when, quite frankly, the creation of these deepfakes requires activity that is clearly harmful. We clearly should make sure that the perpetrators are caught. Given the history of this, I am slightly surprised that the Government’s current interpretation of the new offence in the Online Safety Act includes deepfakes. It is gratifying, but the Government nevertheless need to go further.
(2 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord is absolutely right. The scale of violent images featuring women and girls in our country is intolerable, and this Government will treat it as the national emergency it is. The noble Lord will be pleased to hear that the Government have set out an unprecedented mission to halve violence against women and girls within a decade. We are using every government tool we have to target the perpetrators and address the root cause of violence. That involves many legislative and non-legislative measures, as the noble Lord will appreciate, including tackling the education issue. However, ultimately, we have to make sure that the legislation is robust and that we take action, which we intend to do.
My Lords, as the Minister and others have mentioned, there is considerable and increasing concern about deepfake pornographic material, particularly the so-called nudification apps, which can be easily accessed by users of any age. What action will the Government be taking against this unacceptable technology, and will an offence be included in the forthcoming crime and policing Bill?
The noble Lord raises an important point. Where nudification apps and other material do not come under the remit of the Online Safety Act, we will look at other legislative tools to make sure that all new forms of technology—including AI and its implications for online images —are included in robust legislation, in whatever form it takes. Our priority is to implement the Online Safety Act, but we are also looking at what other tools might be necessary going forward. As the Secretary of State has said, this is an iterative process; the Online Safety Act is not the end of the game. We are looking at what further steps we need to take, and I hope the noble Lord will bear with us.
(4 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberI thank my noble friend for those good wishes. Of course, he is raising a really important issue of great concern to all of us. During the last election, we felt that the Government were well prepared to ensure the democratic integrity of our UK elections. We did have robust systems in place to protect against interference, through the Defending Democracy Taskforce and the Joint Election and Security Preparedness unit. We continue to work with the Home Office and the security services to assess the impact of that work. Going forward, the Online Safety Act goes further by putting new requirements on social media platforms to swiftly remove illegal misinformation and disinformation, including where it is AI-generated, as soon as it becomes available. We are still assessing the need for further legislation in the light of the latest intelligence, but I assure my noble friend that we take this issue extremely seriously. It affects the future of our democratic process, which I know is vital to all of us.
My Lords, I welcome the creation of an AI opportunities plan, announced by the Government, but, as the noble Lord, Lord Knight, says, we must also tackle the risks. In other jurisdictions across the world, including the EU, AI-driven live facial recognition technology is considered to seriously infringe the right to privacy and have issues with accuracy and bias, and is being banned or restricted for both law enforcement and business use. Will the Government, in their planned AI legislation, provide equivalent safeguards for UK citizens and ensure their trust in new technology?
I thank the noble Lord for that question and for all the work he has done on the AI issue, including his new book, which I am sure is essential reading over the summer for everybody. I should say that several noble Lords in this Chamber have written books on AI, so noble Lords might want to consider that for their holiday reading.
The noble Lord will know that the use and regulation of live facial recognition is for each country to decide. We already have some regulations about it, but it is already governed by data protection, equality and human rights legislation, supplemented by specific police guidance. It is absolutely vital that its use is only when it is necessary, proportionate and fair. We will continue to look at the legislation and at whether privacy is being sufficiently protected. That is an issue that will come forward when the future legislation is being prepared.