National Security and Investment Bill

Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted

Committee stage
Tuesday 9th March 2021 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, my reason for speaking in this group relates to licences. I generally support the thrust of Amendment 23, if there can be appropriate definitions, but I was not quite sure whether I agreed with Amendment 38. I disagreed with the explanatory statement of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, because whether or not the licenser maintains control depends on quite a lot of things.

An IP licenser may be able to impose conditions when a licence is first granted, but what happens after that and how much control there is over future events is up to whatever is agreed in the licence. If the price and conditions are right, it could be a fully assignable licence; it could be assignable with or without consent of the IP owner; it could be exclusive, so that the IP owner no longer has any rights to use it themselves or to license others; or it could be a sole licence that also effectively restricts supply under the IP. A licence can therefore be for something that is relevant to national security and have both ownership and security of supply implications.

In paragraph (c) of Amendment 38—the substantive economic ownership point—I am sure the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, is trying to exclude the exclusive licences that are assignable because, as he would say, economic control had been obtained. I am not sure whether that is the right way to define it, but I understand the sense of what he is trying to do. However, I wonder whether that also captures what could be restriction of supply issues. Those can also happen through licences that would not necessarily mean economic control.

The whole matter of licences is quite interesting, but they can be unique—I used to do them for a living, so I should know. We therefore have to be careful about clarifying, perhaps in a more substantive way, the things that one wants to exclude from review. I think it is necessary to exclude some, because I am absolutely certain that you would get an even bigger deluge if you did not. It may be that things that count as ordinary licences, where there are many licensees—rather like in the other amendment—and no security of supply issues, can be treated the same as any product for sale. However, wherever there is a sole or exclusive licence in particular, it would be necessary just to have a look to make sure there was nothing that you might want to do something about. There could quite possibly be something if it was in a relevant technology area. However, the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, has drawn an interesting point to our attention.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, as has been mentioned, the amendments in this group have a common factor very much along the lines of what the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, said: that it is really important to look at the nature of qualifying entities and assets under Clause 7 with a keen eye. I think that the debate will continue beyond Committee.

One has to make choices here where one thinks it is appropriate to go for a change. I would give this a score of one out of three. I put my name to Amendment 23 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, because the argument there is very straightforward. As he said, it is about “business as usual” procurement and the purchasing of things such as software licences and standard equipment, so that, even if it might technically be caught by the sectors, it is not captured in the definition of a qualifying asset. This is so that, again, we do not have a vast quantity of referral requirements for what are essentially day-to-day transactions, which could be a massive burden on business. The noble Lord made the argument extremely well there.

I am much more nervous about the proposition of taking land out of this, particularly when it comes to reversing the requirement: that is, you publish the sensitive sites and then say whether the transaction is caught because it is next door to that site. The way in which the qualifying entities and assets clause is currently set out, with sensitive sites not being published, is probably a rather safer way of dealing with national security, but that is a purely personal view. I hope that we keep things that way round.

It was a great pleasure to hear what my noble friend Lady Bowles had to say about the third proposition, given her experience and expertise in the whole area of intellectual property. That was exactly my reaction: that licences are animals that can vary in many different ways. As she said, they can be exclusive or non-exclusive, long-term or short-term. I agree that they are not as easy to define as an asset transfer, such as an assignment of copyright or other forms of intellectual property. Nevertheless, in substance, they can mean the transfer for quite a period of time—indeed, the wholesale transfer of knowhow—just as much as an assignment can. One therefore needs to be somewhat wary.

Then you start getting into paragraph (c), as proposed by Amendment 38, which says that

“substantive economic ownership of the asset has not been transferred”.

That is virtually impossible to define for this particular purpose. I am wholly sympathetic to the idea of screening and filtering in a way that cuts back red tape, but at the same time one must recognise that intellectual property is one of the most sensitive aspects that needs to be caught by this Bill. That is the future. Intangible assets are the real Crown jewels of national economies. We must be very careful about that.

Business and Planning Bill

Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 13th July 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I speak in support of Amendment 44, so well introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe. As she emphasised, it is a deregulatory amendment that entirely fits within the context of this Bill. Given her experience running the Better Regulation Unit and on the board of a major retailer, she should know.

This amendment is designed to give retailers the option of carrying out contactless age verification at a distance and automatically. It is supported not only by those representing and directly providing digital solutions, such as techUK, NCR and digital identity providers such as Yoti, but by the leaders of the key organisations involved in the retail trade, the British Retail Consortium and the Scottish Grocers Federation. It has the twin benefits of keeping retail staff and customers safe by assisting compliance with coronavirus guidelines and social distancing, and preventing the sales of age-restricted goods to minors, upholding the principles of Challenge 25—the retailing strategy that encourages anyone who is over 18 but looks under 25 to carry acceptable ID if they wish to buy alcohol.

The relaxation of coronavirus lockdown measures will now see an increase in in-store footfall, a potential rise in abuse and social distancing challenges with queues. Queues in supermarkets in particular create a point of potential congestion that can put staff at risk. Retailers have noted that almost 24% of baskets contain an age-restricted item. As a result of current rules, many customers wait longer than necessary. It can typically take 63 seconds to alert a staff member and carry out an age check when a basket includes an age-restricted good.

Age verification has a British standard, BSI PAS 1296 —Online Age Checking: Provision and Use of Online Age Check Services—which has been approved for use for all products apart from alcohol and has received assured advice from the Association of Convenience Stores. The standard has been worked on by age-verification experts and covers all the aspects important for designing and building a robust age-verification system—namely data protection, security, transparency and effective operation. Such a contactless method would take pressure off store staff, at a time when they are busy and pressured, and when wrong decisions can be made and there is temptation not to ask for ID.

The current conditions of customers wearing face coverings and social distancing make checking physical ID documents for age-restricted goods, in a retail context, much harder for staff. Staff have enough problems with aggressive customers without asking them to remove a mask or face covering that they are wearing under government guidance. As a result, there is a heightened risk of increased verbal, physical and racial abuse, increased coronavirus transmission risk when physically examining Challenge 25 approved ID documents, and the difficulty of matching documents to a customer wearing a face covering.

I have, for some time, been a supporter of age verification through digital identity systems, first legislated for in the Digital Economy Act 2017. It is clear that highly accurate digital age-proofing and identity-checking solutions are available off the shelf in the UK today that can significantly help alleviate issues facing retail staff. They are trusted for right to remain without a formal standard for 3 million-plus people and approved by the Joint Money Laundering Steering Group for financial services in the UK. In-store use of these technologies has been successful in the US and Europe—integrated into self-checkout and automated dispensing machines—but not in the UK, purely due to the current inconsistent regulatory requirements. We are behind other nations as a result, which is ironic given that the UK is playing a leading role in this technology.

In summary, the amendment would protect customers’ health, help with the development of a leading UK technology, reduce cost to retail because it reduces time taken at checkout and self-service, and reduce regulatory burden significantly because it removes the need for a second paper check of ID after the digital check. What can the Government conceivably object to in this amendment?

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I am speaking in favour of Amendment 3 from the noble Lord, Lord Balfe. If anything like the normal timetable had been in existence, I would have added my name to it.

At Second Reading, I asked for clarification over the scope of Clause 1(4)(b), specifically whether it covers supermarkets setting up pavement licences and whether that is good for the hospitality sector. The Minister wrote in reply, confirming that it covers any premises, but I will read into the record some of what the letter says, because of the emphasis it gives:

“This includes shops, such as convenience stores and supermarkets, which you referred to, from which food or drink can be bought. Draft guidance mentions public houses, cafés, bars and restaurants, including other types of food and drink establishments such as snack bars, coffee shops and ice cream parlours, though eligibility goes beyond this. It would include any businesses which sell food or drink, for example theatres and galleries with cafés and bars.


You also raised an important question about whether this is helping the hospitality industry by allowing other premises, such as shops from which food or drink can be bought to apply for pavement licences. Given that indoor space will be limited while social distancing measures apply, we want to provide a temporary process that helps support as many businesses to reopen as possible by allowing them to serve customers outdoors. This process is intended to help give much needed support to the hospitality industry, but given the impact Covid-19 has had on the whole economy, this provision should not be limited just to the hospitality industry when there is an opportunity for other sectors which have also been struggling economically to benefit.”

Trade Marks (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018

Debate between Lord Clement-Jones and Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted

Monday 14th January 2019 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

One small point struck me, not having looked at this before we commenced proceedings. I fully understand the transfer of the pending applications and the ability to file a new application and have it allocated the earlier filing date that the European trade mark had. I do not see any legal difficulty with that, but I wonder if there is a legal difficulty in allowing that to claim the priority date of the EU trade mark, in the sense that it would operate under the Paris Convention, which we and many other countries are party to. I used to take great pleasure in reminding the EU that the Paris Convention of 1883 predated the EU treaties and that they sometimes could not do things. But I wonder whether there has been any advice on that, because there is a discontinuity.

To take a parallel example, in the United States, if you file a continuation in part, there are careful rules so that you can ensure that the priority claim can go all the way through in a continuous way. I wonder whether, through the changing from a European office to the UK office, there is a discontinuity here that would mean that priority date was challengeable. If there was a later priority date UK-only national application from an applicant not from the United Kingdom but from another country that was party to the Paris convention, would there be a clash of rights? It is a question that should appeal to lawyers looking at these things. I cannot answer it without having a longer think, so I am asking the Minister whether he can advise me what advice he may have had on that.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend has asked an important technical question, given her long-standing expertise in this area. As with the patent statutory instrument, this does appear to be a solution for trademarks, or to take advantage of the European community trademark. It appears to be a solution devised not just for a no-deal situation, but with a deal or the transition period in mind as well. Again that gives this particular statutory instrument a greater significance because it might be there for some considerable period of time in the event that a deal was reached. Moreover, as the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, has pointed out, similar issues regarding consultation and the impact assessment arise in connection with this statutory instrument as well.

It was interesting to hear what the noble Lord, Lord Deben, had to say about the difference in wording between the different Explanatory Memoranda. Asking a,

“small group of trusted individuals with expertise in trade mark law”,

almost means that the question is asked of people who are not going to give you the wrong answer.

Quite frankly, the really important aspect of this is the impact on business. On the impact assessment, the homework has been done in such a way that it answers the question by bringing the impact under £5 million. I cannot believe that that will be the total cost to business once you have added together all the issues such as the legal advice that will need to be taken and the red tape involved. I know this is a solution that is designed to be constructive but there are inevitably going to be costs. Frankly, the importance of brands being what it is, the actual costs involved to business are going to be quite high. I cannot believe that the figure is not going to be higher than £5 million.

The same issues apply to this statutory instrument as much as they do to some of the earlier ones. However, there are other technical questions. My noble friend has asked one set about the priority date, but another important question is which court will have jurisdiction if the validity of the original EU trademark is challenged in the future. We cannot leave business in a state of uncertainty. Then of course the UK trademark comparable right will be a stand-alone right. Does that mean that in those circumstances an applicant will have to challenge a trademark’s validity both in the UK and in the EU? What is the answer to that? One right derives from another. As a result of that, does someone wishing to demonstrate the invalidity of a trademark have to go to two jurisdictions? If that is not an additional burden on business, I do not know what is.

There are a number of questions to be asked here. We have come back again to the circularity of a quick fix that could have long-term consequences and where the procedure, process, consultation and impact assessment have been grossly unsatisfactory.