Online Safety Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Clement-Jones
Main Page: Lord Clement-Jones (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Clement-Jones's debates with the Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport
(1 year, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak briefly on a couple of amendments and pick up from where the noble Lord, Lord Allan, just finished on Amendment 186A. I associate myself with all the comments that the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, made on her Amendment 191A. As ever, she introduced the amendment so brilliantly that there is no need for me to add anything other than my wholehearted support.
I will briefly reference Amendment 253 from the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. Both his amendment and my noble friend Lord Moylan’s point to one of the challenges about regulating the digital world, which is that it touches everything. We oscillate between wanting to compartmentalise the digital and recognising that it is interconnected to everything. That is the same challenge faced by every organisation that is trying to digitise: do you ring-fence or recognise that it touches everything? I am very supportive of the principles behind Amendment 253 precisely because, in the end, it does touch everything. It is hugely important that, even though this Bill and others still to come are creating an extraordinarily powerful single regulator in the form of Ofcom, we also recognise the interconnectivity of the regulatory landscape. The amendment is very well placed, and I hope my noble friend the Minister looks favourably on it and its heritage from the pre-legislative scrutiny committee.
I will briefly add my thoughts on Amendment 186A in this miscellaneous group. It feels very much as if we are having a Committee debate on this amendment, and I thank my noble friend Lord Moylan for introducing it. He raises a hugely important point, and I am incredibly sympathetic to the logic he set out.
In this area the digital world operates differently from the physical world, and we do not have the right balance at all between the powers of the big companies and consumer rights. I am completely with my noble friend in the spirit in which he introduced the amendment but, together with the noble Lord, Lord Allan, I think it would be better tackled in the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill, precisely because it is much broader than online safety. This fundamentally touches the issue of consumer rights in the digital world and I am worried that, if we are not careful, we will do something with the very best intentions that actually makes things slightly worse.
I worry that the terms and conditions of user-to-user services are incomprehensible to consumers today. Enshrining it as a contract in law might, in some cases, make it worse. Today, when user-to-user services have used our data for something, they are keen to tell us that we agreed to it because it was in their terms of service. My noble friend opens up a really important issue to which we should give proper attention when the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill arrives in the House. It is genuinely not too late to address that, as it is working its way through the Commons now. I thank my noble friend for introducing the amendment, because we should all have thought of the issue earlier, but it is much broader than online safety.
My Lords, even by previous standards, this is the most miscellaneous of miscellaneous groups. We have ranged very broadly. I will speak first to Amendment 191A from the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, which was so well spoken to by her and by the noble Baroness, Lady Harding. It is common sense, and my noble friend Lord Allan, as ever, put his finger on it: it is not as if coroners are going to come across this every day of the week; they need this kind of guidance. The Minister has introduced his amendments on this, and we need to reduce those to an understandable code for coroners and bereaved parents. I defy anybody, apart from about three Members of this House, to describe in any detail how the information notices will interlock and operate. I could probably name those Members off the top of my head. That demonstrates why we need such a code of practice. It speaks for itself.
I am hugely sympathetic to Amendment 275A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, who asked a series of important questions. The Minister said at col. 1773 that he would follow up with further information on the responsibility of private providers for their content. This is a real, live issue. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, put it right: we hope fervently that the Bill covers the issue. I do not know how many debates about future-proofing we have had on the Bill but each time, including in that last debate, we have not quite been reassured enough that we are covering the metaverse and provider content in the way we should be. I hope that this time the Minister can give us definitive chapter and verse that will help to settle the horses, so to speak, because that is exactly what the very good amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, was about.
We are keen to ensure that coroners have access to the information and expertise that they need, while respecting the independence of the judicial process to decide what they do not know and would like to know more about and the role of the Chief Coroner there. It is a point that I have discussed a lot with the noble Baroness and with my noble friend Lady Newlove in her former role as Victims’ Commissioner. I am very happy to continue doing so because it is important that there is access to that.
The noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, spoke to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, about supposedly gendered language in relation to Clauses 141 and 157. As I made clear in Committee, I appreciate the intention—as does Lady Deben—of making clear that a person of either sex can perform the role of chairman, just as they can perform the role of ombudsman. We have discussed in Committee the semantic point there. The Government have used “chairman” here to be consistent with terminology in the Office of Communications Act 2002. I appreciate that this predates the Written Ministerial Statement which the noble Lord cited, but that itself made clear that the Government at the time recognised that in practice, parliamentary counsel would need to adopt a flexible approach to this change—for example, in at least some of the cases where existing legislation originally drafted in the former style is being amended.
The noble Lord may be aware of a further Written Ministerial Statement, made on 23 May last year, following our debates on gendered language on another Bill, when the then Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons said that the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel would update its drafting guidance in light of that. That guidance is still forthcoming. However, importantly, the term here will have no bearing on Ofcom’s decision-making on who would chair the advisory committees. It must establish that this could indeed be a person of either sex.
Amendment 253 seeks to enable co-operation, particularly via information-sharing, between Ofcom and other regulators within the UK. I reassure noble Lords that Section 393 of the Communications Act 2003 already includes provisions for sharing information between Ofcom and other regulators in the UK.
As has been noted, Ofcom already co-operates effectively with other domestic regulators. That has been strengthened by the establishment of the Digital Regulation Co-operation Forum. By promoting greater coherence, the forum helps to resolve potential tensions, offering clarity for people and the industry. It ensures collaborative work across areas of common interest to address complex problems. Its outputs have already delivered real and wide-ranging impacts, including landmark policy statements clarifying the interactions between digital regulatory regimes, research into cross-cutting issues, and horizon-scanning activities on new regulatory challenges. We will continue to assess how best to support collaboration between digital regulators and to ensure that their approaches are joined up. We therefore do not think that Amendment 253 is necessary.
My Lords, the Minister has not stated that there is a duty to collaborate. Is he saying that that is, in fact, the case in practice?
Yes, there is a duty, and the law should be followed. I am not sure whether the noble Lord is suggesting that it is not—
I am not sure that I follow the noble Lord’s question, but perhaps—
My Lords, the Minister is saying that, in practice, there is a kind of collaboration between regulators and that there is a power under the Communications Act, but is he saying that there is any kind of duty on regulators to collaborate?
If I may, I will write to the noble Lord setting that out; he has lost me with his question. We believe, as I think he said, that the forum has added to the collaboration in this important area.
The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, raised important questions about avatars and virtual characters. The Bill broadly defines “content” as
“anything communicated by means of an internet service”,
meaning that it already captures the various ways through which users may encounter content. In the metaverse, this could therefore include things such as avatars or characters created by users. As part of the user-to-user services’ risk assessments, providers will be required to consider more than the risk in relation to user-generated content, including aspects such as how the design and operation of their services, including functionality and how the service is used, might increase the risk of harm to children and the presence of illegal content. A user-to-user service will need to consider any feature which enables interaction of any description between users of the service when carrying out its risk assessments.
The Bill is focused on user-to-user and search services, as there is significant evidence to support the case for regulation based on the risk of harm to users and the current lack of regulatory and other accountability in this area. Hosting, sharing and the discovery of user-generated content and activity give rise to a range of online harms, which is why we have focused on those services. The Bill does not regulate content published by user-to-user service providers themselves; instead, providers are already liable for the content that they publish on their services themselves, and the criminal law is the most appropriate mechanism for dealing with services which publish illegal provider content.
The noble Baroness’s Amendment 275A seeks to require Ofcom to produce a wide-ranging report of behaviour facilitated by emerging technologies. As we discussed in Committee, the Government of course agree that Ofcom needs continually to assess future risks and the capacity of emerging technologies to cause harm. That is why the Bill already contains provisions which allow it to carry out broad horizon scanning, such as its extensive powers to gather information, to commission skilled persons’ reports and to require providers to produce transparency reports. Ofcom has already indicated that it plans to research emerging technologies, and the Bill will require it to update its risk assessments, risk profiles and codes of practice with the outcomes of this research where relevant.
As we touched on in Committee, Clause 56 requires regular reviews by Ofcom into the incidence of content that is harmful to children, and whether there should be changes to regulations setting out the kinds of content that are harmful to children. In addition, Clause 143 mandates that Ofcom should investigate users’ experience of regulated services, which are likely to cover user interactions in virtual spaces, such as the metaverse and those involving content generated by artificial intelligence.
I am happy to provide further detail in writing and to reiterate the points I have made as it is rather technical. Content that is published by providers of user-to-user services themselves is not regulated by the Bill because providers are liable for the content they publish on the services themselves. Of course, that does not apply to pornography, which we know poses a particular risk to children online and is regulated through Part 5 of the Bill. I will set out in writing, I hope more clearly, for the noble Baroness what is in scope to reassure her about the way the Bill addresses the harms that she has rightly raised.
My Lords, it is valuable to be able to speak immediately after my noble friend Lady Harding of Winscombe, because it gives me an opportunity to address some remarks she made last Wednesday when we were considering the Bill on Report. She suggested that there was a fundamental disagreement between us about our view of how serious online safety is—the suggestion being that somehow I did not think it was terribly important. I take this opportunity to rebut that and to add to it by saying that other things are also important. One of those things is privacy. We have not discussed privacy in relation to the Bill quite as much as we have freedom of expression, but it is tremendously important too.
Government Amendment 247A represents the most astonishing level of intrusion. In fact, I find it very hard to see how the Government think they can get away with saying that it is compatible with the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, which we incorporated into law some 20 years ago, thus creating a whole law of privacy that is now vindicated in the courts. It is not enough just to go around saying that it is “proportionate and necessary” as a mantra; it has to be true.
This provision says that an agency has the right to go into a private business with no warrant, and with no let or hindrance, and is able to look at its processes, data and equipment at will. I know of no other business that can be subjected to that without a warrant or some legal process in advance pertinent to that instance, that case or that business.
My noble friend Lord Bethell said that the internet has been abused by people who carry out evil things; he mentioned terrorism, for example, and he could have mentioned others. However, take mobile telephones and Royal Mail—these are also abused by people conducting terrorism, but we do not allow those communications to be intruded into without some sort of warrant or process. It does not seem to me that the fact that the systems can be abused is sufficient to justify what is being proposed.
My noble friend the Minister says that this can happen only offline. Frankly, I did not understand what he meant by that. In fact, I was going to say that I disagreed with him, but I am moving to the point of saying that I think it is almost meaningless to say that it is going to happen offline. He might be able to explain that. He also said that Ofcom will not see individual traffic. However, neither the point about being offline nor the point about not seeing individual traffic is on the face of the Bill.
When we ask ourselves what the purpose of this astonishing power is—this was referred to obliquely to some extent by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley—we can find it in Clause 91(1), to which proposed new subsection (2A) is being added or squeezed in subordinate to it. Clause 91(1) talks about
“any information that they”—
that is, Ofcom—
“require for the purpose of exercising, or deciding whether to exercise, any of their online safety functions”.
The power could be used entirely as a fishing expedition. It could be entirely for the purpose of educating Ofcom as to what it should be doing. There is nothing here to say that it can have these powers of intrusion only if it suspects that there is criminality, a breach of the codes of conduct or any other offence. It is a fishing expedition, entirely for the purpose of
“exercising, or deciding whether to exercise”.
Those are the intrusions imposed upon companies. In some ways, I am less concerned about the companies than I am about what I am going to come to next: the intrusion on the privacy of individuals and users. If we sat back and listened to ourselves and what we are saying, could we explain to ordinary people—we are going to come to this when we discuss end-to-end encryption—what exactly can happen?
Two very significant breaches of the protections in place for privacy on the internet arise from what is proposed. First, if you allow someone into a system and into equipment, especially from outside, you increase the risk and the possibility that a further, probably more hostile party that is sufficiently well-equipped with resources—we know state actors with evil intent which are so equipped—can get in through that or similar holes. The privacy of the system itself would be structurally weakened as a result of doing this. Secondly, if Ofcom is able to see what is going on, the system becomes leaky in the direction of Ofcom. It can come into possession of information, some of which could be of an individual character. My noble friend says that it will not be allowed to release any data and that all sorts of protections are in place. We know that, and I fully accept the honesty and integrity of Ofcom as an institution and of its staff. However, we also know that things get leaked and escape. As a result of this provision, very large holes are being built into the protections of privacy that exist, yet there has been no reference at all to privacy in the remarks made so far by my noble friend.
I finish by saying that we are racing ahead and not thinking. Good Lord, my modest amendment in the last group to bring a well-established piece of legislation—the Consumer Rights Act—to bear upon this Bill was challenged on the grounds that there had not been an impact assessment. Where is the impact assessment for this? Where is even the smell test for this in relation to explaining it to the public? If my noble friend is able to expatiate at the end on the implications for privacy and attempt to give us some assurance, that would be some consolation. I doubt that he is going to give way and do the right thing and withdraw this amendment.
My Lords, the debate so far has been—in the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—a Committee debate. That is partly because this set of amendments from the Government has come quite late. If they had been tabled in Committee, I think we would have had a more expansive debate on this issue and could have knocked it about a bit and come back to it on Report. The timing is regrettable in all of this.
That said, the Government have tabled some extremely important amendments, particularly Amendments 196 and 198, which deal with things such as algorithms and functionalities. I very much welcome those important amendments, as I know the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, did.
I also very much support Amendments 270 and 272 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser. I hope the Minister, having been pre-primed, has all the answers to them. It is astonishing that, after all these years, we are so unattuned to the issues of the devolved Administrations and that we are still not in the mindset on things such as research. We are not sufficiently granular, as has been explained—let alone all the other questions that the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, asked. I hope the Minister can unpack some of that as well.
I want to express some gratitude, too, because the Minister and his officials took the trouble to give us a briefing about remote access issues, alongside Ofcom. Ofcom also sent through its note on algorithmic assessment powers, so an effort has been made to explain some of these powers. Indeed, I can see the practical importance, as explained to us. It is partly the lateness, however, that sets off what my noble friend Lord Allan called “trigger words” and concerns about the remote access provisions. Indeed, I think we have a living and breathing demonstration of the impact of triggers on the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, because these are indeed issues that concern those outside the House to quite a large degree.
Yes, and we can point to the current actions of Ofcom to show that it is indeed doing this already, even without that legislative stick.
I turn to the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Bethell and the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on researchers’ access to data. Amendment 237ZA would confer on the Secretary of State a power to make provisions about access to information by researchers. As my noble friend knows, we are sympathetic to the importance of this issue, which is why we have tabled our own amendments in relation to it. However, as my noble friend also knows, in such a complex and sensitive area that we think it is premature to endow the Secretary of State with such broad powers to introduce a new framework. As we touched on in Committee, this is a complex and still nascent area, which is why it is different from the other areas to which the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, pointed in his contribution.
The noble Baroness, Lady Harding, made the point that in other areas where the Minister has agreed to reviews or reports, there are backstop powers; for instance, on app stores. Of course, that was a negotiated settlement, so to speak, but why can the Minister not accede to that in the case of access for researchers, as he has with app stores? Indeed, there is one other example that escapes me, which the Minister has also agreed to.
We touched on the complexity of defining who and what is a researcher and making sure that we do not give rise to bad actors exploiting that. This is a complex area, as we touched on in Committee. As I say, the evidence base here is nascent. It is important first to focus on developing our understanding of the issues to ensure that any power or legislation is fit to address those challenges. Ofcom’s report will not only highlight how platforms can share data with researchers safely but will provide the evidence base for considering any future policy approaches, which we have committed to doing but which I think the noble Lord will agree are worthy of further debate and reflection in Parliament.
The benefit of having a period of time between the last day of Report on Wednesday and Third Reading is that that gives the Minister, the Bill team and parliamentary counsel the time to reflect on the kind of power that could be devised. The wording could be devised, and I would have thought that six weeks would be quite adequate for that, perhaps in a general way. After all, this is not a power that is immediately going to be used; it is a general power that could be brought into effect by regulation. Surely it is not beyond the wit to devise something suitable.
My Lords, I will speak to the government Amendments 274B and 274C. I truly welcome a more detailed approach to Ofcom’s duties in relation to media literacy. However, as is my theme today, I raise two frustrations. First, having spent weeks telling us that it is impossible to include harms that go beyond content and opposing amendments on that point, the Government’s media literacy strategy includes a duty to help users to understand the harmful ways in which regulated services may be used. This is in addition to understanding the nature and impact of harmful content. It appears to suggest that it is the users who are guilty of misuse of products and services rather than putting any emphasis on the design or processes that determine how a service is most often used.
I believe that all of us, including children, are participants in creating an online culture and that educating and empowering users of services is essential. However, it should not be a substitute for designing a service that is safe by design and default. To make my point absolutely clear, I recount the findings of researchers who undertook workshops in 28 countries with more than 1,000 children. The researchers were at first surprised to find that, whether in Kigali, São Paulo or Berlin, to an overwhelming extent children identified the same problems online—harmful content, addiction, privacy, lack of privacy and so on. The children’s circumstances were so vastly different—country and town, Africa and the global north et cetera—but when the researchers did further analysis, they realised that the reason why they had such similar experiences was because they were using the same products. The products were more determining of the outcome than anything to do with religion, education, status, age, the family or even the country. The only other factor that loomed large, which I admit that the Government have recognised, was gender. Those were the two most crucial findings. It is an abdication of adult responsibility to place the onus on children to keep themselves safe. The amendment and the Bill, as I keep mentioning, should focus on the role of design, not on how a child uses it.
My second point, which is of a similar nature, is that I am very concerned that a lot of digital literacy—for adults as well as children, but my particular concern is in schools—is provided by the tech companies themselves. Therefore, once again their responsibility, their role in the system and process of what children might find from reward loops, algorithms and so on, is very low down on the agenda. Is it possible at this late stage to consider that Ofcom might have a responsibility to consider the system design as part of its literacy review?
My Lords, this has been a very interesting short debate. Like other noble Lords, I am very pleased that the Government have proposed the new clauses in Amendments 274B and 274C. The noble Baroness, Lady Bull, described absolutely the importance of media literacy, particularly for disabled people and for the vulnerable. This is really important for them. It is important also not to fall into the trap described by the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, of saying, “You are a child or a vulnerable person. You must acquire media literacy—it’s your obligation; it’s not the obligation of the platforms to design their services appropriately”. I take that point, but it does not mean that media literacy is not extraordinarily important.
However, sadly, I do not believe that the breadth of the Government’s new media literacy amendments is as wide as the original draft Bill. If you look back at the draft Bill, that was a completely new and upgraded set of duties right across the board, replacing Section 11 of the Communications Act and, in a sense, fit for the modern age. The Government have made a media literacy duty which is much narrower. It relates only to regulated services. This is not optimum. We need something broader which puts a bigger and broader duty for the future on to Ofcom.
It is also deficient in two respects. The noble Lord, Lord Knight, will speak to his amendments, but it struck me immediately when looking at that proposed new clause that we were missing all the debate about functionalities and so on that the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, debated the other day, regarding design, and that we must ensure that media literacy encompasses understanding the underlying functionalities and systems of the platforms that we are talking about.
I know that your Lordships will be very excited to hear that I am going to refer again to the Joint Committee. I know that the Minister has read us from cover to cover, but at paragraph 381 on the draft Bill we said, and it is still evergreen:
“If the Government wishes to improve the UK’s media literacy to reduce online harms, there must be provisions in the Bill to ensure media literacy initiatives are of a high standard. The Bill should empower Ofcom to set minimum standards for media literacy initiatives that both guide providers and ensure the information they are disseminating aligns with the goal of reducing online harm”.
I had a very close look at the clause. I could not see that Ofcom is entitled to set minimum standards. The media literacy provisions sadly are deficient in that respect.
I am not surprised that my noble friend refers to his experience on the Joint Committee. He will not be surprised that I am about to refer to my experience on the Puttnam committee in 2003, which recommended media literacy as a priority for Ofcom. The sad fact is that media literacy was put on the back burner by Ofcom for almost 20 years. While I listen to this House, I think that my noble friend is quite right to accuse the Government, hard as the Minister has tried, of a paucity of ambition and—more than that—of letting us slip into the same mistake made by Ofcom after 2003 and allowing this to be a narrow, marginal issue. The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, has reminded us time and again that unless we educate those who are using these technologies, these abuses will proliferate.
Therefore, with what my noble friend is advocating and what we will keep an eye on as the Bill is implemented—and I now literally speak over the Minister’s head, to the Member behind—Ofcom must take media literacy seriously and be a driving force in its implementation, for the very reasons that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, referred to. We do not want everybody protected by regulations and powers—we want people protected by their own knowledge of what they are dealing with. This is where there is a gap between what has been pressed on the Government and what they are offering.
My Lords, I thank my noble friend very much for that intervention.
My Lords, I remind the House that, as we are on Report, interventions on current speakers should be for direct questions or points of elucidation.
I am sure my noble friend with 30 years’ experience stands duly corrected. He has reminded us that we have 20 years’ experience of something being on the statute book without really cranking up the powers and duties that are on it or giving Ofcom appropriate resources in the media literacy area. If that was about offline—the original 2003 duty—we know that it is even more important online to have these media literacy duties in place. I very much hope that the Minister can give us, in a sense, a token of earnest—that it is not just about putting these duties on the statute book but about giving Ofcom the resources to follow this up. Of course, it is also relevant to other regulators, which was partly the reason for having a duty of co-operation. Perhaps he will also, at the same time, describe how regulators such as Ofsted will have a role in media literacy.
I shall briefly talk about Amendment 269AA to Clause 141, which is the clause in the Bill setting up the advisory committee on misinformation and disinformation. I heard very clearly what the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, had to say, and I absolutely agree—there is no silver bullet in all this. Establishing provenance is but one way in which to get greater transparency and authentication and exercise judgment; it is not the complete answer, but it is one way of getting to grips more with some of the information coming through online. She may have seen that this is an “and” rather than an “or”, which is why the amendment is phrased as it is.
Of course, it is really important that there are initiatives. The one that I want to mention today about provenance is the Content Authenticity Initiative, which I mentioned in Committee. We need to use the power of such initiatives; it is a global coalition working to increase transparency in digital content through open industry standards, and it was founded four years ago and has more than 1,500 members, with some major companies such as Adobe, Microsoft, NVIDIA, Arm, Intel—I could go on. I very much hope that Ofcom will engage with the Content Authenticity Initiative, whatever the content of the Bill. In a sense, I am raising the issue for the Minister to give us assurances that this is within the scope of what the committee will be doing—that it is not just a question of doing what is in the Bill, and this will be included in the scope of the advisory committee’s work.
Thea AI has been an industry-led initiative that has developed content credentials which encode important metadata into pieces of content. Those pieces of information reside indefinitely in the content, wherever it is used, published or stored, and, as a result, viewers are able to make more informed decisions about whether or not to trust the content. The advisory committee really should consider the role of provenance tools such as content credentials to enable users to have the relevant information to decide what is real and what is disinformation or misinformation online. That would entirely fit the strategy of this Bill to empower adult users.
I do not believe that the Minister has dealt with the minimum standards issue.
I do not think that the noble Lord was listening to that point, but I did.
My Lords, Clause 158 is one of the more mysterious clauses in the Bill and it would greatly benefit from a clear elucidation by the Minister of how it is intended to work to reduce harm. I thank him for having sent me an email this afternoon as we started on the Bill, for which I am grateful; I had only a short time to consider it but I very much hope that he will put its content on the record.
My amendment is designed to ask how the Minister envisages using the power to direct if, say, there is a new contagious disease or riots, and social media is a major factor in the spread of the problem. I am trying to erect some kind of hypothetical situation through which the Minister can say how the power will be used. Is the intention, for example, to set Ofcom the objective of preventing the spread of information on regulated services injurious to public health or safety on a particular network for six months? The direction then forces the regulator and the social media companies to confront the issue and perhaps publicly shame an individual company into using their tools to slow the spread of disinformation. The direction might give Ofcom powers to gather sufficient information from the company to make directions to the company to tackle the problem.
If that is envisaged, which of Ofcom’s media literacy powers does the Minister envisage being used? Might it be Section 11(1)(e) of the Communications Act 2003, which talks about encouraging
“the development and use of technologies and systems for regulating access to such material, and for facilitating control over what material is received, that are both effective and easy to use”.
By this means, Ofcom might encourage a social media company to regulate access to and control over the material that is a threat.
Perhaps the Minister could set out clearly how he intends all this to work, because on a straight reading of Clause 158, we on these Benches have considerable concerns. The threshold for direction is low—merely having
“reasonable grounds for believing that circumstances exist”—
and there is no sense here of the emergency that the then Minister, Mr Philp, cited in the Commons Public Bill Committee on 26 May 2022, nor even of the exceptional circumstances in Amendment 138 to Clause 39, which the Minister tabled recently. The Minister is not compelled by the clause to consult experts in public health, safety or national security. The Minister can set any objectives for Ofcom, it seems. There is no time limit for the effect of the direction and it seems that the direction can be repeatedly extended with no limit. If the Minister directs because they believe there is a threat to national security, we will have the curious situation of a public process being initiated for reasons the Minister is not obliged to explain.
Against this background, there does not seem to be a case for breaching the international convention of the Government not directing a media regulator. Independence of media regulators is the norm in developed democracies, and the UK has signed many international statements in this vein. As recently as April 2022, the Council of Europe stated:
“Media and communication governance should be independent and impartial to avoid undue influence on policymaking or”
the discriminatory and
“preferential treatment of powerful groups”,
including those with significant political or economic power. The Secretary of State, by contrast, has no powers over Ofcom regarding the content of broadcast regulation and has limited powers to direct over radio spectrum and wireless, but not content. Ofcom’s independence in day-to-day decision-making is paramount to preserving freedom of expression. There are insufficient safeguards in this clause, which is why I argue that it should not stand part of the Bill.
I will be brief about Clause 159 because, by and large, we went through it in our debate on a previous group. Now that we can see the final shape of the Bill, it really does behove us to stand back and see where the balance has settled on Ofcom’s independence and whether this clause needs to stand part of the Bill. The Secretary of State has extensive powers under various other provisions in the Bill. The Minister has tabled welcome amendments to Clause 39, which have been incorporated into the Bill, but Clause 155 still allows the Secretary of State to issue a “statement of strategic priorities”, including specific outcomes, every five years.
Clause 159 is in addition to this comprehensive list, but the approach in the clause is incredibly broad. We have discussed this, and the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, has tabled an amendment that would require parliamentary scrutiny. The Secretary of State can issue guidance to Ofcom on more or less anything encompassed by the exercise of its functions under this Act, with no consultation of the public or Parliament prior to making such guidance. The time limit for producing strategic guidance is three years rather than five. Even if it is merely “have regard” guidance, it represents an unwelcome intervention in Ofcom going about its business. If the Minister responds that the guidance is merely “to have regard”, I will ask him to consider this: why have it all, then, when there are so many other opportunities for the Government to intervene? For the regulated companies, it represents a regulatory hazard of interference in independent regulation and a lack of stability. As the noble Lord, Lord Bethell, said in Committee, a clear benefit of regulatory independence is that it reduces lobbying of the Minister by powerful corporate interests.
Now that we can see it in context, I very much hope that the Minister will agree that Clause 159 is a set of guidance too many that compromises Ofcom’s independence and should not stand part of the Bill.
My Lords, I will add to my noble friend’s call for us to consider whether Clause 158 should be struck from the Bill as an unnecessary power for the Secretary of State to take. We have discussed powers for the Secretary of State throughout the Bill, with some helpful improvements led by the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell. This one jars in particular because it is about media literacy; some of the other powers related to whether the Secretary of State could intervene on the codes of practice that Ofcom would issue. The core question is whether we trust Ofcom’s discretion in delivering media literacy and whether we need the Secretary of State to have any kind of power to intervene.
I single out media literacy because the clue is in the name: literacy is a generic skill that you acquire about dealing with the online world; it is not about any specific text. Literacy is a broader set of skills, yet Clause 158 has a suggestion that, in response to specific forms of content or a specific crisis happening in the world, the Secretary of State would want to takesb this power to direct the media literacy efforts. To take something specific and immediate to direct something that is generic and long-term jars and seems inappropriate.
I have a series of questions for the Minister to elucidate why this power should exist at all. It would be helpful to have an example of what kind of “public statement notice”—to use the language in the clause—the Government might want to issue that Ofcom would not come up with on its own. Part of the argument we have been presented with is that, somehow, the Government might have additional information, but it seems quite a stretch that they could come up with that. In an area such as national security, my experience has been that companies often have a better idea of what is going on than anybody in government.
Thousands of people out there in the industry are familiar with APT 28 and APT 29 which, as I am sure all noble Lords know, are better known by their names Fancy Bear and Cozy Bear. These are agents of the Russian state that put out misinformation. There is nothing that UK agencies or the Secretary of State might know about them that is not already widely known. I remember talking about the famous troll factory run by Prigozhin, the Internet Research Agency, with people in government in the context of Russian interference—they would say “Who?” and have to go off and find out. In dealing with threats such as that between the people in the companies and Ofcom, you certainly want a media literacy campaign which tells you about these troll agencies and how they operate and gives warnings to the public, but I struggle to see why you need the Secretary of State to intervene as opposed to allowing Ofcom’s experts to work with company experts and come up with a strategy to deal with those kinds of threat.
The other example cited of an area where the Secretary of State might want to intervene is public health and safety. It would be helpful to be specific; had they had it, how would the Government have used this power during the pandemic in 2020 and 2021? Does the Minister have examples of what they were frustrated about and would have done with these powers that Ofcom would not do anyway in working with the companies directly? I do not see that they would have had secret information which would have meant that they had to intervene rather than trusting Ofcom and the companies to do it.
Perhaps there has been an interdepartmental workshop between DHSC, DCMS and others to cook up this provision. I assume that Clause 158 did not come from nowhere. Someone must have thought, “We need these powers in Clause 158 because we were missing them previously”. Are there specific examples of media literacy campaigns that could not be run, where people in government were frustrated and therefore wanted a power to offer it in future? It would be really helpful to hear about them so that we can understand exactly how the Clause 158 powers will be used before we allow this additional power on to the statute book.
In the view of most people in this Chamber, the Bill as a whole quite rightly grants the Government and Ofcom, the independent regulator, a wide range of powers. Here we are looking specifically at where the Government will, in a sense, overrule the independent regulator by giving it orders to do something it had not thought of doing itself. It is incumbent on the Government to flesh that out with some concrete examples so that we can understand why they need this power. At the moment, as noble Lords may be able to tell, these Benches are not convinced that they do.
I am happy to make it clear, as I did on the last group, that the power allows Ofcom not to require platforms to remove content, only to set out what they are doing in response to misinformation and disinformation—to require platforms to make a public statement about what they are doing to tackle it. In relation to regulating news providers, we have brought the further amendments forward to ensure that those subject to sanctions cannot avail themselves of the special provisions in the Bill. Of course, the Secretary of State will be mindful of the law when issuing directions in the exceptional circumstances that these clauses set out.
While the Minister is describing that, can he explain exactly which media literacy power would be invoked by the kind of example I gave when I was introducing the amendment and in the circumstances he has talked about? Would he like to refer to the Communications Act?
It depends on the circumstances. I do not want to give one example for fear of being unnecessarily restrictive. In relation to the health misinformation and disinformation we saw during the pandemic, an example would be the suggestions of injecting oneself with bleach; that sort of unregulated and unhelpful advice is what we have in mind. I will write to the noble Lord, if he wants, to see what provisions of the Communications Act we would want invoked in those circumstances.
In relation to Clause 159, which is dealt with by Amendment 222, it is worth setting out that the Secretary of State guidance and the statement of strategic priorities have distinct purposes and associated requirements. The purpose of the statement of strategic priorities is to enable the Secretary of State to specifically set out priorities in relation to online safety. For example, in the future, it may be that changes in the online experience mean that the Government of the day wish to set out their high-level overarching priorities. In comparison, the guidance allows for clarification of what Parliament and Government intended in passing this legislation—as I hope we will—by providing guidance on specific elements of the Bill in relation to Ofcom’s functions. There are no plans to issue guidance under this power but, for example, we are required to issue guidance to Ofcom in relation to the fee regime.
On the respective requirements, the statement of strategic priorities requires Ofcom to explain in writing what it proposes to do in consequence of the statement and publish an annual review of what it has done. Whereas Ofcom must “have regard” to the guidance, the guidance itself does not create any statutory requirements.
This is a new regime and is different in its nature from other established areas of regulations, such as broadcasting. The power in Clause 159 provides a mechanism to provide more certainty, if that is considered necessary, about how the Secretary of State expects Ofcom to carry out its statutory functions. Ofcom will be consulted before guidance is issued, and there are checks on how often it can be issued and revised. The guidance document itself, as I said, does not create any statutory requirements, so Ofcom is required only to “have regard” to it.
This will be an open and transparent way to put forward guidance appropriately with safeguards in place. The independence of the regulator is not at stake here. The clause includes significant limitations on the power, and the guidance cannot fetter Ofcom’s operational independence. We feel that both clauses are appropriate for inclusion in the Bill, so I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
I thank the Minister for that more extended reply. It is a more reassuring response on Clause 159 than we have had before. On Clause 158, the impression I get is that the media literacy power is being used as a smokescreen for the Government telling social media what it should do, indirectly via Ofcom. That seems extraordinary. If the Government were telling the mainstream media what to do in circumstances like this, we would all be up in arms. However, it seems to be accepted as a part of the Bill and that we should trust the Government. The Minister used the phrase “special circumstances”. That is not the phraseology in the clause; it is that “circumstances exist”, and then it goes on to talk about national security and public health. The bar is very low.
I am sure everyone is getting hungry at this time of day, so I will not continue. However, we still have grave doubts about this clause. It seems an extraordinary indirect form of censorship which I hope is never invoked. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, have a very strong point to make with this amendment. I have tried in our discussions to bring some colour to the debate from my own experience so I will tell your Lordships that in my former professional life I received representations from many Ministers in many countries about the content we should allow or disallow on the Facebook platform that I worked for.
That was a frequent occurrence in the United Kingdom and extended to Governments of all parties. Almost as soon as I moved into the job, we had a Labour Home Secretary come in and suggest that we should deal with particular forms of content. It happened through the coalition years. Indeed, I remember meeting the Minister’s former boss at No. 10 in Davos, of all places, to receive some lobbying about what the UK Government thought should be on or off the platform at that time. In that case it was to do with terrorist content; there was nothing between us in terms of wanting to see that content gone. I recognise that this amendment is about misinformation and disinformation, which is perhaps a more contentious area.
As we have discussed throughout the debate, transparency is good. It keeps everybody on the straight and narrow. I do not see any reason why the Government should not be forthcoming. My experience was that the Government would often want to go to the Daily Telegraph, the Daily Mail or some other upright publication and tell it how they had been leaning on the internet companies—it was part of their communications strategy and they were extremely proud of it—but there will be other circumstances where they are doing it more behind the scenes. Those are the ones we should be worried about.
If those in government have good reason to lean on an internet company, fine—but knowing that they have to be transparent about it, as in this amendment, will instil a certain level of discipline that would be quite healthy.
My Lords, clearly, there is a limited number of speakers in this debate. We should thank the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, for tabling this amendment because it raises a very interesting point about the transparency—or not—of the Counter Disinformation Unit. Of course, it is subject to an Oral Question tomorrow as well, which I am sure the noble Viscount will be answering.
There is some concern about the transparency of the activities of the Counter Disinformation Unit. In its report, Ministry of Truth, which deals at some length with the activities of the Counter Disinformation Unit, Big Brother Watch says:
“Giving officials an unaccountable hotline to flag lawful speech for removal from the digital public square is a worrying threat to free speech”.
Its complaint is not only about oversight; it is about the activities. Others such as Full Fact have stressed the fact that there is little or no parliamentary scrutiny. For instance, freedom of information requests have been turned down and Written Questions which try to probe what the activities of the Counter Disinformation Unit are have had very little response. As it says, when the Government
“lobby internet companies about content on their platforms … this is a threat to freedom of expression”.
We need proper oversight, so I am interested to hear the Minister’s response.
My Lords, the Government share the view of my noble friend Lord Moylan about the importance of transparency in protecting freedom of expression. I reassure him and other noble Lords that these principles are central to the Government’s operational response to addressing harmful disinformation and attempts artificially to manipulate our information environment.
My noble friend and others made reference to the operational work of the Counter Disinformation Unit, which is not, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said, the responsibility of my department but of the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology. The Government have always been transparent about the work of the unit; for example, recently publishing a factsheet on GOV.UK which sets out, among other things, how the unit works with social media companies.
I reassure my noble friend that there are existing processes governing government engagements with external parties and emphasise to him that the regulatory framework that will be introduced by the Bill serves to increase transparency and accountability in a way that I hope reassures him. Many teams across government regularly meet industry representatives on a variety of issues from farming and food to telecoms and digital infrastructure. These meetings are conducted within well-established transparency processes and frameworks, which apply in exactly the same way to government meetings with social media companies. The Government have been open about the fact that the Counter Disinformation Unit meets social media companies. Indeed, it would be surprising if it did not. For example, at the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Government worked with social media companies in relation to narratives which were being circulated attempting to deny incidents leading to mass casualties, and to encourage the promotion of authoritative sources of information. That work constituted routine meetings and was necessary in confirming the Government’s confidence in the preparedness and ability of platforms to respond to new misinformation and disinformation threats.
To require additional reporting on a sector-by-sector or department-by-department basis beyond the standardised transparency processes, as proposed in my noble friend’s amendment, would be a disproportionate and unnecessary response to what is routine engagement in an area where the Government have no greater powers or influence than in others. They cannot compel companies to alter their terms of service; nor can or do they seek to mandate any action on specific pieces of content.
I reassure the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that the Counter Disinformation Unit does not monitor individual people, nor has it ever done so; rather, it tracks narratives and trends using publicly available information online to protect public health, public safety and national security. It has never tracked the activity of individuals, and there is a blanket ban on referring any content from journalists or parliamentarians to social media performs. The Government have always been clear that the Counter Disinformation Unit refers content for consideration only where an assessment has been made that it is likely to breach the platform’s own terms of service. It has no role in deciding what action, if any, to take in response, which is entirely a matter for the platform concerned.
As I said, the Bill will introduce new transparency, accountability and freedom of expression duties for category 1 services which will make the process for any removal or restriction of user-generated content more transparent by requiring category 1 services to set terms of service which are clear, easy for users to understand and consistently enforced. Category 1 services will be prohibited from removing or restricting user-generated content or suspending or banning users where this does not align with those terms of service. Any referrals from government will not, and indeed cannot, supersede these duties in the Bill.
Although I know it will disappoint my noble friend that another of his amendments has not been accepted, I hope I have been able to reassure him about the Government’s role in these processes. As the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, noted, my noble friend Lord Camrose is answering a Question on this in your Lordships’ House tomorrow, further underlining the openness and parliamentary accountability with which we go about this work. I hope my noble friend will, in a similarly post-prandial mood of generosity, suppress his disappointment and feel able to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I support Amendment 228. I spoke on this issue to the longer amendment in Committee. To decide whether something is illegal without the entire apparatus of the justice system, in which a great deal of care is taken to decide whether something is illegal, at high volume and high speed, is very worrying. It strikes me as amusing because someone commented earlier that they like a “must” instead of a “maybe”. In this case, I caution that a provider should treat the content as content of the kind in question accordingly, that something a little softer is needed, not a cliff edge that ends up in horrors around illegality where someone who has acted in self-defence is accused of a crime of violence, as happens to many women, and so on and so forth. I do not want to labour the point. I just urge a gentle landing rather than, as it is written, a cliff edge.
My Lords, this has been a very interesting debate. Beyond peradventure my noble friend Lord Allan and the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, have demonstrated powerfully the perils of this clause. “Lawyers’ caution” is one of my noble friend’s messages to take away, as is the complexities in making these judgments. It was interesting when he mentioned the sharing for awareness’s sake of certain forms of content and the judgments that must be taken by platforms. His phrase “If in doubt, take it out” is pretty chilling in free speech terms—I think that will come back to haunt us. As the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said, the wrong message is being delivered by this clause. It is important to have some element of discretion here and not, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, said, a cliff edge. We need a gentler landing. I very much hope that the Minister will land more gently.
My Lords, this has been a good debate. It is very hard to see where one would want to take it. If it proves anything, it is that the decision to drop the legal but harmful provisions in the Bill was probably taken for the wrong reasons but was the right decision, since this is where we end up—in an impossible moral quandary which no amount of writing, legalistic or otherwise, will get us out of. This should be a systems Bill, not a content Bill.
My Lords, I will make a brief contribution because I was the misery guts when this was proposed first time round. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, not just on working with colleagues to come up with a really good solution but on seeking me out. If I heard someone be as miserable as I was, I might try to avoid them. She did not; she came and asked me, “Why are you miserable? What is the problem here?”, and took steps to address it. Through her work with the Government, their amendments address my main concerns.
My first concern, as we discussed in Committee, was that we would be asking large companies to regulate their competitors, because the app stores are run by large tech companies. She certainly understood that concern. The second was that I felt we had not necessarily yet clearly defined the problem. There are lots of problems. Before you can come up with a solution, you need a real consensus on what problem you are trying to address. The government amendment will very much help in saying, “Let’s get really crunchy about the actual problem that we need app stores to address”.
Finally, I am a glass-half-full kind of guy as well as a misery guts—there is a contradiction there—and so I genuinely think that these large tech businesses will start to change their behaviour and address some of the concerns, such as getting age ratings correct, just by virtue of our having this regulatory framework in place. Even if today the app stores are technically outside, the fact that the sector is inside and that this amendment tells them that they are on notice will, I think and hope, have a hugely positive effect and we will get the benefits much more quickly than the timescale envisaged in the Bill. That feels like a true backstop. I sincerely hope that the people in those companies, who I am sure will be glued to our debate, will be thinking that they need to get their act together much more quickly. It is better for them to do it themselves than wait for someone to do it to them.
My Lords, I add my congratulations to the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, on her tenacity, and to the Minister on his flexibility. I believe that where we have reached is pretty much the right balance. There are the questions that the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, and others have asked of the Minister, and I hope he will answer those, but this is a game-changer, quite frankly. Rightly, the noble Baroness has paid tribute to the companies which have put their head above the parapet. That was not that easy for them to do when you consider that those are the platforms they have to depend on for their services to reach the public.
Unlike the research report, they have reserved powers that the Secretary of State can use if the report is positive, which I hope it will be. I believe this could be a turning point. The digital markets and consumers Bill is coming down the track this autumn and that is going to give greater powers to make sure that the app stores can be tackled—after all, there are only two of them and they are an oligopoly. They are the essence of big tech, and they need to function in a much more competitive way.
The noble Baroness talked about timing, and it needs to be digital timing, not analogue. Four years does seem a heck of a long time. I hope the Minister will address that.
Then there is the really important aspect of harmful content. In the last group, the Minister reassured us about systems and processes and the illegality threshold. Throughout, he has tried to reassure us that this is all about systems and processes and not so much about content. However, every time we look, we see that content is there almost by default, unless the subject is raised. We do not yet have a Bill that is actually fit for purpose in that sense. I hope the Minister will use his summer break wisely and read through the Bill to make sure that it meets its purpose, and then come back at Third Reading with a whole bunch of amendments that add functionalities. How about that for a suggestion? It is said in the spirit of good will and summer friendship.
The noble Baroness raised a point about transparency when it comes to Ofcom publishing its review. I hope the Minister can give that assurance as well.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, asked about the definition of app store. That is the gatekeeper function, and we need to be sure that that is what we are talking about.
I end by congratulating once again the noble Baroness and the Minister on where we have got to so far.
My Lords, I will start with the final point of the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones. I remind him that, beyond the world of the smartphone, there is a small company called Microsoft that also has a store for software—it is not just Google and Apple.
Principally, I say well done to the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, in deploying all of her “winsome” qualities to corral those of us who have been behind her on this and then persuade the Minister of the merits of her arguments. She also managed to persuade the noble Lord, Lord Allan of Misery Guts, that this was a good idea. The sequence of research, report, regulation and regulate is a good one, and as the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, reminded us it is being deployed elsewhere in the Bill. I agree with the noble Baroness about the timing: I much prefer two years to four years. I hope that at least Ofcom would have the power to accelerate this if it wanted to do so.
I was reminded of the importance of this in an article I read in the Guardian last week, headed:
“More than 850 people referred to clinic for video game addicts”.
This was in reference to the NHS-funded clinic, the National Centre for Gaming Disorders. A third of gamers receiving treatment there were spending money on loot boxes in games such as “Fortnite”, “FIFA”, “Minecraft”, “Call of Duty” and “Roblox”—all games routinely accessed by children. Over a quarter of those being treated by the centre were children.