(1 day, 22 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my Amendment 423 would implement a recommendation of the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords in the judgment in the Lee Clegg case in the 1990s. Briefly, the facts of that case were that, on 30 September 1990, Private Lee Clegg was on patrol in west Belfast, when a passenger in a stolen car was shot and killed. Lee Clegg was charged with murder, and his defence was that he fired in self-defence. He was convicted of murder on the grounds that he used disproportionate force.
On an appeal, the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords had to decide whether a soldier on duty in defence of the civil power—in a similar position, therefore, to police firearm officers—who kills a person and who would be entitled to rely on self-defence but for the excessive use of force, is guilty of murder or manslaughter. A manslaughter verdict would have meant a change in the law. Lord Lloyd of Berwick said that the arguments in favour of such a change were very persuasive. Quoting from the Court of Appeal, he said:
“There is one obvious and striking difference between Private Clegg and other persons found guilty of murder. The great majority of persons found guilty of murder, whether they are terrorists or domestic murderers, kill from an evil and wicked motive. But when Private Clegg set out on patrol on the night of 30 September 1990 he did so to assist in the maintenance of law and order and we have no doubt that as he commenced the patrol he had no intention of unlawfully killing or wounding anyone. However, he was suddenly faced with a car driving through an army checkpoint and, being armed with a high velocity rifle to enable him to combat the threat of terrorism, he decided to fire the … shot from his rifle in circumstances which cannot be justified”.
Lord Lloyd continued:
“It is right that Private Clegg should be convicted in respect of the unlawful killing … and that he should receive a just punishment for committing an offence which ended a young life and caused great sorrow to her parents and relatives and friends. But this court considers, and we believe that many other fair-minded citizens would share this view, that the law would be much fairer if it had been open to the trial judge to have convicted Private Clegg of the lesser crime of manslaughter on the ground that he did not kill … from an evil motive but because his duties as a soldier”
meant he had a high-velocity rifle, and
“he reacted wrongly to a situation which suddenly confronted him in the course of his duties … we consider that a law which would permit a conviction for manslaughter would reflect more clearly the nature of the offence which he had committed”.
However, Lord Lloyd ruled it was inappropriate for the courts to change the law, and it was for Parliament to do so.
Here we are, 30 years on, with that opportunity, and the issue has never been more important, given the analogous position of police firearms officers. Since 2010, British police have shot dead 30 people—an average of two a year. Most recently, we have seen the prosecution last year for murder in the case of Sergeant Martyn Blake. Police officers are being deterred from volunteering for firearms training and the National Police Chiefs’ Council says police forces across England and Wales are grappling with a significant shortage of firearms officers, exacerbated by the lack of legal protections afforded to armed officers, particularly regarding criminal and misconduct hearings. The move to anonymity in criminal proceedings is welcome but not enough.
Parliament enacted legislation in 2008, the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act, which set out the law of self-defence in Section 76. This provides that the question whether the degree of force used by D—the defendant—was reasonable in the circumstances is to be decided by reference to the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be, but, crucially, the degree of force used by the defendant is not to be regarded as having been reasonable in the circumstances if it was disproportionate. Therefore, the upshot is that a police officer cannot rely on self-defence to a murder charge if he used disproportionate force. This is unlike in the case of householders who, since the Crime and Courts Act 2013, will now generally have a defence if the force was disproportionate, but not if it was grossly disproportionate.
This confirms my belief that there is a lacuna that needs to be addressed, just as the House of Lords said in the appeal in the case of Lee Clegg. I should add a brief postscript here to the Lee Clegg case, since I believe he was subsequently acquitted on the grounds of new evidence.
On 23 October 2024, the then Home Secretary made a Statement on the Martyn Blake case. She said that
“the current system for holding police officers to account is not commanding the confidence of either the public or the police”,
and that although the public are entitled
“to expect that when officers exceed the lawful use of their powers … there will be … robust processes in place to hold them to account”,
she continued:
“Police officers who act with integrity and bravery to keep us safe each day need to know they have strong public support. If officers lack the confidence to use their powers … public safety is put at risk”.—[Official Report, Commons, 23/10/24; col. 300.]
My amendment seeks to strike this balance by implementing the recommendation of the House of Lords in the Lee Clegg case all those years ago. If passed, it would not, as in the householder’s case, result in an officer’s acquittal, since I do not think that can be justified in the case of trained firearms officers. There needs to be accountability and a criminal penalty. The House of Lords in Clegg seemed to agree, since it recommended manslaughter, not acquittal, for such cases. I will be very interested to hear the views of the Government on this long-standing issue.
My Lords, I support the excellent amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere. Firearms officers provide a valuable and necessary service, and are an important part of UK policing. They do a very difficult and dangerous job and deserve our thanks. The current climate is not conducive to good policing and does not support our officers. This amendment is a positive one which will help them.
This is a topical amendment. Several days ago, the Independent Office for Police Conduct ruled on the case of Sean Fitzgerald being shot during a raid by West Midlands Police. He was holding a black mobile phone, which the officer who shot him believed was a gun.
This ruling was the conclusion of a long, complex investigation that included experts whose reconstruction corroborated the officer’s testimony that the phone could have been mistaken for a gun. The director of the IOPC said:
“The determination over whether the officer should face disciplinary proceedings largely came down to a split-second decision in what was a dynamic, fast-moving, armed police operation”.
This was a tragic accident, but it highlights the fact that firearms officers have to make very difficult, instantaneous decisions that can result in life or death. They have to quickly make a call on what is the safest option for themselves, their fellow officers and the public. In order for them to make the best judgments for themselves and for the public, they need to be confident that they will be supported in making that endeavour.
It is striking that in a piece in the Daily Telegraph, former firearms officer Sergeant Harry Tangye said that his and his fellow officers’ main fear was not being shot themselves; it was facing the investigation that would happen after they discharged their weapon while doing their job. The case of the shooting of Chris Kaba demonstrates this. In response to how the officer was treated, up to 300 Metropolitan Police officers stepped back from firearms roles, and the Army had to be put on standby to support the Met.
Firearms officers go through intensive training, including in how to respond in high-pressure situations. These are dedicated people with a strong desire to protect the public and serve their communities. Tangye said:
“But each time an AFO attends a scene, they face an uncomfortable truth: if I get this wrong I could be jailed. In my 30-year career I never once met an officer who wanted to ‘bag’ a scalp; no-one who hoped for the chance to use their gun to bring down a criminal. Most of us weren’t even keen on firearms at all. If you were a weapons enthusiast, you would be viewed with great suspicion by your force and probably removed”.
Authorised firearms officers, or AFOs, he said,
“shouldn’t have to do their jobs in fear of being jailed, or in fear of their careers, their lives, being ruined”.
The Police Federation also shares these concerns: that firearm officers,
“even when they follow the tactics and training they have received, will face significant struggles and hardships over what are usually split-second decisions taken by them in dangerous and fast-moving situations”.
Firearms officers need to be protected in primary legislation to make sure it is certain that they will be treated fairly when they have to make a very difficult decision. This amendment from the noble Lord is not a “get out of jail free” card; it still holds them to account for their actions. It means that officers who do their job properly, who make a decision that would be impossible for most people in this Chamber to comprehend, are protected under the law, and on that basis, I strongly support the amendment.
(7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the comments made, particularly those of the noble Lord, Lord Murray. This is an extraordinary clause; I am not aware of anything else on the statute book like it.
My practical question to the Minister is: if the Secretary of State takes it upon himself or herself to go to court on a worker’s behalf, and the worker is strongly against that, what will that do to the relationship between the worker and the employer? It could absolutely devastate that relationship, because the employer will greatly resent the fact that the Secretary of State is taking proceedings on behalf of the worker, even if the worker has said that they do not want those proceedings brought. This is not good for industrial relations at all.
I really urge the Government to rethink this. What are its practical implications? How will it work in practice if the worker is against it? Will they be called as a witness by the Secretary of State, if necessary? Will they then be a hostile witness? It is all a complete and utter mess, I am afraid. I was not planning to speak on this, but this is an extraordinary clause and I urge Ministers to drop it completely.
My Lords, I was happy to sign the clause stand part notice with my noble friend Lady Coffey. I am thinking of the words of Zhou Enlai, I think, who, considering the French Revolution, said, “What did they mean by that?” I look at this clause and think, “What do they mean by this?” Maybe the Minister will open the trinket box at the end of this process and let us into the secret of this bizarre, perverse clause, but I really cannot see the point of it.
I am mindful of the fact that we are surrounded by very accomplished lawyers, so I will not get too much into law, but lawyers and others will be aware that Magna Carta—1215; I know the noble Lord, Lord Katz, likes a history lesson occasionally in Committee—resiled from the arbitrary power of the state. It is an arbitrary power of the state for it to insert itself into civil litigation without any real methodological basis, any timeline or, as my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth so rightly said, any tests being met. That is very odd.
Perhaps the Minister will enlighten us as to the rationale. The clause is novel. It is completely perverse and unheard of, to be quite honest, because it will engender a disputatious regime, more litigation and more disputes in the workplace. It will have a deleterious effect on business, commerce and profitability, and on how businesses are run. What tests will the Minister use? How likely is it that these powers will be used and at what likely cost? Is there any impact assessment or opportunity cost as to the use of these powers?
Why does subsection (2) leave agricultural workers out of the process? There may be a specific sectoral reason for that, but that is a reasonable question to ask. Why are they not swept up in these powers? Why are their rights not circumscribed to not get involved in civil litigation in respect of employment?
Finally, the most bonkers part of a truly epically bonkers clause is subsection (7). It is so crazy that it could have been written by the Liberal Democrats, but it would be unkind to make such an observation. My noble friend Lady Coffey has already made the point that you do not even have to be a worker to have the Secretary of State impose themselves into your potential litigation on a matter; you can be someone seeking employment as a worker. Presumably, anyone who is of working age can be affected by this clause. Subsection (7) also states that a worker is defined more widely as an individual who is a worker for the purposes of Part 4A of the Employment Rights Act 1996.
I really do not understand the rationale for or the logic behind this clause. The Minister is clearly aware of the great disquiet that it gives rise to, and I hope she answers the specific points made, not least by the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere. It takes something for a noble Lord of his experience in the law to say that this is the most perverse and strangest clause he has seen in a piece of primary legislation. On that basis, I hope the Minister will respond to that and answer those specific points that noble Lords, in particular the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, have raised.