(5 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her openly consultative approach to these provisions and for the changes that have been made. I think that we have something that should unite most of the House.
These are important new codes of practice, and they are an improvement on their drafts. Codes of practice were almost unheard of when I was on the Police and Criminal Evidence Bill Committee in 1984. They have become a very important part of policing and of the scrutiny of policing, and rightly so. They have given much more confidence as to how significant powers are exercised. Schedule 7, which I have often seen exercised in practice in ports, is a very effective tool as part of the weaponry against terrorism. It produces significant intelligence that can be used across the board in this area.
It is also very helpful that these codes are not only comprehensive but comprehensible to the police officers and others who are trained to use them. I have sampled the training in the past and have found it to be very good.
I support the noble Lord, Lord Harris, on a point that he raised about the definition of a journalist. It is all too easy for people to self-define as journalists, and that is something that we would like to avoid.
It is very important that disclosure of confidential information is being protected so carefully in these provisions, although of course we need to be confident that it is not overprotected. I ask the Minister to confirm that the crime exception remains in force and that information that national security requires should be revealed will be revealed and used in the future.
(5 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe reason for that protection was the shortage of bats in Europe. We have been working closely with the Bat Conservation Trust, Defra and Natural England’s wildlife teams and international partners on this subject. The BCT has provided advice for bat carers, which we helped to write and which takes a precautionary approach.
Does the Minister agree that the Director of Public Prosecutions’ very unusual decision to review every single Covid-related prosecution initiated by the police indicates clear overuse of the powers and that new National Police Chiefs’ Council guidance is needed to replace the overcomplex guidance issued by the College of Policing, which many police officers do not even have time to read?
The College of Policing guidance is there not to replace the government guidance but to assist the police as they go about their daily work. As I said to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, these are new powers and the CPS is therefore reviewing cases charged under both the Coronavirus Act and the public health regulations to make sure that the powers are being applied correctly. Unlawful charges are being withdrawn by prosecutors in court and the CPS is asking for any wrongful convictions to be overturned—but we are in a new world and are having to learn.
(8 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberOh, she is here. What my noble friend said is very interesting, because she is one of the great lawyers on our side specialising in human rights. Perhaps I may draw attention to her view at the time on anonymity right through to conviction. She said:
“I strongly urge that this House does not consider allowing anonymity for anyone who is charged with rape. But the Government might look sensitively at the issue of whether someone should be covered with anonymity until the point of being charged … The reason that women will come forward when they see that a man has been charged with rape is because they are confident that they will not be so readily disbelieved if he is clearly doing it to other women”.—[Official Report, 2/6/03; col. 1085-6.]
It is quite clear that, at that time, my noble friend at least had some sympathy for the principle behind today’s amendment.
The former Prime Minister, David Cameron, told Parliament that he believed that,
“there was a case for saying that between arrest and charge there was a case for anonymity”.
“I think”, he went on to say,
“this does represent a good way forward”.—[Official Report, Commons, 2/6/10; col. 428.]
My right honourable friend Caroline Flint, speaking on behalf of the Labour Party in the House of Commons, said,
“the serial nature of the crime that we are talking about is important, because when a crime is reported and people hear the name of the person who has been charged, they feel confident to come forward and stand by the victims”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/6/10; col. 150.]
Even there, from a spokesman from the Labour Front Bench in the Commons, is an admission that, post-charge, people do come forward. I am not claiming that she would support me on this amendment, but I ask the House to judge her view on the basis of the record to which I just referred.
The Home Affairs Select Committee report in 2014 stated:
“We recommend that the … right to anonymity should also apply to the person accused of the crime, unless and until they are charged with an offence”.
In other words, for the second time the Home Affairs Select Committee of the House of Commons, only two years ago, made the same recommendation—again unanimous.
We then have Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe, a practitioner in the field dealing with these matters. He too says he supports pre-charge anonymity.
Finally, there is the letter of 24 March last year from Theresa May, who is now the Prime Minister, to Keith Vaz, which says:
“The Government accepts the committee’s conclusion”—
that is, the report I just referred to, supporting pre-charge anonymity—
“that there should, in general, be a right to anonymity before the point of charge, but there will be circumstances in which the public interest means that an arrested suspect should be named”.
All these assurances are diluted by the guidance being given to police officers, because that guidance does not work. It is about time that we stood up in Parliament, recognised the deficiency in the way the law is operating and put on the statute book something that requires police officers to operate in a particular way. In this case, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, suggests in his amendment, they should at least be required to apply to a judge for permission to release a name.
The product of all this law as it currently exists, and the present arrangements, is that reputations are undermined, families are discredited—as I said in my contribution in Committee—there are suicides, public lives and reputations are destroyed, and individuals are sacked from their employment. I have a desk full of letters written over the last 15 years by men all over the country—many of them in prisons; we do not know what happened in those particular cases—objecting to the way the law works.
I implore the House: please give the House of Commons the opportunity to reconsider this matter. If I lose in the Commons, fair enough—but at least give the Commons the opportunity. It is in our hands. If we vote for the amendment tonight, the Commons will reconsider the matter.
My Lords, I support what has just been said by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, and the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Paddick. I apologise for not having been here right at the beginning of the debate. Reflecting something said by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, I should state that although this issue affects a number of Members of your Lordships’ House, it affects multiples of ordinary people who are not Members of your Lordships’ House, who have been affected by regional publicity in such cases.
I am almost as dyed in the wool—indeed, dyed in the Welsh wool—a criminal lawyer as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, and I recall two criminal trials in which I appeared that particularly disturb me. In one, which I prosecuted, the defendant was, to my enormous surprise, convicted and sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment, and had to wait a number of months before the Court of Appeal overturned the conviction on very good grounds. In the second, a case in which I defended, my client was convicted of a number of offences and subsequently, after I had been sacked as his counsel, deservedly won his appeal. Those are just examples of the many cases up and down the country in which local and regional publicity has been a powerful driver.
I want to make two points—they are of quality—which were not covered by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, either in his speech this afternoon or in the article he wrote on this subject, which I read a little time ago. The first relates to the quality of non-recent sexual offences. In relation to most offences on the criminal calendar, there is no doubt that a crime has been committed and the investigation is as to who committed that crime and whether that person interviewed was involved in that crime. In the case of non-recent sexual offences, it does not need me to persuade your Lordships’ House that there have been numerous allegations of offences which never occurred. The damage that can be done—wherein I move to my second point—when the police work on the assumption that the complainant, often called the victim, is telling the truth means that those cases are quite different. I am not making this up.
My Lords, I am not a lawyer. When the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, say this is a very difficult issue, I know that this is a very difficult issue. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for retabling the amendment on pre-charge anonymity for those accused of sexual offences and to my noble friend Lord Marlesford for his amendment, which proposes pre-charge anonymity for a person accused of any crime. I know this is a subject which we have debated frequently and in which noble Lords have a great deal of interest, and we have the legal experts of the land here to assist us.
Like other noble Lords have said, I will not repeat all the points I gave in my responses to the amendment in Committee, save to say that the Government fully understand the anguish felt by those who have had their reputation questioned and tarnished following unfounded allegations made against them. My noble friend Lord Lamont very articulately outlined the names of some of them, although I will not go into individual cases. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, indicated in our earlier debate, such anguish will arise whether the unfounded allegation was in relation to allegations of sexual offences, which is the premise of the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, or with regard to other offences, which is the reasoning behind my noble friend’s amendment.
However, I reiterate that the notion that someone is innocent until proven guilty, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, says, is absolutely central to our justice system and the rule of law. There must never be an assumption that being charged or arrested for any offence indicates that a person is guilty of a crime, so the Government have every sympathy for the underlying aims behind both of these amendments. As noble Lords will know, the Government also start from the position that there should, in general, be a presumption of anonymity before the point of charge and believe that there is also a general acceptance that there will none the less be exceptional circumstances in which the public interest means a suspect should be named. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, articulated that. The Government’s position remains that we are not persuaded that legislation is the right way forward at this time.
As with any offence, it is absolutely right and proper for the police to have operational independence in deciding whether to name a suspect, and the Government firmly believe that non-statutory guidance, rather than primary legislation, is the appropriate vehicle for guiding the police in these operational decisions. It is absolutely vital that the police are able to exercise their own judgment and act swiftly in circumstances where releasing the name of a suspect may, for example, prevent further harm. The introduction of a statutory scheme would hamper the police’s ability to act in this way. We know that such identification can help other victims to recognise that they are not the only ones who have suffered, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, said. This is particularly the case with regard to sexual abuse allegations, where the ability of the police to name an individual accused of such an offence might give encouragement to other victims to overcome their reluctance to come forward—and many of them are very reluctant. Victims must feel that they can report the abuse to the police as well as get the support they need.
We have seen recently the significant effect of increased willingness by victims to report what happened to them in the shocking scale and nature of allegations of non-recent child sexual abuse in football. I am sure the whole House will want to join me in paying tribute to the bravery that some ex-footballers have shown in coming forward publicly after so much time in what must have been terribly difficult personal circumstances. Their courage has clearly given confidence to many others to come forward. But had the legislation put forward by these amendments been in place today, the media in this country could have been prevented from reporting the claims of some of these alleged victims. Of course, as with any allegation, it is now for the police to take forward and investigate in order to establish the facts and, where appropriate, to bring prosecutions.
A question was asked—I cannot remember by which noble Lord—about whether the police should believe all victims. The police should always focus on the credibility of the allegation rather than on the credibility of the witness. As I have just outlined in the case of allegations in football, I cannot emphasise strongly enough that we must not undermine victims’—
I do not quite understand how the shocking cohort of football cases relates to the issue in these amendments. These football cases have not followed a specific arrest or arrests. Indeed, the three convictions of Barry Bennell in 1994, 1998 and, I think, 2002, did not produce a cohort of reporting; media publicity of the issue, not of an arrest, produced it. So what does it have to do with this issue?
I am trying to illustrate that alleged victims’ willingness to come forward is now more common because they feel that they can come forward and they are more likely to be believed. There are not huge numbers of convictions in sexual abuse trials, and to go back to the position where anonymity was granted would be a retrograde step.
My Lords, I am conscious that your Lordships want to vote on Amendment 187, so I shall be brief, but I have to say that this proposal is, to my way of thinking, one of the most unjust that I have heard in your Lordships’ House for some time. It is worth identifying what it says. I shall come to the proviso in a moment, but what it says that somebody who is accused of rape is not to know the name of the accuser—the complainant. For that matter, somebody who is accused of actual bodily harm or grievous bodily harm is not to know the name of the accuser or of the witnesses. I ask rhetorically: how on earth can a defendant or his representatives prepare his case for trial without knowing the name of the accuser or the witnesses? After all, they may not have been there. They may be notorious liars. There may be lots of other reasons to distrust their integrity.
The substantive clause here precludes the police from giving the name of the victim or the witnesses to the accused person. That is curiously reminiscent of the procedure underlying lettres de cachet in pre-revolutionary France, as described in A Tale of Two Cities. Let us look at the proviso, because it needs a bit of probing. The proviso in subsection 1(b) of the proposed new clause is so far as,
“non-disclosure would not impact on … a new trial”.
Who is to judge whether it impacts on a fair trial? I can tell noble Lords from the language of the proposed new clause that it is to be the police or the Crown Prosecution Service. So the police or the Crown Prosecution Service, who are party to the procedure, who are making the allegations, will judge whether it is fair to disclose the identity of the victim or the witness. How can that possibly be fair? What procedure is there in the proposed new clause for the accused person to challenge that determination? There is none at all.
We are told, “Ah, the judge will let it in”, but the judge cannot when there is an absolute prohibition. There is no procedure here whereby the decision of the police officer or the Crown Prosecution Service can be challenged. Probing a little further, what about police statements? I am sure my noble friend knows full well that police statements have to be served on the defendant prior to trial so that they can prepare and understand their case. If the identity of the witness or the victim has to be redacted out of the statements, what possible purpose is there in serving the statements at all? One merely has to identify these things to see that this would be struck down, certainly by the courts. It is a clear contravention of the provisions in the convention now in domestic law in favour of a fair trial.
Incidentally, on proposed new subsection 1(c), regarding the protection of people, bail conditions can do that. There may be a case for strengthening bail conditions but there is absolutely no case for introducing a measure that will do a profound injustice in our courts. I hope my noble friend the Minister will give a robust response to this.
Before the noble Viscount sits down, is the point not that the complainant may say that the person who allegedly assaulted him or her is a stranger but may have an oblique motive for so saying? How is the defendant therefore able to defend himself or herself without being able to know who the accuser is? It is a palpable injustice which was not covered, I regret, by the passionate speech by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, which omitted that crucial point.
I could not agree more with the noble Lord. I agree with him as I agreed with him on the previous debate. We are dealing here with the possibility of profound injustice and we should guard against it.
(8 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberWhen we look at events around the world, particularly some of the horrors in America over the last few weeks, I personally always feel glad that we are not an armed country. I totally see where the noble Lord is coming from, but—I will disappoint him when I say this—we have some of the best policemen and women in the world. With the national asset barrier, we have ways of containing potential events such as this, but I would not like to see what the noble Lord talks about as widely available.
Can the Minister confirm that the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre has as part of its focus the identification and interdiction of the types of semi-lone wolves who were described earlier? Can she also confirm that there are sufficient portable barriers, including where necessary the use of fairly heavy vehicles, to protect from the kind of scenarios in places which might otherwise suffer the same fate as the Promenade des Anglais?
My Lords, I can absolutely confirm that JTAC is constantly monitoring such threats to our people and country. I am sorry, but I cannot remember the second part of the noble Lord’s question.
I can confirm that we are satisfied that we have the police-led and vehicle-led capability to deal with such large-scale firearm attacks in the UK. The noble Lord will have to forgive me—it is my first hour, never mind my first day.
(9 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the Minister for the response to my request at Second Reading for a view about each of the 10 tests. I am quite happy to accept these. What I resent is the fact that someone can stand up in our free Parliament and equate the present status of this country with the Stasi, where there was no rule of law, no independent judges, no independent commissioners and no free parliament. Let us have a reasonably decent debate about this.
My Lords, if I may just follow on from what the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, has said, my view, having studied these issues for a very large number of years now, is that the Bill as drafted provides ample protections against invasions of privacy. Indeed, they have that kind of specificity that the courts readily understand. I am not opposed to the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, but I respectfully say to my noble friends that the other amendments in this group, Amendments 1 and 2, add absolutely nothing of substance. I join with the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, in saying that I regard it as outrageous to equate our situation today with Nineteen Eighty-Four. The idea that we have a “Room 101” in this country and cameras in every bedroom—which is what it says in Nineteen Eighty-Four—is completely misleading. My charitable view is that it demonstrates that my noble friend has never read Nineteen Eighty-Four.
I say to all Members of this House, including my noble friends—forgive me for taking up time, but maybe the beginning is the time to say it—let us get this Committee stage done as quickly as we possibly can and not spend our time on large numbers of otiose amendments.
My Lords, the Committee will recall that privacy protections were quite rightly a significant topic of debate as the Investigatory Powers Bill passed through the other place. To make clear the duties in relation to privacy and the associated protections and safeguards, the Government introduced a new overarching privacy clause, Clause 2, and made amendments to Clause 1. Those clauses impose statutory duties on public authorities in relation to privacy and, as drafted, already clearly underscore the right to privacy and provide the necessary balance between that right and the powers necessary to keep us safe.
Amendment 1, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, seeks to add a new clause which would list the 10 tests proposed by the Independent Surveillance Review panel, convened by the Royal United Services Institute, or RUSI. At Second Reading in your Lordships’ House, the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, asked whether the Bill complies with those tests. My noble and learned friend Lord Keen confirmed that it does and undertook to set out precisely how it satisfies the RUSI tests. He then duly wrote to the noble Lord and has placed copies of the correspondence in the Library. Accordingly, and in particular in the light of the noble Lord’s helpful comments a minute ago, I hope noble Lords will accept that the Bill does indeed satisfy those tests. I recognise the desire of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to set the scene, as it were, for our forthcoming Committee debates, and while I agree with the principle and spirit of the proposed new clause, I do not consider that it adds anything to what the Bill already contains. I am confident that the Bill as it stands meets each test.
On the amendments proposed to Clause 1, it is worth re-emphasising that Clause 1 provides an overview of the Bill and sets out the duties relating to privacy and the robust protections applied to the use of investigatory powers. This provides the context for the revised Bill and the accompanying codes of practice, which make clear the strong privacy safeguards that apply to the use of the powers contained in the Bill. The Bill ensures that the security and intelligence agencies and law enforcement continue to have the powers they need to keep us safe—and no more. Amendment 2 is therefore not required; Clause 1 provides a suitable and sufficient overview of the Bill and the privacy protections, so the proposed new text is not merited.
I listened with care to the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger. The Government and law enforcement are clear about the value and importance of accessing internet connection records, in particular, to prevent and detect crime and keep the public safe. I did not hear the noble Lord refer to that imperative, although it has been recognised during the passage of the Bill, including by noble Lords at Second Reading. The Joint Committee that scrutinised the Bill considered this issue in detail and concluded that,
“on balance, there is a case for Internet Connection Records as an important tool for law enforcement”.
On Amendment 3, I begin by thanking again the Intelligence and Security Committee for its diligent and valuable contributions to the Bill. We very much welcome its ongoing input to this debate. As I am sure the Committee will be aware, in its report on the draft Bill published last year, the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament called for the inclusion in the Bill of an overarching clause dealing with privacy protections. That call was echoed by the Opposition and the Scottish National Party in Public Bill Committee. Following those discussions, the Government introduced the new comprehensive overarching privacy clause in the Bill, which was widely welcomed on Report in the other place.
I agree fully with the spirit of the ISC’s amendment but do not consider that it is needed. The new overarching privacy clause and amendments made to Clause 1 not only achieve what the ISC’s amendment seeks to achieve but go much further; rather than signalling the importance of privacy, the amended Part 1 now creates a statutory obligation to have regard to the public interest in privacy. The privacy clause serves to make clear what was always the case: privacy is at the heart of this vital piece of legislation. Therefore, with great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Janvrin, I cannot see that his amendment, well-intentioned as it is, adds value to what is already in the text.
I hope these remarks are helpful and that, while doubtless the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, will reserve the right to return to individual issues, he will nevertheless be content to withdraw his amendments at this stage.
(9 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is always a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Ramsay, but it is a privilege to follow her on a subject of which she has the theoretical knowledge, and probably more practical knowledge than almost any other Member of this House—certainly more than most who are prepared to admit it. I know that repetition rarely involves improvement to the decent argument so I propose to make a few points of emphasis rather than repeat what has been said. I can say at the outset that I support the Bill, for the reasons just given by the noble Baroness and by noble Lords including the noble Lords, Lord Murphy and Lord Butler of Brockwell, my noble friends Lord Campbell of Pittenweem and Lord Macdonald, the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, and the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian.
I have some misgivings about the Bill. They are three in number and I can state them briefly. The first is the issue of legal professional privilege. I am not going to repeat a word of what was said so eloquently by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and my noble friend Lord Lester. I simply invite the Government to continue to consider that issue and to respond consistent with the advice that has been given in the debate.
My second misgiving relates to the use made of certain types of records. We have to be careful to ensure that, for example, medical records are used only for a legitimate purpose. I can see extreme circumstances in which medical records might be relevant to a terrorism event but the use of such records would have to be extremely carefully controlled, so what I would describe as the principle of legitimacy of use is essential to the Bill.
My third misgiving echoes something that was just said by the noble Baroness, Lady Ramsay, alluded to earlier by my noble friend Lord Campbell and stated pithily by my noble friend Lord Macdonald. It is about judges. I have general reservations, as she does, about the role of judges in what is essentially a ministerial act. It is Ministers who are briefed every day on national security issues and who have been issuing warrants though history. It is senior civil servants, such as some of the retired civil servants who have spoken so well in this House—there may be one or two more to come—who have consistently given advice to Ministers. I do not object to judges being involved in some way, but it must be a legitimate way. If judges are to be involved, it is to be for the verification of what has been done and of whether it has been done in accordance with legal principle. That means by the use of the rules of judicial review. Judges are not trained to authorise warrants. Most judges do not want to be trained to authorise warrants, and they should not be thrust into that role. I agree emphatically with my noble friend Lord Macdonald of River Glaven that it is desirable that serving judges should be included as judicial commissioners. It is not that retired judges do not do the job well—they do their work brilliantly in most cases—but the political optics of this issue are very important. The cohort of judges who act as judicial commissioners should include serving judges who go back from their commissioner role to the courtroom in which they give judgments on issues of fact and law so that they are seen to be not in any way the beneficiaries of political largesse.
Earlier, the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, referred to a telephone call he made to me on 11 September 2001. It was probably a call I should not have returned because it resulted in my becoming Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. I did the job from 2001 to 2011. Even in 2011, it was nothing like as complex as it is today, and I pay tribute to my successor David Anderson QC for the brilliant work he has done, the outstanding legal analysis he has brought to his role and his sensitivity to the most difficult political setting in which he has had to carry out his role. It was much easier in the period when there was a Labour Government. Not all the Home Secretaries were entirely consistent in their views, but broadly they were, considering how many there were over those years, including one who is in his place on the privy counsellors’ Bench. David Anderson has had a much more difficult task. The House should be extremely grateful to him for what he has done.
I am frankly outraged, and I suspect David Anderson is, too, by the criticism of civil servants in the Home Office by one speaker in this debate. I observed civil servants in the Home Office over nine and a half years carrying out their role without bias, fear or favour, just doing their sometimes very difficult duty. The suggestion that civil servants in the Home Office, or anywhere else in the public service who I have observed at close quarters, have dealt with terrorism issues in a way that is dishonest in any way whatever just fills me with horror, and I hope that Lordships generally will reject that slur on our civil servants. It should not have been made.
Taking a much more constructive point now, I hope, what we have is a changing situation. As I discovered in my nine and a half years as Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, dealing with terrorism is not science or even art; it is just something that changes day by day. It does not evolve; it simply changes, sometimes suddenly, by mood and disruption in the political and democratic metabolism of the world. Sometimes the changes are unpredicted, and often they are completely unexpected. We should bear that in mind as we look at the detail of the Bill in the weeks to come, and I look forward to playing my part.
(9 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberWe have the Prevent and the Channel programmes, but we also have them in the very helpful context of the counterextremism strategy, which was published at the end of last year. That will probably lead fairly shortly to some legislation coming through this House, which will flesh out some of the points that the noble Baroness raised. But I return to the point that some of the most effective means of combating this distortion and perversion of a great faith in this country come from within the communities themselves.
Does the Minister agree that it is a disappointment that the same group which killed over 100 people in Paris on 13 November was able to kill more than 30 people in Brussels yesterday? If that is right, does he agree that the welcome co-operation that has taken place between the intelligence agencies of the Five Eyes and the European countries other than the United Kingdom should be re-examined so that we have the technical abilities, including surveillance capacity, required to ensure that this is not repeated in yet another European capital, which might be our own?
That is absolutely correct. Of course, that is one of the prime drivers behind the investigatory powers legislation—but the noble Lord will notice that, when we talk about the global fight against terror, the sophistication of the Daesh communications, with the use of social media as a way of communicating, is a completely new challenge for the security services. That is why we are putting the resources into GCHQ. Because Daesh is based in Syria, we need to make sure that we take the fight to it and destroy its capabilities there before it has the opportunity to destroy our way of life here.
(9 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I take a different view from the noble Lord who has just spoken, although I have a great deal of sympathy for the underlying sentiments of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for example—I agree with much of what he and the right reverend Prelate said. But there is a difference between making an obligation mandatory, as is contemplated by the amendment, and exercising the discretion of government. There may very well be a good case for the Government to admit much larger numbers of unaccompanied children than is provided for under the existing scheme, and I would have no objection at all to that number being 3,000 or more. However, I object to it being mandatory, because it deprives the Government of any discretion.
The House needs to keep two things in mind. First, if you admit children who are not accompanied at the moment of admission, you expose the country to a whole range of further applications by those who are related to them; and if you make it mandatory, you have deprived yourself of the ability to regulate that flow. The second, and different, point is the pull factor. The noble Lord, Lord Dubs, for example, is not right to disregard that. We have seen the consequences of Chancellor Merkel’s statement, which resulted in a very great pull factor. My own fear is that if the House made this obligation mandatory, that would encourage people to send their children from where they now are into Europe, unaccompanied, in the hope that they would take advantage either of this provision, if it is carried, or of a future provision which they might envisage being carried forward. I am not against the concepts and arguments which have been very eloquently expressed by noble Lords, but I am against making it mandatory.
My Lords, I join the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, in sharing the feeling behind this amendment, and I congratulate him on moving it. He is one of many distinguished examples of people who have contributed a lot to this country since they arrived here as part of the Kindertransport.
I want, if I may, to mention my own sister. She was born in 1937 in southern Poland and is my only sibling—in fact, she is my half-sibling; her mother died in Auschwitz after four and a half years as a prisoner there, but that difference in parentage has never affected us. I am afraid that I frequently telephone her and remind her how much older she is than me. Over the period of our lives together she has frequently reminded me of what she suffered as a child who did not have the opportunity to take advantage of the Kindertransport. Throughout the Second World War, from the time her mother was taken by the Nazis, she fled from persecution. She moved from place to place, and although people who had feelings for her tried to protect her, she did not have that carapace of parental protection which most of us have enjoyed and which to a great extent was enjoyed by the Kindertransport children. A few years ago she was able to have published her memoirs of the time between her third birthday and the end of the war, such as she remembers it. It is there for all who wish to read it and it is a searing story.
If by this amendment we can save one child from the sort of experience that my sister went through or save the children of one family from the feeling of being lost in an uncaring world, at no real disadvantage to this country, we should do it. Nothing in this amendment would disadvantage this country. If the Government wish to carry out a cost-benefit analysis, they need only to carry out a similar cost-benefit analysis of the Kindertransport children. These 3,000 children would be a jewel in this country’s crown and would appreciate what this country had done for them, like my sister appreciated what it eventually did for her when she was able to come here as an eight year-old in 1946.
(9 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I find myself in great sympathy with what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has just said. If this were a general debate about genocide, I would find myself in total agreement with what has been said by all noble Lords who have contributed; there have been some very remarkable speeches. But it is not. We are actually talking about legislation and we have to ask ourselves the serious question: does what this House is contemplating by way of legislation make legal sense? It is there that I part from those who are advocating this amendment.
I want to concentrate briefly on subsection (1) of the proposed new clause because there are three points that I would like to make about it. First, we are not in the business of talking about groups, although the noble Baroness, Lady Nicholson, did talk about groups. The question is whether an individual belongs to a group, and that involves adjudication, a decision. It is made in the context where there is an enormous amount of scope, and motive too, for misrepresentation. It is sometimes very difficult to tell the difference between a Tajik and an Uzbek or, for that matter, between an Alawite, a Sunni and a Shia. They may all have reason for misrepresenting their status. To put the test in the way that it is expressed in subsection (1) will open up an enormous amount of judicial argument.
The second point is slightly different. In the second line of the subsection is the phrase “in the place”—not in the country, but in the place. The truth is that in a country like Iraq, a Shia may be unsafe in a particular area but can move to another area where he or she is safe. Simply to have the test of whether the conditions exist in the place where a person for a moment in time happens to be resident is, I think, to distort what one really seeks to do.
The last point I want to make is that subsection (1) creates presumptions of entitlement. I believe that presumption should depend on individual adjudication, not on class presumption. This amendment would create a class presumption with which I am bound to say I am extremely uneasy. Therefore while I have enormous sympathy with the points that have been made, and I do not wish in any way to undermine the fervour with which people have spoken, we are in the business of asking ourselves whether particular pieces of legislation which we are being asked to authorise make sense.
My Lords, it gives me great pleasure to applaud the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for bringing this amendment back to your Lordships’ House in an improved form. I do not want this to turn into a lawyers’ fest or to give your Lordships too much pleasure in knowing that the lawyers may disagree about the matters that have just been referred to, but I would remind the House that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, told us earlier that the amendment followed interventions at an earlier stage in the passage of this Bill by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope of Craighead and Lord Judge. Both are former Supreme Court judges, one the former Lord Chief Justice and the other the former Deputy President of the Supreme Court.
I do not disagree in principle with what has just been said by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble Viscount. However, we must remember that the power to pass law rests upon Parliament. This is not a court where we act upon precedent. If Parliament wishes to include a judge’s decision in the determination of a matter of law, it is open to Parliament to do so. Let us not pretend that the Government—particularly this Government—do not send for the judges when they are in an awkward position in any event. We know that that is all too common and currently being done with the most controversial Bill before these Houses: the Investigatory Powers Bill.
I therefore suggest to your Lordships that while we of course listened with enormous respect to the two noble Lords who just spoke, nevertheless what they say does not negate the merits of the debate that we have been hearing. Indeed, we have heard some very eloquent speeches dealing with those merits: for example, the speeches of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, and of the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, who had an excellent article in the Guardian this morning, setting out in principle what everybody on my side of the debate might say.
I do not want to give a catalogue of the events that give rise to this debate; we heard from my noble friend Lady Nicholson in some detail. I applaud, as I am sure we all do, the extraordinary work that she has done with the charity AMAR, of which she is the chairman and founder, which has helped so many, particularly young women, affected by genocide, especially in the Middle East. She deserves great praise for that. Indeed, she and the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, are responsible for bringing these very important and painful issues to the attention not just of the House, but of the country much more widely than the political class represented here and in another place.
I simply say this to your Lordships: there is no more arrogant crime than the crime of genocide. Genocide defies all decent religious standards, albeit sometimes in the heretical pretence of religion. Genocide offends all decent secular standards. I know of no secular state that would allow any of the horrendous practices described in the debate. Genocide rejects the proposition that there should be even any limits to the actions and cruelties committed in war. Genocide diminishes the dignity of the human race, quite simply. Surely Parliaments such as this should recognise the suffering of victims of genocide, and not merely by wringing our hands with rhetoric about those victims. Where else have they to turn to if not to Parliaments and to Governments in countries such as ours? Why are we not making the sorts of declarations that have been made, as I understand it, by the French Government and very clearly by the American Secretary of State?
The designation of crimes as “genocide” sends out a clear message, and it is not an unimportant one: it is a deterrent. Designation of genocide sends out the message that those who commit the act and are identified will one day be brought before international courts and punished for their crimes against the rest of the human race. Designation of genocide by Governments such as ours also sends out a warning to those who might be inclined to commit genocide that they will be pursued to the end of the days—to the end of their lives if necessary, when they are old and hiding from their responsibilities, as happened, for example, with the Nazi genocide.
I heard earlier in the evening—I hope that I am wrong—that Her Majesty’s Official Opposition’s position was to sit on its hands in this debate. I hope that that shameful proposition is not correct. I hope that we will not have a situation in which the party that introduced the Human Rights Act 1998 into our law will chicken out of an official vote on this amendment.
We carry out a great responsibility this evening. I hope that we will do so in a spirit that recognises the challenge that genocide presents to humankind.
My Lords, the issues that the tablers of this amendment have raised are so important and urgent that I am prompted to speak for the first time on the Bill. Everyone’s hearts this evening are on the same page in your Lordships’ House. Our hearts are weary of seeing the suffering on our news bulletins and we want solutions urgently. I hold the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, in the highest regard, not only for their lobbying on behalf of vulnerable people, but for often placing themselves in harm’s way as they do so. They are entirely right that certain groups of people that we should have been focused on more clearly have been lost from view. However, the mechanism proposed this evening will, sadly, not ensure that the most vulnerable people are helped and with huge regret I cannot support the amendment.
First, the amendment runs the risk of taking too long to help these people, as setting up a judicial process with rules of court, et cetera, will take months. Help for these people is needed now, help that can be provided, as I will outline, through the Syrian vulnerable people scheme. As I understand the amendment, this would not just be declaring acts of genocide; what the High Court would be declaring would be a policy of genocide in a particular situation. Since the Second World War, only two situations have merited that declaration: Rwanda and the Srebrenica incident within the Balkans conflict. This is recognised as the crime above all crimes, to be kept special, to be kept unique and with a particular connotation.
Although we can prosecute genocide anywhere in the world, the case of Eichmann, which many noble Lords will remember, remains of its era and we have seen the development of international tribunals to try this particular crime. This amendment draws the declaration of a policy of genocide, which it took the Rwanda tribunal four years to come to, into a domestic court. That opens the way for other domestic courts to do the same and to disagree with us. It risks diluting this crime and we could end up with one domestic courts saying, “We think this is genocide”, and another saying, “This is not genocide”. The risk of politicising and putting into foreign affairs terms a policy such as genocide is grave.
I watched with care the full announcement by Secretary of State Kerry, most of which asserts the supremacy of the judicial process. I was disappointed that such a campaign in America has led, in fact, to so little. They have promised a bit more aid and that they will do some investigation of the evidence. I would like Her Majesty’s Government to deliver more than that.
Perhaps the most important reason for not supporting this amendment is that it will not only apply only to Iraq and Syria. It is, perhaps, most likely to apply, first and foremost, in Sudan, where al-Bashir stands ready to be tried at the International Criminal Court—if they could get him there—for crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of genocide. This amendment would apply to people in other countries; people might learn through social media that the UK has said that they are victims of genocide and can get asylum here and they might leave to come here. As I say, Sudan might be the first case and a determination of that nature by our courts could cause vast numbers of people to flee, not knowing whether they are number four of the 5,000 we have said we are taking or number 4,555. They will not know that; they will leave. This would be particularly dangerous today because their route is through Libya, through IS-controlled territory where they risk being killed and a much more perilous sea journey across the Mediterranean from Libya to Italy.
I have sat before British diaspora who are desperate for their adult sons to remain in those countries and not to travel. Often, they listen to IS footage in Libya on the internet and see what could happen to their relatives if there was any incentive for them to move. Turkey is closing down as a route and the criminal gangs are looking for a different market, or several different markets.
The movers of the amendment are right in principle. I want to return to that. I hope that I can offer a way forward. Will my noble friend the Minister please look urgently to review the criteria of the Syrian vulnerable people scheme, as Iraqi people are the victims of probably the worst postcode lottery? A century ago, Britain was involved in setting the border between Iraq and Syria, which IS just wiped out. So if you can satisfy the vulnerable persons criteria and are a refugee but happen to live on the wrong side of the border—if you are an Iraqi—you are not eligible for the scheme. If you live hundreds of miles away or hundreds of yards away but you happen to be Syrian, you can get safe passage to the UK. As a matter of utmost urgency will my noble friend the Minister look to expand the eligibility for the scheme so that we can offer protection virtually immediately to the Iraqis who so desperately need it? Will he also please ensure that the relevant numbers are raised to accommodate the extra people?
My Lords, no one can fail to be concerned about and moved by the appalling position of those to whom this amendment relates. There is a need to see what more can be done to help those fleeing violence and persecution and to increase safe and legal routes for refugees. We all have sympathy with what lies behind this amendment, particularly with regard to the appalling actions of ISIS—Daesh—against Yazidi women. The amendment as it stands is in our view unworkable, but we would be willing to work with the Government and others in the House to develop a scheme to present at Third Reading for these women and others persecuted on grounds of religion.
Anyone coming under the conditions referred to in proposed new subsection (1) who is already in the United Kingdom should already be able to claim asylum under the existing law and definition of a refugee. However, the amendment appears problematic in a couple of areas. It places responsibility for declaring that a genocide is taking place—and, with it, a presumption that the conditions for asylum in the UK have been met—with the High Court rather than with an international body, which is a departure from existing practice. We are not convinced that this power should rest with domestic courts.
The amendment also allows people to apply for asylum outside the UK, which is again a significant departure from existing law and would allow unknown numbers to apply as, as the amendment sets out, there should be no discrimination in dealing with such applications based on,
“national, ethnical, racial or religious group”.
As a lesser point, there also needs to be more clarity about how the process set out in the amendment would work in practice, how applications would be processed, by whom and where.
While we all want to do more for vulnerable people fleeing persecution and genocide—
The noble Lord is telling us that the Labour Party agrees in principle with the feelings behind the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Alton. Is it not a bit supine for the Labour Party to say that but not put forward an improved amendment of its own if it really seeks to say what we have just heard with full integrity?
I do not share the noble Lord’s view; I am setting out our view of the amendment and have referred to two specific issues, which do not seem to me unimportant. I can only note that he holds a different view.
While we all want to do more for vulnerable people fleeing persecution and genocide—such a debate needs to take place—we are unconvinced that the amendment as drafted represents the best way to do that. It entails a significant change in practice and procedure, and there needs to be much greater consideration than, inevitably, there has been of the practicalities and impact of what is being proposed. For these reasons, if the mover, having heard the Government’s response, decides to test the opinion of the House, we will not be able to lend our support.
My Lords, no one could but be moved by the strength of feeling and concern that has been expressed in this House with regard to events in the Middle East. Several of your Lordships have eloquently articulated the terrible threats that Daesh or ISIS poses to the populations of the Middle East. Who could gainsay the ghastly evidence of some of the events that have been reported?
All of us want to do everything that we can to support the victims of such terrible violence. All of us want to alleviate the suffering experienced in Syria and Iraq at present. But to do that, our primary priority must be to secure an end to the conflict in Syria and Iraq, in order that people can return to their communities and their lives. That is what this Government have been committed to achieving, and I shall not repeat the points made earlier about the steps taken in that regard.
I urge your Lordships to read the amendment to see what, on the face of it, it is intended to do. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, finished by saying that the intention was to bring those individuals responsible to justice. That, with respect, is not the objective of the amendment. Indirectly, it might achieve that, but let us remember to emphasise individuals. We cannot bring Daesh to justice; we must identify the individuals within ISIS and Daesh who have been responsible for these terrible crimes. That is not the objective of this amendment at all.
The amendment deals with three matters. Essentially, proposed new subsection (1) is a presumption that if a person is a member of a certain grouping they have been a victim of genocide. Secondly, there is an adjudication and, thirdly, there is an application process by which an individual who is a member of a group that has been subject to genocide can secure asylum in the United Kingdom but, more importantly, can secure that by means of an application form outside the United Kingdom—a unique and quite unprecedented step in the context of refugee law. Indeed, I would respectfully adopt the observation of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, when he said that he had much more difficulty with the substance of the amendment. With respect, so have we, because if we look at the substance of the amendment, we have to consider the background to what is being addressed.
There are two entirely distinct conventions here. There is what is shortly termed the genocide convention, which is concerned with the identification and prosecution of those guilty of the terrible crime of genocide. Then there is the refugee convention, which is concerned with the circumstances in which a country such as the United Kingdom has an obligation to those who are defined—
I shall finish the sentence, if I may—to those who are defined as refugees. The two are entirely distinct. Under—
The noble and learned Lord said that he was going to give way at the end of the sentence. I detected a full stop. With all his legal experience, he surely knows that numerous applications relating to residence in the United Kingdom are made from outside the United Kingdom. For example, visas are applied for outside the United Kingdom. What is so unique about extending that process?
I am obliged to the noble Lord. I was aware of that—and, of course, the distinction lies in international law. Our obligation towards asylum seekers arises under the refugee convention, and it is in accordance with that that we deal with these applications. I shall elaborate on why that poses such severe problems in the context of the amendment.
Under our own Immigration Rules we have provision for those who enjoy refugee status, which includes those who are the victims or potential victims of genocide. But of course it also extends beyond that category to those who are the victims or potential victims of persecution—for example, political persecution, which would not be covered by this provision. If we look at the provisions of the refugee convention, we find it explicitly stated at Article 3 that in dealing with applications for asylum there will be no discrimination on grounds such as nationality, ethnicity or religion. Indeed, that is reinforced by Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
While I understand the desire of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, to see some help extended to the Christians in Syria, and the Yazidis as well, the reality is that if we had this provision in law we would have no right to discriminate between Christians and Yazidis. We know that in fact the activities of ISIS and Daesh in Syria and Iraq are directed not just at the Christian or Yazidi communities but at the Shia Muslim communities within these countries, at the Kurds and even at the Alawites. All those would also be in a position of complaining that they belonged to a group that was potentially the subject of genocidal acts, torture or violence.
(10 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I agree with everything that the noble Baroness has just said. It is a particular privilege for me to speak in support of the amendment moved by my noble friend Lady Doocey. Those of us who have known her for—I hesitate to say it—some decades know her to be careful, accurate and tenacious, the word used earlier by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall. I pay tribute to my noble friend for her tenacity in pursuing what many of us regard as an extremely important issue.
My noble friend identified the issue with great clarity. She said that if the law is as clear as the Director of Public Prosecutions and others have said it to be, why are there no prosecutions? Why is this successful, clear and full law resulting in no outcomes at all for exploited children in this country? I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to those questions when he replies to this short debate.
Many of us are surprised and disappointed that there is no specific offence of child exploitation in one place in the law. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has said much the same previously and most lawyers who have to consider child exploitation would welcome a single offence in a single place which could readily be assessed and understood. The noble Baroness, Lady Royall, spoke about age disputes. I hope the Minister will confirm that the suggestion that age would create a difficulty in enacting an offence such as the one proposed in Amendment 5 is a false point. Age disputes are litigated almost every day in the Administrative Court—they are extremely common—and there are clear ways in which such disputes are determined. They are determined—surprise, surprise—by evidence, and the evidence available to determine such disputes is now expert, well-tried and tested, and capable of speedy decision when such disputes occur.
If the Minister rejects, as I apprehend he will, my noble friend’s amendment. I hope he will give a government commitment to plug any gaps that may emerge hereafter if his views are proved to be incorrect. It is shocking that there has not been a single case brought of child exploitation, at least of the kind envisaged here. We heard discussion earlier about the number of prosecutions for female genital mutilation. If one takes child exploitation and female genital mutilation as two of the most important and horrifying offences committed against children in this country and reflects that there have been two prosecutions so far—one monumentally unsuccessful recently—in both those categories added together, one has the right to be concerned.
I ask the Minister to tell your Lordships what he expects to be the outcome of the work which has now been started, apparently, between the Crown Prosecution Service, the police and others. If the outcome is merely to discover that there have been no prosecutions because there is an inadequate understanding of the law, one is bound to ask why. I suspect the answer will be because the law is confusing, and so we go round the full circle and arrive at the conclusion that there ought to be the new offence—albeit with assistance from government draftsmen—proposed by my noble friend Lady Doocey.
I would ask the Minister to ensure that, if he rejects the amendment, he can leave us in a frame of mind of genuine optimism that there will be more prosecutions and an increased prospect of convictions even if no change is to be made to the law. Somehow I doubt it and I suspect that we shall be returning to this very important issue in the not too distant future.
My Lords, I rise to support the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. I have added my name to it. I will be brief as both the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, who has just spoken, have made the case clearly and forcefully that the current law must be inadequate as there have been no convictions. I have heard the argument before that there is no issue with the law, but that it is the practice which is the problem, and that is why there have been no convictions. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, has just said, it cannot be that it is just the practice, it must be that the law is deficient in some way, otherwise there would have been convictions against those who commit this horrible crime against children.
The treatment of cases involving children must reflect that in international law children are a special case because of their particular vulnerability and so cannot consent to exploitation. As it stands, Clause 1 of the Bill does not state clearly enough that there is no need to show that force, threats or deception were present in cases of child exploitation. Subsection (3) of the proposed new clause set out in Amendment 5 makes the point that there is a need to include that in the Bill.
The noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, mentioned the letter written by the Minister to the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, on 16 February. It stated:
“Where a person deliberately targets a vulnerable person, such as a child, there is no requirement for any force, threats or deception to be used to induce the child into being exploited”.
This statement perfectly encapsulates what the Bill itself should state so that there are no grey areas and those prosecuting cases are 100% clear what the thresholds of proof are in children’s cases. Government Amendment 4 is welcome, but in my view it does not go far enough towards including that. The Government must formally commit to their intention that force, threats or deception are not required in children’s cases. A failure to improve the current Clause 1 offence leaves the Bill open to interpretation on this key issue, which would be a major disservice to child victims. They must be able to trust in our laws to protect them and ensure their access to justice for the heinous crimes committed against them. I hope that the Minister will be able to comment on that, if not in the Bill, then to state it clearly for the record that that is the Government’s intention.
I am very grateful to the noble and learned Baroness for giving way. Does she not recognise, first, that exactly the kinds of dispute she is describing now are litigated on a daily basis in the Administrative Court and, secondly, that good case management, which is part of the Leveson reforms and recommendations, can make the preparation of these issues and their determination very much easier and as routine as analogous issues?
I certainly hope that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, is right about that. However, with the government position under Clauses 1 and 2, including with Amendment 4, you do not have to prove that the young person is 16, 17 or 18 in order to get a conviction. You will have an aggravated situation if you show that it is in fact a child, say of 14 or 15, and not a young woman of 20, and the judge’s sentence will no doubt be greater. However, the issue of age will not arise for the jury to try because, under Clause 1, you do not have to have an age—anybody who is treated in the way that Clause 1 describes can be found to be a victim. This seems to me to be something introduced by the Bill which has not come in before and which will, I certainly hope, make a very dramatic difference to the way in which prosecutions are dealt with.
Another point that Kevin Hyland made, which I think is of some interest, is about control and prevention orders, on which we have spent virtually no time at all in this House. He told me about a group of Roma—not all of whom are Romanian; some are from other parts of Europe—who apparently are camping at the moment in either Park Lane or Hyde Park. They are begging, and the children are no doubt thieving, in Edgware Road and Oxford Street. He says that when the control and prevention orders come into place, if you can find that these children are doing this, a control or prevention order can be made against the adult—many of whom, of course, are not the parents of these children—and that can last for up to five years and will protect the children, who can also be taken into care. He also made the point that this could be done at the border by the border police, who can get a magistrate’s order in order to protect these children well before you have to come to a prosecution because the children are being exploited. I thought that these were quite interesting points to relay to the House.