(8 years, 10 months ago)
Lords Chamber
That this House takes note of the potential use of identity documentation in dealing with the challenges of assuring the identity of individuals.
My Lords, it being a Thursday afternoon, I have received many apologies from Members unable to attend this debate, for which we are all grateful. The issue of identity cards is the issue in British politics that refuses to go away; it haunts political debate. It is not that it is the unique preserve of any political party. Identity cards have wide support in both Houses of Parliament, across the political divide and in the electorate.
The Labour Government did at least try to develop a scheme. They started in 2002 with a national consultation under the heading Entitlement Cards and Identity Fraud: A Consultation Document but, following legislation, the whole programme was plagued with arguments over whether it should be a national identity card or an entitlement card. This finally led to a climbdown as it was moved from a compulsory to a voluntary scheme. The 2010 election then killed the whole programme. The national identity register, a crucial component in the scheme, was then destroyed on 10 February 2011. The personal details of everyone issued with a card under the pilots were also destroyed. We are now left with biometric residence permits for non-EEA foreign nationals, but only because Europe requires them and the system of national insurance cards is completely out of control. The coalition effectively destroyed the whole programme, leaving us exposed to an explosion in identity fraud and crime that permeates every aspect of our national life.
Nevertheless, to be fair to the Government, they have recognised the need to tackle the issue, in particular on the internet. With that in mind, the Government’s identity assurance programme, IDAP, was launched. Under the IDAP model, people assert their identities to government via a series of private sector identity providers. I understand that PayPal, Cassidian, Experian, Verizon and a number of others have at some stage been in the frame. However, although they build relationships with HMRC, PAYE, the DVLA and other departments or agencies, they lack access to the necessary biometric data such as fingerprints, digital iris recognition and facial digital photographs. Their programmes are undermined, despite the “hub”, by the lack of a national identity register to underpin the process of identity assurance. I sense that this approach is born of the mistaken assumption that it will save money. What it fails to heed is that public confidence in identity assurance cannot rely on private provider systems preoccupied with profit and shareholder value. Such identity assurance programmes will fall down as disastrously as did Vodafone, PA Consulting, EDS and others, all of which have lost data over recent years.
Card opponents tell you that the state equally stands accused of sloppy data handling. They quote HMRC’s loss of two CDs in 2007, leaving millions at risk, along with other examples. They did happen. But Germany has built a secure system with a reputation for impenetrability based on a range of biometrics. The system leads the way in Europe, and if they can do it, we can do it. Germany is leading a whole group of European nations, including Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Finland, Estonia, Denmark, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Greece, Gibraltar, France, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta, Spain, Slovenia, Portugal, Poland and Holland. Most of those regimes require a passport or a card holding data which we refuse to hold. They are all building systems of identity assurance in which their publics can have confidence. Why can we not do the same? That is the background to the debate.
What do we want? Charles Clarke, former Home Secretary, summed it up perfectly in 2006 when he said that we want,
“a universal scheme for everyone legally resident in the UK”.
His scheme required a fingerprint, a photograph and a signature. I would go further, with iris recognition or even DNA added. If whatever data are finally approved were not to be stored on the card itself, the card could secure, through a protocol and a strong process of authentication and tiered authorisation, access to data, perhaps under three headings: “generally available”, “sensitive” and “highly sensitive”. The accessible information on the chip would relate to information held on the national identity register. The chip would have different layers of defence against physical attack, fault attack and side-channel attack. To compromise a properly designed system, you would have to manipulate the national identity register, which I would say is an impossible task. Again, the German system shows the way. I understand that EU passports are already common criteria evaluated, which means they already achieve best practice for attack resistance.
At this point, I thank Professor Keith Mayes of the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway University for helping me to understand the complexity of such systems. The issue for many of us is whether you hold the data on the card or whether the card authorises access to the national identity register. I believe that the cards should be an access tool to a server, enabling the card to establish basic ID as simply as possible.
What is the purpose of the card? We know that the CBI believes that a single source authenticating personal data would be the best protection against fraud. It foresees reduced costs in maintaining back-up systems. A recent government report entitled Future Identities highlighted that people often have several identities, on and offline. We are told that this, among other factors, is now costing us nearly £30 billion a year in fraud. National identity cards with sophisticated biometrics would help combat that fraud. You might compromise a photograph or a signature, but digitised information is hard to replicate. You certainly cannot have two iris patterns on one eye, two different fingerprints on one finger, or even two different types of DNA.
The purposes of a national identity card fall under four headings: to reduce fraud; to establish entitlement to services; to provide security assurance; and to check identity more generally. In defining the benefits, I have consolidated all three tiers and levels of access I previously referred to—generally available, sensitive and highly sensitive. I see the benefits coming as follows: when using banking or financial services, including credit or debit cards; when buying or selling property and vehicles; when making mortgage applications; when making credit transfers; when entering credit, rental, hire or leasing agreements; when boarding aircraft and other forms of public transport; when accessing public buildings and the workplace; when sitting exams and driving tests; when seeking to reduce HMRC’s tax collection costs; when voting; when establishing identity during police inquiries; when tracing the identity of someone who is deceased; when verifying “fit and proper” in the professions; when carrying out checks on workers at airports and in the caring professions, in particular when early decisions are required; when establishing proof of identity; when tackling impersonation, whether in examinations or, as I have said, driving tests; when tracking the background of false accusers; when tracing bail abscondees; when tracing persons engaged in road traffic offences; when dealing with illegal subletting; when accessing public services, public benefits and pensions; when challenging disability fraud; when dealing with council tax and housing benefit fraud; when establishing on-street identity—if I had longer, I would go into that in much greater detail; when establishing entitlements to concessionary travel and relief from congestion charges; and when investigating organised crime, including money-laundering and trafficking.
The card would be of particular benefit to the Government in checking entitlement to European Union health cards and access to national health services, including hospital treatment. It would give the Government the opportunity to sort out the disaster over the allocation of national insurance cards, and the problem of multiple passport irregularities. It would also bring us into line with other states whose cards already substitute for a passport.
Following the Government’s decision to legislate on illegal working, we should also not underestimate the benefit of the card for the private sector—for landlords checking on illegal tenancies, and for insurance companies in dealing with insurance fraud. The scheme should be tailored to allow them sufficient access at the lowest tiers to establish basic identity in carrying out both statutory and non-statutory duties. The scheme would be particularly helpful to the Director of Labour Market Enforcement proposed in the Immigration Bill. It would underpin his work. Most interestingly, the card would be useful in the enforcement of human rights, particularly for that group of women—invariably in the ethnic minorities—who, with tightly controlled family conditions, are denied basic human rights and even their identity.
I now come to the final benefit, which is crucial. Income tax collection in the UK is not without its problems. It is not helped by the system of self-assessment and reductions in revenue and personnel. Many people in the UK live outside or on the margins of the tax system. They pay no or little tax, yet they often earn substantial incomes while drawing extensively on public services. We who pay our taxes resent the freeloaders, be they foreign or UK nationals. We believe that the state should act to stop this abuse. It is costing the country billions. A national identity card with relevant biometric data would be a powerful tool in ensuring that people pay the state for the services they receive.
I recognise that at first glance, the list of benefits I have identified may appear onerous or perhaps even intrusive, but it is a pick-and-choose agenda which can be tailored to conditions nationally at any particular time. It is an agenda whereby identity today is verified with bank cards, passports, driving licences, utility bills, bank statements, council tax demands, national insurance cards and even marriage certificates—all sources of identity information today. We have all been asked for them at some stage in our private lives. All of them have their weaknesses, causing public concern.
The consultation originally carried out by the Labour Government not only recorded a majority in favour of national identity cards but, astonishingly, found that 75% were in favour of providing all three types of biometric data—fingerprints, a facial digital photograph and an iris digital photograph—such was the level of concern at the time. Today, the cry for reform is greater than ever, and I want this whole debate reopened.
My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, for initiating this debate. However, I am going to break the cosy coalition of those who believe that the state is the sole, and safe, guardian of my identity. I say that because I have listened to the debate and am still not clear what the problem is. It is not for me, as somebody who does not believe in ID cards, to defend the status quo; it is for those who want a change to prove that there is a problem and that ID cards are the effective solution.
Let us look at the real world outside this cosy Chamber and see what is happening in the countries that have ID cards. Many noble Lords have mentioned different countries, such as Germany, Spain, Italy and France, in talking about crime. Can any of those noble Lords or those yet to speak who wish to have ID cards point to a direct correlation between a reduction in crime levels and the citizens having ID cards? We need proof, not general statements. Those who suggest that ID cards will reduce the incidence of crime should give the statistics that show a correlation between ID cards and a reduction in crime in Germany, Spain and France.
It is also said that ID cards will somehow be effective in reducing terrorism. I remind noble Lords of the horrific attack and terrorist atrocities in Jakarta this morning and the appalling attacks that we have seen just across the water in France. Indonesian citizens carry ID cards, as do the citizens of France. Have those cards made them any safer? If noble Lords can show me a correlation between identity cards and a reduction in terrorism in those countries, I will support them.
We also hear about identity fraud. Again, I would like to see statistical evidence that there is more identity fraud in this country than in countries that have ID cards. I ask noble Lords to show me the facts. Most identity fraud now occurs online, and in the countries that I have just talked about national ID cards are not used to prove your identity in commercial transactions.
Benefit fraud and taxation fraud, which the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, talked about, have been given as reasons for bringing in ID cards. Most people do not lie about their identity in such cases; they lie about their financial circumstances. So, again, I ask noble Lords who support the introduction of ID cards to give me the facts which show that in countries with ID cards there is less taxation fraud and less benefit fraud.
Perhaps I may put it to the noble Lord that, if the nature of the population of a particular country changes for whatever reason, his argument falls apart because one is not comparing like with like.
My Lords, I am comparing like with like, because those who argue that ID cards work are suggesting that somehow the problems that they have suggested will be reduced. The noble Lord next to me made it very clear that he did not believe that they would wipe out these problems, but I am asking for the evidence that shows that they will reduce them: that is all I am asking for. I accept that they will not wipe them out or get rid of them, but I wish to know whether there is scientific evidence in those countries that shows that these problems have been reduced—because if there is not, we do not have a problem and our system works in a comparable way to that of other nations.
The last thing I will say on this issue, because I do not have time to go into the civil liberties argument, is that it is really important for British civil liberties and freedom. Part of what makes us British—the British values that some go on about—is freedom, and the state not having overall control of our identity. In dealing with this issue—and particularly crime and terrorism, where recently this debate has come up most—we would be undermining the very British values of freedom and civil liberty, and the criminals and terrorists would have won, if we were forced to have compulsory ID cards.
My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, for securing this debate and continuing an exchange which we had when he raised his Question in your Lordships’ House recently.
At the outset, let me say that I may well disappoint the noble Lord by the nature of my response, because the Government’s position is that identity cards as described—and certainly as introduced by the previous Labour Government—failed essential tests in that they were expensive. I realise that the sums talked about— £85 million—may not in the current scheme of things seem large, but back in times of austerity in 2010 they were very significant. Where something was not delivering the expected benefits, the decision was made to use that funding elsewhere.
I totally agree with the noble Lord’s analysis of a growing problem. We need to look at it very carefully. A number of noble Lords spoke about the changing nature of commerce and the way the state interacts with citizens, which raise a number of serious questions about how we establish our identity and keep services and information safe. That is why the Government issue a number of identity documents at present. Some 54 million people—84% of the population—have a passport. Increasingly, those passports carry biometric data, which can be used at special e-border gates that are being introduced. Sixty per cent of the population carry a photo driving licence. I understand that that does not apply to the noble Lords, Lord Berkeley and Lord Harris, but a large proportion of the population does.
Several noble Lords rightly pointed to the fact that, outside of identity cards, there is an EU agreement that all people coming from outside the EEA into that area for a period in excess of six months should be required to have a biometric residence permit. So far, 2 million of those documents have been issued. Moreover, there is a similar European requirement for an application registration card for those claiming asylum in any EEA member country. That applies in this country as well.
I should say at this point that I fully support the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, about collaboration with our European colleagues on security grounds being critical to the safety and security of people in this country. I shall come to some of the measures to which he referred later.
The first point is that there are already a large number of established and robust identity documents. The British passport is recognised as a gold standard in the international community, in terms of its ability to frustrate the fraudsters and those who would seek to copy these documents. Then there is the legislation we introduced just last year on specialist printing presses, which ought to be clamped down on—and the penalties should be increased.
So we have, first, already a large number of identity documents that could be called upon in certain circumstances to establish and verify people’s identity.
Would the Minister confirm that there are no biometric data in the form to which I referred in my contribution for those 600 UK citizens who have gone to join ISIS and who may well return to the United Kingdom in the near future to carry out terrorist offences? Would he confirm that we do not hold biometric data on those persons, unless they committed a crime in the United Kingdom in the period before they left to go to Syria or Iraq?
In the strict way in which the noble Lord poses the question, of course, the answer would be—
Well, in one way, of course, that would be the answer. But let me unfold this, if I can. First, as a result of the counterterrorism legislation that we introduced last year, the Government are now able to intervene and seize someone’s passport before they actually leave the country. Secondly, as a result of that legislation there is the ability to have a controlled or managed return for the individual to this country. Additional passenger name recognition registration information needs to be supplied in advance, and since April, we have introduced exit checks for people leaving this country. Therefore, those people would have needed genuine passports, which would have been checked at the border.
We do not know the specific type of passports they were travelling with in that instance. But additional elements have been introduced to improve our security, and I may just go through a few of them. Certainly, the passenger name records directive was agreed at the Justice and Home Affairs Council following the Paris attacks last year. We have the biometric residence permit, the application registration card, and the Prüm requirements for the exchange of databases. We are part of the Schengen information-sharing system with our European colleagues, and we are going to be part of the second-generation Schengen system. We are part of the European criminal records information system for sharing data across borders. Of course, I appreciate that people will feel that additional information is required, which is one reason why we are introducing the Investigatory Powers Bill. We are also investing heavily in our border security: £380 million of investment is going into the borders and immigration citizenship system, and the digital services for the border security programme, to which we have committed. We have committed an additional £64.5 million to the Channel ports to improve security there, and we have announced a further £1.9 billion to be spent on intelligence and security matters.
My Lords, I am indebted to all noble Lords who have spoken. To the Liberal Democrats who spoke during the debate I say that I fully recognise the traditional commitment to civil liberties of the Liberal Party and its successor, the Liberal Democrats, but I ask them to ponder my case. If my liberty is compromised due to the unfettered and unaccountable actions of another, I have been subject to an injustice. In those circumstances the card helps protect my liberty. That is at the heart of the case that many of us have put. I therefore say to the Liberal Democrats that it may be that in these times they have the whole argument the wrong way round and that they should be thinking more in terms of protecting those whose liberty is accosted or compromised.
The comments made by the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, on the inaccuracy of biometrics were very interesting. Would he refer me after the debate or at some later stage to the sources of that information? I promise him that I shall read them in some detail. I thank the noble Earl, Lord Attlee, for his comments on DNA and, in particular, for his reference to the National DNA Database being secure. Of course, he acted as a Minister here for a department that was responsible for that area of government policy.
I thank my noble friend Lord Berkeley for reinforcing my comment that survival without ID in the United Kingdom is possible; indeed, you can operate outside the system without paying taxes while enjoying all the services. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Blair of Boughton, for pointing out that the ID card could be a powerful tool in investigating criminal activity.
I fully support my noble friend Lord Simon’s comments on the need to expedite criminal background checks. That is a problem at the moment and the card would certainly help in doing that.
I am very interested in the advanced thinking and perceptive thoughts of my noble friend Lord Maxton, who talked about smartcards for all and, ultimately, the chip in the hand. Can we imagine a society in which we will have a chip in the arm or hand which holds all these data and which itself replaces the card?
Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, has given me another subject to put on my list of benefits—that is, the benefits within the prison system of greater access to prisoner identity and how that helps the prisoner, not only the prison system. I am very grateful for the debate and I thank noble Lords.
(8 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberI do not have a specific answer, but I can write to the noble Baroness with details from the communiqué that was produced after the summit. At the summit the EU announced the prospect of a €3 billion package, while the Prime Minister has announced a payment of £275 million to help Turkey secure its southern border in order to reduce the flow of migrants into the European Union. However, I will certainly send a copy of the communiqué to the noble Baroness.
My Lords, is the Minister actually suggesting that the PKK is not part of the coalition attacking Daesh?
What I am saying is that the PKK is a proscribed organisation in terms of the global coalition against Daesh. It is not part of that coalition. There are Kurdish groups in the coalition, and I have mentioned the PYD and the Peshmerga in the Kurdish autonomous region of northern Iraq. The reason is that our main ally in the fight against Daesh in the efforts to stem the flow of migration is Turkey, so we need to maintain strong links with our key NATO ally, and indeed EU aspirant.
(8 years, 12 months ago)
Lords Chamber
To ask Her Majesty’s Government what further consideration they are giving to introducing national identity cards.
My Lords, the Government have no plans to reintroduce identity cards for British citizens.
My Lords, I am sorry to hear that. Nearly all European countries now have national identity cards. Germany’s latest card, which is highly secure, includes a digital photo, an electronic data function and biometric data, which can include a fingerprint. In these difficult circumstances, when identity is at the heart of our problems, should not all the political parties now reconsider their positions on the introduction of national identity cards? If other European countries can have confidence in their ID card systems, why cannot we do the same? Times are changing—the world is very different.
The noble Lord will be aware that we have had this debate before. The decision that was taken to abolish the national identity register and identity cards, which had been introduced by the previous Labour Government, was done on two grounds: first, on cost, because it cost £85 million to run and nearly £1 billion was required to maintain the register; and secondly, in terms of effectiveness, because the very people whose identity we might want to have would be the last people in the queue to comply with the requirement for the ID card. That is not to say that we are not doing anything about that; we are simply saying that we have a different approach. We have passports and driving licences—84% of the population have passports and over 60% have driving licences—and all people who come from outside the EEA to live in the UK for a period in excess of six months are required to have a biometric permit to do so.
(9 years ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Baroness is right to return to this key concern that we all share for the British citizens on the ground. She is quite right that the numbers have varied. That is partly due to the fact that some numbers and details come from the tour operators and other people have gone there of their own accord, perhaps visiting or passing through the country. The figure that the media are primarily using is 20,000. That is the figure at which we are looking at the highest level. Some may well be there serving and working throughout Egypt. It is not possible to give an exact number now. Nevertheless, we are fully aware of the assessments and working very closely with the carriers.
She asked about the airlines. This morning, we have had the airlines working with us at the Department for Transport. They are working together and with the Government. I acknowledge, as did the Secretary of State, the incredible support and co-operation that they are giving to the Government and to the authorities and in particular to the people on the ground.
She rightly raised the issue of those who, financially, could not afford to make arrangements. Again, through the airlines we are working to ensure that anyone whose flights are delayed, or who are delayed in the resort, are also catered for without extra financial hardship. She is also aware from her own experience that there is a specific fund that has been created to deal with these issues, the hardship fund. We believe that the combination of factors, working together with the airline operators and the Egyptian authorities, will enable us to address the primary concerns and to facilitate the safe departure of all those who wish to leave the resort as soon as possible.
She raised the valid point about this being a Russian plane. I can assure the noble Baroness that this afternoon, following the visit by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Transport and Foreign Office representatives to the Russian ambassador, the Prime Minister will be speaking to Mr Putin directly. Without pre-empting what the Prime Minister or President may discuss, I am sure that during the course of those discussions we shall, as we do when such tragedies happen around the world, seek to extend whatever assistance we can from the British Government.
My Lords, the noble Lord did not address the issue of forensics that was raised by my noble friend directly. The subtext to his Statement is that the evidence of a device on board is not forensic; otherwise, the Government would probably have placed the information in the public domain. Therefore, we must presume that it was intelligence based. We know that the evidence of intelligence information is not going to be placed in the public domain, but in so far as the Egyptian economy is going to be quite badly damaged as a result of this and we know that there have been protests from Ministers in the Egyptian Government, surely we owe it to them at least to give the Egyptian Government some information, not as to the source but as to what intelligence information we may have gained that has led us to take the decision that we have taken?
I assure the noble Lord that the situation with regard to forensics is ongoing and evolving as more details emerge, which we will provide when that is possible. We have made a Statement to the House today. I have also shared with noble Lords the fact that two COBRA meetings have occurred. As the noble Lord is aware, it is not just the President meeting our Prime Minister today; other officials are also attending. Those meetings will be used to share information and our concerns. We will use this opportunity to discuss this matter with them. Notwithstanding some of the media reports, the reciprocal arrangements that we had in place with Egypt before this tragedy occurred have worked well. We have a good relationship with the Egyptian Government. The respective authorities have been extremely co-operative throughout yesterday and during the last day or so. The common cause and concern we all share is to identify and, more importantly, address the exact reason why this tragedy occurred. The noble Lord is also right to point out that this is based on the intelligence that the Government have received thus far. However, I cannot go into more detail on that. I reiterate that after the COBRA meeting today the Prime Minister said specifically that our hearts and sympathy go out to the Egyptian people. However, as I repeated at the start of the Statement, our primary concern—I am sure the noble Lord shares that—must rightly be for UK citizens. That is what we are putting first.
(9 years ago)
Lords ChamberWe have stated that there is a double lock, and it is just that. Without both the judge and the Secretary of State giving their approval, it simply cannot happen. Some details are being published today in terms of draft codes of practice, and more information will be fleshed out, in co-operation with the Ministry of Justice, the Lord Chief Justice and, crucially of course, the judicial commissioners themselves, as to how this process will work in an effective and speedy way.
If the judge, in the explanation just given by the Minister, can effectively veto the Secretary of State’s decision, where does accountability lie?
Accountability lies in that it was the Secretary of State, first, who made the decision and that is then checked by a judge. That would be the element of public accountability in that circumstance, but we are talking particularly about warrants which are required in relation to intercept, which is the most intrusive form of investigation power, not necessarily the communications data.
(9 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberI look toward my noble friend the Chief Whip. I am sure that with his professionalism in these matters he will table debates accordingly.
My Lords, have the Government considered the possibility that in 30 to 50 years’ time hundreds of millions of Chinese, Indians and others from developing parts of the world will be flying into Europe? Are we sure, with the nonsense of this Heathrow expansion, that it would actually be big enough? Would it not be better to go down the “Boris Island” route and have something proper built for the future?
I am sure that my honourable friend in the other place has noted the noble Lord’s support for his proposal. People will be flying in from all over the world, as they do today and indeed as my father did from India 50 years ago. That will continue to happen 50 years from now. What is important is that the report highlights the options that we need to undertake up to 2015 and beyond.
(9 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe juxtaposed controls were introduced in response to the situation at the Sangatte camp. Some interesting things are going on at an international and even a European level—for example, the idea of trying to create secure areas within north Africa where people could be safely returned to and where their applications, if they were genuine, could be processed and tested. We should certainly look more closely at an idea of that kind.
My Lords, in the event of the Italian authorities giving temporary residency to boat people coming in from north Africa and landing on Italian shores, what would the position be at Calais? Would be we able turn those people back?
There is an issue in relation to Italy. We would like to see the Italian authorities recognise that they have a major crisis on their hands and take care to ensure that, when people arrive in Italy, they are fingerprinted, registered and recorded as the Dublin regulations require. Her Majesty’s Government’s position is that, if that were to happen in Italy, it would reduce the flows heading north beyond that area.
(10 years ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord asked about surveillance. We are part of the general effort, through Eurosur, which is the surveillance component of Frontex. We have offered to provide additional services if they are called upon. Eurosur is doing a lot of work in that area through drones, exactly as the noble Lord suggests. Through our partnerships in-country, particularly in Syria, we are trying to head this off at source by making people aware of the Syrian resettlement programme and other UNHCR resettlement programmes, of which our Government are a part.
My Lords, the country in the front line in dealing with this problem is Italy. In so far as many of the people crossing the Mediterranean are intending to come to the United Kingdom, what support are we giving the Italian Government to deal with the problem?
(10 years, 12 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Deben, in his amendment. I have no objection to people who wish to exercise their democratic right by demonstrating. However, while they have that right, I believe that those of us who work in the Palace of Westminster, and particularly those who work in offices on the West Front, have an equal right to work in an environment that is not polluted by electronically enhanced voices and music at volumes which, at times, become unbearable.
On one occasion during the passage of the Welfare Reform Bill, my noble friend Lady Finlay and I were trying to write speeches on behalf of those who were bellowing through a loudspeaker outside our window. We put on our coats and went to ask, politely, the young lady who was making the noise if she would kindly modulate it. Her response was to ask why we could not wear ear-plugs. After we had spent some time trying to explain to those involved that they were defeating their objective, they finally conceded and stood or sat quietly for the rest of the afternoon. I have no objection to that sort of demonstration.
Without doubt, those demonstrating for several days while we were debating the same-sex marriage Bill excelled themselves. I will never again hear “I’m Getting Married in the Morning”, or the rival “Amazing Grace”, without cringing. After several days of torment, I tried the noise pollution officer at Westminster City Council. He said that it was not his responsibility but was a police matter. I was told to dial 111. The police said that they could do nothing as the demonstrators were acting within their rights. Unfortunately, noble Lords and officials who work in the West Front offices cannot simply pick up a pen and pad and move to a quieter location; we are somewhat tied to our desks by computers, phones and files—a captive audience, in other words.
The amendment does not stop those who wish to demonstrate, nor would I wish that to happen. Members of another place, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, told us, successfully moved the noise from their environs. We have only this amendment between us and our sanity.
My Lords, I intervene briefly to strongly support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Deben. I refer back to two previous contributions that I made on this subject over recent years and, in particular, to correspondence from Councillor Colin Barrow of Westminster City Council. When the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill was going through Parliament, he wrote to the department expressing concern about how it would operate. This was at a time when, as the noble Lord may recall, the square was inhabited—if I may use that term—by a lot of protesters who were setting up tents and making a lot of noise. At that time, I did not make the proposal that I want to make today. I am using this amendment as a peg on which to promote a principle.
We all believe in the right to demonstrate but we are concerned about noise. We know that people on the West Front—particularly officials of the political parties who work in offices there—have a lot of problems when demonstrations take place, especially during the summer months when they wish to open their windows and, of course, the noise becomes even more prevalent. As Colin Barrow proposed in his correspondence of some years ago, it may be possible to manage the whole square or the green areas in front of Parliament in a better way.
I propose that we establish a centre on one of those pieces of land where people can apply to put up their stands on behalf of various campaigns, perhaps on a rotational basis, months in advance. It would be a lobbying building for Parliament and it would give people the opportunity to recognise that we want to help them protest, but in an organised way. In doing so, we would support the principles set out by Councillor Colin Barrow of Westminster City Council when he asked for a more properly managed square-control arrangement.
I know that the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Deben, is more tightly defined—he is dealing with a narrower area—but I believe that we should think in terms of something more organised whereby organisations throughout the country can apply to demonstrate. At the moment, in the Upper Committee Corridor we effectively have a more organised arrangement which people can apply to use, but they cannot demonstrate. I want something a little more aggressive than what is available with the displays there, so that people can put their case. Instead of MPs simply driving past and not being able to read the signs or hear what is being said because the noise is overwhelming, there would be a place where MPs or Peers could stroll over, walk through the centre, see who had their stands there, talk to the lobbyists and then leave. That would be a far more sensible operation. I am not asking for it to be set up tomorrow, but in the longer term, it would be wise if we were to set off down that road. I support the noble Lord’s amendment.
My Lords, the loud-hailing which took place in Parliament Square was a disgrace. Most of us who have fought elections at council and parliamentary level have used loud-hailing equipment. When that equipment goes above a certain noise level, it becomes a breach of the peace. It is not the first time. When we have been out on the hustings, we have been reminded of that.
That strange character sat in Parliament Square for 10 years, and all sorts of organisations tried to help: the Greater London Council, Westminster Council, the police, Parliament and even the Home Office. Legislation went through both Houses, but it was not strong enough, and the judges said, “No. The chap who is there”—I forget his name—“can use the pavement because it is not really a pavement in the proper sense of the word”. All I can say is that if somebody were sitting outside their house, they would find good legal cause to get rid of him after 10 years.
The other place found arrangements to prevent loud-hailing at that end, but it cannot speak for this autonomous body. That is why the demonstrators have moved up. However, if anyone uses a loud-hailer that gets above a certain level, they are being a nuisance. Even the media agreed with that. The people who had been aggravated most by the person who was on the loud-hailer all day and every day, the character who stood there for 10 years, were those in the Press Gallery. When Parliament went into Recess, people from the Press Gallery went out and told the person concerned in no uncertain terms, “Please stop”.
I support the amendment. An overall body should get control of this situation because the difficulty that Westminster Council had was that its only way of stopping the noise was if the sound level went above a certain decibel level. It had to come along with its testing equipment, and it could have been that the wind was in a different direction or whatever. I know that this amendment is tight. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, suggested we should have a stall where people could come and demonstrate. No one is stopping demonstrations, but this is my understanding of a demonstration: the first time I had a demonstration at Parliament, I was a young trade unionist; I had a day off work; we travelled down in the morning by train; and at night we went back on the train and were away. It was not permanent.
Parliament Square is like a park. It is a lovely place where people should be able to take their family. There should not be a stall there. The place should be enjoyed by everyone. Millions have been spent on Westminster Abbey; millions have been spent on St Margaret’s Church, with which we have a close connection; and, of course, millions have been spent on both Houses, Portcullis House and the other extensions. If it is not already the case, the whole area should be a world heritage site. We should not have someone coming along with a loud-hailer that is so loud that people cannot get on with their proper business in the offices.
My Lords, this has been a very good small debate on what I consider to be a very important subject. My noble friend has done the House a great favour by raising this important matter for us to debate. I will not mention all those who have spoken but, without exception, all noble Lords have recognised the issue that we have to deal with. I hope I can demonstrate that the Government are looking for a positive way forward on this.
I am sure that many other noble Lords besides those who have spoken will have strong views on the noise generated by the demonstrations that take place in the vicinity of the Palace of Westminster. We have, of course, been here before. As noble Lords have pointed out, legislation to deal with such demonstrations was first passed in the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005. We should not forget just how contentious that legislation was, which is why it was repealed and replaced with more proportionate measures in the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011, to which my noble friend referred.
My noble friend and the Committee will be sensitive to the need, before passing further legislation, to be very careful about taking any action that may impact disproportionately on people’s right to protest and their freedom of speech. However, I recognise the gross disturbance which amplified sound is now bringing to otherwise legitimate demonstrations. The proximity to the working offices of the House of Lords makes it difficult for Peers, officers of the House and staff to conduct their parliamentary duties. A number of noble Lords have referred to that.
With the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 having addressed the problems in Parliament Square, noble Lords may feel that some of those problems have been displaced, particularly to the small area around the George V Memorial and the surrounding lawns and paving, as referred to in the amendment. Perhaps it would help noble Lords if I describe the law as it applies for areas away from Parliament Square. The 2011 Act strengthened local authorities’ by-law-making powers, in particular by including a power to seize items used in connection with the contravention of a by-law. Westminster City Council and the Royal Parks authority updated their by-laws immediately after the relevant provisions of the 2011 Act were brought into force. The by-laws include measures to deal with tents, structures and excess noise.
These by-laws, in many ways, already have the effect intended by this amendment. Westminster City Council by-laws and the Royal Parks by-laws contain strict noise control provisions covering Old Palace Yard and surrounding areas such as Abingdon Green. The by-laws state that a person should not make or allow to be caused any noise which is so loud or so continuous as to give reasonable cause for annoyance to others in the area. But here is the rub: the enforcement of by-laws is a matter for Westminster City Council and, ultimately, the police. Suspected breach of a by-law could lead to arrest and prosecution. In taking any enforcement decisions, the authorised officers or the police would take into account the need to allow a right to protest outside Parliament. Achieving a balance seems to be part of the difficulty. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, has suggested an idea that recognises this to try to avoid the gross disruption experienced currently. I do not know. Some noble Lords have questioned what he has proposed, but I thank him for giving us a possible solution.
There is a precedent for building on sensitive land within the area of Westminster; that is, the proposal being made by both Houses to build an educational centre of 6,000 square feet on Victoria Tower Gardens, which is the subject of a lot of debate at the moment. The proposal I am making is not that it would be one exhibitor; there might be a dozen exhibitors on rotation, drawing on different organisations, coming in nationally. Members of Parliament and Peers would visit in those circumstances because it would be a lobbying centre, and it would set a precedent that I think might be mirrored by other parliaments.
I thank the noble Lord for elaborating on what he is thinking. I thank him, genuinely, for trying to think positively about how to handle the rightful expression and the disruption to which Members, staff and officers of this House are currently subject because of the excessive noise.
Of course, there are further provisions. The Public Order Act 1986 allows the police to place conditions on static protests or demonstrations. The Environmental Protection Act 1990 allows the police to deal with noise issues. But enforcement lies at the bottom of all these measures at present, and the police need to balance the management of disruption caused by any protest against people’s right to protest—I think we would all accept that.
The police have sufficient powers under the Public Order Act, and the police and Westminster City Council can enforce by-laws that cater for noise issues around the Palace of Westminster. The issue, therefore, is how the existing by-laws are enforced. One would have to say that this is an operational matter for the police and Westminster City Council. That said, I fully recognise the degree of distress caused by the repeated use of musical instruments, loud-hailers and amplifiers in the areas adjoining your Lordships’ House and the disruptive effect that can have. I have been told—and we have heard today—of Peers evacuating their offices to work elsewhere, and of another who has been made to feel physically ill as a result of the noise. This cannot be tolerated.
I propose to my noble friend that he and I meet the Metropolitan Police and Westminster City Council to discuss this issue ahead of Report to examine a way forward in dealing with this problem. I suggest that we also include the Dean of Westminster Abbey. As my noble friend has pointed out, the abbey is also subject to the gross disturbance that amplified sound is now bringing to some demonstrations.
(12 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I hope that Members, wherever they are in the Palace of Westminster, will make a point of listening to this debate as it is a very important one and raises an issue which has been under continuing discussion, certainly in the House of Commons but outside it as well, over the past 14 years. The issue is very simple: the Intelligence and Security Committee—the ISC—which comprises Members of the Commons and of the Lords and which monitors the agencies responsible for national security, is to be reorganised. The Government propose that it should comprise a committee of parliamentarians constitutionally detached from Parliament: that is, an arm’s-length committee.
My Amendment 1 proposes full Select Committee status for the ISC, thus enabling it to enjoy the absolute protection of privilege conveyed under Article 9 of the Bill of Rights 1689. Amendments 2 and 4 in the next group in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Butler, seek to graft on to the Government’s arm’s-length committee proposal all the rights and privileges of a full Select Committee. The Government claim that they can do this under some highly controversial statutory provision which lawyers believe could be overturned in the courts.
The issue for the House today is simple: why is there all this ducking and weaving by the Government to avoid giving the ISC full Select Committee status, which is what my amendment seeks to do? The noble Lord, Lord Henley, who was the Minister when these matters were considered in Committee, argued that the Government’s proposal for the arm’s-length committee was to ensure that safeguards are in place to protect against the disclosure of sensitive information, retain a statutory ability to prevent publication of sensitive material, ensure that the most sensitive material can be withheld from the committee and to ensure that safeguards exist so there is adequate provision for those exceptional circumstances where the disclosure of information even to the chairman would be damaging to national security. I find that quite remarkable. The Government also seek to ensure that, as regards appointments to that committee, there is little risk of unauthorised disclosure. I argue that all these safeguards are fully and equally available under Select Committee status without any potential challenge on parliamentary privilege.
There are three issues to be considered: the confidence of the public in the new arrangements; the practicality in terms of protecting national security; and, finally, privilege itself. On the confidence of the public I can do no more than quote the very wise words of the noble Lord, Lord Deben, in Committee. He said:
“The issue is the confidence of the public in this committee”.
He added:
“The advantage of a Select Committee is primarily that it is something that people know and it has, over the years, established a position, as a concept, of independence”.
He asked:
“Is it not better to use the strength of the Select Committee process and procedure and, above all, of public understanding rather than to try to create something special?”.—[Official Report, 9/7/12; cols. 925-6.]
I could not put it better myself.
On practicality, my amendments provide a choice. We could put this whole arrangement into statute with the consequential deletions of Clauses 1 to 4, or we could proceed by way of a series of parliamentary resolutions, which is my preferred option. Let me explain.
I believe that Parliament could carry resolutions that would make the committee as hermetically sealed as the structure that currently exists. We are told that such a committee could not be prevented from taking evidence in public session. In response, I argue that a resolution of both Houses could introduce a general prohibition on the Select Committee taking evidence in public. It could further place a requirement on the committee to seek the permission of the appropriate agencies and the Prime Minister in conditions of dispute. As prime ministerial appointees, members are currently responsible for reporting collectively to the Prime Minister. It is argued that such limited powers to report would not be possible if the committee were appointed by the legislature. There is no reason why the resolutions of both Houses should not stipulate the procedure to be used in the publication of reports. They could require the committee to publish its report subject to sidelining by the Prime Minister, as happens today, for reasons of national security. A resolution of both Houses could require that the committee sought the approval of the appropriate agency before reporting to the House. The resolutions could further provide that, in the event of a dispute arising between the agency and the committee over reports to the House, the matter could be referred again to the Prime Minister and the committee could be required to comply with his or her decision.
It is argued that although a Select Committee is neither more nor less likely than the ISC to leak, as a Select Committee it would have the right to publish reports in a way that could prove prejudicial to the interests of national security. A resolution of the House could introduce in response to that problem a general prohibition on the Select Committee publishing reports without approval. It could further place a requirement on the committee to seek the permission of the appropriate agency and the Prime Minister in conditions of dispute. Safeguards would be available for every eventuality in the event that it were to be created a full Select Committee of Parliament. If, in unforeseen circumstances, the committee, or any member of it, threatened to breach the committee’s rules and procedure, as agreed by the House in resolutions, it would always be open to the Leader of the House, on the instructions of the Prime Minister, to dissolve the committee or remove any member of it on a resolution, if managed with caution.
It is also argued that a move to a parliamentary arrangement could lead to greater pressure on Ministers to be accountable as witnesses with less emphasis on agency heads giving evidence. The argument is not supported by an examination of practices in some of the other committees of the House. All that is possible by way of resolutions in the House of Lords and House of Commons. I also argue that the committee needs increased powers to call persons and papers and to communicate with other committees. There are times when the information that comes before the committee should, in certain circumstances, be referred to other Select Committees, but, of course, with the permission of the agencies.
The ISC also needs the power to take evidence under oath. Select Committees have that power. It would not take all evidence under oath but it should at least have the power to do so. As I say, Select Committees have that power but the ISC does not. Without going into any details, there are times when the committee, if assurances were given under oath, might have the confidence, with the approval of the Prime Minister, to make statements that would be extremely helpful during the course of public debate and in the exercise of reassuring public opinion, which in my view is a very important consideration. Again, all that is possible by way of parliamentary resolution or statute, if that be the will of Parliament.
To nail my case to the mast, I call in aid the wise words of that old parliamentary sage, the former clerk of the House of Commons, Mr W R McKay, who, in a letter to me of 21 July 1998—14 years ago—told me:
“You asked for my comments on the attached paper about a possible Select Committee on Security and Intelligence. The general premise in the paper, that select committees are creatures of the House is correct, and the House may, either in the committee’s order of reference or by instruction, require a committee to sit in private or to take evidence or report in a particular manner. Thus the House could, if it so decided, require a committee to obtain the consent of an external body (you suggest the Prime Minister, or a relevant agency) before publishing particular evidence or, conceivably, before publishing a report … the interpretation of the order of reference of a select committee is a matter for the committee itself to decide”.
He quotes page 633 of Erskine May, the 2012 edition of which is updated on page 635—I checked this morning. He then sets the precedents for such a committee, going back to 1837: to name but a few, the Joint-stock Banks Select Committee of 1837, the National Expenditure Select Committee of 1939-40, and the Special Commission on Oil Sanctions of 1978-79. This is a former clerk to the House of Commons indicating to me that this is possible
If Amendment 1 were to be carried, there would be discussions in the House of Commons. It would probably come back with a decision and an announcement to the House that it intended to set up a committee by way of parliamentary resolutions, so none of those issues would arise.
I hope that I can reassure my noble friend and the noble Lord that I intend to use my eloquence so that the House is not presented with this issue of confusion. That must be my task, and I will pray in aid the words of the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell. I hope that the House will not mind if I quote him at length. In Committee, he said:
“I think we all agree that the ultimate purpose is that the public should have confidence in the committee’s scrutiny of the intelligence services. However, it was clear from the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, that if this were to be a Select Committee, it would have to be hedged around by a very large number of parliamentary resolutions, and that would have the same effect as the constraints that are written into the Bill. The question is: would that make it more convincing if it were a Select Committee when it was a Select Committee unlike any other because it would be so inhibited by those restraints?
They say that something which looks like a duck and quacks like a duck can be regarded as being a duck, but this would not look like or quack like a Select Committee; it would be something completely separate”.—[Official Report, 9/7/12; cols. 933-34.]
I hope noble Lords understand why I wished to quote the noble Lord; it was such a brilliant précis of the position.
I can see much force in that argument. It was reinforced today by the noble Lord and by the former chairman of the ISC, the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, and my noble friend Lord King of Bridgwater.
The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, raised the question of parliamentary privilege. It may be possible to give the committee bespoke statutory immunities that would provide it with protections which would replicate aspects of privilege. The noble Lord said that that might well be what the Government are proposing, but it would not be the same as legislating to provide the same privileges for the committee. If the ISC were given privilege by statute, as the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, said, that might encourage courts to rule on proceedings in Parliament. Courts already rule on this question. The Supreme Court judgment in the recent Regina v Chater case is an example of that. For instance, it might be possible to give protection for witnesses before the ISC so that the evidence they give to the ISC in good faith cannot be used against them in criminal, civil or disciplinary proceedings. The Government are considering whether that is a viable approach and whether it is the best approach to tackle this issue. We may bring forward amendments to deal with this issue at a later date.
The addition of the “of Parliament” amendment, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, and the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian—accepted in principle by the Government and to which we will come presently—would have a number of consequences. One possible consequence is that the ISC would have the power to take evidence on oath. This, in turn, raises the possibility that those who intentionally mislead the committee, while giving evidence under oath, would be subject to the same sort of sanctions which might apply in similar circumstances to a witness before a Select Committee. If, on further analysis, that is not a consequence of that amendment, we would be content to look at whether there is the need for a provision in the Bill to make clear that the ISC may take evidence on oath. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, will be happy not to move his amendment in the light of what I have described of the Government’s position on these matters of privilege.
I turn to Amendment 30, which again is tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, and relates to the role of the Intelligence Services Commissioner.
That is an error on my behalf. I tabled it over the weekend when we were not here. I will not move that amendment.
My Lords, I apologise for that and will move on to deal with the substantive issue. The work of the commissioner is a different role from that of the committee. Of course, it complements it. I hope that we will be able to use our ability to enhance it and ensure that it continues to meet our needs. The Government believe in strengthening oversight and, clearly, the commissioner has a role in that.
On the basis of the arguments that I have presented, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have participated in this debate. In my response, I want to dwell on something that the noble Lord, Lord Taylor of Holbeach, slipped into the middle of a sentence. He used the word “aspects” of privilege. The distinction between what I am calling for here—Article 9 protection under the 1689 Act—as against what he is proposing, is full privilege for a Select Committee of Parliament to be known as the intelligence and security services Select Committee.
When I talk about full privilege, I am not talking about some qualification of freedom of information legislation, which I suspect is what the Government and perhaps even the noble Lord, Lord Butler, have in mind, but about full privilege under the Act: rights of access to documents covered by privilege; rights to call Ministers covered by privilege; rights to hold in contempt covered by parliamentary privilege; rights to insist on evidence being taken under oath, if necessary, under parliamentary privilege; rights to have witnesses protected from the courts; rights to have Members protected from assault on free speech; and protection of Members against a threat of intimidation or any undue pressure which prejudices their rights to act freely as Members of Parliament.
These are rights contained in Article 9 of the Bill of Rights, which I do not believe that it will be possible for the Government to allocate as they propose, whether under the statutory provision which we have been talking about up until today or the amendment of the freedom of information legislation, which is the debate going on behind the scenes.
I would like to deal with the issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, when he talked about transfer of responsibility from the Executive to the Speaker. As I understand it, under the arrangements that the Government propose, instead of a Speaker’s Certificate being required in an FOI case there would be a ministerial certificate. This House is full of lawyers, and I am not a lawyer—but am I mistaken in thinking that a ministerial certificate can be overturned by an information tribunal? That is what the law says, although I am not a lawyer and am ready to stand corrected. But if that is the case, it means that this is not an argument over whether you are simply transferring the responsibility from the Executive to the Speaker, potentially you are transferring it from the Executive, on matters of national security, to the information tribunal. Perhaps I am wrong but, even as a barrack-room lawyer, I think that I have got that right.
On the view expressed by my noble friend Lady Taylor of Bolton, I regard perception as extremely important in this whole discussion. Is a halfway house committee, detached from Parliament, more credible in terms of public perception than a full Select Committee of Parliament, circumscribed in the ways that I have suggested to the House in the course of moving my amendment?
I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, cannot support me today, but we are on the route. As I said to him before, privately, inevitably we will end up with a Select Committee—the question is when.
My noble friend Lady Smith of Basildon pointed to the precedent of a Select Committee on Defence in the House of Commons handling these matters in conditions of secrecy and dealing with them as if they were matters of national security, and secret. I understand that committees of this House have dealt in exactly the same way with very sensitive material and have not leaked; all I am asking is that those committees be replicated in a wider Select Committee, comprising Members of both Houses.
Finally, this is not a precedent. Countries throughout the western world have Parliaments that have Select Committees on intelligence. Some on occasion even meet in public—I have not advocated that. They do not leak, and when the members of our ISC travel abroad, as I did when I was on the committee for five years we often met Members of other Parliaments who sat on Select Committees in their Parliaments dealing with these matters. In the United States of America, in the Congress and the Senate, they have Select Committees. If they can do it, why cannot we? It is on that basis that I wish to test the opinion of the House on this amendment.
In moving Amendment 2, I wish to speak also to Amendment 4, with which it is grouped. I hope that I can deal with this group of amendments shortly because the Minister, rather unusually, dealt with them in his response to the previous group of amendments and asked me to withdraw them, which I will do.
However, if I have a complaint against the Government, it is that I moved these two amendments in Committee, seeking that the Intelligence and Security Committee should be described as the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament to emphasise its role as a servant of Parliament rather than as a servant of the Executive. I also moved Amendment 4 in Committee, which seeks to confer privilege on the committee. On that occasion the Minister—the noble Lord, Lord Henley—spoke sympathetically in response to both amendments, as, indeed, has the Minister today. The noble Lord, Lord Henley, said on 9 July, some four months ago:
“Noble Lords will understand from what I have said that there is a degree of sympathy for both amendments, and particularly the first, but more work needs to be done”.—[Official Report, 9/7/12; col. 918.]
Four months have passed and it seems that the Government have not done that work and reached a conclusion in amendments that they could put before the House today. That is a pity.
These are probing amendments. The Minister has said again that he is sympathetic to the addition of the words “of Parliament”. A more substantial issue is Amendment 4, which seeks to confer privilege on the Intelligence and Security Committee. As has come out in the earlier debate, there are genuine difficulties about that. I acknowledge that in response to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. I understand that the clerks of the two Houses of Parliament see difficulty in extending parliamentary privilege in this way.
On behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee, I want to make it clear that the safeguards that are provided by parliamentary privilege are essential—not parliamentary privilege itself. Provided those safeguards can be in the Bill—in other words, the protection of witnesses and the protection of the proceedings of the committee from judicial intrusion or the Freedom of Information Act—that is equally satisfactory. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours expressed some doubts about that and the Minister, in reply, said that there were aspects to be considered. It seems to me that it cannot be impossible for those protections to be provided statutorily in the Bill. Provided that is done, I would not seek, nor would the Intelligence and Security Committee seek, to press Amendment 4. I hope to hear from the Minister, if he does not mind repeating himself a little, that the Government will seek to provide those protections that the Intelligence and Security Committee needs in an alternative way from that of privilege. I beg to move.
I wish to intervene only very briefly, perhaps to rephrase the question about the ministerial certificate that I put during the course of my previous intervention. Is it true that the ministerial certificate could be overturned by a tribunal? Perhaps those in the Box can advise the Minister. If that is the case, it means that the responsibility has been transferred from the Executive to the tribunal, as against being transferred from the Executive to the Speaker. We should know whether that is the case.
If I am correct, the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, is suggesting that somehow that to which I am referring could be dealt with in the legislation whereby there would not be a right to challenge a ministerial certificate, as is the case with a Speaker’s certificate. When he talked about judicial intervention, perhaps he was referring specifically to that. As I understand the freedom of information legislation, it is not possible for a challenge to be mounted against a certificate granted by the Speaker. That is why I always felt that it was far better that the Speaker had that role, because the Speaker of the House of Commons would always uphold national security. It is inconceivable that a Speaker could not be trusted in these circumstances. It seemed to be being suggested that because this power was being transferred from the Executive to Parliament, it was placing something in jeopardy. On the contrary, I should have thought that the Speaker of the House of Commons—whoever that might be at any stage, now or in the future—could be thoroughly relied on to be as secure as the intelligence services themselves in protecting national security.
In one of his amendments, the noble Lord seeks to add the words “of Parliament”. Where we have a committee set up outside of Parliament—at arm’s length—are we saying that, in order to make it look as if it represents Parliament in some way, we simply tag “of Parliament” onto the end to give it the imprimatur of Parliament? As a concept, it is ridiculous and it abuses the institution. What other organisations or statutory bodies of such notable importance are going to be set up with these words simply added onto the end in order to give them some extra credibility? I am opposed to an amendment of that nature.
The noble Lord has repeatedly said, “We are considering”, and “It might be possible”. There is an element of doubt. It may be possible, but if it is not possible, are they then ruling out Select Committee status?
My Lords, I have every confidence that a solution to the issues and challenges of providing the necessary protection will be found. However, I was not intending to use this debate to present those conclusions to Parliament. I am sure the noble Lord will look forward with interest to hearing them in due course.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, for tabling these amendments. I hope he will feel able to withdraw this amendment in the light of my reassurances on progress.
My Lords, again I can speak quite briefly to the amendment, which provides that the chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee should be remunerated on a basis similar to that of chairs of Select Committees of the House of Commons.
I emphasise that the present chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee has not asked for this amendment to be brought forward. However, the members of the committee feel strongly that the chair has to do a large amount of work—as I am sure the noble Lord, Lord King, and the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, also did—and that it is an anomaly that, whereas other Members of the House of Commons who are chairs of Select Committees receive remuneration, the chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee does not.
As I understand it, the Government’s position is that this is, in these days, a matter for IPSA. However, I hope that they will be willing to put this issue to IPSA with their recommendation that it should consider it sympathetically. If the Minister is prepared to go as far as that, my colleagues and I on the Intelligence and Security Committee will be happy not to press the amendment.
My Lords, I vigorously support this amendment because it has always been my view that the chairman should be remunerated. I served under the chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, and he should have been remunerated, as indeed should my noble friend Lady Taylor of Bolton. However, what worries me a little is that the matter is to be left to IPSA. That is a very controversial proposition to put, not because IPSA is as unpopular in the Commons as we know it to be, but why should an organisation established to deal with parliamentary allowances and expenditure be required to deal with the expenditure of an outside body? This is the first body, but are we to presume that in the future IPSA will extend its tentacles to managing the financial arrangements of more bodies that are established under statute? Is this the beginning of the growth of IPSA into something even larger than the current organisation which is causing so much grief to Members of Parliament? I simply put the question. If a mechanism is to be found, perhaps I may suggest that IPSA is not the ideal organisation to proceed with this responsibility.
My Lords, I support what the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, has just said—in the knowledge that there is no back pay in this world. It does seem very weird to be considering this. I am not sufficiently familiar with the remit of IPSA, but although we have been arguing about the extent to which this committee is or is not part of Parliament, in the area of pay and rations it appears to have been put right inside it.
Perhaps I might respond to those two very rational and articulate contributions promoting the idea of a popular vote, as it were, in the House of Commons. I can see the benefits of that and those of ownership. The noble Baroness, Lady Williams, mentioned stakeholding in the House of Commons. However, it seems that at least four problems need to be thought through.
First, the amendment would explicitly exclude anyone from the House of Lords ever chairing this committee. In the previous debate, while not seeking it for this House, we envisaged the possibility that at some stage there might be someone appropriate in this House to chair it. As I read it, the amendment would effectively preclude anyone from the House of Lords—unless it is envisaged that there be a nomination process for this House but that nobody in this House has a vote; only the House of Commons has a vote. The noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, may have been about to suggest that that was possible. It would be a peculiarly quaint electoral procedure for those who were nominating candidates to be precluded from voting on them.
Secondly, it would almost inevitably undermine the possibility of another envisaged benefit of convention: of the place going to the Opposition. It would not preclude it but would make it much less likely that the tradition of the position going to a member of the Opposition would be carried through, if for no other reason than the Opposition being, by definition, a minority in the House of Commons. Anyone from the majority party would therefore have an enhanced ability to achieve the post.
Thirdly, I entirely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert. As someone who has held relatively recent ministerial experience, I can tell your Lordships that there is no way that the Prime Minister could veto a nomination for the chairmanship of this committee without it becoming a major issue—not least because the person thus vetoed would make it a major issue. Once that was out, there would be all sorts of demands, in terms of natural justice and fairness, to put into the public domain the reasons why a Prime Minister should think them so serious that he or she should veto a Member of Parliament—an honourable Member—who was considered unworthy or somehow deficient in integrity or in other skills from being chairman of this committee.
The fourth reason is that, having known the House of Commons relatively recently, I am not sure that this is a position on which we should envisage political campaigning, but I assure noble Lords that that is what we will get if this position is put up for a 100% franchise in the Commons. Therefore, having listened to what has been said, and appreciating what lies beneath the suggestion that there be an electoral college for this composed of the whole House of Commons, I think that before going down this road we would have to think very carefully about the consequences that would arise in the dynamism of real politics from such a decision.
My Lords, I want to argue both ways on this issue because I am of a very mixed mind. I shall start by taking on the case put by my noble friend Lord Reid, who said that it would become controversial and difficulties would arise if it were to be subsequently known by the wider public that there had been some dispute over whether the Prime Minister had been prepared to endorse the candidature of a particular candidate. I would have thought that these matters would be dealt with by the usual channels. The amendment refers to seeking,
“in advance of the ballot the formal consent of the Prime Minister”.
In other words, the Prime Minister would be asked discreetly through the usual channels whether he or she might be minded to endorse the candidature of a particular candidate or candidates, and in the event that there were to be a refusal I would not have thought that the candidate who had been refused would want it generally known that the Prime Minister of the day had turned down their prospective nomination for chairman.
I entirely disagree with my noble friend. Not only would the candidate want it to be known, they might well have a particular reason for wanting to be chairman of the intelligence committee and indeed might even, in a rather covert fashion, be pleased to have been refused the endorsement of the Prime Minister. I do not want to mention any particular such candidates in the House of Commons, but off the top of my head I can think of half a dozen.
If we go back to the speech of the noble Lord who moved the amendment, he never said that any Member of the House of Commons could stand. I had to disappear outside the Chamber for medical reasons, but I understand that the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, argued that any Member of the Commons should be able to stand. However, I do not think that that was the noble Lord’s suggestion. I am presuming that he was moving the amendment on the basis that there would be a membership of the committee that was put to the House on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, and from those members there would then be a person who, with the endorsement of the Prime Minister, could be chairman of the committee. We may be speaking at cross purposes and I stand to be corrected. If the noble Lord is indeed suggesting that any Member of the House could stand to be chairman of the ISC, then I would completely oppose that.
My purpose at this stage, and clearly the amendment has aroused a good deal of interest around the Chamber, was to ensure that we have the widest possible opportunity for people to stand. There are already provisions within the Bill about consultation between the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition and about the procedure, and I did not see those falling away. As to whether anyone would be absolutely precluded—probably not.
If it were indeed the whole House, then I would oppose the amendment, and I will explain why. I sat on the committee for five years when the chairman was the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater. In my experience, and this will be the experience of those members of the committee who now serve under the chairmanship of Malcolm Rifkind, I noticed that this relationship was very special. I balance the openness of the Select Committee with, on the other hand, the special nature of that relationship between the agencies and the chairman. There are circumstances in which I can imagine that relationship breaking down. That is why it is an extremely sensitive appointment. You must therefore have a narrower shortlist, to put it bluntly, than simply the membership of the whole House of Commons.
I have another argument as well, although perhaps I am doing somersaults here. I have a reservation. Subject to the shortlist that I have just referred to, I have argued in the past that not only is the relationship between the chairman and the agencies very special, but I would take it far further than the Government propose to provide for in the legislation. I believe that the chairman of the ISC should have access to everything that goes on within the agency—everything operational or whatever—and should be the only person on that committee who has total access. The legislation before us will provide a qualified element of access to operational material, but it will not provide for looking at the activities of the agencies in future. It will essentially be about retrospective operations. Ideally, in the committee that I would like to see constructed, the chairman would have access to everything—future, prospective, current and past operations—but would be the only member of the committee to do so. In those circumstances, the idea that any Member of the House of Commons could stand as chairman of the committee would be ludicrous.
As I say, I have very mixed views. If it comes to a vote, I shall probably vote for the amendment, in the hope that it is much harder to overturn a resolution in the House of Commons when it has come from the House of Lords than simply to initiate a debate on an amendment in the Commons. On that basis, I hope that the amendment is carried.
My Lords, I share some confusion over this amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, has asked whether it is intended that the chairman should come from a group that has already been put forward and proposed, while the noble Lord, Lord Reid, made the point about the membership of the House of Lords. As I read the Bill, you could end up with one Member of the Commons and eight Members of the Lords. That is pretty unlikely, but I can certainly see that we have moved from having one Member of the Lords as a member of the committee to having two. I can see a situation in which the new Opposition do extremely badly in an election and are very short of membership in the Commons but still have to man all the committees and so on. In those circumstances, they might well prefer it if they had one or two extremely well qualified members, perhaps recent Members who had lost their seat and moved into your Lordships’ House and who would be very useful members of the ISC.
Against that background, there would then be the problem, as the noble Lord, Lord Reid, has said, of whether or not the Commons should vote for Lords. I would trust the members of the committee, knowing the ways in which they have arrived on it, to be well capable of deciding who should be their chairman. That is well established practice, as we know from elsewhere. I therefore feel that, subject only to the qualification that the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert, raised, I support the idea that the chairman should be a member of the Opposition. I feel an amendment coming on at Third Reading, and that is one that the Government might like to prepare for.
That is not the issue that we are debating right now. If I may, I will have to come back to the noble Lord. I would think that that detail will be covered.
Can I help the Minister? Surely, if the committee has asked a department for information, it will know if it does not get it back that it has been refused. The issue is whether it will know which Minister refused the information.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for his assistance. That is absolutely right. If the committee requests the information, because the MoU will make it clear which Minister within a department is responsible for responding or deciding whether or not the department should provide that information, obviously the Minister has an obligation to respond to that request.