Scotland

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Monday 4th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)]

My Lords, if the noble Lord checks back to past Budgets, I think he will find that previous Chancellors from his side of the House put more of an increase on Scotch whisky, whereas this was an increase in line with RPI. If he looks at the Budget overall, he will see that the amount awarded to Scotland is actually significantly greater than at any other time since devolution.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, under this Government’s predecessor, with the SNP in government in Scotland, the relationship between Holyrood and Westminster was at best uneasy and too often characterised by mutual suspicion and sometimes open acrimony. Given Labour’s record on devolution, what lessons have been drawn from last month’s inaugural meeting of the Council of the Nations and Regions on resetting the relationship between the Scottish and UK Governments, which of course is a manifesto pledge?

Horn of Africa

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Tuesday 29th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I begin by commending, thanking and congratulating my noble friend Lady Harman of Peckham on her maiden speech today, a speech demonstrably characterised by great experience, wisdom and insight. I will not attempt to be the feminist from the male sex in this speech— I am too much of a coward in this environment.

Occasionally, I am deluded in regarding myself as an experienced parliamentarian, with 13 years in the other place and 11 years in your Lordships’ House, taking into account that I had a three-year leave of absence. However, next to someone who served in the House of Commons for 40 years—is it 40 or 42 years? My noble friend says it is 40 years and she will know, because she has probably counted them. That makes her, as I understand it, the second-longest serving female MP in British history after my noble friend Lady Beckett, who I am delighted to see in her place today—and ended up as the Mother of the House, I am forced to regard myself as something of a neophyte in this sort of company. No less extraordinary is the fact that, on ending such a distinguished tenure, my noble friend has promptly taken up another role and entered your Lordships’ House. Indeed, perhaps only in politics could one essay this somewhat Benjamin Button-esque transformation from being the Mother of one House to an eager, thrusting new arrival in the other.

I could easily fill my allotted time by rehearsing the details of my noble friend’s distinguished career—noble Lords will be glad to hear that I will not. In my time in politics, I can scarcely think of a better fit between a job and its holder than her time as the first Minister for Women. Her role in driving the adoption of the Equality Act 2010 will be long remembered and long celebrated, and her service as deputy leader and chair of the Labour Party was undertaken with commitment and distinction.

The golden thread running through my noble friend’s career is a passionate commitment to equality and the protection of the human dignity of every individual. That consistency of purpose and sheer doggedness tell me that she is an invaluable addition to your Lordships’ House and that she will command respect and attention in all her interventions in our proceedings.

I thank my noble friend the Minister not merely for affording us the opportunity to consider this Motion today but for the characteristically wise and well-informed speech with which he opened the debate. I called for a full debate in government time on the situation in the Horn of Africa in Oral Questions on 10 October. Whether the scheduling of today’s debate is causation or coincidence, I join other noble Lords in welcoming the opportunity to turn the full glare of our attention to the conflicts that disfigure some parts of the Horn of Africa and the splintering peace in others.

It is perhaps understandable—but no less regrettable—that in general, conflicts in this part of the world are ill-served by international reporting, and consequently receive a very small percentage of global attention. I do not propose to enter into the question of why, for instance, the deaths of around 20,000 in the Sudanese civil war since April 2023 have excited such an extraordinarily small fraction of the international emotion and indignation that has focused on Ukraine and the Middle East over the last couple of years, but it is something that might repay a little thought. Finland’s Foreign Minister rightly warned about the dangers of “Ukraine fatigue” two weeks ago. Those who are victims of state-sponsored violence or repression or of militia groups in the Horn of Africa would welcome even a fraction of the apparently attenuating western attention that is focused on Ukraine.

Mindful of the debate on the 40th anniversary of the Ethiopian famine and the many forensic and moving contributions from noble Lords on that occasion, I will focus the first part of my remarks on Eritrea. Your Lordships’ House will be aware that on 10 October, the Presidents of Egypt, Somalia and Eritrea met in Asmara to sign a joint statement which pledged the three participants to work together for

“strategic co-operation in all fields”.

That designedly vague phraseology should give us pause but, if precedent is any guide, we can expect an intensification of mutual military aid and co-ordination —largely directed against Ethiopia. Indeed, even before the summit concluded, Egypt had sent two arms shipments to Somalia to reduce its reliance on Ethiopian forces in fighting al-Shabaab.

The communiqué that followed the summit underlined tripartite agreement on—I read this short—

“respect for the sovereignty … and territorial integrity of the countries”

in the region. Although cloaked in the cool objectivity of diplomatic language, this was a pretty clear disavowal of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s coastal ambitions and the MoU Ethiopia has concluded with Somaliland.

Such agreements serve only to normalise Eritrea and its regime, but Eritrea has consistently acted as a destabilising force in the region. Not only is it a one-party state but it is now a one-family state, with President Isaias having frequently signalled his intention that his son should succeed him. It ranks last out of 180 countries in the Reporters Without Borders press freedom index. It sits 161st out of 180 countries on Transparency International’s corruption perception index. The UN special rapporteur describes “severe control” exercised by the state over every aspect of civil and personal life, and daily repression clouds the lives of all Eritreans. Thousands of political prisoners within Eritrea are subject to torture and sexual violence, 300,000 individuals are subjected to forced labour, and almost half of Eritrea’s population is forced into military service, which can last for decades.

These statistics detailing internal repression within Eritrea are grim enough, but the recent diplomatic alignment with Egypt and Somalia is doubly concerning given Eritrea’s long record of intensifying regional conflicts or fanning them into flame. Eritrea’s President Isaias has a record of plotting attacks against neighbouring states. Despite having won independence from Ethiopia as recently as 1993, Eritrea has already engaged in conflicts with Yemen, Sudan and Djibouti, while recently offering intermittent support to al-Shabaab. With all that in mind, can the Minster tell us what assessment the Government have made of the potential benefits or drawbacks of sanctioning individual members of the Eritrean Government and the Eritrean Defence Forces who have involved themselves in serious human rights violations in Tigray and Eritrea itself, their own country?

I would also welcome any comments my noble friend might share on Eritrea’s diplomatic closeness with Beijing. Only last month, President Isaias attended the Beijing summit and was greeted by Li Qiang, Premier of the State Council, and a warm statement committing to further Sino-Eritrean co-operation under the auspices of the belt and road initiative. I mention that not merely because it is a further supervening diplomatic complication but because those economic ties to China and the Gulf states render our sanctions many times less effective than they otherwise would be.

I have focused my attention thus far on Eritrea and its increasing gravitation towards Somalia and Egypt, but as other noble Lords have reminded us, the start of this phase of escalation is at least partly consequent on the MoU signed by Ethiopia and Somaliland. The expansionist ambitions of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed are placing a severe strain on relations with Somalia. They are pulling other regional powers, including Egypt and Turkey, into the orbit of this diplomatic crisis, and have fashioned an ideal context in which al-Shabaab recruitment and funding have spiked.

Of course, the quid pro quo for coastal access in the MoU between Ethiopia and Somaliland is the recognition of Somaliland independence. I understand those who point to the cultural distinctiveness, the resilience of civil society and the six democratic elections and peaceful transfers of power in Somaliland as factors that should impel this country to recognise Somaliland independence, but I worry about the consequences.

A senior adviser to the Somali president, speaking under the condition of anonymity, told the world that Somalia is prepared to countenance war with Ethiopia over the deal. In June, Somalia announced that it would expel thousands of Ethiopian troops deployed against al-Shabaab unless the deal was scrapped by the end of the year. Compounding that capacity problem in quelling terrorism, the Institute for the Study of War released an analysis last month that suggested that an intensification of Egyptian military support for Somalia would destabilise the region and hinder operations designed to counter al-Shabaab. In such a febrile situation, what precedent would UK recognition of Somaliland aspirations set?

Were we to indulge in unilateral recognition of Somaliland independence, it is not only possible but probable that this would be seen as implicit endorsement for the separatist aspirations of a host of other groups and regions across the Horn of Africa. In other quarters, it may well be greeted as a piece of high-minded neocolonialism, pushing states engaged in conflict with separatists in their own populations further into the arms of China, Russia and other strategic adversaries. No UN member state has recognised Somaliland’s claim of independence, and earlier this year their Government began the process of appealing to the International Court of Justice. It would surely be destabilising to pre-empt, or possibly to disavow, that judgment by proceeding unilaterally.

The Ethiopia/Somaliland MoU stipulates that Ethiopia can lease a 20-kilometer coastline in Somaliland’s Awdal region for 50 years to build its naval base. That region within Somaliland is dominated by the Issa clan, who have protested vigorously against this deal, accused the Somaliland Government of selling their land and threatened war if the agreement is not rescinded. This is another reminder, if one were needed, of the intense complexities that shape the politics of this region.

Your Lordships’ House will recall the Edwardian satirist, Saki, who in 1911 described countries in the Balkans as producing

“more history than they can consume locally”.

We all know what followed three years later. I believe that the same remark could be applied to this region, with all its complexity: ethnic, religious, cultural and political affiliations that do not conform neatly with national boundaries.

I reiterate my admiration for the vigour with which my noble friend the Minister, the Foreign Secretary and others have pursued a course of de-escalation in the Horn of Africa in the few short months they have been in post. With that in mind, can my noble friend say what consideration the Government are giving to ongoing participation in the EU’s CSDP missions, including in Somalia? Given that international unity is the best means we have of mitigating the humanitarian impact of regional divisions and conflicts, such a step, while small, may well enable us better to ease these conflicts in the medium to longer terms.

Ethiopia Famine: 40th Anniversary

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Thursday 17th October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, given the gravity of the events that are the subject of today’s proceedings, if it is not exactly a pleasure to contribute to this debate, I am pleased to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone. I thank her for securing this debate and for a clear-eyed, informed, impressively analytical and forensic speech. I intend not to repeat the appalling statistics that show the extent to which food insecurity in Ethiopia remains a present reality but to focus on the Tigray and Amhara regions.

As the Motion before your Lordships’ House makes clear, when we examine the situation in Ethiopia today, there is an awful resonance about the events of 1984. Though thankfully different in scale, the current acute food insecurity has one key element in common with the famine of the 1980s: both are, to some extent, manmade. An essay published in the Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Food Studies in June underscores the extent to which, in the conflict between the Ethiopian armed forces and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front,

“belligerent parties on all sides employed food as a weapon, actions that included destroying local food supplies, dismantling capacities to produce food and market infrastructure, and diverting humanitarian aid toward supporters and away from adversaries”.

Though the TPLF and the Ethiopian Government concluded a fragile—and, in the case of the neighbouring Amhara region, largely ostensible—peace in November 2022, the concentric circles of that conflict continue to ripple outwards. Last year, we saw starvation deaths in both Tigray and Amhara. Almost 700,000 people are still displaced and over a quarter of a million men remain under arms and the TPLF banner. Despite the efforts of both this Government and their predecessor, there remains a significant gap between the humanitarian funding needed to feed the hungry in Ethiopia and the amount pledged by the international community.

Perhaps most importantly for those who wish to see the fragile peace between the TPLF and the Ethiopian Government endure, there has been no peace dividend in Tigray. History tells us that, if swords are to be beaten into ploughshares, a demonstrable improvement in everyday conditions needs rapidly to be achieved. Though this summer’s rainy season saw some crops being brought in, many farmers continue to suffer from the historical effects of drought, with some having been unable to harvest for years. Critically, agricultural infrastructure is in a parlous state, with many farmers having had their equipment looted or damaged during the period of conflict. The USAID-supported Famine Early Warning Systems Network has estimated that large parts of northern and eastern Ethiopia experienced crisis levels of food insecurity from August to September 2024 —that is the last two months—and parts of Afar, Tigray and Amhara in the north were in the emergency category.

Meanwhile, the western part of Tigray is disfigured by a campaign of ethnic cleansing prosecuted by Fano militia. They have displaced hundreds of thousands of Tigrayans, perpetrated massacres and used torture, sexual violence and arbitrary detention. That region is now cut off from aid delivery, and sesame, a crucial cash crop that underpins the economy of that region, is going unharvested. Negotiations between the Fano leadership and the Ethiopian Government are not progressing, with a resolution appearing unlikely in the months ahead. Indeed, the counteroffensive of the Ethiopian National Defence Force has led to the indefinite suspension of all transportation activities within the Amhara region, effective from 3 October. That will only impede humanitarian access further, lead to further food shortages and intensify the horrors of conflict.

Where food has so often been used as a weapon of conflict, there is nothing that will act as a greater spur to a renewal of hostilities as the persistence of starvation in peacetime. Earlier this afternoon, your Lordships’ House debated the link between conflict and extreme poverty. That link is as profound as it is inexorable, and no less indissoluble is the need to ensure that peace brings, if not plenty, at least the means of minimum subsistence.

All the humanitarian issues we have heard enumerated in this debate so far are taking place against a darkening backdrop in the Horn of Africa as a whole. The expansionist ambitions of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed are placing a severe strain on relations with Somalia, are pulling other regional powers, including Egypt and Turkey, into the orbit of this diplomatic crisis, and have fashioned an ideal context in which al-Shabaab recruitment and funding have spiked. I know, partly from a ministerial response to my Question I asked on the 7 October, that my noble friend Lord Collins and the Foreign Secretary have made representations at the highest level with the Government of Ethiopia to urge de-escalation. I know that the whole House will wish them well in those efforts.

As the FCDO’s report on UK aid spending in Ethiopia published in July last year made clear, there is something of a paradox about the economic situation there. It described 20 million people as “severely food insecure”, outlines the plight of

“11 million in drought-affected areas”

and identifies an upsurge in cases of cholera, malaria and measles. But this deterioration sits alongside an “ambitious reform agenda”, with significant investment in clean energy, aviation, finance and telecoms. Though any measures which improve the Ethiopian economy are positive, a sharp disjunction between the beneficiaries of this investment and those regions of Ethiopia that continue to see starvation deaths, a lack of basic infra- structure and outbreaks of conflict may serve only to stiffen the resolve of separatist movements to continue their armed struggle against a Government who are apparently oblivious to their suffering.

When preparing my remarks for today’s proceedings, a quotation from Marx’s essay on Louis Napoleon repeatedly came to mind. It runs:

“Men make their own history … under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living”.


I hope that when our successors gather to debate Ethiopia a few decades hence, they will be in a position to celebrate long-term peace and progress rather than trace the outline of that dreadful historical circularity which has so often held Ethiopia in its grip.

Sudan

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Friday 13th September 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, it has been a singular privilege to sit through so many passionate, far-sighted and informed speeches from across your Lordships’ House. The contributions have been informed, in the great majority of cases, by personal experience—none of which I have. I express my thanks to my noble friend the Minister for tabling the Motion and allowing us the opportunity to consider this appalling conflict. I congratulate him for all the very many reasons articulated by others in the context of this debate.

As others have said, to some extent, characterising what is going on in Sudan as a conflict in the singular is itself misleading. Since Sudan achieved independence in 1956, its population has lived through 35 coups, attempted coups or coup plots—more than any other country ever. As we have heard from many knowledgeable speakers, the civil war that currently blights the lives of the Sudanese has at once an ostensibly simple cause and, simultaneously, twisted and complex roots in Sudan’s tragic recent history. The immediate or proximate cause is the power vacuum left by the removal of Omar al-Bashir and the contending attempts of the SAF and the RSF to fill and exploit it. But behind that immediate contention lies the legacy of Bashir’s three decades in power: his use of the Janjaweed militia in the Darfur genocide, supervening ethnic and religious tensions and a willingness of external powers to treat Sudan as a proxy or test case for their own ambitions.

The current conflict is now in its second year. While events in Ukraine and Gaza have monopolised global attention, the UN has characterised Sudan as undergoing the world’s “largest hunger crisis”. Casualty estimates range from 15,000 to 150,000, and more than 10 million people have been displaced both internally and into unstable neighbouring areas, including Chad and Ethiopia. In each of these statistics, as we have heard from those with personal experience, is an individual story, and each individual tragedy deepens the intransigence of the opposing sides. Critically, the breakdown in political stability has been mirrored by a crisis in health and food security.

I sense that every Member of your Lordships’ House could spend far more than their allotted time enumerating the plight of women and children who, with grim inevitability, have borne a disproportionate burden in this conflict. But a few headline statistics do paint an indicative picture and, as others have done, I shall do that.

More than three-quarters of the health infrastructure in Sudan has been destroyed or is out of commission. This has not merely led to a resurgence in diseases such as malaria, cholera and measles but has heightened the population’s vulnerability to mpox. More than 17 million Sudanese children do not have access to clean drinking water, and now it appears that the same number do not have access to education. As the new Development Minister, my right honourable friend Anneliese Dodds, attested after her visit in the summer, Sudan is suffering from a manmade famine. In all, estimates suggest—this is horrifying—that up to 2.5 million people could die of starvation by the end of this year alone. This is the first global declaration of famine for more than seven years.

Despite global awareness of the scale of the suffering, as the noble Lord, Lord Oates, pointed out, the UN appeal for Sudan is only 41% funded. The appeal for the regional refugee response is only 8.5% funded. In addition, the lack of safe and unimpeded humanitarian access is one of the biggest challenges facing humanitarian organisations in scaling up their assistance. My noble friend the Minister raised the restriction on aid convoys in his opening remarks. Drawing on a briefing we perhaps all received overnight from the World Food Programme, I ask the Minister what consideration the Government have given to its suggestion that decoupling ceasefire negotiations from negotiations about humanitarian access may help. If unimpeded access for aid continues to be contingent on progress on the peace track, it may be that we are inadvertently prolonging suffering on the ground.

In debates such as these it is common, as my noble friend the Minister did in opening, to call for a united international response in the hope that such unanimity of purpose might help to abate the tragedy. He is right in that, but much of the limited international political action that has been taken in relation to this conflict has served to fuel further violence and instability.

A report published in July by Amnesty International analysed the export path of the weapons with which this war is being waged. The UAE supplies bullets and drones to the RSF, and the UN has had reports it describes as credible suggesting that much of the RSF’s communications and political operations are run out of that country. Iran and Egypt arm the SAF. Russia has bizarrely supplied arms to both sides, and Wagner mercenaries have been seen on the ground. Turkey’s main weapons manufacturer supplies the SAF, while thousands of Turkish weapons, ostensibly for the civilian market, have found their way into Sudan. An article in the Economist, published about 10 days ago, describes the cumulative effect of these actions as to turn Sudan into “a murderous bazaar”. All this is despite a mandatory UN Security Council arms embargo on Sudan from 2004.

In our capacity as penholder on Sudan, what steps are the UK Government taking not just to enforce but to widen the existing embargo? In addition to the issues raised by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leeds, can the Minister explain what discussions have taken place, both internally and with our allies, on sanctioning the individuals and companies who knowingly flout these restrictions? Accountability is essential, but anything we can do for prevention is even better.

Against this backdrop of suffering and crisis, what response have we seen from the leaders of the two factions? It has been the grotesque spectacle of the head of the SAF and the head of the paramilitary RSF travelling the world to garner political support and legitimacy, while their supporters commit war crimes at home, including targeted mass rape and indiscriminate slaughter. In addition to supplying aid to Sudan and highlighting this slowly unfolding tragedy, our most immediate aim—aside, of course, from mitigating the maximum of human suffering—should be to prevent another genocide, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, explained well and convincingly.

The RSF is also embarking on a programme of ethnic cleansing against non-Arab communities in West Darfur. More widely, war crimes are being committed with impunity by both sides, and it is only the relative equality of strength between them that has prevented genocide from taking place. Sadly, history tells us that appalling humanitarian crimes do not always act as an inhibiting example; in fact, they often serve further to embolden their perpetrators.

This Government have, in their short time in office, built on the commitments made by their predecessor, providing an additional £15 million in aid on top of the doubling of aid that we have already seen. The Foreign Secretary raised the issue of Sudan with other G7 Foreign Ministers in his first days in office. I have seen the support that, as penholder on Sudan at the UN Security Council, this country has provided for the Jeddah talks and believe that we must continue to do all we can to bring pressure to bear on both sides to end the boycott of these negotiations.

I had intended to spend my last seconds to make an argument for a special envoy, but it appears that this has already been taken care of. What I will do is draw attention again to the right reverend Prelate’s suggestion that the strategic defence review headed by my noble friend Lord Robertson should engage on the issue of peacebuilding. My noble friend joined us, although he has since left. Both he and I are ambassadors of the Halo Trust, an organisation working on not just mine clearance but conflict prevention. Its current CEO, a former soldier, intends to expand it into the space that was suggested, and I have no doubt that my noble friend will be willing to examine that possibility.

NATO and European Political Community Meetings

Lord Browne of Ladyton Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd July 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord. First, I apologise to the Leader of the Opposition; he asked me a question that I forgot to respond to. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, will not mind that I address that. The Leader of the Opposition asked me about the Global Combat Air Programme, an intergovernmental organisation. An order will come forward to this House, probably on Monday; I will propose a Business of the House Motion to allow that to come forward. I will send him information about that; I think that the Chief Whips have already spoken.

On Hungary, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, that his question is probably one for the European Union rather than me. It is worth restating that we stand completely in solidarity with Ukraine—that is an ironclad commitment. There have been different views within the EU—Hungary, is notably one of them—but the EU has spoken with one voice and stands with Ukraine.

[Lord Browne of Ladyton (Lab)]

My Lords, I too take this opportunity to warmly welcome my noble friend to the Dispatch Box as the Lord Privy Seal. I congratulate her on a well-deserved appointment to that position and wish her well.

I fully support the steps that my Government are taking to tackle the crisis of illegal migration, which was created substantially by the previous Government’s inaction and incompetent handling of the issue. That aside, the Statement by my right honourable friend the Prime Minister on it is reported in Hansard on Monday at cols. 369-70—I will not read it all out, but it is there for noble Lords to read. However, I will make the point that there is not one Member of your Lordships’ House who, if forced to leave his or her home because of persecution or conflict, would not expect to be able to seek asylum safely. That is not available to anyone who seeks asylum in Europe. I ask my noble friend: was the question of opening safe routes, so that refugees have an alternative to dangerous journeys, raised at all in the discussion with the EPC? There was much agreed, much discussed and much started, but was that touched on at all?

[Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for his comments. I do not know all the details of what was discussed in the meeting, but yesterday I spoke to the Home Secretary, who told me that the meeting on migration lasted twice as long as was anticipated, such was the range of issues discussed and the willingness of countries to co-operate on that. This issue is quite complex and multifaceted in some ways. One of the reasons we want to ensure the £58 million for Africa and the Middle East that I spoke about is to tackle some of the root causes of why people flee their countries and seek asylum. We should address those issues—conflict, poverty or the effects of climate change—as they will have an impact on why people want to leave. I hope that some of them will be addressed. As I said, I do not have a full readout of the meeting, but it was very long and I am told that it was also very productive.