Haulage Permits and Trailer Registration Bill [HL]

Lord Blencathra Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 22nd March 2018 Grand Committee

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

Perhaps I could speak again, because I have been reflecting on what was said. There is another way to deal with this, which is why I intervene: we have gross weight figures. If we had a few more court cases about people using trailers that exceeded the gross weight, that might send out a message “pour encourager les autres” to comply with the law. That is one way to deal with it, along with the lock and chain. I am talking about the smaller trailers, which are worrying me, and which comprise the great volume of trailers.

I come to my second point. I do not have a trailer at the moment but until a few years ago I did. It was a small trailer, probably half the size of one of these desk tops here. We used it once or twice a year. If you are registering it, MoT-ing and all that, that is quite an expense if you use your trailer very rarely. As I say, unless they are in business, people do not drive around with their trailers all the time. They are for occasional use.

There are circumstances in which an MoT could be applied, and that is when a trailer has a brake. If it has a brake, it really is a different piece of machinery. All that most trailers have is a wire that connects the vehicle to the trailer to feed the lights—nothing more. However, where you have a trailer with a brake, my noble friend’s case holds water that there might well need to be some sort of system. I imagine that the two-tonne trailer that my noble friend referred to had a brake; I do not know.

[Lord Blencathra (Con)]

Since we are in declaring-interest mode, I, too, used to have a trailer a few years ago. It is the point about the brakes that interests me, because it seemed to have an automatic brake on the driveshaft when it connected to the car, so when the car was accelerating or driving normally the trailer was dragged, but when one put on the car brakes, the momentum of the trailer pushed forward on a hydraulic ram that automatically activated the rear brake. I have no idea what it was called, and I am sorry that I cannot describe the technology more accurately, but many trailers have these automatic brakes that come on when the vehicle brakes.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

I did not know about that; I did not know it existed. Knowing the noble Lord’s former constituency well, he probably had a fairly substantial trailer. It was probably pretty large because he represented a very rugged area.

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[Lord Tunnicliffe]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 21, I will speak also to Amendments 24, 25 and 27. This group and the next group of amendments are vehicles to effect the recommendations of the Select Committee on the Constitution and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. I hope the Minister will agree with everything I have to say because traditionally the Government respect those committees for the very careful work they do. It is good to see the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, here. I am sure he will speak to these amendments. The work of these committees is essential to keep our law sensible, balanced and correctly scrutinised.

The 11th report of the Select Committee on the Constitution, published on 8 March, says at paragraph 7:

“If there are exceptional circumstances which require the creation of criminal offences by regulations, they should normally be subject to the affirmative procedure”.


It then goes on to talk about sifting. Clause 17(7) of the Bill says:

“Regulations under this section may not provide for an offence to be punishable with imprisonment or with a fine exceeding level 3 on the standard scale”.


But clearly there is a criminal offence and as a general rule we do not believe that any criminal offence should be introduced with a negative instrument. I hope the Minister will agree.

Turning to the subject of Amendment 27, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee says:

“Although the Government do not currently know what regulations under clause 2 will contain or how significant they will be, the Government propose that the negative procedure will always apply to such regulations. For the reasons given at paragraph 9 above, we recommend that there should be a sifting procedure”—


I will come on to that—

“allowing a scrutiny committee to recommend an uprating of the negative procedure to the affirmative procedure”.

Paragraph 9 says:

“We also recommend that there should be a sifting procedure for regulations under clause 1—akin to the one we recommended for the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill—allowing a scrutiny committee to recommend an uprating of the negative procedure to the affirmative procedure”.


The Select Committee on the Constitution also made some references to Clauses 8 and 17. Therefore, for simplicity’s sake, we recommend that all the regulations under Clauses 1, 2, 8 and 17 should be subject to a sifting procedure which can decide whether any should be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. I beg to move.

[Lord Blencathra]

My Lords, as the chairman of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, I am delighted to say a few words on Amendment 27. No doubt my noble friend the Minister swotted up on all the briefs and the grand issues relating to Brexit and European trailers; little did she know that she would have to hear confessions from Members on all sides of the Committee about their experiences driving good trailers, big trailers and dodgy little trailers—and wheels falling off.

I am not sure whether I can trump the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, but as a boy up on the farm in the Highlands I was able to drive a tractor by the age of 10 and drive it on the highway by the age of 12. When I was allowed legally to drive a car on the highway, my first car was a three-gear Ford Prefect which, on a long downhill slope, I once got up to 62 miles an hour—I could drive the tractors a bit faster.

The Delegated Powers Committee has recommended the sifting committee procedure for Clauses 1 and 2. We recommend it for Clause 1 because, as we say in our report,

“the content of any regulations made under clause 1 will depend on future international agreements … there is no current indication as to what regulations under clause 1 might say or how important they might be, if they are needed at all … it cannot be known in advance that the negative procedure will always be suitable for regulations made under clause 1 … it might transpire that some regulations made under clause 1 might require the affirmative procedure”.

On Clause 2, to shorten our report to the basics, we cite the Explanatory Memorandum which states that,

“it is not yet clear what sort of a regime or regimes will need to be introduced and, in the interest of ensuring that the provisions cater for agreed scenarios and are not too wide, it is necessary to legislate by way of secondary legislation once negotiations have been concluded and the nature of any permit scheme that needs to be introduced is clear”.

We say:

“Although the Government do not currently know what regulations under clause 2 will contain or how significant they will be, the Government propose that the negative procedure will always apply”.


For that reason, we think that there should be a sifting mechanism where colleagues in the House can decide which ones are tiddly statutory instruments and the negative procedure is okay and which ones require the affirmative procedure.

We stress in paragraph 10:

“We are not seeking to make a sifting mechanism a general feature of our legislative landscape”—


we are not seeking to attach it to every Brexit Bill.

“However, the circumstances of the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union have given rise to unique legislative challenges”.


We know that next year we may have 800 to 1,000 statutory instruments to get through, perhaps in a short period of time. In those circumstances we have recommended the sifting procedure to the House. I know that the Leader of the House, the Lord Privy Seal, has rejected that already, but we recommend it for the Bill because the first five clauses begin with the words, “Regulations may”. That is almost unique. Because there will be so many regulations and some will be routine, trivial and therefore not crucial, some will be mega important and may require the affirmative procedure, we commend the sifting mechanism—exactly the same procedure as we identified in the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill, using the same secondary legislation scrutiny procedure, not creating any new all-singing all-dancing committee—to the Committee, and I commend it to my noble friend.

[Baroness Randerson]

My Lords, my Amendment 23 is an attempt to tackle the issue in a parallel manner. It takes on board the Delegated Powers Committee report which I think we can say was not entirely favourable. Last week, I quoted the committee as saying that the Bill is,

“more of a mission statement than legislation”.

As the noble Lord just said, the committee specifically referred to Clauses 1 to 5 all beginning with the words, “Regulations may”. It also chastised the Department for Transport for not producing some illustrative regulations alongside the Bill and urged us to probe the Government in Committee. I am trying to follow its advice.

As the committee report highlights, 16 of the 24 clauses contain delegated powers, all of them subject only to the negative procedure. Amendment 23 attempts to rectify this, ensuring that the substantive clauses of the Bill are subject to the affirmative procedure.

I also want to note that the Constitution Committee said specifically that Bills like this are difficult for Parliament to scrutinise and—this is the key phrase—present a fundamental challenge to the balance of power between Parliament and the Executive. Given the reference just now by the noble Lord to the number of statutory instruments that we have coming through, it is important that we continue to maintain a more stringent attitude to SIs than is indicated by the Bill as currently written.

Amendment 21 particularly highlights Clause 17, which would give the Secretary of State the power to create offences by statutory instrument. Labour’s Amendments 24, 25 and 27 relate to the sifting committee for statutory instruments, which was recommended in the report of the Delegated Powers Committee. I believe that these are very sound suggestions and I support them. There are good reasons for adopting a more rigorous attitude towards this and I am sure that the Minister would be the first to admit that at this stage the Government do not have absolute clarity as to how they are going forward. To my mind, that is an even stronger argument for why we should have some form of sunset clause and sifting to ensure that the important elements of this Bill are properly scrutinised in the future.

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[Earl Attlee]

On the precautionary principle, the problem I have is that we are using precious time to debate things that we do not need to. When I was an Opposition Front-Bench spokesman, I dealt with affirmative orders while thinking, “Why in God’s name are we debating this?” One day, the noble Baroness, Lady Symons, came in with a defence order—a Foreign Office order or something. She made a big speech, and I just smiled at her and then the order went through.

The other point that the noble Baroness raised was about the difference between an affirmative order and a negative one. The ability to debate it and to change it is no different whether the order is affirmative or negative. The only difference is whether it has to be debated or whether it gets debated only if we can flag it up: our ability to amend it is no different. I am going to get killed now.

[Lord Blencathra]

I will try smiling at my noble friend to see if he may back down slightly. I admit that there are times when my committee says, “The negative procedure here is wholly unacceptable and this should be affirmative”—but not in this report. Here, we say, “The Government don’t know, the Explanatory Memorandum doesn’t know and we don’t know how many regulations there will be, which ones will be important and which will be less important”. They might all end up being negative or they might all be so crucial that they are affirmative, but I trust my noble friend Lord Trefgarne to make a sensible judgment on this—

[Noble Lords]

Oh!

[Lord Blencathra]

I know some Members of this Committee will be reassured by that.

All we are saying is: let the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee look at the proposed regulations, as we suggest for the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. Let the committee sift them and conclude, as I think it probably would, that 80% of the regulations in the main will be suitable for the negative procedure and the remaining 20% should be affirmative, and then it can recommend that to the House. That does not stop the House, the Opposition or others ensuring that other negative regulations are prayed against, but suggesting a sifting mechanism is not a demand that everything be made affirmative. On this occasion I am not banging on that everything should be affirmative; I am banging on about giving the sifting committee a chance to make a decision that the House can accept or reject.

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, my noble friend is the expert. When I made observations about procedure and so on, was I incorrect in any respect?

[Lord Blencathra]

Sorry, I do not follow my noble friend.

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, I suggested that the only difference between a negative order and an affirmative one was our ability to flag it up for debate. We cannot actually change a negative order or an affirmative one; we just accept or reject them. My point is that we are actually no better off in holding the Government to account whether an order is affirmative or negative. If the industry flags it up as a problem, we have all the tools that we need to hold the Government to account.

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[Lord Snape]

Before the noble Lord answers that, I have a question. I know he was never the noble Earl’s Chief Whip but, in the days when he was a Chief Whip, would he have felt that a smile would have made a difference?

[Lord Blencathra]

In my time as Chief Whip in the other place, I tried to model myself on Lord Dixon, whose style I rather liked as Chief Whip of the Labour Party.

I think what my noble friend means by “flag it up”—I stand to be corrected because I am not an expert on procedure—would require praying against it, and that would take some time. The sifting procedure that we propose is a 10-day system where, when the statutory instruments went before the sifting committee, the SSLC, they would be flagged up within 10 days to go to the affirmative procedure. That satisfies the Government’s requirements that it be done expeditiously.

We accept that next year we will possibly have hundreds of regulations coming through. I know that we want to get some though in advance—we may get many through—but we could have a period next year where we have a huge batch of regulations to get through because we are leaving the EU. Some may need to be done by 29 March while others may be done later, but we will not be able to have a 40-day praying period: we cannot take all that time to decide whether a regulation being passed by the negative procedure might need to go up to the affirmative procedure. The sifting procedure we have proposed is not like the super-affirmative procedure, which is far too slow. The special procedure we have proposed in this amendment, as well as in the EU withdrawal Bill, will allow for a rapid sifting so that recommendations can be made for a regulation to be upgraded to the affirmative procedure.

[Earl Attlee]

My Lords, my noble friend is very helpful. I cannot conceive how any regulation under this Bill would need the affirmative procedure, but we will see what the Minister says.