Assisted Dying Bill [HL]

Lord Blair of Boughton Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 22nd October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

My Lords, I remind the House that I was a member of the Commission on Assisted Dying chaired by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. The word we should hold in front of us is “choice”. This is a choice for a patient facing fear of a very bad death. It is a choice for medical practitioners: as in the case of abortion, while having to accept that assisted dying is an option, they do not have to take part in any such procedure. Even if it is granted, it is still a choice whether the patient takes advantage of the option, as in the Oregon case we have just heard about. However, it is not a choice between palliative care and assisted dying. They sit side by side; they can grow side by side.

Finally, assisting another person’s suicide is an offence which carries a maximum penalty of 14 years in prison. If a suicide happens at home, that home becomes a crime scene, with a forensic tent and computers and last messages being seized. Even assisting someone getting on a plane to Dignitas opens people up to unavoidable police investigation. There can be a convention on no prosecution, but there cannot be a convention of no investigation. A good death is one of the last great liberal causes. I support the Bill.

Right to Die

Lord Blair of Boughton Excerpts

Thursday 14th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Faulks]

The House and I am aware of that and of the noble Baroness’s particular expertise in this area.

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

My Lords, I declare an interest as a member of the commission on assisted dying chaired by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. Does the Minister see any contradiction between the Government taking no action about something that 82% of the public believe should happen and taking enormous action over a 52:48 split?

[Lord Faulks]

The terms of the European Union Referendum Act were much debated in this House and, no doubt, they will continue to be debated. As to polls, I am aware of the poll to which the noble Lord referred. There are other polls and views differ, as he is well aware.

Restorative Justice

Lord Blair of Boughton Excerpts

Wednesday 18th November 2015 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Blair of Boughton]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the effectiveness of restorative justice services in England and Wales.

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

My Lords, I beg leave to ask the Question standing in my name on the Order Paper. In doing so, I draw attention to my interests as a former chair and a current trustee of the Thames Valley Partnership, which manages restorative justice in the Thames Valley Police area.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Faulks) (Con)]

My Lords, there has been no formal assessment to date. However, the Ministry of Justice is aware of the progress that police and crime commissioners are making in developing and delivering restorative justice services and is offering advice and guidance where necessary. The recently announced Justice Select Committee inquiry into restorative justice will help to provide a comprehensive picture of restorative justice across England and Wales.

[Lord Blair of Boughton]

I thank the Minister for that Answer, particularly in national Restorative Justice Week. I congratulate the Government on their interest in restorative justice and on the amount of money they have transmitted to police and crime commissioners for restorative justice services. As far as I know, restorative justice is the only criminal justice intervention which has been proved to be effective through random control trials, in the same way as medical research, in assisting victims to recover and reducing reoffending. However, there are persistent and widespread accounts of RJ services facing difficulties and delays in obtaining victim contact details from police and the courts. Without this, RJ simply cannot work. What are Her Majesty’s Government going to do to clear this blockage?

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, to clear the blockage, apart from other steps, the new victims’ code, which was published two days ago, now requires the police to pass on victims’ details to RJ service providers unless asked not to do so—in other words, an opt-out. This is in line with the mechanism for referral for other victims’ services. We are working with the Association of Policing & Crime Chief Executives to ensure that its toolkit on information sharing is up to date and are making connections between areas where there is good restorative justice take-up and other areas where there is not such a good take-up.

European Union Referendum Bill

Lord Blair of Boughton Excerpts

Wednesday 18th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blencathra]

They did not have the right to vote in a referendum previously. They may have the right to vote in Scottish elections but this is a United Kingdom referendum. I would be quite happy to explain to young Scots that while they may have the right to vote in Scotland, it does not automatically follow that they have the right to vote in a United Kingdom election.

No one under the age of 18 can gamble: we passed that law in 1934. No one under 18 can get a tattoo: we passed that law in 1969. No one under 18 can serve on a jury—a 1974 Act. No one under 18 can watch a violent or pornographic film—a 1984 Act. In 1985 we banned anyone under 18 from buying solvents. No one under 18 can buy alcohol. Interestingly, the Scottish NHS and Government have been trying to push the age up to 21. They tried that in 2008 and are keen to do so again.

Under a 1987 law, no one under the age of 18 can sign a property agreement. In 1996 my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne and I increased the age at which one can buy a knife from 16 to 18. In 2003 we banned anyone aged under 18 from buying paint stripper, and in 2005 we banned anyone aged under 18 from possessing fireworks in a public place. In 2007 we raised the age at which someone can buy tobacco to 18, while in 2010 we banned anyone under the age of 18 from using a sunbed.

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord for giving way. Everything he has mentioned concerns banning people from doing something. This amendment is about permitting people to do something. I do not think that the analogy works.

[Lord Blencathra]

I beg to differ with the noble Lord. I have almost concluded my remarks on the timescale on which we ban things and I am trying to show that, over the years, this House and the other place have been raising the age at which young people are permitted to do things. It is quite incongruous to suggest that, as we raise the age bar every year because we do not trust the ability of young people to make certain decisions, we should suddenly say that we will lower to 16 the age at which people have the right to vote in this referendum.

On 21 July this year we banned anyone under the age of 18 from buying fireworks. Without listing all the other legislation through which we have prohibited under 18 year-olds from doing things like opening a bank account, making a will or appearing in an adult court, the trend is pretty obvious. Rather than Parliament acknowledging that young people are growing up faster and can be trusted with decisions, rightly or wrongly, we have been going in the opposite direction. Almost every year we have been raising from 16 to 18 the age at which young people can do things. I simply say that we cannot have it both ways, as the proponents of this amendment are arguing. We cannot say that young people should be permitted to vote at the age of 16 because they are more aware and mature—and then push the age up to 18 for almost everything else.

I conclude by saying that if under 18 year-olds are not fit to serve on a jury and judge the fate of an individual human being, I submit that they are not fit to decide the fate of a nation.

Assisted Dying Bill [HL]

Lord Blair of Boughton Excerpts

Friday 16th January 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Berkeley of Knighton]

As in so many things, there is a line here which is difficult to draw. However, doctors in this House have privately told me of occasions when they have treated people with appalling pain in a way that they knew was likely to finish their life. It is very hard to put it more precisely. They would not guarantee that it did because, as we have heard from the medical profession, nobody can guarantee anything. No doctor here can tell us when we are going to die; they can say only, “This is the likelihood”, so I cannot give the noble and right reverend Lord a definitive answer. Everybody keeps saying that we must have clarity but there is no clarity about dying or pain relief. That is the whole point of this. What I can say, which is germane to the argument at the moment, is that we need at least six months to be able to discuss these things calmly and give people the feeling that they can plan ahead. In fact, that should rule out the bronchial infections we have been talking about because they would not be considered part of the terminal disease. It is a question of planning and so many people have said, “I want this option at the end of my life”. Who are we to deny it?

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

My Lords, I declare an interest in that I was a member of the Commission on Assisted Dying, chaired by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. I want to respond to Amendments 17 and 21 by mentioning specifically that at the conclusion of the two years in which we heard evidence, our initial position was that this prognosis period should be 12 months. We based that on the GMC guidance to which the noble Lord, Lord Warner, has just referred. It was based on the time at which a doctor could begin to discuss end-of-life care with his or her patient. We decided to reduce the period to six months because we thought that this decision was even more dramatic than the 12-month position of possibly dying. Now that we are into six months, we are much closer.

With all respect, it seems that the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, has made the right point in relation to these amendments. We are looking at this from the wrong end. As the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, has just said, there is no certainty but this is aimed at those individuals who themselves believe, with mental capacity, that what lies ahead of them in suffering and indignity is unbearable to them. It may not be unbearable to somebody else but, for them, it is unbearable and they want to have a discussion. We have been told about people who are going to recover because a new treatment will appear. These are people of mental capacity who are making clear judgments. Is it very likely that those people, if they start to feel better, will say, “No, I still want to die because I decided that I wanted to a little while ago although I now feel better”? That is a completely nonsensical position.

There is one provision of this Bill that people do not seem to notice. In Oregon, when the decision is made, the medicine is handed to the patient and he or she wanders off and puts it in the cupboard. That is not the case in the Bill. The medicine, such as it is, will be in a pharmacy. It will not be released to the patient until everybody is absolutely clear that all the processes have been gone through and that the person still has a settled determination to end their own life. It will then be released to a medical practitioner or nurse and if that patient does not take it within 24 hours, it is not left in the house. It goes back to the pharmacy and the discussion starts again. These are reasonable provisions. There is the idea that we should tie it to the uncertainty of a medical prognosis. We have to have some limits but, after two years of deliberation and knowing the GMC guidelines, six months struck those of us in the commission as a reasonable compromise. I recommend it to the House.

[The Lord Bishop of Carlisle]

My Lords, very briefly, I support Amendment 13, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, and the other amendments in this group.

I note the detailed points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. Like the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, I am struggling a bit with them. However, it seems to me that these amendments are generally sensible and important. The arguments in favour have been very well and movingly advanced. They would make this proposed legislation safer, as the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Harries, suggested.

I shall take this opportunity to point out that our support for these and other amendments does not in any sense signify the Church of England’s support for the overall intention of the Bill. I am sure this applies to other Members of your Lordships’ House. Some suggestion has been made, not least in the media, that our position lacks clarity. Nothing could be further from the truth. We have every sympathy with and respect for—I cannot emphasise this too much—the honourable and compassionate motives that inspire the Bill’s proponents, as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, indicated.

The church’s stance on assisted dying was made abundantly clear by the General Synod in 2012. When this subject was debated then, not a single member of it opposed a motion to keep the current law. Of course, some individual church members may and clearly do disagree but, to avoid any misunderstanding as we debate these amendments, that remains our corporate stance for reasons of principle and pragmatism that have already been very well rehearsed in this House.

Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill

Lord Blair of Boughton Excerpts

Monday 15th December 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick]

With great respect, there is even less justification if we are going to ask the question about professional advice from solicitors, because we are surely entitled to assume that solicitors are capable of understanding basic law. This is not complicated law: it is trite, obvious law that already protects those who volunteer and act as heroes.

It has been said at previous stages of the Bill that we often legislate in the hope of changing people’s behaviour. Reference has been made, for example, to the Race Relations Act. But what is different and what is exceptional about Clause 2 is that it does not purport to change the law one jot or iota. All that it will do is enable Mr Grayling to say that he is in favour of social action; and when we come to Clause 4, he will be able to say that he is in favour of heroism, as if the rest of us were not. I object to legislation being used by the Government to send what is no more than a political message.

In paragraph 125 of its excellent report, published last week, on the office of Lord Chancellor, your Lordships’ Constitution Committee stated that the Lord Chancellor should have,

“a clear understanding of his or her duties in relation to the rule of law and a willingness to speak up for that principle in dealings with ministerial colleagues, including the Prime Minister”.

The Lord Chancellor ought to understand that it is part—an important part—of the rule of law that the statute book has a role and a purpose: it is a purpose distinct from a party conference speech or a party election broadcast. Clause 2 simply debases the parliamentary currency and it therefore undermines the rule of law. If the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, decides to test the opinion of the House on Clause 2, he will certainly have my support.

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

My Lords, I spoke in Committee in support of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, and I am not going to repeat what I said then. I might take issue with the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, about this matter being discussed in the silent halls of the Middle Temple. If you give ordinary police officers, firemen and ambulance crews two sets of words about the same thing, you are going to cause a lot of confusion a long way before it gets to the Middle Temple.

In the gap since we spoke about this in Committee, this law has achieved something that I have not seen in this House before. I know I have not been here that long, but I have never heard of a particular statute being used as an example in another discussion altogether when it has not even been passed. In the debate put forward on 4 December by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, about the procedures and practices of the House, this Bill got not just one but two mentions. It was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, who is in his place next to me, and by the noble Lord, Lord Dykes. The noble Lord, Lord Butler, said that,

“we might be saved from legislation such as the absurd Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill”.—[Official Report, 4/12/14; col. 1495.]

Later, the Bill was described as,

“a badly drafted, silly Bill that is all to do with ‘manifesto-itis’ rather than any deep legislative urge on behalf of the Executive”.—[Official Report, 4/12/14; col. 1499.]

I do not think we should proceed with this matter.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, perhaps I may return briefly to the point that I made in Committee, which is directed to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, about the solicitor advising—no doubt—an employer. The problem to which I drew attention was where somebody such as a fireman, police officer or some other person in the emergency services wanted to take the kind of action for the benefit of society that is talked about in Clause 2, but his superior officers said, “No, you can’t, because if you do that, my organisation is liable to be sued”.

My point is that Section 1 of the previous statute deals with outcomes and separates the outcome from the person who is being sued. The problem with this Bill is that it links irrevocably and inextricably the person who is being sued with the person who is acting. With great respect to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, I do not think that this clause and the section deal with precisely the same thing. I think that this is a much narrower clause, dealing with a particular part of the subject. Therefore, it just adds to confusion when we have an existing piece of legislation which covers all the aspects and is perfectly serviceable to then come along with something which covers only part of it.

When the Minister replies, I hope that he will say why the Government have not taken the opportunity to broaden this clause so that it covers precisely the same ground as the existing legislation, because to have two pieces of legislation, one half-baked and one dealing with the whole thing, just adds to confusion. It is a great shame to be invited to pass a measure of that kind.

Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Bill

Lord Blair of Boughton Excerpts

Tuesday 18th November 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts]

I am not going to try to argue a fine legal point with the noble Lord but the fact of the matter is that the museum was advised that unless there were full and clear CRB checks for all individuals, it would be liable. This piece of legislation gives us an opportunity because in a case such as this, the museum,

“was acting for the benefit of society or any of its members”.

I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, that I was disappointed with his remarks at Second Reading when he said:

“The irony is, of course, that banging on about a compensation culture is itself likely to create the very apprehension that the Bill purports to allay”.—[Official Report, 4/11/14; col. 1552.]

Regrettably, the apprehension is already very widespread. If he wishes to find out what is causing that apprehension, I invite him and other noble Lords to read the briefing sent by the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers, which describes the impact of the Bill as follows. It says that,

“those who ‘employ’ volunteers may be less rigorous in their risk assessments, thereby leaving those in their care more vulnerable to harm. An example is the chairman of a local football club where volunteers coach children. As a result of this Bill, the chairman may be tempted to cut corners in vetting the suitability of his volunteers”.

To suggest that those of us who support the Bill are somehow careless about our children’s future is unfair, unworthy and, indeed, outrageous.

I referred earlier to my support for the rule of law but I have an equally deep affection for the right of free association. It is on this right that our civil society is built. Many argue that in this screen-based age, our society is becoming more atomised and more self-centred. Whether or not this is true, I believe strongly that a vibrant civil society improves social well-being and social cohesion. All possible steps should be taken to avoid people being discouraged from getting involved.

I expect that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, will argue that if a case with the characteristics I have described were to come to court, it would be thrown out. That is as may be. I am certainly not going to try to swap legal precedents with them as that would be a battle I would surely lose. But I ask the Committee to consider that for the noble Lord and the noble and learned Lord, a day in court is another day at the office, but for the defendant it is an entirely strange world —working to unfamiliar and not always understandable procedures, often taking quite a long time to come to court and incurring considerable cost and expense. It is a highly stressful experience for the layman or laywoman as well as for their families and work colleagues. Of course, if the defendant is a trustee of a charity which is not a CIO, he or she has unlimited liability.

In the background is the advice we were given at the time of the task force by an experienced litigation solicitor who explained that he would do everything he could to prevent his clerk going to court in what he called “volunteer liability” type cases because, as he put it, they are always complex and judgmental. Once you appear before a judge, and even more so before a judge and jury, the potential for unpleasant surprises increases significantly.

Earlier in the Bill, I said this was one of a series of bullets that needed to be fired to tackle this problem. So that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, do not think that I am trying to attack the lawyers, I will give two brief examples of other bullets that need to be fired. One is the availability of insurance. The task force found that improving the clarity and comparability of insurance cover would have a major impact on encouraging volunteers. As the task force recommended, the Government have established a working party that includes representatives of the insurance industry and the voluntary sector to tackle this and other insurance problems. For the second bullet, I follow what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said earlier, when he wrote in his Times article, “Why not just issue a press release or pay for a newspaper advertisement?”. This raises the issue of myths. My task force was appalled at what we found, and we listed the 20 most extraordinary in our report. They include people worried that they could not put a plaster on a child’s cut; that goggles could not be worn in a swimming lesson; that they could not take photographs of their children at a school play, and that they could not offer meeting space in an office to a local community group. I hope that in parallel with implementing this Bill the Government will take active steps to ensure that where myths occur, they are duly busted.

To conclude, valuable steps have already been taken as regards the law in this respect. The Compensation Act was the subject of our debate this afternoon. The restrictions on contingent-fee legal work and after-the-event insurance are most welcome. We need, however, to continue to explore ways to encourage, or at least not discourage, our fellow citizens to get involved in civil society, and this Bill is important in that regard. I hope that the noble Lord will not divide the House tonight on the proposal that Clause 2 should stand part of the Bill and that my noble friend on the Front Bench will be robust in rejecting the Motion.

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

My Lords, I find myself very surprised to be supporting the Motion, if that is the right term, of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but I do. I am surprised because, although I am broadly in sympathy with what the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, has been saying, I think this piece of legislation is, frankly, a lousy way to do it.

Most years I would take part in a little-known ceremony called the Provincial Police Award, which is for the greatest act of heroism by a member of the public. This is what happens when a member of the public sees a red mist and goes for the armed robbers. It is fantastic. The award could actually be called the Unluckiest Robber of the Year Award, which would be a more accurate term. Having said that, we know how difficult it is to legislate in this field. I was involved in a number of the cases concerned with health and safety legislation and the police and the fire service. Those cases were extraordinarily difficult. After a number of pretty climactic events, we ended up in long, detailed and creative discussions with the Health and Safety Executive about the right way to deal with issues which affect not only members of the public, but also the individuals who work for these services. Can they climb ladders? Can a sergeant order somebody to climb a ladder? Can they dive into rivers? It needs really detailed work. What this clause does is smooth over all that with a series of words that have very little meaning in relation to the detail.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, talked about the Bee Gees. In my view, what the Government are attempting here is more like Don Quixote and Sancho Panza: they are riding along and tilting at windmills.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I am troubled by this clause for a reason related to the two speeches that have been just been made. I can express it in a slightly different way.

There was a tragic incident in Scotland a few years ago where a young woman had been walking in the country and fell down a hole, which I think had been created by old mine workings, and she could not get out. The fire brigade was summoned and its officers were prepared to go down the hole and rescue her, which they had to do because I think she was injured and could not use a rope or a ladder. They were perfectly willing to help her, and you might say that that was an act of heroism of the kind that Clause 4 is asking us to think about. But the fireman who really wanted to go was ordered not to do so by his superior officer, no doubt for reasons of health and safety. Unfortunately, the woman died of hypothermia because by the time the appropriate equipment, which the person who was prepared to go down was happy to dispense with, reached the site, it was too late.

The case caused great concern in Scotland. I know that it is a Scottish case which did not occur in this jurisdiction, but it is an example of something that I do not believe this Bill deals with. It is an example of the way in which the Bill has not been properly thought through. I think that there is a real problem for employers who are contemplating health and safety legislation and thinking not so much about themselves as their liability. It may be vicarious liability, which I understand the Minister is not interested in, or it may be a direct liability for something they failed to do to protect an officer who is himself injured or killed. It is a great shame that all these clauses have not faced up to that.

That is due partly to the wording of Clauses 1, 2 and 4, which concentrate on an individual who is described as “a person” and “the person”. It is feature of this Bill that one is asked to think of the same person all the way through; in other words, the person who is said to be negligent or in breach of statutory duty is the same person that you are supposed to be thinking of when you contemplate whether they were acting heroically. In the example I am talking about, the person who was at risk of being sued, or thought that his organisation was at risk of being sued, was not the person who was acting heroically. Therefore, Clause 4 in particular—and, I suspect, Clause 2 as well—misses the real target where the most difficult problem in dealing with these situations arises.

Funnily enough, if you look carefully at Section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006, you see that it does not create that problem because it does not use such precise language; rather, it is framed in a general way that covers the kind of situation I am talking about. One is not asked to be so precise in looking at the person who is undertaking particular acts or is prepared to do so.

For those reasons, I am deeply troubled by Clauses 2 and 4. I really do not think that they have been framed in a way that meets the full range of cases, in particular cases where employers instruct those who are prepared to do these things not to do them. It is not quite the same as the example in Oxford, but I suspect that it is not far removed. Perhaps the noble Lord, Lord Blair, can think of examples where police forces have suffered exactly the same problems. It is a great shame that the Government have not thought this through, faced up to the real problem, and addressed it in a proper way.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Blair of Boughton Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Low of Dalston]

My Lords, I can be quite brief. This amendment arises from a conversation which began at Second Reading when the noble Lord, Lord Blair, and I identified the problem of children and vulnerable adults who are dependent on an adult who is sentenced to a prison sentence being left without support when the offender is sent to prison. It is estimated that some 200,000 children have a parent in prison at any one time, which is nearly three times the number of children in the care system. They are twice as likely as other children to experience behaviour and mental health problems, and three times as likely to go on to commit an offence themselves. Sixty-five per cent of boys with a convicted father will themselves go on to offend. Therefore, there is an obvious need for these people to be picked up and supported, yet there is no official way of identifying them or ensuring that their need for support is taken care of.

Organisations such as Barnardo’s and other members of the Families Left Behind campaign report from their work in prisons that a lack of identification of the children or vulnerable adults dependent on a parent or carer remanded in custody or sentenced to imprisonment often puts the child or vulnerable adult at risk. They have records of cases where children have been left with friends or neighbours as a temporary measure and are then passed on to other friends or associates; cases where children have been left with individuals who misuse drugs and alcohol; cases of children left at school with no one to collect them and with no one contacting the school; and cases of children left with elderly relatives, relatives with disabilities, relatives in distress or relatives living in poverty who have offered to step in to provide emergency care but do not really have the resources to do so.

In the past, the probation service would have stepped in to bridge the gap but, with the probation service progressively becoming more of an offender management and less of a social service, a vacuum has opened up. In 2011, with the support of the NSPCC, Action for Prisoners’ Families and HM Courts and Tribunals Service, Pact published a range of resources aimed at promoting good practice in relation to children and dependent adults whose primary carers had been sent to prison, including guidance asking magistrates to check that there were no immediate welfare needs. Three years on, however, it is clear that many courts are not following this guidance, and there continues to be a lack of awareness of the need to make sure that arrangements are in place for the care of children and dependants of people placed in custody. Accordingly, the Families Left Behind campaign is calling for a statutory duty to be placed on courts to ask an individual, when they are sentenced to prison or held on remand, whether they have any dependants. If they do, steps can then be taken to ensure that appropriate care arrangements are in place.

At Second Reading, the Minister acknowledged the problem and undertook to consider it. I am very grateful to him for the constructive discussions he has made possible and to the members of the Bill team for the positive contribution they have made and for all their help in getting the amendment right. As a result, I am hopeful that we now have an amendment that the Government can broadly support. The Minister felt that a statutory duty might be a bit heavy-handed and suggested that the amendment might be better couched in terms of guidance. Accordingly, the amendment now seeks to achieve its effect through directions, although I note that the word “duty” remains in the heading of the proposed new clause. The Minister may have something to say about that.

The amendment would amend the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the Bail Act 1976 to put in place a system for courts to establish whether an individual sentenced to prison or held on remand has children or vulnerable adults who are dependent on them and who may need immediate welfare support. The proposal is that, immediately following the decision to send someone to prison, the defendant will be asked by the court whether they have children or vulnerable adults dependent on them and, if so, whether care arrangements are in place. If there are no such arrangements, the defendant will be given the opportunity to make a phone call to family members to inform them about the situation and make the necessary short-term arrangements, such as for collecting a child from school or nursery, or ensuring that they are not left at home alone. If this does not achieve a satisfactory result, the court should direct an appropriately qualified person in the court—for example, probation staff, the defendant’s legal representative, court staff, a voluntary sector organisation or a police liaison officer—to take specific action before the defendant leaves court. Where necessary, this may entail contacting the appropriate local authority children’s or adult social care team.

I hope the amendment may give us a basis for moving ahead consensually on a matter which, once pointed out, has prompted concern across the whole House. I beg to move.

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Low, in this matter and I am grateful to the Minister for the co-operation that he and his office have shown in relation to the amendment.

I declare an interest as the chairman of the Thames Valley Partnership, a criminal justice organisation which, as it says on the tin, is in the Thames Valley. I came across this problem in relation to some of the partnership’s work, as there is at the moment absolutely no statutory requirement for anyone, for instance, to inform a school that a child attending the school has a parent who is now in prison. The failure to do this is also often compounded by the embarrassment of the other parent. She is not going to mention it but the other children in the playground will know who has just had their father sent to prison and the bullying and exclusion start. This relatively short amendment, which imposes the lightest of requirements on the sentencers, fills an obvious lacuna.

I apologise to the House that I was not in attendance for the first 30 seconds of the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Low, so I do not know whether he mentioned the fact that the numbers are vast—200,000 children, which is three times the number in care. Obviously, that is not every year in terms of sentences but there is a long-term impact. Some of the work done by the Thames Valley Partnership shows that children increasingly, as they grow older into their teenage years, lose contact with the parent in long-term custody.

I hope the Government will accept the amendment. I understand there are a number of routes we can take between now and Report. Whether this is done through statute or practice direction, I hope that we can close the gap which leaves children vulnerable when some parts of the agencies of the state know what has happened but are not talking to one another.

[Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)]

My Lords, my name is on the amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Low, has made a powerful speech. I do not intend to repeat his arguments and I shall not detain the Committee long.

In this case we must surely be seeking a balance. There is the need to ensure that the position of children or dependents of a person detained in custody is properly protected at a time of considerable trauma and family disturbance. The impact on the children of a parent, particularly a mother, going to jail has been well documented—it has been referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Low, and in briefings that your Lordships will have received from Barnardo’s and other NGOs—and that is one side of the balance. The other side of the balance is that we have to do this without tying up the courts in extensive bureaucratic form filling, much of which is time consuming and may prove ineffective. It is the balance between those two considerations that Amendment 55A seeks to achieve.

All that remains for me to do is to thank the Minister, his officials and, indeed, the Government for the courtesy they have shown in considering this difficult matter. I hope that this redrafted amendment will commend itself to him.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Lord Blair of Boughton Excerpts

Monday 21st July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, I ask the Government to think carefully about this clause—and I do so because they have pushed me into the very unlikely position of finding it impossible to support this proposal. The reason I find it impossible is that we already have more people in prison than any comparable country in the world. When we had a discussion about that, Ministers said, “Ah well, judges deem it right to send people to prison”. I do not see how you can say that and then say that in circumstances of this kind, judges should be told that they have to send people to prison. That is the first point that I find very difficult to take.

The second point is that judges are in a position to make proper decisions about very vulnerable young people. When I had a young persons’ prison in my constituency, to go there was one of the most depressing moments of the month because you met all sorts of young men who could so easily have been your own children, if they had not been brought up in circumstances of such horror and in such appalling situations that you were surprised that anybody could have turned out other than criminal. You cannot excuse people by their background or environment but you have to make your judgments on punishment with a full understanding of the circumstances and likely effects of the punishment that you make.

The third reason is this. If you can think of a way most likely to ensure that someone who has broken the law will continue to do so, a short prison sentence must be it. It is manifestly true that it does not work; it is even more true that it normally can make things worse. If other countries manage to have a different system without having some enormous increase in crime, the Government really have to think again. After all, if you walk in the streets of Paris or Berlin, or indeed in Dusseldorf or Lille, do you feel less safe because there are half as many people in prison? Of course you do not. They have found better ways of doing this. I am citing not Scandinavian countries but those countries with which we would normally compare ourselves.

There is a further reason, too, which is this. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will not be embarrassed by this but I do not like the way that this got into the Bill. It was not in the Bill originally; the Government did not think that it was the answer. What happened was that people outside, not known for their concern for young people or their concern for moderation and real facts, started a campaign to say that this was the answer. But that is the same campaign that we have had for years and years, which is: “Be tougher, lock up more people and really show which side you are on”.

I do not think that anyone could claim that I am on any side other than having the toughest belief in the rule of law and the most concern to protect people. However, I do not like it when the law is changed, or proposed to be changed, not by the sober reflection of those who have to carry the consequences but by the noisy statement of those who will move on to another campaign the moment that that one ceases to sell newspapers or gain support. That for me is the reason why this is intolerable. We must make our laws because we know that they are right and have thought about them; otherwise, we will go backwards in so many ways.

I end by saying to my noble friend that one of the things that characterises this Government—and, indeed, this moment in our history—is that we have become more understanding about things and less damagingly demonstrative about our attitude to other people. We have become more willing to say that there must be another way. As we are going to discuss the appalling situations created by those who think that the only way forward is to use force against others, we ought also to think about ourselves. We do not have this right. We have not made our whole punishment system work as well as those of many of our neighbours. Is not this the moment to say that we are not going to keep going down this route but are genuinely going to see whether we can learn more from other people and, having done so, change our system so that we can get the results we need without the knee-jerk reaction of “lock ’em up”?

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

My Lords, I strongly oppose the proposal that Clause 25 should not stand part of the Bill and it appears that commissioners may think in the same way, according to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Since the early 19th century, it has been the received wisdom that people are deterred from committing crime by the likelihood of detection rather than the length of sentence. I agree with that in general.

As a former Metropolitan Police commissioner and deputy-commissioner, I have experience of two categories of crime that proved the rule by being exceptions to it. The first is the one that Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe has apparently already mentioned: that is, the reduction in shootings that occurred in London after a five-year mandatory sentence was announced. That occurred because communication among the criminal fraternity is good. It is particularly good among the women of that group, who stopped carrying the guns in their handbags. Therefore the guns are not as much in evidence as they were.

I imagine that many noble Lords will recall my second example, which was a response to the marked rise in fatal and near fatal stabbings of teenagers in London a few years ago. The most important factor in reducing that was the issue of a practice direction from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge—I do not think that he is in his place—when he was Lord Chief Justice, that a first offence of unlawful possession of a knife should normally be considered for a custodial sentence. Knife crime started to fall and I believe that is because people knew that that message was passing around the streets of London.

I believe that, with knife crime falling, a custodial sentence for a second offence of carrying these weapons makes much better sense than for a first offence. The reason for that is it provides people with a chance. A sentencer now sentencing someone for a first offence can give them a very simple message which is very easy to understand—“Don’t do this again or you will go to jail”. Normally, I am in favour of leaving judges and magistrates free to exercise their judgment but this crime has an additional catastrophe attached to it. It ruins the life not only of the person who is seriously injured or killed but also the life of the offender in those circumstances.

I had to talk to the families of people who had been murdered in these circumstances. We have not heard enough from those who oppose the clause or, with respect, from the noble Lord, Lord Deben, about the victims of knife crime. Knife crime can change lives catastrophically. One of the awful things about that period when teenagers were killing each other in London was how often there was only one knife wound. A single blow had caused these deaths, as if these young people had no idea that that action would kill someone. It seems to me sensible to pass a message to stop the thing happening that will then allow someone to be murdered. One cannot murder someone very easily if one does not have a knife or a gun. I strongly oppose the proposal.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, judicial discretion is a very important aspect of the judicial process. However, embedded in judicial discretion is the fact that you cannot know in advance with precision how that discretion will be exercised. If you have studied the sentencing guidelines you may know roughly the areas in which the discretion will operate, but having a fixed penalty as a minimum means that it is known in advance that unless there is a particular circumstance to take you out of the situation a fixed penalty will happen. You know that in advance.

I have heard what has been said in support of this clause and also the other point of view from a very experienced police officer. I know a case of knife-carrying that was enough to kill somebody and give the carrier a life sentence. I found that a very traumatic experience. Telling people in advance what the sentence will be is an extremely important deterrent. It has been done in various parts of our judicial system. Therefore I do not regard the principle on which this is based as one that can apply in all circumstances. In a second offence for knife crime it is reasonable for a statement to be made about precisely what the sentence as a minimum will be unless there are circumstances that take it out of the ordinary.

My noble friend Lord Marks has commented on the nature of the exception. If he wishes to improve on that, there is the option of an amendment to that effect. So far, none is forthcoming. I shall take it that the exception, in so far as it is stated, is a reasonable exception in the circumstances of this case. Of course the idea is not to put more people in prison; it is to prevent people from going to prison by knowing that if they do this particular thing for a second time that is where they will go. On the whole, one hopes that that has a deterrent effect.

Information about this will quickly get around among the people who are affected by it. One can understand the idea of discrimination but of course it depends on the way in which the power to stop and search is used. As far as I am concerned, this power must be used in accordance with the best discretion of the police officers on the street. However this amendment has come about—it was made in the other place—the Government have decided in the light of their experience and of their policy as a whole that it should be adhered to and given effect.

Assisted Dying Bill [HL]

Lord Blair of Boughton Excerpts

Friday 18th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Blair of Boughton (CB)]

My Lords, I declare the interest that I was a member of the commission of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, on assisted dying. I agreed with its findings and I support the Bill.

I will talk in my short time about the commission. First, this was a comprehensive inquiry, which took evidence for 18 months. It ended with a comprehensive report, which is over 300 pages long. It is therefore a little unnecessary to suggest that we need another royal commission. Secondly, it is worth remembering that, while not being the complete answer to the principle objected to by some, every proposal in the Bill is voluntary. It is voluntary for those who wish to die; it is voluntary for those who wish to assist them, whether or not they are healthcare professionals. Thirdly, in the visits that the commission paid to Oregon, which is the only equivalent jurisdiction with an equivalent law, we found evidence neither of a slippery slope down to involuntary euthanasia nor of the elderly being pressured. Fourthly, the Bill is particularly well circumscribed. It does not include anything to do with those without mental capacity to make such a decision, nor does it include those who are disabled, however fundamentally, but who are not dying. One of our commissioners, who signed up to the report, was Dr Stephen Duckworth, himself a disabled campaigner and a person suffering from serious disability. Fifthly, that means that the Bill is aimed at the very small number of people who are dying, who are unable to kill themselves and whose pain cannot be treated.

One of the people who came to give evidence to the commission was Dr Ann McPherson, an Oxford GP and founder of Healthcare Professionals for Assisted Dying. She died of cervical cancer before the report was published. I would, with a heavy heart, recommend that noble Lords Google or look at her daughter Dr Tess McPherson’s account of her mother’s death; it is in the British Medical Journal. Ann had access from the inside of the profession to the best that medicine could provide to ease her passing. It could not. The account of her death is harrowing, shocking and—bluntly and sadly—quite disgusting. It is the compassionate aim of the Bill to prevent others from dying so badly.

Others are better qualified to speak about those kinds of points. I want to talk about one part of my own expertise. For as long as the law remains unchanged, as I said in a debate last December, while prosecutors may have guidance that makes the prosecution of assisted suicide unlikely, each such death means a police investigation. The house will be a crime scene: tents, officers in forensic clothing, photography and the seizure of computers, last letters, presents and bank statements. This is a homicide scene and it is immensely distressing for those left behind. The funeral will be delayed for a post-mortem. Relatives will be faced with months of anxiety, waiting for a prosecutorial decision. It is also an extremely unpleasant task for the police and an entirely unnecessary one.

Thelma Stone is a friend of a friend. She recently wrote to me about the death of her husband Alan, who was terminally ill with motor neurone disease and took his own life. Your Lordships may think that she puts this rather mildly:

“One feels a certain loneliness on top of the bereavement when one is treated as a potential criminal at such a painful time”.

At the end of “King Lear”, Kent says of the dying king:

“O, let him pass! He hates him

That would upon the rack of this tough world

Stretch him out longer”.

It is not just the dying but their relatives and friends who need to be released with compassion and safeguards from the rack of these kinds of awful deaths.