Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Lord Black of Brentwood Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 13th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 127 in this group. I do not hold, in any particular way, to my choice of wording, but I am fairly sure the Government’s choice of wording is not right. We all receive a huge quantity of emails; we do not want multiplicity—we want effectiveness—and to demand that these emails come separately is a mistake. I hope the Government will see this as an opportunity to rationalise and reduce the size of my inbox and everybody else’s inbox. If we allow more than one thing to be in the message, then the prominent message must be the statutory one. To have it in the subject line and in the first sentence, so that it comes up in the summary when you look at what the email is about, would be a better way of putting it than my amendment, but I am sure the Government can improve on that.

[Lord Black of Brentwood (Con)]

My Lords, I refer to my earlier declarations of interest.

I raised a significant number of issues relating to subscription contracts in Committee. I am very grateful to both my noble friends on the Front Bench for listening to those arguments, and for bringing forward amendments to deal with them, and I strongly support them. They help fulfil the Government’s aims without placing unacceptable burdens on business.

There is only one remaining issue that we dealt with in Committee, and that is why I am supporting the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Lucas. His amendment would remove the prescriptive wording that is currently in the Bill and allow for traders to provide notices

“in a clear and prominent manner:”

His wording simply recognises that the prescribed renewal information is at the heart of the notice and must not be skewed out of view, while allowing for other beneficial information to be included, if desired. I am sure all noble Lords will be very happy that it ensures notices do not become a GDPR-style irritant, but something which is actually helpful to consumers. It would certainly be counterproductive if consumers experienced information fatigue and stopped opening communications from traders or simply opted out of them all together.

Equally, it will alleviate the burdens on traders, who may feel obliged to send emails around the time of renewal notices, to provide information on alternative deals, packages and so on, which could otherwise be dealt with in one communication. As my noble friend said, there may be other ways of dealing with it, or other wording, and I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say about this amendment, which I support.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I am going to be extremely brief as I think we are all anxious to move towards seeing whether the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, will move his previous amendment to a vote.

There is a common factor here; all these amendments were designed to flush out the Minister to give more assurance and information, and in large part that has been successful. There are still some outliers in terms of reminder notices; the Minister is well aware that there are some players, like Adobe, who will find, when they work it out, that they are going to have to give five notices for an annual contract. I do not know whether the Minister has looked at that and has answers to it.

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Lord Black of Brentwood Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 11th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Colville of Culross (CB)]

I have added my name to the Minister’s Amendment 1 with great pleasure, because the Government agree that the power in Clause 6 is one the Secretary of State does not need. I have also added my name to Amendment 56 as it aims to curtail an even greater Secretary of State power. In Committee, I tabled a series of amendments to limit the Secretary of State’s powers over various stages of the Part 1 conduct requirement process. At the time, we were told that these powers were needed to ensure that the regime could respond to the fast evolution and unpredictability of digital markets. I grateful to the Minister for changing his mind on one of these powers in Clause 6 and for tabling the amendment to leave out subsections (2) and (3), which, even with the affirmative procedure, were going to give the Secretary of State unnecessary powers. It is a sensible move, as the criteria for deciding whether a digital activity should be deemed of strategic significance are, as he said, broad and well set out in subsection (1).

My concern was that the powerful tech companies, whose market dominance will be investigated in the Part 1 process, might put pressure on Ministers to amend the four criteria in Clause 6 to dilute the range of company activities under consideration for SMS positions. I am satisfied that this amendment will stop that happening. I hope that the Minister will now listen favourably to other amendments, which will be debated today, to ensure that the conduct requirement process is as swift as possible and that the Secretary of State does not have overmighty powers to intervene in the process.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, for tabling Amendment 56, to which I have added my name, to Clause 114. Subsection (4)(a) as it stands gives too much power to the Secretary of State to approve these guidelines. As I said in Committee, it was pointed out that the guidelines are the most important part of the SMS process. They set out the framework for the conduct requirement process and allow implementation of the new powers the Bill gives to the CMA to examine market-dominant activities by big tech companies.

One of the reasons for my fear of the Minister’s powers is that she might be subject to lobbying by tech companies, as the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, pointed out, either to change the guidelines or to slow down implementation. At the moment, the Secretary of State has the power to delay approval indefinitely, and, looking to the future, when the guidelines need to be updated or revised, she or her successor could do the same thing. I am grateful to the Minister and his officials for meeting me twice to talk about this issue. I appreciate his time and attention, but I am disappointed that he and the Bill team felt unable to do anything to fetter the Secretary of State’s powers with a time limit on delay for approval. The Minister feels that a time limit would make the process brittle, and fears that an election or some big political event could cause the process to time out. I ask noble Lords to bear in mind that the amendment deals with the Secretary of State’s powers of approval of the guidelines only, not the entire procedure for setting up the guidelines. If there were an election, ministerial work would stop. However, once the new Government were in place, the time limit could kick in and start again. The Secretary of State could then approve the guidelines in 40 days or send them back to the CMA with reasons.

In my meeting with the Minister, he kindly offered to publish letters exchanged between the Secretary of State and the CMA as the guidelines were created. This seemed a wonderful offer that would go far towards ensuring transparency in the process and allay fears of backstage lobbying, and go some way towards assuaging Members’ concerns about the process of creating guidelines. Unfortunately, the Minister rescinded that offer. I ask him in the name of the openness and transparency of the Part 1 process to reinstate it.

Such a move would complement the second part of Amendment 56, whereby if the Minister does not approve of the guidelines—which would surely be the only reason for delay—an open statement of reasons as to why the guidelines could not be approved would be published. Surely noble Lords agree that transparency in the guidelines process would go far in calming any fears of it being influenced by the big tech companies.

I want very much to see this Bill on the statue book, but the Secretary of State’s powers in Clause 114 are detrimental to the Part 1 process and need to be looked at again. I hope the Minister will accept Amendment 56. If not, I will support the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, should he decide to test the opinion of the House.

[Lord Black of Brentwood (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as deputy chair of the Telegraph Media Group and my other interests as set out in the register. I will focus briefly on three crucial amendments in this group—on proportionality, the appeals standard, and the Secretary of State’s powers—echoing points that have already been made strongly in this debate.

I fully support Amendments 13 and 35 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks. The amendment made to the Bill in the Commons replacing “appropriate” with “proportionate” will significantly expand the scope for SMS firms to appeal the CMA’s decision to create conduct requirements and initiate pro-competitive interventions.

As we have already heard, the Government have sought to argue that, even absent the “proportionality” wording, in most cases the SMS firms will be able to argue that their ECHR rights will be engaged, therefore allowing them to appeal on the basis of proportionality. The question arises: why then introduce the “proportionality” standard for intervention at all, particularly when the CMA has never had the scope to act disproportionately at law?

In this context, it is clear that the main potential impact of the Bill as it now stands is that a court may believe that Parliament was seeking to create a new, heightened standard of judicial review. As the Government have rightly chosen to retain judicial review as the standard of appeals for regulatory decisions in Part 1, they should ensure that this decision is not undermined by giving big tech the scope to launch expensive, lengthy legal cases. All experience suggests that that is exactly what would happen by it arguing that the Government have sought to create a new, expansive iteration of JR. I fear that, if the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, are not adopted, we may find in a few years’ time that we introduced full merits reviews by the back door, totally undermining the purpose of this Act.

Amendments 43, 44, 46, 51 and 52 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, are also concerned with ensuring that we do not allow full merits appeals to undermine the CMA’s ability to regulate fast-moving digital markets. Even though full merits are confined to penalty decisions, financial penalties are, after all, as we have heard, the ultimate incentive to comply with the CMA’s requirements. We know that the Government want this to be a collaborative regime but, without there being a real prospect of meaningful financial penalties, an SMS firm will have little reason to engage with the CMA. Therefore, there seems little logic in making it easier for SMS firms to delay and frustrate the imposition of penalties.

There is also a danger that full merits appeals of penalty decisions will bleed back into regulatory decisions. The giant tech platforms will undoubtedly seek to argue that a finding of a breach of a conduct requirement, and the CMA’s consideration that an undertaking has failed to comply with a conduct requirement when issuing a penalty, are both fundamentally concerned with the same decision: “the imposition” of a penalty, with the common factor being a finding that a conduct requirement has been breached. The cleanest way to deal with this is to reinstate the merits appeals for all digital markets decisions. That is why, if the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, presses her amendments, I will support them.

Finally, I strongly support Amendment 56 in the name of my noble friend Lord Lansley, which would ensure that the Secretary of State must approve CMA guidance within a 40-day deadline. This would allow the Government to retain oversight of the pro-competition regime’s operations, while also ensuring that the operationalisation of the regime is not unduly delayed. It will also be important in ensuring that updates to the guidance are made promptly; such updates are bound to be necessary to iron out unforeseen snags or to react to rapidly developing digital markets. Absent a deadline for approval, there is a possibility that the regulation of big tech firms will grind to a halt mid-stream. That would be a disaster for a sector in which new technologies and business models are developed almost daily. I strongly support my noble friend and will back him if he presses his amendment to a vote.

With the deadline to comply with the Digital Markets Act in Europe passing only last week, big tech’s machinations in the EU have provided us with a window into our future if we do not make this legislation watertight. As one noble Lord said in Committee—I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie—we do not need a crystal ball when we can read the book. We have the book, and we do not like what we see in it. We must ensure that firms with an incredibly valuable monopoly to defend and limitless legal budgets with which to do so are not able to evade compliance in our own pro-competition regime.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 43, 44, 46, 51 and 52, to which I have added my name, and Amendment 59. Before I do, I register my support for Amendments 13 and 35, which were brilliantly set out by my noble friend Lord Faulks and added to by others. I too shall support them if they choose to ask the opinion of the House.

I also support Amendment 56 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley. I have lived experience of waiting too long for the code to come back from the Secretary of State. Even without being a bad actor, it is in the nature of Secretaries of State to have a burgeoning in-tray, and it is in the nature of codes to be on a subject that politicians have moved on from by the time they arrive. I fully support him, and 40 days seems like a modest ask given the importance of the Bill overall.

I turn to the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. I look forward to her setting them out after I have supported them. They would reinstate judicial review as the appeal standard for penalty decisions. I thank the Minister for the generosity of his time; I know he spoke not only to me but to a number of noble Lords. However, the thing I have taken away from discussions with government and during Committee is the persistent drumbeat that asserts that we are giving huge new and untested powers to the CMA. Here, we can fill in as we like: full merits on penalty, countervailing benefits, proportionality, and Secretary of State powers have been introduced simply to give a little balance. I find that unacceptable given the power of the companies and the asymmetry we are trying to address.

The reality is that the powers given to the CMA, while much needed, are dwarfed by the power of the companies they seek to regulate. The resources available to the CMA, while welcome, are dwarfed by the resources available to a single brand of a single SMS. Most of all, the CMA’s experience of regulating digital companies is dwarfed by the experience of digital companies in dodging regulation. I am struggling to understand the imbalance of power that the Government are seeking to address.

I was in Brussels on Wednesday last week and there is a certain regret about the balancing that the EU allowed to the DMA in face of the tech lobby, only to see Apple, TikTok and Meta gleefully heading to the courts and snarling up the possibility of being regulated as intended for many years—or perhaps at all. This issue was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Black. Adding a full merits appeal on penalty will embolden the sector to use the threat of appeal to negotiate their position at earlier points in the process. It will undermine the regulator’s strength in coming to a decision. Very possibly, as other noble Lords have said, it could bleed backwards into areas of compliance and conduct requirements. It is, as the noble Baroness, Lady Harding, said, creating a hole for water to get in. The companies lobbied furiously for full merits on penalties. This is not an administrative point; it goes to the heart of the regime. Full merits give the regulated leverage over the regulator.

The most straightforward way of ensuring that the regulator does not abuse its new, enhanced power, as the Government appear to fear, is to make it accountable to Parliament, as the noble Baroness, Lady Stowell, set out in full, repeatedly and with great eloquence. I am sorry that we will not have an opportunity to make our feelings on that issue felt today, but I strongly support her saying that we should not drop this issue just because it is inconvenient to deal with at this point in the electoral cycle.

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[Lord Black of Brentwood (Con)]

My Lords, I refer to my entry in the register of interests. I will speak to my Amendment 34, the effect of which would be to allow the final offer mechanism to be initiated by the CMA after a conduct requirement of the type allowed under Clause 20(2)(a)—to

“trade on fair and reasonable terms”—

has first been breached and the other conditions in Clause 38 are met. This includes the condition that

“the CMA could not satisfactorily address the breach within a reasonable time frame by exercising any of its other digital markets functions”.

I am very grateful to noble Lords who have added their names to my amendment.

As I explained in Committee, I am concerned that the final offer mechanism must be a credible incentive to negotiate rather than such a distant prospect that the big tech firms can delay and frustrate enforcement. The whole point of the Bill is to reduce the limitless ability of big tech to leverage its huge market power and financial and legal clout. Yet, if Google or Meta believes that the FOM will never be reached, they will happily offer publishers and content creators suboptimal deals and elongate the negotiation process, and publishers—I think particularly of the hard-pressed local press—may well be compelled to accept suboptimal deals out of commercial necessity.

It is important to note that the amendment would not rush a publisher or platform into the FOM unnecessarily. If the CMA judges that its other enforcement mechanisms would bring a swift resolution to any dispute on commercial terms, it could proceed with those remedies. Therefore, the amendment seeks merely to give the CMA a wider range of tools at an earlier stage, rather than mandating which tools it should select.

We need only to look to Australia, the first country to introduce final offer arbitration, to see just how determined some firms are to avoid fair commercial deals for the trusted content that is the antidote to a new wave of AI-generated disinformation. Less than two weeks ago, Meta, with weary inevitability, announced that it would close Facebook’s news tab feature in Australia and would not renew any of the deals made with publishers after the news media bargaining code was put on to the statute book.

At a minimum, there must be assurances that the CMA will be able rapidly to move through the enforcement stages prior to the FOM, setting short deadlines for compliance and being ready to swiftly set new or more prescriptive conduct requirements of the type allowed in Clause 20(2)(a) if the initial requirements are inadequate.

We must also be sure that, under Clause 20(2)(a), the CMA will be able to require SMS firms to share information necessary for publishers to calculate the value of their content. Without this information, publishers will inevitably be at a severe disadvantage in initial negotiations, making it nigh on impossible for “fair and reasonable terms” to be agreed. In parts of the Bill dealing with the FOM itself, it is explicitly stated that the CMA can use an information notice to require an SMS firm to give information to the CMA, and for that information to be shared with a third party, such as a publisher. Although this precise mechanism may not be appropriate for negotiations outside the FOM, if the CMA’s conduct requirements were not able to encompass a requirement for the necessary information to be shared, we would end up in a situation where the FOM was the only means to facilitate “fair and reasonable” commercial terms. Robust reassurances on this matter from my noble friend the Minister would be most welcome; I am waiting to see whether he writes “robust” down.

Finally on my amendment, I note that although this legislation ultimately cannot prevent global monopolies denying their users access to all trusted news content, the conduct requirement in Clause 20(3)(a) prevents SMS firms

“applying discriminatory terms, conditions or policies”.

We must have clarity that the CMA would be able to use this requirement to prevent the withdrawal of a service by an SMS firm—including ending the hosting of news content—if it is done in a discriminatory manner. Such discriminatory behaviour could include the removal of news content from UK news publishers in an effort to avoid payment while promoting news content from English-language titles based in other jurisdictions. That must not happen. Again, I hope the Minister can provide reassurance.

I will say very briefly that I support Amendments 23 and 24, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, which would reintroduce the indispensability standard to the countervailing benefits exemption. When the Bill was first published, the committee chaired by my noble friend Lady Stowell found that this exemption, as drafted, constituted a “proportionate backstop”, provided that the threshold for its use remained high, and stated explicitly that the Government should not lower the threshold.

We have been told by the Minister before that the changes made in the Commons do not lower the threshold but are an effort to add clarity. Yet, Cleary Gottlieb, a law firm which has represented Google in competition cases, has itself admitted that the new standard “is arguably lower”. Unfortunately, if these amendments are not adopted, it seems highly likely that the courts will reach the conclusion that Parliament explicitly moved away from one set of words to another, the clear implication being that it wishes to create a new and novel standard, and one which would seriously undermine the whole purpose of the legislation.

On the issue of precision, it is hard to see how a move away from a well-established and understood legal concept can add clarity in this area. Since its adoption in the Competition Act 1998, as my noble friend Lord Lansley said, the indispensability standard has been tested extensively, meaning that designated firms, third parties and the CMA alike would have a huge amount of precedent to draw on if it was reintroduced into the legislation. Why on earth would we tamper with that?

As my noble friend Lord Lansley’s amendments demonstrate, it is questionable whether the stand-alone exemption is necessary at all. Therefore, given that the changes made in the Commons may well have lowered the threshold required to access the exemption and the fact that they only reduced clarity—neither of which was the Government’s stated intention—there seems no sound policy reasons not to return Clause 29 to its original form, and I will support the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones.

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)]

My Lords, I assure noble Lords that, having spoken at length in the first group, I will be very brief in this group, not least because my noble friend Lord Black has made my argument for me on the countervailing benefits issue, which Amendment 23, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, addresses. I support that amendment because, as my noble friend just said and as I referred to in my remarks on the first group, there were several issues in the Bill that your Lordships’ Communications and Digital Select Committee was clear were important and should not be changed, one of which was countervailing benefits. I therefore support the amendment, which would reverse what has been changed in the Bill back to its original wording. As has been said, we know from the evidence of the last few weeks since the Digital Markets Act has been in force in Europe, and other cases have been brought against some of the respective large tech firms, that those firms will take any and every opportunity there is to exploit potential weaknesses or loopholes in legislation. That is why it is important that the language remains in its original wording.

I also support my noble friend Lord Black’s remarks about his Amendment 34. I too look forward to my noble friend the Minister giving him some assurance in robust terms.

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Lord Black of Brentwood Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 7th February 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Black of Brentwood (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to the stand part notices in my name on Clauses 262, 263 and 264. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement- Jones, for adding his name to the stand part notices on Clauses 262 and 264. I will also speak to Amendments 221 and 224, in my name. As these and other amendments in the next group have a special relevance to media businesses, I remind noble Lords of my interest, declared at the start of Committee, as deputy chairman of the Telegraph Media Group, which is a member of the News Media Association.

I hope noble Lords will forgive me if I make just a few general remarks about the issue of subscriptions, to set my amendments in this group and the next in context. I applaud the aim of tackling the nuisance of subscription traps. It is imperative to make sure, however, that the day-to-day operations of reputable traders are not adversely impacted by the measures designed to achieve this. This is important for businesses in many industries that benefit from a degree of commercial certainty in their operations as a result of subscriptions. In the creative economy, it is especially so for hard-pressed publishers that are painstakingly building sustainable business models through subscriptions at a time of considerable economic challenge. Concern has been expressed across the creative sector and beyond, as demonstrated by the briefing documents I have received, and other noble Lords may have, from the News Media Association, techUK, the Federation of Small Businesses, the Online Dating and Discovery Association, the Professional Publishers Association, the Motion Picture Association, the Association for UK Interactive Entertainment and the Commercial On-Demand and Broadcasting Association.

All noble Lords will know that the impact of digital has brought about the destruction of the old print-based business model that for generations supported our free press at a national and local level. Publishers have had to reinvent themselves, and subscriptions are a key part of that new commercial reality. In a world of infinitely free content, it is remarkable that many publishers have begun to turn the tide on the notion that news provision, which is very expensive to create, should be free at the point of access. A business like the Telegraph, which I work for, now has over 1 million subscribers across print and digital. That is the key to the future, because the business of high-quality journalism is an expensive one. This Bill must help, not hinder.

We all feel passionately about the democratic importance of a thriving press—the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, spoke about it movingly in Committee last week—but we have to give publishers the freedom to survive and grow. As it stands, the Bill endangers that because of the unintended consequences of the measures within it, which will introduce onerous and unnecessary new requirements on all types of subscriptions. This will drive up costs, stifle innovation and, paradoxically, reduce consumer choice. The Bill is supposed to be about helping consumers, but it does not achieve that. As I have observed in Committee on other areas, we are willing the ends but not the means.

The issue is that the Bill treats all subscriptions as though they were an endemic problem and unwanted by consumers, but that is not the case. By the Government’s analysis, four out of five adults in the UK have at least one subscription, often many more, providing them with convenience, consistency and choice. Only 5% of subscriptions are unwanted. There is a danger that we are creating a sledgehammer to crack a nut and are doing so in a way that significantly undermines all the good done by the rest of the Bill, in ushering payment for content and more equitable terms by the dominant tech platforms. It is about giving with one hand and taking away with the other.

The Government’s own impact assessment suggests that the package of measures will cost businesses £1.2 billion in the first year alone, with SMEs the hardest hit. The Government are supposed to be committed to reducing regulatory burdens on business, using regulation only as a last resort. Here, it seems to be the first resort and it has not been thought through, with no proper consultation.

The problems with subscriptions fall into four areas. This group covers cooling-off periods and the implementation period for the legislation. We will come to reminder notices and cancellation rights in the next group. The amendments that I have tabled tackle the issues brought about by the Bill’s well-intended but overly prescriptive subscription provisions. I hope that the Government will support them and bring forward their own amendments on Report.

I will deal first with cooling-off periods in Clauses 262 to 264. The Bill as it stands retains the 14-day cooling-off period under the Consumer Contracts (Information, Cancellation and Additional Charges) Regulations 2013, referred to as the CCRs. It starts once a contract is entered into or the consumer has taken physical possession of goods. However, the Bill amplifies the CCRs by introducing the concept of a renewal cooling-off period, which would apply at the point that a consumer transitions from a free trial or discounted introductory offer period to a contract charged at full price and each time a contract renews on to a term of 12 months or more.

While I have no problem with the existing 14-day cooling-off period under the CCRs, the renewal cooling-off period is a deeply harmful expansion of regulation, based on burdensome, EU-derived consumer law. I thought, perhaps mistakenly, that we were supposed to be making the most of the so-called Brexit freedoms rather than, ironically, gold-plating restrictions that have been manufactured in Brussels.

This is particularly true when viewed alongside the other provisions on subscriptions that the Bill introduces. For example, the new and detailed pre-contract information will ensure awareness of the product costs and renewals. Reminder notices will then reinforce awareness of a consumer’s ongoing contract. Furthermore, when transitioning from a free trial or discount period to a full-price-paid contract, or when renewing a subscription, a sufficient opportunity to establish the nature, characteristics and functioning of the product will already have been made available to the customers, which frankly makes these provisions redundant, creating harm and doing no good.

We should seek to retain the concept of a cooling-off period, as a grace period, applicable where a contract has been taken out erroneously—but not apply it at each and every renewal point. Consumers will be very aware that they have a subscription, given that they will be inundated with reminder notifications and will therefore have plenty of notice to cancel a subscription before it renews. Although they will do nothing to tackle the problem of subscription traps, which are at the heart of this Bill, the terms of this Bill will undermine a legitimate commercial strategy of discounted prices and trial periods, from which consumers can exit, in a way that puts unnecessary and burdensome constraints on businesses to grow and acquire new customers. Those discounted offers are important for consumers, especially at the time of a cost-of-living crisis.

Think what this would mean for a digital broadcaster or video-on-demand provider. Each time a customer entered into a subscription contract, they would receive a cooling-off period. This would allow them, for example, to binge on a specific series—as I am sure we have all done—or watch a sports event, and then withdraw immediately and receive a refund. The Bill does not put any limit on how many times a customer can enter into a contract and then exit using the cooling-off period. In effect, therefore, it will make trial periods redundant because it would make little commercial sense to provide customers with a trial period and a cooling-off period.

The point is that CCRs already tackle this issue by allowing consumers to request immediate access to digital content by acknowledging that the 14-day cooling-off period would no longer apply upon the supply of that content. It seems quite wrong to me that this Bill does not expressly retain this principle. I am sure that the Minister will tell us that the Government have said that they will consult on how the new cooling-off period in this Bill will work in practice, including whether a waiver of the rights should apply to certain types of subscription contracts.

Although that is encouraging and I am grateful for it, it still leaves the additional unnecessary cooling-off provisions on the statute book, meaning huge uncertainty for subscription-based businesses. Also, we have yet to see any detail on the scope of the promised consultation on a potential waiver for this provision, which gives little comfort. Far better to remove these provisions entirely—that is the point of these amendments—especially as their aims are already achieved elsewhere, in Part 4 of the Bill, and enshrined in the existing CCRs. This would still protect customers but would allow digital businesses, which are the future of the creative economy, the opportunity to expand and flourish.

I will speak briefly on Amendments 221 and 224 to Clause 334. The changes proposed in this legislation are very significant, even if the amendments in this group and the next are accepted, and will have many implications for British businesses. However, the Bill currently makes no explicit provision setting out how long businesses will have to implement these changes, which will be very onerous for many traders to implement. The Government will introduce a commencement order in due course, but there is obviously a clear benefit to giving the businesses that will be impacted—particularly SMEs, as the Federation of Small Businesses has pointed out—time to implement the changes effectively.

For legislation that brought in changes of a similar scope, such as that implementing the GDPR requirements, businesses were given more than two years to prepare for substantial change. The Government have delayed the implementation of the Health and Care Act’s advertising restrictions for two and a half years, until October 2025, in order to allow the sector to prepare for them. One business I spoke to estimated that it will take at least 10 months of development work to ready its systems for compliance with the Bill as it stands.

Amendments 221 and 224 would introduce a two-year implementation period after the passage of the Bill and a start date broadly in line with similar precedents. This period would allow businesses sufficient time to adapt their practices and systems in order to comply with the new regulations, reducing the burden of immediate changes and facilitating a smoother transition. I look forward to hearing what my noble friend the Minister has to say on these points.

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Moved by

[Lord Black of Brentwood]

170: Schedule 21, page 373, line 29, leave out paragraphs 29 to 39
Member’s explanatory statement
See explanatory statement to amendment at Clause 256, page 170, line 28 in the name of Lord Black of Brentwood.

[Lord Black of Brentwood (Con)]

My Lords, what a start. I shall also speak to Amendments 175 to 189, and to the stand part notice on Clause 257. I am again grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, for adding his name to Amendments 170 and 185 to 188. The amendments in this group relate to reminder notices and cancellation rights.

Let me deal first with those amendments that relate to Clause 256. I support the Government’s intent to ensure that businesses send more regular reminders to customers. These can play an important role in ensuring that customers are not trapped in unwanted or forgotten subscriptions and, indeed, ensure that they can get the best deals on offer, which is important for consumers facing cost of living pressures. But such measures need to be proportionate and targeted at the practices of bad actors that cause consumers the greatest level of harm, not at the entire sector.

At present, the Bill requires traders to provide six-monthly reminders to all customers with subscriptions and sets out in painstaking detail what the reminders need to include. This is predicated on what I think is an erroneous assumption that the majority of customers do not know to what they are subscribed and are not actively using those services on a daily or weekly basis. It would also prohibit the trader from bundling in potentially useful information as they see fit, such as how much of a service a consumer has used during the period or the benefits of the subscription being missed by the customer, to assist the customer to make informed decisions. The prescription in the measure seems to be a missed opportunity to do something that would be genuinely useful for both businesses and customers. Indeed, these prescribed communications risk becoming a GDPR-style irritant and therefore ignored.

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[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, I get the impression from my noble friend that this is not an area of the Bill that the Government want to move on, but I get the impression from the Committee that we would very much like to see some changes. I hope that, between now and Report, there may be some constructive conversations between me, my noble friends and noble Lords opposite to see whether we can make some consolidated suggestions to the Government that we need not argue about, so we can focus the argument on them.

[Lord Black of Brentwood (Con)]

I thank all noble Lords for what have proved to be good and constructive debates on both groups of amendments.

I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, that I think we pretty much have a consensus. There may be some issues at the margins, but we all agree, partly because, as my noble friend Lord Vaizey said, we are not hostile to any of these intentions. We support the intentions, but we recognise that we need to support business while protecting customers. This is important because, in many ways, it goes to the heart of the creative economy and the media ecosystem. The key point that has come across from many of the excellent contributions today is that this is a rapidly evolving environment and, as my noble friend Lady Stowell said, a highly competitive one.

The whole question about digital subs is that they are a new model for the way businesses are operating. For many, that model is becoming business-critical and should therefore not be dealt with, with what the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, rightly said is a blunt instrument. We should therefore not write things into the Bill that we will regret in subsequent days. I agree with a lot of what the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, said: of course there are some bad actors in this space. All we are saying is that we should not be putting into regulations things to deal just with those bad actors that would damage the much wider economy.

I hope that the Government will think again about a lot of these things. I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for saying that we will continue discussions between now and Report. That is very important, as I think he will have the mood of the Grand Committee: that we will want to return to this area. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Lord Black of Brentwood Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 29th January 2024 Grand Committee

I think that this Bill is fundamentally unbalanced in this area and it is bound one way or another to create a higher risk of failure. I do not get into the predictions game often—in fact, scarcely at all—but I predict that if we leave this Bill as it is, which is what is most likely to happen, it will not be long before there are calls in this place for amendments when the mistakes, which will inevitably happen, are explained to us.

[Lord Black of Brentwood (Con)]

My Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Tyrie, who has made an important speech. I shall speak to Amendment 66 in the name of my noble friend Lady Stowell, to which I have added my name. I also support the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, which cover similar ground. I remind noble Lords of my registered interests set out on the first day in Committee.

Two key themes seem to have emerged consistently during the scrutiny of this Bill in Committee: first, the need for there to be as much clarity as possible with no room for protracted legal wrangling as a result of legal loopholes; and, secondly, the emphasis on the speedy resolution of disputes. My noble friend’s amendment goes to the heart of both those themes and seeks to enshrine in the Bill the Government’s stated commitment, which is strongly shared by the Grand Committee, as I have seen to date, to clarity and speed.

As the Minister made clear at Second Reading, the Government intend that merits-based appeals are available once a breach has been found only if

“the imposition of a penalty was not appropriate, the level of it was not suitable, or the date by which it should be paid needs to be changed”.—[Official Report, 5/12/23; col. 1450.]

Merits appeals are not intended to apply to the decision that a breach has occurred or to the decision to set a conduct requirement in the first place or to introduce a remedy such as an enforcement order following a breach.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston (Con)]

My Lords, I speak to my Amendment 77 in this group. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Tyrie and Lord Clement-Jones, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Whitchurch, for adding their names to it.

I do not support what the Government did in the Commons, which the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, described and which his amendment seeks to overturn. However, I think that I understand why they did it, and I have some sympathy with their reasoning, if it is, as I assume, about increasing oversight of the CMA. Where I differ is that I do not believe that this is a job for the Secretary of State. In saying that, it is important to add that this is not just about a turf battle, for want of a better expression, between the Executive and Parliament. It is quite dangerous for the Secretary of State to position herself in this way, because she will become the subject of intense lobbying if she has the power to approve the CMA guidance on how Part 1 of the Bill will operate. That lobbying will be done in private—it could go on for weeks, as the noble Viscount said—and any change made as a result of that activity would be subject to massive rows, if not legal challenge. For me, nothing makes sense about the solution to the problem with which I have some sympathy.

As I have said on several occasions, the need for regulators to be independent can sometimes be over-argued. I very much believe that their regulatory decisions should be made independently without fear or favour or any kind of political interference. What I am most concerned about is that they must be accountable, even though they are independent. We are giving the CMA substantial new powers, so we must also ensure that we—Parliament—oversee its use of them properly.

I will come to parliamentary accountability and how we might improve on that in another amendment in my name, which relates to this group but is in another, for the reasons that the noble Viscount set out. But here, my Amendment 77 proposes that, instead of the Secretary of State approving the CMA guidance, the CMA must

“consult the relevant Parliamentary committees … and publish its response to any recommendations”

made by the committee at the same time that it publishes the final version of its guidance. That approach would ensure oversight of the guidance before it is implemented. It would also make sure that there is scrutiny of the CMA, that the CMA is properly accountable to Parliament and that any debate about the guidance happens in the open and not behind closed doors.

I am pleased to say that I have received widespread support for my proposal from many stakeholders and trade bodies, from all angles. I am not exaggerating when I say that what is proposed by way of Amendment 77 serves everyone’s needs and shared objectives, whether that is big tech, challenger tech, Parliament or the Government. I am grateful to my noble friends—both the Ministers—for our meeting to discuss this matter, which we had a couple of weeks ago. When my noble friend comes to respond—having already, I hope, discussed my amendment with colleagues in Whitehall—I hope he is able to express some support for what is proposed here. This is an important amendment to the Bill and I hope very much that he, speaking for the Government, feels able to accept it and make it their own.

[Lord Black of Brentwood (Con)]

My Lords, I want to support Amendment 76, to which I have added my name, with some brief remarks because the noble Viscount, Lord Colville, has put the case with great power and eloquence. I also support Amendment 77 in the name of my noble friend Lady Stowell, which is a clever solution to the issue of accountability.

I support Amendment 76 in particular, both because I do not believe the requirement is necessary and because—this is a consistent theme in our Committee debates—it builds into the legislation a completely avoidable delay and poses a very real threat to the rapid enforcement of it. Quite apart from the issues of principle, which are significant, this is also intensely practical. The CMA’s guidance on the Bill, published earlier this month, set out the expected timetable for the consultation phase on the Bill’s implementation, running through to October 2024, which could be a very busy month. It is almost certainly when we will have a general election or be in the midst of one.

It seems highly unlikely that the Secretary of State will be able to approve guidance during the purdah of an election campaign and if, after the election—whoever wins it—we have a new Secretary of State, there will inevitably be a further delay while he or she considers the guidance before approving it. The Bill therefore ought to be amended to remove the requirement for the Secretary of State’s approval, or, at the very least, set a strict timetable for it, such as the draft guidance being automatically approved after 30 days unless it is specifically rejected. That would ensure that there is not unnecessary delay, which could run into many months, before the new regime takes effect—especially if there is, as a number of noble Lords have made clear, intense lobbying of the Secretary of State behind the scenes.

[Baroness Kidron (CB)]

My Lords, I support both amendments in this group. This seems to be fundamentally a question of what happens in private and what happens in public. I was struck by the number of exchanges in the second day in Committee last week in which noble Lords raised the asymmetry of power between the regulator and the companies that may be designated SMS. The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester said,

“let us get this right so that Davids have a chance amid the Goliaths”.—[Official Report, 24/1/24; col. GC 230.]

Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Bill

Lord Black of Brentwood Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 5th December 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Black of Brentwood (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble and learned Lord, and, indeed, so many speakers who have made such powerful points, with which I am overwhelmingly in agreement. There is a danger that I might sound like Little Sir Echo. I declare my interest as deputy chairman of Telegraph Media Group and director of the Advertising Standards Board of Finance, and I note my other interests in the register.

Like other noble Lords, I wholeheartedly support this legislation. As we have heard, it has been the subject of countless studies and consultations over many years, dating back to Dame Frances Cairncross’s admirable review—even before Furman—of the sustainability of the press, which concluded that

“the unbalanced relationship between publishers and online platforms”

threatened the future of journalism, and recommended that

“these platforms should be required to set out codes of conduct to govern their commercial relationships with news publishers”.

That review reported in early 2019—nearly five years ago—since when the commercial position of the press, and in particular the local and regional press, has deteriorated significantly. So, as we have heard many times, this has been a long time coming—but it will have been worth the wait, as long as we now get on with it without delay.

This legislation is hugely important because it delivers on so many different policy fronts. It is a policy for economic growth because, with the creative economy at its heart, it will open up digital markets, allowing UK businesses to innovate and grow. It is a policy for fairness, ensuring that the giant, unaccountable tech platforms deal with publishers on a level playing field. It corrects a dreadful imbalance in market power, which springs from the fact that, essentially, two foreign companies now take 80% of UK digital advertising but do not agree fair and reasonable terms for the content that powers their operations.

It will be good for consumers, as each UK household now pays over £200 more each year than it should for its online purchases as a result of the stranglehold on the ad market exercised by Google and Meta. It is also an investment in the future of trusted, authoritative journalism at a national and local level, which will be in deep jeopardy if there is no correction to a deeply distorted market, which means that publishers do not receive anything like a fair share of digital advertising revenues.

Finally, it delivers on perhaps one of the most important areas with which we, as parliamentarians, will have to grapple in the future: artificial intelligence. It is not quite “oven ready” but it is certainly “AI ready”, because it could also provide a route for publishers to negotiate the fair use of their content by AI systems. Without adequate compensation in this way, the commercial sustainability of content providers will progressively erode and, in the long term, fail.

Before coming on to some of the detail of the Bill, I want to explain why I think it is so essential. First, it is now crystal clear that the anti-competitive practices of the global monopolies are harming the UK economy. The CMA estimated back in 2018—the position will be much worse now—that Google and Facebook made excess UK profits of £2.4 billion in digital advertising. Those excess profits did not come from a free market but from the unashamed leveraging of market power. It is a closed market.

Secondly, it is equally clear that the big tech platforms benefit hugely from the content produced by publishers, both with advertising shown around the news, and the data obtained by platforms that interact with that content without paying for it. Again, the CMA has found that adtech intermediaries, in a market dominated by Google, capture over a third of the value of the ad space on publishers’ websites. The fact that people can find trusted news there makes them return more frequently, further expanding the market of the duopoly—a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Fox. It is a virtuous cycle generating cash for the platforms, but a vicious cycle for those investing in regulated news and investigative journalism.

Thirdly, the Google and Meta duopoly have become “must have” services for publishers because that is where people go for news. Google’s search engine is second only to the BBC as the most used online news website for people seeking news. This has produced a profound fault line in the operation of the market: publishers are at the mercy of big tech and have no choice but to accept their terms, leading to a position of clear market abuse.

The establishment of the Digital Markets Unit will correct these and many other faults. Publishers will be able to negotiate fair terms for the value that news content brings to platforms, and, as we have heard, if they refuse to comply then a final offer mechanism will be deployed, with each party submitting bids and the fairest offer selected. The DMU will ensure that publishers receive a fair share of revenues for advertising shown around their content and receive user data when consumers interact with their content. Unfair app-store terms will be prevented, allowing publishers to build sustainable subscription businesses.

As with all Bills that come here, we need to scrutinise it properly to ensure that it delivers what it says on the tin. There are a number of issues that we need to look at very closely. One area that we must guard against is importing anything into the DMU’s procedures that would allow the platforms, as we have heard, to deploy delaying tactics. They have the money and the legal clout to slow dispute resolution down to such an extent that the terms of the Bill could, if allowed to do so, become worthless.

A good example is the countervailing benefits exemption in Clause 29, as many noble Lords have mentioned, which would allow the DMU to close an investigation into a breach of conduct requirement if a big tech firm could demonstrate that its anti-competitive conduct produced benefits that outweighed the harms. The Government’s original policy intention was to ensure that this should be used only in the most rare and exceptional of circumstances, but, as the noble Lord, Lord Bassam of Brighton, said, amendments in the Commons have watered that down by introducing an untested and uncertain standard. It is not at all clear why that change—moving away from the recognised competition law standard of “indispensability”—was necessary. We need to return Clause 29 to its original wording, or indeed get rid of it altogether, otherwise the big tech firms will simply be presented with a “get out of jail free” card.

Also concerning are the powers given to the Secretary of State to approve CMA guidance, a point made by the noble Viscount, Lord Colville of Culross. That guidance will be crucial in setting out how specific digital services should comply with the Bill’s conduct requirements, allowing the pro-competition regime to be proportionate and targeted. In a system designed to regulate rapidly moving digital markets, any delay could seriously undermine the CMA’s ability to target consumer harm. As several noble Lords have said, there must be a time limit for the Secretary of State’s decision.

We have heard a lot about the maintenance of the judicial review standards, but again those have been watered down for appeals on penalty decisions. There needs to be absolute clarity in the Bill on the very limited area covered by the so-called full-merits appeals, so that it does not bleed into other parts of the system.

We should also consider in Committee the way in which the final offer mechanism will work. At the moment it is a last resort, quite rightly, but it is one that could become such a distant prospect that publishers were forced to accept sub-optimal terms simply because of the pressing commercial imperative to do so quickly.

The part of the Bill that concerns me most is Part 4, relating to subscriptions. Like everyone else, I applaud the aim of tackling the nuisance of subscription traps, but we need to make sure that the day-to-day operations of reputable traders are not adversely impacted by the measures designed to achieve this—particularly publishers, such as the one I work for, which are building sustainable business models through subscriptions. Subscriptions provide many different types of businesses with a degree of certainty in order to invest in their operations, but I fear that we risk undermining some of that certainty with the measures in the Bill at a challenging economic time for many traders.

The severity of the measures in the Bill treats all subscriptions as though they were an endemic problem and unwanted by consumers, when that is not the case. By the Government’s own analysis, four in five adults in the UK have at least one subscription—and often many more—yet only 5% of subscriptions are unwanted. There is a danger that we are creating a sledgehammer here to crack a nut. As an example, under the terms of Clause 258, traders will be required to establish procedures that enable consumers to terminate subscription contracts in a “single communication”. That could have many unintended consequences which, ironically, disadvantage the customer, not least because many are often happy to take advantage of discounts and price offers that arise during their exit journey.

There are also potential problems with the cooling-off period. Clause 262 largely retains the 14-day cooling-off period under EU law, which starts the day after the day on which a contract is entered into. However, the Bill introduces a so-called renewal cooling-off period which, for instance, occurs when an annual subscription renews. That is an unnecessary expansion of the existing regulation without any evidence that it is needed, and it is hardly a Brexit dividend to impose even harsher regulations on British business than the EU does.

In a Bill intended in part to ensure the sustainability of journalism, with business models often based on subscription income, some of the measures introduced in the Bill, ironically and dangerously, point in the opposite direction. We must correct that. These are issues that we will scrutinise in Committee with our usual vigour. None of them is insuperable and I hope that, as with the Online Safety Bill, my noble friend the Minister will engage in constructive debate. As I said at the start, I wholeheartedly support the Bill. It has been a long time in gestation, it is supported by all the parties in Parliament and it has been endlessly consulted on. Let us now get on with it without delay and in that spirit of consensus on these issues that binds us together.