(6 years, 5 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
I beg to move,
That this House has considered the Diplomatic Service and resources.
It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Bailey. I am grateful for and slightly awed by the array of right hon. and hon. Members present who have much more experience of this issue than I have. It is an extremely important one and I am very grateful to the Minister for being here. I hope that he will be able to address some of the points that I and others raise.
We exist at a time of the greatest turbulence and change. With Brexit, we have the resulting need to engage as never before with countries around the world. We see, never more than this week, challenges to the rules-based order. We see the rise of new powers, such as China, which is stamping its mark on the world politically, economically and militarily on a scale unimagined a few years ago. We also see the influence of political disrupters across western democracies. This is the time to challenge policy of several Governments and many decades that has led to a decline in our commitment to foreign engagement.
It has been a real privilege for me to travel as a Minister, as a trade envoy, as the leader of the UK’s delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and in other capacities, and to see at first hand the astounding professionalism of our diplomatic staff around the world. Numbers are not everything. Having a fluent Arabic-speaking middle east expert as our ambassador to Iraq with the President’s personal mobile number on his speed dial is of incalculable value. However, we have reached a critical moment in our ability to promote our interests abroad.
I had a conversation yesterday with Lord Waldegrave. He has spent time as a Minister in both the Treasury and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and he said, in a way that was somewhat light-hearted but nevertheless heartfelt, that in his impression there has been a multi-decadal battle between the Treasury and the FCO, which the Treasury has now won—a battle between the two great Departments of state that vie for influence with No. 10 and across Government. Two decades ago, it was deemed the right thing to hive off international development to a new Department. Part of that perhaps was a good thing at the time, but I have always felt that part of it was distaste for the concept that aid and influence could ever go together. For me, that has never been a problem: of course they can, and they should.
In some areas, the European Union was seen by some as the deliverer of our overseas influence.
My right hon. Friend talks about the Treasury and other Departments. Obviously, the Department for International Development has had successive incredible spending rounds. Does he agree that the military attaché network, which he and I have seen in places such as Africa, does a huge amount of good in terms of influence and building those relationships? Surely, in countries that are basically aid-dependent, DFID should be paying for that network.
My hon. Friend makes a very good point. Later in my speech, I will talk about defence attachés and how we can copy the way that other countries do that better.
I have travelled to parts of the world where the Union flag might exist in the corner of an island state’s flag but there is no Union flag flying over anything that could resemble a high commission, embassy or diplomatic mission. All aid to the Pacific region was delivered through the EU; I could not find one sign of recognition of the sacrifice that the UK taxpayer made to provide that much-needed aid—it all had the EU mark on it.
Well before 2010, embassies were being sold off. They were bricks and mortar whose value in terms of influence vastly outweighed their real estate value. Our missions abroad were reduced and our diplomatic service language school was closed. After 2010, some good things started to happen: the language school was reopened; embassies that had been closed were reopened. But what that really meant was that our diplomatic missions abroad were marginally broader, but shallower too. I was in Mali just as we reopened our embassy there. An excellent ambassador arrived and she took over with a staff of one locally recruited driver. According to the FCO figures, there are now three FCO personnel there.
This year, the Government will spend £2.15 billion on the winter fuel allowance—a welfare element that we all support—but that is more than the £2 billion we spend on our foreign affairs budget. Let us compare how France and Germany—two similar-sized countries, both in the EU—manage their diplomatic services abroad. France spends £4.2 billion on its diplomatic service—more than twice what we spend on ours. As a country, it has a clear view that in order to maintain its P5 status it will stay true to its spheres of influence. Our 30-year bout of post-colonial guilt syndrome in this country, which may well have abated now, never seemed to have a parallel in the French psyche. France maintains a very clear involvement and commitment to countries in north and west Africa in particular, but also across the middle east. It maintains a much more permanent presence in areas where it has a history of influence.
I am listening closely to what my right hon. Friend is saying. I believe that even some former French colonies are represented in the French Parliament, unlike here. At the end of the day, it is worth remembering that France has Francophonie; they look with envy at the Commonwealth, which is an organisation that they are unable to replicate. They rather wonder at it. I very much hope that my right hon. Friend will mention the Commonwealth in his speech.
I certainly will. Our commitment to the Commonwealth is at the forefront of our minds, with the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting about to take place. There are some very important Commonwealth countries that we owe more attention to. We must see this as a very important part of our foreign engagement in the years ahead. There has not been a more important time for the Commonwealth to exist, and for the Government to have a clear strategy of supporting it both economically and using all the soft-power influence we can, to ensure that this wide variety of economies and countries united by a set of values can be a key part of our foreign engagement in future.
I do not know how many diplomats France deploys in the Central African Republic, Niger or Senegal, but I bet it is many more than the two we have in Lusaka, the two we have in Gaborone or even the seven we have in Harare, according to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office annual report and accounts.
My right hon. Friend mentions Zimbabwe; I was there recently and I noticed that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and DFID sit together in the same building. It is clear, when looking at it, what a remarkable success that is; they each act as a force multiplier to each other. It would be just as well if that was replicated the whole way across the foreign service.
I could not agree more. I saw a similar one-post operation in Addis Ababa, where our excellent ambassador, Susanna Moorehead, has forged a team that includes representatives of DFID, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department for International Trade into one cohesive force. They certainly punch above their weight, and they are able to influence things as a result. I particularly note what my right hon. Friend said about Zimbabwe. There has never been a more important time for us to engage there. If we allow ourselves to be optimistic, there is the chance that Zimbabwe will emerge from the tragedy of recent decades.
Will my right hon. Friend also consider the influence that small missions can have? For example, in the past seven years we have opened embassies in Abidjan, Juba and Antananarivo. Although they have only one FCO-employed official and some locally employed staff, they deliver huge influence and are very warmly received by the host country. Surely we should do that more in Africa and the Pacific.
I could not agree more. As I said, numbers are not everything. Diplomats’ ability to influence and to project Britain’s engagement abroad is of course down to the skill of individuals and their capacity to get that message across. The number of countries where we do not have anyone is missing from the list of personnel in the FCO’s annual report and accounts. We need to look at that.
I said that I would come back to the point that my hon. Friend the Member for North West Norfolk (Sir Henry Bellingham) made about defence attachés. France deploys a cadre of highly professional defence attachés who are proficient in local languages and who develop their careers and are rewarded as resident experts in countries across the middle east and north and west Africa. They often attend local staff colleges. Their career involvement in the regions to which they are posted is considered a virtue. I, too, have met some outstanding defence attachés. I know that there has been a change in recent years to try to develop longer-term postings, and that we send people to staff colleges, for example. However, the French colonel I met who had a direct way in to the Minister of Defence in a particular country had that because he had been in that region for 15 years, was fluent in the language and had embedded himself in the politics of the region.
Developing my right hon. Friend’s theme, I too have experience of the outstanding work that defence attachés do in our NATO partner countries, such as the United States, and way beyond, in the Gulf and the far east. Their role extends further than military-to-military relationships; they also play a vital role in assisting commercial exploitation of defence capability and supporting British companies that seek to secure defence and security orders overseas.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The role of defence attachés in our defence manufacturing capability and our ability to market that important part of our economy is so important. I entirely support what he says.
France also has a truly impressive integrated soft power strategy. The opening of the Louvre museum in Abu Dhabi is a key indicator of that. Off the back of Government investment—not private investment, but cultural investment by the Government—flows influence that directly benefits France’s Exchequer. It is hard to compare like with like, but it is possible to argue that Germany spends about three times what we spend on its posts abroad. Even if we strip it down, it spends at least £4.6 billion, which is well over twice what we spend. We spend way more than Germany on development aid in Zambia, yet we employ about 11 people to deliver it, while Germany has around 150 people delivering its aid projects there. That is because we deliver our aid through a variety of organisations, including non-governmental organisations and international institutions such as the World Bank, whereas Germany uses a well-developed cadre of in-country experts in education, health, agriculture and other disciplines to implement its projects. At the end of the day, that means that German taxpayers get a better deal because German business is intrinsically linked to the soft power investment that its Government makes.
I am here not just to whinge, but to suggest a way forward. I want the Minister to reassure us. If he cannot, I want him to take on board the genuine concerns of people who have seen how our country operates abroad and believe that, impressive though that is, we need a dynamic shift in our ability to engage in the dangerous and highly competitive world in which we find ourselves. Can he assure us that every penny of official development assistance that can be used to develop a growing number of highly professional diplomats, defence attachés and other personnel is being used to maintain us as a relevant power in the coming decades? Can he convince me that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office understands Africa? Does he understand my concern, as someone who has travelled widely in Africa and was for some years our trade envoy in Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique, that our position as a favoured partner may be under threat?
In a few years’ time, a quarter of the world’s population will live in Africa. It is a continent of huge natural resources and has massive potential as a partner in trade and so many other areas, but it feels like Britain risks being left behind. China’s investments abroad are not altruistic. In many ways, what it is doing is good—I have seen new roads, electricity generation projects and vast business parks, including in Ethiopia, that are changing people’s lives and providing wealth and opportunities for female empowerment, among other things—but it has a massive benefit to China, too. There can be a similar benefit to Britain if we play to our strengths on a continent where we are still admired and where such things as our language and our time zone are distinct advantages.
The Select Committee on Foreign Affairs was in Paris the other day. We had an interesting discussion about how Britain and France can co-operate in Africa. There are countries where the former colonial power is not well regarded. We have been able to play an important role in places where France is the former colonial power—Mali, the Sahel and so on—in return for exactly the same co-operation where we are the former colonial power. Now that we are leaving the European Union, I wonder whether we need to be wise about how we manage our relations with our European allies.
The hon. Gentleman makes a very good point. Our trade envoy, Lord Risby, is doing great work in countries such as Algeria in promoting what we do. I have not heard this from him, but I imagine that he is able to have conversations that the French perhaps find it harder to have. On defence engagement, we are using the Lancaster House agreement to our benefit. We are assisting the French forces in Mali with lift—with helicopters and things like that. That partnership in the fight against terrorism—against organisations such as Boko Haram and al-Shabaab—delivers influence and benefit in a variety of ways.
My final point is that Ministers in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office require political intelligence.
Perhaps I should have worded that better. They require intelligence about what is going on politically in those countries. They need to know who is on the rise in different parties, who the new influences are and who could be the next generation of leaders. Our diplomats provide that intelligence superbly, but Parliament should hold the Executive to account to ensure that we have enough of them and that we have them in the right places.
I argue that there should be a new strategy, even if we were not leaving the EU. However, Brexit brings a new urgency to our deliberations. It is not too late to see a paradigm shift in our strategy, but influence is hard won and easily lost. We need to understand that with influence comes jobs at home and stability abroad. That is something that even the Treasury should understand.
I will take the hon. Gentleman’s intervention first, and then that of my right hon. Friend.
I will take a brief intervention from my right hon. Friend the Member for Newbury.
I was in Panama just after we sold one of the few nice buildings in Panama City, on the main corniche, and moved the embassy residence to the suburbs. The ambassador said to me, almost with tears in his eyes, that he could have made a business case for the use of that building that would have allowed us to continue there. Does my right hon. Friend agree that such decisions are often taken with a short-term perspective, which results in a failure to understand not only the long-term business case, but the influence case?
My right hon. Friend is clearly right. I see that on 21 February, in a topical question, I asked that there be a moratorium on any asset disposals until such a review is complete. That question was answered with tremendous agreement by the Foreign Secretary. Let us have a moratorium until we decide what our global footprint will be, and let us have no more selling off of properties until the Foreign Affairs Committee has some formal oversight role.
Another thing I campaigned for, which my right hon. Friend the Member for Mid Sussex touched on briefly in describing his experiences in Zimbabwe, is what I called “one HMG”. I should be interested to hear an update from the Minister on that. Over the years, many different Government Departments have crept into some of these places and have other organisations in many capitals around the world; they include the Scotland Office, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and the Department of Energy and Climate Change. Often, the ambassador does not have much control over some of these other organisations.
In some countries—I think Nepal was one—the head of the Department for International Development was a much more senior figure than our ambassador and would not kowtow to them. It is my view that, very simply, the individual who represents the British Government abroad is the ambassador, and everybody should work for the ambassador. There should be no discrepancy in employment, accommodation and so on, and where possible, all those other agencies should be brought under the British embassy or the British high commission and co-located on that estate.
That leads me to my next point: we are still shadow-boxing about the independence of DFID. Increasingly, as a lot of the Foreign Office is funded by overseas development money, that skews things and the lines are getting blurred. I wish at some point someone would have the bravery to say that DFID belongs back with the mother ship. We could have huge economies and savings, and greater alignment of British views and values overseas, by bringing it back to the mother ship. To anyone who says, “We can’t do that; all the non-governmental organisations will get too upset,” I say that I do not think the NGOs are in any position to do anything at the moment—at least some of them—and the stock rejoinder to them is, “Look, we stand by our pledge of 0.07% of GDP. That’s our answer. How we actually apply that is up to the Government, not the NGOs.”
We are about to see a major change to the European External Action Service, the force under Federica Mogherini. I always thought it to be pretty hit and miss around the world; it seemed to me very often that the head of the EEAS was always going off to the British embassy to find out the latest intelligence, but we paid a lot of money to the EEAS and a lot of our best people were employed there, on better terms than our own people locally. That is something we want to withdraw; I would be interested to hear the Minister’s views on how many British people who currently work for the EEAS will be pulled back into the FCO and where they will be deployed.
Overall, it seems to me that a major piece of work needs to be done—a major realignment of what the UK is seeking to do abroad. That involves the World Service, the British Council and different Departments of State; it involves redefining what we mean by soft power as well as ensuring that that soft power is backed up by a sufficient military capability. It is pointless to have soft power unless we have decent armed forces which, if necessary, can support that soft power. That is a fundamental piece of work that needs to be done, and I am not convinced that it is being done cross-departmentally or that it is being done by Ministers. I believe a Cabinet Sub-Committee should be set up without further ado to bring together all these competing demands on the Exchequer, to articulate what we expect from our superb diplomatic service—the envy of the world—to ensure that it is given the tools to do the job, and to better co-ordinate all the different parts of the state to that end.
I am grateful to the Minister for coming here and giving such an honest and frank assessment. It was very impressive to hear. I hope he can convey a message back that many of us are looking, over the next few months, for a major setting out of a new strategy for these extraordinary times in which we live. That is going to require looking across the many issues that we have discussed. I am grateful for his reply to us today.
Motion lapsed (Standing Order No. 10(6)).
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
As someone who has campaigned for some time on the so-called “Magnitsky campaign”, may I say that the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill offers an opportunity for us to have the full Magnitsky, as opposed to Magnitsky-lite which we got last year in another piece of legislation? The Opposition’s amendments were well intended but can be improved on. May I tell my right hon. Friend that on Report there will be an opportunity for the whole House to come together to give a clear message? I urge him, with all the measures I can, to listen to all sides, because this issue concerns people right across this House.
My right hon. Friend is right to say that this issue greatly exercises Members on both sides of the House. As I have said repeatedly, we will certainly address the issue and we will try to find a way forward that addresses Members’ concerns.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Public Bill CommitteesOn this very cold morning, Dame Cheryl, I am grateful to you for allowing me to keep my overcoat on.
Amendment 1 and its consequential amendment, amendment 2, are Magnitsky amendments. I think by now hon. Members understand what they are all about: they would enable us to sanction people who have committed gross human rights abuses. Very briefly, the history is that Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian lawyer who uncovered and tried to expose a big tax fraud, was imprisoned and tortured for a whole year and finally beaten to death. After his death, he was tried for tax fraud, which was obviously completely ridiculous.
I draw Committee’s attention to the wording of amendment 2, which covers not only the perpetrators of torture but the people who manage it and give the orders. Once upon a time, people used to make the excuse, “I was only following orders,” but nowadays we more often hear, “I am only giving the orders,” which is really not acceptable. In the amendment’s definition of “conduct”, we have therefore included
“directing, or sponsoring, such activities…profiting from such activities, or…materially assisting such activities”,
including by providing goods or services. In other words, the amendment covers those who turn the thumbscrews, those who order others to turn them, and those who supply them.
Similar legal provisions have been made in other countries. The Government argued on Second Reading that such a provision would make no difference,but we have seen the Magnitsky list of people who have been sanctioned in the USA but whom we have not sanctioned. It includes a man called Maung Maung Soe, one of the Myanmar generals responsible for the genocide, ethnic cleansing and serious abuse of the Rohingya over the past few months. To be honest, I do not understand why the Government did not say on Second Reading that they thought such a provision was absolutely fine and they agreed with it. Everyone is appalled by such human rights abuses and we do not want to provide any comfort to people who commit them, so I am really puzzled.
I am further puzzled because the Government agreed to include similar provisions in the Criminal Finances Act 2017. The Minister for Security and one of the Justice Ministers, I think—people keep being reshuffled, so I am not sure—argued strongly for such provisions to be included in that Act, so I do not grasp why the Government do not want them in the Bill. The Minister said on Second Reading that the Home Office can ban people and that those provisions are adequate. It is not clear to me that the Home Office has banned the people on the American Magnitsky list, so I am uncomfortable relying on that process. That is why we tabled these amendments.
Amendment 13 is about serious organised crime and trafficking. Amendments 1 and 2 would amend the part of the clause that relates to the purposes for which sanctions can be imposed. We think that serious organised crime and trafficking should be included, because it, too, is a long-standing problem. We had the cockle pickers who died on the beaches of Morecambe bay, and we discussed on Tuesday the hundreds of thousands of people in Libya. The National Crime Agency estimates that between 10,000 and 13,000 people are trafficked into this country every year. One of my constituents was trafficked into this country as a 10-year-old and forced to work in a cannabis farm. The Government are very firm on modern slavery, but they do not seem to want to see it through in other legislation. I do not intend to press amendment 13 to a vote, but the Government need to be a bit more thoroughgoing, consistent and comprehensive when it comes to the victims and perpetrators of serious organised crime and trafficking.
It is a great pleasure to speak in this important debate. I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland for what she said. I have been involved for some time in the campaign to get the equivalent of the American Magnitsky Act into UK law. It was a considerable surprise to find myself on the Committee—it may have been a surprise to others, too—but it is nevertheless a delight.
To start, I will use the words of David Cameron. In a recent speech to Transparency International, he said:
“One of my regrets of my time in office was that we didn’t introduce the Magnitsky Act. The Foreign Office argument was that Britain’s existing approach was better, because we could sanction all the people on that list—and more besides. And I went along with it.
But I soon realised this ignored the advantages of working together—with other countries—under a common heading. It’s not PR, it’s a fact. You get extra clout from coming together across the world and saying with one voice to those who are responsible for unacceptable acts: ‘We are united in our action against you.’
I pay tribute to my successor Theresa May for adding Magnitsky provisions to the recent Criminal Finances Act. And I also pay tribute to someone who has fought longer and harder and at more risk to himself than anyone else—the man behind that campaign, the legislation and a brilliant book, ‘Red Notice’, on it, Bill Browder.”
It has been a great privilege for me to get to know and work with Bill in his fearless efforts to get equal provisions and consistency. International organised crime is more fluid today than ever, with the ability to move money and take advantage of different activities and opportunities. There are two central reasons why those criminals come to the United Kingdom. One is that we have a prosperous economy with good property and intellectual property rights and a large percentage of the world’s financial institutions based here. The other, to be perfectly honest, is that the kinds of people we do not want investing in our economy—the fellow travellers of the criminals, be they lawyers, accountants or other financiers, who are able and willing to work with them—can exploit gaps and make investments in this country. David Cameron said, with typically honest, self-effacing candour, that the position that has been taken for so long by the United Kingdom Government is that adequate provisions apply. However, we know that they have not been applied.
I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland. I will always remember her rage of two days ago, and there will be times when I try to find my inner Helen Goodman. However, I have say to her that the last 48 hours have been extremely beneficial to me—I hope they have also been beneficial to the Bill—because they have allowed me to spend a lot of time with human rights lawyers who have brains that are infinitely bigger than mine, and an understanding of international law and human rights law that is infinitely bigger than mine, and to spend time with the Minister for Europe and the Americas, and his officials. I know there is a public perception that the process involves thumbscrews and all kind of threats, but I think the system knew that I, as somebody who has no ambition, was not persuadable on anything.
We have to get this right, and there are two areas of consistency that we need to achieve. First, as I have already mentioned, the Bill that receives Royal Assent must be consistent with similar legislation that has been brought in by other jurisdictions abroad. Secondly, the Bill must be consistent with our own judicial system. I was on the verge of supporting the hon. Lady, had her amendment been tabled at an earlier stage. However, I have a few suggestions that I hope my right hon. Friend the Minister might be able to support.
There are two key elements of Magnitsky: the one we are debating now—essentially, it concerns definitions and a few other bits—and the review structure, which we will talk about later today. A good Magnitsky amendment, of the sort that I would like to see, would put into the Bill a definition of gross human rights abuse. Such a definition is, at present, absent from the Bill, which only refers to generic, undefined
“international humanitarian and human rights law”
and respect for human rights and their promotion. It does not contain any specific requirement for sanctions or accountability for human rights violations.
I ought to declare an interest as a human rights lawyer, but certainly one whose brain is no bigger than, and probably nothing like as big as, my right hon. Friend’s. I was confused by the repetition of “gross human rights abuse” in amendment 2, and I am concerned that the fact that it appears several times will encourage future readers and users of the legislation to define it differently in each case. Does that concern him?
My hon. Friend makes a valid point, which I was coming on to. When we talk about consistency across our judicial system, definitions are important. If we have differing definitions in similar types of Bills that seek to achieve similar things, courts can be worked by clever lawyers to try to find a hole through which to escape. Consistency here is therefore really important.
The people behind the Magnitsky campaign tell me that they would be happy with a definition that accorded with section 241A of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. If my right hon. Friend the Minister could assure us that in the few weeks before Report he can produce an amendment that satisfied that requirement, we would have consistency across law. That seems important.
I entirely accept what the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland says about the kind of people we are talking about. One of the many brave people I have met in the campaign is Vladimir Kara-Murza, who has survived being poisoned twice and now works fearlessly for Open Russia. He says that this element of the Bill is the most pro-Russian piece of legislation we could make: it is about helping honest, decent Russians and holding back the chances of the corrupt, wicked people who have made their lives such misery. It builds on what my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Dominic Raab) did in driving through the amendment to the Criminal Finances Act 2017, for which he deserves credit.
As the Minister knows, I have been prepared to support amendments that we are debating today, but after burning much midnight oil I suggest to the hon. Lady that consistency is very important, and the two differing definitions could allow for confusion.
I have the Criminal Finances Act in front of me, and I am a little unclear as to where the inconsistency is. The conditions in that Act are about:
“a public official, or a person acting in an official capacity…instigating the conduct, or in consenting to or acquiescing in it”,
with conduct connected
“with the commission of a gross human rights abuse…acting as an agent…directing, or sponsoring, such activities…profiting from such activities, or…materially assisting such activities.”
That seems to be the same wording as in the amendment, as does
“provides goods or services in support of the carrying out of the activities, or…otherwise provides any financial or technological support in connection with their carrying out.”
I cannot quite understand where the inconsistency is, but I am sure the right hon. Gentleman can tell us.
I am reliably informed that there are inconsistencies. I suggest that, for simplicity, if the Bill were to say that any reference to “gross violation of human rights” is to conduct that constitutes, or is connected with, the commission of a gross human rights abuse or violation, and whether conduct constitutes or is connected with a commission of such an abuse or violation is to be determined in accordance with section 241A of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, we would have the consistency that the campaigners—and, I think, the Government—seek.
I understand that the Government want to achieve this. They want to see the full Magnitsky on the statute book. This suggestion offers a way of making sure that we get the definitions right.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Dame Cheryl, and to follow my right hon. Friend the Member for Newbury. There is no one in this House who has done more than he has to prosecute this matter. I am also grateful for the contribution from the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland.
Although I am entirely sympathetic to the Magnitsky principle, there are three reasons why, on careful textual analysis, amendment 2 is flawed—not just a bit, but quite significantly—and should therefore be rejected. That should not be taken in any way as a disagreement with the principle, but it echoes the point, which has already been made, that we have got to get this right.
The overarching point is that, although the amendment intends to transpose the substance of section 241A of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, as amended by section 13 of the Criminal Finances Act 2017, which the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland referred to, there are three errors in the transposition that will cause confusion, hold back the Magnitsky principles and create a field day for lawyers.
First, in the context of defining a gross human rights abuse or violation, amendment 2 would insert subsection (6B), which says,
“The first condition is that the conduct constitutes the torture of a person or a group of people”.
The expression “a group of people” is not to be found in the 2002 Act, which is the UK’s primary criminal financing legislation and allows for civil recovery of cash on the basis of non-conviction proceedings. Property can be forfeited irrespective of whether a person has been convicted. That is the key piece of legislation, but the amendment contains a crucial inconsistency. The insertion of “a group of people” creates a problem, because lawyers will look at it and say, “Why has Parliament inserted that here, but not in the Proceeds of Crime Act?”
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for his remarks. My hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham and I have gone quite a long way in looking at an alternative definition that would meet the requirements of the Magnitsky standard and that is consistent across our judicial system. Does my right hon. Friend support that direction of travel, and will what he commits to bringing forward on Report satisfy those who have campaigned on the matter for a long time?
I can certainly say to my right hon. Friend that we will endeavour to work towards that destination. He will appreciate that in Government, agreement to certain processes requires collective responsibility. I want to see what we can do to head in the direction that he has campaigned for, but we will have to wait until the days leading up to Report to get to the point when I can say so for certain. I hope the hon. Lady will withdraw amendment 1.
Our objective is not to satisfy campaigners in this House, but to get the law right.
May I assure the hon. Lady that I am not a lone voice in my party? In fact, quite the reverse. There are a lot of people and a head of steam now on these issues. If we get to Report and we are not satisfied, we are prepared to vote accordingly. I will continue to work with her, as I will continue to work with the Government, to make sure we get the measures we need.
I appreciate the right hon. Gentleman’s offer. I think that the Committee can take a decision in principle. I am not trying to prevent debate on the Bill—far from it. It was the Government Whip who did that on Tuesday, so I am certainly not going to have that laid at my feet now. We can come back to the matter on Report in the way that the Minister suggests, but I would like—
I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her remarks. Let me give a couple of examples about two different sanctions regimes where the content of sanctions and object of the sanctions are quite different. Sanctions on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are aimed at preventing it from developing weapons of mass destruction. That is a really big foreign policy objective for all of us. Nobody wants the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and not in that region; it is an extremely destabilising occurrence. At the same time, we need a parallel diplomatic strategy. The South Koreans are doing quite well on that following the Olympics, with efforts to shift the discussion from sport to politics. I am not absolutely clear what the Government’s view is on the exit strategy and precisely what changes in behaviour they want. This has been difficult and fraught and the Government have made serious efforts at the UN, but we are trying not to starve the North Korean people, who anyway have an extremely low standard of living and a horrible quality of life; we are trying to stop the regime from developing weapons of mass destruction.
The situation in Myanmar and its risks and problems are different. Those sanctions are aimed at preventing the ethnic cleansing of Rohingya and ensuring their safe, voluntary and dignified return to their homeland in Rakhine state. We want the UN to be able to oversee that return and the full implementation of the Annan commission recommendations. Again, we are trying to influence the regime to do something. We have an aid programme to other parts of Myanmar and we are not trying to undermine that, but we want to shift the military, which is why the position of Her Majesty’s Opposition on sanctions on Myanmar is different from the Government’s position. We agree on the North Korean sanctions, but not on Myanmar, because we would like the sanctions to cover the whole of that part of the Myanmar economy that is controlled by the military.
Those two examples show that different problems need different approaches. We need to be clear about that. We will be better at running our foreign policy if we are clearer. This co-operation was very strongly commended by UK Finance, which is the collaboration between banks and financial service providers. For them, life just becomes extremely difficult if we do not have the same approach as the Europeans and the Americans. They have said to us that they want us very much to maintain our integration with the EU on our sanctions policy, because they are worried that if we were to have a different tweak here and there, other international finance actors would be very risk averse, and would not want to put money into British banks and then find that they were suffering second round sanctions, particularly from the Americans.
To be honest, I thought that the speech the Foreign Secretary made on Second Reading—it was typical of him—did not really take that into account. It began and ended with a lot of Brexity rhetoric, but it did not really focus on the detailed policy reality of what to do when we are operating sanctions. He said:
“The Bill will give us the freedom to decide on national sanctions as we see fit”.—[Official Report, 20 February 2018; Vol. 636, c. 77.]
He went on to say that “Britain can act independently”, that we will have “freedom of manoeuvre”, be an independent global power, and be able to
“exert our rightful influence on the world stage”.—[Official Report, 20 February 2018; Vol. 636, c. 80.]
The thing about this is that we can and we will, but the truth is that we do that much better by collaborating with other countries. Everybody knows that sanctions are much more effective when we co-operate with other countries. That is why we included paragraph (e) in this amendment.
I am confused by this one. I may be a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, and I would not want anyone in this Committee to think that I have gone native and that somehow we want everything hushed up. I am entirely in favour of transparency of strategy, because that is the easiest way for Parliament to hold the Government of the day to account. But it seems to me that elements of this amendment would make it unworkable. It would favour the kind of state that we might seek to sanction, by laying bare before the world a strategy that, at times, it is worth while keeping within the corridors of power. I am sure some people will accuse me of being part of some sort of elite or believing in closed government, but it is absolutely not true.
The amendment calls for a memorandum that would show
“clear objectives for the relevant sanctions, including well-defined and realistic demands against which compliance can be judged…a coherent overarching diplomatic strategy”.
That is available, to an extent, and is discussed. It is part of our national security strategy. But to communicate in a way that would be helpful to—the actual words used in this amendment—“targeted countries,” would burden future Governments and that of today in a way that concerns me. I hope we may get some clarification on this, either from my right hon. Friend the Minister or the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland.
I can confidently say that if anyone has a hot water bottle, I am prepared to offer them very good money for it. I have not got quite as many layers on as some others in the Committee. I will respond to the points made about this amendment and in large part concur with the comments made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Newbury.
The Bill as drafted already requires a Minister to lay before Parliament a report alongside the introduction of any sanctions regulation. Amendment 14 appears to duplicate that duty, setting out a number of specific factors to be included in such a report. I have some sympathy with the aim of the amendment. Given the potential effects of sanctions, they should only be used where it is appropriate and where the Government have thought through all of the consequences. It is right and proper that the Government can and should be held to account over the use of this power. As I have said, clause 2 already requires the Government to lay a report before Parliament alongside the introduction of any sanctions regulation.
The report would set out why a Minister considered the sanctions regulations to be consistent with the purposes outlined in the Bill, and why they were a reasonable course of action. I assure hon. Members that it will clearly state the objectives of the sanctions, their place within a broader diplomatic and foreign policy strategy and, if appropriate, the conditions under which they might be lifted—for example through the resolution of an armed conflict to which they were designed to apply.
In addition, the Government have committed to publishing an annual review of each of the sanctions regimes, which will be laid before Parliament as set out in clause 27. That report will explain why the sanctions regimes continue to be appropriate and how they meet the objectives set out in the original report.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Westminster HallWestminster Hall is an alternative Chamber for MPs to hold debates, named after the adjoining Westminster Hall.
Each debate is chaired by an MP from the Panel of Chairs, rather than the Speaker or Deputy Speaker. A Government Minister will give the final speech, and no votes may be called on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
That is a matter that needs to be discussed, and it will be interesting to hear how the Minister responds to that point later in the debate. Of course it would be possible for the two fishery vessels to continue to do their scientific research there at the same time as there being full protection, but we have already got full protection of those waters under the long-standing MPA that is already there. I am not certain that what is proposed by the coalition would necessarily add anything to that. However, it might well undermine our ability to provide that scientific data and it might invite other CCAMLR members to say that it is not being done properly and therefore they—the other CCAMLR members—have some kind of right to do that scientific fishing research in the area. I therefore think there are downsides, as well as upsides, to what the coalition proposes. It is a delicate political decision, which the Minister might refer to in his response.
There could, therefore, be a perversity in what the coalition demand—namely, that more fish will be caught in the area as a result, rather than less. That is something that we have to be extremely careful about. There may be innovative solutions to the problem, particularly surrounding enforcement of the MPA, perhaps using the latest satellite technology, and further discussion may well be warranted about how the UK can best protect the waters around South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands and revitalise international efforts to increase protection around the world.
I congratulate my hon. Friend on securing this important and timely debate. As I understand, one of the Foreign Office’s concerns about the new larger reserve around the South Sandwich Islands is that it might result in a displaced krill fishery, but no krill have actually been caught around the South Sandwich Islands commercially for 25 years. I am concerned that those concerns have not been properly thought through, and that the opportunity to create a 500,000 sq km exclusion zone in this pristine water, with the conditions that my hon. Friend refers to, will be missed.
My right hon. Friend, who knows a great deal about these matters, makes two points. One is that there will be some interference with the krill fishing, which has not actually occurred for many years. That is not one of our concerns: there is no such fishing, therefore it is not something we would necessarily be concerned about. His second point is that we might somehow be sacrificing the opportunity for this fantastic protected area. That protected area already exists under the MPA. We already have that protection for the waters around the South Sandwich Islands, and therefore I am not certain that what is being proposed would necessarily add very much to it.
My right hon. Friend mentioned the Foreign Office. I pay particular tribute to the department in the Foreign Office that runs these matters, in particular the outstandingly good Jane Rumble, who has done this work for many years and knows more about Antarctica than most of us know about anything else. I certainly do not want to be thought to be blocking efforts to enhance marine protection around South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, Antarctica or anywhere else in the world, but we do need to be aware of the law of unintended consequences. I think that what my right hon. Friend proposes may suffer from exactly that law—in other words, protection for the South Sandwich Islands may be the worse if what he proposes is allowed to occur.
The public reaction to “Blue Planet II” offers us one of those rare opportunities to make a real difference in the world, and that must now be seized. We must remind audiences at home and in the world of our utmost commitment to the Blue Belt programme. The Government must listen carefully to the latest proposals for the South Sandwich Islands, but they must never forget that those also form part of a bigger picture of environmental protection and marine conservation in Antarctica and the Southern ocean. The Blue Belt programme of marine protected areas around the 14 British overseas territories is world-leading. I hope that in his response the Minister will reassert our commitment to it and our determination to lead the world in the ocean protection so passionately demanded, most notably by Sir David Attenborough, and now by a fast-growing percentage of the British electorate as well.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Hollobone. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for North Wiltshire (James Gray) on securing this highly topical debate. As chair of the all-party parliamentary group for the polar regions, he brings a wealth of experience on the Arctic and Antarctic, and a close interest in the health of their marine environments, as do all the other right hon. and hon. Members in the Chamber, especially my right hon. Friend the Member for Newbury (Richard Benyon), who has taken an acute interest in this issue.
I am particularly grateful for the opportunity to highlight once again the Government’s Blue Belt initiative. This is one of the most ambitious programmes of marine protection ever undertaken. Of the approximately 6.8 million sq km of ocean surrounding the UK and our 14 overseas territories, we have committed to developing measures to ensure the protection of 4 million sq km by 2020. I personally announced that commitment at the Our Ocean summit in Washington in September last year, and am delighted to confirm that the delivery of the commitment is on track.
Over the past few weeks much of the country, and audiences across the world, have been engrossed in the BBC’s brilliant “Blue Planet II”. Sir David Attenborough and his team have expertly shone a light on our incredible oceans and how diverse, important to the health of our planet and vulnerable they are.
If I may pray on some of the generous time that the Minister has offered, I just ask him to consider, as part of the very exciting Blue Belt policy, that certain problems exist not only for marine ecosystems and the species we want to see recover, but for the people who live on the islands and on whose support we depend. In particular, in Ascension Island there are very real difficulties with the prosperity of that community as a result of the failures to make the runway safe for use. Can my right hon. Friend the Minister assure us that investment is being made in Ascension Island? That will ensure that the people of that island can really support the marine protected area because they have a viable existence on the island.
Air access to Ascension Island resumed on 18 November, and a monthly air service has begun to and from neighbouring St Helena. Most workers on Ascension are from St Helena; as a Minister for the Department for International Development, I was largely responsible for building the airport there, which I am pleased to say now works. Employers on Ascension confirm that the monthly air service meets their current needs.
To return to “Blue Planet”—I risk being pressed for time if I do not get through what I need to tell the House—the series highlighted the many pressures that we are putting on our oceans, including the scourge of plastic waste, the unpredictable effects of global warming and atmospheric pollution and the danger of overfishing. Many of those challenges—perhaps most of them—must be addressed at the global level, and the UK will play a full and active leadership role in that work. Yet there is also good evidence that establishing well designed, effectively managed and properly enforced marine protection measures can help parts of the ocean withstand some of those pressures.
Our Blue Belt initiative is committed to doing just that. We have already declared large-scale marine protected areas in five of our overseas territories—St Helena, Pitcairn, the British Indian Ocean Territory, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands and the British Antarctic Territory, representing a total of 2.9 million sq km, or more than 40% of British waters. Of this, 1.5 million sq km, or more than 20% of our waters, are now designated as highly protected and closed to all commercial fishing.
(7 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberIf the hon. Gentleman consults the speeches of the Prime Minister more closely, he will discover a wealth of information about our negotiating position, but since he has not bothered to do that, I do not propose to enlighten him now, except to say that Sir Ivan Rogers did an excellent job and always gave me very good advice. I think his reasons for stepping down early were persuasive. Sir Tim Barrow, as anybody who has worked with him will know—I think that people on both sides of the House will have done so—is an outstanding public servant with long-standing experience of UK representation in Brussels, and he will do a superb job in the forthcoming talks.
I am sure my right hon. Friend will agree that not only are diplomatic relations important, but relationships between Members of this House and European partners have been important. Membership of the Council of Europe, of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and of all-party groups has never been more important, so can he give an assurance that his Department will assist in every way in making sure that bilateral relationships that exist between Members of this House and Europe will be encouraged?
Absolutely—I am very happy to give that assurance to my hon. Friend. As he will know, there are parliamentary bodies of one party or another that have links with sister parties across the continent, and we will do absolutely everything we can to promote that in the years ahead.
(7 years, 9 months ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
As one of the Members of Parliament who has visited RAF Akrotiri and looked into the eyes of the C-130 crews who would be asked to carry out these missions, I think we should be careful to avoid making a “something must be done” response to a situation that shames humanity and that is on a par with Rwanda, Srebrenica and other events us that have shamed us collectively in the west. Learning from those events, could other actions be taken not only to hold Russia to account but to look at what really hurts that evil regime? London is full of people with connections to that regime who are doing business and educating their children in this country. They need to understand that they cannot behave with impunity and seek to enjoy the benefits that we all take for granted in this country.
I pay tribute to my hon. Friend’s military experience. The role of the C-130 in conducting these airdrops would be exceedingly difficult. As I have said, we do not rule this out, but it would be a huge challenge. He asks what more can be done. At the heart of this is the role of Russia, which is pivotal in being able to exercise influence over Assad, to introduce a ceasefire and to allow access to humanitarian aid. Unfortunately, Russia has vetoed five United Nations Security Council resolutions, thereby preventing even the most basic humanitarian aid from getting through. The Canadians are now seeking to pursue a General Assembly vote, which, if not in an emergency session, would require half the votes. This would be tricky, however, because Russia would use its influence to prevent it from succeeding. We are collectively looking to see what could happen in this dire situation that is reminiscent of Rwanda and Srebrenica. If the UN machine is not working, we have to find ways of circumnavigating it.
(8 years, 3 months ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
The hon. Gentleman makes an important point. If Iran is to take a more responsible role on the international stage, following the nuclear deal, we expect it to act in a more honourable way, whether in Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad or Sana’a. We have not seen that to date. He is right to say that Hezbollah continues to play an important role, but we are also seeing a difference of opinion between what Iran is looking for and what Russia is after.
When we hear at first hand from charities and NGOs that run hospitals in places such as Aleppo of those hospitals being bombed repeatedly by the regime and by Russian forces, the temptation is to come to this place and rage against the system, using those well-worn words, “Something must be done.” But in reality this is a most complex situation. What we want to hear—I think I heard the Minister allude to it this morning—is that everything is being done to work with the Russians to create a framework whereby safe areas and, if possible, air corridors for delivering aid can be secured. There must be a way of ensuring that it is humanitarian aid, even if that means having a Russian at Akrotiri to see what goes on the wretched plane that is delivering it.
My hon. Friend and I discussed these things over the weekend, and I know he has been following events closely. Indeed, he knows people working in the region. It is important we look for a longer-term solution around access to the humanitarian corridors. As I mentioned, the Foreign Secretary is speaking with John Kerry this afternoon, and I hope we will have more to report as time elapses.
(8 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberUrgent Questions are proposed each morning by backbench MPs, and up to two may be selected each day by the Speaker. Chosen Urgent Questions are announced 30 minutes before Parliament sits each day.
Each Urgent Question requires a Government Minister to give a response on the debate topic.
This information is provided by Parallel Parliament and does not comprise part of the offical record
Again, experience is the answer. I have not tried to make the call, and I am in no doubt that I could predict quite confidently the outcome of such a call to Foreign Minister Lavrov. I have had many conversations with him over the course of our regular meetings at Syria-related events, none of which has been fruitful.
It is depressing to calculate the sum total of human misery that has resulted from Russia’s intervention in this bloody civil war, which has gone from vetoing attempts by countries to get an early resolution to Assad and a transition Government in place through to, as one non-governmental organisation put it to me, the bombing of a hospital four times by Russian planes. May I re-emphasise what my right hon. Friend says by asking him to treat with huge caution this move and to hold Russia responsible for any war crimes that it commits in the future?
My hon. Friend reminds us of an important fact. If somebody who has gone into another country, bombed civilian populations and destroyed hospitals and schools then decides, five months later, that they have done enough, let us not give them too much praise. It is a bit like that question, “Did he stop beating his wife?” The fact that the Russians are there in the first place is something that we must continually protest about, and we certainly should not give them any credit for simply withdrawing from those illegal activities.
(8 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI congratulate the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Crispin Blunt), and his Committee—albeit perhaps in its previous form—on making a recommendation that the Government have actually listened to. I entirely agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay (Mr Baron) that the Chancellor’s announcement on Foreign and Commonwealth Office spending drew a line under the reductions that had taken place over many years. Like many who have spoken in the debate today, I believe that those reductions have damaged Britain’s ability to project soft power.
I have just come from a meeting of the Defence Committee, at which we heard about an organisation called the Conflict Studies Research Centre, which used to be based within Whitehall. It was a Government organisation, but it was cut in a similar way to that described by my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay when he talked about our ability to inform the Executive of what was going on. However, I am delighted to say that it has re-emerged in the private sector. With London continuing to be a major hub for international organisations, think-tanks and other sources of expertise in foreign affairs and defence issues, we need to be smarter and more fleet of foot in using those resources—much as similar resources are used in Washington, perhaps rather better than we use ours.
In my capacity as a Minister and subsequently in roles on Select Committees and on the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, I have been privileged to see our Foreign Office posts working abroad and I have huge respect for those who work in them. The programme of post closures was reversed under the coalition Government, and that was very welcome, but I believe that what we have in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office has become broad and shallow. We need to concentrate on finding depth, and I therefore agree with many of the sentiments that have been expressed today. William Hague’s reopening of the language school is a welcome part of the re-engagement with those important skills.
Through Foreign and Commonwealth Office posts abroad, the UK projects soft power. I often see this in my capacity as a trade envoy. Cuts to the FCO are short-sighted. When we engage with countries and build relationships over long periods of time, that is reflected in jobs at home, in exports and in helping our balance of payments. I have seen our influence way exceed expenditure because of the hard work being put into relationships being built with Governments, people of influence and countries. I am kicking the dust off my feet following a trip to Jordan and Lebanon last week with the Defence Committee. I should like to put on record my thanks to those two outstanding posts and to the ambassadors, the defence attachés, the political officers and the security staff operating in those countries. The United Kingdom’s stock is high over there, and we are benefiting from trying to keep those two countries stable in the face of unbelievable threats from over the border in Syria and Iraq.
I want to concentrate on what my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay called trouble spots. He perhaps looked back with a degree of Schadenfreude, and in some cases he was justified in expressing that, although in other cases I might question it. In looking at trouble spots, he said that we should look forward and ask where the trouble spots of the future might be. I suggest that a glaring example is a resurgent Russia.
Whitehall had real experts on the Soviet Union throughout the cold war, as my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate said. When the Soviet Union fell, many of those posts were stripped out as the people retired, were let go or moved to other areas of the Foreign Office or other Departments. At that point, our corporate knowledge fell to an alarming degree. I may be straying from the point slightly here, but the Defence Intelligence Service had no Ukraine desk officer at the time of the uprising. It had to borrow one from the South Caucasus desk. I imagine that similar problems existed elsewhere in the Foreign Office as the glaring reality of a major threat to the interests of Britain and NATO suddenly emerged. There is a real need to understand these threats and to examine how we should resource them in the future.
I am not making any excuses for the Soviet Union, but at least in those days there was some kind of group accountability in that country and we did not feel that the regime was simply being run by one individual on his whim. Now, Russia is ruled by one autocratic mega-thief, a kleptocrat of quite staggering proportions who can annex the sovereign territory of another state, who can have people murdered on the streets of London and no doubt elsewhere, and who oversees a regime that murders people such as the lawyer Sergei Magnitsky in prison in Russia. I wonder how many more Litvinenkos and Magnitskys there are. This is a man who can do to parts of Syria what he did to Grozny and who can threaten states that we are treaty-bound to defend under our membership of NATO. This is an individual for whom rules-based governance is anathema. We should therefore govern much of our thinking—and much of the way in which we resource our foreign policy and defence policy—by the use of one clear question: “What would Putin want?”
The right hon. Gentleman must have read the next page of my speech. I shall answer that question precisely in a moment; I think he will agree with what I have to say.
What President Putin would want first is for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office budget to be curtailed. He would also want a weaker NATO that was riven by infighting and that continued to run down its armed forces, as it has done in years gone by. He would also want a NATO that did not respond to an escalation in aggressive actions against states on Russia’s western border. He has had a bit of bad news in that regard, however, because there has been a reversal in the decline in defence spending, not least by Britain but also by some of our allies. This situation requires massive efforts of diplomacy to keep our alliances moving in the right direction, showing resolve and showing the ability to stand up to the actions of his regime.
To answer the question from the right hon. Member for Carshalton and Wallington (Tom Brake), Putin wants a west in which influential countries such as Britain become less influential. I think the right hon. Gentleman can see where I am going here. Putin wants a weakened European Union. Let us remember that it is the EU, not NATO, that can impose damaging sanctions against his regime. He hates having an economic rule-setter on his western border.
As the leader of the UK delegation to NATO, I recently attended a meeting with other delegation leaders at NATO headquarters. Informally and formally, our allies crossed the floor to ask me, with varying degrees of incredulity, whether Britain was really going to leave the EU. I hope that the Foreign Affairs Committee’s report will look not only at the costs of a possible Brexit but at the impact it would have on the geopolitics of our European foreign policy. These people, including Americans, were coming up to me and saying, “Now? At this time? Really? With all that threatens Europe, economically, militarily and societally?” There is much that our diplomats and intelligence services have to do in the coming years: shore up our alliances, particularly NATO; encourage more spending on defence among our allies; and use all methods, through both our hard and soft power postures, to deter Russia. This is about how we invest; how we work with our allies; and how we exercise our armed forces and show strength.
When we met Jens Stoltenberg in Brussels last week, he not only concurred with a lot of what my hon. Friend is saying, but discussed the other side of the coin, which is the importance of dialogue with Russia. Does my hon. Friend agree that it is important to attempt to engage with Russia, despite these tensions, to try to defuse them?
I entirely agree with that. I am certainly not somebody who believes in confrontation; my hon. Friend probably knows that well, as he knows how I operate in this House, and exactly the same applies in how we deal with a potential aggressor. The purpose of what I am saying today is that not only should we be strong, showing that our alliance is strong and that we are not going to see the envelope of article 5 pushed by people such as President Putin, but we should engage diplomatically with him and with his regime to try to get some common sense. We should use resources such as the World Service and the British Council, which my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay talked about earlier. Very movingly last week, a Romanian who works at NATO said that the greatest treat of her day used to be sitting under her bedcovers listening to the British World Service, as it kept her in touch with what was going on in the west and the freedoms that we enjoy, and she just used to want some of that—she has now got it. Through such means, we can also influence people in Russia.
When I used to go back to Warsaw to see my grandfather in communist times, we always listened to the BBC World Service, albeit very quietly and with the curtains drawn, as of course it was illegal to do so. That was a great comfort to my grandfather and his generation of Poles, as they knew there were people outside, beyond the iron curtain, who were struggling for them and ensuring that they were kept informed.
As always, my hon. Friend makes a very powerful point, and he and his family perhaps understand this more than any of us in this House.
Let me conclude by talking about one concept in foreign policy, which is our will—our will to make a better world and to extol the virtues of the kind of society that we enjoy in this country and that most of our European colleagues also enjoy in the west. We face difficulties in that; we get on with our lives as independent members of different alliances, be it NATO, the EU or other arrangements we have, whereas an aggressor such as Russia is one country controlled pretty much by one individual, and so our will is tested. On the face of it, we should not be alarmed, because across NATO 3.2 million troops are under arms and the four largest NATO members spend $740 billion a year on defence compared with Russia’s figure of £65.6 billion. But that statistic, stark as it is, does not describe the depth of the problem we are seeing in places such as Ukraine, Georgia and Syria, and the threats, be they actual or subversive, faced by NATO countries such as the Baltic states. We have to have a strong will, and proving that we have it requires resources, commitment and the hard slog of soft power and diplomatic efforts. It requires language skills and a real in-depth understanding. Of course there are other problems in the world, for example, in the South China sea, in Africa and elsewhere, which draw many of those resources away from a particular problem.
As so many people have said in this debate, we do not know what is coming round the corner next, but I am certain about one thing: Russia will tweak NATO’s nose, push the envelope of article 5, be it through cyber, by playing on Russian-speaking nationals in certain countries or just by threatening countries that are friendly to us but not members of NATO, such as Sweden, through incursions into their waters or airspace. Today, in the Defence Committee, we were told that
“any weakness on our part, Russia exploits.”
Making sure that Russia understands that the west will respond and will punish it if it attacks a NATO state must remain a key foreign policy objective—but it is one that needs proper resourcing.
(8 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberI am grateful for that intervention. A number of things could be done in the long term, some of which I shall come on to. Deterring the corruption that has been rife in Burundi is one of them. Having proper enforcement of the anti-corruption convention and, indeed, the African Union’s convention on preventing and combating corruption would assist not just in Burundi, but elsewhere. Specific things could be done immediately, too.
I would like to commend the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, my hon. Friend the Member for Rochford and Southend East (James Duddridge), who has responsibility for Africa, for travelling to the region just before Christmas and speaking to the Burundian Government about some of the language used, which was reminiscent of the language used prior to the 1994 Rwandan genocide. I am also very pleased to see in his place on the Front Bench the Minister of State, Department for International Development, my right hon. Friend the Member for New Forest West (Mr Swayne). He will know that as a result of the corruption in Burundi, his Department withdrew its support for the Government. One issue that the Government need to look at and consider is restoring that support. Without it, it is fair to say that the UK will have a voice that is less likely to be listened to by the existing Government of Burundi and elsewhere.
A number of us were privileged to hear Bill Gates speak earlier today. One thing he said was that, generally speaking, the better off a country is, the more it is inclined towards democracy, good systems of government, health care and everything that flows from it. My right hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) asked about solutions, and clearly one key point is that we should be focused on trying to improve the economic state of these countries and, therefore, the systems of governance that flow from that.
My hon. Friend is absolutely right; I agree with him. Perhaps when the Minister responds to this debate, he will tell us that that is a particular focus of the Government, which I think would be a useful thing for the Government to say.