Criminal Justice System: Capacity

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 22nd October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I begin by thanking the Minister for engaging with me in correspondence last week, in which he calmly set out his reasoning for the present policy proposal. I express my deep sympathy to him for having to respond to questions on a Statement from the other place that is heavy in hyperbole and very weak on reasoning.

What is particularly surprising is that by this morning, the Justice Secretary, who made the original Statement in the other place, was conceding in an interview that this is not a problem you can build yourself out of.

Where did this policy originate? The last Labour Government, while recognising the obvious link between sentencing and prison capacity, decided to advance a policy that relied on prison capacity being predicted and adjusted to accommodate sentencing policy, rather than sentencing policy taking account of prison capacity. The Centre for Criminology at the University of Oxford described this “predict and provide” policy as flawed. The then president of the Prison Governors Association described the then Labour Government’s policy as

“an out-of-control demand met by the provision of little more than penal warehousing”.

The noble Lord, Lord Dubs, then chair of the prison policy group, described the policy as “simplistic”.

What did the then Labour Government do? They announced plans for the building of three titan prisons with massive capacity. What did they do next? They announced the abandonment of plans for three titan prisons with massive capacity and announced plans for the building of five new prisons. If we could find them all, we might utilise their capacity, but the fundamental issue here is not prison cells but penal policy. It is not only obvious but well established that if you increase sentencing powers, sentences increase. Magistrates, like science, cannot resist a vacuum. They will fill it. Increasing sentencing in the magistrates’ court may well relieve some pressure on the Crown Court, but it is liable to increase pressure on reception prisons and category C prisons.

What will that impact be? We have no impact assessment, but the means to carry out such an assessment are potentially available. During the pandemic, the sentencing powers of magistrates were temporarily increased from six to 12 months. It should be possible to correlate this with the impact on reception prisons and category C prisons. Why has that not been done?

I note the Government’s most recent decision, which is to appoint the former Conservative Justice Secretary David Gauke to carry out a review. I applaud their decision to call on his expertise and ability to properly inform them as to what they should do next.

I come on to the question of early release, which is connected to this proposal over sentencing. If the Government are to release more prisoners in the next few days, will they please try to release the right ones? Last time, they released dozens of prisoners who did not qualify for release and dozens of prisoners who had breached restraining orders and should never have qualified for early release. Of those who did qualify for early release, some were let out on licence without an electronic tag, which might have made it a little difficult to work out where they had gone.

In coming to a conclusion, I observe that the marrying up of social policy, penal policy, sentencing policy and prison capacity in the context of recidivism, extensive substance abuse, mental health issues and the requirements for care in the community and family support raises complex issues, particularly when the Treasury will rarely, if ever, invite the Ministry of Justice to the front of the spending queue. Those issues have to be addressed as a whole and, in my respectful view, they are not well served by a simplistic statement of blame, which was essentially what was delivered in the other place.

I conclude by thanking the Minister once again for his reasoned and calm engagement on this topic and I look forward to his response.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, gave us some interesting historical context, but I had expected an apology—or at least a guilty plea, with the plea in mitigation that he chose to leave the previous Government before the ceiling really started to fall in. They left an appalling situation: overflowing prisons, a huge backlog of untried cases, record numbers of remand prisoners, and victims seeing no outcome or closure to what they had suffered. This Government now have to deal with that, and they are running out of their few options to do so. I welcome their decision to have a fundamental review of sentencing policy and to invite David Gauke to carry it out. I very much agree with the noble and learned Lord on that; he is a good choice and I wish him well in the task.

Why are we filling prisons with more offenders than any other western European country? Why are we failing to recognise that we are putting resources into a prison system that is institutionally ill equipped to do the kind of rehabilitative work that is clearly necessary? Unless we see a significant reduction in prisoner numbers, what hope is there that rehabilitation programmes can work in prisons?

With so few options available to them, it seems logical and sensible for the Government to make use of the available time of magistrates who are willing to sit on more serious cases, freeing up time in Crown Courts. However, last time, this was not found to be very effective; it led to an increase in the demand for prison places. The Lord Chancellor conceded in the Commons:

“That is what happened and what I expect to happen again”.—[Official Report, Commons, 17/10/24; col. 1011.]


It is not even a temporary solution. Do these plans overlook the possibility that some defendants will opt for a jury trial when they no longer have the incentive that magistrates can sentence them only to six months? That means longer sentences and larger prisoner numbers. Will special training be provided to magistrates to try to ensure that good use is made of them in cases dealing with more serious offences that require a longer sentence, but that the new powers do not simply inflate sentences that would otherwise have been given to potentially shorter-sentence prisoners?

The Lord Chancellor has said, and I agree with her, that

“people have to know and believe there are consequences to breaking our laws”.

This is not achieved when prisoners are released without completing their sentences or any serious regard to why they were imprisoned for a long period. Neither is it achieved by using a significant part of our resources in a prison system which is ill equipped, ill resourced and ill prepared to rehabilitate offenders. If this announcement buys the Government some time, can we have some reassurance that it will be used for fundamental change?

Streatham Incident

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

Monday 3rd February 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. This was a very serious incident; our thoughts are with the victims. It could have been much worse but for the rapid action of police officers. We should also recognise, as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, did, the contribution of members of the public who came to the aid of the injured.

This terrorist was released by an automatic process which falls short of what we need to do to protect the public. We agree that, in future, release of those convicted of terrorist offences before the end of their sentence should require an assessment by the Parole Board, which will need the resources to do this. The Government have given some indication that they may give these. However, that is necessarily quite a limited thing, which will not in the end make a fundamental difference to the fact that most of these people will eventually come out of prison—a point which I will come to in a moment. If, for example, we have a terrorist conviction for possessing or distributing literature, the amount by which the sentence would be extended, from half to two-thirds, would be small as a proportion of a shorter sentence. In presenting this matter to the public, we should be clear about its limits. Is the Minister telling us—this is the point about retrospection that the noble Baroness referred to—that existing sentenced prisoners currently able to get release on licence at the halfway point will have their custody extended to two-thirds even if they are given a positive review in the Parole Board assessment? That seems to be not only retrospection but punishing prisoners for what others have done while they are inside.

The key point is that most of those we sentence for terrorist offences will eventually be released, so we have to deal with the risks. We need more resources to go into deradicalisation programmes in prisons, using any available expertise from other countries which have also been on this path. We need far more staff in our prisons, trained to deal with these prisoners. I do not think many people in the prison system would recognise the rosy picture tucked away in the Statement of life in our prisons. They house far more prisoners than they are built or staffed to hold, mainly because of longer sentences for a range of non-terrorist offences, which make prisons virtually unmanageable. We need rigorous management of terrorist prisoners, who all too often become members of a radical subculture in prison, which provides recruitment and training for terrorism and inspires the worst kind of fanaticism. When these prisoners are released, we need to be sure that they are supervised by properly financed probation services, police monitoring and, where justified, close surveillance and the involvement of the security services. We look forward to the Jonathan Hall review of multiagency co-operation, which is essential to dealing with this problem.

Finally, this House will want to look carefully at the legislation referred to in the Statement, because it touches on some important civil liberties issues. We must not let the terrorists destroy liberties which we all prize.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am most obliged for the contributions from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Beith. They touched on a very significant point, namely retrospection. I will elaborate a little on that.

There will be a retrospective element in the proposed legislation. It will not increase the sentence of those who have already been sentenced by the court. However, it will address the custodial period of the given sentence, which would be consistent with convention law and the common law. Therefore, we may have a situation in which someone has already been sentenced to a period of, say, nine years and might anticipate release without further consideration by the Parole Board after four and a half years. He would then face the prospect that the custodial element of the given sentence would increase to six years and he would also be subject to consideration by the Parole Board before he could be released even at that point. To that extent, as I say, there is an element of retrospection. We consider that to be proportionate and appropriate in the circumstances. As I say, it is consistent with convention jurisprudence and the common law that we should be able to address the custodial period of a sentence without altering the sentence itself. That is what we have in mind.

Noble Lords also raised the matter of resources. As I sought to indicate when repeating the Statement, we are seeking to address it. We are also addressing the need for clear licensing conditions to be imposed on those who are ultimately released having been sentenced for terrorist offences. Indeed, in this instance, there were conditions clearly attached. I cannot go into the detail, because that will be the subject of the police investigation, but I can say that there was a condition with regard to the place of residence of the individual who is believed to have been involved in this incident, for example. That would be common.

In addition, we have introduced the desistance and disengagement programme to try to mentor persons who have become involved in this sort of activity. That is an ongoing programme which operates both within and without prison.

I hope I can give some reassurance to noble Lords that we are concerned with the seriousness of this issue. I note with relief that noble Lords agree that we should address very quickly the question of automatic release of prisoners when they have committed terrorist offences of this kind.

European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 15th January 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith]

Can the noble and learned Lord tell us at what level of court he thinks it would be inappropriate to extend these powers, and would that level embrace all those courts which do not have a precedent-creating capacity?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

As the noble Lord is aware, there is a level of courts, for example the Sheriff’s Court in Scotland, which is not bound by each other’s judgments, and therefore at that level one could arrive at inconsistency of decision-making, and we are conscious of that. The question is where we should best place the determination, and the whole point of this clause is to allow for the flexibility that is required, upon consultation with the appropriate parties, to determine how we can best achieve the outcome that everyone seeks. I am not in a position to say that it will be just the Supreme Court, as it is under Section 6, or to say that it will be just the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal. However, one can see a rationale behind the approaches, both of which have been supported by various noble and learned Lords in the course of this debate. What we want to be able to do is to resolve that debate and achieve a consensus that will bring about the best result for the law of the United Kingdom, given its different legal systems. What we are seeking in the end is certainty for those who seek to litigate in our courts, and we would achieve that by coming to a consensus on how we should look at EU case law going forward.

I cannot accept the amendment and at this time I would urge the noble Lord to withdraw it.

Courts and Tribunals (Online Procedure) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 2nd July 2019 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the House for its engagement on this Bill throughout its passage. I will first turn to government Amendment 3 on the topic of paper processors. I thank noble Lords once again for their engagement over recent weeks and commend the constructive discussions that we have had on this topic.

On Report, amendments were tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Beith; the noble Lord, Lord Pannick; and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, to ensure that it was clear in the Bill that the ability to submit paper forms and documents would remain available throughout proceedings governed by online procedure rules, not just at the beginning of the application. I am aware that noble Lords were concerned that people should be able to receive documents from the court in paper form as well as to send them.

Of course, our original government amendment tabled before Report sought to address this issue, but I agreed to go away and look again at whether we could provide additional clarity. It has always been the Government’s intention to ensure that paper processors are available at each stage of the process. We are committed to an accessible justice system which supports the needs of all our users. I hope that our new amendments clarify this to the House.

The new amendments make provision for users to choose a paper option at any time throughout their proceedings, and this includes both the sending and receiving of documents. Our system must be accessible and useful for everyone, and with the Bill as drafted I now think that we have achieved that.

I will now turn to government Amendments 1, 2, 5 and 6. Before Report, the Government tabled two amendments relating to support for users of our online services. The first of these provided that, when making new court rules, the committee must have regard for the needs of those who require support to engage online. The second amendment followed this to ensure that the Lord Chancellor should also have regard for the needs of litigants who require digital support when deciding whether to allow or disallow the Online Procedure Rules. These amendments did, and still do, ensure that rules will be made with due consideration of the support which is in place for those requiring assistance to engage with digital services under the Online Procedure Rules.

I had tabled these further amendments to both clarify the intention and ensure consistency of drafting between the earlier government amendments and the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, which was accepted on Report. The amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, places a duty on the Government to provide support for users of the online system. The amendment does not use the word “technical” to qualify this support, and instead requires the Lord Chancellor to provide support to assist those people accessing or who wish to access the online procedure by electronic means, in accordance with the electronic procedure rules. The support will be such as the Lord Chancellor considers appropriate and proportionate to assist users to gain greater access to and make better use of online services. The government amendments ensure consistency with that approach. They also underline our intention that users who might otherwise be digitally excluded must have appropriate and proportionate support to assist them to access the electronic services that will underpin the new online procedure.

In addition, there are consequential amendments. Amendments 4 and 7 are minor consequential amendments. Amendment 4 follows on from the insertion in Clause 5(7), by way of amendment on Report in the Lords, which allows the Lord Chief Justice to appoint a judicial member as chair of the Online Procedure Rule Committee. This amendment means that the Lord Chancellor, subject to the concurrence and consultation requirements in Clause 7, may if necessary amend Clause 5(7), as he may amend other provisions in Clause 5.

Finally, following amendment on Report in the Lords, Amendment 7 is consequential to the insertion of Clause 10(3), which requires the Lord Chief Justice’s concurrence before the Lord Chancellor may amend legislation in consequence of, or in order to facilitate the making of, Online Procedure Rules. It allows the Lord Chief Justice to nominate a member of the senior judiciary to give such concurrence. I beg to move.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

I think we are in danger of slight confusion, with too many amendments moved at the same time. This is obviously a mark of the Minister’s enthusiasm for his amendments, which is actually shared by Members around the Chamber, because they are the fruit of the discussions to which he referred. I simply want to say, before it all becomes water under the bridge, how very much I welcome the Minister’s Amendment 3, which fully achieves what I have been trying to do in amendments both in Committee and on Report. This is, as the noble and learned Lord indicated, to ensure that someone who does not feel comfortable with or able to use the online system can participate in the same process using paper, can receive any documents they have to receive and can put in any subsequent documents, not just the initiating documents, on paper, because the Courts Service will scan the documents and provide the necessary copies as well.

I suspect that this is a minority and even a generational thing. When people like me have ceased even to think of engaging with court cases, or are lying beneath the ground, everybody will be online—but that is certainly not the situation at the moment. We do not want the law to be blind to the concerns of those for whom this is a very new kind of proceeding, and one for which they do not have the necessary skills or experience, particularly when dealing with something as difficult as a legal case. So I am very grateful to the Minister for all he has done in this respect and I support this—and indeed his other amendments.

Courts and Tribunals (Online Procedure) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 24th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. I propose to address Amendment 5, which touches upon government Amendment 4, and then go on to look at manuscript Amendment 9A and thereafter Amendment 7. I will also touch upon the two technical amendments, as they were termed by the noble Lord, Lord Marks.

On Amendment 5, the use of the word “initiate” was intended to capture all engagement with online services throughout the proceedings, as I indicated on a previous occasion—in other words, “initiate” was taken as a synonym for “engagement”, not “commence”—but I appreciate the uncertainty that is in the minds of some noble Lords with regard to that matter. The noble Baroness, Lady Drake, made the point about comparing the terms of an earlier clause with this clause, where it refers only to “initiate”. I intend to look further at that matter before Third Reading so that we can arrive at a conclusion as to the appropriate wording, because I believe we are as one on the appropriate outcome on that point. In these circumstances, I hope that the noble Lord may see fit not to press his amendment at this stage so that we can proceed with Amendment 4 and address that point further in due course.

[Lord Beith]

I thank the Minister for that indication. I will not seek to move the amendment at this stage.

Courts and Tribunals (Online Procedure) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 10th June 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I begin by responding to the observations made by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. This is a piece of enabling legislation—a very welcome one, I suggest—it is not a case of us bringing in powers without limits or regulation. It will establish an expert committee, including judicial representatives, legal representatives and others, that will be able to call upon the expertise of others in particular areas as and when it comes to address them. I will come on to that in a moment in the context of family law. It will operate under the umbrella of not only the Lord Chancellor—or, in the case of employment tribunals, the Secretary of State for BEIS—but the Lord Chief Justice. It does not give free rein to some individual in the Executive to determine how court cases will be determined, but I emphasised that it is concerned only with civil procedure. As the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, acknowledged, the reference in his amendment to criminal procedure is otiose and unnecessary.

Over and above that, I seek to anticipate something that will arise repeatedly in the debate—the position of the Lord Chief Justice regarding the operation of this matter overall, a point we touched on at Second Reading. I am conscious of the desire in some quarters that certain of the Bill’s provisions should provide not simply for consultation with the Lord Chief Justice, which, let us be clear, is a formidable requirement: if you consult with the Lord Chief Justice you consult with him, and if you do so you do not ignore his advice or opinion. Indeed, if you did, it would be open to him to make a report to Parliament under Section 5 of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, which I think one of my officials referred to as the nuclear option. It is not one that anybody would want to encourage.

I am conscious of the suggestion that, in some areas, we should move from the idea of consultation with the Lord Chief Justice to one of concurrence. That, in a way, touches on many of the issues that arise in the Bill. I can go no further at this stage than say that I have that under active consideration and would anticipate returning to the point on Report. I do not give any unequivocal undertaking, but I indicate that I appreciate how and why certain aspects of the Bill, if moved from consultation to concurrence, would meet some of the concerns, particularly those expressed by the Constitution Committee, regarding this matter. I make that general observation at this stage, because it is a point that we may well return to with regard to certain further amendments.

As I set out at Second Reading, the intention is, as far as possible, to make online procedure the preferred procedure for the commencement and defending of cases that fall within its remit. Of course, our ambition is to develop services that are easier to access and to use, so that over time, digital channels become the default choice for at least the majority of users. I emphasise “majority of users”, for the reasons which we have already touched upon.

As we have set out, our initial intention is that this procedure would consider civil money claims up to a value of £25,000 before widening its remit to cover other proceedings, so it is a question of taking it step by step to see how these procedures will work. It is not our intention that the OPRC would start to remake rules across other jurisdictions immediately. We want to complement and build upon the work of the existing committees in this area, to see whether this incremental approach to the extension of the OPRC’s remit can be successful. But no proceedings will be brought into the Online Procedure Rules without the views of the judiciary, of the committee and, in particular, of the Lord Chief Justice being taken into account—whether by consultation or by way of his concurrence.

Amendment 2, moved by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, appears to be intended to transfer the regulation-making power set out in the Bill from the Lord Chancellor to the existing procedure rules committees—or at least make it subject to that. In effect, it would be for those existing rules committees to decide when proceedings may be subject to the Online Procedure Rules. We consider that this would pose a number of serious practical difficulties.

First, it would place the legislation required to bring proceedings under the remit of the Online Procedure Rule Committee on an entirely different footing from that for the existing rules committees for civil, criminal and tribunal. It would be on the basis of a negative resolution statutory instrument developed by an independent rules committee, as opposed to an affirmative instrument laid by the Government, and that, in itself, would not allow for the appropriate degree of parliamentary scrutiny which should be applied here.

The second difficulty is, I am sure, entirely unintentional. Under the existing civil procedure rules committees, there is a means by which—for example, with regard to employment tribunals and employment appeal tribunals—the Secretary of State in the case of the employment tribunal or the Lord Chancellor in the case of the employment appeal tribunal, can direct the making of regulations or rule-making powers. I do not believe that that would be a consequence one would seek in the present context.

Thirdly, the three existing rules committees cover three entirely independent jurisdictions, and it is unclear how they might decide among themselves which proceedings should be extended to the Online Procedure Rule Committee and which should not. We anticipate that in itself creating very real practical difficulties over the administration of the future Online Procedure Rule Committee. This is why we do not consider that this amendment would have an acceptable outcome.

The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, touched on housing. At present there is no intention to proceed with the simplified Online Procedure Rules in respect of housing cases. However, housing cases are governed by the Civil Procedure Act 1997, and are therefore subject to the Civil Procedure Rules, meaning that they would potentially be subject to the OPRC in the future. If and when that were to occur, it would be after consultation or concurrence with the Lord Chief Justice. It would occur because the committee had determined to proceed in that way—a committee which at that stage could be joined by suitable experts in housing law, and other related experts. Only at that stage would it be contemplated.

I notice, however, that although that is not presently anticipated, it is currently possible to initiate some housing enforcement claims online, through the Possession Claim Online website. That has been operational for almost a decade. There have been no difficulties—certainly no reported difficulties—over access to justice because of the use of that Possession Claim Online website. So I accept the potential width of the Bill.

This brings me to Amendment 8, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, the issue of family proceedings and the concern that has been expressed there. There may well be situations, such as those posited by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, where one would never anticipate online procedure or digital process being appropriate for types of family law cases, such as those concerned with children and their welfare. Nobody is suggesting otherwise, but it is not necessary for us to list particular exclusions, because in doing so one is liable to overlook something. It is far better for us to ensure there are appropriate safeguards in place, such as by judicial input, whether by consultation or concurrence; by having an appropriately qualified committee with the ability to bring in experts, particularly on areas such as family law or child welfare; and by ensuring that we proceed incrementally only where the introduction of these simplified procedures is in the interest of litigants. There are circumstances in which it may be in the interest of litigants, in family law cases, to have access to a simple, inexpensive online procedure for the resolution of some types of dispute.

[Lord Beith]

To support that approach, perhaps the Government should be using different language from that used in the Explanatory Notes in paragraph 1, which says:

“We expect the Committee to focus on the civil and family jurisdictions in the first instance”.


That is pretty broad.

Probation Reform

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

Thursday 16th May 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Lord and welcome the fact that he has given consideration to these issues and is able to contribute to this matter with his interim report. No doubt he may take that further. On his second point, I had mentioned that the 11 proposed areas will be coterminous with PCC regions. There are more than 11 PCCs, of course, but we will ensure that the regions are coterminous so that we can develop the appropriate relationships between the PCCs and the NPS in that context. It is certainly not our intention for this to be rushed. I would mention two points: first, although the existing CRC contracts, as adjusted, run to the end of 2020, we have the ability to extend them to the spring of 2021 to have time to bring in these reforms; and, secondly, there will be a pilot in some sense because the model we are now adopting is the one we had already decided to adopt for Wales, which will be implemented from 2019. We will be able to see how this actually operates in practice before we proceed further with the rollout across the rest of England.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, if the Government do not succeed in putting right the failings which many of us identified in previous reports, they will not win the confidence of sentencers and be able to proceed with getting rid of short custodial sentences, which is part of their policy. Surely, in order to get these things right, you do not want too complicated a structure. The intermediate body which is doing the commissioning from the voluntary and private sector seems a rather cumbersome structure, and we have to deal with telephone reporting being relied on, excessive workload for probation officers and features demonstrating that the system is not delivering what it ought to deliver.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I acknowledge that under the present scheme we have seen instances of excessive caseloads being placed upon probation officers, and we are concerned to address that issue. Equally, we are concerned to ensure that appropriate contact between probation and the persons to be released from prison can be achieved. I entirely concur with the noble Lord’s observation about the need to ensure that probation works in an effective manner, such that we can instil in both the courts and the public a confidence in non-custodial sentences. That is one of the objectives we have in mind with regard to these reforms.

Cross-Border Mediation (EU Directive) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 20th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

Is it the Government’s policy, if they are negotiating in a transition period because they have got an agreement, to seek to continue the kind of provisions that are in these regulations when we come to the end of the transition period?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The Government—in the event that we have a withdrawal agreement—will enter into negotiations on our future relationship with the EU, and that will include a desire to ensure that we have addressed the full panoply of judicial co-operation issues that exist at the present time. We cannot say unilaterally that we will secure all of those, but clearly we have an interest in carrying on that negotiation. That is why, at the end of any implementation period, it may be that we can simply revoke these instruments without them ever having to be applied.

The instrument relates to mediation, which is, as noble Lords will be aware, a structured process whereby the parties to a dispute attempt on a voluntary basis to reach an agreement to settle their dispute with the assistance of a mediator, but without a court needing to rule on the dispute. In the civil and commercial fields, such a dispute covers a wide range of contractual and other issues, but also touches on family issues such as access to children.

In 2008, the European Council agreed what it termed a “cross-border mediation directive” which sought to harmonise certain aspects of mediation in relation to EU member states’ cross-border disputes. I should note that the directive does not apply to Denmark, so when I refer to “member states” in this context, I am not including Denmark, which has an opt-out under Protocol 22 of the Lisbon treaty. The aim of the mediation directive is to promote the use of mediation in such cross-border disputes. An EU cross-border dispute can be one between parties who are domiciled, or habitually resident, in two or more different member states, or it can be a dispute where judicial or arbitration proceedings are started in a member state other than the one where the parties are living or domiciled.

The United Kingdom then enacted domestic legislation which gave effect to certain aspects of the mediation directive. I say “certain aspects” because, in many areas—such as ensuring the quality of mediation, and information about mediation for the public—our existing arrangements already met the requirements or standards set out in the 2008 directive. However, in order to implement the directive, the UK had to introduce some new rules for EU cross-border mediations involving UK parties. These new rules first specified that if a time limit, or limitation period, in domestic law during which a claim could be brought in a court or tribunal expires during the mediation process, the parties can still seek a remedy through the courts or tribunals should the mediation not be successful. Secondly, the new rules defined the rights of a mediator, or someone involved in the administration of mediation, to resist giving evidence in civil or judicial proceedings arising from information disclosed during mediation. Various changes were also made to court rules to supplement these changes and to implement the requirements of the mediation directive relating to the enforceability of agreements resulting from mediation.

Under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, the legislation implementing the mediation directive is retained EU law upon the United Kingdom’s exit from the EU. However, should the UK leave the EU without an agreement on civil judicial co-operation, the reciprocity on which the directive relies would be lost. So, even if we were to continue to apply the enhanced EU rules to EU cross-border disputes, we would be unable to ensure that the remaining EU member states applied the rules of the directive to cross-border disputes involving parties based in the United Kingdom, or to judicial proceedings or arbitration taking place in the United Kingdom.

Accordingly, and in line with the Government’s general approach to civil judicial co-operation in the event of no deal, this instrument will repeal, subject to transitional provisions, the legislation that gives effect to the mediation directive’s rules on confidentiality and extension of limitation periods. It amends the relevant retained EU law in England and Wales and Northern Ireland, and in Scotland in so far as it relates to reserved matters. Separate instruments will amend the related court rules in England and Wales and Northern Ireland. Other legislation implementing the directive is within the legislative competence of the Scottish Government, and I understand that they have decided to bring forward their own legislation in this area.

This instrument is necessary to fix the statute book in the event of a no-deal exit. We have assessed its impact and have published an impact assessment. By repealing the domestic legislation which gave effect to the mediation directive, we will ensure clarity in the law applying to mediations between UK parties and parties domiciled or habitually resident in EU member states. We will also avoid a situation where mediations of an EU cross-border dispute conducted in the UK are subject to different—and arguably more favourable—rules on confidentiality or limitation than other UK mediations.

As I indicated earlier, the instrument will change the rules applying only to what are currently EU cross-border mediations, and then only in two respects: time limits and confidentiality. On time limits, claimants involved in such mediations who no longer have the benefit of an extended limitation period would, if they wanted more time to allow for mediation to take place, have to make an application to the court to stay proceedings and would have to pay a fee. We are unable to assess how many cases this would affect. Limitation periods can extend from three years, to six years, to 10 years in some instances, and can either bar a case from being brought or extinguish the claim in its entirety. They are extensive periods in any event, but they may be impacted by these changes

Overall, the instrument will ensure that, post exit, UK-EU mediations are treated consistently under the law with mediations between UK domiciled or habitually resident parties, or UK parties and parties domiciled or habitually resident in non-EU third countries.

I have set out to deal with the issue of EU cross-border mediations because, without a deal in place on 29 March 2019, such mediations involving UK-domiciled parties would no longer be subject to the mediation directive rules in EU member states. The regulations now moved will fix deficiencies and ensure that both the courts and UK citizens have clear and effective rules to follow in such circumstances.

Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 29th January 2019 Grand Committee

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I take the noble Lord’s point when he says “negotiate”; that is the whole point. If he looks at the political declaration, there is a reference to the desire of all parties to negotiate on this among other issues so that we may be part of a regime perhaps similar to Lugano. Let us be clear: we have not only applied to become an individual signatory to Hague 2005, which involves reciprocity between the convention members and ourselves—although I say, quite candidly, that it is not as perfect as Brussels Ia, being more akin to Brussels I. That is why it is in many ways a second best to that extent, but that is as far as we can go. We have also applied to the council of the Lugano convention to become a party to the Lugano convention—a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beith. That will of course require the consent of the EFTA parties and of the EU, and it will be subject to negotiation, but we hope also to be a member of the Lugano convention.

If noble Lords have regard to the impact assessment, they will see that under option two we looked at simply leaving the UK law as it is—in other words, embracing all those relevant terms of Brussels Ia without any right to reciprocity from the EU 27. The difficulty there is that in the absence of reciprocity, people would not know what they were going to get from those provisions. Furthermore, it would raise two obvious difficulties. First, corporations, companies and associations within Europe could secure a decree there and automatically seek to secure enforcement in the UK, but companies, corporations and associations in the UK that secured a judgment from a UK court could not expect to enforce it in the EU 27 countries. That is why I stressed the concept of reciprocity. Yes, we want to negotiate and to secure reciprocity, but until we do, we have to make sure that the statute book is in some sort of order for a no-deal exit—which, as far as I am aware, no one truly wishes for.

Secondly, if we embrace the Brussels Ia regime without being a member of the EU, we would be discriminating between the EU 27 jurisdiction and all the other third-party countries. We would be giving some benefits to the EU 27 under Brussels Ia, albeit without reciprocity, but we would not be giving the same benefit to third-party countries such as the United States, India and China, and Commonwealth countries such as Australia and New Zealand. That raises real issues about discrimination in the context of wider issues on services and so on.

[Lord Beith]

I thank the Minister for explaining the Government’s objections to option two. It might have been a good thing if he had written the impact assessment and developed those points. I shall still disagree with him on some other matters, including the fundamental issue here, but he has clarified that very helpfully.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Lord. I know the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, made much of this, but that is why the impact assessment is between the statute book as it is upon exit and the statute book as it would be under the instrument upon exit, because Parliament has made the law and Parliament is determined to exit on 29 March. If that is reversed, so be it, but that is where we are and that is the impact that we have to properly address in this context.

On the wider point made by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, about the benefits of being in the EU and within Brussels Ia, I am not going to seek to disagree with him. Brussels Ia was a marked improvement on Hague 2005, for example; we all know that. Therefore, in many senses, exit from the EU without a deal is unattractive in the context of the provision of legal services in the UK, as indeed are the implications of that for those who have to engage those services and have recourse to the courts. No one is denying that either, but these are the consequences of the law that Parliament has made in these circumstances.

The noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, asked what steps are being taken with regard to reciprocity. As I say, we are applying to become signatories to the Hague convention 2005, which will give us certain reciprocal rights. We are applying to the council of the Lugano convention to become a party to that, which will give us reciprocal rights with the EFTA countries. In addition, we are intent upon negotiating around the whole issue of judicial co-operation in future, which is why it features in the political declaration. At this stage we cannot demand reciprocity from the EU 27 and they are certainly not prepared to offer it at this stage. At a very early point there were discussions about, for example, the recognition of legal qualifications and mutual issues of that kind, and the EU made it very clear at that stage that that was a discussion for another day. That is where we are.

Coming on to a further point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, about what happens to the SI, if we have an agreement on the terms of the present withdrawal agreement then we go into a two-year implementation period where we will remain a part of the Brussels Ia regime, so the instrument itself will essentially be suspended by the withdrawal agreement Bill. However, it will not be completely done away with because at the end of the implementation period—two, three or four years, whatever it might be—we will then have to decide whether or not we have achieved agreement with the EU 27 on future judicial co-operation. That might be on essentially identical terms to what we have now, in which case we will not need the instrument at all, or it may be that we cannot achieve agreement at that stage, in which event we will need to revive the instrument in order to bring the statute book into proper order. That is why I have referred to it as being “deferred” in that context; it is deferred for the implementation period, whatever that period might ultimately turn out to be. That is where we are on that.

On the issue of forum non conveniens, which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, alluded to, that has always been a part of our common law because we apply it in the context of third party countries outwith the Brussels Ia convention. The noble and learned Lord may recollect the litigations that took place around the Pan Am/Lockerbie case and the attempts to take it further than just applying the doctrine of forum non conveniens but rather to apply the issue of interdict against the raising of proceedings in a third party country, which is attendant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens—although I recall being in a Texas court where the judge asked it to be pointed out to me that in Texas they do not have forum non conveniens, and we have to accept that there are some jurisdictions of that ilk. Nevertheless, the courts will fall back upon these common-law concepts which have not been done away with but have not applied in the context of the Brussels Ia regime for the reasons that the noble and learned Lord very carefully pointed out.

The European Judicial Network is a very fine body but it was set up in order that there could be engagement across the EU 28 about the operation of the regime that at the moment we are referring to as Brussels Ia, but it also looks at Brussels IIa and other issues. It concerns the operation of that regime and how it may be improved. For example, it contributes to how you move from Brussels I to Brussels Ia. If we are not part of the regime, we are not part of the European Judicial Network and we really have no part to play in that. But again if, going forward, we are able to achieve a negotiated position with the EU 27 where we are, if you like, semi-detached from Brussels Ia and the other Brussels regime, no doubt they will consider allowing us a seat perhaps not at the table but at least in the room of the judicial network in order that we can contribute to it. However, that too is a negotiation for another day. It is not what this instrument is addressing and not what it is intended to do. So, with all due respect to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, there is no elephant in the room. Parliament removed the elephant when it decided that, as a matter of law, we would leave on 29 March 2019. The Executive have to address that point in order to put the statute book in proper order.

Mutual Recognition of Protection Measures in Civil Matters (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 29th January 2019 Grand Committee

[Lord Beith (LD)]

I agree entirely with my noble friend. Oddly enough, we had not consulted each other beforehand, but we reached the same conclusion from the same basic principles: where people are particularly vulnerable, when the arrangements we make in this country can afford them some protection, we should do so without regard to the reciprocity we would prefer, which we might not be able to have.

It is particularly depressing to have to see through this statutory instrument which says to people in desperate family situations threatened with violence, “Sorry, but, whereas we have been able to issue a procedure in the past which gives you some protection, even if you are going elsewhere in the European Union”—which they may be doing because there are grandparents or aunts and uncles for their children to see—“we can no longer offer you that, and you are that much more vulnerable as a consequence”. We really must negotiate our way to a better position. Like my noble friend, I think it is right that the Government should continue to offer protection when a court elsewhere in the European Union has deemed it necessary.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions. No matter how divisive the issues that we face on Europe, we should seek to do good where we can in the present circumstances. We consider that we can do this by accepting these unilateral measures for the benefit of EU and UK citizens.

Regarding the issue of reciprocity, we would clearly like to see the development of a reciprocal regime similar to that which is presently enjoyed, but the way negotiations have been carried on is such that they will not be salami-sliced, if I can put it that way. Going forward, we are going to have to negotiate judicial co-operation as a whole. It is therefore not possible to pre-empt the Commission on these matters by taking them one by one, however regrettable the matter might appear to be.

On the matter of costs, I concur with the noble Lord, Lord Beith: in a sense, it is a matter of no real concern whatever that cost might be, given the individuals that we are concerned with. However, I understand that these orders are very few and far between and that there will be no major impact on our public authorities.

On Scotland and Northern Ireland, the regulation does not apply intra-UK; it applies to the UK as a member of the EU. Intra-UK, these matters are determined by our domestic law, and I see no reason to anticipate that the Scottish Government will alter the present system whereby within domestic law you can have suitable reciprocal enforcement of orders in this area. It is a matter for the Scottish Government to bring forward their own instrument in this regard, and I am not in a position to pre-empt them on that.

Against that background, I am obliged to noble Lords for having welcomed this instrument, at least to the extent that it is doing some good. I therefore commend the draft instrument to the Committee.

Services of Lawyers and Lawyer’s Practice (Revocation etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 15th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

In relation to this particular instrument, I am not in a position to say where the Scottish Government are in processing such a proposal. That is a matter for them and it is not a matter that they would, as a matter of course, disclose to me. But, as I say, I have confidence that they are aware of the issue and they have decided that they will take it forward. If they had wanted to utilise the provisions of the Scotland Act to have the UK Parliament legislate for them in regard to this matter, they would of course have said so. The very fact that they have not is indicative that they are making progress to legislate for this on their own behalf. That is where we stand.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

Perhaps I might ask the Minister to tidy up the point that was raised earlier. What ensures that if there is some kind of deal, the provisions of this instrument fall away? Does it require some further statutory provision to do so—in effect, revoking the instrument—or does it fall away if there has not been an exit day? But surely if there is a deal, there is still an exit day.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, in the event that we have a deal, we will repeal this instrument. It will have no further purpose in those circumstances. This is to address the issue of there being no deal—I emphasise that again.

Courts: Modernisation

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 6th June 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government when legislation to modernise the courts system will be introduced, as set out in the Queen’s Speech.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, the Government introduced the Courts and Tribunals (Judiciary and Functions of Staff) Bill into the House of Lords on Wednesday 23 May of this year. This legislation is the first step in implementing the wider reform package and the Government remain committed to implementing further court reform legislation as soon as parliamentary time allows.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, it was nice to have such a quick response after tabling my Question but it really is a little mouse of a Bill. It has some useful provisions but why has it been stripped of almost all the court modernisation measures which were promised in the Queen’s Speech? How is it that halfway through a two-year parliamentary Session the Government have not found time for urgently needed and relatively uncontroversial provisions to enable the courts to modernise and speed up processes which cause delay and distress to court users, and which cost money that could be better spent improving access to justice?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, this is a mouse that roared. It may be a small Bill but it has extensive implications for the operation of our court system. Splitting the legislation originally set out in the Prison and Courts Bill will allow the Government to progress these vital reforms utilising the time available in both Houses.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

Report: 6th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 8th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I rise to move the Government’s Amendment 117. The Bill’s approach to certain EU rights of challenge and associated remedies has already been scrutinised closely. We have debated at length the substantive provisions in the Bill covering this area and this House has made clear its views. I do not intend to go over old ground again in this speech. The amendment deals with the approach to transitional cases in one important area, where Francovich damages are being sought. I will say a little about the particular substantive provisions that this relates to.

Francovich damages are a specific form of remedy that exists in EU law. They are available in certain strictly limited circumstances where member states have breached EU law, for example where a member state has failed to properly transpose a directive. The Government remain firmly of the view that, after we leave the EU, Francovich damages will no longer be relevant when we cease to be bound to follow obligations that apply to member states. This is for the simple reason that the majority of Francovich cases in the UK have been brought on the grounds of non-implementation or insufficient implementation of a directive. The UK will no longer be under an obligation to implement directives after exit and the directives will not form part of our domestic law as retained EU law, so the ability to claim Francovich damages would not be possible for a post-exit cause of action. Paragraph 4 of Schedule 1 therefore removes the right to Francovich damages after exit day. The Government consider this outcome to be a natural consequence of the decision to leave the EU, while ensuring Parliament is sovereign.

The impact of these provisions on transitional cases is one area that the House urged us to think again on when we debated the matter in Committee. I concede that the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Stamford and Lord Carlile, made powerful arguments, in particular on the need to look again at cases where an individual’s course of action accrued before we left the EU. The amendment responds directly to that concern.

We remain of the view that it would not be reasonable for there to be a long tail of cases based on outdated elements of EU law continuing to process through our courts, potentially for many years after we leave the EU. That would not be conducive to the legal certainty this Bill aims for. The Bill will therefore set what the Government believe to be a clear and sensible cut-off point. The amendment we have brought forward will therefore delay the prohibition in the Bill on seeking Francovich damages in domestic law for two years after exit day. This will provide individuals with a fair and sensible opportunity to seek damages for pre-exit breaches of EU law. It also ensures that we continue to have a clear and certain cut-off point after which such challenges would end. I hope that the House supports the proposals that we have put forward, which I think provide important reassurance to individuals and businesses. I therefore beg to move.

[Lord Beith]

My Lords, I wonder whether the noble and learned Lord could help the House, or those of us who were not following quickly enough, as to how Amendment 117 relates to Amendment 116, which, as I understand it, the Government did not move, and what the effect would be of having Amendment 117 without Amendment 116. Would that affect the Francovich damages time limitation?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, the intention with respect to Amendment 117 is that there should be a two-year period after exit, during which it will be possible for a claim to be made in respect of a right of action that accrued up to the point of Brexit. I hope that that clarifies the point.

[Lord Beith]

What was not clear to me was why the Government did not move the preceding amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

That is probably attributable to a note that I have here saying, “Don’t move Amendment 116”.

Probation: Voluntary Sector

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 24th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I do not consider that a material consideration, given that they are subject to the very report that we are discussing presently, Dame Stacey’s report of 17 April.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, the Minister should not speak about unexpected difficulties, given that the likelihood that the amount of work going to the CRCs would be lower than the Government predicted was something of which the Justice Committee warned, along with many other things.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee: 11th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 28th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

The Government’s objective is to conclude a withdrawal agreement by October of this year. That has been stated on a number of occasions and it is in that context that we intend that the present Bill should deal with the situation, whether or not there is a withdrawal agreement or an implementation period. As and when a withdrawal agreement is concluded, it will be dealt with in the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. Clearly, if we enter into an international treaty with the EU 27 in respect of these matters, we will respect that international treaty and our obligations inherent in it and, in accordance with the duality principle, draw down those obligations into our domestic law, using the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill. I suggest that it is inconceivable that we would not seek to do that.

[Lord Beith]

The noble and learned Lord has been quite clear that it will be the withdrawal Bill that is the mechanism. Is he saying that it will be that Bill and not the use of the statutory instrument powers to be found elsewhere in this Bill which will enable him to modify or repeal its sections when it is an Act?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

We have been clear that the withdrawal agreement and implementation Bill will legislate for the withdrawal agreement. That may involve us amending the terms of the present Bill, but we should remember that the present Bill is intended to accommodate the situations where there is a withdrawal agreement and where there is no withdrawal agreement and therefore no implementation period. It is to bring certainty to the statute book in that context. Clearly, there may be a situation in which we have to bring forward amendments to the present Bill in the second withdrawal agreement Bill. I recognise that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Goldsmith]

My Lords, I support the amendment. There is not much to add to what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said about what the amendment does and why it is necessary, nor to add to the questions he asked or to those then added by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, which in particular picked up issues with regard to the devolved Administrations.

We know that a major theme in your Lordships’ House, rightly, has been how powers are to be exercised, recognising that there may be circumstances in which they have to be exercised. Notwithstanding that, on the whole this Committee has rightly taken the view—or we hope that we will see it take the view, certainly from the interventions and contributions that have been made throughout the Committee—that this is a matter where proper parliamentary scrutiny is required. There may well be a role for certain delegated legislation, but please let us not add to it with still yet another way in which things can be done which avoid that full parliamentary scrutiny.

I hope that the Minister, when he responds, will be able to say something reassuring, both answering the questions posed by the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Beith, and saying why we need not be concerned and that the Government will content themselves with relying on those delegated powers that will be specific to the Bill, once this Committee and the other place have determined just what those delegated powers should be.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to noble Lords. I begin by making two observations. These amendments are linked closely to the issue we have already debated in Committee of the status of retained EU law and how we deal with it in the context of its status. As has been indicated previously in Committee, the Government have been listening and considering that, and we intend to come back to the House on the matter before Report. I mention that because it is a relevant backdrop to what we are considering at this stage.

On the points raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, essentially, the powers in paragraph 3 of Schedule 8 are, first of all, designed to remove what I might term the shadow of European law from what will be domestic legislation. However, more particularly, the noble Lord raised a point about the devolution issues and quoted from the Explanatory Notes. I understand that the section of the Explanatory Notes that he refers to addresses Clause 11 prior to its recent amendment. I appreciate that we then withdrew that amendment, but the Explanatory Notes should be read in that context. Essentially, therefore, we have moved on because of the decision to flip Clause 11—I think that was the term used—so I ask the noble Lord to look at the proposed amendment to Clause 11 to understand the context in which we now want to deal with this point.

[Lord Beith]

The noble and learned Lord is being reasonable, but he is inviting us to presume that we have moved on when we have not yet done so. The Government have indicated a willingness to look further at the Clause 11 issues and come back with something new. However, when we compare that discussion to the one we just had, it is a bit odd now to be invited to behave as if something has happened which has not happened yet.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I understand the noble Lord’s point. He appreciates the statements of intent that we have made with regard to Clause 11. Although we withdrew the amendment to Clause 11, it was tendered and withdrawn for a particular purpose, in order to ensure that it could be finalised before Report. I hope that that addresses the noble Lord’s concern about the terms of the Explanatory Note that he quoted.

We have discussed on previous occasions in Committee the risk of ossifying the statute book and how that has to be balanced against checking the ability of the Government to propose changes to retained EU law. Clearly, as I indicated, the Government have heard the debates on the question of how we should treat the status of retained EU law, and we intend to come back on that. However, we must make provision for how delegated powers outside the Bill will interact with retained direct EU legislation. To do nothing would create uncertainty and potentially—by putting it beyond the reach even of Henry VIII powers that can modify Acts of Parliament—risk placing retained EU law on a pedestal of protection beyond even the elevated position of primary legislation. That is why I say that the two issues are linked: how we deal with the status of retained EU law but also carry on with our domestic powers to deal with the entire scope of our domestic legislation, including that which is going to be defined as retained EU law.

Worboys Case and the Parole Board

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 28th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I welcome the High Court decision and the fact that it showed up the really serious errors made by both the Parole Board and the Ministry of Justice. But I take it that the Minister agrees that these errors should not blind us to the proper role and importance of the parole system within our criminal justice system and, indeed, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, rightly pointed out, to the contribution, which the Minister has already acknowledged, that Nick Hardwick has made in several positions—bearing in mind also that Nick Hardwick argued that the transparency we are all now calling for was not allowed by law and should have been.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Well, indeed. I am obliged to the noble Lord for his observations in that regard. As I indicated earlier, it had occurred to my right honourable friend’s predecessor, almost as soon as this matter came to his attention, that Rule 25 really did need to be looked at and given further consideration because of the impact it had on the perception of proceedings. Regarding the proceedings of the Parole Board itself, clearly, there are hundreds of individuals involved and engaged in that process. It is critically important as part of our criminal justice system and it is equally important that it should remain independent of the Executive.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee: 9th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Wednesday 21st March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

Might noble Lords be referring to the mixed metaphor they have just heard?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

May I proceed to split an infinitive?

The new arrangements must be achieved in partnership with the devolved Administrations. Crucially, that takes time to work through.

We must proceed with caution in considering any form of sunset which would change the purpose of our discussions from designing and implementing frameworks that are fit for purpose to ones that can be achieved in the time allowed. Our priority must be to continue to provide legal certainty on how these laws will work in that interim, but this could risk uncertainty where the provisions may lift before their replacement is known.

This is a substantial and significant amendment to Clause 11. It reflects the progress that we and the devolved Administrations have made on frameworks and in our discussions on Clause 11. It strikes the right balance, delivering for the devolved Administrations and for businesses and people across the United Kingdom. I am grateful for the consideration that this House will provide on this offer as we continue to refine and consider the policy in coming weeks.

The amendments in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson, Lord Griffiths and Lord Thomas, would amend elements of the amendments that we have put forward. We have heard much on the question of the consent of the devolved institutions for the use of the proposed new Clause 11 powers that would “freeze” existing UK frameworks. As I indicated earlier, I wish to be clear on two fundamental points. The first is that this will be a collaborative process. There is no suggestion or intention that we want to cut our devolved institutions out of these decisions. We have put in place a set of shared principles that the Scottish and Welsh Governments have agreed and which guide our work on frameworks—I referred earlier to the statement following the Joint Ministerial Committee in October last year that sets out those principles in detail. Departments across Administrations are now working together to consider frameworks. Devolved and UK Ministers continue to discuss these matters regularly at Joint Ministerial Committee meetings. The limits on the powers make it clear that the views of the devolved Ministers must be heard and the United Kingdom Government in exercising the power must set out what those views are for Parliament’s consideration. That is not a power grab. As we have heard today, this Parliament will rightly hold us to account on how the Government act on devolution policy. The second point is that we must be clear about the implications and outcomes of this work. These decisions affect every part of the United Kingdom. It is the United Kingdom Government and the United Kingdom Parliament that are responsible for matters that affect the whole of the United Kingdom.

We must therefore be very careful about the impact of a hard-edged legal requirement, not because we do not want the Scottish Government and the Welsh Government and, once restored, the Northern Ireland Executive to be part of these decisions but because it cannot be for an Administration in one devolved nation to exercise what amounts to a veto over something that would be in the interest of the other nations of the United Kingdom as a whole. That is not and never was the purpose of the devolution settlement.

I thank my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay and the noble Lords, Lord Foulkes and Lord Wigley, for their proposals to bring the United Kingdom Government and devolved Administrations together. These are constructive suggestions for a middle way that deserve serious thought. I am encouraged by the effort being made to reach agreement.

At present, we believe that the JMC will be the right forum for engagement, working under the principles agreed for the work on frameworks in October last year, but I would like to take away the ideas that have been brought to the table here today by way of the further proposed amendments and consider how these matters might be incorporated into our policy thinking, while continuing to meet our two stated objectives on legal certainty and respect for the devolved settlements.

I thank my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern for his amendment, which seeks to find a way forward in the context of Clause 11 and the frameworks. Again, it is an attempt to ensure engagement between all the interested Administrations to achieve consensus at the end of the day. My noble and learned friend’s amendment highlights the importance of clarity as we develop frameworks. As we have discussed during earlier debates, the work on frameworks will have to be a collaborative effort designed to ensure maintenance of a single internal market for the United Kingdom after we leave the EU. Our intention remains to reach agreement with the devolved Administrations. However we approach it, we have that as a goal.

The approach that we have put forward for Clause 11 in these amendments is, I venture, an entirely reasonable proposition. By default, and unless further action is taken, the returning EU powers in the 153 areas identified will become devolved matters. We should perhaps take pause to remind ourselves that these are entirely new powers for the Scottish Parliament and National Assembly for Wales, expanding devolved competence into areas previously held and exercised by the EU and, prior to that, by the United Kingdom Parliament.

We believe that what we propose addresses the points raised by the Scottish and Welsh Governments in their legislative consent memorandums. I hope that noble Lords will recognise that we have moved a considerable way on this, but that we continue to see the importance of providing as much certainty as early as possible for businesses across the UK in order that we can avoid, or indeed manage, divergence between the individual nations of the United Kingdom. While we have not yet reached agreement with the devolved Administrations, discussions will continue and we are extremely keen to maintain our engagement with them. But we consider that it is right that noble Lords have the chance to consider these amendments—the Government committed to that on Report and we brought them forward for consideration by this Committee. I hope noble Lords whose amendments are in this group will feel able to withdraw them at this stage; we, as I indicated earlier, will do similarly with the government amendments at the end of this debate. I beg to move.

Amendment 302B (to Amendment 302A)

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee: 4th sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 5th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their brevity.

Amendment 40ZA, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, seeks to ensure that challenges to validity could continue on general principles of EU law grounds. I will address concerns raised on general principles in more detail later. First, Schedule 1 generally ends the ability to bring challenges on validity grounds to what will become retained EU law after we leave the EU. We recognise, however, that in some circumstances, individuals and businesses may be individually affected by an EU instrument. For example, a decision of an EU institution or body may be addressed directly to an individual or business. After exit, they would continue to be able to challenge such decisions—in so far as they apply in the EU—before the CJEU, and to have them annulled. Of course, the converted form of the decision would however remain in force within the UK as retained EU law.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, asked whether paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 would, after exit day, prevent a challenge to a provision of retained EU law by reference to common-law principles. I understand that the answer is no, it would not, and it is not intended to do so. I hope that that meets the position that he raised with me a moment ago.

Domestic courts currently have no jurisdiction to annul an EU measure or declare it invalid, and we do not believe it would be right to hand them a new jurisdiction which asks them effectively to assume the role of the CJEU in this context. This amendment would effectively ask our courts to consider whether the EU acted incompatibly with the general principles when it made an EU instrument. Generally speaking, this is a function that we do not consider it appropriate to confer on domestic courts.

Therefore, although I appreciate the points raised by the noble Baroness, the amendment would undermine the Government’s stated policy of a clear exclusion of both validity challenges and general principle challenges provided for within Schedule 1. However, we recognise that there might be some limited circumstances in which it would be sensible to maintain the ability to challenge retained EU law on validity grounds. The Bill therefore contains a power set out in paragraph 1(2)(b) of Schedule 1, to which the noble Baroness alluded, which would enable the Minister to make regulations providing for a right of challenge in domestic law to the validity of retained EU law in specified circumstances.

Sub-paragraph (3) sets out that those regulations may provide that a challenge which would previously have proceeded against an EU institution may, after exit, proceed against a UK public authority, because of course there would be no EU institution against which it could be directed. I seek to reassure the noble Baroness that the word “may” is there as a precautionary term lest, in the context of trying to make such a regulatory power, it be perceived that there is no easily identifiable body against which the matter can be directed. However, the intent is that it should be possible to proceed against a public body in those circumstances.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

Can the noble and learned Lord envisage the circumstances in which such regulations would be made? Will Ministers have to decide between now and exit day a category of matters for which such regulation is to be provided, or are we to await a case coming up which ought to have been the subject of regulations which are then made? That surely cannot be possible.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

With respect, it is a precautionary power and it is intended that, where the circumstances arise, the Minister will address himself to those circumstances and contemplate the making of appropriate regulations.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Monday 26th February 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I must compliment the noble and learned Lord on his second sight. As I was about to say, the next argument put to us is that if we say that the charter is not adding anything, what is the problem with keeping it? I hope that is a fair summary of the noble and learned Lord’s intervention. With respect, this argument simply fails to take account of how the charter applies at present. The charter and the rights that it reaffirmed have a limited application. They apply to the EU institutions all of the time, but apply only to member states acting within the scope of EU law. We will no longer be a member state and so we will be no longer be acting within the scope of EU law. Simply retaining the charter would not reflect the realities of leaving the EU. It cannot be right that a document called the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union could continue to be used as the justification to bring cases that would lead ultimately to the striking down of UK primary legislation after we leave the EU. Outside our membership of the EU, it is simply not appropriate to retain the charter.

There are also practical questions to consider. It would be no simple matter to say that we are keeping the charter. The amendments in this group all attempt, in various ways, to solve the riddle of how an instrument inherently linked to and constrained by our membership of the EU could apply purely domestically. They each highlight the complexity involved in such an exercise.

In Amendment 13A, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, requires the Government to lay a report on how the charter will continue to apply to retained EU law after we leave the EU. However, his other amendments are far from clear on precisely how he intends the charter to have effect domestically after exit. They would remove the exclusion of the charter provided for in Clause 5, presumably with the intention that it would now form part of retained EU law. I note that one of his amendments would excise the definition of what the charter is from the Bill, despite going on to say that this undefined, unclear thing will continue to have effect in relation to retained EU law under Clauses 2, 3 and 4. What would our courts make of that? Many articles of the charter set out principles, not rights, which can be relied on directly by individuals. How would these have effect after exit? Eight articles of the charter constitute rights intrinsically linked to EU citizenship—for example, the right to vote in an EU parliamentary election. Of course, they claw at the air—we appreciate that—but they do nothing.

Let us pause again on the fact that the charter applies to member states only when acting within the scope of EU law. Presumably, if retained under the Bill, the charter would then apply only when we were acting within the scope of retained EU law, which I believe is the elaboration that the noble and learned Lord made in response to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. Over time, our domestic law will evolve and new laws will be made by this sovereign Parliament and the devolved legislatures that will start to replace and supersede this category of retained EU law. We would be retaining the charter, in whatever capacity the noble and learned Lord intends, only for an ever-diminishing proportion of our law. This further risks incorporating complexity and confusion into our domestic statute book.

We should not overstate the accessibility of the current rights regime, which relies on citizens knowing—

[Lord Beith (LD)]

The noble and learned Lord is right in that assertion, but it does not follow that retained European law should not be read across in the form of the charter as well as its other features on exit day. Lots of things will change over time. Parliament will no doubt amend retained European law so that it ceases to be retained European law, but the Bill is about legal continuity and what the situation is on exit day. For this purpose, surely the Minister should accept what is being proposed.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I entirely agree with the noble Lord as to what this Bill is about. With regard to the charter, the point is that it does not bring anything over on its own. We already have these rights and obligations, as established by the principles of EU law, convention law and the common law.

As to a concern that something is omitted at the end of the day, as I indicated, we would address that to ensure that all rights are brought across. However, with great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, I do not believe that you can never have too many belts and braces. If you have too many belts and braces, eventually you cannot stand up. It is therefore important that we approach this issue with a degree of proportionality, if I may use a European term.

Following on from the point I made earlier, retaining the charter for what will become a fluid and changing category of law risks legislatively binding us to a document that would bring the illusion of clarity in the short term but serve only to undermine it in the longer term. Indeed, the other amendments in this group raise similar issues to those put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith.

My noble friend Lord Hailsham has tabled amendments that seek to build on the amendments put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith. They seek to assign the status of primary legislation to the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. For reasons that we will go into in a later group, the Government believe that the question of assigning status to retained EU law is complex and should be approached with caution. I hope that we can come back to this question when we have concluded our debate on the approach to rights protection and to status more generally. I will not seek to take up time on that issue at this stage.

I suspect that the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, would also add to the confusion. Seeking to afford charter rights the same level of protection as convention rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 is fraught with difficulty. Charter rights do not correspond exactly to ECHR rights and apply in different ways. The charter also contains non-justiciable principles as well as rights, and it is unclear what status these would have in domestic law under his amendment. Moreover, it does not deal with how explanations to the charter articles should be treated or how certain sections of the Human Rights Act would apply to charter rights. I appreciate that we are in Committee and that the noble Lord is entitled to say that he will look more carefully at the form of the amendment and perhaps elaborate upon it in due course, but there are fundamental difficulties with the approach he is attempting to take in simply trying to incorporate the charter when, as indeed the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, himself observed, the expression of rights in the charter does not coincide precisely with the expression of rights in the convention.

I would like to emphasise again that we remain committed to listening to this House and indeed to working constructively to ensure that we have a functioning statute book which maximises legal certainty. I understand the concerns expressed by some about whether some rights would somehow be left behind, but if we can and do identify a risk of such rights being left behind, we are entirely open to the proposition that we have to address that by way of amendment to the Bill, and we will seek to do that. I wish to reassure noble Lords on that point.

Transparency of the Parole Board and Victim Support

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 9th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I note what the noble Baroness has said, and I quite understand the basis on which she expresses these views. As I have already said, there is a question about the discretionary contact where a case has not actually been prosecuted. Clearly, we must have that in mind when we take the question of the VCS forward. As I observed earlier, it would not be appropriate for me at this stage to set out the parameters of a review that is under contemplation at present.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

When cases show a pattern of serial and prolific offending, ought it not to be considered by the prosecution service that how many cases to prosecute should not be unduly restrained by either CPS resources or court resources, because of the effect that may have on the sentencing?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I do not understand that they are ever determined by reference to court resources at all. The CPS has to make an independent judgment on these matters. It applies its evidential tests to the complaints that are brought before it by the police, to determine whether or not the prosecution should appropriately be taken forward. One has to acknowledge that there are cases when victims come forward, and yet, because of the particular circumstances, it is not possible for the CPS to determine that the evidential test has been met.

Probation Service

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

Thursday 14th December 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, I endorse entirely the observations made by the noble Lord. It is for the courts to impose programme requirements as part of the community or suspended sentences orders that they make. Clearly, we have to ensure that they continue to have faith in the system when they are making those orders.

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, surely the case is overwhelming for a careful review of what the Government were warned about by the House of Commons Justice Committee and others: not providing the resources for Through the Gate supervision of prisoners, which was the purpose of the reform, would ensure that it would fail. Given that the structure has not worked either because, as the Minister has indicated, far more people have been referred to the National Probation Service because of the level of their offence, it is surely time to review the operation of the scheme.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, we do not consider that a root-and-branch analysis or going back to the drawing board is required at this time. However, we are taking active steps to address the very point that the noble Lord raises. Indeed, we are paying CRCs significantly more in the way of funding to ensure that they can deliver the services required, including, critically, Through the Gate services.

Prisons: Safety and Security

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 21st December 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

Will Ministers address the urgent need to deal with the release of IPP prisoners who are beyond their tariff? What use is being made of the reserve list, which Mr Grayling set up in 2014 when he was Secretary of State, of former prison officers and others who could be called in during situations such as this?

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to the noble Lord. Public protection remains a key priority in the context of how we deal with IPP prisoners. These people have been sentenced for offences involving serious violence and serious sexual crime. We set up a new unit within the Ministry of Justice to tackle the backlog with respect to IPP prisoners and we are working with the Parole Board to improve the efficiency of that process. We have an enhanced case-management system. We are diverting recall cases away from the Parole Board so that it can focus on reviewing IPP prisoners. In the past year, 38% of IPP prisoners who attended oral hearings completed by the Parole Board went on to be released. So matters are improving. Indeed, in the last year we released 512 IPP prisoners from custody—the largest number so far—bringing the total figure below 4,000.

Serious Disturbance at HM Prison Birmingham

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

Monday 19th December 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, in thanking the noble and learned Lord for repeating the Statement I ask him to recognise that, but for the skill, courage and day-to-day resourcefulness of prison officers and governors across the prison system, there would have been even more serious and violent incidents than have occurred. The prison system is holding far more prisoners than it is resourced to manage. As a result, rehabilitation programmes are disrupted or not in place at all. To make matters worse, when there are riots those prisoners who want to do their time peaceably, take the courses and train for a job are prevented from doing so and therefore more likely to reoffend when released.

I put two questions to the noble and learned Lord. First, will he say whether G4S had fallen short of its contracted staff numbers at Birmingham? Then, on the wider question, when will Ministers accept and cease to deny that there are offenders in prisons who could be better dealt with by tough community sentences? Unless we use the expensive resources required for prison places more sensibly, as most other European countries do, and unless we address sentence inflation we will build up even more potential for future violence in prisons. Getting the numbers down is not a quick solution to the immediate crisis, but if Ministers do not begin to deal with it now the problems in our prisons and outcomes on release will just get worse.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to noble Lords. I begin by responding to some of the observations made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. Staff in all our prisons, whether public or private, work hard to keep prisoners safe and to address the causes of reoffending. Our recently published data show no obvious differences in performance levels between public and private prisons. There are of course issues across the entire prison estate, seen in both public and private sector, and there is no question but that these are attributable to a mix of factors, including the increased use of psychoactive substances, the increased availability of mobile phones within prisons, the increased level of gang violence within prisons, as well as issues about retention of staff and numbers of staff, all of which we are seeking to address and have addressed already by virtue of the White Paper. So far as G4S is concerned, we robustly monitor the performance of all contractors providing services to the Ministry of Justice, and privately managed prisons are subject to the same rigorous external inspections as those in the public sector by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons.

With regard to the question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, as to the precise number of staff at Birmingham, I do not have those numbers to hand but I am quite happy to write to him and will place a copy of that letter in the Library once I have the relevant information.

On sentencing, since 2010, the prison population has remained relatively stable and static, at about 85,000. There has been a marked decrease in the number of those serving short sentences, by 1,500, but there has been an increase in the number of those serving longer sentences, especially for sexual offences and offences involving violence. Public safety must be at the forefront of our minds when we address these issues.

We are seeking to increase staffing levels across the entire prison estate and are investing in the prison estate itself—a £1.3 billion programme is under way. In February next year, Her Majesty’s Prison Berwyn will open in Wrexham. It will be the second-largest prison in Europe and will ensure that we have enough capacity within the prison estate to address overcrowding.

So far as an investigation is concerned, as I indicated previously, there is already a proposal that an inquiry should be undertaken by Sarah Payne, adviser to the independent Chief Inspector of Probation. We will await the outcome of that investigation before we decide what further steps should be taken.

Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) (Amendment) Regulations 2016

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

Tuesday 25th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, I hesitated to rise before the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, because I was sure he would have found there was something wrong with this instrument that I had not managed to discover. I am quite touched to find that he agrees with it as much as I do. It is a small but welcome improvement in the legal aid situation which has caused many people a great deal of anxiety. Although I fully recognise that legal aid resources are not—and cannot be— unlimited, their application was not always to the public good. There were many situations in which one party had the benefit of legal aid and the other party could not really afford the costs of privately financing the case. So the position is more complex than it sometimes appears.

The effect of this instrument, as I understand it from the Government’s memorandum, is that about 70 cases a year will attract legal aid which would not otherwise have done so, and about £250,000 has been found from somewhere to ensure that this can be financed. That is welcome news, and it opens up the possibility that there will occasionally be a case which is of real public value—because ultimately it will affect cases brought by other people—or is of fundamental importance to an individual, which would not have got legal aid and would not have been proceeded with, but which will now be satisfactorily dealt with by the courts system. That has to be an improvement, so I welcome the instrument. I also, of course, welcome the review—to which the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, referred, and which the House of Commons Justice Committee, which I then chaired, was particularly keen to see—of a piece of legislation that had such far-reaching effects on access to justice.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I am obliged to noble Lords, particularly the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, for their observations. I shall respond to those. Of course a review of LASPO will have to take place before April 2018, and we will endeavour to keep the House informed as to when that review will take place. There is certainly no present intention to limit the scope of the review, but that will be addressed at the time when the review is determined. Again, we will keep the House advised on that point.

With regard to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, it is correct that additional funding has been found, for what is, I accept, a small, but nevertheless an important, change to the merits criteria regulations, which will at least embrace some further parties who would otherwise fall outwith the ambit of the legal aid regulations. I commend these regulations to the House.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard - part two): House of Lords
Monday 17th October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

To pose a legal challenge which is not based on any instance or evidence of the basis on which such a challenge could be made—I certainly cannot think of a basis on which someone could require the production of knowledge of the means used for interception, based on existing legislation.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Amendment 137A seeks to insert a provision into the Bill that would require the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to notify the subject of a targeted interception or equipment interference warrant in certain circumstances. The amendment tries to tightly draw those circumstances, and I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for recognising in drafting it that a significant number of factors should rightly preclude such notification from taking place. Nevertheless, I still think the amendment could threaten to undermine the capabilities that law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies rely on to pursue the most serious wrongdoers. The amendment recognises that notifying a person that they have been the subject of surveillance may have an immediate impact on an investigation—or it may have damaging effects on the public interest or national security more broadly.

That being the case, it is extremely difficult to envisage a scenario where notification could responsibly be allowed to occur. Notifying a person that their communications have been intercepted, irrespective of whether that notification included any further details about the methods used, would necessarily risk hindering a future investigation. For example, there will be circumstances where a terrorist or serious criminal who was previously the subject of a warrant will no longer be an active suspect in an investigation. Advising that individual that they have been the subject of interception may help them to evade detection if they were minded to return to or resume criminal activity.

On one reading, then, the amendment would not provide for disclosure other than where a person has been the subject of deliberate wrongdoing or a serious error. If that is the intention behind the amendment—and I fear it is not—it is redundant, because there is already provision in the Bill to notify people who have been the subject of serious errors.

The alternative, of course, is that the amendment should provide for individuals to be notified in a wider range of circumstances. I find that prospect troubling. As I say, it is never possible to know whether an individual will return to criminality in the future. Even if they do not, revealing the fact that they were the subject of a warrant may provide some small insight into the techniques and capabilities used by law enforcement and the security and intelligence agencies. That, in turn, would provide an avenue for the most determined and capable actors to piece together a picture of the agencies and how they work, handing an advantage to those we are working hard to pursue—let alone the prospect that they might seek disclosure by way of a review of the conduct of the authorities in order to determine exactly what methodology had been employed. For all these reasons, I hope the noble Lord will be prepared to withdraw this amendment.

I turn to Amendments 137B to 137F, which, as the noble Lord indicated, are in a sense consequential on his primary amendment, and which deal with error reporting as provided for in Clause 209. Clause 209 is of the utmost importance. It provides that if a person has been the subject of a serious error, and it would not be contrary to the public interest, the commissioner must inform that individual of the error and their right to apply to the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. The judicial commissioner must provide such details as considered necessary for the person to bring a claim.

Clause 209 seeks to maintain a very delicate balance between two important but competing interests. On one hand, there is the right of the individual who has suffered harm as a result of the error to seek some sort of redress. On the other, there is the long-standing security and intelligence agency principle of neither confirming nor denying that an individual has been the subject of investigatory powers. This principle is vital to the security and intelligence agencies, as it prevents those who would wish to do us harm launching spurious complaints and claims in order further to understand the agencies’ most sensitive capabilities. I hope the noble Lord will agree that, given the fine balance between these two principles, it is right that the decision be taken on a case-by-case basis by the commissioner, a senior member of the judiciary who will have full access to the facts on which to base their decision.

Amendments 137B and 137C would remove the commissioner’s discretion to make that judgment. He would no longer be able to consider how the wider public interest would be best served, and would instead be compelled to tell an individual if they had been the subject of a serious error, regardless of the consequences and the harm that might be caused. I do not think that is right. It is, for example, conceivable that an investigation into a dangerous criminal gang may result in action mistakenly being taken against an innocent associate of one of the gang members. That would be unfortunate, and the commissioner would undoubtedly want to ensure that remedial action was taken at an appropriate time. But before doing so, it is right that the commissioner should consider the public interest in informing the person, balanced against the risk of undermining an ongoing investigation, and that is what the clause as drafted provides for.

Amendment 137D seeks to require notification where the error has not caused serious harm or prejudice but may do so in the future. I do not think it necessary or appropriate, given the difficult balance that has to be struck here, for persons to be informed when there is such an error. This would put the commissioner in the difficult position of speculating on potential future consequences. Additionally, the commissioner does not get only one opportunity to assess the harm that has occurred. We would of course expect the commissioner to keep under review the consequences of an error and, if it resulted in harm at some point in the future, it would be open to the commissioner to inform the individual at that point. This seems a more sensible approach than putting the commissioner in the position of second-guessing what potential future consequences may one day occur or not occur.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 7th September 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend has very helpfully referred to the qualification of economic well-being as a justification by reference to national security and he rightly probed why it appears in that form. It gave me some satisfaction, in a sense, that it was qualified in this way because, in my years on the Intelligence and Security Committee, I occasionally thought that the concept of economic well-being was capable of extraordinarily wide interpretation. If it was being interpreted very widely in order to support actions which might in some way touch upon economic well-being, it is appropriate that it should be qualified if the powers engaged are sufficiently wide as potentially to affect the rights and liberties of other people. In this legislation we are talking about powers which can impinge upon the lives and liberties of other people unintentionally or not as part of the purpose but as a necessary consequence of being able to use things such as bulk datasets or equipment interference. Therefore, I hope that the reason that economic well-being is qualified by reference to national security is a recognition that some of the powers given in this Bill require particularly stringent qualification to be permissive and used. If that is so, I welcome it.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for making it clear that these are essentially probing amendments and I respond to them in that light. These amendments relate to the issuing, approval and modification of warrants under Parts 6 and 7 of the Bill.

Amendments 194J, 201B and 210B would remove from the Bill an important safeguard which requires that a bulk interception, acquisition or equipment interference warrant may be issued only if doing so is in the interest of national security. The Bill provides for a warrant under Part 6 to be issued where it is necessary on three statutory grounds: in the interests of national security; for the prevention and detection of serious crime; or in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom where those interests are also relevant to national security.

Clause 129(1)(b)(ii), Clause 146(1)(a)(ii) and Clause 164(1)(b)(ii), which these amendments seek to remove, ensure that one of those statutory grounds must always be national security. This is clearly an important safeguard which recognises the particular sensitivity of bulk powers and therefore limits their use to the most tightly drawn circumstances. In other words, the Bill says that a bulk warrant provided for in Part 6 of the Bill must have,

“in the interests of national security”,

as one of the statutory purposes to authorise collection. However, collection can also be authorised to prevent serious crime and to protect the economic well-being of the United Kingdom in addition to being authorised to protect national security.

The inclusion of the additional statutory grounds relating to serious crime and economic well-being remains vital. There will be circumstances where it is necessary and proportionate to select for examination data collected under a bulk warrant in order to, for example, prevent and detect serious crime, such as to detect and disrupt child sexual exploitation. However, the Bill ensures that the initial collection of data could be authorised only if doing so is necessary to protect national security, albeit that it may be necessary for one of the other two purposes that I have already described. In other words, there is a relationship between the statutory requirements for the bulk warrant and the operational purposes which will be specified in the same warrant application, some of which may relate to the prevention of serious crime or economic interest.

On that last point of economic interest, it has been asked how that can be distinguished from national security. In a sense, it is a matter of emphasis at the end of the day. The ISC looked at this in detail, and at the need to retain it as a statutory purpose in its own right. It took extensive evidence from the agencies and, indeed, from the Foreign Secretary. I believe that Dominic Grieve was the chair at that time. He made it clear during Report in the Commons that the ISC had been persuaded that there remained a need for safeguarding the UK’s economic well-being to continue to exist as a statutory purpose for the use of the investigatory powers in the Bill in their own right. Therefore, I accept that it is linked to national security but it is a matter of underlining the need to have in mind the cases in which economic well-being will be the prevailing factor.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

Monday 5th September 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith]

My Lords, these amendments address the fact that the fundamental principle in Clause 207 is very heavily qualified, even in cases where the error might be serious. I draw your Lordships’ attention to paragraph 5.42 of David Anderson’s report on bulk powers, in which he deals with errors. He rightly sets this in the context of a strong culture of compliance and self-reporting in the agencies when things go wrong. I agree with that, and it is right that we discuss it in that context. However, the fact remains that there are errors and, as the Minister pointed out, the statistics of errors are reported, so we know what they are. My concern is to be satisfied that most of these errors, if they impinge on the rights of a citizen, are notified to the citizen so that they know they can take further action.

I particularly draw attention to one case. David Anderson says in paragraph 5.42:

“In one very serious incident in 2014, an individual who deliberately undertook a number of unauthorised searches for related communications data had his employment terminated and vetting status withdrawn”.

That clearly indicates the point I made earlier: the agencies take this matter very seriously. I am interested in whether in that case the individual or individuals who may have been the victims of that improper use of the powers would be notified under the provisions of this clause, or whether the clause is so qualified that they might not be. Quite clearly, powers were abused by an individual acting without authority and wrongly, and the individual and the agency paid the price for doing so—he lost his job, which, from the limited description, seems entirely right. However, it is not clear whether the citizen, who had wrongly been the subject of this investigation, would know and would therefore be able to pursue his rights.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

Clearly, I am not in a position to comment on a particular case. However, in the context of what is said at paragraph 5.42, one has to remember that there is the further issue of whether it would have been in the public interest to make disclosure. That necessary test would have had to be met before there would have been disclosure, however serious the original breach.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

Monday 5th September 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beith (LD)]

My Lords, it is quite important that we get this right. As I think the noble Lord, Lord Murphy, will remember, one of the commissioners under the previous arrangements was found by the ISC to have been hopelessly inadequately provided with staff, to such an extent that there was a huge build-up of correspondence. That was some years ago and it took some effort by Members of our party as well as of his to ensure that that was quickly remedied.

I also have experience as a constituency Member of Parliament in dealing with an employee issue, the merits of which I will certainly not go into but which was not helped by its being unclear who the employer was. I am talking about somebody who was engaged in the office of one of the commissioners. So I am grateful to my noble friend for trying to make sure that we get this bit right.

[The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)]

My Lords, I turn first to Amendment 194ZA, regarding the provision of funds to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, and I note that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has referred to this as a probing amendment.

I entirely agree with what this amendment seeks to achieve. The Investigatory Powers Commissioner must be free to appoint whomever he or she thinks is right and proper and to arrange their office as they see fit. It is certainly true with the current independent commissioners that, although they receive their funding from the Secretary of State, they are free to employ whomever they think best suited for any role they have to fill.

It has always been the intention under the Bill that the commissioner should appoint whom they wish. However, I would not want to accept this amendment as drafted since it may preclude the Secretary of State providing non-monetary assistance to the IPC. I will consider further whether anything more should be done to put beyond doubt that the commissioner will have autonomy over the appointment of staff, but I hope I have made the intention absolutely clear in response to the request from the noble Baroness. On that basis, I invite her to withdraw the amendment.

On Amendment 194DA, it is certainly the case in practice that the president of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal is consulted before the budget allocated to the tribunal is settled. The tribunal then has sole responsibility for paying the salaries and expenses of the tribunal. This is a sensible way of doing things and ensures that the tribunal has sufficient funds to conduct its business. I see no reason for changing this practice.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Debate between Lord Beith and Lord Keen of Elie

Wednesday 13th July 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I will begin with that last point on Amendments 85A and 85B. The Government believe that the power is necessary for the reasons outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, but we are conscious of the terms of the report made by the Delegated Powers Committee. We are still reflecting on those comments and intend to respond in due course. I hope that that will give some satisfaction to the noble Lord. The matter is still under consideration and no final view has been arrived at.

I now turn back to the matter raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. By way of background, your Lordships will be aware that, last November, the Prime Minister announced additional protections for the communications of Members of Parliament and Members of other legislatures, including the Scottish Parliament and the assemblies. Clause 26 sets out the requirement for the Prime Minister to approve the Secretary of State’s decision to issue a warrant to acquire communications sent by a Member of Parliament or intended for a Member of Parliament. Again, I use the term “Member of Parliament” to embrace Members of the other legislative assemblies referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Murphy.

Amendment 43A would remove the role of the Secretary of State from the warrant authorisation process where the Wilson doctrine is engaged—I will come on to the Wilson doctrine in a moment—which would in fact reduce the safeguards for parliamentarians. In line with the commitment given by the Prime Minister last November, the Bill provides a triple lock where warrants concern a parliamentarian’s communications: they must be authorised by the Secretary of State, agreed by the Prime Minister and authorised by a judicial commissioner.

I will not rehearse again the arguments for the double lock at this point, but it is important to remember that it was endorsed by the Joint Committee of Parliament that scrutinised the draft Bill and that, following amendments made in the other place, it enjoyed cross-party support. The triple lock for parliamentarians simply adds an extra layer of checks to this important process. It is difficult to see what possible benefit would accrue from removing one of those checks—that is, the Secretary of State—which would also serve to undermine the accountability of the Secretary of State to Parliament for the activities of the agencies that the Secretary of State oversees. In view of that, I respectfully invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

Amendment 45 would provide a role for the First Minister of Scotland in approving warrants to acquire communications sent by or intended for a Member of the Scottish Parliament. However, we do not consider that it would be appropriate for the First Minister to have a role in approving a decision taken by the Secretary of State on what is a reserved matter.

As to the operation of serious crime warrants, which the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, might have had in mind, particularly in Scotland, it is of course for Scottish Ministers to determine what additional safeguards they wish to provide in relation to parliamentarians. That is a devolved matter within their competence, and the same may in due course apply in the context of the Welsh Assembly—or, indeed, any other assembly that is set up.

The effect of Amendment 44 would be to provide for the Prime Minister to inform the relevant legislature that such a warrant or warrants has or have been issued—a point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Beith. Noble Lords will be aware that the Wilson doctrine, as it is termed, followed from a statement made by the then Prime Minister that, as a general policy, there would be no tapping of MPs’ telephones—but that, if there was a need to make a change to this general policy, the Prime Minister would, at a time of his choosing and when the national security situation allowed, make a Statement in the House. That is what is encompassed within the Wilson doctrine.

In a Written Ministerial Statement last November, the Prime Minister again confirmed that the Wilson doctrine continued to apply. He went on to explain the Government’s position on the Wilson doctrine and how it would apply in the 21st century. In his Statement, the Prime Minister was clear that the Wilson doctrine does not place an absolute bar on the interception of parliamentarians’ communications and confirmed that he would be consulted should there ever be a requirement to target a parliamentarian under a warrant issued by a Secretary of State. As has been noted, particularly as a result of the changes in the other place, the Bill now goes further by providing that the Prime Minister must provide explicit authorisation for a warrant to target a parliamentarian’s communications.

I understand that every Administration since 1966 has confirmed that the Wilson doctrine remains in place. This Government have done so on numerous occasions in Parliament. The doctrine includes the Prime Minister’s commitment to inform the relevant legislature, at a time of his choosing and when national security allows, should there ever be a change to the general policy. There has been cross-party agreement on this issue for more than 50 years. In view of the Prime Minister’s statement, and the stringent safeguards in the Bill, which go further in statute than was previously provided for, no further statutory provision is considered necessary.

[Lord Beith]

Does that not make for a very limited interpretation of the Wilson doctrine? For the Prime Minister to have to come and make a Statement to the House, it would have to be, “It is now the Government’s policy to intercept the communications of MPs generally, or widely, and this represents a change in policy”. That is the only way I can understand the doctrine working in the way that the Minister described.

[Lord Keen of Elie]

I concur with the observation of the noble Lord. It would have to be a change to the general policy that prompted a Statement to Parliament. It is not the use of the statutory powers that will ever prompt a Statement to Parliament. Indeed, if a parliamentary Statement were required in those circumstances, it would essentially undermine the purpose of these investigatory powers.