Oral Answers to Questions

Lord Beith Excerpts

Tuesday 10th February 2015 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney-General]

I understand my hon. Friend’s point. Of course she is right that when the convention was originally drafted, it was precisely to deal with the most egregious examples of breaches of human rights across the world. That is what we have always supported, and we will continue to do so. What we do not support is the extension of that franchise to discussing things such as the insemination of prisoners in prison, and whether prisoners should be given the right to vote in British elections. That is in no way comparable to what my hon. Friend is discussing.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

Will the Attorney-General confirm that neither the repeal of the Human Rights Act nor a British Bill of Rights could in any way diminish Britain’s obligations under the European convention on human rights, or does he disagree with his predecessor on that point?

[The Attorney-General]

As I have said, there is no direct connection between what we decide to do on the Human Rights Act and what we decide to do in support of human rights, both nationally and internationally. We remain wholly committed to the preservation of human rights, both in this country and abroad. As for my predecessor, I think that he would wholeheartedly support that position.

Abortion Act

Lord Beith Excerpts

Wednesday 9th October 2013 Westminster Hall

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

In her distinguished medical career, did my hon. Friend think, at any time, that because she could be taken to the General Medical Council for a failing of practice, she was exempt from the law of the land on a matter such as this?

[Dr Wollaston]

Absolutely not, but I think that all right-thinking medical professionals, on viewing this form, would reject pre-signing it, and would find it completely abhorrent that someone could pre-sign it and allow an unnamed, undated form to be photocopied. That point is very important. We also saw the scale of this; it was happening at 14 locations, so it was not an isolated event.

The guidance from the BMA’s handbook of ethics and law, which my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate (Mr Burrowes) referred to, is also part of the problem. The guidance begins:

“The Association believes that it is normally unethical to terminate a pregnancy on the grounds of fetal sex alone except in cases of severe x-linked disorders.”

So far, so good. However, the guidance goes on to say:

“The pregnant woman’s views about the effect of the sex of the fetus on her situation and on her existing children should nevertheless be carefully considered. In some circumstances doctors may come to the conclusion that the effects are so severe as to provide legal and ethical justification for a termination. They should be prepared to justify the decision if challenged.”

That is wholly unacceptable. A woman may feel under huge pressure from her family to abort a fetus of the wrong sex, but doctors should not collude in the family’s point of view and assist in a termination just because the situation may be stressful for the woman. Rather, they should explore the reasons for that pressure with the woman and protect her from undue pressure from her family; they should certainly not just collude in such attitudes, which reinforce a misogynist point of view that daughters are of less value than sons. That harms not only women worldwide, but all societies where this practice is common, including the men in those societies. There is a straightforward, strong issue of equality here.

As has been said, there is no specific exclusion for gender-specific termination in certificate A. However, we have a precedent for such an exclusion in paragraph 11 of schedule 2 to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008, which refers to sex selection when embryos are implanted. The Act makes it clear that, other than in cases where we are trying to prevent a severe inherited medical condition, gender selection is unacceptable in the implantation of embryos. I wonder whether now is the time for an amendment to the Abortion Act to make that explicit and to put the issue beyond any doubt.

Another issue with certificate A is the wording of category A, which refers to the possibility that

“the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the pregnant woman greater than if the pregnancy were terminated”.

The statistics for maternal mortality for 2006-08 show that 107 women died from conditions directly related to pregnancy, whereas two women died as a result of complications following sepsis after the termination of a pregnancy. Will the Attorney-General clarify whether it would be possible, on a technicality, for any doctor to carry out any abortion on demand because of that difference? Technically, it could be argued that every abortion could satisfy section A of certificate A.

It is perhaps time for us to issue greater clarification of what would constitute unacceptable grounds. It is perhaps time for us to have a wider debate about that. As I said, I speak as someone who firmly believes in a woman’s right to access safe abortion, but not to access it on grounds that, in my view and the view, I think, of the vast majority of the public, would harm women’s rights and make misogynist attitudes more acceptable.

In a number of cases, we have seen that people have a natural tendency to shy away from awkward situations. We saw that in Rochdale, in different circumstances. When we drill down and look in greater detail at the possibility that gender selection is happening in this country, we see that, although there does not appear to be a distortion in the gender statistics overall, that could be the case in certain communities. We should not, therefore, take the view that these things are not happening in the UK, because they could well be, and we need to put the issue absolutely beyond doubt in law.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Attorney-General]

I am sure that my hon. Friend has had an opportunity to read the full note produced by the DPP. It sets out in detail, which I do not have time to go into this afternoon, the evidence in the case of each doctor presented to the CPS. My hon. Friend will appreciate that it is important that the evidence in each case is looked at separately. The DPP goes through it in detail and explains that the issue is not gender-specific abortion. If somebody says to a doctor without more ado, “I want an abortion on gender-specific grounds,” and the doctor says yes, the case might be a clear-cut matter to prosecute because the grounds fall clearly outside the ambit of the 1967 Act. The section of the Act with which we are concerned is about the physical and mental health of the woman. It is about good faith, in that it is for the doctor to satisfy themselves that any abortion falls within the criteria. If my hon. Friend looks at the matter in detail, he will see why the director came to the conclusion he did, which I will address, but in briefer terms.

The CPS concluded, with some difficulty, that there was just enough evidence available in the cases to bring the good faith of the doctors into issue. I think that the hon. Member for Islington South and Finsbury was wrong when she said in her final statement that the position had changed. The DPP’s statement of reasons says, nevertheless, that the evidence was not strong in either case and the prospects of conviction would not in his judgment have been high on the facts as they appeared. The matter does not rest there. Even in a case that just about passes the evidential threshold, the CPS is obliged to consider whether a prosecution would be in the public interest. That is one of the tasks that we require it to do. The fact that an evidential threshold is passed—a point raised in the debate—does not mean that a prosecution has to, or indeed should, follow.

The decision was that prosecution did not pass the public interest threshold. It is that aspect of the decision that raises wider issues of public policy, some of which we have debated today, which I accept are an entirely legitimate topic of debate. The issue, as I see it, is this. Because the law makes the difference between lawful and unlawful abortion subject to a medical test, doctors have to be able to carry out that test on a case-by-case basis according to proper medical standards of care, skill and judgment. That is, effectively, what the test of “good faith” in the 1967 Act means. Doctors are required by law to make such decisions to a proper professional standard. If a question arises about whether a doctor has done so in any given case, a law enforcement agency must look to approved medical practice for assistance in identifying the proper standard. The same thing applies in virtually every case involving professional standards. Dare I say it, it would apply even in the case of a plumber who carried out some work that led to a catastrophic outcome.

[Sir Alan Beith]

It would surely not be right in such circumstances merely to demonstrate that other plumbers engaged in conduct that did not meet professional standards, and no more would it of doctors.

[The Attorney-General]

I reassure my right hon. Friend that that is certainly not the case. Ultimately, in any case, the jury decides, not the experts. One would normally expect a jury to be given some indication of the professional standards expected in a profession—there may even be rival professional views about what the standards should be—in order to help it decide.

Such a problem might not arise in an extremely clear-cut case. We might imagine a case in which a doctor behaved in a way in which no reasonable practitioner would behave, for example by arranging a medical abortion for a patient about whom he or she knew nothing and whom he or she had never met or spoken to. In any other circumstances, however, the CPS would need, and would expect to be able, to refer to medical consensus to determine whether a proper professional approach had been taken.

When they are looked at in the kind of detail considered by the prosecutor, the cases that we are debating are not extreme ones in which the doctors behaved as no reasonable practitioner would behave. Complicating factors were raised by both the patients and the doctors, who subsequently had to take the decisions. There were, as we have discussed, no detailed professional rules or step-by-step guidelines telling doctors how to take such decisions; the matter was left to general professional standards and ethics. The CPS, therefore, had no detailed consensus to help it to evaluate the matter.

To prosecute would have been to ask a jury to decide what steps a doctor should take. Juries take difficult decisions robustly, and sometimes they have to find their way through conflicting medical evidence. Is it right or fair, however, to ask a jury to arbitrate on a question of medical standards and ethics on which the profession has not published a detailed consensus, and on which a great deal turns for both doctor and patient? The CPS concluded in the recent cases that it would be contrary to the public interest to proceed.

Those who have the relevant policy and professional responsibilities are, no doubt, reflecting on the conclusions to be drawn. The Under-Secretary of State for Health, my hon. Friend the Member for Battersea (Jane Ellison), is present for precisely that reason. As the House will appreciate, these are not my responsibilities.

Phone Hacking

Lord Beith Excerpts

Wednesday 6th July 2011 Commons Chamber

[Chris Bryant]

It pains me to say this as well, but the honest truth is that a lot of lies have been told to a lot of people. When police officers tell lies or at least half-truths to Ministers of the Crown so that Parliament ends up being misled, I think it amounts to a major constitutional issue for us to face. I hope that there will end up being a full investigation into that element and that we will come to the truth, but at the moment what hangs around is a very dirty smell. We need the Metropolitan police to be trusted—not just in London but across the whole of the United Kingdom. That is why we need to fight on this issue.

Did the reason that nothing happened have anything to do with the closeness between the Metropolitan police and the News of the World? After all, we know for a fact that Assistant Commissioner Andy Hayman, who was in charge of the investigation into the News of the World, now works for News International. We know that senior officers were wined and dined by senior News of the World executives at the very time, and occasionally on the very day, when they were making key decisions about whether any further investigation should proceed against that organisation. And we know that the News of the World paid police officers for information.

I say that categorically because, on 11 March 2003, in the Select Committee on Culture, Media and Sport, I asked Rebekah Wade, as she then was—Rebekah Brooks, as she now is—whether she had paid police officers for information. She said:

“We have paid the police for information in the past.”

I asked:

“And will you do it in the future?”

She replied: “It depends.” Andy Coulson, who was sitting next to her, said:

“We operate within the code and within the law and if there is a clear public interest then we will.”

I said:

“It is illegal for police officers to receive payments.”

Mr Coulson said:

“No. I just said, within the law.”

I do not believe that it is possible to pay police officers “within the law.” That is suborning police officers, it is corruption, and it should stop.

In April this year, Rebekah Brooks was asked by the Chairman of the Select Committee on Home Affairs to clarify exactly what she had meant. She replied:

“As can be seen from the transcript, I was responding to a specific line of questioning on how newspapers get information. My intention was simply to comment generally on the widely-held belief that payments had been made in the past to police officers. If, in doing so, I gave the impression that I had knowledge of any specific cases, I can assure you that this was not my intention.”

[Laughter.] I see that the Attorney-General himself is smiling.

Even more worryingly, as we discovered only last night, News International has handed over copies of documents that appear to show that former editor Andy Coulson authorised a series of payments to police officers running into tens of thousands of pounds. That is News International saying, “Yeah but no but yeah but…” . The truth is, however, that News International was doing it, and cannot be allowed to get away with it. I know that the News of the World seems to be hanging Andy Coulson out to dry, but surely the buck stops at the top, and that is the chief executive.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

I agree with what the hon. Gentleman is saying. Can we also agree that, in our handling of this matter, we must not for a moment prejudice the possibility of successful prosecutions of people who did these things?

[Chris Bryant]

As I shall try to prove in my next few remarks, I think that that is absolutely essential. My hope is that people who committed criminality at the News of the World will end up going to prison. The last thing I want is for the debate, or any inquiry, to hamper the police investigation or any possible prosecution. I agree with the right hon. Gentleman about that.

Dr David Kelly

Lord Beith Excerpts

Thursday 9th June 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney-General]

The hon. Gentleman will be the best judge of that. Professor Flanagan’s and Dr Shepherd’s reports will both be in the Library. I think they are written in pretty plain English. Clearly, they are also medically based, which is inevitable. In the schedule, I have used that material and other material to seek to set out each matter in slightly plainer terms. I think it is readily comprehensible, and I hope it will help to inform the public as well as Members of the House.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

Will the Attorney-General note that when, along with my Intelligence and Security Committee colleagues, I questioned Dr Kelly two days before he died, I formed the view that a very distinguished public servant was deeply distressed by the situation in which he had placed himself? Although I am wholly unpersuaded by any of the theories that have been put forward as an alternative to suicide, will the Attorney-General spell out what he thinks will be lost by allowing the process of inquiry to be completed by an inquest?

[The Attorney-General]

The first problem is that there is no basis on which the High Court could possibly order an inquest. In my judgment, if I were to go to the Court and make such an application, it would be dismissed, and dismissed with—I assume, on the basis of my reasoning—a certain amount of irritation, because such an application must be made on an evidential basis.

We have also held an inquiry. I make the point in the schedule that the suggestion that the inquiry was in some way inferior to an inquest, in the sense that it was unable to look at some of the things that an inquest could have looked at, really does not bear any reasoned—either logical or legal—examination. Therefore, in practical terms, the inquest—or something tantamount or equivalent to it—has already taken place. On top of that, a review has been carried out in the knowledge of public anxiety by eminent professionals, who have looked specifically at the anxieties that have been raised, either by the memorialists or others. In each case, they have said that the original findings were correct.

I should just make the point that there was one exception: the timing of death was reviewed, because the conclusion was reached that the tables that were used by the pathologist at the time—through no fault of that pathologist—were in fact not accurate. That is a question of the development of medical science. With that exception, nothing calls into question any of the detailed findings or comments that were made originally.

Injunctions

Lord Beith Excerpts

Monday 23rd May 2011 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney-General]

I would assume that across the House it would be considered that the abuse of parliamentary privilege to subvert court orders made with the express intention of implementing Parliament’s legislation through the courts is improper. Ultimately, however, that is a matter for this House and Mr Speaker to regulate, and it is through our own mechanisms that we do so; that is the right and privilege we have. I certainly agree with the hon. Gentleman that it is a privilege that must not be abused.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

We would expect a Joint Committee to uphold the necessary rights of Parliament and defend them, but would any Committee not also have to look at the separate question of whether it can be right for someone to use Twitter or electronic media of other kinds to place something in the public domain with the express intention of allowing it then to be reported?

[The Attorney-General]

The right hon. Gentleman raises an important point, but it ties in with the earlier point about how all this can be enforced. As I said earlier, however, those who take an idea that modern methods of communication mean that they can act with impunity may well find themselves in for a rude shock.

Voting by Prisoners

Lord Beith Excerpts

Thursday 10th February 2011 Commons Chamber

[Andrew Bridgen (North West Leicestershire) (Con)]

rose—

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

rose—

[Mr Davis]

If colleagues will forgive me, I am almost out of time.

So where do we go from here? If Parliament decides by a strong majority today, the Government will have to go back to the Court and tell it to think again, because it cannot deliver a third of its rulings. If this House will not provide a change in the law, it cannot deliver a change in the law. That will lead the Court to have to decide how it deals with this sort of crisis in future. Lord Justice Judge and Lady Justice Arden, and others, have predicted this crisis and pointed out that we need to have the right of recall, the right of review and the right of challenge. That is what should come out of this motion.

As my right hon. and learned Friend the Attorney-General was kind enough to intervene on me, I thought I would remind him that today is almost the anniversary of the day when he said the following words:

“The Government must allow a parliamentary debate which gives MPs the opportunity to insist on retaining our existing practice that convicted prisoners can't vote.”

I agreed with him then, and I agree with him now. The House should insist that this is our decision, and from this place we will not move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Charlie Elphicke (Dover) (Con)]

rose—

[Sir Alan Beith]

rose—

[Mr Straw]

I need to make progress, but I will give way to the right hon. Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) a bit later.

Rather, the problem has arisen because of the judicial activism of the Court in Strasbourg, which is widening its role not only beyond anything anticipated in the founding treaties but beyond anything anticipated by the subsequent active consent of all the state parties, including the UK.

In his major lecture two years ago, to which reference has already been made, Lord Hoffmann spelled out in eloquent detail the difficulties that the situation was causing, including for the UK judiciary. He said that the Strasbourg Court

“lacked constitutional legitimacy”

in intervening in matters

“on which Member States…have not surrendered their sovereign powers”.

He added well-founded criticism of the highly variable quality of its judges and administration.

Where the Court has given judgment against the UK in respect of fundamental human rights, successive Home Secretaries and UK Governments have readily complied, whether on specific cases, such as terrorist deportations, or on matters such as the need for proper regulation of phone-tapping and the intelligence agencies—and so has this House, whether or not it agreed with what the Court was saying, because we have voluntarily and readily accepted its jurisdiction.

[Sir Alan Beith]

Various states will from time to time think that the Court has overstepped its limits and taken too broad a view of its powers. Are they all entitled at any stage to disregard its judgments, and what does that mean for the convention?

[Mr Straw]

No, they are not, and I will come on to that. The fundamental distinction to be drawn is this: all of us, as I have just spelled out, are required to respect and observe decisions of the Court on fundamental human rights, because it was in respect of those that we and other countries signed up.

Ian Tomlinson

Lord Beith Excerpts

Monday 26th July 2010 Commons Chamber

[The Attorney-General]

I certainly endorse the hon. Lady’s final comment. Yes, and I hope I made it clear that there is something profoundly unsatisfactory about a conflict of evidence arising on facts and matters of this kind. Some matters the hon. Lady raises are not within my province, but there may well be some lessons to be learned, and as I indicated previously, this matter is at least not yet completely at an end. That having been said, prosecutors have to see that the law is observed, but they have to act within the law and on the evidence. They are constrained by that; indeed, that is one of their responsibilities and duties. The fact that the evidence ends up unsatisfactory and that the matter cannot therefore be taken any further does not mean that they have not done their job properly.

[Sir Alan Beith (Berwick-upon-Tweed) (LD)]

Does the Attorney-General accept that, whatever may be the normal practice, there was nothing to prevent the CPS from bringing a simple assault charge while other matters continued to be investigated? Does he also recognise that the urgency of creating a system of genuinely independent medical examiners, as recommended after the Shipman case and by the Justice Committee, is confirmed by aspects of this case?

[The Attorney-General]

The right hon. Gentleman raises the question of whether an assault charge could have been brought while the investigation continued. I say simply that it could have been. The difficulty that might have arisen is that if that assault charge had been taken to conclusion through the courts during the period of the investigation and subsequently the material on which a manslaughter charge could have been based became apparent, it might then have been impossible to proceed with the manslaughter charge. I do not think that that matter can simply be overlooked.

I did not fully respond to the point put by the hon. Member for Hackney North and Stoke Newington (Ms Abbott) about the timing. I simply say this: there was an IPCC inquiry first of all, which took some months. By the time the Crown Prosecution Service got the material in this case, time had already gone on a fair bit. In those circumstances, I do not take the view from what I have seen that the CPS was in any way dilatory in trying to bring this matter to a conclusion.