(10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, briefly, I support the amendments moved and spoken to in this group by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks. I spoke on this matter at Second Reading and agreed with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, said in his speech then.
The Committee may know that, along with others, including the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett of Maldon, I have put my name to later amendments that question the changes proposed by the Government to the Parole Board. In my view, those changes attack pretty fundamentally the independence of that board and allow the Secretary of State to interfere in these matters to an extent that affects the separation of powers. As a rule, I argue that it is never a good idea, however tempting for Governments, for the Executive to interfere with matters that should be the role of the judiciary. Taken as a whole, these changes are unnecessary and overcomplex, and will prove to be extremely costly.
Today, we are discussing the amendments so well put by the noble and learned Lord, who speaks with such huge authority; I am pleased to support them. They argue that the Upper Tribunal is entirely the wrong body to hear these cases. The Government would be well advised, with respect, to listen to him, and to remind themselves of the powerful speech made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, at Second Reading. It is not often that this House is privileged to have the support of the last two Lord Chief Justices on a matter that they are profoundly expert in. I ask the Minister, who is always very reasonable, to think very carefully about how powerful the case that has been made this afternoon is.
Of course, I strongly agree with the amendment spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Marks, on the necessity of a report from the Secretary of State on the implementation of these proposals, which I consider to be pretty disturbing on the whole. I ask the Minister, when he replies, to consider carefully where these amendments are coming from.
My Lords, I will speak with the leave of the Committee and with many apologies; I was delayed in a committee. Amendment 143A is a probing amendment to seek to understand whether the Secretary of State will issue guidance on these matters, and if so, what that guidance will include. The Prison Reform Trust is particularly concerned about this, being aware that an overturned release decision would be likely to undermine public confidence in the parole system and so on. I am sure that the Minister will want all the actors in the sector to understand how these arrangements are intended to work and how they can be scrutinised.
(12 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy name is to this amendment. The Minister in Committee referred to Clause 9 on exceptional case determination and said that guidance would make it clear that victims of trafficking would, or should, be able to benefit from those provisions. Tonight, we have heard that the Government will bring claims by victims of trafficking within scope, I assume, at Third Reading. We have not seen the detail and, like the noble and learned Baroness, I have been wondering about the issue of evidence about an individual being a victim of trafficking. I was very pleased about that—I suppose it is a provisional pleasure until one has seen the detail—although it raises the question of whether the government amendment is necessary, given Clause 9, and given what was said at the previous stage. I hope that does not sound ungrateful. If it is necessary, what about problems that we have not yet unpacked on Clause 9?
Amendment 69, as the noble and learned Baroness said, is relatively limited in its ambition. That is not a criticism at all. However, it made me start to think about the problems faced by trafficked people. The noble Lord, Lord Beecham, referred to children in schools from a particular background having problems. I have written down: education issues around childcare; benefits, obviously; immigration other than asylum; the associated costs; expert reports; interpretation; and the disbursements paid by a solicitor such as these. I know that the Minister may think that I am pushing my luck but, as I have said before, this country finds itself as the involuntary host to a number of people who have been trafficked and it has very particular responsibilities. Perhaps after tonight it might be possible to explore what the Government have in mind in this connection and how far assistance can be provided. I pray in aid the Government’s strategy which makes it entirely clear that improved victim identification and care is at the heart of our response to trafficking. I am very pleased to be able to support the amendment. I look forward to what may come at the next stage.
My Lords, we continue to support this theme of amendments. There were two in Committee moved by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. We supported them then and described them as powerful amendments. Amendment 69 remains a powerful amendment. We look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say. We hope and expect him to be sympathetic.
(12 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we absolutely support the noble and learned Baroness in her amendments in this group. Very few crimes engender more opprobrium or anger both within and between Governments than crimes involving human trafficking. It is dispiriting that even today the illegal trade of people in this form still exists and perhaps even flourishes.
As the noble and learned Baroness said, we should rightly be proud that the international community has worked together to promulgate the protocol to prevent, suppress and punish trafficking in persons, especially women and children, adopted by the United Nations in Palermo in 2000. I am proud again that nine years later our country ratified the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. The noble and learned Baroness quoted from part of that convention. The quote that I have is from Article 15 of that convention, to which she referred. She quoted from Article 12, I think, but Article 15.2 says:
“Each Party shall provide, in its internal law, for the right to legal assistance and to free legal aid for victims under the conditions provided by its internal law”.
It goes on at paragraph 4 to say:
“Each Party shall adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to guarantee compensation for victims in accordance with the conditions under its internal law, for instance through the establishment of a fund for victim compensation or measures or programmes aimed at social assistance and social integration of victims, which could be funded by the assets”—
and it goes on to describe those assets. It is a pity that the Government have, so far at least, shown a somewhat less generous view of their obligations.
The Government stated in their response to consultation on this matter:
“There will be instances in which the Convention”—
meaning the Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings —
“requires legal aid to be provided to victims of trafficking to fund their claims. However, we estimate that the volume of these cases is likely to be small and any obligation to provide legal aid will be met by the proposed new exceptional funding scheme that will provide legal aid where failure to do so would be likely to result in a breach of the individual’s rights to legal aid under the Human Rights Act 1998”.
The feeling around the Committee seems to be, and I very much share it, that that approach on this matter is unacceptable. Neither is it worthy of our legal system and our commitment to access to justice. It is not enough to rely on the Human Rights Act 1998 and say that anything that might not be in breach of it is somehow okay.
If legal aid is taken out of scope, it threatens to force victims of trafficking—acknowledged by the Government as some of the most vulnerable people in our country—to navigate an unfamiliar system in a language they may not understand, when they are almost certainly highly distressed and seeking legitimate redress against their persecutors. The noble and learned Baroness described the state of a number of those who had suffered in this way. To abandon them in the way that the Government intend, if this Bill were to go through unamended, for such small savings would be a violation of our positive obligations under the treaty and of our obligations under any sensible framework for deciding when the state should provide legal advice to those who need it.
If I use an unparliamentary expression, forgive me, but this amendment really should be a no-brainer. Victims of trafficking deserve not just our compassion and help, but that of the state when they require it. If we take the Government's own analytical framework for decisions on scope for legal aid, this would seem to be a group that perfectly fits the criterion of a,
“physically or emotionally vulnerable group”.
ILPA, the immigration lawyers’ association, described this group as a kind of paradigm of that criterion and I hope that the Committee would agree.
As far as the gateway to which the noble and learned Baroness referred in opening this short debate is concerned, it must always be remembered that the gateway is there only for matters that remain in scope. In any matters that come outside scope, the person who receives a phone call from a would-be client has to say, “I am sorry, this is not in scope”. Maybe they will give the name of some solicitor or other but they will not be able to take it further themselves, because the matter is out of scope. How horrific it would be if this matter became out of scope, so that even when a telephone call was made—and that is not the most satisfactory way of doing it—they could not be helped.
Secondly, some years ago the noble Baroness, Lady Young of Hornsey, who is not in her place and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, among others, came and saw me about an issue in a criminal justice Bill that was going through this House which involved this sort of vulnerable victim. They asked us to take some action in regard to it. It was not to do with legal aid or anything like that, but I mention it because we listened to what they had to say. The arguments then were powerful; they are very powerful tonight on behalf of this group. I very much hope that the noble and learned Lord will at least take this away, and consider whether the Government cannot make what would be generally received as a very acceptable concession, if concession is the word, to the present wording of the Bill. Given all the difficulties the Government have and the criteria they set down, I ask them to reconsider their approach to this group of people. These are very powerful amendments indeed.
My Lords, I wonder whether the noble Lord has had the professional experience that I have had, where somebody who is faced with a claim which may result in quite a hefty award of compensation or damages against him finds that his mind is quite concentrated. That in itself is a very significant deterrent to continuing in the business, and trafficking is a business.
(13 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I beg to move Amendment 233A on behalf of my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill. Reference has just been made to experts. I am not as expert as my noble friend, and I may get into trouble because I am not going to use all the briefing that he has given me.
Amendment 233A would exclude from Section 329 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 a constable in the course of his duty. That section is what noble Lords might know as the Tony Martin defence. It was enacted in response to the case of Tony Martin, who shot two intruders in his home thinking they were attempting a burglary. It provides that the court must give permission for an offender to bring a civil suit for an assault committed at the time and in the circumstances that the offender committed the act for which he was convicted. It provides the defendant with a defence to such proceedings provided that his action was not grossly disproportionate. The defendant must believe the offender was about to commit an offence, was in the course of committing one or had committed one and that his actions were necessary to defend himself or someone else, to protect or recover property, to prevent or stop the offence or to catch and secure the conviction of the offender.
At the time that the section was being debated, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Scotland of Asthal, said that the section,
“would strengthen the civil law to improve protection for victims of crime against civil claims for damages by offenders”.
She also said:
“It benefits third parties who are not the direct victim of the offence, but who may have intervened to protect the victim or deter the criminal”.—[Official Report, 11/11/03; cols. 1307-08.]
That was the only indication of the intended use of the section by those who are not direct victims of the crime.
In 2009, there was a case in the Court of Appeal: Anthony Adorian v The Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police. In his judgment, Lord Justice Sedley said:
“There is nothing on the face of the section or in its shoulder-note which manifests an intention to afford the police a novel protection from claims by offenders for objectively unreasonable or unnecessarily violent arrests”.
Only police defendants have invoked this section. Lord Justice Sedley went on to say:
“The consequences should not go unnoticed. In place of the principle painstakingly established in the course of two centuries and more, and fundamental to the civil rights enjoyed by the people of this country—that an arrest must be objectively justified and that no more force may be used in effecting it than is reasonably necessary—the section gives immunity from civil suits, not confined to those involving personal injury, to constables who make arrests on entirely unreasonable grounds, so long as they are not acting in bad faith, and accords them impunity for using all but grossly disproportionate force in so doing”.
In summary, Section 329 has only ever been used by the police, and my noble friend tells me that it has led to a mismatch between civil and criminal proceedings with no equality of arms between police and private individuals. The current position does not recognise that the police are public officers of the state endowed with special powers and that as a corollary they have special obligations that Section 329 allows them to circumvent. My noble friend says that ordinary people may be given some leeway for honest and instinct overreactions when protecting or defending themselves or another from a crime but, on the other hand, a police officer trained in the use of force must be required to justify his or her actions objectively and to use no more force than is reasonably necessary.
I had not appreciated until listening to the previous debate how neatly this followed on in some ways. My noble friend Lord Lester has tabled this amendment and as he is not able to be here this afternoon he asked me to move it.
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, on having picked up this point so well from her noble friend Lord Lester. I congratulate him too on putting down this amendment. I hope he will forgive me in his absence for describing him in this instance as a dog with a bone. He has come back to this issue today after first raising it following the judgment in the case that the noble Baroness referred to when the previous Government were in power. He did that in the course of a couple of Bills. At that stage Ministers, including me, I have to admit, had to tell the noble Lord, Lord Lester, that consultations would take place with the police.
There is undoubtedly a point here—the noble Baroness has described it very well. This particular section of the 2003 Act was clearly intended as some sort of response to the Martin case and the Act’s purpose was really intended, or so it said, for other citizens as opposed to the police. There is some sort of at least theoretical clash, as Lord Justice Sedley pointed out in the instant case, between the position of police officers and others on arrests, so it does require an answer from Government.
We said on 25 February 2010—it was me, I am afraid to say—that the consultation that we had said would take place had not taken place by that date. But of course the noble Baroness will know that her Government have now been in power for a good 13 months now—it is 15 or 16 months since I uttered those words—and I am quite sure this consultation will have taken place regardless of government. I therefore look forward to hearing her response to this small but quite important point about the 2003 Act. I presume the consultation has taken place and the Government will be able to tell us what they intend to do about the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lester.
My Lords, it falls to me to answer this debate. I have to say that I am not fully briefed on whether or not the consultation has taken place. I suspect there was a little bit of irony there from the noble Lord, Lord Bach, and his confidence that this will automatically take place regardless of changes in government, but I will write to him to inform him about how far it has got.
We are talking of course about Section 329 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The intention was to benefit victims of crime, together with third parties who are not the direct victim of the offence but who may have intervened to protect the victim or deter the criminal. We are aware that it has so far been invoked only in respect of damages claims by police rather than by others who have sought to rely on the provisions as a defence in a number of cases. As noble Lords have mentioned, Lord Justice Sedley, in the case of Adorian v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, made a number of criticisms.
Section 329 of the 2003 Act is not a licence for the police to use disproportionate force as under the criminal law. The police can use only reasonable force. Neither does the section affect the criminal liability of householders, victims and others. Let us also keep in mind that the section applies only when the offender has been convicted of an imprisonable offence committed on the same occasion as the incident he is now suing for.
With these points in mind, this amendment raises a number of issues. First, is it fair and reasonable under general law to treat a person who holds the office of constable less advantageously than any other member of the public? Secondly, we should be very clear on what the practical consequences will be before making an amendment which would result in making it easier for a convicted offender to sue the police for damages. Thirdly, we need to be a little clearer on how this amendment might work, given that the powers of constables apply 24 hours a day, seven days a week. An off-duty constable who exercises this power to arrest a suspect found breaking into his own private dwelling or a neighbour’s dwelling would still be acting in the course of his or her duty. We also need to consider how the amendment would apply to special constables or others who are lawfully employed to prevent crime.
We note the thrust of the comments in the Adorian case and that the application of Section 329 to the police was not expressly discussed in Hansard at the time that that legislation was passing through Parliament. However, we are currently unconvinced that for the police to invoke Section 329 is really an unintended consequence of that section. Arguably, the police are the people most likely to rely on a provision which restricts liability towards a person who is committing a criminal offence at the time. The reference in Section 329(5)(b) to the defendant believing that his act was necessary to,
“apprehend, or secure the conviction, of the claimant after he had committed an offence”,
might suggest that it was not so very far from Parliament’s contemplation that the police could seek to invoke this provision. But what matters is whether it is right, fair and proportionate for this protection to apply to constables.
I am afraid that as yet we remain unconvinced that the provisions in Section 329 are not right, fair and proportionate in their application to the police. Therefore, we remain unconvinced that they require amendment as the noble Lord suggests. In particular, we cannot see any reason why the civil liability of a victim and a constable who act jointly on the same occasion, or act as individuals on separate occasions, to resist and detain the convicted offender should not be subject to the same threshold.
Nevertheless, as this amendment raises important issues relating to the role and powers of the police, and given that the noble Lord has been patiently pursuing this matter for some time, I can give the noble Lord and the noble Baroness on his behalf the assurance that this Government, while bearing in mind other government priorities, will take one final look at this matter before the next stage. On that basis, I hope that the noble Baroness feels able to withdraw this amendment.
My Lords, my noble friend may be a dog with a bone, but he is quite a pedigree sort of dog. Clearly, the noble Lord as an outgoing Minister did not leave a letter on his desk for his successor, so we have no amendments.
My noble friend has made a number of detailed points on the amendment, which I understand. I am prepared now to undergo a seminar by my noble friend when he has read Hansard but the important point is that the Government have acknowledged that this amendment is deserving of some thought. I am grateful for that and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(14 years, 1 month ago)
Grand CommitteeIt is important to mention that the noble Lord has just used the word “convenient”. I am sure that he would like to confirm to the Grand Committee that he is not suggesting that there would be any detriment to security by losing this scheme.
I think that there might be some advantages for security in this scheme, and I would like to know the Government’s view on that. From the exchanges I have been reading from, it seems that there may well have been some advantages so far as security is concerned. Indeed, I am reminded that Mr Fazackerley was asked a question by the honourable David Simpson:
“On a point of clarification, Mr Green asked Mike—
I presume that is Mr Fazackerley. I do not think that we would call an expert witness by their Christian name in this House, but perhaps I am being old-fashioned—
“a question about the fact that it takes eight to 12 weeks to carry out the security side of the process, but if a card is lost or misplaced, it can be replaced within 24 hours. Did you say that no further security checks were carried out?”.
Mr Fazackerley answered by saying:
“At that point. The benefit that we got from the system was that you were absolutely sure that the person who was standing in the pass office was the right person”. —[Official Report, Commons Public Bill Committee, 29/6/10; col. 28.]
Whether what he said about the issue goes to the question of security or not is a matter for the Committee to decide.
I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate: my noble friend Lord Brett, with his expert knowledge of systems at airports; the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, for the points that he made; and, of course, the Minister, for her response. This proposal does not depend on whether it, in the end, improves airport security or not. We certainly think that it cannot do any harm, to put it at its mildest, and probably has some positive effects. Obviously, on its own, an ID card system of this kind is nowhere near enough; of course there has to be continued checking, as the noble Baroness said in her response. We accept all that. I am not sure that her point about a philosophical difference between the two sides carries very much water. We are arguing that you can put security on one side, if you want, for the moment; we are talking about an attempt to save hard-pressed businesses costs and a degree of effort that they do not otherwise have to use. This is a very important industry for this country, and if anything can help to save legitimate costs, expenditure and time, I would argue that it is the duty of government to look carefully at it.
What is Amendment 5 intended to do? It states that the trial should continue for a longer period and that, at the end of it, the Secretary of State shall lay before both Houses of Parliament a report on,
“the outcome of the trial use of ID cards for airside workers”,
and,
“the measures the Secretary of State proposes to implement arising from it”.
It obviously does not find favour with the Government, but I would be interested to know what they intend to do with the information that has been gleaned from the six months of the trial. As the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, said, no doubt there were some benefits to be gained and it would be useful for the future to know what they might be.
I find it difficult to understand how that could possibly cost £100,000, bearing in mind that the cards have already been given out free. What would be the costs of carrying on the trial? I find that hard to understand.
As the noble Lord said, there may be lessons to be learnt, and I, too, should be interested to know them. He described what the new clause does. I think that I am right to say that, implicitly, it requires the continuance of the register until the end of the process described here. It seems to me that that must follow. The noble Lord has not referred to it, but the two go so closely hand in hand that I assume that that is the case. Perhaps he could confirm that or correct me.
I am not sure whether the register would have to continue or not. The data would continue to be collected and we would see at the end of the period whether the trial had made life easier and more secure for those who have to run our airports. I take the noble Baroness's point; I know that it is an essential part of the Government's case that the register should be closed at the earliest possible moment. I suggest that the effect of having an identity card as passport might be to make it possible to get the information that would be of assistance.
I see that the Government are not attracted by the wording of the amendment. I am very grateful to the noble Baroness for her response, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.