School Trips: Passport and Visa Requirements

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Wednesday 2nd February 2022 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the consequences of current passport and visa requirements on the number of school trips from continental Europe to the United Kingdom.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I beg leave to answer the Question in my name on the Order Paper.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I think that the noble Lord wants to ask the Question. Before he does so, perhaps I may say to the House that yesterday I was quite insistent that not only had I sent out a letter to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, but that the whole Committee had had a copy of it. I had cleared the letter but it had not gone out. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for alerting me to that this morning and I apologise unreservedly to the Committee and the House.

We no longer accept national identity cards as a valid travel document from EU, EEA and Swiss visitors to the UK. The experience at the UK border since the change has been positive, with EU, EEA and Swiss citizens making the switch to use their passports for travel. We do not plan to change that approach.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

Around 1 million European children, mostly from France and Germany, used to come to the UK each year on school trips. Now that people need passports and, in some cases, visas, bookings for the UK are widely reported to have collapsed. Ireland and even Normandy are stepping in. Will the Government either bring back ID card travel for these low-risk groups or devise a simple group travel scheme that will let us welcome them to this country?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, it is quite early in the implementation to say just which way overall bookings are going but certainly Ireland is reporting positively on this. Of course, there are in existence such things as collective group passports, although they will decline over time. However, we do not plan to bring ID cards back and it is important that we have secure documents such as passports at the border.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 27th January 2022 Lords Chamber

It is not often that life gives you the chance to go back, start again and get it right the second time around. This is one of those cases and I urge noble Lords in all parts of the House to seize it.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I shall speak to oppose the Question that Clause 9 stand part and to my Amendment 28, with my thanks to noble Lords from four different parties who have added their names. Unlike Amendments 27, 29 and 30 to 32, my proposals would not affect the grounds on which citizenship can be withdrawn, though, in partial sympathy with those amendments, and subject to hearing the Minister, I suspect that the current “conducive to the public good” criterion, introduced in 2006, as the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, has just said, is broader than it needs to be.

My stand part amendment gives effect to proposals of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and your Lordships’ Constitution Committee. Grateful as I am to the Minister for her letter on Clause 9—and I really am—it does not allay my profound concerns about a new power to remove a person’s citizenship not just without giving reasons, but without ever having to tell them that you have done so.

I would like first to probe rather further the need for Clause 9, by which I mean the practical need rather than the theoretical points set out in the letter. A Written Question in my name of 5 January asked in how many cases the need to give prior notification had prevented use of the deprivation power. The Minister replied:

“Prior to the recent High Court decision in the case of D4 ... there had been no cases where the notification requirement had prevented deprivation action from taking place.”


That is an interesting admission. For a short period between August 2018 and July 2021, the Government thought they had the power to notify by merely entering a note on the subject’s Home Office file, a route which the High Court and now the Court of Appeal have declared in the D4 case to be outside the statutory requirement that a person be given written notice.

The Minister’s answer shows that not only during this period but before it, when the Government did not claim to be able to notify simply by “putting the document in a drawer”, as Lord Justice Baker put it yesterday in the Court of Appeal, there were no cases in which the requirement to give notice prevented them removing citizenship. That is perhaps not surprising, since it is enough under the existing rules, which are very broad, for notice to be sent by post or email to the person’s last known address, or to a parent, or to the parent’s last known address.

What of the one exception, the case of D4? Her own lawyers told the High Court that her whereabouts in a Syrian camp were known to the Government at the time of deprivation—government agencies had been there to talk to her daughter—and that her family continued to live at her previous address in England. If that is right, the problem was not that the ordinary rules were inadequate but that the Home Office sought to use a procedure that turned out to be unlawful. The case for Clause 9, therefore, even in a case such as that of D4, has yet to be made. I urge the Minister to remedy that defect, if she can.

I question, secondly, the scope of application of Clause 9. Amendments 25 and 26 from the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, would remove some of the alternative grounds on which notice can be withheld. However, with great respect, they do not address the ground that is so broad as to make the others almost redundant: the power to withhold notice whenever it appears to the Secretary of State that this is in the public interest. With or without the noble Baroness’s amendments, Clause 9 permits notice to be withheld even when notification would be perfectly feasible and when no national security concerns are in play. Its effect would be to give the Home Secretary the simple option of telling people or not, as she pleases.

The Home Office has suggested, on social media, that the power would be used only in exceptional circumstances, or only if other means of service are not practicable, or in cases of a threat to national security. If that is the case, it should say so in the Bill. Tweets and videos do not bind current Home Secretaries, let alone future ones—neither, so far as the courts are concerned, do statements from the Dispatch Box. I say to the Minister: please put it in the law.

Thirdly, there is a remarkable absence of safeguards, even by comparison with the two countries I have found whose Parliaments have been prepared to give Ministers a power to withhold notice of citizenship removal: Australia and New Zealand. In Australia, the power to withhold notice applies only to deprivations on national security grounds, and only if the giving of notice would harm security, defence, international relations or law enforcement. There are no such limitations here—and there is accountability: the Minister must regularly table a report to Parliament on his use of the power and brief the Australian Intelligence and Security Committee in writing as soon as practicable after doing so. The Australian equivalent of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, the even more indigestibly titled Independent National Security Legislation Monitor, has a standing own-motion power to review citizenship deprivation laws, something that successive Home Secretaries have refused to permit here. The withholding of notice must be reviewed by the Minister personally every 90 days, and cannot be extended indefinitely, as Clause 9 proposes, keeping the subject in the dark and rendering nugatory his right of appeal. The previous Australian independent monitor, the former military lawyer, James Renwick SC, has proposed that notice should be given as soon as reasonably practicable and always within six months of the deprivation.

New Zealand has in place a stronger safeguard still. If the Minister wishes to dispense with notice, she must apply to the High Court and, if the High Court accepts her application, it will then carry out a full merits review of the decision to deprive. Prior judicial authorisation is hardly alien to our national security culture: we apply it to TPIMs, temporary exclusion orders and a whole range of intrusive surveillance powers. Why should it not apply to this most life-changing of executive measures—the cutting of the bond between citizen and nation?

My Amendment 28 would subject the citizenship removal power on “conducive” grounds to annual review, like the other powers used to combat terrorism. The current triennial review applies only to citizenship removal resulting in statelessness, as provided for by the Immigration Act 2014—removals which, one would hope, are unlikely ever to be more than a tiny proportion of the total.

Why? A recent Written Answer said there had been 14 citizenship deprivations on conducive grounds in 2016, rising to 104 in 2017 and falling back to 21 in 2018. No further breakdown, I was told, could be provided. Why the variation? Why the huge number in 2017, and why has there still been no publication of the figures for 2019, 2020 or 2021? A security cleared independent reviewer—why not the one we already have?—needs to be able to ask those questions, hold feet to the fire and report regularly to Parliament. How else are we to know what is going on in our name?

Nationality and Borders Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 5th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I shall concentrate on the subject that I know best because I reviewed it for the Home Office in 2016: the deprivation of citizenship, covered in that late addition to the Bill, Clause 9. The phrase has a Cold War feel to it: we think of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, deprived of his citizenship by the USSR. But it is really a version of the ancient practice of banishment—likened by Voltaire, himself exiled to England as a young man, to

“throwing into a neighbour’s field the stones that incommode us in our own.”

The tightly drawn powers to remove citizenship under the British Nationality Acts, including for disloyalty or disaffection towards Her Majesty, were not used in the 30 years prior to the war on terror, but thresholds were reduced in 2003 and 2006 to the point where today, Ministers need be satisfied not that someone is a terrorist or a traitor but only that their removal would be

“conducive to the public good”.

In 2014, a further power was taken to render naturalised British citizens stateless, if the Home Secretary was additionally satisfied both that their conduct was seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom and—a concession made in response to concerns expressed in your Lordships’ House—that they were eligible for citizenship elsewhere.

Removal of citizenship is now relatively common. The factsheet for the Bill on this matter tells us that the power to deprive people of their citizenship on “conducive to the public good” grounds was exercised around 170 times between 2010 and 2018. Clause 9 does not alter the criteria for removal of citizenship but effectively makes it optional, rather than mandatory, to notify the subject of their change in status. A more limited attempt to achieve this, which deemed notice to have been given by the entry of a note on the subject’s Home Office file, was made in a statutory instrument of 2018 that passed unremarked through Parliament but was held last July in the case of D4 to be ultra vires of the Act. At least this time around we have a power of amendment.

With Committee stage in mind, I ask the Minister six questions which I would be happy to have answered in writing. First, why is such a power needed at all? The existing rules allow subjects or their parents to be notified by post or email at their last known address, at home or abroad. Have there been cases—and if so, how many—in which even this basic information is not known?

Secondly, if it is necessary to remove citizenship without notice, why is the prior permission of a judge not required—the safeguard that applies to more transient measures such as TPIMs and, formerly, control orders?

Thirdly, why are the circumstances in which notice may be dispensed with so extraordinarily broad, even by comparison with the rules that were struck down in July? Clause 9 allows notice to be withheld even when up-to-date contact details are available, when it is practicable to give notice, and when no considerations arise of national security or foreign relations. The Secretary of State does not even have to try to give notice: she must only believe that dispensing with notice is “in the public interest”. Hints of future ministerial restraint of the sort that the Home Office has been energetically tweeting during this debate have no basis in this clause and are no substitute for properly defined laws.

Fourthly, where is the provision to require notification after the event? What reason could there possibly be for not informing somebody within days, weeks or months of such a potentially cataclysmic event as the removal of their citizenship—especially when it is their only citizenship?

Fifthly, when does the time to appeal begin to run? You cannot appeal a decision you have not been told of, but once you do find out, is your appeal said to be time-barred?

Sixthly, why are courts restrained, retrospectively, from treating a deprivation order as invalid for failure to comply with such notification requirements as still remain?

There is already apprehension, especially and understandably among people of mixed heritage, about this country’s unusually far-reaching powers to remove citizenship. The proposal to allow the use of those largely unmonitored powers to be kept secret, even from a subject who could perfectly easily be told, has predictably compounded those fears.

Clause 9 has been insufficiently thought through; at least, I hope that is the explanation. We can, and must, do much better.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (Continuation) Order 2021

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Tuesday 30th November 2021 Grand Committee

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, here we are again: the five-yearly renewal of the TPIM scheme, which has been in place since 2006. I oppose these restrictive measures, which are an extrajudicial way of interfering with the rights and liberties of people who cannot be convicted of any crime.

I am curious to know whether the Home Office has explained to the Prime Minister that it is doing this. I ask because, while MP for Henley in 2005, Boris Johnson wrote of the Act in his Telegraph article of 10 March:

“It is a cynical attempt to pander to the many who”—


forgive my language here—

“think the world would be a better place if dangerous folk with dusky skins were just slammed away, and never mind a judicial proceeding; and, given the strength of this belief among good Tory folk, it is heroic of the Tories to oppose the Bill. We do so because the removal of this ancient freedom is not only unnecessary, but it is also a victory for terror.”

I hope that the Minister will at least pass this back to the Home Office to make sure that the Prime Minister is happy with this renewal. It must be so difficult for Ministers to do anything without Boris Johnson having opposed it somewhere at some point in the past; there is always an article somewhere that one can track down. Our Prime Minister is so very often so wrong, but on this rare occasion he was so right: it is heroic to oppose these measures, and the Greens in your Lordships’ House will register their opposition every five years when this continuation order comes round. I actually hope this will be the last time.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

As Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation in 2016, I had no hesitation in recommending the second renewal of TPIMs in that year. I share the Government’s view that TPIMs, although they involve a particularly severe deprivation of liberty and intrusion into private life, may be an appropriate tool for dealing with a small number of individuals who are believed to endanger the public but whom it is feasible neither to prosecute nor to deport.

However, close scrutiny of TPIMs is important, all the more so since the maximum duration of a TPIM was significantly increased by the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Act 2021. I am here to raise with the Minister one concerning development that has arisen since my time as independent reviewer: the refusal of legal aid to TPIM suspects who cannot afford to progress the automatic review of each TPIM that is provided for in Section 9 of the TPIM Act 2011.

Jonathan Hall QC, the current independent reviewer, reported to the Government in November 2020 that, in the previous year, three subjects of so-called light-touch TPIMs, known as JD, HB and HC, requested the court to discontinue the reviews in their cases and that

“the absence of funding was a factor”.

In each case, they had been refused legal aid. The independent reviewer’s report, published in March 2021, recommended that, subject of course to means, legal funding should swiftly be made available to TPIM subjects for the purpose of participating in Section 9 review hearings. Mr Hall informed me this afternoon that, more than eight months after publication, there has still been no response from the Home Office to this recommendation. Can the Minister say when a response will be provided?

In the hope that it may influence the substance of any response, which, I might add, I do not expect today, I shall make four points. First, on 12 October 2020, the Government wrote to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, defending the TPIM regime on the basis that, among other things,

“all TPIM subjects have an automatic right to have a court review the imposition of their TPIM and each of the measures imposed. This hearing also provides an opportunity for the subject to hear the national security case against them.”

I assume that in the last sentence the reference is to the gist of the national security case, which is now provided to the TPIM subject. It is plain from what I have said, and from what the independent reviewer has said, that there is, in reality, no automatic right to review and that there will be no such right for as long as legal aid is refused to TPIM subjects on grounds other than means.

Secondly, it would be unacceptable if funding were to be denied because of a misapprehension that a Section 9 review is a form of challenge that requires a TPIM subject to establish reasonable prospects of success. As the independent reviewer explains in his report, Section 9 review was designed not as an add-on but as an integral part of every TPIM. Furthermore, it is not feasible to apply a merits criterion to the grant of legal aid, because the requirements of national security mean that TPIM subjects do not know, and will never be told, the full reasons for the Secretary of State’s decision to impose a TPIM.

Thirdly, if the aim is to save money or a desire to avoid giving money to lawyers for suspected terrorists, that aim is not only misguided but likely to be counterproductive. The legal aid issue affects very few cases—just three in 2019, as I indicated—but is bound eventually to lead to prolonged litigation about the fairness of proceedings.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Lords Hansard - part two & Committee stage
Wednesday 27th October 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)]

My Lords, I put my name to Amendment 106A, which the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has just introduced thoroughly and persuasively. Although I have sat as a part-time judge in crime for many years now, I freely admit that I do not have the depth of background in this field of other noble Lords, not least the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, who I see in his place. Nevertheless, I am inclined to support this amendment for three reasons, on which I hope the Minister might comment.

First, as I understand it, the amendment simply seeks to extend to third-party material the safeguards that have already been agreed by the Government in relation to data in the possession of the victim. Do the Government share that understanding? If they do not accept that the same protections are appropriate in those two situations, could the Minister explain why?

Secondly, the Victims’ Commissioner asserts in her detailed briefing that it has become “routine” for rape complainants to be asked to hand over excessive personal information, including third-party material. She cites, among other things, a CPS internal report reported in the Guardian in March 2020 to the effect that 65% of rape cases referred by police to the CPS for early investigation advice involved disproportionate and unnecessary requests for information. She quotes officers from Northumbria Police as saying that third-party material is a “real bone of contention” and:

“The CPS routinely ask us to obtain peoples 3rd party, medical, counselling and phone records regardless of whether a legitimate line of enquiry exists or not.”


Is that a picture the Government consider to be accurate?

Thirdly, it is said that this amendment has the full support of the National Police Chiefs’ Council lead for disclosure and of the Information Commissioner. That prompts me to wonder about the position of the Crown Prosecution Service, which seems equally relevant. Does the CPS take a different view from the policing lead and the Information Commissioner and, if so, how does it defend that view? I am sure that other noble Lords, like me, appreciate the difficulty of the task of the CPS and would give it a fair hearing. In summary, the Government seem to have a case to answer on Amendment 106A and I look forward to hearing from the Minister what that answer might be.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly on my own behalf and that of my noble friend Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, who is unable to be with us this evening. My noble friend attached her name to Amendments 79, 89 and 107. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has given us a very clear and complete explanation, so I just want to reflect on the average age of noble Lords, as we sometimes do. We really have to work quite hard to understand the way in which people’s lives are entirely contained in their phones, particularly younger people, and what an invasion it is to have that taken away.

The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, referred in particular to Amendment 107 and the situation of immigration officers. I have heard a number of accounts of what has been happening to people arriving, particularly from Calais and surrounding areas, on boats in the most difficult and fearful situations. For people who wish to contact family and friends to say they are safe or wish to make some kind of plan for the future, to lose their phone in those situations or have it taken away is very difficult.

We have not had an introduction to Amendment 103, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, to which I have attached my name. We have had expressions of concern from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, and we really would like to hear from the Minister the justification for that. By oversight, I failed to attach my name to Amendment 104. As a former newspaper editor, I think we really need to get a very clear explanation of how confidential journalistic material could be covered under these circumstances. We have grave concerns about freedom and the rule of law in our society, and this is a particularly disturbing clause.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments & Ping Pong (Hansard) & Ping Pong (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 9th February 2021 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Alderdice) (LD)]

The noble Baroness, Lady Massey of Darwen, has withdrawn so I call the next speaker, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I shall speak to Motions A, C and E on the basis that each of them relates in some way to an earlier amendment in my name.

Motion A concerns Amendment 1, which I originally moved in Committee. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, I would have preferred the requirement that belief be reasonable to have been included in the Bill. However, I welcome the fact that it will at least now be plainly stated in the code of practice at paragraphs 3.10 and 6.4 in terms that improve significantly on the earlier suggested amendment—memorably described by my noble and learned friend Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd as the “worst of both worlds”. The new paragraphs will say plainly that

“the person granting the authorisation must hold a reasonable belief that the authorisation is necessary and proportionate.”

Something similar has been said from the Dispatch Box, but authorising officers will perhaps have the code of practice more readily to hand than the Official Report. I welcome the new wording and, like the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—who, with the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, took over this amendment on Report—I do not oppose Motion A.

I turn to Motion C on the availability of compensation for the victims of authorised crimes. Lords Amendment 3, which your Lordships passed on Report by a majority of 91, provided that there was no bar to the criminal injuries compensation schemes in Great Britain and Northern Ireland being available to victims of authorised crimes. Without such a clause, it was at least possible that Section 27 of RIPA, which renders authorised activity lawful for all purposes, would have prevented such recourse. The Commons rejected that amendment, with the stated basis being that it was

“inappropriate to create an exception to the effect of criminal conduct authorisations.”

I am pleased that the Government have thought again. Their new clause is, so far as I can see, simply a competently drafted version of mine. It will mean that, should an act of violence ever be authorised, the innocent victim will not be disqualified from compensation by the fact that the perpetrator was a CHIS. It improves the Bill in a specific but potentially significant way.

Finally, Motion E originates in an amendment from my noble and learned friend Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. That amendment would have improved my own Amendment 5 on real-time notification, which now constitutes Clause 3 of the Bill, by underlining what I believe in any event would be the practical reality: that the disapproval of a judicial commissioner will normally result in the cessation of all further activities undertaken pursuant to an authorisation. My noble and learned friend’s amendment was not agreed to in the other place, but he has negotiated in its place an acceptable alternative in the form of an amendment to the code of practice. It begins:

“Where a judicial commissioner makes observations in relation to a notification, it is for the authorising officer to determine what action should be taken”—


not whether any action should be taken, but what action should be taken, which implies that some action will be taken.

IPCO must then be informed of that action as soon as reasonably practicable, and the Investigatory Powers Commissioner retains full discretion to take what further steps may be thought appropriate—including, as the Minister expressly confirmed on Report, passing the file on to the Director of Public Prosecutions or his equivalent in Scotland and Northern Ireland. As the Minister clarified on 11 January, at cols. 497-98 of the Official Report of your Lordships’ House, if the authorisation is determined not to have met the statutory requirements of necessity and proportionality, nothing in this Bill or in RIPA itself prevents the prosecution either of those responsible for authorising the crime or of the person who committed it.

The consequences for anyone who has unlawfully issued a criminal conduct authorisation are therefore real and give the lie to any suggestion that the real-time notification procedure is without teeth. Successive Investigatory Powers Commissioners have been among our highest-ranking and most experienced judges, well capable of deploying both the bark and the bite. This Bill, read with its code of practice, equips them for both.

In short, we have a solution on each of these three amendments which is largely satisfactory. I thank the Bill team and the Minister for their constructive and courteous engagement with operational partners over many months. The Bill is not perfect—given the intractable subject matter, that is not surprising—but it has been very significantly improved by your Lordships. We can fairly say that we have done our job, and I look forward to seeing the Bill on the statute book.

[Lord Paddick (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I will speak to the two Motions on which the House will divide. Motion B asks that this House do not insist on its Amendment 2, which placed in the Bill a list of offences that a criminal conduct authorisation could not authorise. This amendment was suggested by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and was championed by the noble Baroness, Lady Massey of Darwen, and the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. The Commons disagree because doing this

“would place sources, and the wider public, at risk.”

As the Minister explained, the argument goes that sources could be tested against such a list to discover whether they were a CHIS and, further, that pursuant of testing to see if a person was a source, they would ask other people who were not CHIS to commit crimes listed in Lords Amendment 2.

Those arguments were demolished by the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, in Committee—and the Government have, to date, failed to address them. Australia, Canada and the United States of America have similar lists and they do not present the sort of difficulty in those countries that the Government claim would occur here. In a blatant act of whataboutery, the Minister responded that these countries were different because we have the Human Rights Act and they do not. On Report, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, comprehensively demolished the argument that the Human Rights Act was sufficient, but that is not why the Commons disagrees with Amendment 2.

What has the Human Rights Act got to do with the Commons disagreement? A list is published in each of the countries—Australia, Canada and the USA—of offences that CHIS cannot be authorised to commit, and the reasons the Commons has given for rejecting this amendment do not arise in those countries. Their CHIS are not tested against the list and there is no evidence that others are tested against it either. We are not talking about a hypothetical situation of “What if there was a list of prohibited offences?” but about the fact that this has been tried in practice for many years in similar jurisdictions and the Commons’ stated concerns do not exist.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, then went on to explain why he believed publishing a list is not a problem in those jurisdictions and why it would not be a problem here. If a gang tested a member by asking them to rape and the gang member refused, it could be that the gang member has scruples that he is not prepared to set aside. I could add to the noble Lord’s example and say that the gang member may be incapable of performing an act of rape in front of an audience or that his sexuality gets in the way of his being able to rape the man or woman he is being asked to rape. There are a host of more likely explanations as to why the gang member might not commit a serious crime other than that he might be a covert human intelligence source refusing to do so simply because he is a CHIS.

To paraphrase the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, a former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, also with direct experience of Northern Ireland, he said he found it hard to understand why a shortlist bearing no relation to the types of crime that would routinely be authorised should increase the risk to a CHIS or other members of the public or make it more likely that he would be successfully outed as a CHIS by the criminal group in which he is embedded. As a police officer of over 30 years’ experience, including direct experience of managing police informants, I do not understand either.

Domestic Abuse Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 1st February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 71, 72 and 73. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, for putting his name to Amendment 71; I thank both him and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, for putting their names to Amendments 72 and 73.

These amendments as a group look at time limits and prohibitive requirements. Amendment 71 would ensure a maximum timeframe—five working days—within which a contested DAPO made without notice was brought back to court. There may be cases where a particular programme has to be assessed but the police may not know whether it is readily available, and it may take a certain amount of time to get an assessment for a programme. The purpose of this amendment is to put a time limit on that rather than it dragging on for a longer period.

Amendments 72 and 73 address the same issue but from a different perspective: that is, if there is a positive requirement as part of a DAPO, either to go on a course or to go to drug rehabilitation, the person who is to be submitted to the DAPO should agree to go on that course. While I understand that putting negative requirements on alleged perpetrators is something one can do without their permission, positive requirements will have a far greater likelihood of success if, first, they have been assessed and, secondly, the person agrees to go on whatever course it may be. There could be a number of different elements to this. I have mentioned drug and alcohol and domestic abuse courses, but there are also mental health issues with a number of the alleged perpetrators. All this needs to be taken into account, and that is the purpose of this group of amendments. I beg to move.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I welcome the introduction of DAPOs but believe that, in certain respects, clearer rules are required to ensure that they are used in a practical and proportionate manner. It is in this constructive—I hope—spirit that I have put my name to the amendments in this group.

The potential scope of a DAPO is extraordinarily wide. Under Clause 33, it may include any prohibition or restriction considered necessary to protect a person from the risk of domestic abuse, expressly not limited to what are referred to as the “examples” of non-contact, residence and tagging provisions in subsections (4) to (6). I remind the Committee that even the types of measure that can be imposed on suspected terrorists under the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011—TPIMs—are exhaustively spelled out in the Schedule to that Act. They include some measures that one assumes would never be imposed in the context of domestic abuse, but the contrast in approach is striking none the less. With such a powerful and open-ended instrument as the DAPO, it is important that we get the safeguards right.

Of course, it will sometimes be necessary to impose the DAPO without notice. Amendment 71 would ensure that those cases did not fall between the cracks and were brought back to court as soon as practical, and in any event within five days. That matters for the reasons given just now by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and more broadly because DAPOs are highly personalised and highly intrusive. Without the presence of the person against whom the order is made, no one can be sure that the most effective and appropriate DAPO will have been arrived at first time around. Indeed, Clauses 31 and 34 acknowledge the principle that, if DAPOs are to be effective, they must be suitable and enforceable having regard to such matters as the work and educational commitments of their subjects, any other court orders or injunctions which may apply to them, and the interests of other persons including children.

As to Amendments 72 and 73, I comment only that in my days as a Crown Court recorder, it was axiomatic that one did not impose a positive requirement, such as a drug or alcohol rehabilitation order, or a mental health programme, in the absence of the intended subject of that requirement. These interventions are costly and, if they are to be effective, they require not just the presence but the consent and indeed the commitment of the subject. I have strayed there into Amendment 81, which we will come to shortly.

Self-evident as these matters may be to some, there is an advantage to putting them clearly in statute so that magistrates and their clerks are in no doubt as to the position. The amendments in this group are particularly compelling to me because they are supported by the Magistrates Association and by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, in his capacity as a magistrate with current front-line experience. I hope that the Minister will look favourably on them.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I support all the amendments in this group; I put my name to the ones that I thought were more appropriate for me but I agree with them all. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, has said, it is of course true that these amendments are supported by the Magistrates Association. My reason for supporting them, apart from the fact that I am convinced that they are right, is that they come from the Magistrates Association, of which I had the honour to be president for almost 10 years. However, that experience is rather elderly and I am therefore very happy that these amendments are supported by an active, front-line, authoritative magistrate today.

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[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con) [V]]

I support these amendments, which are supported by the Magistrates’ Association, because it is very clear that they will have taken the view of a number of experienced magistrates in what they have formulated. It is in the nature of this order that it is an interim order, because it is made on the basis that it will be reconsidered after the representations, if any, that the respondent makes. It is essential that in due course an opportunity is given for that as part of the order. In due course, as we suggested in a previous group of amendments, it will be modified to five days and that is going to happen. Therefore, it is an interim order in its nature, even if it is not called that in these proposals.

It is important to note that this application continuation will take place in a hearing which will normally be extremely short. It will not be in the same set of court cases involving any kind of substantial and long hearing and is not likely to be very much affected by the present situation with regard to criminal cases.

The noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, mentioned being taken for a ride. It is also possible, at least with some of these orders, that a person may be very willing to take it on. I had experience, a long time ago now, of a case in which a young mother in Glasgow undertook to attend a very good programme for dealing with addiction. I am certain that she was determined to go through with it, because it was much better than having a sentence which might involve separation from her child. However, I learned some time after I had made the arrangements with her and got her fervent consent, that she had left the programme. That can happen, not as a deliberate act, but as a consequence of the power of addiction to alter a person’s will at a particular time.

I support these amendments and I am glad that they are supported by an active and leading magistrate who has current experience of these matters.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I have put my name to Amendments 81, 83 and 84. I addressed Amendment 81 when speaking to Amendments 72 and 73 in the last group. The Minister suggested in response that there were certain circumstances in which it might be appropriate to impose a drugs or alcohol rehabilitation order, or a mental health disposal, without the commitment, consent or even knowledge of the intended subject—at least, I think that is what he said. I should be interested to hear him elaborate on the sort of circumstances he has in mind.

As to the proposal of a statutory time limit in Amendments 83 and 84, I endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, has said from experience about the practice in comparable contexts, and what the Magistrates’ Association has said about the desirability of allowing the court to put in place review hearings if appropriate. I will add one or two further points.

Clause 36(5) recognises that an electronic monitoring requirement should be authorised for no more than 12 months, yet there is no time limit on the other provisions of a DAPO despite their unlimited range. I expect the Minister will refer to the right of a person to apply for the variation or discharge of a DAPO under Clause 42, but that is a haphazard safeguard and one that the Bill itself acknowledges is not sufficient where tagging is concerned. Something more is required, and I suggest that the amendments provide it.

Finally, there also seems to be force in the other amendments in this group. The case for Amendment 86 in particular seems unanswerable. I know from our time together at the Bar that the Minister is more than capable of rising to any occasion, but I hope that in relation to this group he will find at least some of the amendments to be uncontentious.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

3rd reading & 3rd reading (Hansard) & 3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 21st January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, noble Lords can imagine that there is a lot of legislation going through this House that I oppose. In the past, I have exercised restraint and have not been disruptive with procedural Motions, but there are times when we all need to make a stand, and this Bill, for me, is one of those situations. It is a terrible piece of legislation and I cannot be complicit in it, nor in future acts of state oppression that will be the result of our passing it, and I will, therefore, divide the House.

Noble Lords have spent many days trying to improve the Bill, and we have made a few positive steps, but even if the other place does not remove most of those amendments, the Bill is still so fundamentally flawed that it should not be allowed to pass. Scotland has had the sense to refuse the Bill and I wish that we would do the same. I was subject to police surveillance for more than a decade. I did not know about it, it did not affect me, and even when I found out, it really did not affect me very much—but others in your Lordships’ House were subject to similar but much worse surveillance, and many will not even know whether they were observed and under surveillance or not. The Bill does nothing to improve that situation; in fact, it will make things worse by granting total legal immunity to undercover officers, spies and informants.

There is also the fact that the Bill has been brought forward while the Undercover Policing Inquiry is still going on. Not far from here, that inquiry is hearing evidence about police infiltration of peaceful campaign groups and unions, and undercover officers forming sexual relationships with women. The Bill learns no lessons from that inquiry and does nothing to support the victims. It actually grants much broader legal immunity to the wrongdoers.

I am also concerned that I did not get a proper answer to my repeated questions about the proceeds of crimes authorised under the Bill. My conclusion is that the police will be able to authorise people to profit from criminal activities, and that there is no way for the state to recover those profits. I hope there will not be too many miscarriages of justice and abuses of power before we revisit and repeal this legislation. With all that in mind, I am sad that I am in a minority in opposing the Bill, but I cannot in conscience abstain and accept its passage. I beg to move.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]]

My Lords, as one of the many Cross-Benchers who has applied themselves to this Bill, I record my thanks to the Minister for her explanations and for the discussions with her, which I have enjoyed—no 48-hour weeks for her—and James Brokenshire, who continues to have all our good wishes; to the Bill team; to the police and MI5; to IPCO, whose monitoring function is so vital; and to the NGOs and individuals who campaign on these issues and do their best to keep us all honest. I am particularly grateful to those who brought the Third Direction case. There are issues of great public concern which simply do not come to the attention of Parliament without the spur of litigation, and this is one of them. I have also appreciated not only the speeches of other noble Lords but my informal dialogue with them, intensive at times, which in my experience can be achieved just as easily, if not quite so pleasurably, in a virtual House as in a physical one.

This Bill was not widely consulted on and went from Committee stage to Third Reading in the other place during a single day. It needed the time we were able to give it, and I believe that after seven days of debate we have achieved significant improvement and clarification. I thank the Minister in particular for working with me on real-time notification. I hope we can achieve a satisfactory result on the other excellent amendments that we have passed, including those of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, which improve notification and the amendment of the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, on juvenile CHIS, while still enabling the Bill to be enacted by the start of the Court of Appeal hearing on 28 January, which I know is the Government’s ambition.

I have great respect for the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and understand her regrets, which are underlined by the withholding of consent by the Scottish Government, but I will not be voting for her amendment to the Motion. For all its difficult and controversial features, the Bill is a clear improvement on the opaque and poorly safeguarded arrangements that preceded it, and it has my support.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I have bled your Lordships’ ears over this Bill long enough, so I can be short. I thank the Minister for her patience and fortitude but my profound fears about this legislation will continue for a very long time, until it is amended or repealed. My concerns are about the signal that it sends but, even more, about the serious human rights abuses that it will herald. It is, quite simply, the most constitutionally dangerous legislation that I have seen presented in this country in my working life.

I am rather ashamed not to have been able to persuade more of your Lordships of the profound dangers of allowing the Executive to grant advance immunity for criminal actions to a whole raft of their agents—not just the brave security services or the hard-pressed police but many other government agencies and quangos, and the members of our communities who inform for or work for them, including even children. It will not even be with prior judicial warrant. This legislation does not put current arrangements on a statutory footing, so it does not merely respond to the litigation mentioned by the previous speaker. As for that litigation, there may be a lesson here for those of us who at times have dabbled in test-case legislation: to be careful what we wish for when provoking the might of the state in this fashion.

Just as our cousins on the other side of the Atlantic are beginning to rebuild their own bedrock of the rule of law, it will take a little longer in our own jurisdiction. A lot is said of patriotism these days. My patriotism is not the love of a flag but, in a nutshell, a love of the NHS and the rule of law. This Bill abrogates the vital principle of equality before the law, which I think all people well understand. It is a very sad day for me. For the moment, like the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, I can only bear witness for the record—but that I must do. I cannot in good conscience support the Bill being passed off as law.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Report stage & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th January 2021 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich]

22: Clause 1, page 3, line 16, at end insert—
“( ) Notwithstanding section 27, injury sustained by any person shall not be excluded from the scope of the Schemes provided for by the Criminal Injuries Compensation Act 1985 and the Criminal Injuries Compensation (Northern Ireland) Order 2002 by virtue of the fact that the conduct causing such injury was authorised under this section.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that victims of violent crime are not rendered ineligible for criminal injuries compensation by reason of the fact that the crime was the subject of a criminal conduct authorisation.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]]

I beg to move and I wish to test the opinion of the House.

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Moved by

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich]

33: After Clause 2, insert the following new Clause—
“Notification to a Judicial Commissioner
After section 32B of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 insert—<strong>“32C</strong> Notification of criminal conduct authorisations(1) This section applies where a person grants or cancels an authorisation under section 29B.(2) The person must give notice that the person has granted or cancelled the authorisation to a Judicial Commissioner.(3) A notice given for the purposes of subsection (2) must be given—(a) in writing as soon as reasonably practicable and, in any event, before the end of the period of 7 days beginning with the day after that on which the authorisation to which it relates is granted or, as the case may be, cancelled; and(b) in accordance with such arrangements made for the purposes of this paragraph by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as are for the time being in force.(4) A notice under this section relating to the grant of an authorisation under section 29B must—(a) set out the grounds on which the person giving the notice believes that the requirements of section 29B(4) are satisfied in relation to the authorisation; and(b) specify the conduct that is authorised under section 29B by the authorisation.(5) Any notice that is required by this section to be given in writing may be given, instead, by being transmitted by electronic means.””Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause requires a person who grants or cancels a criminal conduct authorisation under new section 29B of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 to give notice to a Judicial Commissioner (appointed under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016). It provides for when and how the notice must be given and requires that it contains certain information. The references in the new clause to the grant of an authorisation include the renewal of an authorisation (see section 43(5) of the 2000 Act).

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]]

I beg to move.

Amendment 34 (to Amendment 33)

Moved by

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Moved by

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich [V]]

44: Schedule 2, page 9, line 9, at end insert—
“2A_ In the heading before section 32A (authorisations requiring judicial approval), after “approval” insert “or notification”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is in consequence of the new clause which inserts section 32C of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 on judicial notification.

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Moved by

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich [V]]

46: Schedule 2, page 11, line 14, at end insert—
“Coronavirus Act 2020
15_(1) Sub-paragraph (2) applies to—(a) section 22 of the Coronavirus Act 2020 (appointment of temporary Judicial Commissioners),(b) regulation 3(1) of the Investigatory Powers (Temporary Judicial Commissioners and Modification of Time Limits) Regulations 2020 (S.I. 2020/360), and(c) any appointment which was made under that regulation and has effect immediately before the coming into force of this paragraph.(2) In section 22(1), regulation 3(1) or the appointment, references to functions conferred on Judicial Commissioners by—(a) the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000,(b) the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2000, and(c) the Investigatory Powers Act 2016,are to be read as including references to functions conferred on Judicial Commissioners by those Acts by virtue of amendments made by this Act.” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment allows for functions conferred on Judicial Commissioners by virtue of the Bill to be performed by temporary Judicial Commissioners appointed under regulations made under section 22 of the Coronavirus Act 2020.

Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Bill

Lord Anderson of Ipswich Excerpts

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords & Report: 1st sitting & Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Monday 11th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Dubs (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, before I speak to the details of Amendment 3 in my name, I will comment briefly on the speech made by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. I am totally with her in saying that there are dangers in this Bill, and some of the amendments are very crucial indeed. I also agree with her that we must always be vigilant to protect the rule of law, human rights and civil liberties. Indeed, she has done that all her life, since the time she ran the organisation Liberty in such an effective manner. I have listened hard to what she has said, and I believe that the most effective safeguards would be some kind of prior oversight to check an organisation before it went ahead. I believe that is probably the most important safeguard. I look forward to debating the amendment to that effect in the next group.

In the meantime, I turn to Amendment 3. Its purpose is to amend the Bill so that victims of criminal conduct carried out under a CCA can access compensation. I speak as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, and I am very much influenced in my contributions to this debate by the conclusions of the committee’s report, which has been widely praised across the House. The report noted that the Bill as introduced was potentially incompatible with human rights legislation, specifying:

“Article 1 ECHR requires the UK to secure the rights of all those within its jurisdiction, including the rights of victims of crime. Where a crime also amounts to a human rights violation, the victim has a right to an effective remedy under Article 13 ECHR. A victim also has an Article 6 right “to have any claim relating to his or her civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal.’”


People may ask at that point about the criminal injuries compensation scheme. I put it this way: since the Bill would authorise criminal conduct lawful for all purposes, it would prevent a victim of authorised crime vindicating their rights by bringing a civil claim for compensation. Seemingly, this would also prevent a claim for compensation under the criminal injuries compensation scheme. This is not a novel proposal. The amendment is very close to the regime in Australia, which provides

“indemnification for any participant who incurs civil liability in the course of an undercover operation”.

The most usual and commonly quoted example, which my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti mentioned, is when a CHIS is driving a getaway car for a gang at high speed and has an accident. Under the Australian regime, the system would provide indemnification in the course of an undercover operation. In other words, in Australia, a civil claim can be brought against the perpetrator by the victim and compensation secured, but the state will then step in to indemnify the perpetrator against his or her losses. The amendment would ensure that the person authorised to carry out criminal conduct would not suffer the consequences of civil liability. It would also ensure that the victim of that conduct would obtain civil redress, while allowing secrecy to be maintained.

This amendment is fully in keeping with the overall intentions of the Bill, but it would provide an important safeguard. Otherwise, individuals will lose out badly through personal injury or by having their car damaged. At present, they are unable to obtain civil redress, and my amendment would put that right. It is an important but straightforward amendment. The principle is easy and I hope that the Government will find their way to accepting it. I beg to move.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendments 21 and 22, which are intended to elucidate and, if necessary, reinforce the provision for criminal responsibility and civil recourse that already exists under the scheme in the Bill. I will start with criminal responsibility, which is the subject of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of Amendment 21.

Sub-paragraph (a) seeks confirmation that if a public officer who authorises a criminal conduct authorisation wilfully neglects to perform his duty, or wilfully misconducts himself to such a degree as to amount to an abuse of the public’s trust, he should be open to prosecution for misconduct in public office. The Bill team has kindly confirmed to me in correspondence that nothing in the statute rules out the prosecution of an authorising officer for, for example, misconduct in public office if the authorisation was corruptly granted. I hope the Minister can confirm this when she responds. The concept of corruption is not as narrow as it may sound. It was elucidated last month by the Law Commission, in its report on misconduct in public office, as applying to the circumstances

“where a public office holder knowingly uses or fails to use their public position or power for the purpose of achieving a benefit or detriment, where that behaviour would be considered seriously improper by a ‘reasonable person.’”

There is another purpose to sub-paragraph (a): to clarify that a prosecution for misconduct in public office can be brought without the considerable inconvenience of first needing the CCA that was authorised to be declared a nullity. I believe that this follows from the existing text of RIPA and from the Bill. Section 27 of RIPA states that conduct will be lawful if it is authorised and if it is in accordance with the authorisation, but it does not create an immunity for the authorisation of such conduct. Nor is such an immunity created by the new Section 29B(8), which by its own terms is limited to conduct

“authorised by a criminal conduct authorisation”,

not conduct authorising a criminal conduct authorisation. I hope very much that the Minister will be able to offer me this second assurance as well.

Moving on to sub-paragraph (b), I accept that it may be more problematic to prosecute an authorising officer for the inchoate offences of encouragement, assistance or conspiracy. If the conduct of the CHIS is rendered lawful by Section 27, it is certainly arguable that there is no crime capable of being incited or being the object of a conspiracy. I believe, however, that the Government agree with me that the immunity falls away altogether, with the result that the CHIS can be prosecuted for the authorised crime and the authorising officer prosecuted for the associated inchoate offences if the CCA has first been declared to be a nullity by a competent court. Depending on the circumstances, that court may be the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, the High Court or indeed a criminal court. The Minister and the Bill team have been extremely helpful in explaining—[Inaudible]— and I believe there is nothing between us on this. I should be grateful if the Minister could confirm, thirdly, that this is the Government’s understanding.

Of course, the paper possibility of a prosecution means little if the CPS, Crown Office or PPS are not made aware of the circumstances that may make a prosecution appropriate. Important in this respect, it seems to me, are the powers vested in judicial commissioners under the Investigatory Powers Act. [Inaudible.]

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, I am sorry to interrupt the noble Lord, but there is a little bit of interference.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]]

[Inaudible]—in relation to matters for which a judicial commissioner is responsible. Could the Minister confirm, fourthly, that this is the Government’s understanding also?

I move on now, more briefly, as noble Lords may be relieved to hear, to civil recourse for the innocent victim of an authorised crime—[Inaudible.]

[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, I do not know if the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, can hear me in the Chamber. I am afraid that we have some interference on the line, so we might need a short adjournment for five minutes while we sort it out.

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[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

My Lords, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, not just to resume his speech—we look forward greatly to the rest of it—but, if he would be so kind, to repeat the last few statements he made, because sadly they were inaudible.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]]

I am grateful, and apologise for what seems to have been something of a crossed line.

I dealt with proposed new paragraph (a) in Amendment 21, so will move on to proposed new paragraph (b). I accept that it may be more problematic to prosecute an authorising officer for the inchoate offences of encouragement, assistance or conspiracy than for misconduct in public office, but that is because, if the conduct of the CHIS is rendered lawful by Section 27, it is certainly arguable that there is no crime capable of being incited or being the object of a conspiracy.

However, I believe that the Government agree with me that the immunity falls away altogether, with the result that the CHIS can be prosecuted for the authorised crime and the authorising officer prosecuted for the associated inchoate offences, if the CCA has first been declared a nullity by a competent court. Depending on the circumstances, that court may be the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, the High Court or a criminal court. The Minister and the Bill team have been extremely helpful in explaining their thinking on this; I believe that there is nothing between us on this point. I would be most grateful if she could confirm—this is the third confirmation I am asking for—that this is the Government’s understanding of the law.

Of course, the paper possibility of a prosecution means little if the CPS, Crown Office or PPS in Northern Ireland are not made aware of the circumstances that may make a prosecution appropriate. Important in this respect are the powers vested in judicial commissioners under the Investigatory Powers Act. Section 231 provides for serious error reports, and Section 232(2) provides for the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to

“provide advice or information to any public authority or other person in relation to matters for which a Judicial Commissioner is responsible”,

presumably including the CPS. Could the Minister confirm, fourthly, that this is also the Government’s understanding?

I move on, more briefly, to civil recourse for the innocent victim of an authorised crime. I start from the position that some means of compensation should exist for injury or loss caused by a crime committed pursuant to a criminal conduct authorisation, not from the person who was authorised to commit the crime but from the authority which authorised it or from the state more generally. Proposed new paragraph (c) in Amendment 21 seeks confirmation of what I do not believe to be in dispute: that compensation may be obtained from the Investigatory Powers Tribunal in a case brought by an innocent victim. That is the fifth thing I ask the Minister to confirm.

That may, however, not be the most practical of remedies. Judicial commissioners have the power to tip someone off that they may have a remedy in the IPT when they consider that to be in the public interest but, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and I suggested in Committee, there may be very limited circumstances in which that will be possible; there might well be risks to the operation and to the CHIS if unconnected persons were informed that their injuries were attributable to an undercover operative. The judicial commissioners are likely to have that well in mind, hence the importance of Amendment 22, which in the case of injury to an innocent victim would ensure that an application could be made in the normal way to the criminal injuries compensation scheme. That would have the great advantage of affording compensation to the innocent victim without it being necessary to disclose to the victim the status of the person—the CHIS—who inflicted the injury.

In their response last week to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which was published by the Joint Committee at 11 this morning, the Government state that, having considered the question in detail, they have concluded that

“nothing in this Bill would frustrate a victim’s ability to recover compensation for injury or loss through that scheme.”

That is certainly encouraging, but I am afraid that the mouth of this particular gift horse needs a little more inspection. If actions committed pursuant to a valid criminal conduct authorisation are, in the words of Section 27(1), “lawful for all purposes”, can the Minister explain how injuries caused by such acts can be criminal injuries for the purposes of the compensation scheme? That is the sixth and final assurance I request from the Minister.

There is often an argument for making things clear in statute, even if satisfactory assurances can be given. Accordingly, if the Government accept the thrust of these amendments but have difficulties with the drafting, I shall certainly look constructively on any commitment to come back at Third Reading with revised drafts. I shall listen carefully to what the Minister says in response. Depending on the content of that response, and if no commitment is given to accept these amendments or come back to them at Third Reading, on Wednesday I may test the opinion of the House on either or both of Amendments 21 and 22.

[The Deputy Speaker (Lord Lexden) (Con)]

My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, who is next on the list, has been replaced by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser.

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The noble Baroness, Lady Williams, was kind enough to invite my noble friend Lord Blunkett and me to discuss our amendment with her last week, and I am grateful for that. It is a mystery that, unless she surprises me, she has not been able to persuade the Home Secretary to accept it, because it would add accountability and therefore—I stress this—legitimacy to CHIS work. Surely we should all share the common aim of deploying the limited resources of undercover police officers, who do dangerous jobs, to catch real criminals, such as drug traffickers, human traffickers, terrorists and criminal gangs, not political activists challenging the prevailing orthodoxy of the time, whether on anti-apartheid, racism, women’s rights or climate change. I will await the noble Baroness’s reply before I decide whether to beg leave to divide the House on my Amendment 16.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]]

My Lords, in speaking to Amendments 33, 37, 44 and 46, which are also signed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, and the noble Lords, Lord Butler and Lord Rosser, I first pay tribute to the Minister and the Bill team, who offered to co-operate with me on these amendments and have been as good as their word. They now give more complete effect, in language approved by parliamentary counsel, to the homemade amendments that I moved in Committee. The lead amendment is Amendment 33; Amendment 37 mirrors it for Scotland; and Amendments 44 and 46 are consequentials.

The amendments provide, in summary, not for prior judicial authorisation but for judicial scrutiny of another kind: the real-time notification of authorisations to a judicial commissioner, as soon as reasonably practicable and in any event within seven days. That should be seen very much as an outer limit for notification that should, so far as possible, be in real time. It will be open to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to encourage not only prompt notification but pre-notification for informal guidance, as already occurs in some other surveillance contexts. This might be particularly useful for bodies that do not make frequent use of the power.

The case for real-time notification, as I shall call it, has been put most persuasively by those who signed the equivalent amendments in Committee—the noble Baroness, Lady Manningham-Buller, and the noble Lords, Lord Butler and Lord Carlile. I shall summarise it as briefly as I can.

My immediate reaction to this Bill was to support prior judicial authorisation. I championed the use of prior judicial approval for other investigatory powers in my report A Question of Trust, and was delighted to see this in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. I accept that it might also be feasible in this context, given sufficient judicial training, yet I have reservations about prior judicial approval in this Bill, not only for the pragmatic reason that the Government have so firmly set their face against it. Handling and authorising a CHIS is a highly specialised function that requires a close and dynamic understanding not only of the details of the operation but of the characters of those involved. That is not something that a judge, let alone a Secretary of State, will necessarily have the capacity to pick up. It differs considerably from the classic judicial exercise of weighing the benefits of tapping a phone or an undersea cable against the associated intrusion of privacy.

The person who tasks a CHIS, including by authorising criminality, effectively takes on a long-term duty of care, not only towards any potential victims of that crime but towards a CHIS for whom exposure could result in injury or death. Perhaps it is for that reason that the American and Canadian models of prior judicial authorisation, both of them inspirations for A Question of Trust, are not applied in either country to the tasking of a CHIS to commit crimes.

The main objection offered to these amendments in Committee was to the insufficient sharpness of their teeth. It is true that real-time notification may mean that the judicial commissioners are powerless to stop a particularly rapid deployment. It is also true that criminal deployments of this kind cannot just be turned on and off like a tap, but I say three things in response.

First, precisely the same result may arise under a system of prior judicial authorisation, for such a system, like its equivalents in other areas of investigatory powers, will inevitably involve an urgency procedure: deploy first, seek authorisation later.

Secondly, there is an existing precedent for real-time notification—the deployment of undercover police under the so-called relevant sources order of 2013, which, judging from IPCO’s annual reports, works well. The knowledge that a CCA will go straight before a senior judge is a useful discipline for authorising officers. My experience of IPCO, and my own work until last year as Investigatory Powers Commissioner in the Channel Islands, is that the prospect of an interrogation, investigation, recommendations and a possible serious error report are, from the police’s point of view, striking enough to encourage a high standard of conduct, but not so intimidating as to encourage the concealment of honest error. Further assurance would be given by Amendment 34 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, which I will leave him to develop but which I support for making this explicit in the modern practice of undercover policing.

Thirdly, though the precise mechanism may still be in dispute, it is clear that neither RIPA nor this Bill provides for complete immunity from prosecution for those who authorise criminal conduct. I mentioned earlier the assurance of the Bill team, which the Minister repeated just now, that nothing in the statute prevents the prosecution of an authorising officer for misconduct in public office—for example, a corruptly obtained authorisation. She has also accepted that such immunity as provided by Section 27 of RIPA will be removed if an authorisation is found by a competent civil or criminal court to be either not necessary or not proportionate.

I propose to move these amendments on Wednesday, subject to one point on Amendment 37, the Scottish one. The Minister updated us on engagement with the Scottish Government during the first grouping. Were the Scottish Government to indicate before Wednesday’s debate that they would not recommend a legislative consent Motion, with the result that Scotland is carved out of the Bill, I would not wish to move Amendment 37.

[Lord Rosser (Lab) [V]]

Amendments 5 and 23, tabled by my noble friend Lord Dubs, provide for prior judicial oversight. They have the Opposition’s support. A criminal conduct authorisation would not have effect until approved by a judicial commissioner, unless it was urgent, in which case it would come into effect immediately but with the proviso that it must receive judicial approval within 48 hours.

Amendment 17 provides that, where a criminal conduct authorisation is granted, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner must be notified of certain details, including the purpose and extent of the deployment, before the CHIS can be deployed. In urgent cases, notification can be given afterwards—as soon as reasonably possible, but within seven days. We will support Amendment 17 in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. It provides a further form of prior oversight to help ensure that the criminal conduct authorisation will not be used in an inappropriate manner.

We support Amendment 33 in the lead name of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, which provides that the Investigatory Powers Commissioner must be informed of an authorisation as soon as reasonably practicable, and within seven days at the latest. It also represents a significant improvement in the Bill, in which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has played a key role. It enables an effective and powerful independent and impartial check on the use of criminal conduct authorisations, which will help to ensure that the bodies being given the power to authorise criminal conduct by covert human intelligence sources use that power appropriately and lawfully, in the knowledge that they will be held to account, albeit probably afterwards, by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner.

Amendment 34 would make it explicit in the Bill that, if the Investigatory Powers Commissioner thinks an authorisation should not have been granted, the authorisation will be cancelled. We support that. However, there are benefits from prior independent oversight that post-notification oversight does not provide: namely, the opportunity to prevent something out of order occurring before it happens. Prior judicial consideration is about approving or otherwise beforehand what is said needs to happen, and why. Post authorisation, it is about what actually happened and why. Both forms of consideration are important.

The absence of prior independent scrutiny for criminal conduct authorisations under this Bill is not in line with procedures that apply to other investigatory functions, although I appreciate that it has been argued that these investigatory functions are not similar to the authorisation of a CCA. Police search warrants require a magistrate to be satisfied that there are objective reasonable grounds for them. Targeted interception of communications or phone tapping must be approved by the Secretary of State and authorised by a judicial commissioner before being carried out—a double lock which the Investigatory Powers Commissioner says ensures that all investigatory powers warrants issued are necessary, proportionate and lawful. The power to require telecommunications operators to retain communication data for investigatory purposes can be used by the Secretary of State but must be approved by a judicial commissioner.

If these requirements for prior judicial approval, including in some instances a double lock of independent scrutiny, are needed for search warrants, phone tapping and retention of data, surely they are even more necessary for the potentially more damaging human rights violations, including physical violence, that could arise from the authorisation of criminal conduct by a covert human intelligence source.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]]

My Lords, we have Amendments 6, 18 and 36 in this group. Under new Section 29B, the person granting a criminal conduct authorisation must believe that the authorisation is necessary on one of three specific grounds, including that it must be

“proportionate to what is sought to be achieved”

and that the requirements imposed by the Home Secretary will be satisfied—which we have had confirmed as being restrictive rather than loosening safeguards. Amendment 36 is the Scottish equivalent of Amendment 6.

The noble Lord, Lord Anderson, had this amendment in Committee and I am grateful to him and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, for adding their names to it. As party politicians, my noble friend Lord Paddick and I could be thought of as political troublemakers, which is not what we set out to be. However, the noble Lord and the noble and learned Lord who also signed this amendment apply their measured, informed objectivity. The Bar Council has also been in touch with me to give its support.

Belief is subjective, informed or misinformed by background, experience and personality. Some people are naturally more inclined to be that bit more optimistic; I want to avoid judgmental terms such as “casual”. Necessity and proportionality are rightly required criteria, but they lose their force as safeguards unless there is a degree of objectivity in their assessment. “Reasonable” is so usual a term in legislation that its omission itself assumes some significance.

I do not think we have heard an argument that a belief must be reasonable to be a belief, but I anticipate that. I reject that it is implied, because there is no reason to omit the term—and anyway, we should not work on the basis of what may be implied by long usage, as distinct from precedent.

In Committee, the Advocate-General said that under section 3.10 of the draft code of practice,

“the person granting the authorisation should hold a reasonable belief that it is necessary and proportionate.”—[Official Report, 1/12/20; col. 667.]

Section 3.10 is within the section on general rules on authorisation of someone to take on the role of CHIS. The paragraph specifically on criminal conduct authorisations says that

“it is expected that the person granting the authorisation should hold a reasonable belief that the authorisation is necessary and proportionate.”

The noble and learned Lord told the Committee that new Section 29B was

“drafted to align with the existing Section 29”,

and that the amendment would

“cast doubt on the test to be applied for other authorisations”;—[Official Report, 1/12/20; col. 667.]

it would be inconsistent. The engagement of a CHIS is of huge significance, as we have heard this evening and on previous occasions, but it is of a lesser order than a criminal conduct authorisation. In any event, I rather take the view that the Section 29 powers should require a reasonable belief that they are necessary and proportionate to be exercised, and that that should be in the Bill. If the Government accept Amendments 6 and 36, we will not challenge such an amendment to Section 29 if they bring that forward at Third Reading.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, said he would clarify this by way of letter. I have not seen that, although I have seen a Home Office email, which went not to me but was passed on, referring to a requirement for a reasonable belief. But I do not think it is a matter of clarification; it should be in the Bill. The government response to the JCHR this morning repeats what the Minister said in Committee. I am worried about inconsistency between the Bill and the draft code of practice. To be clear, I am not suggesting the word should be taken out of the code.

Amendment 18 has found its way into this group, which is perhaps no bad thing given the length of the previous group. It is the seriousness of a CCA that prompted that amendment. It provides that a CCA would expire after four months, although it could be renewed. In Committee, the Minister argued for consistency with Section 29 authorisations, which are for a period of 12 months, and referred to the code of practice, which says that the CCA should be

“relied upon for as short a duration as possible.”

The power should remain “operationally workable”; I think four months fulfils that.

The CCA takes us to an even more serious place than infiltration. As my noble friend pointed out, on the Government’s logic we would not need a Bill to authorise CHIS to commit a crime because it is just the same as deploying a CHIS. This amendment has dropped the monthly review of CCA, which was in our Amendment 49 in Committee, in an attempt to meet the Government part way. Surely it is good practice to have a very clear and fairly frequent timetable laid down; four months is not that often. In many situations it is good practice to have a very clear checklist. This is one of them.

To return to Amendments 6 and 36, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, said so succinctly in Committee, anything other than a belief held on an objective basis would be quite exceptional. The Bill ought to be clear, with no room for ambiguity or argument if the matter ever comes before the court. This is such an important point that, in the absence of the Government’s agreement, I will seek the opinion of the House. I beg to move.

[Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I have signed Amendments 6 and 36, having tabled similar amendments myself in Committee. At this stage, I am a little mystified by the Government’s position. They seem to accept that the relevant belief of authorising officers should be reasonable to the point where they have made an amendment along these lines to the code of practice at paragraph 6.4. Yet they refuse to make the equivalent amendment to the Bill.

The noble and learned Lord the Advocate-General defended the Government’s position in Committee, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, on the basis that it would promote consistency between different parts of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act. I suggest that is an argument of little force, given the unique nature of the power conferred by the Bill.

In fact, it is the Government’s position that results in a greater and more damaging inconsistency between the terms of the Bill and the associated parts of the code of practice. If the test is to be reasonable belief, it needs to be stated in the law. We are offered a code of practice now amended so that paragraph 6.4 provides that

“it is expected that the person granting the authorisation should hold a reasonable belief that the authorisation is necessary and proportionate.”

A code of practice is not the same as the law and “it is expected” is not even the language of legal obligation; it is the language of a dress code.

This is not just playing with words. On the basis of our first debate, it seems to be common ground that criminal responsibility for incorrect authorisations is dependent, at least in part, on a court having found the authorisation to be a nullity, presumably because the necessity or proportionality criteria were not satisfied. If the legal standard set out in the Act is one of “reasonable” belief, the court will scrutinise whether the officer’s belief was reasonable. If that word is not in the Act, a court will be invited to proceed on the basis of a test of subjective belief or, at most, the relatively undemanding test or public law rationality.

These apparently inconsequential amendments go to the issue of immunity, reflected in my Amendment 21 and in the amendments and speeches of many other noble Lords. That issue is at the heart of the Bill. I hope the Minister will accept Amendments 6 and 36, because she appears to agree with their substance, but if the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, presses them to a vote she will have my support.

[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]]

I can add very little to what has been so ably said in support of the amendment, to which I put my name. I support what is a very small change to the Bill because it is important that we hold the services, particularly the officers who will give these authorisations without any prior approval, to a very high standard. If they do not have high standards and things go wrong, the damage to the service concerned will be very serious.