Criminal Justice Bill

Debate between Laura Farris and Jess Phillips

Report stage
Wednesday 15th May 2024 Commons Chamber

[Laura Farris]

I want to be crystal clear that, under the new clause, the offence is committed if the pseudo-image is created without the consent of the person who is the subject. That is at subsections 1(c) and 2(c) of proposed new section 66AD.

Let me talk for a moment about intent. The new clause differs from some of the content in the Online Safety Act 2023. It does not relate to intimate images, such as a person wearing a swimsuit, but applies to sexually explicit images, which are defined in legislation. It requires not only that the image is sexually explicit and is created without the consent of the subject matter, but that it is done for the purposes of sexual gratification or with the intent of causing humiliation, alarm or distress. I gently say that a similar measure was debated in the Bill Committee. I think it was tabled by the hon. Member for Nottingham North (Alex Norris), and he will recognise that the intent of the provisions that the Government have adopted is the same as the Opposition’s.

I am aware of what my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke is saying about the base events. Perhaps I can allay her concerns by simply saying this: it is a novel new measure for any Government to take. She makes sensible and compelling arguments on this point, and I hope she will feel reassured if we take an iterative approach for the time being. She will recall that the Law Commission recommended that we did not introduce legislation at all, and I will come on to say a little about that. It is right to say that other countries are looking at us carefully. The Justice Secretary was at the G7 in Venice just last weekend, and other G7 Justice Ministers had noticed that we are making this change and were observing carefully. We are making this change because we recognise the inherent risk posed by these images and that the offence is overwhelmingly targeted at women, predicated on an absence of consent. As such, we consider it a gateway to more serious offending.

We make some points by way of clarification. We carefully considered the Law Commission’s recommendations in its excellent report on intimate image abuse, which has informed much of our recent work, although respectfully on this, we have diverged from its point of view. In response to some of its concerns, I would like to reassure the House. We recognise that the amendment could criminalise young people, particularly teenage boys. To reduce the risk of over-criminalisation, we believe that we have set pragmatic parameters. Creation alone will be a non-imprisonable offence, although it will incur a potentially unlimited fine. The offence of creation alone would not attract notification requirements, meaning that the offender will not be placed on the sex offenders register. As hon. Members will know, all of that changes if the image is shared. Victims of that offence will be entitled to automatic anonymity in line with all the other sexual offences and they will also be eligible for special measures at trial. We are delighted to see major deepfake websites withdraw from the United Kingdom and we encourage the others to follow their lead.

I turn to Government new clause 87, which introduces a statutory aggravating factor for manslaughter involving sexual conduct. The clause corresponds to, and potentially should be read in conjunction with, section 71 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, which says that it is not a defence to argue that a victim consented to the infliction of serious harm for the purpose of sexual gratification.

We have long held concerns about killing of this nature where, by definition, the victim cannot give an account of consent, yet on occasions the court has implicitly sought to categorise the killing as a consequence of sexual choice, as opposed to the consequence of the development of social norms based on structural inequality. We invited the eminent criminal barrister Clare Wade KC to consider the issue specifically in her domestic homicide review last year. She said that cases of this nature must be viewed through the prism of coercive control and that

“the policy underpinning law ought to consider the wider harms which emanate from the behaviour which can and does lead to this category of homicide.”

We agree, and we are increasing the punishment for degrading and abusive conduct of this nature. Following careful consultation with the Sentencing Council, we are tabling a statutory aggravating factor so that sentences for manslaughter involving sexual conduct must be more severe. It will cover all cases where the act is directly attributable to sexual conduct.

I want to provide the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley (Jess Phillips) with one point of reassurance. She will know from all her work, and particularly the research conducted by We Can’t Consent To This and the team, that of all these homicides almost 60% are strangulation cases. I know that that is not the point that she wishes to make with her amendment, but there is some overlap.

On parental responsibility, as hon. Members will be aware, the Government have already amended the Children Act 1989 via the Victims and Prisoners Bill to provide for the automatic suspension of parental responsibility in cases where one parent kills the other. We are making an amendment to develop the law further, providing that, where a father is convicted of child rape, parental responsibility that he may have for any child will be automatically suspended.

I pay tribute to the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman)—I think that she is in the wars at the moment—for the way in which she has presented this issue. She has advanced the compelling argument that we have long-established principles to protect children from sex offenders by placing people on the sex offenders register and protecting them from working with children, but while we have measures to protect other people’s children, the same protection does not exist for the children of the offender unless the mother goes to the family court to remove his rights.

I also pay tribute to Sanchia Berg, the journalist who revealed this issue through her work and highlighted the practical obstacles that some mothers had faced in making this application, as well as other families who have talked about their experience, including via their Member of Parliament, one example being my hon. Friend the Member for Meriden (Saqib Bhatti); I am not sure if he is in his place.

The father will still be able to apply to the family court to have the suspension of his parental responsibility lifted, but it is obviously fair to assume that, if he has been convicted of child rape, such an application is unlikely to succeed. We have also included a clear requirement for this measure to be reviewed after it has been in place for three years.

[Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to see in the Public Gallery some of the families who have championed this issue in the west midlands. Am I right in thinking—I really hope that I am not—that this measure covers only those convicted of the rape of a child, not other sexual offences against a child and a child aged 13 or over?

[Laura Farris]

The hon. Member is correct. I simply want to say again that this is a novel power that we are extending to Crown court judges, who typically do not have any knowledge of family law matters or a family law background. Once again, we think it is right that we take an iterative approach. There was a dialogue between the Mother of the House and the Lord Chancellor on this point, and she agreed with the approach. I do not want to put words in her mouth, and I am keenly aware of her absence when she should be speaking to her new clause, but I believe that she is satisfied with where we have got to. I commend the new clause and urge all colleagues to give it their support.

I turn next to new clauses 94 and 95 and new schedule 4. I commend my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) for his excellent campaign and dedication to crafting a new offence. I must also mention my hon. Friends the Members for Eastbourne (Caroline Ansell) and for Hertford and Stortford (Julie Marson), who also came to see me and made a really compelling argument.

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[Laura Farris]

My right hon. Friend is quite correct: that is the basis on which the Government cannot accept the amendments. Of course, everybody agrees that water companies should be punished as robustly as possible, but it is also the case that we have pre-existing offences that apply. Pollution incidents are already the subject of criminal sanctions available to the Environment Agency under the Environmental Permitting (England and Wales) Regulations 2016, and there is a serious risk of duplication, not least because—I hope the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale (Tim Farron) will not mind my saying this—the sanctions he has included in his amendments are just more fines, and we already have a fines regime.

Let me set out very briefly the basis on which, in a principled way, we are saying no to the amendments. As the environment regulator, the Environment Agency can and does prosecute company directors and other senior officers under the relevant regulations. It has a power to fine, and there can be convictions for polluting rivers and coastal waters, where it can be proved that the offence has been committed. Expanding criminal liability would simply create a repetition of the existing powers. It is the Government’s view that the amendments would create a dangerous and unacceptable risk of double jeopardy across the two regulatory regimes that are administered by Ofwat and the Environment Agency.

The amendments would simply duplicate the existing sanctions, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Ludlow (Philip Dunne) put it, for not meeting performance commitments. More seriously, they could undermine the robustness of the Environment Agency’s criminal sanction regime. On that basis, I hope the hon. Member for Westmorland and Lonsdale will understand why we do not want to see duplication in an area where there is already the capacity to prosecute, a criminal law regime and the sanction of fines, which is everything that his amendments seek.

[Jess Phillips]

I fear the Minister is coming to the end of her remarks, but she has not addressed my new clause 44. Does she have any comment on it?

[Laura Farris]

I thank the hon. Lady for reminding me, but I had not forgotten. I listened carefully to her speech and I have read all her amendments, not all of which were selected, but some of which she has raised before. On the general defence, she will know that the Law Commission is currently undertaking a review of the defence of duress in relation to women and the crime—

[Jess Phillips]

It is not that amendment.

[Laura Farris]

I know that the amendment has not been selected, but I want to provide the hon. Lady with some reassurance on it, because we on this side of the House continue to think about the issues she has raised. She is aware of the Law Commission’s review of the defence of duress as it applies to murder. I want to provide her with an update and some reassurance that we will take the lessons that come out of that review, and consider it more widely, if appropriate, in alignment with the point that I think she made earlier in this debate.

On new clause 44, this is an important point between us, but the Government are resisting it not because there is any real dispute of principle, but because there is dispute of degree. There is a concern that by amending the wordings of sections 52 and 53 of the Sexual Offences Act, as so drafted, we could unnecessarily narrow the scope of section 52 as it has been applied in the criminal courts and potentially add an additional element to be proved in relation to section 53 that could make prosecution harder. We disagree not on the principle but about whether it will have the effect she is looking for. I did listen carefully to her speech and the way that she has presented the argument on previous occasions.

Criminal Justice Bill (Sixteenth sitting)

Debate between Laura Farris and Jess Phillips

Committee stage
Tuesday 30th January 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Laura Farris]

I am happy to take that correction—sorry, I was just speaking informally when I should not have been.

On new clauses 26 and 30, section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959 enables the police to divert individuals engaged in on-street sex work to alternative interventions. I will reference some of the points made by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, because we did some research into what is happening. First, the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s guidance, which advises officers, makes clear that it will not be commonplace to prosecute individuals who sell sex in public, and that every effort should be made to refer them to partner agencies and seek a diversionary route where possible. I have looked at the most recent data, which I will share with the Committee. In the year to March 2023, 301 soliciting crimes were recorded, of which 32—around 10%—resulted in either a charge or a summons. Of those that were charged, there has been on average less than one conviction a year from 2010 until today.

The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley also raised the issue of criminal convictions staying on people’s records. If someone is trying to exit enforced prostitution and rebuild their life, that is profoundly unhelpful—I agree with her without reservation. She will be aware of the announcement that spent convictions are now being removed from criminal records; that was in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act, but has been reinforced by the Lord Chancellor a number of times. I have already said that I will write to her about something, but I will just update her on that. We are working to try to get criminal records off people’s profiles, so that they can move on with their lives. That applies for all offences, because we think it is important that rehabilitation should have a serious meaning, whatever the offence.

Where we have this offence at the moment, we are principally seeing the police using it as a tool for diversion—that can be interpreted in a number of ways, but that is what we are principally seeing. The police have a challenging role, balancing the need to safeguard vulnerable on-street women who are selling sex from the harm they face, with the need to protect neighbourhoods from the negative consequences of that type of activity. Obviously, other crimes can often be concomitant to prostitution, particularly on the part of the people who control the women. There is also the issue of children being able to witness stuff like that. The police have to strike a balance there. Careful consideration of the law in this area is warranted, even when such considerations are placed in the balance. At the moment, the law in this area gives the police the flexibility to balance the different priorities, but we are thinking hard.

New clause 44 was tabled by the hon. Member for Swansea East, who raised interesting points that intersect with modern slavery. She made an interesting observation about something that I have seen in some of my other work, about where numbers all link to one person, or whether the same number is being duplicated across different sites. That goes right to the heart of modern slavery, and is a pressing issue for the Home Office.

I want to flag to the hon. Lady one of the difficulties that cuts across her new clause. It would effectively put an end to online services where individuals selling sex advertise lawfully. The research that the Home Office commissioned from Bristol University, which we published in 2019, showed that some people prefer to use technology to advertise because they feel safer doing so. The Government’s priority is to keep people engaged in this kind of work safe from harm, so we have to tread a difficult balance. We do not want to do something antithetical to protecting people from harm, which might happen if individuals selling sex were deprived of using technology and somehow diverted on to the street, forced underground or forced into an inherently more dangerous practice. It is reasonable for us to consider all the outcomes that could result, although I am not disagreeing with the force of the hon. Lady’s argument.

The Online Safety Act 2023, which is going through various stages of commencement now, should ensure that online platforms for individuals advertising are responsible and accountable for the content on their sites. They are required in law to take proactive steps to prevent those sites from being used by criminals. The commencement of the Online Safety Act is happening currently, so it is difficult to give an assessment, but all of this was covered in it. That includes a requirement for sites to proactively identify and remove content that is linked to priority offences, including controlling and inciting prostitution for gain, and human trafficking and modern slavery. As I have said, this cuts across these issues. With all due respect to the arguments advanced, I invite hon. Members not to press their new clauses.

[Jess Phillips]

I would welcome any intervention from the Minister. We would never write the phrase “child prostitute” into a document, so we should be really mindful of why on earth we allow that to continue with adults. We would call it exploitation; we call it the crime that it is.

Paying anybody for sex, even if completely legitimately —let’s face it, this mainly involves women—is fundamentally not a consensual act. None of us would choose it, would we? Would anybody here choose to have sex for money? We do not have to choose it from within a framework that means we will never have to. Would any of us choose it for our daughters? Would any of us be happy for our daughters to be on OnlyFans, selling it legally? I do not have any daughters, but I would certainly have a problem with my sons purchasing it.

The idea that this is a choice-based environment always gets used as a reason for not making progress on the issue. My concern is that there is no definition of adult sexual exploitation on a statutory footing, as my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North has pointed out. Perhaps I would withdraw the motion on the basis that the Government go away and include the idea of adult sexual exploitation in the Bill, or even in the Victims Bill as it goes through. Why on earth do we not have a definition of adult sexual exploitation, as if the adults who do these things choose to do them, even though we have recognised that none of us would?

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 24

Human trafficking

(1) Section 2 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (1) for ‘arranges or facilitates the travel of’ substitute ‘recruits, transports, transfers, harbours or receives through force, fraud or deception’.

(3) In subsection (2) for ‘travel’ substitute ‘the matters mentioned in subsection (1)’.

(4) Omit subsections (3) to (5).

(5) In paragraph (6)(a) for ‘arranging or facilitating takes’ substitute ‘matters mentioned in subsection (1) take’.

(6) Omit paragraph (6)(b).

(7) In paragraph (7)(a) for ‘arranging or facilitating takes’ substitute ‘matters mentioned in subsection (1) take’.

(8) In paragraph (7)(b) for the first ‘the’ substitute ‘any’.—(Jess Phillips.)

This new clause brings the definition of human trafficking in the Modern Slavery Act 2015 in line with the UN definition, particularly removing the requirement for exploitation to have involved travel.

Brought up, and read the First time.

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[Laura Farris]

I thank the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley for setting out her case for the new clause. I understand the concern underpinning the new clause that there are inconsistencies between the definition of human trafficking in the 2015 Act and some of the international definitions, including the Palermo protocol. However, the definitions set out in sections 1 and 2 of the 2015 Act capture all aspects of modern slavery offending, from international cross-border human trafficking in section 2 to the enslavement of victims in a domestic setting.

In cases where the travel aspect of trafficking is not present or cannot be proven to the criminal standard, criminals can be prosecuted for an offence under section 1 of the 2015 Act. That makes it an offence for a person to hold someone in any kind of slavery or servitude, or to require them to perform forced, coerced or compulsory labour. There is no need for the prosecution to prove that travel was an element of the section 1 offence. I point out too that both section 1 and section 2 attract the same maximum penalty of life, which is a reflection of how seriously both offences are viewed.

[Jess Phillips]

Does the Minister know how many cases of that were convicted last year, or in how many life has ever been given?

[Laura Farris]

No, I do not, but I can respond to the hon. Lady on that.

[Jess Phillips]

Fewer than 10.

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[Laura Farris]

But the police do not tell us that they lack the tools or that there is a gap in the law that requires us to amend section 2. Together, the offences defined in sections 1 and 2 comprehensively cover modern slavery and they are collectively aligned to the international definitions. The police tell us that they provide a clear legal framework. We think that new clause 24 would create overlapping offences, which could cause confusion among the police and prosecutors. I hope that, in light of that explanation, the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley will be content to withdraw her new clause.

[Jess Phillips]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 31

Reasonable force in domestic abuse cases

(1) Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (reasonable force for purposes of self-defence etc.) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (5A) after ‘In a householder case’ insert ‘or a domestic abuse case.

(3) In subsection (6) after ‘In a case other than a householder case’ insert ‘or a domestic abuse case’.

(4) After subsection (8F) insert—

‘(8G) For the purposes of this section ‘a domestic abuse case’ is a case where—

(a) the defence concerned is the common law defence of self-defence,

(b) D is, or has been, a victim of domestic abuse, and

(c) the force concerned is force used by D against the person who has perpetrated the abusive behaviour referred to in paragraph (b).

(8H) Subsection (8G)(b) will only be established if the behaviour concerned is, or is part of, a history of conduct which constitutes domestic abuse as defined in sections 1 and 2 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, including but not limited to conduct which constitutes the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship as defined in section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 (controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship).’

(5) In subsection (9) after ‘householder cases’ insert ‘and domestic abuse cases’.—(Jess Phillips.)

Statutory defence for victims of domestic abuse who may have been coerced into committing certain crimes or driven to use force against their abuser, as a result of being a victim of domestic abuse.

Brought up, and read the First time.

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[Laura Farris]

I thank the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley for tabling new clauses 31 and 32 and new schedule 2, which would create two new statutory defences for victims of domestic abuse. She mentioned the defence of self-defence, which is not available to householders only; self-defence is a complete defence available to anyone put in a situation where they are required to engage it. I make that point in passing.

The Committee is aware of the work that the Government have done on domestic abuse, so I will confine my remarks to our most recent work, which has focused on the issues set out in the hon. Member’s new clauses and new schedule. First, she is aware that we commissioned a domestic homicide review—undertaken by Clare Wade KC, who has given evidence to the Committee—which was the first from any Government to look at homicide in a domestic context. As part of that exercise, we invited Clare Wade to look at the law on domestic abuse defences. She did not have time to do so then, but she recommended that a further review should be undertaken. At the end of 2023, we commissioned that review by the Law Commission to look specifically at women driven to kill their abusive partners and the defences available to them, and to consider specifically whether legislative change was necessary. The review is due to conclude later this year—I understand by the summer.

I hope to reassure the hon. Member by reading out a few sections—I will only read short sections—of the review’s terms of reference, which I believe dovetail neatly with the points she has made in her new clauses and new schedule. Those terms of reference state:

“Most deaths that occur in the context of domestic abuse involve male abusers who kill their female victims. A much smaller number of (almost entirely female) victims of domestic abuse kill their (almost entirely male) abusers…Despite reforms to the partial defences of provocation (now loss of control) and diminished responsibility, concerns continue to be raised that the existing defences to murder and their application in the courts do not achieve just outcomes for this group of victims of domestic abuse who become defendants.”

It continues:

“The Law Commission will review the use of defences in domestic homicide cases in the light of modern understandings of the effects of domestic abuse on victims. The project will consider, but is not limited to, the following:

(1) whether the existing defences to murder, and arguments as to lack of requisite intent for murder, operate satisfactorily in the context of a defendant who has suffered domestic abuse;

(2) if not, whether reform of the existing defences or a new bespoke defence or defences are needed for the group identified…while ensuring that reformed or new defences are appropriately limited…

(3) the operation of the applicable rules of evidence, procedure, and ways that the defences are considered from the beginning of the police investigation up to and including at trial, in this context”.

[Jess Phillips]

I recognise all that good work, and I was pleased to see that, but that is specifically about murder and killing, not offending per se, which is what I was talking about. The Law Commission will not come back to the example I gave, with duress defences being used. I was talking about magistrates court cases, where medical evidence of domestic abuse needs to be produced to get a duress defence.

[Laura Farris]

The hon. Member is correct. I will come on to the other parts but I am starting with the most serious category of offences; I think there has been a particular concern in the law about whether they are adequately dealt with. However, I hope she will understand why we are keen to see the Law Commission’s review through to its conclusion, although we are sympathetic to the general aims.

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[Jess Phillips]

Is the Minister still talking about murder? I am not denying that it would be taken into account in murder, but it would not be taken into account in theft or the car incidences. It would not be taken into account like any offence would be for a victim of modern slavery. I am not talking about murder; I recognise the environment for that.

[Laura Farris]

Well, I have made the point. I was addressing new clause 31. The householder defence is really a homicide defence; those were the circumstances in which it came up, which is why I made those remarks.

New clause 32 and new schedule 2 seek to create a new and specific statutory defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence. The first version provides a defence where a person aged 18 or over does an act because they are compelled to do so as a result of the fact that they are a victim of domestic abuse, and a reasonable person in the same situation as that person, with the same relevant characteristics, would have no realistic alternative to doing that act. The second version applies to persons under 18, and provides a defence where a person acts as a direct consequence of being, or having been, a victim of domestic abuse. New schedule 2 sets out the offences to which that proposed defence would not be available.

I am sympathetic to the thrust of this new clause, particularly because of the correlation between domestic abuse and women who find themselves in the prison system. I know that the Prison Reform Trust, in conjunction with the Centre for Women’s Justice, has done really important work on this issue.

I will respond to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley about the case that she mentioned. She called it “JS”, but I think it is fair to use its title, because it is in the public domain: Stevens v. The Director of Public Prosecutions. She was quite right to outline the facts of the lady concerned, who said that she had found herself behind the wheel of a car, she was in her pyjamas and her other half was next to her; I think he had cocaine in his system. There was a background of coercive control. However, it is also true to say that her defence failed not only at first instance but on appeal, and I will just tell the Committee why, because I was troubled by the case and I wanted to see what factors the Court had considered.

The woman was driving dangerously at the time. However, she had already been disqualified from driving and she purchased the car when she was disqualified from driving. She conceded that she had driven it unlawfully a number of times before, with or without her husband. I am simply going through the factors. These are the factors that the Court of Appeal—the High Court, I think it was—had considered.

The jury took into consideration the fact that the woman did not tell the police at the time, or even in the police station, that she was under duress; she had also called her mum and had not mentioned being under duress. She had also—

[Jess Phillips]

Terrible defence.

[Laura Farris]

Well, this is the decision of the Court of Appeal.

[Jess Phillips]

I am afraid all the Minister is doing is identifying that this change is needed. So that woman did not tell her mother what her cocaine-fuelled partner, who her mother probably hated, was doing to her? Her mother has probably been isolated from seeing her daughter. She did not tell her mother? Has the Minister told her mother about every terrible thing that has ever happened to her? This is all just based on absolute myth and stereotype.

[Laura Farris]

I am simply going through how the higher court approached it. The point is that the Court found that the jury had not been persuaded that this was a duress case; duress was advanced as a defence, but that defence was not accepted. That is the nature of the system. So, it was not a case that the arguments were ignored; it was that she was not believed.

[Jess Phillips]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Laura Farris]

Before I do, may I say that I am not asserting my own view, but I did bother to read the case, because I thought it was a difficult case? And I think that it is probably difficult in Committee for MPs to weigh in to whether the appeal courts are right or wrong. The Court’s conclusion was that she had not made out her case; that was its conclusion. That is not my view; it is a fact.

[Jess Phillips]

It may very well be a “fact” that that woman was not successful in getting the defence of duress. In different circumstances, would she have been able to get the defence that I am talking about today? That would be easier to prove, because cases of duress require relevant characteristics to be established, including “battered woman syndrome” and “learned helplessness”. Those are outdated concepts, which pathologise women rather than offering an effective defence suitable for the actual circumstances. These concepts require a production of medical evidence—I do not have that for coercive control. That is not practicable and in many cases involves low-level offending tried in magistrates courts.

[Laura Farris]

I thank the hon. Member for her intervention, which leads into the point I wanted to address in her new clause. Subsection (3)(b) of new clause 32 says that the criminal offence must be:

“a direct consequence of a person being, or having been, a victim of such abuse.”

My point is that whatever we make of this case, that woman did not prove causation; the jury was not satisfied that there was causation. And that would still be the case even under the new clause, as drafted. Someone would have to prove a causal connection between domestic abuse and the criminal offence that took place.

So, while we are interested in this area of the law, at the moment it is difficult to see how the new clause changes the defences of duress or self-defence, which already exist in common law.

[Jess Phillips]

I will just quote the Minister to herself. Earlier, when we were discussing spiking, she said that it was all too well and easy to say, “This already exists. We shouldn’t do anything about it.” I am just quoting her back at herself. These defences already exist.

[Laura Farris]

I am simply making a point about causation. The hon. Member has put a causal measure into her new clause and she raised a case, and I am simply saying that it was the conclusion of the jury in that case that causation was not established. I cannot go behind that finding, because we have an independent court system.

[Jess Phillips]

Apart from the Post Office.

[Laura Farris]

That has assisted there.

A new statutory defence would also be restrictive in how it is framed and, unlike the common law defence, is less able to respond to the changing nature of forms of domestic abuse. We have seen how in recent years the courts have recognised the development of certain forms of domestic abuse, such as controlling and coercive behaviour, and have been able to weigh that into the application of certain defences in law.

I am interested in this area of the law; I just do not think the new clause is right yet. It is very wide and could provide a full defence to any criminal act, save for those offences listed in schedule 2, without considering the range of seriousness. I recognise that the list of behaviours in schedule 2 is based on the modern slavery defence, but the behaviours covered by that statutory defence are much narrower than those in the Bill, and they apply only where the pressure on the defendant would amount to an offence under the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

To conclude, the Government do not agree at present that the measures proposed by new clauses 31 or 32 are necessary, and I ask the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley not to press them.

[Jess Phillips]

I will just read the first bit of my speech again and then sit down, because we have to get through proceedings today. More than six years ago, in 2017, the Home Office Minister for Crime, Safeguarding and Vulnerability said there needed to be

“a root and branch review of how women are treated in the criminal justice system”.

I will welcome it when it eventually comes. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 39

Requirement for specialist rape and serious sexual offence teams

(1) The chief officer of each police force in England and Wales must establish a specialist team for the investigation of rape and serious sexual offences within the relevant force area.

(2) The chief officer must provide for members of the specialist team to be provided with such training and guidance on the investigation of rape and serious sexual offences as the chief officer sees fit.

(3) Any chief officer who fails to establish a specialist team must produce and publish a report to the Secretary of State outlining–

(a) the reasons for the chief officer’s decision not to establish a specialist team;

(b) how rape and serious sexual offences are to be investigated in the absence of a specialist team;

(c) what training and guidance is given to officers on the investigation of rape and serious sexual offences.”—(Alex Norris.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Laura Farris]

I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland, who has been such an effective campaigner on this deeply personal offence that completely devastated her young life. She has made sure that it is seen not as a minimal offence or a nasty accident, but as the most serious form of assault. I know that she has been engaging with the Lord Chancellor, and I do not want to pre-empt those conversations. I was due to meet her this week; she was unwell, but we will still do so, and there is a process of discussion.

I want to say a little about new clause 50, and about one or two of the concerns that we have at this point. One-punch manslaughter is already a form of unlawful act—manslaughter—and it closely overlaps with that offence. The new clause closely reflects the existing law, but the common-law offence of unlawful act manslaughter has a maximum penalty of life imprisonment.

The new clause has two elements that differ from unlawful act manslaughter, meaning in practice that it would apply only to a small number of cases. First, the unlawful act set out in the new clause requires

“a single punch to the head or neck”.

Secondly, whereas unlawful act manslaughter requires that a reasonable person would have understood that the act posed some risk of harm, the new clause requires a “significant risk” of harm. In other words, it is setting a higher evidential threshold for what the perpetrator knew than the current principles of manslaughter. We would not wish to create an offence that made it harder to get a conviction rather than easier, as is currently the case with manslaughter.

We make similar observations in relation to GBH. Murder can be charged in two circumstances: where there was an intention to kill, or where there was an intent by the perpetrator to cause serious harm to the level of GBH. An intent to kill is not usually present in one-punch cases, but an intent to cause serious harm to the level of GBH may be present. That is called the GBH rule, and in some ways it overlaps with the specific circumstances described in the new clause. There is therefore a risk that people who could be charged with murder would deviate to pleading guilty to the lesser offence because they think that they would get less time. We want to avoid that.

I had another point to make in passing about the Australian system—I cannot lay my hand on my note, but I was going to say that it results in lower sentences than what is suggested here, so it is not a perfect read-across.

The Government’s other concern, as nobody on this Committee will be surprised to hear, is about the new clause setting a minimum sentence. We do not wish to create anomalies in the law. How would the family of a victim who was killed by a single punch to the abdomen feel if the minimum sentence did not apply? How would the family of a victim who was killed by two punches to the head feel if their case was treated differently?

As the Committee has seen over the course of our debates, minimum sentences sometimes create difficulties in the law on homicide and irregularities in sentencing. When we extrapolate those to certain circumstances, some of which we probably cannot even imagine as we sit here today, they could cause irregularities further down the line. None of that is fatal to the new clause, by way; it simply informs our thinking and our nervousness with the minimum-sentence suggestion at the moment.

We appreciate, without any reservation, the very serious harm that the new clause targets. We want to see laws and sentencing powers that are flexible enough to deal with different levels of culpability. We would not wish for more people either to get away with it because the intent could not be proved or to use this new offence as an alternative to murder.

We are thinking hard about it, and we wish to maintain consistency in the law. At the same time, we recognise the harm that is caused by this offending. We recognise the seriousness of it, and we recognise the importance of the campaign that my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland has presented to the House. I ask the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley to withdraw the new clause at this point, but we are continuing conversations with my hon. Friend.

[Jess Phillips]

The hon. Member for Bishop Auckland did not ask me to press new clause 50. However, I can see from looking through the list of supporters that she has managed to unite me and the hon. Member for Ashfield (Lee Anderson)—she may be the only person ever to have managed that. I hope he doesn’t take my ribbing too seriously and change his vote on something.

The hon. Member for Bishop Auckland tells me that the Minister and the Secretary of State have both been engaging with her and that she wishes to continue that engagement, so I imagine that these issues will arise again on Report or even in the Lords. I will not press the new clause to a vote today, but the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland is young, bright and short and is determined to see some action on the issue before she leaves this place. Who could blame her, considering her experiences? I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 51

Aggravated offences: hostility towards transgender identity, sexual orientation and disability

“(1) The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 is amended as follows.

(2) For the first cross-heading under Part II, substitute ‘Offences aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity: England and Wales’.

(3) In section 28—

(a) for the heading, substitute ‘Meaning of “aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”’;

(b) in subsection (1), omit ‘racially or religiously aggravated’ and insert ‘aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’;

(c) in subsection (1)(a), omit from ‘based on’ to the end of sub-subsection (a) and insert—

‘—

(i) the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a racial group;

(ii) the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a religious group;

(iii) a disability (or presumed disability) of the victim;

(iv) the sexual orientation (or presumed sexual orientation) of the victim; or

(v) the victim being (or being presumed to be) transgender, or’;

(d) in subsection (1)(b), omit from ‘hostility towards’ to the end of sub-subsection (b) and insert—

‘—

(i) members of a racial group based on their membership of that group;

(ii) members of a religious group based on their membership of that group;

(iii) persons who have a disability or a particular disability;

(iv) persons who are of a particular sexual orientation; or

(v) persons who are transgender.’;

(e) in subsection (2), in the definition of ‘membership’ leave out ‘racial or religious’ and insert ‘relevant’.

(4) In section 29—

(a) for the heading, substitute ‘Assaults aggravated on grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’;

(b) in subsection (1), omit ‘racially or religiously aggravated’ and insert ‘aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’.

(5) In section 30—

(a) for the heading, substitute ‘Criminal damage aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’;

(b) in subsection (1), omit ‘racially or religiously aggravated” and insert ‘aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’.

(6) In section 31—

(a) for the heading, substitute ‘Public order offences aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’;

(b) in subsection (1), omit ‘racially or religiously aggravated’ and insert ‘aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’.

(7) In section 32—

(a) for the heading, substitute ‘Harassment etc aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’;

(b) in subsection (1), omit ‘racially or religiously aggravated’ and insert ‘aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’.”—(Alex Cunningham.)

This new clause would include offences motivated by hostility towards an individual’s disability status, sexual orientation or transgender identity (or perception thereof) in those which are aggravated under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Alex Cunningham]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 51 would address the disparity between existing characteristics and current hate crime legislation. It would create parity for maximum possible penalties for all five characteristics defined under the sentencing code. Under current hate crime legislation, hate crimes based on race and/or religion can have higher maximum penalties than their base equivalents, whereas hate crimes based on sexual orientation, transgender identity and/or disability cannot. This creates a two-tier system of justice.

There are precedents for expanding the characteristics covered by aggravated offences. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 originally defined only racially aggravated offences; this was amended in the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 to include religiously aggravated offences. In December 2021, the Law Commission published “Hate crime laws: Final report”, a comprehensive review of all hate crime legislation. Its conclusion was:

“We remain of the view that we expressed in our 2014 report that the current hierarchy of protection is unfair and sends a distinctly negative message to victims of hate crimes on the basis of disability, sexual orientation and transgender identity. We therefore recommend parity of protection for aggravated offences across all five characteristics.”

It also stated:

“There was very strong support for a consistent approach amongst organisational stakeholders…For example, The Bar Council simply said…‘There would not appear to be any good reason to withhold parity of protection across the range of protected characteristics.’”

Does the Minister agree with the Law Commission’s recommendation that offences motivated by hostility towards an individual’s disability status, sexual orientation or transgender identity should be encompassed within the aggravated offences under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998?

New clause 51 comes in the context of soaring levels of hate crime reporting. Over 145,000 cases were reported in 2022-23. Across all monitored strands of hate crime, the numbers of offences have soared since 2011-12. Racially motivated hate crime rose by over 200% in the period, topping 100,000 instances for the first time in 2021-22. Meanwhile, hate crime motivated by religion increased by 433%. What is wrong with our bloomin’ society? By sexual orientation, it has increased by 493% and, by transgender identity, it has increased by 1,263%. Violent crime or crimes against the person rose as a proportion of hate crime offences from 29% in 2012-13 to 41% in 2022-23. The number of violent hate crime offences has risen sixfold, from 12,739 to 63,895 in 2022.

LGBT+ people and people with a disability should be able to live their life free from fear, abuse or violence. Labour has committed to take back our streets and be tough on hate crime. We will do so by strengthening and equalising the law so that every category of hate crime is treated as an aggravated offence, to ensure that everyone who falls victim to a hate crime is treated equally under the law. I hope that the Government will support new clause 51.

Criminal Justice Bill (Fifteenth sitting)

Debate between Laura Farris and Jess Phillips

Committee stage
Tuesday 30th January 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Laura Farris]

The new clause seeks the automatic suspension of parental responsibility where a parent has been convicted of a serious sexual offence against a child. We understand fully the motivation in bringing the new clause. We have discussed it and I respect the remarks that have been made. I want to confine my remarks to the contours of the current system and where that fits in relation to Jade’s law, which the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley has already alluded to, and how that was introduced in the Victims and Prisoners Bill.

Starting with the current state of the law, the paramountcy principle is the cornerstone of the family justice system. There must be full consideration of the best interests of the child as a starting point. The hon. Member for Stockton North has just given an example of a number of cases where the parent had committed a very serious sexual offence and the family court acted accordingly to suspend parental responsibility.

[Jess Phillips]

Perhaps the Minister would like to see my email account, which has a folder specifically for the thousands of cases from the family court where the cornerstone is absolutely not the safety of the child. There are lots of cases where that does not happen—far more than the handful that have been referred to.

[Laura Farris]

I noted what the hon. Lady said in her opening remarks, but I will go through the legal landscape before I come to other issues. As I say, we are carefully considering the force of the new clause.

In cases in which a parent has been convicted of a child sexual offence, the family court has the power to strip out parental responsibility. That decision is made only after careful consideration of the best interests of the individual children, to ensure that their needs are the driver for action. Decisions about suspending or restricting parental responsibility have significant ramifications for children, which is why judges prefer to consider each case on its individual merits and make a decision that is specific to the best interests of that child.

We must not conflate suspending an individual’s parental responsibility with a punishment. It is a step that is taken to protect the child from harm, and because of that it must be taken when it is in the best interests of the child. The new clause, as drafted, makes no provision for the consideration of the best interests of the child. For that reason, we think it engages article 8 consideration under the European convention.

Members are of course aware that the Government recently tabled an amendment to the Victims and Prisoners Bill that will automatically suspend parental responsibility where a parent has been convicted of the murder or the manslaughter of the other parent. We wish to make clear that distinction. In many cases in which one parent has killed the other, the children involved will have no one left to exercise parental responsibility, apart from the killer of their other parent. In such circumstances, we think that it is right that whoever is left caring for the child, whether that be a grandparent or even the local authority, is spared the onus being on them to commence family proceedings to restrict the offender’s parental responsibility.

Where a parent has committed a serious offence other than murder or voluntary manslaughter, it is likely that there will be another parent able to exercise parental responsibility and apply to the family court.

[Jess Phillips]

Does the hon. Lady think it is okay for a woman who has been abused and had her husband convicted of paedophilia to pay £30,000 in order to keep her children safe?

[Laura Farris]

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention. That case has caused concern, and we have been looking carefully at the legal aid position, which I will come on to.

As I was saying, where a parent has committed a serious offence other than murder or manslaughter, it is likely that there will be another parent able to exercise parental responsibility and make the application to the family court—I will come to legal aid in a moment—for the well-established method of restricting the offender’s parental responsibility.

Lord Meston, a family court judge who sits in the House of Lords, made a speech on the Victims and Prisoners Bill in which he warmly welcomed the inclusion of Jade’s law as a way of automatically restricting the rights of the other parent. I just say this in passing. He was invited to consider whether there should be the automatic suspension of parental responsibility if another kind of crime was committed. He said something that we have noted as part of our thinking:

“However, on reflection, I do not think that the Crown Court should be expected, as part of a sentencing exercise, to make automatic prohibited steps orders”

in different cases. He continued:

“The Crown Court will not have, and cannot be expected to have, a full appreciation of the family’s structure and dynamics, and of the circumstances of the children concerned, and will not have input from Cafcass.” Lords—[Official Report, House of Lords, 18 December 2023; Vol. 834, c. 2094.]

That is not determinative of our thinking, but it is the reflection of a family court judge who sits in the other place. That is what he said in relation to Jade’s law while, of course, welcoming it.

The automatic nature of the new clause would mean there would be no space for the court to consider the wishes of the other parent or the wishes of the children as to whether the matter should be brought to a family court.

[Jess Phillips]

The new clause clearly states that the other parent can apply to the court to have their wishes heard, but it is not the responsibility of a completely innocent mother, in most cases, to have to protect her child from a sex offender.

[Laura Farris]

I accept that the new clause gives the other parent the right to return to the family court, but effectively it could force a child to make applications to the family court to have their wishes considered.

[Jess Phillips]

How?

[Laura Farris]

Because there has to be an application for the reinstatement of parental responsibility. That is what the new clause states at proposed new section 2A(2).

[Jess Phillips]

The hon. Lady said that a child would have to make an application to the family court. How is that the case?

[Laura Farris]

The child would have to advance what their best interests are to the family court, if parental responsibility has already been suspended.

[Jess Phillips]

Children do not take cases.

[Laura Farris]

We have carefully considered the case in Cardiff. I want to make it clear that legal aid is available for a prohibited steps order and specific issue order in specific circumstances, subject to means and merits tests and evidence requirements relating to domestic abuse or the protection of children being met. Where the subject of an order has a relevant conviction for a child abuse offence, it is likely that the application would satisfy the relevant evidence and merits criteria. We are looking into why that was not the case for the lady in Cardiff.

[Jess Phillips]

Could I also open all the other cases with the Legal Aid Agency? The vast majority of people I encounter—there are thousands, and I have sat in the family court for hours—have not been able to access legal aid. Every one of them is a victim. Perhaps the Minister could look into that.

[Laura Farris]

That warrants a response, and the hon. Lady will get one.

My final point, to which the hon. Lady alluded in her opening remarks, when she said she hoped the provision might go wider, is that one of the conceptual difficulties with the new clause is that it would seek to remove parental responsibility in cases of serious child sexual abuse, but it is silent on, for example, child murder. Or what about perhaps a serious case of terrorism, where we could advance a plausible argument? We think there are issues around the scope of the new clause.

[Jess Phillips]

I could not agree more—the scope needs to be much wider—so will the Minister and the Government, by Report stage or in the Lords, finally act on the harms review by tabling amendments to the Bill that we can all be proud of?

[Laura Farris]

As I say, we are looking at the definitional issues. We are also looking carefully at the paramountcy principle, which underpins the way in which cases are approached in the family court. The new clause has a worthy aim. We have huge sympathy for families in these circumstances and want to do as much as possible to support them in getting the right outcome for their children. At present, we do not think the new clause is the right way to do that, and we urge the hon. Lady to withdraw it.

[Jess Phillips]

For nearly 10 years I have had Ministers stand in front of me and say, “We are a bit worried about” some legal word or other. How many children have died because of family court proceedings in the 10 years that we have been trying to raise the alarm? The family courts in our country will be the next Rotherham or Rochdale. State-sanctioned child abuse is going on and we all just turn a blind eye. The things that I have seen in courts are harrowing. I have watched children being removed from their loving mothers and placed fully in the care of paedophiles—proven child abusers. For me, we cannot casually sit here and pretend that that is okay.

Funnily enough, one of the people I started this campaign with, all those years ago, was the current Justice Secretary. Why is it taking so long to do something about the family courts in our country? They are actively dangerous, everybody knows it and nobody is doing anything about it. It is like the Post Office; I will not be one of those people who sat by and did nothing.

I will not press the new clause to a Division, because its scope is not wide enough and does not deal with half the harms that I see. If the Minister wants to take away the parental responsibility for children from terrorists she can knock herself out—I will support it. I will support any movement towards progress in the family court, because I have seen none. I look forward to the Government coming forward with an all-singing, all-dancing proposal that will make children safe. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jess Phillips]

Can the Minister tell me what protections are in place for the woman in the case that I outlined? She was considered to be an accessory to a crime. She was a victim of coercive and controlling behaviour, and the crime was a part of a pattern of domestic abuse.

[Laura Farris]

In that circumstance, the defence of duress would be available to the victim in the ordinary way.

[Jess Phillips]

Currently, that is absolutely not what is happening in our criminal courts. It is currently no defence for victims of domestic abuse in these cases to say, “I’m a victim of domestic abuse: that’s why I ended up here.” The Minister is saying that there is the defence of duress; I am saying that it never gets used. It does not stack up, and this is not happening in reality. She has spoken of her pride in the Government over coercive control. Does she think that there need to be specific elements, within this conversation about joint enterprise, to protect people who are coerced into such behaviours?

[Laura Farris]

We will come on to some amendments of that nature and I will deal with them in due course, but the defence of duress is a standard defence in the criminal context. [Interruption.] These are the criminal defences that get advanced.

In response to the hon. Member for Bootle, this is an area of the law that is intrinsically linked with other inchoate offences such as encouraging or assisting a crime. We think that it is too difficult to require the prosecution to prove a significant contribution; as we say, the very important case of Jogee has set clear parameters for both the conduct element and the mental element, which we think creates the correct framework of common law. For those reasons, the Government are unable to support the new clause, and we ask the hon. Member for Bootle to withdraw it.

Criminal Justice Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Debate between Laura Farris and Jess Phillips

Committee stage
Thursday 25th January 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Jess Phillips]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 74 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 75 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 76

Regulations

Amendment made: 146, in clause 76, page 68, line 15, after “purposes” insert “or areas”.—(Chris Philp.)

This amendment provides that regulations under the Bill (other than regulations under clause 78) may make different provision for different areas.

Clause 76, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 77

Extent

Amendments made: 41, in clause 77, page 68, line 36, leave out “5” and insert “1”.

This amendment provides that clauses 1 to 4 extend to (ie form part of the law of) Scotland and Northern Ireland, as well as England and Wales.

Amendment 42, in clause 77, page 69, line 2, at end insert—

“(ea) section (Terrorist offenders) (and Schedule (Notification orders));”.

This amendment provides that the new clause and Schedule moved by NC14 and NS1 extend to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

Amendment 43, in clause 77, page 69, line 10, at end insert—

“(3A) Sections 11 and 12 extend to England and Wales and Northern Ireland.”.

See the statement to amendment 23.

Amendment 44, in clause 77, page 69, line 11, after “by” insert “section 32(2) or”.—(Chris Philp.)

This amendment to the extent provision is consequential on Amendment 40.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)]

I beg to move amendment 147, in clause 77, page 69, line 11, after “by” insert

“section (Administering etc harmful substances (including by spiking))(2) or”.

This amendment provides that consequential amendments made by subsection (2) of the new clause moved by NC45 have the same extent as the provision amended.

--- Later in debate ---

[Laura Farris]

I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford, who has been an important voice on the issue. When I made a statement to the House just before Christmas, I thanked everybody: my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester, the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North and the hon. Member for Bradford South. Theirs have been important voices, and they have been helpful to us as we have worked our way through this issue.

I did not set out our thinking in my initial remarks, so it might be helpful for me to do so. First, it was said that spiking was covered by other offences, but when we look at the language of the Offences against the Person Act, it is accurate to say that parliamentarians at the time had something different in mind. We can tell that just by reading the legislation.

Secondly, all parliamentarians are familiar with being told that something is already covered by another law, but it is worth asking, “Would this particular offence be better captured in a defined way?” We have done the same with offences such as stalking in the life of this Parliament. For lots of offences, it is possible to think, “Can we crystallise the offence in a more accurate way?” That was material to our thinking, and that is why we have made these changes. I hope that that is helpful to the Committee.

I reassure my right hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford that all forms of spiking are included, whether by needle, vape, drink or a food substance. New clause 45 is deliberately widely constructed so as to capture the whole range. She made a point about urine testing. We have been told by police that the biggest barrier to conviction is that even if the victim reports the incident the following morning and immediately gives a sample for a toxicology test, they can be left with the disappointing news that the substance has left their body, even though the police often accept that everything that they and perhaps their friends are describing is consistent with a spiking incident. That is why investment in rapid drinks testing kits, which are at a nascent stage, has been a big part of the non-legislative measures. If we can get those up and running, we can roll them out across night-time venues to facilitate on-site testing without having to go through the standard toxicology route. We think that would be really helpful in getting convictions.

We have been working with the Security Industry Authority on the training of nightclub doormen and bouncers. From April this year, there will be a condition for any new nightclub bouncer entering the industry to have specific training on spiking. From September, we will begin a refresher element, including a spiking course, for those already employed in the sector. It is anticipated that, within three years, all nightclub bouncers will have had had specific night-time training, and we are doing something similar with bar staff.

There is also a national reporting tool, which is currently operated by 20 police forces in England and Wales. It is being rolled out, but about half of the forces are using it. It allows people to report spiking anonymously. That does not have to be the victim; anyone who has seen something that they think is consistent with a spiking incident can make a report. That will help forces to develop a clearer picture of where spiking is happening and whether there are hotspots or problem areas, which will allow them to intensify the police response. Finally, we are doing some police intensification work.

I have probably gone on too long. Suffice it to say that dealing with spiking properly requires more than a change in the law, but we do think a change in the law is necessary and desirable, and we therefore hope that Members will support new clause 45.

Amendment 147 agreed to.

Amendment made: 50, in clause 77, page 69, line 12, at end insert—

“(5) Nothing in subsections (1) to (4) limits the extent within the United Kingdom of the armed forces provisions.

(6) Section 384(1) and (2) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (extent outside the United Kingdom) applies to the armed forces provisions as it applies to the provisions of that Act.

(7) In subsections (5) and (6) the “armed forces provisions” means—

(a) a provision made, or inserted, by or under this Act so far as it is applied (by whatever words) by or under the Armed Forces Act 2006;

(b) an amendment, modification or repeal made by or under this Act of—

(i) a provision of or made under the Armed Forces Act 2006,

(ii) a provision that amends, modifies or repeals a provision of, or made under, that Act, or

(iii) any other provision, so far as the provision is applied (by whatever words) by or under that Act.”.—(Chris Philp.)

This amendment makes provision about the extent of provisions of or made under the Bill which relate to the Armed Forces Act 2006.

Clause 77, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 78

Commencement

Amendments made: 45, in clause 78, page 69, line 18, after “sections” insert

“(Testing of persons outside of police detention for presence of controlled drugs),”.

This amendment makes provision to bring NC13 into force on Royal Assent for the purpose of making regulations and issuing codes of practice.

Amendment 131, in clause 78, page 69, line 18, leave out “, 21 and 34” and insert “and 21”.

This amendment and amendment 132 provide for the clauses about serious crime prevention orders to be brought into force by regulations.

Amendment 46, in clause 78, page 69, line 18, after “regulations” insert

“or issuing codes of practice”.—(Chris Philp.)

See the statement for amendment 45.

[Jess Phillips]

I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 78, page 69, line 21, at end insert—

“( ) section ([Removal of women from the criminal law related to abortion]).”

This is an amendment conditional on the introduction of NC1. It would bring the new law into force on the day the Act is passed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jess Phillips]

One too many.

[Laura Farris]

Okay, but it is one, to give the Committee a sense of the scale of this issue in the criminal courts.

I turn first to amendment 1 and new clause 1, tabled by the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North. The purpose of new clause 1 is to disapply existing criminal law relating to abortion from a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy at any stage of gestation. Under section 6 of the Abortion Act 1967, “the law relating to abortion” means

“sections 58 and 59 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, and any rule of law relating to the procurement of abortion”.

Section 5(1) of the 1967 Act provides:

“No offence under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 shall be committed by a registered medical practitioner who terminates a pregnancy in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”

New clause 1 refers to “the law related to abortion”. Unlike the Abortion Act, it is not limited to specific provisions, and it could therefore be interpreted as applying more widely. It could, for example, include other offences against the person that may apply in this context, such as maliciously administering a poison so as to endanger life or inflict grievous bodily harm. In that regard, it differs from the law as it applies in Northern Ireland.

The hon. Member for Walthamstow takes a different approach. Her new clause 2 would require the Secretary of State to decriminalise abortion through regulations. Among other things, the regulations would repeal sections 58 to 60 of the Offences against the Person Act and make provision for alternative offences in relation to non-consensual abortion.

I reiterate that, should Parliament wish to change the law, the Government will not stand in the way, but hon. Members may consider that there would be alternative ways to amend primary legislation. Leaving aside the way in which decriminalisation might be achieved, there is the question whether the repeal of section 60 of the Offences against the Person Act is appropriate. Section 60 makes it an offence for a person to conceal the birth of a child by disposing of the child’s body after its birth. There is a high-profile case in the papers today concerning exactly that issue. It is not generally considered to be an abortion offence and it is not limited to the abortion context. Repealing the offence could have unintended consequences.

[Jess Phillips]

On the point made by the right hon. Member for Chelmsford, I have to say that I have noted from prior conversations people’s level of fear that they might have to vote on this issue today. If I were on the other side of this debate, I would not stop and think for a second that the will of the House needed to be tested, or that there was not a sneaky way to change the legislation—but I am not. We have tested the will of this House a number of times in the nine years that I have been here, and on every single occasion Parliament has acted in a pro-choice manner and has had a pro-choice majority. I have no doubt that I would hold the majority should I press new clause 1 to a Division in this Committee.

I agree with the right hon. Member for Chelmsford that it is the will of the House that these issues need to be tested. As I have said, I have no doubt that we will win in that context. What I would say is that it is always women’s bodies that we say this about. There is a load of people who will never have the experiences that I have had personally, or that some of the other women in this room have had, but get to have an opinion about the way that I live my life and make my choices about my own body, and we are taught to sort of genuflect and respect that. It should be a women’s health issue. If this was the women’s health Bill, we would be more than happy to amend all sorts of things in this room, but we allow this issue to retain some sort of grandiosity, as if it is any more than having a prostate exam, which even the King is doing and talking about. It should not be a thing any more. We are doing line-by-line scrutiny; we should be amending small bits.

On the Minister’s point about the things that the Government have put in place, let me say on behalf of my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North that she is welcome, because every single one of them came from an amendment that my right hon. Friend tabled. This is not her first rodeo; it is a long passion.

The thing I heard today that gave me solace was from my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North, who said from the Opposition Front Bench that the Labour party will move to ensure that, under any Labour Government, Parliament has time to actually consider this issue, so that people do not have to tack things on to Bills that they might not quite fit in.

The Minister mentioned one person having been criminalised. I imagine that, if she goes away and gets the data on the number of incidents of domestic abuse where a miscarriage has been forced and the man has been charged with the same offence that she identified under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act, she will find that it is zero, yet that will have happened hundreds of times in the last few years.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: 148, in clause 78, page 69, line 24, at end insert—

“(aa) section (Maximum term of imprisonment for certain offences on summary conviction);”—(Laura Farris.)

This amendment provides that the new clause moved by NC47 comes into force two months after Royal Assent.

Amendment made: 132, in clause 78, page 69, leave out line 28.—(Chris Philp.)

See the explanatory statement to amendment 131.

Clause 78, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 79 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 10

Power to seize bladed articles etc: armed forces

“In the Armed Forces Act 2006, after section 93ZC (inserted by section (Stolen goods on premises (entry, search and seizure without warrant): armed forces) insert—

“93ZD Power to seize bladed articles etc

(1) This section applies where—

(a) a service policeman is lawfully on any premises which are searchable by virtue of this Part, or

(b) a person subject to service law who is not a service policeman is lawfully on any premises in the exercise of a power of search conferred by virtue of this Part.

(2) If the service policeman or person subject to service law—

(a) finds, on the premises, an article which has a blade or is sharply pointed (a “relevant article”), and

(b) has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the relevant article would be likely to be used in connection with unlawful violence (if it were not seized),they may seize the relevant article.

(3) The following provisions apply where a relevant article is seized under this section.

(4) The service policeman or person subject to service law who seized the relevant article—

(a) must give a record of what was seized to a person who is on the premises, or

(b) if there is no person on the premises, must leave a record of what was seized in a prominent place on the premises.

(5) The record must—

(a) describe the relevant article,

(b) state that it has been seized under this section,

(c) specify the date of seizure,

(d) give the reason why the relevant article was seized, and

(e) specify the name, rank or rate, and the unit, of the service policeman or person subject to service law who seized the relevant article.

(6) Following seizure of the relevant article, the service policeman or person subject to service law may—

(a) retain it, or

(b) destroy it or otherwise dispose of it. This is subject to subsections (7) and (12).

(7) A person (“P”) claiming to be the owner of the relevant article may apply to the commanding officer of the relevant person for a determination that the relevant article should be delivered to P.

(8) The “relevant person” is the person by virtue of whose occupation of or other connection with the premises, the premises are within subsection (1).

(9) The commanding officer may make a determination under subsection (7) if it appears to them that—

(a) P is the owner of the relevant article, and

(b) it would be just to make the determination.

(10) If the commanding officer does not make a determination under subsection (7), P may appeal to a judge advocate.

(11) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision—

(a) with respect to the practice and procedure which is to apply in connection with applications for a determination under subsection (7) and appeals under subsection (10);

(b) conferring functions on judge advocates in relation to appeals under subsection (10).

(12) The relevant article may not be destroyed or disposed of—

(a) in the period of 6 months beginning with the day on which it is seized, or

(b) if an application under subsection (7) is made in that period, until the application (including any appeal) has been finally determined or otherwise disposed of (and then, only if no determination is made that the relevant article should be delivered to P).

(13) In this section “unlawful violence” includes—

(a) unlawful damage to property, and

(b) a threat of unlawful violence (including of unlawful damage to property).””—(Chris Philp.)

This new clause amends the Armed Forces Act 2006 to make provision equivalent to that made by clause 18 of the Bill.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 11

Stolen goods on premises (entry, search and seizure without warrant): armed forces

“In the Armed Forces Act 2006, after section 93 insert—

“93ZA Search for particular stolen goods

(1) A service policeman of at least the rank of naval lieutenant, military or marine captain or flight lieutenant may authorise a service policeman to—

(a) enter specified premises which are relevant residential premises, and

(b) search the specified premises for specified items.

(2) An officer may give an authorisation under subsection (1) only if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that—

(a) the specified items are stolen goods,

(b) the specified items are on the specified premises, and

(c) it is likely that the purpose of the search would be frustrated or seriously prejudiced if no search could be carried out before the time mentioned in subsection (3).

(3) That time is the earliest time by which it would be practicable—

(a) for a service policeman to obtain and execute a warrant under section 83 authorising the entry and search of the premises, or

(b) in a case where a member of a UK police force could obtain a warrant under section 8 of PACE or any other enactment authorising the entry and search of the premises, for a member of such a force to obtain and execute such a warrant.

(4) An officer may give an authorisation under subsection (1) orally or in writing.

(5) As soon as reasonably practicable after giving the authorisation the officer must record in writing—

(a) if the authorisation is given orally, the authorisation, and

(b) in any case, the officer’s reasons for being satisfied as mentioned in subsection (2).

(6) The powers conferred by an authorisation under subsection (1) may be exercised only—

(a) by a service policeman in uniform,

(b) before the end of the 24 hour period beginning with the time the authorisation is given, and

(c) at a reasonable hour (unless it appears to the service policeman that exercising them at a reasonable hour may frustrate or seriously prejudice the purpose of exercising them).

(7) The power of search conferred by an authorisation under subsection (1) is exercisable only to the extent that is reasonably required for the purpose of searching the specified premises for the specified items.

(8) Where the occupier of the specified premises is present at the time the service policeman seeks to enter and search them, the service policeman must—

(a) identify themselves to the occupier, and

(b) state the purpose for which they are entering and searching the premises.

93ZB Seizure on search under section 93ZA

(1) This section applies where a service policeman is lawfully on relevant residential premises in exercise of the powers conferred by an authorisation under section 93ZA(1).

(2) The service policeman may seize anything which is on the specified premises (whether or not it is a specified item) if the service policeman has reasonable grounds to believe—

(a) that it is stolen goods, and

(b) that it is necessary to seize it in order to prevent it being concealed, lost, damaged altered or destroyed.

(3) The service policeman may seize anything which is on the specified premises (whether or not it is a specified item) if the service policeman has reasonable grounds to believe—

(a) that it is evidence in relation to—

(i) an offence under section 42 which the service policeman is investigating, or

(ii) any other offence under section 42,

as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is theft, and

(b) that it is necessary to seize it in order to prevent the evidence being concealed, lost, damaged, altered or destroyed.

(4) The powers of seizure in subsections (2) and (3) include power to require information which is stored in an electronic form and is accessible from the premises to be produced in a form—

(a) in which it can be taken away and which it is visible and legible, or

(b) from which it can readily be produced in a visible and legible form.

(5) As soon as reasonably practicable after exercising a power of seizure conferred by this section, the service policeman must record in writing—

(a) the grounds on which the power was exercised, and

(b) the items seized.

93ZC Sections 93ZA and 93ZB: supplementary

(1) The powers conferred by sections 93ZA and 93ZB do not include powers to search for or seize—

(a) items subject to legal privilege,

(b) excluded material, or

(c) special procedure material.

(2) In sections 93ZA and 93ZB “specified” means specified in an authorisation under section 93ZA(1).

(3) Sections 93ZA and 93ZB are to be construed in accordance with section 24 of the Theft Act 1968, reading references in that section to blackmail and fraud as including an offence under section 42 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is blackmail or fraud.

(4) In sections 93ZA and 93ZB the following expressions have the meanings given by section 84—

“excluded material”

“items subject to legal privilege”

“relevant residential premises”

“special procedure material” .””—(Chris Philp.)

This new clause amends the Armed Forces Act 2006 to make provision equivalent to the provision inserted into the Theft Act 1968 by clause 19 of the Bill.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 12

Powers to compel attendance at sentencing hearing: armed forces

“(1) The Armed Forces Act 2006 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 259 insert—

“Attendance at sentencing hearings

259A Power to order attendance

(1) This section applies where—

(a) an offender has been convicted of a service offence in respect of which a life sentence may, or must, be passed,

(b) the offender is kept in service custody awaiting sentencing by the Court Martial, and

(c) the offender has refused, or there are reasonable grounds to suspect the offender will refuse, to attend court for the sentencing hearing.

(2) The Court Martial may order the offender to attend court for the sentencing hearing.

(3) An order under subsection (2) may be made by the Court Martial of its own motion or on the application of the Director of Service Prosecutions.

(4) Before making an order under subsection (2) in relation to an offender aged under 18, the Court Martial must have regard to the welfare of the offender.

(5) In this section—

“life sentence” means any of the following sentences imposed by virtue of this Act—

(a) a sentence of imprisonment for life,

(b) a sentence of detention for life during His Majesty’s pleasure, or

(c) a sentence of custody for life;

“sentencing hearing” means a hearing following conviction that is held for the purposes of sentencing an offender.

(6) Nothing in this section limits any other power of the Court Martial to order an offender to attend court for a sentencing hearing.

259B Power to order production of offender

(1) This section applies where—

(a) an offender aged 18 or over is kept in service custody awaiting sentencing by the Court Martial or the Service Civilian Court in respect of a service offence, and

(b) the offender has refused, or there are reasonable grounds to suspect the offender will refuse, to attend court for the sentencing hearing.

(2) The court may order that the offender is produced before the court for the sentencing hearing.

(3) An order under subsection (2) may be made by the court of its own motion or on the application of the Director of Service Prosecutions.

(4) A person subject to service law who is authorised for the purposes of this section by the Provost Marshal of the Royal Military Police may use reasonable force, if necessary and proportionate, to give effect to an order under subsection (2).

(5) In this section “sentencing hearing” has the meaning given by section 259A.

(6) A person is to be treated as having complied with an order under subsection (2) if they have done all that they reasonably can to secure that the offender is produced before the court for sentencing.

(7) Nothing in this section affects—

(a) any other power of the court to order that an offender is produced before the court for a sentencing hearing;

(b) any other power to use force.”

(3) In section 309 (offences of misbehaviour in court etc)—

(a) after subsection (1) insert—

“(1A) The Court Martial also has jurisdiction under this section to deal with an offender who fails without reasonable excuse to comply with an order under section 259A(2) (order to attend sentencing hearing).”

(b) in subsection (2)(a) after “days” insert “or, in a case within subsection (1A), 2 years”.”—(Chris Philp.)

This new clause amends the Armed Forces Act 2006 to make provision equivalent to the provision inserted into the Sentencing Code by clause 22 of the Bill.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 13

Testing of persons outside of police detention for presence of controlled drugs

“(1) The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is amended as set out in subsections (2) to (5).

(2) In section 30 (arrest elsewhere than at police station), after subsection (11) insert—

“(11A) Nothing in subsection (1A) or in section 30A prevents a constable delaying taking a person to a police station, or releasing the person under section 30A, for such time as is reasonable for the purpose of taking a sample under section 32A.

(11B) Where there is any such delay the reasons for the delay must be recorded when the person first arrives at the police station or (as the case may be) is released under section 30A.”

(3) After section 32 (search upon arrest) insert—

“32A Testing for presence of controlled drugs upon arrest at a place other than a police station

(1) An approved constable may take a single non-intimate sample from a person for the purpose of ascertaining whether any specified controlled drug is in the person’s body, if the following conditions are met—

(a) the arrest condition,

(b) the age condition, and

(c) the request condition.

(2) The arrest condition is that section 30(1A) applies in respect of the person and either—

(a) the offence for which the person was arrested is a trigger offence, or

(b) a constable of at least the rank of inspector—

(i) has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the misuse by the person of a specified controlled drug caused or contributed to the offence for which the person was arrested, and

(ii) has authorised the sample to be taken.

(3) The age condition is that the person is aged 18 or over.

(4) The request condition is that an approved constable has requested the person to give the sample.

(5) Before requesting the person to give a sample, an approved constable must—

(a) warn the person that if, when so requested, the person fails without good cause to do so the person may be liable to prosecution, and

(b) in a case within subsection (2)(b), inform the person of the giving of the authorisation and of the grounds in question.

(6) A sample may only be taken under this section—

(a) at or near the place where an approved constable requested the person to give the sample, and

(b) before the person has been taken to a police station or released under section 30(7) or 30A.

(7) If a sample is taken from a person under this section, an approved constable must give the person a notice in writing which sets out—

(a) the offence in respect of which the arrest condition is met;

(b) in a case within subsection (2)(b), details of the authorisation and the grounds in question;

(c) the date and time when the sample was taken;

(d) the location where the sample was taken;

(e) whether an analysis of the sample reveals that a specified controlled drug may be present in the person’s body.

(8) A notice under subsection (7) must be given as soon as reasonably practicable and in any event before the earlier of the person being released or charged with the offence in respect of which the arrest condition is met.

(9) A person who fails without good cause to give any sample which may be taken from the person under this section commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 months or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale (or both).

32B Section 32A: supplementary

(1) A constable of at least the rank of inspector may give an authorisation under section 32A(2)(b) orally or in writing but, if it is given orally, the constable must confirm it in writing as soon as is practicable.

(2) If a person from whom a sample is taken under section 32A is taken to a police station, the constable giving the notice under section 32A(7) must secure that a record is made, as part of the person’s custody record, of the matters set out in the notice.

(3) If a person from whom a sample is taken under section 32A is released under section 30(7) or 30A, the constable giving the notice under section 32A(7) must, as soon as is practicable after the notice is given, make a record in writing of the matters set out in the notice.

(4) Section 32A does not prejudice the generality of section 63.

(5) In section 32A—

“approved constable” means a constable who has been approved for the purposes of section 32A by the chief officer of police of the police force to which the constable belongs (or, where the constable belongs to the British Transport Police Force, by the chief constable of the British Transport Police Force);

“non-intimate sample” has the same meaning as in Part 5 (see section 65(1));

“specified controlled drug” means a controlled drug (within the meaning of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971) specified in regulations under section 32C;

“trigger offence” means an offence specified in regulations under section 32C.

32C Section 32A: regulations

(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations for the purposes of section 32A—

(a) specify a controlled drug as a “specified controlled drug”;

(b) specify an offence as a “trigger offence”.

(2) Regulations under subsection (1)—

(a) may make different provision for different purposes or different areas; and

(b) may make transitional, transitory or saving provision.

(3) Regulations under this section are to be made by statutory instrument.

(4) A statutory instrument containing (whether alone or with other provision) regulations under subsection (1)(b) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.

(5) Any other statutory instrument containing regulations under this section is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.

(6) In this section “controlled drug” has the same meaning as in the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.

32D Section 32A: disclosure of obtained information

Information obtained from a sample taken from a person under section 32A may be disclosed—

(a) for the purpose of informing any decision about granting bail in criminal proceedings (within the meaning of the Bail Act 1976) to the person;

(b) for the purpose of informing any decision about the giving of a diversionary caution under Part 6 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 to the person;

(c) where the person is in police detention or is remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court or has been granted such bail, for the purpose of informing any decision about the person’s supervision;

(d) where the person is convicted of an offence, for the purpose of informing any decision about the appropriate sentence to be passed by a court and any decision about the person’s supervision or release;

(e) for the purpose of an assessment which the person is required to attend by virtue of section 9(2) or 10(2) of the Drugs Act 2005;

(f) for the purpose of proceedings against the person for an offence under section 12(3) or 14(3) of that Act;

(g) for the purpose of ensuring that appropriate advice and treatment is made available to the person.”

(4) In section 63B, after subsection (5D) insert—

“(5E) A sample may not be taken from a person under this section if—

(a) the person is in police detention by virtue of being taken to a police station after being arrested at a place other than a police station, and

(b) a sample was taken from the person under section 32A.”

(5) In section 66(2) (codes of practice), after “section” insert “32A or”.

(6) In Schedule 1 to the Bail Act 1976 (persons entitled to bail: supplementary provisions), in Part 1 (defendants accused or convicted of imprisonable offences), in paragraph 6B(1)(b)(i), after “under section” insert “32A or”.”—(Chris Philp.)

The new clause provides for testing of controlled drugs upon arrest at a place other than a police station and makes related changes.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 14

Terrorist offenders

“(1) Schedule (Notification orders) amends Part 4 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (notification requirements) so as to enable courts to make notification orders in respect of persons who have committed certain domestic offences or service offences.

(2) In section 43B of the Terrorism Act 2000 (terrorist offenders released on licence: arrest without warrant pending recall decision) in subsection (4) after paragraph (d) insert—

“(e) a person in respect of whom—

(i) a domestic offence notification order (within the meaning of Schedule 4A to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008), or

(ii) a service offence notification order (within the meaning of Schedule 6A to that Act),

has been made and who is serving a sentence for the offence by virtue of which the order was made.””—(Chris Philp.)

This new clause introduces the Schedule moved by NS1 (which provides for orders applying the notification requirements in Part 4 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 to persons who have committed certain domestic offences or service offences) and also extends powers of arrest and search to persons in respect of whom such orders are made.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 21

Dispersal powers: removal of senior police officer authorisation

“(1) Omit section 34 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (authorisation of constables to use dispersal powers by police officer of at least the rank of inspector).

(2) In consequence of subsection (1), in section 35 of that Act (directions excluding a person from an area)—

(a) in subsection (1)—

(i) omit “and an authorisation is in force under section 34”;

(ii) for “in the locality specified in the direction” substitute “in a locality”;

(b) in subsection (4), omit the second sentence.”—(Chris Philp.)

This new clause removes the requirement that a police officer of at least the rank inspector must authorise the use of dispersal powers under section 35 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 22

Dispersal powers: extension to local authorities

“(1) The Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 35—

(a) in subsections (1), for “a constable in uniform” substitute “an authorised person”;

(b) in subsection (2), (3) and (6), for “constable” substitute “authorised person”;

(c) after subsection (4), insert—

“(4A) Each of the following is an “authorised person”—

(a) a constable in uniform;

(b) a person authorised for the purposes of this Part by the local authority in whose area the public place mentioned in subsection (1) is situated (“authorised LA officer”).”

(d) after subsection (6), insert—

“(6A) A direction given by an authorised LA officer under this section is not valid if the officer—

(a) is asked by the person to whom the direction is given to show evidence of their authorisation, and

(b) fails to do so.”

(e) in subsection (7), for “the constable” substitute “a constable in uniform in the public place”;

(f) for subsection (8) substitute—

“(8) Any constable may withdraw or vary a direction given by a constable under this section.

(8A) Any authorised LA officer may withdraw or vary a direction given by an authorised LA officer under this section.

(8B) A variation under subsection (8) or (8A) must not extend the duration of a direction beyond 48 hours from when it was first given.”

(g) in subsection (11), for ““exclusion period”” to the end substitute “—

“authorised person” has the meaning given by subsection (4A);

“exclusion period” has the meaning given by subsection (1)(b);

“local authority” has the same meaning as in Part 1 (see section 20).”

(3) In section 36 (restrictions)—

(a) in subsections (1), (2), (3) and (4), for “A constable” substitute “An authorised person”;

(b) in subsection (1), for “constable”, in the second place it appears, substitute “authorised person”;

(c) in subsection (5), for “a constable” substitute “an authorised person”.

(4) In section 38 (record-keeping), in subsections (1) and (2), for “A constable” substitute “An authorised person”.

(5) In section 41 (guidance), in subsection (1), for “chief officers of police” to the end substitute “—

(a) chief officers of police about the exercise, by officers under their direction or control, of those officers’ functions under this Part;

(b) local authorities about the exercise, by persons authorised under section 35(4A)(b), of those persons’ functions under this Part.””—(Chris Philp.)

This new clause confers dispersal powers under Part 3 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 on persons authorised by local authorities for the purposes of the Part.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)

Criminal Justice Bill (Tenth sitting)

Debate between Laura Farris and Jess Phillips

Committee stage
Thursday 18th January 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Laura Farris]

I thank the shadow Minister for his speech and for supporting the clause. In answer to his final criticism that we have abandoned women and girls, the Serious Crime Act that created the offence of coercive, controlling behaviour received Royal Assent in February 2015. With respect to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, it predates her arrival in Parliament, but we created that criminal offence and we have been evolving its implementation since.

[Jess Phillips]

Will the Minister give way?

[Laura Farris]

I will make some progress. I want to respond to the points raised by the shadow Minister. [Interruption.]

--- Later in debate ---

[Laura Farris]

The provision has been welcomed by the Domestic Abuse Commissioner. She said:

“This provision will help to ensure that perpetrators are properly managed in the community and victims can be kept safe from further harm. The Commissioner welcomes this provision and will continue working with the government to develop proposals for the effective management of perpetrators.”

In answer to the hon. Lady’s question, in the data we have, which is from 2022, 566 people were convicted of coercive control, and it is estimated that, as she suggested, around 200 would be serving 12 months or more and would have been eligible for MAPPA management. We simply make the point that the MAPPA framework is used for the most serious offenders; whether it is a sexual, violent or terrorist offence, people qualify for MAPPA if their sentence is one year or more. We are not doing anything unorthodox or irregular in having that criteria in relation to coercive control.

I will respond to one of the shadow Minister’s final points. He asked whether there was provision for other forms of domestic abuse to fall under MAPPA management —the answer is yes. We strengthened the statutory guidance to clarify that MAPPA management can be considered by the relevant agencies in all domestic abuse cases. I hope that answers his query.

[Jess Phillips]

I did not find the piece of paper from Refuge, but I knew it would be about 200 people. Just to make it clear for the record, in one ward in my constituency there will be 200 violent perpetrators of domestic abuse. To the Minister’s point that she did not wish to take my intervention on the piece of legislation that was passed, I will never, ever criticise this Government on that. They have passed lots of legislation, so the skins of goats have had lots of words written on them. It means absolutely nothing—pieces of words on goat skin mean absolutely nothing if they are not then properly resourced, managed and implemented in our communities. The women in refuge accommodation speak of little else than what a nirvana it has been recently under this Government.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jess Phillips]

Will the Minister give way?

[Laura Farris]

I have not really started, but yes.

[Jess Phillips]

I just wondered whether that pilot had started.

[Laura Farris]

I don’t—[Interruption.] Yes, it has.

The clause extends eligibility for polygraph testing to offenders who have been convicted of murder and are assessed as posing a risk of sexual offending on release. It extends eligibility to those who are serving multiple sentences where the index sex offence will already have expired. To give a rather grim illustration of what that might look like, if somebody is sentenced for convictions of rape and murder, by the time of their release the sentence for the sex offence will have expired, and they would therefore not automatically qualify for polygraph testing without the extension that the clause provides.

The clause also extends polygraph testing to a cohort of individuals who have received non-terrorism sentences. At this point, I want to pick up on what Jonathan Hall told the Committee in evidence just before Christmas. This measure could apply, for example, in the case of someone who was convicted of conspiracy to murder but whose offences were an act of terrorism, took place in the course of an act of terrorism or were committed for the purposes of terrorism, if they committed their offences before the relevant legislation came into force.

The way in which we make that assessment will depend on the judge’s sentencing remarks. If, in sentencing, the judge made an express reference to the offending being in the course of terrorism, the extension provided by the clause would make polygraph testing applicable. We define this cohort as historical terrorism-connected offenders, and the polygraph testing licence condition is currently unavailable as a tool to manage the risk that they pose, although it would be available for an individual who commits the same offence today.

The intention of the clause is to fill the gap and provide more effective risk management in the community. I reassure the Committee that that does not mean that the person can be recommitted to prison. It is an assessment of their licence conditions. It affects their risk management. If it should later transpire that they have breached licence conditions, they could be recalled, but not by the polygraph test alone. As a whole, the clause will ensure that polygraph testing can be used to strengthen the management of those who pose a risk of sexual offending and those who committed historical terrorism-related offences.

Criminal Justice Bill (Ninth sitting)

Debate between Laura Farris and Jess Phillips

Committee stage
Thursday 18th January 2024 Public Bill Committees

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)]

It is again a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Bardell.

Clauses 25 to 27 concern the transfer of prisoners to foreign prisons. Clause 25 introduces the measures that are relevant to the transfer of prisoners to rented prison spaces overseas. It defines key terms relevant to the following sections, and establishes the nature of the agreements and to whom those provisions may be applicable. The measures have been drafted to apply to a broad cohort of adult prisoners. This will ensure that the measures are applicable to the final cohort that will be decided on under the terms of any final agreement with a partner state. Prisoners will be subject to a transfer only after an assessment of the individual circumstances of their case. Although the details will be subject to future negotiation and agreement, additional exclusion criteria may apply.

Clause 26 deals with the transfer of prisoners between the territory of the United Kingdom and rented prison spaces overseas. It will allow the Secretary of State to issue warrants for the transfer of individuals from the United Kingdom to rented prison spaces overseas or for the return of prisoners held in rented spaces overseas to the territory of the United Kingdom. It allows for transfers both ways, as needed. Like many of the provisions relating to the transfer of prisoners to rented prison spaces overseas, these provisions may be used only once prison rental arrangements with foreign countries are in place, and may be used only for the specific purpose of transferring prisoners as part of that arrangement. The clause also provides that time spent in a rented prison space overseas will count towards the prisoner’s sentence as determined in England and Wales.

[Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)]

Will the Minister tell the Committee whether the Government intend to transfer women prisoners? Literally decades of data shows that women prisoners are predominantly victims of domestic and sexual violence, which is often a pathway to their offending.

[Laura Farris]

The hon. Lady’s question is a good one. She will know that women form a very small part of the overall cohort of prisoners, that women prisoners have unique vulnerabilities and that they experience prison in a very different way from the male cohort. It is true that women are not expressly excluded from the provision, but obviously the United Kingdom Government are bound by the considerations under the European convention on human rights, and one can readily imagine how those will extend to female prisoners. It is obviously more likely that men will be transferred, because of the size of the cohort.

[Jess Phillips]

Would it not be better to put on the face of the Bill that women are carved out? I do not see any reason why we could not do that, if it is so vanishingly unlikely that a Government would transfer women prisoners. I am afraid to say that Governments are not always great on the issue of women in prison—not just this Government, but any Government, including any that might come in—so would it not be better to include that safeguard?

[Laura Farris]

I am sympathetic to the hon. Lady’s point, which I will take away. The purpose of the provisions is to set the framework for future agreements, so of necessity they are deliberately quite widely drafted and do not seek to tie our hands. The hon. Lady’s points are irrefutable; I looked at the issue when I was a member of the Justice Committee.

Domestic powers to transfer individuals to rented spaces such as these do not currently exist in UK law, and the provisions, widely drafted though they are, are essential for the operation of a future agreement. Clause 27 contains provisions regarding the operation of warrants, which are proposed in clause 26. The provisions allow the Secretary of State to appoint individuals to escort prisoners in transit to and from rented prison spaces overseas and to provide those individuals with the powers necessary to exercise those duties.

The provisions are similar to existing transport and escort provisions contained in the Repatriation of Prisoners Act 1984 and are built on long-standing operational practices. They are an essential complement to the powers set out in clause 26 and are necessary for the effective operation of a warrant for transfer. The clause also contains provisions to enable designated individuals to detain prisoners who may attempt to escape or who find themselves unlawfully at large in the process of transit to or from a rented prison space overseas. I commend clauses 25, 26 and 27 to the Committee.

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[Laura Farris]

I thank the shadow Minister and my hon. Friend the Member for Meon Valley for their contributions, and I will respond to them as best I can. First, I want to talk a little about the context of the pressure on prison places. As of September 2023, 16,200 people were on remand in prisons in England and Wales. The reason why we have such a big remand population is that during the white heat of the pandemic, the Government took the decision to continue with full jury trials.

I remember listening very carefully to what the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy)—now shadow Foreign Secretary, then shadow Justice Secretary—said on the issue. Colleagues may recall that at one point he called for a reduction in the size of juries. He said that it was imperative to keep the criminal justice system moving, and he advocated for a shift to juries of five, only during covid. He was robustly attacked by Baroness Kennedy in the Lords, a Labour peer, who said that that was an absolute dereliction of article 6 rights. She gave a very passionate speech about it, brilliantly written, and I noticed that the shadow justice team never mentioned reducing the size of juries again.

Respectfully, I say it is reasonable to infer that the Opposition supported our decision to continue with full jury trials. If I am wrong about that, they can direct me to where they called for something different, but as I say there was a tension between the then shadow Justice Secretary and Baroness Kennedy. [Interruption.] It was incredibly difficult, and I think that is why the shadow Justice Secretary got himself into a bit of a muddle.

The decision to continue with full juries of 12 people determining the result of criminal trials during covid contributed heavily to the backlog, and to why we have so many people on remand awaiting trial.

[Jess Phillips]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Laura Farris]

I will continue a little more. We are undertaking the biggest prison building exercise since the Victorian era. We have committed to creating 20,000 new prison places, and have already got 5,700 of those places on stream, but we are not there yet.

The amendment tabled by the hon. Member for Stockton North gives rise to a number of sensible points. Let me distil them: he thinks that prisoners should not be transferred if they are getting near to the end of their sentence, have a sentence of imprisonment for public protection, are going through constructive rehabilitation treatment, or are implicated in some form of criminal proceeding. All those are very sensible ideas, but we respectfully believe that they are best addressed through policy, based on the appropriate expertise from within the prison system, not set out in primary legislation.

In fact, I think the hon. Gentleman made the point tacitly himself. He gave a number of other very good examples, including prisoners who have serious mental health conditions, are pregnant or are someone’s primary carer. All those factors are highly material. Let me reassure him slightly, if I can. To the extent that the exploratory conversations have begun, we are only having them with other European countries. That means that they are bound by the same obligations under the European convention on human rights, which would be material in the types of cases the hon. Member for Stockton North has suggested.

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[Laura Farris]

I have never been involved in a case of that nature; cases where the offending is really serious tend to be much more straightforward. There is flexibility, because we can take such cases to court to appeal the removal. Obviously, when someone is already a victim of crime, that is a different context, so I do not know how the courts would deal with it. The law itself, however, is set out under the established immigration rules, in primary legislation and has been operational for 12 years now. That is not part of the dispute today.

To continue, it is right that we take innovative measures to ensure that we always have sufficient prison capacity to fulfil the orders of the court and to punish the most dangerous offenders. I reiterate at this stage that the powers simply lay down the foundation for future arrangements. I repeat: all the points raised by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Stockton North, about the considerations that might apply were relevant, but this is about future arrangements so that we will have the power to transfer prisoners to rented foreign prisons. No foreign prison rental agreements are yet in place, however. As he is aware, there is precedent in Europe: both Norway and Belgium have similar arrangements with the Netherlands at present.

[Jess Phillips]

I want to respond to some of what the Minister said. She told us not to worry about people’s families visiting, because 10% of them are foreign nationals. She went on to say that foreign nationals have children abroad. I represent loads and loads of people who are not British nationals but who definitely have family in the UK, so the idea that 10% of the prison population do not have any families who want to visit them, or that the families of all non-British nationals in UK prisons live back home, is wrong. Welcome to the world—people move about and they have babies with people here in this country. That is a bit of a reality check on some of what was said.

I also did not understand the Minister saying that we now have a massive backlog because the justice system carried on during the pandemic. Was the justice system due a three-year break to stop the backlog? Do we normally have a three-year break to make sure that we have enough prison places? That is a weird justification, which I did not really understand.

On human trafficking, there are more victims of human trafficking in prison than there are human traffickers; the woeful rates of conviction of people who people-smuggle or commit modern slavery are well charted. Last week, I was in a meeting with the bishops, the Lords Spiritual—I always think “Lords Spiritual” sounds like a rock band—about this exact issue. Prison wardens and governors from a variety of prisons were there to give evidence, as was the Bishop of Gloucester—I believe her role is as the overarching Lord Spiritual for prisons—the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and lots of organisations who work with trafficking victims, including the Salvation Army and others. I was there, and the prison governors made it very clear that lots of people in prison have a pattern to their behaviour.

If we look at the Rochdale case from last week, we see that a young girl was criminalised as a pattern of her sexual abuse. That is not uncommon or unknown; it is in fact the opposite—it is well known, well charted and well evidenced. There is a huge amount of evidence for that, so I absolutely want to see a carve-out in that particular space for anyone identified as a victim of modern slavery.

The Minister asks us to wait for policy to feel comfortable about this, rather than writing things into the Bill. I totally understand that legislation does not necessarily need to be very detailed, but I would have liked, for example, to have had the word “women” once in the Domestic Abuse Bill—but, you know, we can’t be picky.

The trouble is that I have seen what happens when we leave things to policy that is skew-whiff and ambiguous in the Home Office, especially when it comes to cases of human trafficking. As the Minister said in response to my hon. Friend the Member for Swansea East, she has not been involved in any particular cases.

Currently, Government policy is a bit skew-whiff on how we remove or deal with victims of human trafficking. It is not exactly clear, and even the lawyers are not clear, both those from the Home Office and those seeking to represent victims of human trafficking who are threatened with deportation. Last week, I was with a barrister in a case, and she clearly said that the policy is to remove all victims of human trafficking from Albania, which the Government have said is a completely safe country—perhaps, unless you are a young woman who has been trafficked repeatedly, in which case all of the evidence suggests that Albania is incredibly dangerous.

I was in court because the Government were trying to deport a victim of human trafficking who had stayed within the national referral mechanism—in fact, had had her therapy paid for by that very same Home Office —for three and a half years. The Home Office had agreed yes, she is a victim of human trafficking. Literally, she has a piece of paper from the Home Office—it might as well have been signed by the Home Secretary—to say, “You are a victim of human trafficking.” She had two children, and both had lived in Britain for seven years, both born here of the rapes that she had suffered. But the Home Office was trying to deport her to Albania, a place they had already deported her to once; she had been re-trafficked from there immediately after reporting to the police. So excuse me if I do not trust something not being written into a Bill about how to handle these difficult cases.

I want to see on the face of this Bill provision so that no woman, no victim of human trafficking and no one with autism—the number of people with autism in our prison estate is phenomenal. Where are the safeguards so that barristers such as the one I was with last week have something to lean on when the Home Office decides that its policy is a little bit grey and so it can actually do what it wants?

[Laura Farris]

I thank the hon. Lady for her submission. I will confine myself simply to arguments as they relate to the prison transfer issue. Furthermore, this part of the Bill is Ministry of Justice, not Home Office.

Let me address two points. I am sorry if I was insufficiently clear when I talked about foreign-born offenders. Of course I do not make the crude assumption that none of them will have connections with the United Kingdom, including family, but some will not. We know we have problems with foreign gangs coming over. My simple point in response to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, is that not every single prisoner will have strong local ties in the United Kingdom, because that is not true and will be a relevant consideration in assessing the cohort for transfer.

On my other point, I am again sorry—perhaps it was my mistake—if I was confusing about the decision to maintain full jury trials during covid. That decision was a controversial one because of the number of jurors required. Those were physical trials at the time, and having the number of jurors required to sit together in a courtroom during a period when social distancing was set out in law was incredibly difficult. Without doubt, that delayed the process of the criminal justice system, so much so that some Supreme Court justices urged the Government to dispense with juries altogether. As I said in an earlier observation, the then shadow Justice Secretary, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), suggested we shrink juries rather than abandon them altogether. Other eminent lawyers—I cited one—thought that that was the wrong idea.

This was a very difficult decision on how to operate criminal trials, but in the end we decided that it was imperative, in the interests of justice and of article 6, the right to a fair trial, that everyone who was charged with a criminal offence in the Crown Court had the right to have justice administered as fairly as possible, so we stuck with the juries. That has led to delay, and that is why the remand population—in other words, people still awaiting trial—is higher than it otherwise would be, which has caused pressure on prison places. I apologise if that was insufficiently clear. That concludes my remarks.

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[Laura Farris]

We are committed to ensuring that any foreign prison will be subject to an inspection arrangement; it is simply the terms of that inspection arrangement that we are not putting into primary legislation.

Amendment 67, tabled by the shadow Minister, is important. Arrangements for the independent inspection of escort arrangements in England and Wales already engage HM inspectorate of prisons to some extent, and the Prison Act 1952 allows the Secretary of State to investigate any matter connected to prisoners and prisons in England and Wales. We are committed to ensuring that effective scrutiny of escort arrangements is in place but, again, the exact terms of the arrangements are yet to be concluded and it is inappropriate to attempt to distribute specific responsibilities without prior agreement.

Amendment 68 addresses deaths in custody. This is an important point and must be subject to high-level scrutiny. That is especially true where there may be a death in custody that occurs overseas. This matter will be of primary importance to us during negotiations with any partner country. We are committed to ensuring that we are able to comprehensively investigate any deaths that may occur in rented prisons overseas.

This subject is a prime example of how we intend to use the delegated power we are seeking in clause 29. Once we have agreed arrangements with a partner country, we intend to use our delegated power—by potentially extending the remit of relevant bodies in England and Wales, for example. Until those arrangements are finalised it would be inappropriate to bind any potential body or person, including coroners, in law.

We are also committed, of course, to upholding the human rights of prisoners, including their rights under articles 2 and 3 of the European convention on human rights. That is legally binding on us, and those are absolute rights. We are currently considering only entering into arrangements to rent prisons from countries that can demonstrate that their prison conditions and capabilities—including for death investigations—comply with that same human rights law and our expectations on the fair treatment of prisoners.

On the basis that this is an important issue for future negotiations, or is non-negotiable given our international obligations, it is too early to begin considering how issues such as death investigation will be accounted for without first making precise arrangements with a partner country. I therefore urge the hon. Member for Stockton North to withdraw this amendment and to not press the other amendments in his name in this group.

I will speak now to clause 28, which concerns oversight arrangements for rented prison spaces. I have said already that the clause establishes a duty on the Secretary of State to appoint a controller. I have also set out their responsibilities for ensuring that any prisoner transferred to a foreign prison will be returned before the end of their sentence to allow for sufficient time for resettlement and reintegration back into the United Kingdom before release.

Clause 28 also extends the remit of His Majesty’s inspectorate of prisons to allow for inspections of any rented prison spaces overseas and subsequent reports to the Secretary of State on their findings—respecting their operational independence. Consideration of prison conditions and the treatment of prisoners has been, and will remain, central to our decision making.

[Jess Phillips]

On the point of saying here, and the law even saying, although the law does not say it, that prisoners will be returned to the UK before the end of their sentence, is there—well, I imagine that there is—a chance that their sentence might be extended because there is no place for them to be brought back to?

For example, our modern slavery laws say that we would have to wait for 45 days of reflection in cases of modern slavery. In reality, it is 700 days at the moment. So, laying out a term: is there any worry that, if we say that prisoners have to come back here before they are released to do a period of parole, we will in fact be extending people’s sentences because there are not any places for them to come back into?

[Laura Farris]

Can I just clarify that I have understood the hon. Lady’s intervention?

[Jess Phillips]

Basically, what if there is no space?

[Laura Farris]

I think it would have to be part of the planning for any prisoner who was going to be transferred for there to be space for them to be returned, because that is part of the policy—that they will be brought back into a domestic prison before release so that there can be proper engagement with the parole and probation services. That is, as hon. Members would expect, to facilitate a smooth release back into the community, as with any prisoner.

We are mindful of the need to ensure that effective inspection and monitoring provisions are in place. While the exact arrangements will be subject to future negotiation, we will ensure that those are sufficient, and they will also be subject to further parliamentary scrutiny. I commend clause 28 to the Committee.

Criminal Justice Bill (Eighth sitting)

Debate between Laura Farris and Jess Phillips

Committee stage
Tuesday 16th January 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Laura Farris]

Let me give the hon. Gentleman a practical illustration. Lucy Letby was not compelled to attend her sentencing hearing. She was a young woman in her early 30s and not obviously a massive danger to the victims’ families or somebody who was going to be disruptive, yet the judge did not compel her attendance. We think that the provisions in the Bill alter that and make it far more likely that somebody would be required to attend their hearing.

[Jess Phillips]

With regard to that particular case, the Minister is absolutely right. It would seem that somebody could use reasonable force to get Lucy Letby there. The fact that she is a woman and the vast majority of the security staff in the court would be men would, I imagine, make them pause with concern as employers. My hon. Friend the Member for Swansea East just pointed out to me that these court security officers earn around £18,000 a year. If this piece of law is saying that it is still up to the judge, where is the compulsion? Currently, it is up to the judge. In Lucy Letby’s case, it was up to the judge. The measure still says that it is up to the judge. So why does it make a difference?

[Laura Farris]

The difference it makes is that now we will not necessarily even see a judge consider exercising that discretion. By putting it into primary legislation—I appreciate the word “may” is used, and I am not going to pretend otherwise—you are essentially saying to the judge, “The time has come for you to exercise your discretion. Considering this defendant, in these circumstances in this case, are you going to compel attendance in the circumstances that are set out in the Bill?” There are other examples of where we put things on the statute book that existed somewhat loosely as a practice or in common law and were not been evenly applied, and it has ended up with a much more linear application of something that we think is socially desirable. That is the effect.

I want to make one other point. The hon. Member for Stockton North made some good points about people in riot gear, but I think one of the things he would perhaps gently concede, looking back particularly over the last two to three years of some of the most high-profile cases, is that it has developed into something of a trend. In some high-profile cases, people are aware that they have got away with not going. People say to their lawyer, “Do I have to go?” and the answer is no. The clause changes that. Actually, if you get back into a pattern where the defendant is in the dock for sentencing, you will see much less resistance. I am afraid to say that there has been a bit of contagion around this particularly pernicious conduct, and the clause is aiming to right that wrong. By embedding a practice where effectively they do have to go, or at least they will be video linked up, there will be no way in which the court will not be able to see their face as the remarks are read out to them. In some way or another, I hope that alters this ugly pattern of behaviour.

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[Laura Farris]

I thank the Chair, and remember her direction to direct my own remarks towards her, which I will try to do on this occasion.

I am pleased to speak to the provisions contained in clause 23. In recent years, there have been a number of high-profile cases involving so-called grooming gangs—groups of offenders involved in child sexual exploitation—in Rochdale, Rotherham, Telford, Newcastle, Oxford and Reading, and those are just the ones we know about. The discovery of the network of those grooming gangs was a significant factor in this Government’s setting up the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse, chaired by Professor Jay, who did the initial report into Rotherham. The Government believe that grooming gang members should face sentences that reflect the seriousness of their offending, which is why, last April, the Prime Minister made a commitment to introduce a new statutory aggravating factor to target grooming behaviour.

This new measure, introduced by clause 23, creates a statutory obligation to consider grooming an aggravating factor when sentencing specified child sex offences, including rape and sexual assault. In plain English, that means they will get a longer sentence. It will capture offenders whose offending is facilitated by, or involves, the grooming of a person under 18. The grooming itself need not be sexual.

It is already the case that both grooming behaviour against the victim and acting together with others to commit an offence are high-culpability sentencing guidelines for a number of sexual offences. However, this measure goes further by creating an obligation to aggravate the sentence in instances where the offence has been facilitated by grooming undertaken by a defendant who is a participant in a grooming gang, even if they did not personally groom the victim. That means the aggravating factor will, for the first time, capture models of exploitation not currently directly addressed elsewhere: for example, where an offender assaults a victim who has been previously groomed by another member of the same grooming gang.

The measure requires the courts to consider grooming an aggravating factor when sentencing in relation to any of the listed child sex offences. It will remain within the court’s discretion to consider grooming an aggravating factor irrespective of the offence being sentenced where it is deemed to be relevant to the offending.

[Jess Phillips]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship once again, Ms Bardell. I am pleased that the Minister leaned on it being a year on from the child abuse inquiry—not one of whose recommendations, I think it is fair to say, has yet come to fruition. Well, hope springs eternal for this year! There are plenty of recommendations for the Government to crack on with in this regard, and I look forward to seeing some sort of timeline from the Home Office of any progress in that particular area.

New clause 25, which I tabled, seeks to try to include adult grooming victims on the same footing as children. The grooming of adults is widely and wildly misunderstood, despite there being considerable overlaps of perpetrators and, in fact, perpetrator behaviours and tactics of those seen in cases of child sexual grooming.

At the moment, sexual grooming is a crime only when the victim is a child, but grooming can and does happen to adults as well. It is a technique used by perpetrators to ensure compliance on the part of the victim and to avoid detection, as the victim’s actions are more likely to appear consensual when they are being groomed. Grooming is a deliberate process of limiting the freedoms of a person by gaining control over them and creating a dependency.

New clause 25 would make an aggravating factor of grooming in certain adult cases, including around domestic and sexual abuse. That would both challenge the misconception that adults cannot be groomed and send a message to perpetrators of domestic and sexual abuse that the grooming of adults is being taken seriously and will not be tolerated.

The 2018 Spicer report acknowledged for the first time that not only children but women over 18 are being groomed and sexually exploited. Since 2019, STAGE, the partnership against adult sexual exploitation—I make a declaration that I am the chair—has supported over 700 adult women who have experienced grooming just in the north-east and Yorkshire. The issue is widespread and prevalent in every part of the UK, but is under-represented in UK legislation.

STAGE’s work has confirmed that grooming is a common technique used to manipulate people for sexual exploitation. It has a negative impact on people’s ability to consent and to make capacitated decisions. However, for adults who have experienced grooming, this is often reduced to making “poor life choices”, because of the belief that grooming can only happen to children.

Everything that we heard yesterday about what was said to the girls in Rochdale is being said today to somebody over the age of 18, or even to somebody of the age of 18. Adult victims of grooming are repeatedly asked victim-blaming questions such as “Why did you get back in the car?”, “Why did you stay with them?” and “Why didn’t you leave?” by professionals and services that are meant to be protecting them. This ignores the immense impact of grooming. Because of this, many victims and survivors feel unable to leave their perpetrator, or may not even recognise the abuse that they are experiencing. Until the grooming of adults is recognised in legislation, it will continue to be misunderstood by law enforcement and the criminal justice system, and victims will not be adequately protected. That is why I have tabled new clause 25.

Yesterday, in the light of the Rochdale report, I thought of a woman I had supported. I wanted to make sure, because of the media, that she was okay, because when these sorts of things happen it is pretty traumatic for women who have been exploited in childhood and adulthood. She is 27 years old, so the legislation we are debating would not include her. I needed to search through my email to find her phone number. I found among my emails a letter that I had forgotten, which she had written to the now ex-Home Secretary, the right hon. and learned Member for Fareham (Suella Braverman). I will read it now:

“Following on from your statement on the 2nd of April 2023, I am writing this letter as a victim who has been let down by countless professionals and services, but worryingly the Home Office itself.

I will begin by providing a summary of my experiences. I was groomed at the age of 13 and this then led on to me experiencing sexual and criminal exploitation for over a decade, whereby I was trafficked all-round the country and sold from one gang to another. There were countless times where I was gang-raped, injected with heroin and left black and blue. I was exposed to serious and organised crime and my perpetrators would laugh at how they continued getting away with what they were doing to me and so many other girls. I did not see any of my family for years and my childhood and early adulthood was stolen away from me.

Whilst I acknowledge your statement that you vow to stamp out child grooming gangs, that is a very easy statement to make. Victims of this crime all around the country have heard it all before. Although you’ve announced new measures to tackle the issue, it makes me question how is this achievable when there are so many flaws in the systems already in place, such as The National Referral Mechanism (NRM).

The police did not refer me into the NRM, despite them full well knowing I had been trafficked. I have spoken with several police officers over the years who do not know what the NRM is, let alone know that they are first responders. It took 562 days for me to get my conclusive grounds decision and for most of that time I continued to be exploited. Nearly a year ago, I was sitting in a hotel paid for by the police, after I’d been physically and sexually assaulted. My accommodation was not safe, and I had requested a safe house. After a lot of back and forth, I was eventually told by…the Home Office’s contractor for NRM services, that a safe house was not an option as I was a British national and that there were no other appropriate housing options. I had to return to unsafe accommodation to then be raped and physically assaulted again.

As you have overseen a system that has routinely let vulnerable people down, I would like to know what action has or is going to be taken to improve this?

I spent days and days in police interviews going into as much detail as I possibly could, with the hope that I would get justice and the men who had tortured me would end up behind bars. The reality is so many victims like me must drop out of investigations because we are not safeguarded, resulting in thousands of perpetrators on the streets continuing to exploit and intimidate vulnerable children and adults. If possible, imagine you are at a police station as a victim of this crime and a stream of text messages come through your phone from your perpetrators saying that they know where you are and that if you do not leave, they will kill you and your family. That is just one example of a threat I have received.

This is not going to stop until appropriate measures are put in place to protect us. In the meantime, the trauma victims experience at the hands of their exploiters is exacerbated when we are routinely let down by the so-called systems in place to protect us. I haven’t even covered in this letter, the battles we face accessing support for our mental health and the legal challenges.

I do hope that you read this letter and that it provides you with an opportunity to reflect on an example of someone who has experienced failures from the Home Office.”

I just ask that we do not fail her again and that we recognise the abuses that she suffered. For women who have been sexually exploited in adulthood—by the way, the sexual exploitation of adults is not defined in law; it has no legislation around it, but believe you me, there are some new clauses coming down the line later—I ask that we recognise that the people who groom children go on to groom the same women as they turn into adults, when they do not have the same protections. I completely agree with everything that the Minister has said; I just want it for her as well. That is all that new clause 25 seeks.

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[Laura Farris]

Let me start with the shadow Minister’s comments. He asked about the definition of grooming, the nature of the prosecution and the scope of a grooming gang. There is no definition of grooming because of the broad range of behaviour that it can encompass. Identifying a grooming gang is a task for the police working in conjunction with the CPS. One force told me recently about a grooming gang prosecution in which they had to identify the number of defendants. They were talking about tens of defendants and tens of victims, and some of the defendants in the grooming gang had never met each other and had no idea who the other people were. It was quite a difficult exercise for the CPS to judge how best to get a prosecution and a conviction. In that case, they succeeded, but that is why the definition is not set out in law. It is dealt with on a case-by-case basis.

The shadow Minister challenges me to explain what this provision adds, when grooming is already an aggravating factor and is often considered in child sex offences and taken seriously. I hope I have explained, but I will clarify again if he did not understand. We are simply adding that a member of a grooming gang, as defined within the parameters of that case, can be subject to the aggravation provision at sentencing, irrespective of the fact that they did not directly groom the victim of that child sexual offence. They could be a tangential member of the gang—perhaps one of the people who has never met one of the other defendants, such as in the case I just outlined—yet they could still be subject to the aggravation.

The shadow Minister asked about cost. That is a fair question, and I will have to come back to him in writing on that. We will add it to the list.

[Jess Phillips]

I feel I know what grooming is, but, on the Minister’s earlier point about the Court of Appeal reducing the sentence, without a proper definition of grooming or at least a working definition in secondary legislation or regulation, are we not at risk of appeal? I do not know whether she or any of us has sat through a lot of court cases like this, but the idea that there is heavy knowledge in police forces, the CPS and the judges of our country about exactly what grooming or coercive control are, I have to say, is for the birds. I am a bit worried about the risk of appeal on a loosey-goosey case that could be grooming. Why would someone not just take it to appeal immediately, if their sentence was aggravated?

[Laura Farris]

I will come back to that. For the purposes of this afternoon’s Public Bill Committee, the issue is not whether the courts have an adequate understanding of grooming.

I will give my experience. I was appointed as counsel to the independent inquiry into child sexual abuse. I worked on that inquiry from 2016 to 2017, and it is on my Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I was also instructed by a Telford victim in a public law challenge—not a criminal law challenge in the High Court—against the local authority in relation to its breaches of various duties to her. So I have direct familiarity with cases of this nature.

There are many, many issues with this kind of offence. I think that the courts understand child sexual exploitation and grooming gangs and that it is left deliberately loose in law so that a range of behaviours can be encompassed. The one that the public are most familiar with is sexual exploitation, but there are other forms of grooming that go much wider and where there is no sexual element. It is right that that flexibility exists so that somebody is not outside the possibility of being a victim of a grooming offence.

[Laura Farris]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention and I promise that I will give some thought to that, but I just wanted to come back to the new clause tabled by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley. This is not about creating a new offence. The treatment that the victim the hon. Lady described was subjected to is already covered by criminal law. This amendment is simply about an aggravating element going into statute in relation to grooming.

As the hon. Lady is well aware, the difference is that we are confining our amendment to the grooming of children for sexual purposes. That is our amendment. We have focused our amendment on that because child sexual exploitation by grooming gangs has been so problematic and so serious.

I will go back to some of the examples that the hon. Lady gave, although it is very difficult to respond to an individual’s case in the context of a Public Bill Committee, because I do not know all the details. I think that the hon. Lady said that the person was 27 and had been groomed since the age of 13. The vast part of what she suffered in the early days would be captured by this provision, because she was a child. I appreciate what the hon. Lady said about the continuing grooming—I think she said that that person is still being groomed today.

[Jess Phillips]

Continuously, yes.

[Laura Farris]

But, in a case of this nature, the judge would still have the discretion to consider that treatment as an aggravating circumstance, so there is nothing precluding a judge—they would have to get to the end of the trial, get the conviction and get the offence—from treating it as aggravating. I have not been given an example, in the context of this particular clause, of somebody going to court about a case of this nature, getting the conviction and then getting a sentence that was not sufficiently serious.

[Jess Phillips]

You would be lucky.

[Laura Farris]

Well, grooming cases are brought to court, and convictions come from those cases.

One thing that I would gently say, since the example of Rochdale has come up a lot, is that the report that was published yesterday relates to the period between 2004 and 2013. When we worked on IICSA, Rochdale and Rotherham directly informed why IICSA was set up and why Alexis Jay was appointed chair of that inquiry. IICSA was informed by all the cases we were looking at, whether it was Dolphin Square, residential schools, the Catholic Church or the Australian migrant scheme. Even though Andy Burnham commissioned that review, it related to a time period that goes quite a long way back, starting from 20 years ago, rather than what is happening in your—[Interruption.]

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[Laura Farris]

What came out of yesterday's report was shocking, but it was also known. As I said, it informed IICSA. We looked at Rotherham extensively throughout. I did not read the report and say, “I’ve never heard any of this before.” I knew about it, and I had spent time on stuff like this. I am simply saying about the case that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley described—a horrific case—is that the clause would, first, cover a perpetrator being brought to justice who had abused her as a child. Secondly, if her case got to court and she got a conviction on the multiple offences that she seems to be describing, there is nothing to stop the judge from treating it as aggravating and enhancing the sentence.

[Jess Phillips]

If there is nothing to stop a judge in a case where an adult has been sexually exploited as an adult because of multiple perpetrators over many years—different faces changing, some just in adulthood, some from childhood, but basically a pattern is set when someone abuses a child and that carries on for a lot of their life—is the Minister saying that as we can already aggravate on the basis of grooming an adult, what do we need this piece of legislation for children? Also, to push back heavily, I cited in my speech the 700 cases of adult sexual exploitation found in Yorkshire and Newcastle alone, so if her idea is that adult sexual exploitation is not a big issue in our country, on the same scale if not greater than child exploitation, I suggest that she has not been out to the country.

[Laura Farris]

I will keep my remarks concise. Let us look at adult sexual exploitation—I accept, by the way, the breadth of the problem without reservation. First, the adult, simply by virtue of being an adult, has more ability to vocalise their experience than a child does. Secondly, there are more forms of exploitation—for example, forced labour or human trafficking, both of which overlapped with what the hon. Lady described. The case of children who are victims of grooming gangs is specific, and it is also a direct thing that we dealt with. The clause is directed just at children.

[Laura Farris]

I have to take this back to what it is. It is not about creating an offence. It is not about saying, “If you sexually exploit a child, you’ve committed a criminal offence, but if you sexually exploit an adult woman, you haven’t.” That is not what this is about, and I do not want to get lost in that. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley described a series of offences that, if they achieved convictions, would be category A offences. They are unbelievably serious offences. We are not denying that.

The clause, however, is directed at grooming gangs as they relate to children. The purpose of the clause is to capture the wider membership of the grooming gangs so that even if people did not directly groom the victim, they are on the hook for the same aggravation. It is to bring in the entirety of the grooming gang. As I said, that is usually defined by the CPS in terms of how it will choose to prosecute a case. That can be very wide indeed. It can bring hundreds to court, or certainly tens, but that is a decision for the CPS. The clause potentially brings all gang members within the scope of the aggravation, simply because they have been identified as part of the gang, if one of those victims has been groomed. That is the purpose of the clause.

[Jess Phillips]

I did not for one second think that I was asking for a new offence. If I had been, I would have tried to write it into the clause. The Minister is suggesting that there are not wide-scale gangs grooming adults in our country that need targeting. It is exactly the same. There are grooming gangs. Perhaps we could all spend a bit of time at the National Crime Agency or watch any drama about organised crime, which always includes drugs, sexual exploitation and prostitution. There are grooming gangs grooming adults, both men and women. Especially when we are talking about men, it is very silenced. There is a trade in drug addict, down-and-out men in our country that would make people’s toes curl. I have rarely met a young heroin addict who was not traded for sex by powerful men.

I cannot believe the categorisation of it. I do not believe it, because I know the Minister well. For children it is, “grooming matters more”. For adults, we might as well say, from what I have heard today, “Why did you get back in the car?” I have to say, it is not characteristic and not what I was expecting. I find it very disappointing. There is no crime of adult sexual exploitation. It does not exist. It is as if we just do not care that adults get sexually exploited. It is as if we tolerate it in society.

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[Laura Farris]

Clause 24 sets out the new statutory aggravating factor for murders that are connected with the end of a relationship. This provision is one of four that the Government are taking forward in response to the independent review of sentencing in cases of domestic homicide that was undertaken by Clare Wade KC. Together they will ensure that the seriousness of murder committed in a domestic context is reflected in our sentencing framework. Around a quarter of all homicides in England and Wales are classed as domestic. In other words, the perpetrator is a partner or former partner of the victim.[Official Report, 1 March 2024, Vol. 746, c. 6MC.] (Correction) The vast majority of these homicides are committed by men against women and usually follow a pattern of years of abuse prior to the homicide.

The legal framework for murder sentencing is contained in schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020, a piece of legislation that was first introduced in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, 20 years ago. While every case of murder carries a mandatory life sentence, this framework sets out the principles to guide the court in determining the minimum custodial term. It is a non-exhaustive list. It is always open to judges to consider aggravating and mitigating factors not contained in schedule 21.

Until now, schedule 21 has contained no express recognition of the seriousness of domestic murders, but over the past 20 years—I would argue particularly in the past five—our understanding of offending committed in a domestic context has improved. As Clare Wade highlighted in her review, our sentencing framework needs to be updated to reflect that. On the overall measures, last year, a statutory instrument was laid before Parliament to introduce both a statutory aggravating factor and a statutory mitigating factor for murder in relation to controlling or coercive behaviour, in line with the recommendations. Where an abusive partner has killed their victim, in recognition of the seriousness of the preceding abuse of coercive control and the experience of the victim before death, the coercive control will constitute an aggravating factor for the purposes of sentencing.

A new mitigating factor will apply in cases where the victim of an abusive partner or family member has killed their abuser, in recognition of their experience as a victim of abuse preceding the killing, which is exactly what happened in the Sally Challen case. This is consistent with the conclusion of the Court of Appeal—it is essentially taking the court’s conclusion and making it a statutory mitigating factor.[Official Report, 1 March 2024, Vol. 746, c. 7MC.] (Correction)

We have also introduced new statutory aggravating factor for murders involving gratuitous and excessive force, sometimes referred to as overkill. That is something that Clare Wade found to be strikingly prevalent in not only domestic murders,[Official Report, 1 March 2024, Vol. 746, c. 7MC.] (Correction) but all the cases she assessed. The perpetrator in cases of overkill—to use that shorthand—was male in all but one case.

Clause 24 introduces the fourth legislative measure that the Government committed to take forward in response to Clare Wade’s recommendations. This provision will make murders connected to the end of a relationship, or the victim’s stated intention to end a relationship, a statutory aggravating factor. In 40% of the murder cases analysed by Clare Wade as part of her review, the murder occurred at the end, or perceived end—an important qualification—of the relationship. The perpetrator was male in all those cases, and, in over two thirds of them, a history of coercive or controlling behaviour was also identified.

Killing in those circumstances is often the final controlling act of an abusive partner. As Clare Wade put it in her report, when the perpetrator learns he no longer has control over his partner because she is going to leave, the final act is homicide—the last way he can control her. The old shorthand used in court is: “If I can’t have you, no one will.” It is striking how often it twins with overkill—the use of gratuitous and excessive violence—at that moment. They often occur at the same time.

While it is for the judge to determine the appropriate weight given to the aggravating factors in each case, we expect that this change, along with the other statutory aggravating factors we have introduced in response to Clare Wade’s recommendations, will have a significant impact on the minimum custodial terms. It will also get the court to consider the nature and context of domestic homicides specifically, which has never happened before. These changes mark a step change in the way our sentencing framework responds to and understands cases of domestic murder. For the first time, the nature of these murders and the unique harms underpinning them will be recognised expressly in our sentencing framework. The perpetrators must serve sentences that truly reflect the severity of their crimes.

[Jess Phillips]

I will speak to new clauses 27 to 29. I do not disagree on the issue. I worked very closely with the families to get Clare Wade’s review up and running under the then Lord Chancellor, the right hon. and learned Member for South Swindon (Sir Robert Buckland)—who I believe was just speaking in the Chamber, making a nuisance of himself today as well. While we are making these changes, I think that Clare Wade has herself said, as have many of the families involved, that making these limited and piecemeal changes is not good enough. I will place some of my own thoughts on record for the sake of showing the many ways in which the aggravating factors for cases of domestic homicide need to be updated.

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[Laura Farris]

I thank the shadow Minister for his intervention. We are thinking hard on that point.

I want to check that I have not missed anything from section 55, where anything

“done or said amounted to sexual infidelity is to be disregarded.”

That is still good law. I suggest that the issue of some defendants claiming as a defence that they had killed a victim because she had been unfaithful to them has now been resolved and it is excluded as a qualifying trigger for the loss of control defence.

Clare Wade recommended that sexual infidelity should also be prohibited from being considered as a mitigating factor when it came to sentencing. We published our response to her review in July last year, setting out why we will not take that forward. The domestic abuse sentencing guideline already expressly states that provocation is no mitigation to an offence in a domestic context, except in rare circumstances. No evidence was provided in the review that sexual infidelity was ever being taken into account inappropriately as mitigation. I am therefore satisfied—it is the only point on which I really disagree with the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley—that the law already has sufficient protection in place. I urge the hon. Member not to move the new clauses.

[Jess Phillips]

I do not actually move them yet, as we do not do that for new clauses until the end. I was saying to myself, “I don’t think I have to do anything.”

I have, of course, already taken part in the consultation alongside the Killed Women network, which I work with incredibly closely. To the Minister’s final point, I started my remarks by saying that I do not agree with myself, having to do a piecemeal job. Schedule 21 needs an overhaul, but we will all start tinkering with it until it ends up in the place it already is, with bolt-ons and batons hanging off it, when something much more fundamental, in a modern world, needs doing.

On the final point about the defences, it may surprise the Minister to hear that that definitely came to me from some pretty eminent lawyers who work in the field—maybe even Clare Wade. I will take that back and speak to them about what exactly was concerning them with regard to that particular issue. I will bring it back to the Committee when we discuss new clauses at the end, of which there will be loads.

Question put and agreed to.

Clause 24 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)

Criminal Justice Bill (Sixth sitting)

Debate between Laura Farris and Jess Phillips

Committee stage
Thursday 11th January 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)]

I missed Clare Wade’s evidence because I was unwell when she gave evidence to this Committee. Are we to assume that the clause will be used in the prosecution of cases where self-harm is caused by incidents within domestic abuse relationships or as a result of grooming, sexual violence and broader violence against women? I think that it was clarified during the evidence session that that was the case.

[Laura Farris]

I thank the hon. Lady for her question. It is quite clear that Parliament’s intention, in the way that we are framing the clause, and how the clause might actually play out when it comes before the courts, are probably quite different. I have been thinking about that myself. This is very much an extension of what I may call—I hope you will forgive me if I use this as a shorthand—the “Molly Russell” principle, which was established by that tragic case and led to all the new principles of the Online Safety Act—bringing them into line with the offline environment.

However, I think that you are quite correct; when we read clause 11, we see that it belongs in a range of different circumstances, all of which I have thought through. Yes, I think that you are right to say that it could very easily exist within a domestic—

[Laura Farris]

My apologies. I am sorry for being too informal; I am not familiar with this. I think that it is the case that the issue is readily identifiable within certain forms of domestic abuse scenario, and that the clause would apply in those circumstances. It is obvious in the statutory language.

[Jess Phillips]

I will speak more broadly about the issue in a moment, and I am pleased to hear what the Minister has said; that is what we would all want to see. However, I am concerned about the each-way offences that the Minister outlined. Let us say that in a case of suicide a coroner found that domestic abuse had been involved—I mean, chance would be a fine thing in most cases—and a manslaughter charge was laid and then the perpetrator pled guilty. There has only been one case of this. I just wonder how these summary limits and these each-way offences would work in that situation.

[Laura Farris]

I thank the hon. Lady again for her question. Actually, I think that we would have to concede immediately that it would be on the charge sheet. However, the hon. Lady has raised the topical, important and very difficult issue of whether or not a domestic abuse perpetrator has elicited suicide in circumstances where, as she will know, there are evidential difficulties. There is a discussion happening within Parliament, and more widely within the legal profession, about the offence of manslaughter and its ambit when it takes place in the context of suicide.

Perhaps I can reassure the hon. Lady, though, by saying this: if we stop short of suicide—very much mindful of the fact that that engages quite difficult legal issues—and we think about the offences created under clause 11, I think that it is almost inconceivable that there would be a circumstance in which a clause 11 offence existed and was not accompanied by an offence of coercive control under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. I just do not think that, in a domestic abuse context, those two things would not exist in parallel. Therefore I think that we would already be looking at a more serious form of sentencing if we were into an “eliciting self-harm” clause 11 offence. It would also be automatically brought under the ambit of the Domestic Abuse Act, and it is already a more serious offence in that context.

Clause 12 is the facilitation element of the offence, and subsection (1) provides that anyone who arranges for somebody else to do an act capable of amounting to inducing self-harm is also committing an equivalent offence. Subsection (2) provides that an act can be capable of encouraging or assisting self-harm even when done in circumstances where it was impossible for the final act to be performed. For example, if pills were provided to a person and they ended up not to be the pills that were intended, it is exactly the same offence. Equally, if something harmful was sent by post but never arrived, the offence and sentence are the same irrespective.

Subsection (3) provides that an internet service provider does not commit the offence merely by providing a means through which others can send, transmit or publish content capable of encouraging or assisting serious self- harm. Subsection (5) provides that section 184 of the Online Safety Act 2023 is repealed in consequence of these provisions, which create a much broader basis, bringing the online and offline environments into parity.

[Jess Phillips]

The Minister and I have had some back and forth on this. I rise really to hammer home the point regarding the good intentions of the clause, but the need to think about it in the context of a domestic abuse, grooming or sexual violence situation. It is undoubted in any professional’s mind that one of the consequences of violence, abuse and coercion against an individual, specifically in young women, is self-harm and suicide.

As the Minister rightly says, it is important that we recognise that in the vast majority of cases self-harm falls short of suicide. There is a huge amount of self-harm going on across the country, genuinely encouraged as a pattern of domestic abuse, and we need to ensure that this piece of perfectly reasonable legislation, which was designed for those on the internet trying to get people to be anorexic and all of that heinous stuff, which we are all very glad to have not had to put up with in our childhood—I look around to make sure that we are all of a relatively similar age—also covers that.

There is one particular risk: how does the clause interact with institutions? Perhaps the Minister could assist me with that. The Minister for Crime, Policing and Fire, a Home Office Minister, is sat in front of me. I was a few minutes late for the sitting this morning because I was in court with one of my constituents in a case—I am afraid to say—where we were on the other side from the Home Office. My constituent literally had to take medication during the court proceedings, such is the mental health trauma that has been caused to her by the Home Office. I wonder how this piece of legislation might be used. I suppose I worry that there is too much opportunity for it to become useful, in that there are so many ways in which institutions and individuals cause people to end up in a self-harm and suicidal situation. I seek clarity on that, unless Ministers wish to be found wanting by the Bill.

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[Jess Phillips]

In this case you are.

[Laura Farris]

Well, okay, but I struggle to conceive of circumstances, other than very unusual and extreme ones, where it would be said that a statutory body was doing an act with the intention of eliciting the consequence of self-harm. Anyway, the point has been made and I have responded to it. I know the hon. Lady’s case is an emotive one.

[Jess Phillips]

I am not going to talk about my case, but with regard to the charge sheet, coercive control legislation does not currently cover adults who are sexually exploited in grooming situations. In the case of a woman who is sexually exploited by an adult, like the woman I was with this morning, coercive control legislation does not apply. However, self-harm—I mean, I am going to say that literally being forced to be raped by 20 men a day is self-harm—is absolutely part of the pattern of coercion and abuse that those people suffer, so we would assume that adult-groomers would be covered by the Bill.

[Laura Farris]

I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention. I think a very helpful fabric of possible scenarios has been identified this afternoon. I simply say that in the different circumstances that she has just outlined, there are different criminal offences that would also apply. My simple point is that a case of the nature that she has described would not be confined to a section 11 offence under the Criminal Justice Act 2024, as I hope it will become in due course; there would be a range of serious criminality connected to that.

[Jess Phillips]

There isn’t. I hope, as the Minister hopes, that there will be by the time we have got to the end of our scrutiny of the Bill, but there is no crime of grooming adults in sexual exploitation; that exists only for children as an aggravating factor in offences. I suppose pimping legislation would not count in the case I mentioned if self-harm was caused. I do not think there are other bits of legislation for adult victims of sexual exploitation.

[The Chair]

Order. We are having a very important and thoughtful debate, but can we please try to observe the normal procedures so that Hansard colleagues, and those who are watching, can catch all of the proceedings?

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[Laura Farris]

The clause is the latest in a sequence of legislation dealing with intimate image abuse. People may correct me if I am wrong, but I think I am right to say that we have not dealt with intimate image abuse until this Parliament. The first time it hit the statute book properly was the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. I think it is also right to say that, as a Parliament, we have framed it correctly as something that is more often than not just another ugly incarnation of coercive control. It is highly intrusive, humiliating and distressing conduct.

In November 2022, following the passage of the Domestic Abuse Act, the Government announced their intention to create a suite of new offences to deal with intimate image abuse, closely based on the Law Commission’s recommendations in its July 2022 report. Under the Online Safety Act 2023—I hope the Committee will not mind if I spend a moment on the chronology and the legislative journey on intimate image abuse—the Government repealed the offences of disclosing or threatening to disclose private sexual images, replacing them with four new offences of sharing or threatening to share intimate images.

The Bill goes further to tackle the taking of intimate images without consent, and the process of installing equipment for that purpose. First, it repeals two voyeurism offences related to voyeurism of a private act and taking images under a person’s clothing, for which we use the shorthand “upskirting”—although that precedes the life of this Parliament, so I am wrong about that. Anyway, both those offences are reasonably new and have resulted in amendments to the Sexual Offences Act 2003. The Bill will replace them with new criminal offences to tackle the taking or recording of intimate images without consent and the installing of equipment for such purposes.

Those taking offences build on the sharing offences identified in the Online Safety Act to provide a unified package of offences using the same definitions and core elements. That addresses the criticism that there was previously a patchwork of protection, which the police told us led to gaps in provision when it came to this type of behaviour. I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Basingstoke (Dame Maria Miller), who is not a member of the Committee. She has done a lot of work on the issue, and identified this problem in particular. As we know, one of the issues was proving intent.

I am grateful to the Law Commission for its work. It consulted widely with the police, prosecutors and legal practitioners, so we could not only read its report, but hear from a range of experts, including those supporting and campaigning on behalf of victims, and others who are far more knowledgeable than any of us.

The clause will insert a suite of new provisions after section 66 of the 2003 Act. The clause will create three new offences: the taking or recording of an intimate photograph or film without consent; and two new offences about installing equipment to enable a taking offence. I will go through them briefly.

The first provision of the clause is the creation of what we call a base offence of taking any intentional image of a person in an intimate state without their consent. That amounts to what we will call a section 66AA offence. It removes the requirement for a reason or motive. It does not matter if the person was doing it for a joke or for financial payment, or even if their reason was not particularly sinister. The base offence would be met if those elements were established. The offence is triable summarily only and will attract a maximum prison term of six months.

The wording of the two more serious offences mirrors some of the language that we are familiar with; the offences refer not just to “intentionally” taking an image, including of a person in an intimate state without their consent, but to having the intent of causing them “alarm, distress or humiliation”, or taking the image for the purpose of “obtaining sexual gratification” for themselves or another person. The offences are serious and carry a maximum sentence of two years. The three offences are designed to achieve the right balance between the protection of the victim and the avoidance of any over-criminalisation. I will return to that when I speak to new clause 20, tabled by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley.

The base taking offence is subject to a defence of reasonable excuse, such as a police officer taking an image without consent for purposes connected with criminal proceedings. Similarly, a base sharing offence is subject to the defence of reasonable excuse; for example, images taken for the purpose of a child’s medical treatment would meet that threshold, even if the victim was distressed by that. There is another exemption—I do not know who came up with this example, but it is a good one—if the image is taken in a public place and the person shown in the image is in the intimate state voluntarily. A distinction is therefore drawn between, for example, a photo of a streaker at a football match, and that of someone who had a reasonable expectation of privacy; that would relate to upskirting, for example.

We are also creating two offences to do with the installation of spycams, which I am afraid we see more and more of in cases going through the courts: an offence of installing, adapting, preparing or maintaining equipment with the intention of taking or recording intimate photograph or film; and an offence of supplying for that purpose. To be clear, it will not be necessary for the image to have been taken; if equipment was installed for that purpose, that is enough to meet the requirements of the offence.

Overall, the clause amends the Sexual Offences Act 2003 to ensure that notification requirements can be applied, where the relevant criteria are met, to those convicted of the new offence of taking for sexual gratification and installing with the intent to enable the commission of that offence. I commend the clause to the Committee. I will respond to the new clause later.

[Jess Phillips]

I will be brief. New clause 20 would extend the definition of “intimate image” to include specific categories of image that may be considered intimate by particular religious or cultural groups—for example, instances of a person not wearing modesty clothing such as a hijab or niqab when they would normally do so.

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[Laura Farris]

I am very sensitive to the issues that have been raised and will respond to them, but I will also explain why we do not accept the new clause.

We have steered very close to the course recommended by the Law Commission in what we have defined in law as an intimate image. It includes anything that shows a person who is nude or partially nude, or who is doing anything sexual or very intimate, such as using the toilet. It is a wider definition of “intimate” than was used in the revenge porn provisions under the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. We have expanded it, but we have confined it to what we think anyone in this country would understand as “intimate”.

One of the challenges in adopting a definition of “intimate” that includes, for example, the removal of a hijab is that we are creating a criminal offence of that image being shared. It would not be obvious to anyone in this country who received a picture of a woman they did not know with her hair exposed that they were viewing an intimate image and committing a criminal offence. The Law Commission has made very similar points in relation to showing the legs of a woman who is a Hasidic Jew, or showing her without her wig on. This would be grotesquely humiliating for that victim, but that would not be completely obvious to any member of the public who might receive such an image of them.

[Jess Phillips]

Will the Minister give way?

[Laura Farris]

I will, but I would like to develop this point a little bit more.

[Jess Phillips]

I strongly suggest that the hon. Lady does not come from the same community as me. I described images being sent to the community; the nature of the image would absolutely be clear to lots of people where I live.

[Laura Farris]

I was going to complete the point. If the hon. Lady will forgive me, I will do so before I give way again. We have to create laws that apply equally to everybody in the United Kingdom. If we are to create an offence of sharing intimate images, we have to have a translation of intimacy that is absolutely irrefutable to anybody sending that image around. Even if they do not know the person in the image, it has to be absolutely clear to the sender that they are sending an intimate image. I have already made the point that it would not be immediately obvious to everyone in the United Kingdom that an image of a woman showing her hair was a humiliating image of her. It would not automatically be an intimate image even if the person sharing it knew that the woman in the image was Muslim, because some Muslim women do not wear headscarves.

The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley described a very dark case. She mentioned the language of blackmail and honour-based violence. She intimated coercive control. My simple point is that in the circumstances she has identified, there are a host of serious criminal offences being committed in conjunction with the use of the intimate image. We would say, very respectfully, that we think that kind of crime belongs much more comprehensively within other offences.

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[Jess Phillips]

rose—

[Laura Farris]

I am not going to engage in a case-by-case discussion. It is so difficult for me to do that; I do not have the papers in front of me. I understand the issue about community-based events, but if the purpose of sending the image is to blackmail a person, they have already engaged another element of the criminal law, and there is already aggravation, in that the perpetrator is being domestically abusive or is committing an honour-based offence, as the hon. Lady described.

I want to make it clear that by introducing the base offence, this legislation is removing the need to show an intention to cause distress. That is the issue that Georgia Harrison had, but managed to circumvent when she got that very successful and high-profile conviction against Stephen Bear, who went to prison for two years. She had an evidential difficulty in proving intent in her case. Although she did, she then became a really powerful advocate for removing intent from the offence, and we have done so.

I am not for a moment suggesting that there will not be cases of maximum sensitivity in which somebody is humiliated, but as I say, in the case that the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley described, in the background, other offences were materialising. Our view is that it is more appropriate that they are dealt with under other elements of the law, rather than our muddling the police response, or even creating offenders where we do not mean to, because under the hon. Lady’s offence, the offender does not know they are committing an offence. They might think that they are sharing an image of a glamorous woman, not knowing that it is grossly offensive that they have shown a picture of a woman who does not have her hair covered as she normally would, because they do not know her.

I hope that answers the hon. Lady. With great respect, I urge her not to press her new clause. However, I would like to hear from her, because I did not give way to her a moment ago.

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[Jess Phillips]

I rise to support both amendments, and, in fact, what the hon. Member for Wyre Forest said as well. No one should have the ability to host an image of a person that they did not want out there in the first place. Unfortunately, what people tend to get back is that it is very difficult to place these things, but all sorts of things around copyright are traced on all sorts of sites quite successfully. We put a man on the moon 20 years before I was born, and brought him back. I reckon we could manage this and I would really support it.

Turning to the point made by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest and the issue of faking intimate images, I am lucky enough to know—I am almost certain that most of the women in this room do not know this about themselves—that deepfake intimate images of me exist. As I say, I am lucky enough to know. I did not ever once consider that I should bother to try to do anything about it, because what is the point? In the plethora of things that I have to deal with, especially as a woman—and certainly as a woman Member of Parliament in the public eye—I just chalk it up to another one of those things and crack on, because there is too much to be getting on with. But on two separate incidents, people have alerted me to images on pornographic websites of both me and my right hon. Friend the Member for Ashton-under-Lyne (Angela Rayner); they have a thing for common women, clearly. There is nothing that even somebody in my position can do about it.

The first time I ever saw intimate images of me made on “rudimentary” Photoshop, as my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North called it, if I am honest, like with most abuses against women, I just laughed at it. That is the way we as women are trained to deal with the abuses that we suffer. They could only be fake images of me, because, unlike my children, I do not come from an era where everybody sends photos of everybody else naked. As a nation, we have to come to terms with the fact that that is completely and utterly normal sexual behaviour in the younger generation, but in that comes the danger.

The reality is that this is going to get worse. Rudimentary Photoshop images of me were sent to me about five years ago, or even longer—we have been here for ages. Covid has made it seem even longer. The first time I saw fake images of me, in a sexualised and violent form, was probably about eight years ago. Over the years, two, three or four times, people have sent me stuff that they have seen. I cannot stress enough how worrying it is that we could go into a new era of those images being really realistic. On the point made by the hon. Member for Wyre Forest, I have heard, for example, two completely deepfake recordings of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) that were put out and about. To be fair to Members on the Government Benches, they clearly said, “This is fake. Do not believe it; do not spread it.” We must have that attitude.

However, it is one thing to stop something in its tracks if it is the voice of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras saying, in that instance, that he did not like Liverpool, but that is nothing compared with the idea of me being completely naked and beaten by somebody. It is like wildfire, so I strongly encourage the Government to think about the amendments and how we make them law.

[Laura Farris]

Opposition Members have made two very good points, which I will respond to. The issue of publishing or hosting unlawfully obtained internet photographs is salient. It was probably thrown into its sharpest relief by Nicholas Kristof at The New York Times when he did a big exposé of Pornhub. I have never read off my phone in any parliamentary sitting before, but I will briefly do so, because the opening to his article is one of the best that I have read about Pornhub:

“Pornhub prides itself on being the cheery, winking face of naughty, the website that buys a billboard in Times Square and provides snow plows to clear Boston streets. It donates to organizations fighting for racial equality…Yet there’s another side of the company: Its site is infested with rape videos. It monetizes child rapes, revenge pornography, spy cam videos of women showering”.

The point is very well made.

Under the Online Safety Act 2023, we have ensured that all user-to-user services in scope of the illegal content duties are required to remove that type of illegal content online when it is flagged to them or they become aware of it. That would cover something such as the Pornhub apps I have described. We believe that the robust regulatory regime for internet companies put in place by the Act, with the introduction of the offence of sharing intimate images, which extends to publication, are the most effective way to deal with the problems of the spread of that material.

Our essential answer is that under the Online Safety Act a host site—I have given a big name, because I am critical of that particular site—would be under a legal obligation to remove content flagged to it as featuring prohibited content, so it would have an obligation under the law to remove an intimate image of an individual created without their knowledge or consent or to be subject to criminal sanctions. Under the Online Safety Act, those are substantial; Parliament worked collectively to ensure that meaningful sanctions would be applied in that regard.

There is a concern that creating a new offence would partially overlap with existing criminal offences—for example, that we would basically be duplicating some of the provisions under section 188 of the Online Safety Act. We worry that that would dilute the effectiveness with which such activity will be policed and charged by the Crown Prosecution Service. I understand that the provisions under the Act have not yet been commenced, so we would be legislating on top of legislation that has not been commenced. Respectfully, I invite hon. Members to allow the Act to come into force comprehensively before we make an assessment of whether we need to legislate again on the issue of hosting unlawful content. However, I am sympathetic to it, and I think the whole House agrees with the principle.

Equally, the Law Commission was asked to look at the issue of deepfakes, which it considered and responded to. I will remind the Committee of how it undertook its inquiry into the issue. It undertook a full public consultation on the point and engaged with the CPS and police, and it concluded that making a deepfake offence was not necessary. It identified certain associated risks, including difficulties for law enforcement and, again, the risk of overcriminalisation, which potentially would outweigh the benefits. The Government share the view of the Law Commission and have decided not to create a separate making offence.

I will provide hon. Members with some reassurance: nobody is in any doubt about the risk. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley described harmful, culpable conduct relating to her personally and to other senior politicians in this House. My hon. Friend the Member for Wyre Forest gave hypotheticals that could easily materialise, and we all know that there is an increased risk of that as we move into an election year on a global scale, because elections are happening all over the world this year. Nobody doubts the risk. I want again to provide the reassurance that such conduct generally involves sharing of these images, or threats to share, both of which are criminalised by offences under the Online Safety Act, or by other offences—communication offences and harassment offences—so it is already captured.

The secondary issue identified by the Law Commission concern the prosecution difficulties, because it would be difficult to prove some elements of the offence, such as an intention to cause distress, in circumstances in which the image had not been shared—by the way, I take out of that a circumstance in which the defendant has told the victim that they hold the image, because that has already crossed the threshold. The question that I asked officials—I have now lost the answer, but they did give it to me. Hang on a minute; someone will know where it is. Will the Committee give me one moment?

--- Later in debate ---

[Laura Farris]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for his forbearance. Just to pick up on that point, I think he is right to hold the Government’s feet to the fire on the commencement of the Online Safety Act, because it is all very well having these provisions in law, but if they are not actually operational, they are not doing any good to anyone. I accept that tacit criticism as it may be advanced. I recognise that implementation now is critical; commencement is critical.

I will disclose the question that I put to officials. I was interested in the question of what happens if, for example, a schoolboy creates a deepfake of another pupil and does not share it, so that it is not covered by the Online Safety Act but is none the less an offence. I am told that that is covered by two separate bits of legislation. One is section 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978, which includes making indecent images of a child, including if that is a deepfake, which would be covered by the statutory language. The second provision is section 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which is possession of any indecent image of a child and would include where it had been superimposed.

I am satisfied that the current law, including the Online Safety Act—I have already accepted that there are commencement issues—deals with deepfakes. I am sensitive to the prosecutorial difficulties that I have identified and I think that these are covered, particularly by the Online Safety Act. We accept the Law Commission’s very careful work on the issue, which was a detailed piece of research, not just a short paragraph at the end. On that basis, I very respectfully urge the hon. Member for Nottingham North to withdraw or not press the amendments.

[Jess Phillips]

On the answer that the Minister got from her officials, there are so many bits of legislation about abuses of children, sexual violence towards children, sexual grooming of children and sexual exploitation of children, and there are none about adults, as though such behaviour is not harmful when someone turns 18. If the same kid in the same class is 17 and makes images of a person who is turning 18, the view is that one day it would be a problem and the next day it would not, as though the abuse of adult women is just fine. The Online Safety Act does not say the word “woman” once, so I will gently push back on the idea that it deals with this. I am going to scour Pornhub now—I will not do it while I am in Parliament in case somebody sees me—to look for these images, and I will rise to the Minister’s challenge. I am going to go to the police once the Online Safety Act is in force and we will see how far I get.

[Laura Farris]

I thank the hon. Lady for her point. She is making very, very good ones, as she always does. That is a legitimate challenge. I just would also ask her to bear this in mind. She has heard our answer. First, we are accepting the Law Commission’s recommendation for now. Secondly, we think the Online Safety Act covers what she has described in terms of sharing. The third point that I draw her attention to is the pornography review launched today. That is a critical piece of work, and she made the good point that we focus extensively on children. There is a really important element of that.

First, we know that there is a dark web element where a lot of online pornography is focused directly on child pornography. We also know that adult pornography not only contributes to the pubescent nature of abuse that we see in the violence against women, but also violence against women much more widely. I have spoken about this; the hon. Lady has spoken about this—we have been in the Chamber together numerous times talking about it. I hope that that review will get on top of some the issues that she is raising today. I hope she will accept our gentle refusal of her amendment and maybe consider withdrawing it.

Criminal Justice Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Laura Farris and Jess Phillips

Tuesday 12th December 2023 Public Bill Committees

[Laura Farris]

Q My final question is about the minimum age provisions in that. I know that the age of criminal responsibility begins at 10, but based on your work, was that an area where you found that antisocial behaviour was perpetrated a lot by youngsters in their teens?

Baroness Newlove: I have not specifically looked at that. Looking at all the reviews I have done, I have said outside this role that parenting is the most difficult job anybody can do, but you have to be accountable for the actions.

I have concerns: yes, the age is 10, but there could be other areas in which that person is suffering, such as dyslexia or autism. Also, the parents could be suffering domestic abuse. How do you make them pay that fine, at the end of the day? If you go back to that, we had that kind of language in the riots, where we were going to get the parents and take them out of their homes. For me, there has to be accountability, but how would you get that parent, who is probably suffering from domestic abuse or may have mental health and addiction issues, to fully understand the impact that their child is having? They may need support to rectify that. Also, that child could have other issues.

I can see where you are going from that. I welcome anything, but I am just stepping back a little to consider how that would have an impact on the rest of the family to make sure we can get a better solution.

[Jess Phillips]

Q Nicole, give the Committee an idea of the number of domestic abuse incidents a year.

Nicole Jacobs: Well, according to the Office for National Statistics, it is 2.3 million.

Town Centre Safety

Debate between Laura Farris and Jess Phillips

Tuesday 5th December 2023 Commons Chamber

[Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)]

Will the Minister give way?

[Laura Farris]

If I could just finish my sentence, I will of course give way to the hon. Lady. The most recent figures we have are from March 2023, when the figure for police offices in England and Wales was 149,566. It has never been higher. With that, I give way.

[Jess Phillips]

I wonder whether the Minister can provide the per capita of population figures.

[Laura Farris]

I do not have that figure, so I will have to write to the hon. Lady.

It is right that decisions about how police resources are deployed, including the number and composition of people in neighbourhood and local policing roles, are for the determination of chief constables, who know their beat better than anyone and are accountable to democratically elected police and crime commissioners. Nevertheless, the numbers have a broader significance, and I want to draw the Opposition’s attention to four points.

First, due to the investment in the police uplift programme, the number of police officers in local policing roles is the highest since comparable data began to be collected, with an increase of 6.5% in the 12 months to 31 March. We have more female officers and more officers from minority ethnic backgrounds than ever before—something that I hope the hon. Member for Nottingham North will agree is consistent with some of the conclusions that were certainly implied, if not made explicit, on the nature of representation in Baroness Casey’s report into conduct in the Metropolitan police.

We have more officers receiving specialist training for specific categories of crime. I will give the House one example, because yesterday I visited Avon and Somerset Police, the pioneering force conducting Operation Soteria Bluestone in the investigation of rape. They made it perfectly clear to me that the increase in numbers that they have seen locally has facilitated a huge increase in the number of specialist trained rape and serious sexual offences police officers. In fact, there are 2,000 nationwide. I noted that the hon. Gentleman said that we were setting the police up to fail. That could not be more different from the information that that force gave me yesterday—and if they are incorrect, I would appreciate it if he would explain why when he closes.

International Women’s Day

Debate between Laura Farris and Jess Phillips

Thursday 5th March 2020 Commons Chamber

[Laura Farris (Newbury) (Con)]

I first got involved with International Women’s Day in 2015, when I was asked to speak at an event; I had not heard of it before. That has prompted me to think about where we were then with women in public life, and where we are now. In 2015, there were 148 women in this House and 104 women in the two Houses of Congress, and a woman was poised to secure the Democrat nomination in the race for the White House—well, that one did not work out; but fast forward to today, and there are 220 women in Parliament, which is a 49% increase in five years.

[Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)]

You’re welcome.

[Laura Farris]

I thought I might get that. There are 127 women in the two Houses of Congress, which is a 23% increase, and we have had a second woman Prime Minister. Sometimes the pace towards gender equality is glacial, but in the last five years, it has been considerable, and that is something to celebrate this International Women’s Day.

Children and Domestic Abuse

Debate between Laura Farris and Jess Phillips

Tuesday 3rd March 2020 Westminster Hall

[Jess Phillips]

I absolutely agree. The Domestic Abuse Bill gives us a real opportunity. We will not get the moon on a stick—the Bill will not give us everything—but the annual case load at Women’s Aid, where I used to work, involved on average 8,000 women and 16,000 children. Children’s names are written down on a form and their social work paperwork is in the file, but no one from my organisation would necessarily have laid eyes on them. A tiny fraction of them would have lived in refuge accommodation—less than 10% of the total number would have gone through that in a year—so we are talking about thousands of children in the west midlands who, every day, are without someone to confide in, to talk to, or to deal with the trauma they are feeling in their lives.

Anyone who sits for five minutes with people who have been a child victim of domestic abuse, who have grown up in a home, will tell us that that trauma stays with them in adulthood. They are likely to suffer from PTSD and from problems within their own intimate relationships. All the findings from studies of crime data on knife crime or even terrorism show links to people who grow up in traumatised households. It is imperative for the future of those children and our country that we get this right. Children must be included in the Bill, and at the same time we must take a huge, wholesale look at funding for children’s services in the country. I ask the Minister directly: how many young people’s violence advisers and specialist children’s workers are there across England and Wales? The SafeLives data shows that it would cost only £2.5 million to provide those services across England and Wales. In the greater scheme of things, what it would save would be huge.

We are moving into an era when this will be talked about in schools. All of us in the Chamber have fought—some of us literally had to fight directly on the streets—to ensure that compulsory sex and relationship education will be available in our schools. As we roll that out and talk about such subjects in schools, we must ensure that we do not open a door into an empty room. We must ensure that specialist training and specialist single points of contact are available to handle this in every school, and to handle it well.

The murder rate of women and girls were released the week before last. I have forgotten the name of the organisation, but the data was released: 144 women and girls were murdered last year. That is an increase of about 27 on the previous year. Those figures include the murder of girls younger than three. The reality is that we need to provide support for victims of domestic violence who are children, and it is also imperative that they are safeguarded. We need to start looking at where we are failing in the system of children’s social care. To look at my own city again, I am sure that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Preet Kaur Gill) could tell horror stories about how the under-resourcing of children’s services is leading to dangerous situations for the city’s children.

I cannot stress one thing enough when it comes to the review being undertaken of the family court. All of us have been in meetings with the likes of Claire Throssell, whose children were burned in their home by a violent perpetrator who the family courts had allowed to have access to them, even though she had begged and pleaded against that. The presumption of access for domestic violence perpetrators has to end.

[Laura Farris (Newbury) (Con)]

To build on the hon. Lady’s point, the presumption in favour of access for a parent who in a criminal court would be considered a violent offender has a hidden dimension. Sometimes the perpetrator of domestic abuse will use the child as a pawn. Enhanced right of access will, typically, be used as a tool to torture the mother. The hon. Lady gave powerful figures not only for women who have been killed by domestic abuse but for children as young as three. She also gave an example of arson. That grim conclusion might not be reached, but children are still treated as pawns. They are placed with the perpetrator parent, in a highly dangerous situation, and they are denied access to their mother. That is a tool to torture the mother, and goodness knows what is happening. Another problem is the reporting restrictions in the family court, which make it difficult to know how the decisions are reached and the slipstream in which those children are moving.

[Jess Phillips]

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. I have seen hundreds of cases in which access to a child is used simply to extend the abuse. Children become pawns, and that has a psychological effect on them. They are pulled about and told that they have to go somewhere, such that they do not feel safe. Their mothers have to watch on and say goodbye to their children, putting them into the custody of someone they do not believe to be safe. That is psychological torture in our family court system—although, thanks to its secrecy, we will never truly know. However, I am sent emails with reams of accounts about that exact thing happening, day in, day out. We have to stop wringing our hands.

The Children and Family Court Advisory and Support Service is also an issue with regard to the family court. CAFCASS provides support and services for perpetrators to try to stop the perpetration of domestic abuse. I am not here to criticise that, but I note that CAFCASS does not provide the same support for women and children. I often found a disparity when people decided to fund local commissioned services for perpetrators. Again, I have no problem with that, but there was always a discrepancy between the amount of money that would go to the perpetrator project and the amount that would go to the project that ran alongside it for women and children. Double the number of people was always a fraction of the price, I noted.