Criminal Justice Bill (Fourteenth sitting)

Jess Phillips Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 25th January 2024 Public Bill Committees

That is quite wide-ranging and includes serious assault and serious sexual assault, which would meet the mandatory referral criteria. Given what I have just read out, many allegations of domestic abuse are likely to fall into one of those criteria.

[Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)]

“Likely” is not good enough for me, I am afraid, as I said in my speech. I just do not see why we would not add domestic abuse to the list, given that the Government have themselves made domestic abuse a serious crime. The list might capture it, but in lots of cases does not.

[Chris Philp]

I think that the 2020 regulations refer to this, so if the change were to be made, it could and probably should be made via the regulations, rather than the Bill, so that it was treated the same way as the other items.

While I am not ready to accept the amendment today, I will take away the question of whether there is a case for amending the regulations to include domestic abuse on the list. There will be arguments on both sides, because there is a necessarily high threshold. I do not disagree with the hon. Lady, but just to give the other side of the argument, the IOPC has quite a heavy workload, there are quite long delays, and we need to make sure that we direct the IOPC’s finite resources towards the most serious matters. I know domestic abuse is serious; I am not disputing that. However, we have to make sure that we calibrate that the right way. I will take the matter away and come back to the Committee once I have received further advice. That is a slightly softer commitment than on the other two measures, but it is an undertaking to look at the suggestion seriously in the context of the regulations.

On vetting clearance, I have already made the point that the College of Policing code of practice was updated in July to set out that there should be continuous vetting, and we will put that in regulations, as I said. I also spoke in debate on the last group of measures about the funded policing plan to carry out continuous integrity monitoring, which is basically the data wash I mentioned earlier done on a continuous basis.

It is the case that the full re-vetting is done every number of years. However, the proposed, revised authorised professional practice on vetting, which was published on 10 January—quite recently; it is out for consultation—suggests there should be an annual change-of-circumstance and integrity check, to check in on individuals without having to do the full re-vetting, in addition to the continuous integrity work I mentioned. The APP is out for consultation; it closes in a couple of months’ time. The annual check-up is in the APP. I looked at it earlier, and I warn colleagues that it is about 400 pages long. It is quite a heavy read. I hope that the proposal in the APP and the continuous integrity screening, which I mentioned in the previous debate and which we funded, combined with the code of practice released last July and the regulations that we will lay before Parliament this spring and early summer, will ensure that the required standards are met not just as a one-off today, but on an ongoing basis.

[Jess Phillips]

Will the Minister comment specifically on the amendment on evidence that is gathered in the family court?

[Chris Philp]

I am extremely grateful to the hon. Lady for drawing my attention to amendment 134, which I had momentarily overlooked. It is a fair point to raise.

For the Committee’s benefit, evidence placed before the family court is currently not considered when vetting decisions are taken. The family court will consider things such as child custody cases, for example, and it may be that allegations are made in the family court of domestic abuse or even more serious matters such as rape. The family court may, on occasion, make a finding of fact, where it finds on the civil standard of the balance of probability—not the criminal standard, which is beyond reasonable doubt—that a particular thing has happened, which could be a criminal offence. It is not a criminal conviction. It is not beyond a reasonable doubt, but on the balance of probability.

Family court proceedings are closed, and they are not, generally speaking, published, so that information is not available to take into account during vetting. Of course, police doing vetting do not know which officer may or may not have been involved in child custody proceedings. The vast majority will not, of course, but a small number will. Because that information is generally not published, in order to get hold of the information, the police would have to either ask for their officers to self-disclose that they had been subject to proceedings—there is obviously the possibility that the officer would lie, particularly if there was an adverse fact—or make individual applications for each case to the family court to disclose first whether there had been proceedings and secondly, if there had been proceedings, whether the findings of fact could be disclosed. It may be that the family court would not disclose that information, because that is a decision for the family court judge.

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[Alex Norris]

rose—

[Jess Phillips]

rose—

[Chris Philp]

I think the shadow Minister was up first, and then I will give way to the hon. Lady.

[Chris Philp]

I would be interested to hear, including via an intervention in response to this, how we would craft that—what legislative measure we could pass that would essentially open up what are currently closed proceedings within the ambit of the family courts to the police vetting process. I will happily give way if the hon. Gentleman can suggest that or come back to me later on.

[Jess Phillips]

Really, it is unfair on the Minister for me to ask him to do this, because he is absolutely right: it is practically impossible for him to agree to it today, because our family courts system—and, in fact, we do not have a Justice Minister in front of us—[Interruption.] Oh, the hon. Member for Newbury is a Justice Minister; I apologise. Okay then, I am happy to take interventions when I wind up.

We do not record anything that happens in our family courts. Now, we do not need Fujitsu; I could knock up an Excel spreadsheet that a clerk could put the findings in the case into at the end of every day and that was searchable by safeguarding agencies. It is not beyond the wit of man, but it is absolutely beyond the wit of the policing Minister—not because of a lack of skill, but because he literally cannot commit to doing something that the Ministry of Justice should have done a long time ago and that should already exist. The failing, actually, is not on the right hon. Gentleman’s part in not being able to accept it; it is due to the fact that we have allowed a wild west to occur in our family courts. So it is not his fault.

[Chris Philp]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for her personal exoneration on this occasion; I will take that while I can. However, it may be that an MOJ colleague will respond. Obviously, the hon. Lady is able to question MOJ Ministers in parliamentary questions, and it may be that it is possible to have a discussion here; I do not know. However, that is obviously, as the hon. Lady said, something that the justice system has to consider. As a Home Office policing and crime Minister, that is not in my ambit. Therefore, as far as I am concerned—as the hon. Lady has acknowledged—it is difficult to say anything further.

However, I will just repeat the point that it is obviously open to a party to family court proceedings—if they are making an allegation of criminality to the family court, I am sure we would all strongly encourage them to also report it to the police, because it should be—[Interruption.] I know that there may in some cases be reasons not to, but they should also report that to the police so that it can be criminally investigated. Were they to do so, that would then appear on the police national database, although I do understand that there are some individual circumstances in which a victim may not want to do that.

There are a lot of new clauses and amendments in this group. I apologise for speaking to them at such length, Sir Robert, but I hope that I have set out that the majority of these things are already being done via regulations. There are two or three areas—new clauses 34 and 43 particularly—where I have undertaken to come back with further thinking, but I hope that that gives the Committee sufficient assurance that the Government are taking this important area very seriously—and, more than just taking it seriously, taking action.

[Jess Phillips]

I really appreciate the approach that the Minister has taken on all of the areas. I do not doubt that we are cross-cutting on certain things that have been going on, which many of us in this House have been working on for at least the past two years, since this became such a public issue. I also appreciate the Minister saying that he will come back on various different things.

Some of the amendments that I have tabled are just minor and technical amendments to other bits of—[Interruption.] Yes, apologies; I do not mean to wade into the argument about, “What is a technical amendment?”, because I do not know—or care, to be perfectly honest. That is the truth. I really appreciate those opportunities to discuss this with the Minister.

On the issue of the family courts, I will speak to another amendment on that shortly, later on in this debate. The reason I feel compelled to do that—even though I have admitted that in this instance the Minister’s hands are tied—is that we are three years on since the Ministry of Justice’s harms review. If the Justice Minister here today would like to tell me that I am wrong, she can, but we are three years on from the Ministry of Justice identifying the harms in the family courts—serious harms of child abuse and serious cases of rape—and nothing has changed.

We are no further in using the perfectly good piece of work that was started by myself and the now Justice Secretary, the right hon. and learned Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk), who was not in that role at the time. Actually, it is really woeful, and so I find myself only able to tag this on to Bills where it is wholly inappropriate to ask the Minister concerned to include it, even though I absolutely want to see this very substantive thing done.

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Appeals to police appeals tribunals

[Jess Phillips]

I beg to move amendment 137, in clause 74, page 66, line 1, leave out “a local policing body” and insert

“the Independent Office for Police Conduct”.

The power to seek a referral to the police appeals tribunal should sit with an independent organisation, such as the IOPC.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

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[Jess Phillips]

Everyone will be pleased to hear that I have only a few paragraphs to read.

Clause 74 has been proposed with a view to strengthening the oversight of police chiefs. Although this is an important goal that the Bill seeks to achieve, the clause in its current form is misguided. If clause 74 seeks to address inadequacies in internal processes, the Government must instead implement measures to improve the efficacy and independence of the system, rather than delegating these powers to police and crime commissioners.

Disciplinary procedures must be independent and not subject to political influence, which would be a huge risk if the power to refer a police chief to a police tribunal sits with PCCs. In order to maintain the integrity of the system, these powers must sit with an independent body. The Independent Office for Police Conduct has been established specifically to hold police behaviour to account, so we should give the powers to refer a police chief to a tribunal to an organisation that exists to uphold police integrity.

I do not wish to besmirch any particular PCC, but having spent nine years in this building trying to overcome, and make processes to overcome, political interference and political patronage in cases of misconduct, I am always anxious when politicians and friends mark the homework of their friends.

[Alex Norris]

To some degree, the Minister has made the case for the clause already, but we support that element. It relates, of course, to the dismissals review commissioned in the light of the Casey review.

I did not hear this from the Minister, but—I think this speaks to the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley has just made—we should not throw the baby out with the bathwater when it comes to the input of individuals who are independent. I know that that was not the point that the Minister was making about legally qualified chairs. I understand the point he was making about some of the delays and how unintentionally cumbersome the system has become. Nevertheless, as my hon. Friend said, the principle of independence is important for public confidence in the system. It would doubtlessly be an odd quirk if we got stuck with a system that had been designed to stop chief constables protecting staff who perhaps should have been dismissed, but which actually had the opposite effect in some cases of officer misconduct at more junior ranks. Having spoken to chiefs, I know there are frustrations there.

Again, the most important thing is that the process is fair, transparent and as simple and speedy as possible, so of course a judicial review cannot be a part of that process. That is of course wrong, so changing to a different appeal mechanism is probably a good thing to do. That leaves me with only one question for the Minister. This clause does not make the regime that he has mentioned and that I have spoken about, but gives the powers to make such a regime. I wonder why regulations are preferred for that and whether he has a sense of the timing for that and for the consultation, because clearly there will be a lot of interest in that—I am talking particularly about proposed new subsection (1A) of the Police Act 1996. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s rationale.

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[Chris Philp]

I explained in the last debate the rationale for clause 74, which, as the shadow Minister said, is to allow the chief constable to initiate an appeal where he or she disagrees with the finding of the misconduct panel on which the chief constable is in a minority—there are two independent members. To the point about independence, which the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley raised, given that there are still two independent members, and the chief chairs it but is in the minority, that gives quite a good assurance. Of course, the individual police officer has a right of appeal to the Police Appeals Tribunal, which is an essentially digital function, and in this clause we are also giving the chief constable a right to appeal if they do not like the decision.

Turning to the amendment and who should initiate the appeal where it is the chief constable themselves who is the subject of the misconduct proceedings, let me make a couple of points. First, the police and crime commissioner, or the deputy mayor where there is a mayoral model, ultimately exercises oversight of the chief constable. They can fire them for poor performance, for example, and they are responsible for hiring them as well, so it is consistent with that hiring and firing power that they make the decision on whether to appeal where a finding misconduct is made against the chief constable themselves.

It is worth repeating the point I made just now that the panel that makes a finding has two independent members, so that is pretty independent. We are not giving the police and crime commissioner the right to, as it were, ratify or reject the finding of the panel; we are merely giving a power to refer it to the Police Appeals Tribunal, an essentially judicial body that will then hear the appeal. It is simply a right of referral to the Police Appeals Tribunal, not a right to make a decision. For that reason, I think it is the right way to approach things. On that basis, I urge the Committee to not adopt amendment 137, but to incorporate clause 74 as part of the Bill.

[Jess Phillips]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Clause 74 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 75 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 76

Regulations

Amendment made: 146, in clause 76, page 68, line 15, after “purposes” insert “or areas”.—(Chris Philp.)

This amendment provides that regulations under the Bill (other than regulations under clause 78) may make different provision for different areas.

Clause 76, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 77

Extent

Amendments made: 41, in clause 77, page 68, line 36, leave out “5” and insert “1”.

This amendment provides that clauses 1 to 4 extend to (ie form part of the law of) Scotland and Northern Ireland, as well as England and Wales.

Amendment 42, in clause 77, page 69, line 2, at end insert—

“(ea) section (Terrorist offenders) (and Schedule (Notification orders));”.

This amendment provides that the new clause and Schedule moved by NC14 and NS1 extend to England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

Amendment 43, in clause 77, page 69, line 10, at end insert—

“(3A) Sections 11 and 12 extend to England and Wales and Northern Ireland.”.

See the statement to amendment 23.

Amendment 44, in clause 77, page 69, line 11, after “by” insert “section 32(2) or”.—(Chris Philp.)

This amendment to the extent provision is consequential on Amendment 40.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Laura Farris)]

I beg to move amendment 147, in clause 77, page 69, line 11, after “by” insert

“section (Administering etc harmful substances (including by spiking))(2) or”.

This amendment provides that consequential amendments made by subsection (2) of the new clause moved by NC45 have the same extent as the provision amended.

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[Laura Farris]

I pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford, who has been an important voice on the issue. When I made a statement to the House just before Christmas, I thanked everybody: my hon. Friend the Member for Gloucester, the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North and the hon. Member for Bradford South. Theirs have been important voices, and they have been helpful to us as we have worked our way through this issue.

I did not set out our thinking in my initial remarks, so it might be helpful for me to do so. First, it was said that spiking was covered by other offences, but when we look at the language of the Offences against the Person Act, it is accurate to say that parliamentarians at the time had something different in mind. We can tell that just by reading the legislation.

Secondly, all parliamentarians are familiar with being told that something is already covered by another law, but it is worth asking, “Would this particular offence be better captured in a defined way?” We have done the same with offences such as stalking in the life of this Parliament. For lots of offences, it is possible to think, “Can we crystallise the offence in a more accurate way?” That was material to our thinking, and that is why we have made these changes. I hope that that is helpful to the Committee.

I reassure my right hon. Friend the Member for Chelmsford that all forms of spiking are included, whether by needle, vape, drink or a food substance. New clause 45 is deliberately widely constructed so as to capture the whole range. She made a point about urine testing. We have been told by police that the biggest barrier to conviction is that even if the victim reports the incident the following morning and immediately gives a sample for a toxicology test, they can be left with the disappointing news that the substance has left their body, even though the police often accept that everything that they and perhaps their friends are describing is consistent with a spiking incident. That is why investment in rapid drinks testing kits, which are at a nascent stage, has been a big part of the non-legislative measures. If we can get those up and running, we can roll them out across night-time venues to facilitate on-site testing without having to go through the standard toxicology route. We think that would be really helpful in getting convictions.

We have been working with the Security Industry Authority on the training of nightclub doormen and bouncers. From April this year, there will be a condition for any new nightclub bouncer entering the industry to have specific training on spiking. From September, we will begin a refresher element, including a spiking course, for those already employed in the sector. It is anticipated that, within three years, all nightclub bouncers will have had had specific night-time training, and we are doing something similar with bar staff.

There is also a national reporting tool, which is currently operated by 20 police forces in England and Wales. It is being rolled out, but about half of the forces are using it. It allows people to report spiking anonymously. That does not have to be the victim; anyone who has seen something that they think is consistent with a spiking incident can make a report. That will help forces to develop a clearer picture of where spiking is happening and whether there are hotspots or problem areas, which will allow them to intensify the police response. Finally, we are doing some police intensification work.

I have probably gone on too long. Suffice it to say that dealing with spiking properly requires more than a change in the law, but we do think a change in the law is necessary and desirable, and we therefore hope that Members will support new clause 45.

Amendment 147 agreed to.

Amendment made: 50, in clause 77, page 69, line 12, at end insert—

“(5) Nothing in subsections (1) to (4) limits the extent within the United Kingdom of the armed forces provisions.

(6) Section 384(1) and (2) of the Armed Forces Act 2006 (extent outside the United Kingdom) applies to the armed forces provisions as it applies to the provisions of that Act.

(7) In subsections (5) and (6) the “armed forces provisions” means—

(a) a provision made, or inserted, by or under this Act so far as it is applied (by whatever words) by or under the Armed Forces Act 2006;

(b) an amendment, modification or repeal made by or under this Act of—

(i) a provision of or made under the Armed Forces Act 2006,

(ii) a provision that amends, modifies or repeals a provision of, or made under, that Act, or

(iii) any other provision, so far as the provision is applied (by whatever words) by or under that Act.”.—(Chris Philp.)

This amendment makes provision about the extent of provisions of or made under the Bill which relate to the Armed Forces Act 2006.

Clause 77, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 78

Commencement

Amendments made: 45, in clause 78, page 69, line 18, after “sections” insert

“(Testing of persons outside of police detention for presence of controlled drugs),”.

This amendment makes provision to bring NC13 into force on Royal Assent for the purpose of making regulations and issuing codes of practice.

Amendment 131, in clause 78, page 69, line 18, leave out “, 21 and 34” and insert “and 21”.

This amendment and amendment 132 provide for the clauses about serious crime prevention orders to be brought into force by regulations.

Amendment 46, in clause 78, page 69, line 18, after “regulations” insert

“or issuing codes of practice”.—(Chris Philp.)

See the statement for amendment 45.

[Jess Phillips]

I beg to move amendment 1, in clause 78, page 69, line 21, at end insert—

“( ) section ([Removal of women from the criminal law related to abortion]).”

This is an amendment conditional on the introduction of NC1. It would bring the new law into force on the day the Act is passed.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 1—Removal of women from the criminal law related to abortion—

“For the purposes of the law related to abortion, including sections 58 and 59 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929, no offence is committed by a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy.”

This new clause would disapply existing criminal law related to the accessing or provision of abortion care from women acting in relation to their own pregnancy at any gestation, ensuring no woman would be liable for a prison sentence as a result of seeking to end her own pregnancy. It would not change any law regarding the provision of abortion services within a healthcare setting, including but not limited to the time limit, the grounds for abortion, or the requirement for two doctors’ approval.

New clause 2—Abortion: Decriminalisation—

“(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make whatever changes appear to the Secretary of State to be necessary or appropriate for the decriminalisation of abortion, in line with the recommendation in Paragraph 31 of the CEDAW General Recommendation No. 24: Article 12 of the Convention that “When possible, legislation criminalizing abortion should be amended, in order to withdraw punitive measures imposed on women who undergo abortion”.

(2) Regulations under subsection (1) must—

(a) provide for the repeal of sections 58, 59 and 60 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861,

(b) provide that no offence under these regulations or any other legislation is committed by a person complying with the requirements of subsection 1 of the Abortion Act 1967,

(c) provide that no offence under these regulations or any other legislation is committed by a person acting in relation to their own pregnancy where they have been coerced into taking that action,

(d) provide that no person acting in relation to their own pregnancy may be sentenced to a custodial sentence, and

(e) provide for alternative offences in relation to acts of abortion where the woman has not, or is suspected to have not, consented to the abortion.

(3) The Secretary of State may by regulations make any provision that appears to the Secretary of State to be appropriate in view of subsection (1), or (2).

(4) If regulations under subsection (1) are not approved by both Houses of Parliament within three months of this Act receiving Royal Assent, then sections 58, 59 and 60 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 are repealed.

(5) A statutory instrument made under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”

[Jess Phillips]

I want to speak specifically to new clause 1, which was tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North and concerns a matter close to my own heart: the removal of women from the criminal law relating to abortion. The Minister just made a compelling argument for ending the use of language from the Offences against the Person Act. Abortion remains a criminal act in England and Wales because of a piece of legislation from before any of us in this building were even born.

If a woman undergoes an abortion at any gestation without the permission of two doctors, whether she takes abortion medication bought online or a uses sharp object to end her pregnancy in desperation, she commits a crime that carries a maximum life sentence. Although the Abortion Act 1967 legalised abortion in certain fixed circumstances, the Offences against the Person Act 1861 and Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 maintain the criminal framework. In the 50 years following the passing of the Abortion Act, only three women in the UK have been convicted of an illegal abortion, but in the last 18 months, six women have appeared in court charged with allegedly ending their own pregnancy outside the law. Meanwhile, abortion providers have reported receiving escalating numbers of requests for women’s medical records from the police in relation to suspected abortion offences. The catalyst for this uptick in police investigations is unclear, but we need only look at what is happening in countries such as the USA, where citizens have lost their constitutional right to an abortion in recent years, and Poland, where a near-total ban on the procedure has taken effect.

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The Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 deals with late-term abortions in England and Wales. Under section 1 of the Act, it is an offence for any person, with intent to kill a child that is capable of being born alive, to cause the death of that child before it is born, unless it is proved that the act was done in good faith and only to preserve the life of the woman. To illustrate how many criminal convictions there have been in last six years for which the MOJ holds data, it is one.

[Jess Phillips]

One too many.

[Laura Farris]

Okay, but it is one, to give the Committee a sense of the scale of this issue in the criminal courts.

I turn first to amendment 1 and new clause 1, tabled by the right hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North. The purpose of new clause 1 is to disapply existing criminal law relating to abortion from a woman acting in relation to her own pregnancy at any stage of gestation. Under section 6 of the Abortion Act 1967, “the law relating to abortion” means

“sections 58 and 59 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861, and any rule of law relating to the procurement of abortion”.

Section 5(1) of the 1967 Act provides:

“No offence under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 shall be committed by a registered medical practitioner who terminates a pregnancy in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”

New clause 1 refers to “the law related to abortion”. Unlike the Abortion Act, it is not limited to specific provisions, and it could therefore be interpreted as applying more widely. It could, for example, include other offences against the person that may apply in this context, such as maliciously administering a poison so as to endanger life or inflict grievous bodily harm. In that regard, it differs from the law as it applies in Northern Ireland.

The hon. Member for Walthamstow takes a different approach. Her new clause 2 would require the Secretary of State to decriminalise abortion through regulations. Among other things, the regulations would repeal sections 58 to 60 of the Offences against the Person Act and make provision for alternative offences in relation to non-consensual abortion.

I reiterate that, should Parliament wish to change the law, the Government will not stand in the way, but hon. Members may consider that there would be alternative ways to amend primary legislation. Leaving aside the way in which decriminalisation might be achieved, there is the question whether the repeal of section 60 of the Offences against the Person Act is appropriate. Section 60 makes it an offence for a person to conceal the birth of a child by disposing of the child’s body after its birth. There is a high-profile case in the papers today concerning exactly that issue. It is not generally considered to be an abortion offence and it is not limited to the abortion context. Repealing the offence could have unintended consequences.

[Jess Phillips]

On the point made by the right hon. Member for Chelmsford, I have to say that I have noted from prior conversations people’s level of fear that they might have to vote on this issue today. If I were on the other side of this debate, I would not stop and think for a second that the will of the House needed to be tested, or that there was not a sneaky way to change the legislation—but I am not. We have tested the will of this House a number of times in the nine years that I have been here, and on every single occasion Parliament has acted in a pro-choice manner and has had a pro-choice majority. I have no doubt that I would hold the majority should I press new clause 1 to a Division in this Committee.

I agree with the right hon. Member for Chelmsford that it is the will of the House that these issues need to be tested. As I have said, I have no doubt that we will win in that context. What I would say is that it is always women’s bodies that we say this about. There is a load of people who will never have the experiences that I have had personally, or that some of the other women in this room have had, but get to have an opinion about the way that I live my life and make my choices about my own body, and we are taught to sort of genuflect and respect that. It should be a women’s health issue. If this was the women’s health Bill, we would be more than happy to amend all sorts of things in this room, but we allow this issue to retain some sort of grandiosity, as if it is any more than having a prostate exam, which even the King is doing and talking about. It should not be a thing any more. We are doing line-by-line scrutiny; we should be amending small bits.

On the Minister’s point about the things that the Government have put in place, let me say on behalf of my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North that she is welcome, because every single one of them came from an amendment that my right hon. Friend tabled. This is not her first rodeo; it is a long passion.

The thing I heard today that gave me solace was from my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North, who said from the Opposition Front Bench that the Labour party will move to ensure that, under any Labour Government, Parliament has time to actually consider this issue, so that people do not have to tack things on to Bills that they might not quite fit in.

The Minister mentioned one person having been criminalised. I imagine that, if she goes away and gets the data on the number of incidents of domestic abuse where a miscarriage has been forced and the man has been charged with the same offence that she identified under the Infant Life (Preservation) Act, she will find that it is zero, yet that will have happened hundreds of times in the last few years.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment made: 148, in clause 78, page 69, line 24, at end insert—

“(aa) section (Maximum term of imprisonment for certain offences on summary conviction);”—(Laura Farris.)

This amendment provides that the new clause moved by NC47 comes into force two months after Royal Assent.

Amendment made: 132, in clause 78, page 69, leave out line 28.—(Chris Philp.)

See the explanatory statement to amendment 131.

Clause 78, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 79 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 10

Power to seize bladed articles etc: armed forces

“In the Armed Forces Act 2006, after section 93ZC (inserted by section (Stolen goods on premises (entry, search and seizure without warrant): armed forces) insert—

“93ZD Power to seize bladed articles etc

(1) This section applies where—

(a) a service policeman is lawfully on any premises which are searchable by virtue of this Part, or

(b) a person subject to service law who is not a service policeman is lawfully on any premises in the exercise of a power of search conferred by virtue of this Part.

(2) If the service policeman or person subject to service law—

(a) finds, on the premises, an article which has a blade or is sharply pointed (a “relevant article”), and

(b) has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the relevant article would be likely to be used in connection with unlawful violence (if it were not seized),they may seize the relevant article.

(3) The following provisions apply where a relevant article is seized under this section.

(4) The service policeman or person subject to service law who seized the relevant article—

(a) must give a record of what was seized to a person who is on the premises, or

(b) if there is no person on the premises, must leave a record of what was seized in a prominent place on the premises.

(5) The record must—

(a) describe the relevant article,

(b) state that it has been seized under this section,

(c) specify the date of seizure,

(d) give the reason why the relevant article was seized, and

(e) specify the name, rank or rate, and the unit, of the service policeman or person subject to service law who seized the relevant article.

(6) Following seizure of the relevant article, the service policeman or person subject to service law may—

(a) retain it, or

(b) destroy it or otherwise dispose of it. This is subject to subsections (7) and (12).

(7) A person (“P”) claiming to be the owner of the relevant article may apply to the commanding officer of the relevant person for a determination that the relevant article should be delivered to P.

(8) The “relevant person” is the person by virtue of whose occupation of or other connection with the premises, the premises are within subsection (1).

(9) The commanding officer may make a determination under subsection (7) if it appears to them that—

(a) P is the owner of the relevant article, and

(b) it would be just to make the determination.

(10) If the commanding officer does not make a determination under subsection (7), P may appeal to a judge advocate.

(11) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision—

(a) with respect to the practice and procedure which is to apply in connection with applications for a determination under subsection (7) and appeals under subsection (10);

(b) conferring functions on judge advocates in relation to appeals under subsection (10).

(12) The relevant article may not be destroyed or disposed of—

(a) in the period of 6 months beginning with the day on which it is seized, or

(b) if an application under subsection (7) is made in that period, until the application (including any appeal) has been finally determined or otherwise disposed of (and then, only if no determination is made that the relevant article should be delivered to P).

(13) In this section “unlawful violence” includes—

(a) unlawful damage to property, and

(b) a threat of unlawful violence (including of unlawful damage to property).””—(Chris Philp.)

This new clause amends the Armed Forces Act 2006 to make provision equivalent to that made by clause 18 of the Bill.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 11

Stolen goods on premises (entry, search and seizure without warrant): armed forces

“In the Armed Forces Act 2006, after section 93 insert—

“93ZA Search for particular stolen goods

(1) A service policeman of at least the rank of naval lieutenant, military or marine captain or flight lieutenant may authorise a service policeman to—

(a) enter specified premises which are relevant residential premises, and

(b) search the specified premises for specified items.

(2) An officer may give an authorisation under subsection (1) only if satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that—

(a) the specified items are stolen goods,

(b) the specified items are on the specified premises, and

(c) it is likely that the purpose of the search would be frustrated or seriously prejudiced if no search could be carried out before the time mentioned in subsection (3).

(3) That time is the earliest time by which it would be practicable—

(a) for a service policeman to obtain and execute a warrant under section 83 authorising the entry and search of the premises, or

(b) in a case where a member of a UK police force could obtain a warrant under section 8 of PACE or any other enactment authorising the entry and search of the premises, for a member of such a force to obtain and execute such a warrant.

(4) An officer may give an authorisation under subsection (1) orally or in writing.

(5) As soon as reasonably practicable after giving the authorisation the officer must record in writing—

(a) if the authorisation is given orally, the authorisation, and

(b) in any case, the officer’s reasons for being satisfied as mentioned in subsection (2).

(6) The powers conferred by an authorisation under subsection (1) may be exercised only—

(a) by a service policeman in uniform,

(b) before the end of the 24 hour period beginning with the time the authorisation is given, and

(c) at a reasonable hour (unless it appears to the service policeman that exercising them at a reasonable hour may frustrate or seriously prejudice the purpose of exercising them).

(7) The power of search conferred by an authorisation under subsection (1) is exercisable only to the extent that is reasonably required for the purpose of searching the specified premises for the specified items.

(8) Where the occupier of the specified premises is present at the time the service policeman seeks to enter and search them, the service policeman must—

(a) identify themselves to the occupier, and

(b) state the purpose for which they are entering and searching the premises.

93ZB Seizure on search under section 93ZA

(1) This section applies where a service policeman is lawfully on relevant residential premises in exercise of the powers conferred by an authorisation under section 93ZA(1).

(2) The service policeman may seize anything which is on the specified premises (whether or not it is a specified item) if the service policeman has reasonable grounds to believe—

(a) that it is stolen goods, and

(b) that it is necessary to seize it in order to prevent it being concealed, lost, damaged altered or destroyed.

(3) The service policeman may seize anything which is on the specified premises (whether or not it is a specified item) if the service policeman has reasonable grounds to believe—

(a) that it is evidence in relation to—

(i) an offence under section 42 which the service policeman is investigating, or

(ii) any other offence under section 42,

as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is theft, and

(b) that it is necessary to seize it in order to prevent the evidence being concealed, lost, damaged, altered or destroyed.

(4) The powers of seizure in subsections (2) and (3) include power to require information which is stored in an electronic form and is accessible from the premises to be produced in a form—

(a) in which it can be taken away and which it is visible and legible, or

(b) from which it can readily be produced in a visible and legible form.

(5) As soon as reasonably practicable after exercising a power of seizure conferred by this section, the service policeman must record in writing—

(a) the grounds on which the power was exercised, and

(b) the items seized.

93ZC Sections 93ZA and 93ZB: supplementary

(1) The powers conferred by sections 93ZA and 93ZB do not include powers to search for or seize—

(a) items subject to legal privilege,

(b) excluded material, or

(c) special procedure material.

(2) In sections 93ZA and 93ZB “specified” means specified in an authorisation under section 93ZA(1).

(3) Sections 93ZA and 93ZB are to be construed in accordance with section 24 of the Theft Act 1968, reading references in that section to blackmail and fraud as including an offence under section 42 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is blackmail or fraud.

(4) In sections 93ZA and 93ZB the following expressions have the meanings given by section 84—

“excluded material”

“items subject to legal privilege”

“relevant residential premises”

“special procedure material” .””—(Chris Philp.)

This new clause amends the Armed Forces Act 2006 to make provision equivalent to the provision inserted into the Theft Act 1968 by clause 19 of the Bill.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 12

Powers to compel attendance at sentencing hearing: armed forces

“(1) The Armed Forces Act 2006 is amended as follows.

(2) After section 259 insert—

“Attendance at sentencing hearings

259A Power to order attendance

(1) This section applies where—

(a) an offender has been convicted of a service offence in respect of which a life sentence may, or must, be passed,

(b) the offender is kept in service custody awaiting sentencing by the Court Martial, and

(c) the offender has refused, or there are reasonable grounds to suspect the offender will refuse, to attend court for the sentencing hearing.

(2) The Court Martial may order the offender to attend court for the sentencing hearing.

(3) An order under subsection (2) may be made by the Court Martial of its own motion or on the application of the Director of Service Prosecutions.

(4) Before making an order under subsection (2) in relation to an offender aged under 18, the Court Martial must have regard to the welfare of the offender.

(5) In this section—

“life sentence” means any of the following sentences imposed by virtue of this Act—

(a) a sentence of imprisonment for life,

(b) a sentence of detention for life during His Majesty’s pleasure, or

(c) a sentence of custody for life;

“sentencing hearing” means a hearing following conviction that is held for the purposes of sentencing an offender.

(6) Nothing in this section limits any other power of the Court Martial to order an offender to attend court for a sentencing hearing.

259B Power to order production of offender

(1) This section applies where—

(a) an offender aged 18 or over is kept in service custody awaiting sentencing by the Court Martial or the Service Civilian Court in respect of a service offence, and

(b) the offender has refused, or there are reasonable grounds to suspect the offender will refuse, to attend court for the sentencing hearing.

(2) The court may order that the offender is produced before the court for the sentencing hearing.

(3) An order under subsection (2) may be made by the court of its own motion or on the application of the Director of Service Prosecutions.

(4) A person subject to service law who is authorised for the purposes of this section by the Provost Marshal of the Royal Military Police may use reasonable force, if necessary and proportionate, to give effect to an order under subsection (2).

(5) In this section “sentencing hearing” has the meaning given by section 259A.

(6) A person is to be treated as having complied with an order under subsection (2) if they have done all that they reasonably can to secure that the offender is produced before the court for sentencing.

(7) Nothing in this section affects—

(a) any other power of the court to order that an offender is produced before the court for a sentencing hearing;

(b) any other power to use force.”

(3) In section 309 (offences of misbehaviour in court etc)—

(a) after subsection (1) insert—

“(1A) The Court Martial also has jurisdiction under this section to deal with an offender who fails without reasonable excuse to comply with an order under section 259A(2) (order to attend sentencing hearing).”

(b) in subsection (2)(a) after “days” insert “or, in a case within subsection (1A), 2 years”.”—(Chris Philp.)

This new clause amends the Armed Forces Act 2006 to make provision equivalent to the provision inserted into the Sentencing Code by clause 22 of the Bill.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 13

Testing of persons outside of police detention for presence of controlled drugs

“(1) The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 is amended as set out in subsections (2) to (5).

(2) In section 30 (arrest elsewhere than at police station), after subsection (11) insert—

“(11A) Nothing in subsection (1A) or in section 30A prevents a constable delaying taking a person to a police station, or releasing the person under section 30A, for such time as is reasonable for the purpose of taking a sample under section 32A.

(11B) Where there is any such delay the reasons for the delay must be recorded when the person first arrives at the police station or (as the case may be) is released under section 30A.”

(3) After section 32 (search upon arrest) insert—

“32A Testing for presence of controlled drugs upon arrest at a place other than a police station

(1) An approved constable may take a single non-intimate sample from a person for the purpose of ascertaining whether any specified controlled drug is in the person’s body, if the following conditions are met—

(a) the arrest condition,

(b) the age condition, and

(c) the request condition.

(2) The arrest condition is that section 30(1A) applies in respect of the person and either—

(a) the offence for which the person was arrested is a trigger offence, or

(b) a constable of at least the rank of inspector—

(i) has reasonable grounds for suspecting that the misuse by the person of a specified controlled drug caused or contributed to the offence for which the person was arrested, and

(ii) has authorised the sample to be taken.

(3) The age condition is that the person is aged 18 or over.

(4) The request condition is that an approved constable has requested the person to give the sample.

(5) Before requesting the person to give a sample, an approved constable must—

(a) warn the person that if, when so requested, the person fails without good cause to do so the person may be liable to prosecution, and

(b) in a case within subsection (2)(b), inform the person of the giving of the authorisation and of the grounds in question.

(6) A sample may only be taken under this section—

(a) at or near the place where an approved constable requested the person to give the sample, and

(b) before the person has been taken to a police station or released under section 30(7) or 30A.

(7) If a sample is taken from a person under this section, an approved constable must give the person a notice in writing which sets out—

(a) the offence in respect of which the arrest condition is met;

(b) in a case within subsection (2)(b), details of the authorisation and the grounds in question;

(c) the date and time when the sample was taken;

(d) the location where the sample was taken;

(e) whether an analysis of the sample reveals that a specified controlled drug may be present in the person’s body.

(8) A notice under subsection (7) must be given as soon as reasonably practicable and in any event before the earlier of the person being released or charged with the offence in respect of which the arrest condition is met.

(9) A person who fails without good cause to give any sample which may be taken from the person under this section commits an offence and is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 3 months or a fine not exceeding level 4 on the standard scale (or both).

32B Section 32A: supplementary

(1) A constable of at least the rank of inspector may give an authorisation under section 32A(2)(b) orally or in writing but, if it is given orally, the constable must confirm it in writing as soon as is practicable.

(2) If a person from whom a sample is taken under section 32A is taken to a police station, the constable giving the notice under section 32A(7) must secure that a record is made, as part of the person’s custody record, of the matters set out in the notice.

(3) If a person from whom a sample is taken under section 32A is released under section 30(7) or 30A, the constable giving the notice under section 32A(7) must, as soon as is practicable after the notice is given, make a record in writing of the matters set out in the notice.

(4) Section 32A does not prejudice the generality of section 63.

(5) In section 32A—

“approved constable” means a constable who has been approved for the purposes of section 32A by the chief officer of police of the police force to which the constable belongs (or, where the constable belongs to the British Transport Police Force, by the chief constable of the British Transport Police Force);

“non-intimate sample” has the same meaning as in Part 5 (see section 65(1));

“specified controlled drug” means a controlled drug (within the meaning of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971) specified in regulations under section 32C;

“trigger offence” means an offence specified in regulations under section 32C.

32C Section 32A: regulations

(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations for the purposes of section 32A—

(a) specify a controlled drug as a “specified controlled drug”;

(b) specify an offence as a “trigger offence”.

(2) Regulations under subsection (1)—

(a) may make different provision for different purposes or different areas; and

(b) may make transitional, transitory or saving provision.

(3) Regulations under this section are to be made by statutory instrument.

(4) A statutory instrument containing (whether alone or with other provision) regulations under subsection (1)(b) may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.

(5) Any other statutory instrument containing regulations under this section is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.

(6) In this section “controlled drug” has the same meaning as in the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971.

32D Section 32A: disclosure of obtained information

Information obtained from a sample taken from a person under section 32A may be disclosed—

(a) for the purpose of informing any decision about granting bail in criminal proceedings (within the meaning of the Bail Act 1976) to the person;

(b) for the purpose of informing any decision about the giving of a diversionary caution under Part 6 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 to the person;

(c) where the person is in police detention or is remanded in or committed to custody by an order of a court or has been granted such bail, for the purpose of informing any decision about the person’s supervision;

(d) where the person is convicted of an offence, for the purpose of informing any decision about the appropriate sentence to be passed by a court and any decision about the person’s supervision or release;

(e) for the purpose of an assessment which the person is required to attend by virtue of section 9(2) or 10(2) of the Drugs Act 2005;

(f) for the purpose of proceedings against the person for an offence under section 12(3) or 14(3) of that Act;

(g) for the purpose of ensuring that appropriate advice and treatment is made available to the person.”

(4) In section 63B, after subsection (5D) insert—

“(5E) A sample may not be taken from a person under this section if—

(a) the person is in police detention by virtue of being taken to a police station after being arrested at a place other than a police station, and

(b) a sample was taken from the person under section 32A.”

(5) In section 66(2) (codes of practice), after “section” insert “32A or”.

(6) In Schedule 1 to the Bail Act 1976 (persons entitled to bail: supplementary provisions), in Part 1 (defendants accused or convicted of imprisonable offences), in paragraph 6B(1)(b)(i), after “under section” insert “32A or”.”—(Chris Philp.)

The new clause provides for testing of controlled drugs upon arrest at a place other than a police station and makes related changes.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 14

Terrorist offenders

“(1) Schedule (Notification orders) amends Part 4 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (notification requirements) so as to enable courts to make notification orders in respect of persons who have committed certain domestic offences or service offences.

(2) In section 43B of the Terrorism Act 2000 (terrorist offenders released on licence: arrest without warrant pending recall decision) in subsection (4) after paragraph (d) insert—

“(e) a person in respect of whom—

(i) a domestic offence notification order (within the meaning of Schedule 4A to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008), or

(ii) a service offence notification order (within the meaning of Schedule 6A to that Act),

has been made and who is serving a sentence for the offence by virtue of which the order was made.””—(Chris Philp.)

This new clause introduces the Schedule moved by NS1 (which provides for orders applying the notification requirements in Part 4 of the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 to persons who have committed certain domestic offences or service offences) and also extends powers of arrest and search to persons in respect of whom such orders are made.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 21

Dispersal powers: removal of senior police officer authorisation

“(1) Omit section 34 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (authorisation of constables to use dispersal powers by police officer of at least the rank of inspector).

(2) In consequence of subsection (1), in section 35 of that Act (directions excluding a person from an area)—

(a) in subsection (1)—

(i) omit “and an authorisation is in force under section 34”;

(ii) for “in the locality specified in the direction” substitute “in a locality”;

(b) in subsection (4), omit the second sentence.”—(Chris Philp.)

This new clause removes the requirement that a police officer of at least the rank inspector must authorise the use of dispersal powers under section 35 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

New Clause 22

Dispersal powers: extension to local authorities

“(1) The Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 is amended as follows.

(2) In section 35—

(a) in subsections (1), for “a constable in uniform” substitute “an authorised person”;

(b) in subsection (2), (3) and (6), for “constable” substitute “authorised person”;

(c) after subsection (4), insert—

“(4A) Each of the following is an “authorised person”—

(a) a constable in uniform;

(b) a person authorised for the purposes of this Part by the local authority in whose area the public place mentioned in subsection (1) is situated (“authorised LA officer”).”

(d) after subsection (6), insert—

“(6A) A direction given by an authorised LA officer under this section is not valid if the officer—

(a) is asked by the person to whom the direction is given to show evidence of their authorisation, and

(b) fails to do so.”

(e) in subsection (7), for “the constable” substitute “a constable in uniform in the public place”;

(f) for subsection (8) substitute—

“(8) Any constable may withdraw or vary a direction given by a constable under this section.

(8A) Any authorised LA officer may withdraw or vary a direction given by an authorised LA officer under this section.

(8B) A variation under subsection (8) or (8A) must not extend the duration of a direction beyond 48 hours from when it was first given.”

(g) in subsection (11), for ““exclusion period”” to the end substitute “—

“authorised person” has the meaning given by subsection (4A);

“exclusion period” has the meaning given by subsection (1)(b);

“local authority” has the same meaning as in Part 1 (see section 20).”

(3) In section 36 (restrictions)—

(a) in subsections (1), (2), (3) and (4), for “A constable” substitute “An authorised person”;

(b) in subsection (1), for “constable”, in the second place it appears, substitute “authorised person”;

(c) in subsection (5), for “a constable” substitute “an authorised person”.

(4) In section 38 (record-keeping), in subsections (1) and (2), for “A constable” substitute “An authorised person”.

(5) In section 41 (guidance), in subsection (1), for “chief officers of police” to the end substitute “—

(a) chief officers of police about the exercise, by officers under their direction or control, of those officers’ functions under this Part;

(b) local authorities about the exercise, by persons authorised under section 35(4A)(b), of those persons’ functions under this Part.””—(Chris Philp.)

This new clause confers dispersal powers under Part 3 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 on persons authorised by local authorities for the purposes of the Part.

Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Scott Mann.)