Criminal Justice Bill (Sixteenth sitting)

Jess Phillips Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 30th January 2024 Public Bill Committees

[Chris Philp]

What is certain is that under the new clause, as drafted, a criminal offence of cuckooing could be committed even where there is no coercion and consent is freely given. I will be interested to hear the hon. Member’s response to that, if he plans to speak. On my other points, if a criminal offence occurs at a premises because they are being used as a base for criminal activities, it is not likely but certain that that criminal offence will be prosecuted. That is a certainty. If a criminal offence has been committed, that can obviously be prosecuted as a matter of certainty.

[Jess Phillips (Birmingham, Yardley) (Lab)]

On the Minister’s point about the trespass offence, does he think that in such circumstances a person would get anywhere near the sentence that they would for taking over a vulnerable person’s home and coercing them? Is that an appropriate response? Secondly, what has made the Government change their mind after they committed to making cuckooing an offence, which Conservative Members and I have pushed for for some time? Now the Government are saying, “Don’t worry. It’s absolutely fine.”

[Chris Philp]

The antisocial behaviour plan, published in the spring of last year, committed to engaging with stakeholders on that question. That engagement has happened and continues to happen. On the point about penalties, if someone is occupying someone else’s house and is dealing, for example, class A drugs, the maximum penalty, wherever that happens, is life. Under the Modern Slavery Act, the maximum sentence under sections 1 and 2 for making another person a victim of modern slavery is life imprisonment. The penalties available are severe. In the two examples that I just gave, the maximum sentence is life imprisonment.

The maximum penalty for participating in the activities of an organised crime group under section 45 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 is five years. On the inchoate offences under sections 45 or 46—that is, where someone is incited or encouraged to commit an offence—the maximum penalty is the same as that for the primary offence. So, it is not true that the maximum sentences available in this sphere are in any way light or incon-sequential.

This matter obviously concerns everybody. It is as much a matter of enforcement as anything else because, as I have explained, we have a number of different laws on the statute books that cover such behaviour with significant penalties attached. The question is how we make sure that they are properly enforced. As drafted, the new clause probably does not have quite the intended effect, because it is widely drafted. Even if it were drafted to include a requirement for duress or coercion or that consent had been withheld, we could legitimately debate whether it does or does not fill a lacuna.

In addition to the criminal sanctions that I have just enumerated, there are a very large number of civil orders available to try to prevent a property being misused. I will not go through the detail of them all because that will take too long, but I will list what they are. They include closure notices, community protection notices, public space protection orders, civil injunctions under part 1 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, criminal behaviour orders, gang injunctions, a section 8 notice under the Housing Act, and slavery and trafficking risk orders. Those are civil measures, but they are in addition to the various criminal measures that I enumerated.

In conclusion, the Government accept the spirit of the concern that has been raised. Cuckooing is a concern; it happens, and it needs to be stopped. It is worth saying that we have closed down a very large number of county lines over the last four years—I think about 3,000. Enforcement action is happening. There is scope to go further, but numerous existing criminal offences give the police the powers they need. We need, collectively, to make sure that the police always exercise those powers where cuckooing occurs.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Cunningham]

I am grateful to the Minister for providing clarification on that. As he heard me say earlier, we are looking at the new clause very much as creating a specific offence of cuckooing. I recognise the lesson in drafting that he has given me this afternoon.

It had been my intention to push the new clause to a vote but, after the lesson in drafting from the Minister, I no longer intend to do so. The Minister is aware, however, that there is considerable cross-party support for this aim. The Minister says that he has a problem with the drafting of the clause, but he does not appear to have a problem with its purpose, so on that basis I ask that he work with others—some from his own side, although we are happy to pitch in as well—to bring forward what we believe is needed: a specific clause on cuckooing that will once and for all protect the victims, rather than giving free rein to those who choose to exploit them. On that basis, in the hope that we will see something come back later, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 23

Sexual exploitation of an adult

“(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.

(2) Section 52 is amended as follows—

(a) in the title for ‘Causing or inciting prostitution’ substitute ‘Sexual exploitation’, and

(b) in paragraph (1)(a) for ‘causes or incites another person to become a prostitute’ substitute ‘sexually exploits another person’.

(3) Section 53 is amended as follows—

(a) in the title for ‘prostitution’ substitute ‘sexual exploitation’, and

(b) in paragraph (1)(a) for ‘prostitution’ substitute ‘sexual exploitation’.

(4) Section 54 is amended as follows—

(a) in subsection (2) for ‘sections 51A, 52, 53 and 53A’ substitute ‘section 53A’, and

(b) at end insert—

‘(4) In sections 52 and 53 “sexual exploitation” means conduct by which a person manipulates, deceives, coerces or controls another person to undertake sexual activity.’.” —(Jess Phillips.)

This new clause is an amendment to the Sexual Offences Act 2003, specifically in Sections 52 and 53, “replacing prostitution for gain” with “sexual exploitation of an adult”.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Jess Phillips]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 26—Loitering and soliciting: repeal—

“Section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959 (loitering or soliciting for purposes of prostitution) is repealed.”

This new clause repeals soliciting and loitering as an offence.

New clause 30—Power of Secretary of State to disregard convictions or cautions: Loitering or soliciting for purposes of prostitution—

“(1) Section 92 of the Street Offences Act 1959 is amended as follows.

(2) For subsection (1) substitute—

‘(1) A person who has been convicted of, or cautioned for, an offence in circumstances where—

(a) the conduct constituting the offence was sexual activity between persons of the same sex, or

(b) the offence was committed under section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959, may apply to the Secretary of State for the conviction or caution to become a disregarded conviction or caution.’

(3) In subsection (2) after first ‘caution’ insert ‘received in the circumstances set out in subsection (1)(a)’.”

A new clause that allows a process allowing the Secretary of State to disregard convictions and cautions received under section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959.

New clause 44—Offence of enabling or profiting from prostitution—

“(1) A person or body corporate (C) commits an offence if they—

(a) facilitate, whether online or offline, or

(b) gain financially from

a person (A) engaging in sexual activity with another person (B) in exchange for payment or other benefit, or the promise of payment or other benefit, and the conditions in subsection (2) are met.

(2) The conditions are—

(a) that C knows or ought to know that A is engaging in, or intends to engage in, sexual activity for payment or other benefit; and

(b) that C is not a dependent child of A.

(3) For the purposes of this section—

(a) ‘Sexual activity’—

(i) means any acts which a reasonable person would, in all the circumstances but regardless of any person’s purpose, consider to be sexual,

(ii) requires A and B to be in each other’s presence,

(b) ‘Facilitates’ includes, but is not limited to, causing or allowing to be displayed or published, including digitally, any advertisement in respect of sexual activity involving A.

(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—

(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both;

(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years.”

This new cause would make it an offence to facilitate or profit from the prostitution of another person.

[Jess Phillips]

The new clause seeks to replace the term “Controlling prostitution for gain” with

“sexual exploitation of an adult”

and to provide a definition of “adult sexual exploitation” through the Sexual Offences Act 2003, as one does not currently exist.

In 2015, a significant change was made through the Serious Crime Act 2015 whereby “controlling a child prostitute” or a “child involved in pornography” was replaced with

“sexual exploitation of a child”.

That led to a shift in perceptions—we would never use the term “child prostitute” now, but we definitely did when I was first working in this field—so that child victims of exploitation were exactly that: victims. It also allowed for the improvement of service provision and available support. It is not perfect by any stretch of the imagination, but it is better. Children who were once labelled as prostitutes or as having made poor lifestyle choices are now quite rightly recognised as children who have been groomed.

Unfortunately, no such change has occurred for adult victims of sexual exploitation. Once an individual reaches the age of 18, there is often a sudden change in the perception of their experiences by professionals and services—actually, the problem often occurs once an individual reaches the age of 16, as that is the age of consent. Victims of adult sexual exploitation are falsely identified as consensually engaging in sex work, and the labelling of that abuse as “prostitution” in law only serves to perpetuate it. That mislabelling has led to countless people across the UK falling through the gaps and not receiving necessary support as their experiences are not recognised.

--- Later in debate ---

[Laura Farris]

I am happy to take that correction—sorry, I was just speaking informally when I should not have been.

On new clauses 26 and 30, section 1 of the Street Offences Act 1959 enables the police to divert individuals engaged in on-street sex work to alternative interventions. I will reference some of the points made by the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley, because we did some research into what is happening. First, the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s guidance, which advises officers, makes clear that it will not be commonplace to prosecute individuals who sell sex in public, and that every effort should be made to refer them to partner agencies and seek a diversionary route where possible. I have looked at the most recent data, which I will share with the Committee. In the year to March 2023, 301 soliciting crimes were recorded, of which 32—around 10%—resulted in either a charge or a summons. Of those that were charged, there has been on average less than one conviction a year from 2010 until today.

The hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley also raised the issue of criminal convictions staying on people’s records. If someone is trying to exit enforced prostitution and rebuild their life, that is profoundly unhelpful—I agree with her without reservation. She will be aware of the announcement that spent convictions are now being removed from criminal records; that was in the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act, but has been reinforced by the Lord Chancellor a number of times. I have already said that I will write to her about something, but I will just update her on that. We are working to try to get criminal records off people’s profiles, so that they can move on with their lives. That applies for all offences, because we think it is important that rehabilitation should have a serious meaning, whatever the offence.

Where we have this offence at the moment, we are principally seeing the police using it as a tool for diversion—that can be interpreted in a number of ways, but that is what we are principally seeing. The police have a challenging role, balancing the need to safeguard vulnerable on-street women who are selling sex from the harm they face, with the need to protect neighbourhoods from the negative consequences of that type of activity. Obviously, other crimes can often be concomitant to prostitution, particularly on the part of the people who control the women. There is also the issue of children being able to witness stuff like that. The police have to strike a balance there. Careful consideration of the law in this area is warranted, even when such considerations are placed in the balance. At the moment, the law in this area gives the police the flexibility to balance the different priorities, but we are thinking hard.

New clause 44 was tabled by the hon. Member for Swansea East, who raised interesting points that intersect with modern slavery. She made an interesting observation about something that I have seen in some of my other work, about where numbers all link to one person, or whether the same number is being duplicated across different sites. That goes right to the heart of modern slavery, and is a pressing issue for the Home Office.

I want to flag to the hon. Lady one of the difficulties that cuts across her new clause. It would effectively put an end to online services where individuals selling sex advertise lawfully. The research that the Home Office commissioned from Bristol University, which we published in 2019, showed that some people prefer to use technology to advertise because they feel safer doing so. The Government’s priority is to keep people engaged in this kind of work safe from harm, so we have to tread a difficult balance. We do not want to do something antithetical to protecting people from harm, which might happen if individuals selling sex were deprived of using technology and somehow diverted on to the street, forced underground or forced into an inherently more dangerous practice. It is reasonable for us to consider all the outcomes that could result, although I am not disagreeing with the force of the hon. Lady’s argument.

The Online Safety Act 2023, which is going through various stages of commencement now, should ensure that online platforms for individuals advertising are responsible and accountable for the content on their sites. They are required in law to take proactive steps to prevent those sites from being used by criminals. The commencement of the Online Safety Act is happening currently, so it is difficult to give an assessment, but all of this was covered in it. That includes a requirement for sites to proactively identify and remove content that is linked to priority offences, including controlling and inciting prostitution for gain, and human trafficking and modern slavery. As I have said, this cuts across these issues. With all due respect to the arguments advanced, I invite hon. Members not to press their new clauses.

[Jess Phillips]

I would welcome any intervention from the Minister. We would never write the phrase “child prostitute” into a document, so we should be really mindful of why on earth we allow that to continue with adults. We would call it exploitation; we call it the crime that it is.

Paying anybody for sex, even if completely legitimately —let’s face it, this mainly involves women—is fundamentally not a consensual act. None of us would choose it, would we? Would anybody here choose to have sex for money? We do not have to choose it from within a framework that means we will never have to. Would any of us choose it for our daughters? Would any of us be happy for our daughters to be on OnlyFans, selling it legally? I do not have any daughters, but I would certainly have a problem with my sons purchasing it.

The idea that this is a choice-based environment always gets used as a reason for not making progress on the issue. My concern is that there is no definition of adult sexual exploitation on a statutory footing, as my hon. Friend the Member for Stockton North has pointed out. Perhaps I would withdraw the motion on the basis that the Government go away and include the idea of adult sexual exploitation in the Bill, or even in the Victims Bill as it goes through. Why on earth do we not have a definition of adult sexual exploitation, as if the adults who do these things choose to do them, even though we have recognised that none of us would?

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 24

Human trafficking

(1) Section 2 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (1) for ‘arranges or facilitates the travel of’ substitute ‘recruits, transports, transfers, harbours or receives through force, fraud or deception’.

(3) In subsection (2) for ‘travel’ substitute ‘the matters mentioned in subsection (1)’.

(4) Omit subsections (3) to (5).

(5) In paragraph (6)(a) for ‘arranging or facilitating takes’ substitute ‘matters mentioned in subsection (1) take’.

(6) Omit paragraph (6)(b).

(7) In paragraph (7)(a) for ‘arranging or facilitating takes’ substitute ‘matters mentioned in subsection (1) take’.

(8) In paragraph (7)(b) for the first ‘the’ substitute ‘any’.—(Jess Phillips.)

This new clause brings the definition of human trafficking in the Modern Slavery Act 2015 in line with the UN definition, particularly removing the requirement for exploitation to have involved travel.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Jess Phillips]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

The new clause seeks to align our definition of “human trafficking” with the UN definition, particularly removing the requirement for exploitation to have involved travel. We have heard all about cuckooing today. You could be in your house for this; you might not have travelled anywhere.

The UN definition of human trafficking, as set out in the Palermo protocol, is the

“recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.”

As somebody who has spent time at the UN, I can say that its writing style is never snappy. It becomes the place that time forgot when you are trying to agree wording.

In contrast to that, the definition of human trafficking set out in section 2 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 refers only to cases in which

“the person arranges or facilitates the travel of another person…with a view to”

that other person “being exploited.” Currently, cases that would be considered human trafficking by the UN are not considered to be human trafficking according to our legislation. For example, the current definition excludes cases of harbouring individuals; we just talked about that.

Therefore, as we have discussed, instances of sexual exploitation taking place in one location—such as a person’s home, somewhere they have travelled to freely, or online—would be considered human trafficking under the UN definition but not under the Modern Slavery Act. That happened to a woman who was supported by the STAGE project. She was placed in a B&B when she was facing extreme poverty, homelessness and mis-treatment. Unfortunately, she faced sexual exploitation and forced labour, perpetrated by the owners of the B&B. That is not uncommon in our unregulated supported accommodation services. That bed and breakfast had been used by housing and social services authorities for years to house vulnerable people, and the owners exploited their vulnerabilities. That woman was not trafficked and would not have been covered by the definition; inconsistency with the UN definition means that people like her are not protected in this country.

[Alex Cunningham]

Human trafficking has been with us for thousands and thousands of years, but it has no place in a modern society. The nature of human trafficking offences makes it challenging to assess the number of victims in the UK, but we know that referrals through the national referral mechanism for modern slavery and human trafficking have increased. In the year ending December 2022, 7,936 referrals were made for potential victims of exploitation taking place solely in the UK. That was an increase of 10.3% on the previous year. Almost two thirds of British victims of modern slavery and human trafficking are children being exploited for criminality. That accounts for 2,534 children.

The National Crime Agency has warned that the rising cost of living has almost certainly exacerbated the risks of modern slavery and human trafficking. It has said that it is likely that organised crime groups will consider ways to maintain profitability by offsetting rising costs on to victims, such as by spending less time on victim welfare and by coercing victims into providing even more arduous and risky services.

I am grateful that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley has provided the Committee with the opportunity to discuss the legal framework around human trafficking. I am sure that all of us in this room would wish that framework to be as robust as possible. As my hon. Friend explained, new clause 24 amends the definition of human trafficking in the 2015 Act to bring it in line with the UN definition, notably by removing the requirement for exploitation to have involved travel. As such, there are a number of cases that would be considered human trafficking by the UN that would not be recognised as such by our criminal justice system.

I am interested to hear the Minister’s thoughts on the discrepancy, particularly if she has had any sense from the Department of the number of cases that may fall into that legislative gap, or if she is aware of any cases of the types that my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Yardley outlined, which would not be recognised as human trafficking in English criminal law.

I am particularly interested to hear some comments from the Minister in relation to my hon. Friend’s point about offences that take place online, which may not fit the current requirement to have involved travel. Such online offending has increased significantly in recent years with even easier access to digital devices and the internet, and it was driven up during covid lockdowns. I wonder whether the Department has considered the impact of amending the framework in the way that my hon. Friend has suggested. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Laura Farris]

I thank the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley for setting out her case for the new clause. I understand the concern underpinning the new clause that there are inconsistencies between the definition of human trafficking in the 2015 Act and some of the international definitions, including the Palermo protocol. However, the definitions set out in sections 1 and 2 of the 2015 Act capture all aspects of modern slavery offending, from international cross-border human trafficking in section 2 to the enslavement of victims in a domestic setting.

In cases where the travel aspect of trafficking is not present or cannot be proven to the criminal standard, criminals can be prosecuted for an offence under section 1 of the 2015 Act. That makes it an offence for a person to hold someone in any kind of slavery or servitude, or to require them to perform forced, coerced or compulsory labour. There is no need for the prosecution to prove that travel was an element of the section 1 offence. I point out too that both section 1 and section 2 attract the same maximum penalty of life, which is a reflection of how seriously both offences are viewed.

[Jess Phillips]

Does the Minister know how many cases of that were convicted last year, or in how many life has ever been given?

[Laura Farris]

No, I do not, but I can respond to the hon. Lady on that.

[Jess Phillips]

Fewer than 10.

[Laura Farris]

But the police do not tell us that they lack the tools or that there is a gap in the law that requires us to amend section 2. Together, the offences defined in sections 1 and 2 comprehensively cover modern slavery and they are collectively aligned to the international definitions. The police tell us that they provide a clear legal framework. We think that new clause 24 would create overlapping offences, which could cause confusion among the police and prosecutors. I hope that, in light of that explanation, the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley will be content to withdraw her new clause.

[Jess Phillips]

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 31

Reasonable force in domestic abuse cases

(1) Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 (reasonable force for purposes of self-defence etc.) is amended as follows.

(2) In subsection (5A) after ‘In a householder case’ insert ‘or a domestic abuse case.

(3) In subsection (6) after ‘In a case other than a householder case’ insert ‘or a domestic abuse case’.

(4) After subsection (8F) insert—

‘(8G) For the purposes of this section ‘a domestic abuse case’ is a case where—

(a) the defence concerned is the common law defence of self-defence,

(b) D is, or has been, a victim of domestic abuse, and

(c) the force concerned is force used by D against the person who has perpetrated the abusive behaviour referred to in paragraph (b).

(8H) Subsection (8G)(b) will only be established if the behaviour concerned is, or is part of, a history of conduct which constitutes domestic abuse as defined in sections 1 and 2 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, including but not limited to conduct which constitutes the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship as defined in section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 (controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship).’

(5) In subsection (9) after ‘householder cases’ insert ‘and domestic abuse cases’.—(Jess Phillips.)

Statutory defence for victims of domestic abuse who may have been coerced into committing certain crimes or driven to use force against their abuser, as a result of being a victim of domestic abuse.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Jess Phillips]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

[The Chair]

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:

New clause 32—Defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence—

(1) A person is not guilty of an offence if—

(a) the person is aged 18 or over when the person does the act which constitutes the offence,

(b) the person does that act because the person is compelled to do it,

(c) the compulsion is attributable to their being a victim of domestic abuse, and

(d) a reasonable person in the same situation as the person and having the person’s relevant characteristics would have no realistic alternative to doing that act.

(2) A person may be compelled to do something by another person or by the person’s circumstances.

(3) Compulsion is attributable to domestic abuse only if—

(a) it is, or is part of, conduct which constitutes domestic abuse as defined in sections 1 and 2 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, including but not limited to conduct which constitutes the offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family relationship as defined in section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015, or

(b) it is a direct consequence of a person being, or having been, a victim of such abuse.

(4) A person is not guilty of an offence if—

(a) the person is under the age of 18 when the person does the act which constitutes the offence,

(b) the person does that act as a direct consequence of the person being, or having been, a victim of domestic abuse as defined at subsection (3)(a) above, and

(c) a reasonable person in the same situation as the person and having the person’s relevant characteristics would do that act.

(5) For the purposes of this section ‘relevant characteristics’ means age, sex, any physical or mental illness or disability and any experience of domestic abuse.

(6) In this section references to an act include an omission.

(7) Subsections (1) and (4) do not apply to an offence listed in Schedule [Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply].

(8) The Secretary of State may by regulations amend Schedule [Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply].

(9) The Secretary of State must make arrangements for monitoring of the types of offence for which victims of domestic abuse are prosecuted and use this evidence to inform an annual review of the offences listed in Schedule [Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply] and any amendment to Schedule [Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply].

Statutory defence for victims of domestic abuse who may have been coerced into committing certain crimes as a result of being a victim of domestic abuse.

New schedule 2—Offences to which the defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence does not apply—

Common Law Offences

1 False imprisonment.

2 Kidnapping.

3 Manslaughter.

4 Murder.

5 Perverting the course of justice.

6 Piracy.

Offences against the Person Act 1861 (c. 100)

7 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861—

• section 4 (soliciting murder)

• section 16 (threats to kill)

• section 18 (wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm)

• section 20 (malicious wounding)

• section 21 (attempting to choke, suffocate or strangle in order to commit or assist in committing an indictable offence)

• section 22 (using drugs etc to commit or assist in the committing of an indictable offence)

• section 23 (maliciously administering poison etc so as to endanger life or inflict grievous bodily harm)

• section 27 (abandoning children)

• section 28 (causing bodily injury by explosives)

• section 29 (using explosives with intent to do grievous bodily harm)

• section 30 (placing explosives with intent to do bodily injury)

• section 31 (setting spring guns etc with intent to do grievous bodily harm)

• section 32 (endangering safety of railway passengers)

• section 35 (injuring persons by furious driving)

• section 37 (assaulting officer preserving wreck)

• section 38 (assault with intent to resist arrest).

Explosive Substances Act 1883 (c. 3)

8 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Explosive Substances Act 1883—

• section 2 (causing explosion likely to endanger life or property)

• section 3 (attempt to cause explosion, or making or keeping explosive with intent to endanger life or property)

• section 4 (making or possession of explosives under suspicious circumstances).

Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 (c. 34)

9 An offence under section 1 of the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 (child destruction).

Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (c. 12)

10 An offence under section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 (cruelty to children).

Public Order Act 1936 (1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6 c. 6)

11 An offence under section 2 of the Public Order Act 1936 (control etc of quasi-military organisation).

Infanticide Act 1938 (c. 36)

12 An offence under section 1 of the Infanticide Act 1938 (infanticide).

Firearms Act 1968 (c. 27)

13 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Firearms Act 1968—

• section 5 (possession of prohibited firearms)

• section 16 (possession of firearm with intent to endanger life)

• section 16A (possession of firearm with intent to cause fear of violence)

• section 17(1) (use of firearm to resist arrest)

• section 17(2) (possession of firearm at time of committing or being arrested for specified offence)

• section 18 (carrying firearm with criminal intent).

Theft Act 1968 (c. 60)

14 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Theft Act 1968—

• section 8 (robbery or assault with intent to rob)

• section 9 (burglary), where the offence is committed with intent to inflict grievous bodily harm on a person, or to do unlawful damage to a building or anything in it

• section 10 (aggravated burglary)

• section 12A (aggravated vehicle-taking), where the offence involves an accident which causes the death of any person

• section 21 (blackmail).

Criminal Damage Act 1971 (c. 48)

15 The following offences under the Criminal Damage Act 1971—

• an offence of arson under section 1

• an offence under section 1(2) (destroying or damaging property) other than an offence of arson.

Immigration Act 1971 (c. 77)

16 An offence under section 25 of the Immigration Act 1971 (assisting unlawful immigration to member state).

Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (c. 2)

17 An offence under section 170 of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 (penalty for fraudulent evasion of duty etc) in relation to goods prohibited to be imported under section 42 of the Customs Consolidation Act 1876 (indecent or obscene articles).

Taking of Hostages Act 1982 (c. 28)

18 An offence under section 1 of the Taking of Hostages Act 1982 (hostage-taking).

Aviation Security Act 1982 (c. 36)

19 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Aviation Security Act 1982—

• section 1 (hijacking)

• section 2 (destroying, damaging or endangering safety of aircraft)

• section 3 (other acts endangering or likely to endanger safety of aircraft)

• section 4 (offences in relation to certain dangerous articles).

Mental Health Act 1983 (c. 20)

20 An offence under section 127 of the Mental Health Act 1983 (ill-treatment of patients).

Child Abduction Act 1984 (c. 37)

21 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Child Abduction Act 1984—

• section 1 (abduction of child by parent etc)

• section 2 (abduction of child by other persons).

Public Order Act 1986 (c. 64)

22 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Public Order Act 1986—

• section 1 (riot)

• section 2 (violent disorder).

Criminal Justice Act 1988 (c. 33)

23 An offence under section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (torture).

Road Traffic Act 1988 (c. 52)

24 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Road Traffic Act 1988—

• section 1 (causing death by dangerous driving)

• section 3A (causing death by careless driving when under the influence of drink or drugs).

Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990 (c. 31)

25 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990—

• section 1 (endangering safety at aerodromes)

• section 9 (hijacking of ships)

• section 10 (seizing or exercising control of fixed platforms)

• section 11 (destroying fixed platforms or endangering their safety)

• section 12 (other acts endangering or likely to endanger safe navigation)

• section 13 (offences involving threats).

Channel Tunnel (Security) Order 1994 (S.I. 1994/570)

26 An offence under Part 2 of the Channel Tunnel (Security) Order 1994 (SI 1994/570) (offences relating to Channel Tunnel trains and the tunnel system).

Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (c. 40)

27 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997—

• section 4 (putting people in fear of violence)

• section 4A (stalking involving fear of violence or serious alarm or distress).

Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (c. 37)

28 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998—

• section 29 (racially or religiously aggravated assaults)

• section 31(1)(a) or (b) (racially or religiously aggravated offences under section 4 or 4A of the Public Order Act 1986).

Terrorism Act 2000 (c. 11)

29 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Terrorism Act 2000—

• section 54 (weapons training)

• section 56 (directing terrorist organisation)

• section 57 (possession of article for terrorist purposes)

• section 59 (inciting terrorism overseas).

International Criminal Court Act 2001 (c. 17)

30 An offence under any of the following provisions of the International Criminal Court Act 2001—

• section 51 (genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes)

• section 52 (ancillary conduct).

Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (c. 24)

31 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001—

• section 47 (use of nuclear weapons)

• section 50 (assisting or inducing certain weapons-related acts overseas)

• section 113 (use of noxious substance or thing to cause harm or intimidate).

Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 (c. 31)

32 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003—

• section 1 (female genital mutilation)

• section 2 (assisting a girl to mutilate her own genitalia)

• section 3 (assisting a non-UK person to mutilate overseas a girl’s genitalia).

Sexual Offences Act 2003 (c. 42)

33 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Sexual Offences Act 2003—

• section 1 (rape)

• section 2 (assault by penetration)

• section 3 (sexual assault)

• section 4 (causing person to engage in sexual activity without consent)

• section 5 (rape of child under 13)

• section 6 (assault of child under 13 by penetration)

• section 7 (sexual assault of child under 13)

• section 8 (causing or inciting child under 13 to engage in sexual activity)

• section 9 (sexual activity with a child)

• section 10 (causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity)

• section 13 (child sex offences committed by children or young persons)

• section 14 (arranging or facilitating commission of child sex offence)

• section 15 (meeting a child following sexual grooming)

• section 16 (abuse of position of trust: sexual activity with a child)

• section 17 (abuse of position of trust: causing or inciting a child to engage in sexual activity)

• section 18 (abuse of position of trust: sexual activity in presence of child)

• section 19 (abuse of position of trust: causing a child to watch a sexual act)

• section 25 (sexual activity with a child family member)

• section 26 (inciting a child family member to engage in sexual activity)

• section 30 (sexual activity with a person with a mental disorder impeding choice)

• section 31 (causing or inciting a person with a mental disorder impeding choice to engage in sexual activity)

• section 32 (engaging in sexual activity in the presence of a person with a mental disorder impeding choice)

• section 33 (causing a person with a mental disorder impeding choice to watch a sexual act)

• section 34 (inducement, threat or deception to procure sexual activity with a person with a mental disorder)

• section 35 (causing a person with a mental disorder to engage in or agree to engage in sexual activity by inducement, threat or deception)

• section 36 (engaging in sexual activity in the presence, procured by inducement, threat or deception, of a person with a mental disorder)

• section 37 (causing a person with a mental disorder to watch a sexual act by inducement, threat or deception)

• section 38 (care workers: sexual activity with a person with a mental disorder)

• section 39 (care workers: causing or inciting sexual activity)

• section 40 (care workers: sexual activity in the presence of a person with a mental disorder)

• section 41 (care workers: causing a person with a mental disorder to watch a sexual act)

• section 47 (paying for sexual services of a child)

• section 48 (causing or inciting child prostitution or pornography)

• section 49 (controlling a child prostitute or a child involved in pornography

• section 50 (arranging or facilitating child prostitution or pornography)

• section 61 (administering a substance with intent)

• section 62 (committing offence with intent to commit sexual offence)

• section 63 (trespass with intent to commit sexual offence)

• section 64 (sex with an adult relative: penetration)

• section 65 (sex with an adult relative: consenting to penetration)

• section 66 (exposure)

• section 67 (voyeurism)

• section 70 (sexual penetration of a corpse).

Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (c. 28)

34 An offence under section 5 of the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (causing or allowing a child or vulnerable adult to die or suffer serious physical harm).

Terrorism Act 2006 (c. 11)

35 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Terrorism Act 2006—

• section 5 (preparation of terrorist acts)

• section 6 (training for terrorism)

• section 9 (making or possession of radioactive device or material)

• section 10 (use of radioactive device or material for terrorist purposes)

• section 11 (terrorist threats relating to radioactive devices etc).

Modern Slavery Act 2015 (c. 30)

36 An offence under any of the following provisions of the Modern Slavery Act 2015—

• section 1 (slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour)

• section 2 (human trafficking).

Ancillary offences

37 (1) An offence of attempting or conspiring to commit an offence listed in this Schedule.

(2) An offence committed by aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring an offence listed in this Schedule.

(3) An offence under Part 2 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (encouraging or assisting) where the offence (or one of the offences) which the person in question intends or believes would be committed is an offence listed in this Schedule.

[Jess Phillips]

Over six years ago, in 2017, the then Home Office Minister for Crime, Safeguarding and Vulnerability said:

“There needs to be a root and branch review of how women are treated in the criminal justice system when they themselves are victims of abuse”.

However, no such review has ever taken place, and the criminal law still fails to protect those who experience abuse that drives them to offend. We all know that it does that and there has been endless evidence over many years; the Corston report, now decades old, still stands. While householders have legal protection when they act in self-defence against an intruder, no such protection is available to victims—survivors—acting in self-defence against their abuser.

New clauses 31 and 32 would introduce two measures to address that: a new statutory defence for those who are coerced into offending, and an amendment to the law on self-defence for those who use force against their abuser. Common law defences are outdated and ill-fitting to the context of domestic abuse, leaving survivors with no effective defence. These amendments would modernise the law and reflect improved public understanding of domestic abuse. They are based on legal precedents in place to protect other groups and are not gender-specific. They would address gaps in legal protection for survivors, strengthen recognition of the links between victimisation and offending, and deter inappropriate prosecutions. These reforms should be accompanied by a cross-Government policy framework to aid implementation. We propose that the two new clauses and new schedule 2 be added to the Bill.

New clause 31 amends the law on self-defence and is modelled on the provisions for householders in section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. There are Acts that seem to be about two completely separate things put together; it is good to see that Labour Governments did that as well! The clause would allow survivors acting in self-defence against their abusers the same protection as householders defending themselves against an intruder. In the case of a householder using force against an intruder, section 76(5A) of the 2008 Act provides that the degree of force used by said householder

“is not to be regarded as having been reasonable…if it was grossly disproportionate”.

A householder can therefore use force that is dispro-portionate, but not grossly disproportionate, provided that the degree of force was reasonable. It is outrageous to deny equivalent protection to women who are victims of domestic abuse defending themselves against someone who has raped, tortured, abused and attacked them. As Nicola Wake has argued, that disparity in protection is impossible to justify.

New clause 32 and new schedule 2 introduce statutory defences for survivors modelled on section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act. They would give survivors of domestic abuse similar protections to victims of human trafficking who are compelled to offend. A case study from the Centre for Women’s Justice makes the need for that clear:

“YS is charged with driving whilst disqualified, driving with excess alcohol, driving without insurance and dangerous driving. An officer noticed a vehicle with its brake lights permanently illuminated and swerving from side to side. He activated the siren, indicating for the vehicle to stop. The vehicle did not stop, and a chase continued for five minutes. In the driving seat was a woman, YS.

YS explained she had been dragged from her home partially dressed by her partner, forced to drive, and that he threatened to kill her if she did not drive on. The partner was screaming at her throughout, punching her in the ribs and trying to grab the steering wheel.

The police stop this vehicle and YS is prosecuted. Despite running duress and despite her being viewed as credible, she is convicted. Her conviction was upheld on appeal to the High Court.”

Duress was brought up earlier, and I got some points in the break on the defence of duress from some lawyers who have run these cases. As demonstrated by that case study, the defence of duress in these cases is inadequate. For example, the duress defence emphasises the threat of death or serious injury and ignores complexities of DA: a barrister I spoke to in the break said, “Basically, the reason duress doesn’t work is because it doesn’t work. You have to basically prove you had a gun to your head in the moment.” It does not recognise sexual, financial or psychological abuse. It also fails to recognise the nature of domestic abuse, because for the defence of duress to succeed, the threat of physical harm must be imminent—it has to be a gun to your head. The proposed statutory defence is closely modelled on section 45 of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, which provides a defence for victims of trafficking who offend as part of, or due to, their experience of modern slavery or trafficking. The same protections should be offered to victims of domestic abuse.

[Alex Cunningham]

I will be brief, because my hon. Friend’s contribution was very thorough. The explanatory statements make it clear that the aim of these new clauses would speak to the agenda of the House in relation to ending violence against women and girls while ensuring that they get the protection of the law. There is no doubt that the development of such defences in law is far from easy—in fact, it is extremely complicated, as was illustrated—but it is important that we get it right. Labour is determined that women and girls are protected from violence. The work done by my colleagues will help to ensure that we as a society do better in that regard.

No one can doubt that women can be driven to defend themselves when subject to controlling behaviour and domestic abuse, and they can then face prosecution for their actions. Similarly, the controller can drive them to commit other crimes for the benefit of that controller. It can be well argued in both cases that those women are not responsible for their own actions. I am interested in what the Minister will say and how she will address such things to ensure that the victim is not turned into a criminal.

[Laura Farris]

I thank the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley for tabling new clauses 31 and 32 and new schedule 2, which would create two new statutory defences for victims of domestic abuse. She mentioned the defence of self-defence, which is not available to householders only; self-defence is a complete defence available to anyone put in a situation where they are required to engage it. I make that point in passing.

The Committee is aware of the work that the Government have done on domestic abuse, so I will confine my remarks to our most recent work, which has focused on the issues set out in the hon. Member’s new clauses and new schedule. First, she is aware that we commissioned a domestic homicide review—undertaken by Clare Wade KC, who has given evidence to the Committee—which was the first from any Government to look at homicide in a domestic context. As part of that exercise, we invited Clare Wade to look at the law on domestic abuse defences. She did not have time to do so then, but she recommended that a further review should be undertaken. At the end of 2023, we commissioned that review by the Law Commission to look specifically at women driven to kill their abusive partners and the defences available to them, and to consider specifically whether legislative change was necessary. The review is due to conclude later this year—I understand by the summer.

I hope to reassure the hon. Member by reading out a few sections—I will only read short sections—of the review’s terms of reference, which I believe dovetail neatly with the points she has made in her new clauses and new schedule. Those terms of reference state:

“Most deaths that occur in the context of domestic abuse involve male abusers who kill their female victims. A much smaller number of (almost entirely female) victims of domestic abuse kill their (almost entirely male) abusers…Despite reforms to the partial defences of provocation (now loss of control) and diminished responsibility, concerns continue to be raised that the existing defences to murder and their application in the courts do not achieve just outcomes for this group of victims of domestic abuse who become defendants.”

It continues:

“The Law Commission will review the use of defences in domestic homicide cases in the light of modern understandings of the effects of domestic abuse on victims. The project will consider, but is not limited to, the following:

(1) whether the existing defences to murder, and arguments as to lack of requisite intent for murder, operate satisfactorily in the context of a defendant who has suffered domestic abuse;

(2) if not, whether reform of the existing defences or a new bespoke defence or defences are needed for the group identified…while ensuring that reformed or new defences are appropriately limited…

(3) the operation of the applicable rules of evidence, procedure, and ways that the defences are considered from the beginning of the police investigation up to and including at trial, in this context”.

[Jess Phillips]

I recognise all that good work, and I was pleased to see that, but that is specifically about murder and killing, not offending per se, which is what I was talking about. The Law Commission will not come back to the example I gave, with duress defences being used. I was talking about magistrates court cases, where medical evidence of domestic abuse needs to be produced to get a duress defence.

[Laura Farris]

The hon. Member is correct. I will come on to the other parts but I am starting with the most serious category of offences; I think there has been a particular concern in the law about whether they are adequately dealt with. However, I hope she will understand why we are keen to see the Law Commission’s review through to its conclusion, although we are sympathetic to the general aims.

--- Later in debate ---

The fact that an accused person is also a victim of domestic abuse will be considered throughout the criminal justice process, from the police investigation through to any Crown Prosecution Service charging decision, to the defences deployed at trial under the existing law.

[Jess Phillips]

Is the Minister still talking about murder? I am not denying that it would be taken into account in murder, but it would not be taken into account in theft or the car incidences. It would not be taken into account like any offence would be for a victim of modern slavery. I am not talking about murder; I recognise the environment for that.

[Laura Farris]

Well, I have made the point. I was addressing new clause 31. The householder defence is really a homicide defence; those were the circumstances in which it came up, which is why I made those remarks.

New clause 32 and new schedule 2 seek to create a new and specific statutory defence for victims of domestic abuse who commit an offence. The first version provides a defence where a person aged 18 or over does an act because they are compelled to do so as a result of the fact that they are a victim of domestic abuse, and a reasonable person in the same situation as that person, with the same relevant characteristics, would have no realistic alternative to doing that act. The second version applies to persons under 18, and provides a defence where a person acts as a direct consequence of being, or having been, a victim of domestic abuse. New schedule 2 sets out the offences to which that proposed defence would not be available.

I am sympathetic to the thrust of this new clause, particularly because of the correlation between domestic abuse and women who find themselves in the prison system. I know that the Prison Reform Trust, in conjunction with the Centre for Women’s Justice, has done really important work on this issue.

I will respond to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley about the case that she mentioned. She called it “JS”, but I think it is fair to use its title, because it is in the public domain: Stevens v. The Director of Public Prosecutions. She was quite right to outline the facts of the lady concerned, who said that she had found herself behind the wheel of a car, she was in her pyjamas and her other half was next to her; I think he had cocaine in his system. There was a background of coercive control. However, it is also true to say that her defence failed not only at first instance but on appeal, and I will just tell the Committee why, because I was troubled by the case and I wanted to see what factors the Court had considered.

The woman was driving dangerously at the time. However, she had already been disqualified from driving and she purchased the car when she was disqualified from driving. She conceded that she had driven it unlawfully a number of times before, with or without her husband. I am simply going through the factors. These are the factors that the Court of Appeal—the High Court, I think it was—had considered.

The jury took into consideration the fact that the woman did not tell the police at the time, or even in the police station, that she was under duress; she had also called her mum and had not mentioned being under duress. She had also—

[Jess Phillips]

Terrible defence.

[Laura Farris]

Well, this is the decision of the Court of Appeal.

[Jess Phillips]

I am afraid all the Minister is doing is identifying that this change is needed. So that woman did not tell her mother what her cocaine-fuelled partner, who her mother probably hated, was doing to her? Her mother has probably been isolated from seeing her daughter. She did not tell her mother? Has the Minister told her mother about every terrible thing that has ever happened to her? This is all just based on absolute myth and stereotype.

[Laura Farris]

I am simply going through how the higher court approached it. The point is that the Court found that the jury had not been persuaded that this was a duress case; duress was advanced as a defence, but that defence was not accepted. That is the nature of the system. So, it was not a case that the arguments were ignored; it was that she was not believed.

[Jess Phillips]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Laura Farris]

Before I do, may I say that I am not asserting my own view, but I did bother to read the case, because I thought it was a difficult case? And I think that it is probably difficult in Committee for MPs to weigh in to whether the appeal courts are right or wrong. The Court’s conclusion was that she had not made out her case; that was its conclusion. That is not my view; it is a fact.

[Jess Phillips]

It may very well be a “fact” that that woman was not successful in getting the defence of duress. In different circumstances, would she have been able to get the defence that I am talking about today? That would be easier to prove, because cases of duress require relevant characteristics to be established, including “battered woman syndrome” and “learned helplessness”. Those are outdated concepts, which pathologise women rather than offering an effective defence suitable for the actual circumstances. These concepts require a production of medical evidence—I do not have that for coercive control. That is not practicable and in many cases involves low-level offending tried in magistrates courts.

[Laura Farris]

I thank the hon. Member for her intervention, which leads into the point I wanted to address in her new clause. Subsection (3)(b) of new clause 32 says that the criminal offence must be:

“a direct consequence of a person being, or having been, a victim of such abuse.”

My point is that whatever we make of this case, that woman did not prove causation; the jury was not satisfied that there was causation. And that would still be the case even under the new clause, as drafted. Someone would have to prove a causal connection between domestic abuse and the criminal offence that took place.

So, while we are interested in this area of the law, at the moment it is difficult to see how the new clause changes the defences of duress or self-defence, which already exist in common law.

[Jess Phillips]

I will just quote the Minister to herself. Earlier, when we were discussing spiking, she said that it was all too well and easy to say, “This already exists. We shouldn’t do anything about it.” I am just quoting her back at herself. These defences already exist.

[Laura Farris]

I am simply making a point about causation. The hon. Member has put a causal measure into her new clause and she raised a case, and I am simply saying that it was the conclusion of the jury in that case that causation was not established. I cannot go behind that finding, because we have an independent court system.

[Jess Phillips]

Apart from the Post Office.

[Laura Farris]

That has assisted there.

A new statutory defence would also be restrictive in how it is framed and, unlike the common law defence, is less able to respond to the changing nature of forms of domestic abuse. We have seen how in recent years the courts have recognised the development of certain forms of domestic abuse, such as controlling and coercive behaviour, and have been able to weigh that into the application of certain defences in law.

I am interested in this area of the law; I just do not think the new clause is right yet. It is very wide and could provide a full defence to any criminal act, save for those offences listed in schedule 2, without considering the range of seriousness. I recognise that the list of behaviours in schedule 2 is based on the modern slavery defence, but the behaviours covered by that statutory defence are much narrower than those in the Bill, and they apply only where the pressure on the defendant would amount to an offence under the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

To conclude, the Government do not agree at present that the measures proposed by new clauses 31 or 32 are necessary, and I ask the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley not to press them.

[Jess Phillips]

I will just read the first bit of my speech again and then sit down, because we have to get through proceedings today. More than six years ago, in 2017, the Home Office Minister for Crime, Safeguarding and Vulnerability said there needed to be

“a root and branch review of how women are treated in the criminal justice system”.

I will welcome it when it eventually comes. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 39

Requirement for specialist rape and serious sexual offence teams

(1) The chief officer of each police force in England and Wales must establish a specialist team for the investigation of rape and serious sexual offences within the relevant force area.

(2) The chief officer must provide for members of the specialist team to be provided with such training and guidance on the investigation of rape and serious sexual offences as the chief officer sees fit.

(3) Any chief officer who fails to establish a specialist team must produce and publish a report to the Secretary of State outlining–

(a) the reasons for the chief officer’s decision not to establish a specialist team;

(b) how rape and serious sexual offences are to be investigated in the absence of a specialist team;

(c) what training and guidance is given to officers on the investigation of rape and serious sexual offences.”—(Alex Norris.)

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Alex Norris]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

It is a pleasure, Sir Graham, to serve with you in the Chair on this final afternoon in Committee. We did not want to miss this opportunity, as any criminal justice legislation is an opportunity to try to improve our dreadfully bad outcomes as they pertain to rape. According to Rape Crisis, there were 68,109 rapes between July 2022 and June 2023. By the end of that 12-month period, charges had been brought in 2.2% of those cases, so that is two out of every 100 resulting in someone being charged. That is just the ones that are reported, with five in six women and four in five men who are raped not reporting.

In the courts, we see trials delayed for years and a staggering 70% of survivors dropping out of the system altogether. Of that 2.2% charge rate, the number of convictions is just a fraction of an already dreadfully low figure. New clause 39 seeks to establish specialist rape and serious sexual offence teams in every police force by making that a requirement. Those teams would have to be provided with proper training and guidance.

If a chief officer of a police force or the Minister had concerns that such a measure fettered operational independence, the new clause hopefully offers a workaround on that. If a chief officer of a police force does not establish such teams, they will be required to publish a report to the Secretary of State outlining the reason, how rape and sexual offences are to be investigated and what training and guidance will be given to officers investigating such cases.

These specialist investigation units will be allowed to use tactics normally reserved for organised crime or terrorist investigations to identify and go after the most dangerous repeat abusers and rapists and get them off our streets. That is not just something that we are pushing forward; it is also a recommendation of the Home Affairs Committee. I am pleased to have the support of its Chair, my right hon. Friend the Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Dame Diana Johnson). The evidence points to specialist teams being effective at investigating such serious crimes, and those forces that do have units already know how well they are performing. Clearly, this should be rolled out so that every victim, no matter where they are in the country, can have their case investigated properly with a view to securing a charge and a conviction.

--- Later in debate ---

[Jess Phillips]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

I did not know until moments ago, when the Minister was speaking, that we were allowed props. My phone is not a prop, but I inherited the moving of this motion about an hour ago and the prop I have is some messages that the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Dehenna Davison) has sent me. I signed her new clause 50 mainly because of many years of listening to her speak very compellingly about her experience as the daughter of a victim of a single-punch death. Essentially, what she has asked me to put on the record today is that the average sentence for deaths in such cases is currently only about four years, and recent sentences have been as low as two years. That is a massive kick in the teeth for the families of victims.

New clause 50 would raise the minimum sentence to seven years, although no sentence will ever feel enough —these are the hon. Member’s words, not mine. Crucially, it would also create an offence category, to help with reporting. As things stand, we do not have concrete information on how often these deaths happen and what sentences are passed. With the new clause, we are looking for clarity, but also deterrence and a sense that the sentences are commensurate with the harm caused in these cases. I shall say no more at this stage.

[Vicky Ford (Chelmsford) (Con)]

I, too, have spoken to my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland. I apologise that I did not sign the new clause; I wish I had.

There is clearly a gap in the criminal justice system, because so often the perpetrators of one-punch assaults are handed unduly lenient sentences that do not provide the sense of justice that victims’ families seek and that members of the public expect. That is why my hon. Friend tabled new clause 50, which has been signed by many other hon. Members. It would make one-punch manslaughter a specific offence, attracting a minimum sentence of seven years, and would ensure that these crimes are reported in a consistent way.

--- Later in debate ---

[Laura Farris]

I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland, who has been such an effective campaigner on this deeply personal offence that completely devastated her young life. She has made sure that it is seen not as a minimal offence or a nasty accident, but as the most serious form of assault. I know that she has been engaging with the Lord Chancellor, and I do not want to pre-empt those conversations. I was due to meet her this week; she was unwell, but we will still do so, and there is a process of discussion.

I want to say a little about new clause 50, and about one or two of the concerns that we have at this point. One-punch manslaughter is already a form of unlawful act—manslaughter—and it closely overlaps with that offence. The new clause closely reflects the existing law, but the common-law offence of unlawful act manslaughter has a maximum penalty of life imprisonment.

The new clause has two elements that differ from unlawful act manslaughter, meaning in practice that it would apply only to a small number of cases. First, the unlawful act set out in the new clause requires

“a single punch to the head or neck”.

Secondly, whereas unlawful act manslaughter requires that a reasonable person would have understood that the act posed some risk of harm, the new clause requires a “significant risk” of harm. In other words, it is setting a higher evidential threshold for what the perpetrator knew than the current principles of manslaughter. We would not wish to create an offence that made it harder to get a conviction rather than easier, as is currently the case with manslaughter.

We make similar observations in relation to GBH. Murder can be charged in two circumstances: where there was an intention to kill, or where there was an intent by the perpetrator to cause serious harm to the level of GBH. An intent to kill is not usually present in one-punch cases, but an intent to cause serious harm to the level of GBH may be present. That is called the GBH rule, and in some ways it overlaps with the specific circumstances described in the new clause. There is therefore a risk that people who could be charged with murder would deviate to pleading guilty to the lesser offence because they think that they would get less time. We want to avoid that.

I had another point to make in passing about the Australian system—I cannot lay my hand on my note, but I was going to say that it results in lower sentences than what is suggested here, so it is not a perfect read-across.

The Government’s other concern, as nobody on this Committee will be surprised to hear, is about the new clause setting a minimum sentence. We do not wish to create anomalies in the law. How would the family of a victim who was killed by a single punch to the abdomen feel if the minimum sentence did not apply? How would the family of a victim who was killed by two punches to the head feel if their case was treated differently?

As the Committee has seen over the course of our debates, minimum sentences sometimes create difficulties in the law on homicide and irregularities in sentencing. When we extrapolate those to certain circumstances, some of which we probably cannot even imagine as we sit here today, they could cause irregularities further down the line. None of that is fatal to the new clause, by way; it simply informs our thinking and our nervousness with the minimum-sentence suggestion at the moment.

We appreciate, without any reservation, the very serious harm that the new clause targets. We want to see laws and sentencing powers that are flexible enough to deal with different levels of culpability. We would not wish for more people either to get away with it because the intent could not be proved or to use this new offence as an alternative to murder.

We are thinking hard about it, and we wish to maintain consistency in the law. At the same time, we recognise the harm that is caused by this offending. We recognise the seriousness of it, and we recognise the importance of the campaign that my hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland has presented to the House. I ask the hon. Member for Birmingham, Yardley to withdraw the new clause at this point, but we are continuing conversations with my hon. Friend.

[Jess Phillips]

The hon. Member for Bishop Auckland did not ask me to press new clause 50. However, I can see from looking through the list of supporters that she has managed to unite me and the hon. Member for Ashfield (Lee Anderson)—she may be the only person ever to have managed that. I hope he doesn’t take my ribbing too seriously and change his vote on something.

The hon. Member for Bishop Auckland tells me that the Minister and the Secretary of State have both been engaging with her and that she wishes to continue that engagement, so I imagine that these issues will arise again on Report or even in the Lords. I will not press the new clause to a vote today, but the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland is young, bright and short and is determined to see some action on the issue before she leaves this place. Who could blame her, considering her experiences? I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.

Clause, by leave, withdrawn.

New Clause 51

Aggravated offences: hostility towards transgender identity, sexual orientation and disability

“(1) The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 is amended as follows.

(2) For the first cross-heading under Part II, substitute ‘Offences aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity: England and Wales’.

(3) In section 28—

(a) for the heading, substitute ‘Meaning of “aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity”’;

(b) in subsection (1), omit ‘racially or religiously aggravated’ and insert ‘aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’;

(c) in subsection (1)(a), omit from ‘based on’ to the end of sub-subsection (a) and insert—

‘—

(i) the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a racial group;

(ii) the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a religious group;

(iii) a disability (or presumed disability) of the victim;

(iv) the sexual orientation (or presumed sexual orientation) of the victim; or

(v) the victim being (or being presumed to be) transgender, or’;

(d) in subsection (1)(b), omit from ‘hostility towards’ to the end of sub-subsection (b) and insert—

‘—

(i) members of a racial group based on their membership of that group;

(ii) members of a religious group based on their membership of that group;

(iii) persons who have a disability or a particular disability;

(iv) persons who are of a particular sexual orientation; or

(v) persons who are transgender.’;

(e) in subsection (2), in the definition of ‘membership’ leave out ‘racial or religious’ and insert ‘relevant’.

(4) In section 29—

(a) for the heading, substitute ‘Assaults aggravated on grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’;

(b) in subsection (1), omit ‘racially or religiously aggravated’ and insert ‘aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’.

(5) In section 30—

(a) for the heading, substitute ‘Criminal damage aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’;

(b) in subsection (1), omit ‘racially or religiously aggravated” and insert ‘aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’.

(6) In section 31—

(a) for the heading, substitute ‘Public order offences aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’;

(b) in subsection (1), omit ‘racially or religiously aggravated’ and insert ‘aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’.

(7) In section 32—

(a) for the heading, substitute ‘Harassment etc aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’;

(b) in subsection (1), omit ‘racially or religiously aggravated’ and insert ‘aggravated on the grounds of race, religion, disability, sexual orientation or transgender identity’.”—(Alex Cunningham.)

This new clause would include offences motivated by hostility towards an individual’s disability status, sexual orientation or transgender identity (or perception thereof) in those which are aggravated under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.

Brought up, and read the First time.

[Alex Cunningham]

I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

New clause 51 would address the disparity between existing characteristics and current hate crime legislation. It would create parity for maximum possible penalties for all five characteristics defined under the sentencing code. Under current hate crime legislation, hate crimes based on race and/or religion can have higher maximum penalties than their base equivalents, whereas hate crimes based on sexual orientation, transgender identity and/or disability cannot. This creates a two-tier system of justice.

There are precedents for expanding the characteristics covered by aggravated offences. The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 originally defined only racially aggravated offences; this was amended in the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 to include religiously aggravated offences. In December 2021, the Law Commission published “Hate crime laws: Final report”, a comprehensive review of all hate crime legislation. Its conclusion was:

“We remain of the view that we expressed in our 2014 report that the current hierarchy of protection is unfair and sends a distinctly negative message to victims of hate crimes on the basis of disability, sexual orientation and transgender identity. We therefore recommend parity of protection for aggravated offences across all five characteristics.”

It also stated:

“There was very strong support for a consistent approach amongst organisational stakeholders…For example, The Bar Council simply said…‘There would not appear to be any good reason to withhold parity of protection across the range of protected characteristics.’”

Does the Minister agree with the Law Commission’s recommendation that offences motivated by hostility towards an individual’s disability status, sexual orientation or transgender identity should be encompassed within the aggravated offences under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998?

New clause 51 comes in the context of soaring levels of hate crime reporting. Over 145,000 cases were reported in 2022-23. Across all monitored strands of hate crime, the numbers of offences have soared since 2011-12. Racially motivated hate crime rose by over 200% in the period, topping 100,000 instances for the first time in 2021-22. Meanwhile, hate crime motivated by religion increased by 433%. What is wrong with our bloomin’ society? By sexual orientation, it has increased by 493% and, by transgender identity, it has increased by 1,263%. Violent crime or crimes against the person rose as a proportion of hate crime offences from 29% in 2012-13 to 41% in 2022-23. The number of violent hate crime offences has risen sixfold, from 12,739 to 63,895 in 2022.

LGBT+ people and people with a disability should be able to live their life free from fear, abuse or violence. Labour has committed to take back our streets and be tough on hate crime. We will do so by strengthening and equalising the law so that every category of hate crime is treated as an aggravated offence, to ensure that everyone who falls victim to a hate crime is treated equally under the law. I hope that the Government will support new clause 51.