(4 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI not only recognise but acknowledge and agree with the noble Lord’s point. I appreciate the time that we had to talk about some of these difficult issues. Where a child is a British citizen, we will work with partners to try to find a safe route to return them to this country, as he says.
My Lords, is it not a principle of British justice that an accused person is innocent until proven guilty in a legitimate court of law? On the basis of what evidence are these British nationals denied entry to the UK or even denied British citizenship? Should the UK not do what almost every other country is doing and repatriate its nationals, albeit to face trial if necessary?
My Lords, different countries have different approaches. I am aware of what they are doing. Where the noble Lord talks about being innocent until proven guilty, I assume that he means people who have gone to Syria to fight. He is right to say that these people should be brought to justice, and that is why we are having conversations with our international partners to look at the best method to work this out in an internationally agreed way.
(4 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberAs I explained to the noble Lord, these things are multifactorial. The increased pressure on police, the increased demand on police, the changing nature of crime and certainly some of the issues we have seen in the last couple of years have placed unprecedented pressure on police. The noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, often mentions the efficiency and effectiveness of the police, as well as the resources and capabilities that we support them in having.
My Lords, there is documented evidence from the College of Policing that stop and search is effective only up to a certain level, after which increases produce no drop in crime. Certainly in knife crime hotspots, the amount of stop and search is above that effective level. Why are the Government making it easier for the police to engage in stop and search without any reasonable suspicion? Does the Minister accept that excessive stop and search can be counterproductive? I speak as someone who was involved as a police sergeant in the 1981 Brixton riots.
It is important that police officers have good relationships with their communities so that there is an element of trust in the police and what they do. As we have discussed before, it is also important that stop and search is intelligence-led rather than just being indiscriminate in certain parts of London and other areas of the country, as the noble Lord talked about.
(4 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI understand my noble friend’s point. However, take as an example two types of venue: the Parliamentary Estate, and the mitigating measures that the parliamentary authorities have put in around the estate to make your Lordships’ House and the other House safer following the London attacks; and venues where people might go to listen to music, and so on. The Government have a long-standing work programme to provide the owners and operators of these crowded places with high-quality advice and guidance. Therefore, when I say to the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, that we are considering it, I mean that we need to look at all the various things that are in place and come up with the right solution.
My Lords, the Manchester Arena bomb was detonated outside one of the entrances. Crowds outside venues arguably present an easier target for terrorists. Does the Minister agree that legislation is necessary because security measures should include the build-up of large numbers outside venues, potentially in public spaces, as well as the security of those inside the venues?
My Lords, you cannot think about a crowded venue without thinking about the people outside. I sometimes find that when I am leaving this building in a car, we simply cannot get out. It is quite frightening to be stuck trying to get out of a venue. When we talk about venues, we are talking about both the outside and the inside and what people do when they are stuck trying to get in or out.
(4 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI think that we are talking about two entirely different things. Nobody disputes the right to protest. Everyone is well educated on some of the climatic changes that are taking place. This is about bringing a capital city to a standstill.
My Lords, while recognising that many citizens support Extradition Rebellion’s aims, it risks losing that support by disrupting London’s road transport, particularly the bus network that the poor and disabled rely on most. Would a ban on obstructing roads rather than a blanket ban on all protests by Extinction Rebellion be a more proportionate response? Will the Minister answer my noble friend’s Question about what discussions the Government have had with the Metropolitan Police on this issue?
On the final point, the noble Lord will know that it is an operational matter for the police to make that judgment call; that is what they have done. He said, “Extradition Rebellion” —I think he meant Extinction Rebellion. On whether the police could impose conditions not allowing these people on the roads, the condition was actually on assembling in Trafalgar Square. It has been very difficult to engage with these people. The MPS—the Metropolitan Police Service—still stands ready to engage but, to date, that engagement has been very difficult.
(4 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI agree with my noble friend that it is monstrous. People may be unable to seek medical treatment or, indeed, emergency treatment in St Thomas’. Exactly the same thing happened in Bristol, where somebody could not get to see their dying parent, who died before they could get to see them. It is monstrous. As I said, half the sites are now cleared, and I hope that the area around St Thomas’ Hospital will be accessible to all those who need to go there.
My Lords, dealing with the nature and volume of demonstrations we are currently seeing is very resource-intensive. Does the Minister agree that the dramatic reductions in police numbers under this Government not only impact on day-to-day policing but reduce the resilience of the police and their ability to respond to such demonstrations?
Certainly, this current set of protests has been very resource-intensive. Obviously, the noble Lord will join me in being very pleased about the plans for 20,000 more police officers over the next three years.
(4 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in drawing up the terms of reference for the inspection, HMICFRS will come to its own conclusions about what the noble Lord has just outlined. I think taking into account the IOPC’s recommendation means taking a view of it in the round.
My Lords, Sir Richard Henriques’s report states that there were such inconsistencies between the fantasist Nick’s statements to Wiltshire Police and his later account to the Metropolitan Police that it was obvious that Nick’s account could not be relied on. In the full knowledge of that information, the senior investigating officer told a press conference that what Nick had said was “credible and true”. How can the so-called Independent Office for Police Conduct exonerate all those involved in such circumstances? Who are the IOPC trying to protect, and who was the DAC in overall charge of the investigation’s line manager at the time?
First, the noble Lord will know that Wiltshire Police dismissed the claims of Nick. On his question of who the IOPC is trying to protect, the IOPC is independent of both government and the police, and it is absolutely right that such a body exists to be able to scrutinise them.
(4 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberIt was the Prime Minister who said that the Home Office was reviewing the matter, and therefore I do not assume that there is a change in the position. I hesitate to say this to the noble Lord, but I am sure that it will be done in due course.
My Lords, while the application is being processed, the Government give some seekers of sanctuary no support at all—they can stay but with no recourse to public funds—or they provide them with such low subsistence that it is impossible for them to buy essentials such as clothes or shoes. Either they have a legitimate claim to be here or they should be deported, but why should they be made destitute while their application is being considered?
The noble Lord is absolutely right that either their claims should be considered or not, and that should be done swiftly, which is what I was saying to the noble Lord, Lord Reid. The sooner that people’s applications are considered, the sooner these things can be determined.
(4 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am sure my right honourable friend the Home Secretary will consider that in due course.
My Lords, refugee families often have to make repeated applications for leave to remain, before becoming eligible for British citizenship, paying thousands of pounds at each stage, potentially costing tens of thousands of pounds overall—way above the actual cost to the Home Office of processing their applications. Does the Minister accept that the government policy of overcharging positively discourages those seeking sanctuary in the UK? All these people want is to contribute to and integrate with British society.
The Home Office does not make a profit from application fees. The income that it derives is used to fund other vital areas of the borders, immigration and citizenship service. We have always provided refugees with exceptions to the need to pay application fees for leave to remain, in specific circumstances. That might be for refugees or those living in local authority care.
(4 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord makes a good point. As I said to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, the use of this technology is being looked at by the ICO. It has launched an investigation following concerns about the use of LFR by managers of shopping malls in and around King’s Cross. I have explained the oversight process to the noble Lord but, as I said to other noble Lords, it is very important that the technology is used proportionately and within the law, and of course the court judgment last month confirmed that that was the case.
My Lords, is the Minister not concerned that using custody image databases that include pictures of unconvicted people in conjunction with facial recognition technology is potentially a breach of innocent people’s human rights? Is this not another reason why the Government need to take action?
It might be helpful to the noble Lord if I outlined the types of people who could be on a watch list. They are persons wanted on warrants, individuals who are unlawfully at large, persons suspected of having committed crimes, persons who might be in need of protection, individuals whose presence at an event causes particular concern, and of course vulnerable persons—we must not lose sight of the fact that the technology can be incredibly useful in detecting vulnerable people.
(4 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group—LIFG—was established in the early 1990s and aimed to replace the Gaddafi regime with a hard-line Islamist theocracy. The group mounted a terrorist campaign inside Libya in the mid-1990s, including a 1996 attempt to assassinate Muammur Gaddafi, before becoming part of the wider global Islamist extremist movement in the 2000s.
In 2008, the group formally merged with al-Qaeda. The LIFG has been proscribed as a terrorist organisation in the UK since October 2005. That decision was taken after extensive consideration and in light of a full assessment of available information, and was approved by Parliament. It is clear that the LIFG was concerned in terrorism at that time.
However, the group announced that it was disbanding in 2010. Some of its former members continued to be involved in terrorism, aligned to other groups, or have been involved in fighting since the 2011 Libyan revolution. Some are now involved in more moderate pursuits, such as mainstream Libyan politics or everyday occupations. The LIFG is now assessed to be defunct and no longer exists.
Under Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000 the Home Secretary has the power to remove an organisation from the list of proscribed organisations if she believes it no longer meets the statutory test for proscription. Having reviewed the information available about the current activities of the LIFG, after careful consideration the Home Secretary has concluded that there is now not sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that the LIFG is currently concerned in terrorism, as defined by Section 3(5) of the Terrorism Act 2000.
Accordingly, the Home Secretary has brought this order before the House and, if approved, this means that being a member of, or providing support to, this organisation will cease to be a criminal offence on the day that the order comes into force. The decision to deproscribe the LIFG was taken after extensive consideration and in light of a full assessment of available information.
As noble Lords will appreciate, it would not be appropriate for us to discuss any specific intelligence that informed the decision-making process. The Government do not condone any terrorist activity. Deproscription of a proscribed group should not be interpreted as condoning any previous activities of this group.
The British Government have always been clear that the LIFG was a brutal terrorist organisation when it existed. Groups that do not meet the threshold for proscription are not free to spread hatred, fund terrorist activity and incite violence as they please. The police have comprehensive powers to take action against individuals under criminal law. We are determined to detect and disrupt all terrorist threats, whether homegrown or international. Proscription is but one tool in the considerable armoury at the disposal of the Government, the police and the Security Service to disrupt terrorist activity.
The Government continue to exercise the proscription power in a proportionate manner in accordance with the law. We recognise that proscription potentially interferes with an individual’s rights—in particular, the rights protected by Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights on freedom of expression and freedom of association—and so should be exercised only where absolutely necessary. A decision to deproscribe is taken only after great care and consideration of the case, and it is appropriate that it must be approved by both Houses. If agreed, the order will come into force the day after the debate in the other place. I beg to move.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for explaining the order, but I am a little confused. The Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the order states that in January 2019 an application was made to the Secretary of State for the deproscription of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group—the LIFG. It also says:
“The Proscription Review Group (PRG), a cross-Government group … makes recommendations and provides advice … on the implementation of the proscription regime including the case for proscription and consideration of deproscription applications … The PRG”,
as the Minister has just said,
“has assessed that the group is now defunct and no longer exists”.
What is not clear to me, even after what the Minister has said, is who made the application for the deproscription.
We discussed the proscription of terrorist organisations at length during the passage of the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill in December last year. We learned that very few organisations have applied to be deproscribed, not least because it is very expensive. In one case that was referred to during that debate, apparently it cost £300,000 to secure deproscription. Presumably in this case the application was not made by the LIFG, a defunct organisation that no longer exists.
During the debate on the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, attempted to reinstate and put on a statutory basis an annual review of the activities of proscribed organisations—something that apparently had happened routinely until four or five years ago—and the deproscription of those lacking a statutory basis for continued listing. Have the Government adopted the recommendation of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, at least to the extent that they are now reviewing proscribed organisations to establish whether they meet the statutory requirement for proscription? If so, during that debate the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, also said that at least 14 of the 74 organisations proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000, not including 14 Northern Ireland groups, are not concerned in terrorism and therefore do not meet the minimum statutory condition for proscription. If there has been a government review resulting in the proposed deproscription of this organisation, when will the other organisations to which the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, referred be deproscribed? I look forward to the Minister’s response.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has largely raised all the points that I was going to refer to, so I will not detain the House for long. However, I was surprised about the application and just want to ask about a couple of further points.
First, what happens if this group, which we are told is defunct and no longer exists, reappears? Secondly, are any frozen assets held in the UK at present and, if so, will it be possible for them to be unfrozen and for people to get their hands on them? I would be very interested in hearing the answers to those two points and those raised by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. With that, I will not detain the House further.
(5 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Lord asked a number of questions, one of which was about border staff. He will know that we have recruited almost all the 900 staff that we undertook to recruit in preparation for Brexit. I will write to him with a longer answer on the inspectorate because I do not have the details at my fingertips today.
My Lords, is the real problem at the Home Office not the culture, which is still being driven by trying to achieve the target of reducing net immigration to the tens of thousands? This House has recently passed legislation that effectively continues free movement of EU citizens in the event of a no-deal Brexit. So, the only way that this ridiculous target can be achieved is by the ruthless pursuit of anyone who can be deported, even for the most minor of reasons. Does the Minister not agree that the hostile environment may have changed its name, but it persists?
As I have said before, the hostile environment started under Alan Johnson and ended under my right honourable friend the Home Secretary. The noble Lord has made the point about culture before, and he is right that the culture of an organisation is key to the way its policies operate. There are no targets of the kind that the noble Lord described. We have a general ambition of reducing net migration but targets—particularly in the hostile environment, as the noble Lord referred to it—no longer operate.
(5 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberI thank the noble Lord for his questions. He asked why victims of modern slavery were not detected prior to detention. Quite often, Home Office staff pick up the fact that people are victims of modern slavery. It is not the case that the 507 individuals were detained after getting positive reasonable grounds. As stated clearly in the FoI response, the figure relates to people who had positive reasonable grounds when entering detention or while in it. Further analysis of the figures shows that, of the 507 people in question, 479 received the positive reasonable grounds decision during a detention period. Of those, 328—68%—were released within two days of that decision. In total, 422—88%—were released within a week of the positive reasonable grounds decision. Of the 57 who were detained for eight days or more following the positive reasonable grounds decision, 46—81%—are foreign national offenders.
On the data and the differences in the figures, my right honourable friend the Immigration Minister was absolutely correct to say that there is no central record of those who received a positive conclusive grounds decision and are detained under immigration powers. While the information might be available from the live Home Office case information database, known as CID, it would be for internal management only. For example, some data may be incomplete, and every FOI response is caveated as such.
My Lords, it is not just the victims of modern slavery but survivors of rape and other serious sexual assaults whose details are being passed to immigration officials by the police, with a view to deporting those who are undocumented migrants. Perpetrators of modern slavery and rapists will be telling these victims, with good reason, that they cannot go to the police because they will be deported. Vulnerable people are being raped and then deported because they reported the rape to the police. Does the Minister not accept that this kind of data sharing between the police and immigration officials is preventing modern slavery and rape being tackled effectively, and that it has to stop?
I say to the noble Lord, as I think I said the other day, that someone who is a victim of modern slavery, which may well include those who have been raped—these people are exploited to an insufferable degree—should be treated first and foremost as a victim. The abuse and trauma they have suffered should be dealt with first and foremost. However, it is also true that other issues may be involved, such as immigration control. Quite often, in a number of cases, that immigration control will in and of itself protect the victim, because the whole picture will come out. But I reassure the noble Lord that, if someone comes forward who is a victim of modern slavery, they will be protected and treated as a victim first and foremost, and will get all the support they need.
(5 years, 1 month ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, this draft order differs from recent amendments to the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 in that it is based on changes to scientific and technical detail in existing legislation and does not introduce further controls on compounds under the 1971 Act. I thank the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs—the ACMD—for its expert advice on this technical matter, which has informed the draft order before the Committee.
The order was first laid before Parliament on 4 June. Its purpose is to amend Schedule 2 to the Misuse of Drugs Act by reducing the scope of the generic definition of the third generation of synthetic cannabinoids. I assure noble Lords that this amendment does not repeal the generic definition of synthetic cannabinoids under the Act, and compounds commonly known as Spice and Mamba will continue to be subject to controls under that legislation. The measure is brought forward as a result of the recommendation from the ACMD published on 22 December 2017.
It may be helpful if I explain to the Committee the history of the control of synthetic cannabinoids under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, as it helps to frame the context of this amendment. The ACMD, the independent experts who provide advice to the Government on the misuse and harms of drugs, first published guidance in 2014 on the third generation of synthetic cannabinoids. This is a group of compounds that mimic the effects of cannabis and are commonly referred to by brand names such as Spice and Mamba. The ACMD recommended that synthetic cannabinoids should be captured under a generic definition— as class B drugs under the Misuse of Drugs Act—due to their associated harms and widespread availability, and it followed the control of the first generation of synthetic cannabinoids in 2009 and the second generation in 2013.
The ACMD advice also recommended that these compounds be placed under Schedule 1 to the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 2001, as it could not determine any known medicinal or therapeutic benefits from these drugs. Any drugs listed under Schedule 1 are deemed to have little or no known medicinal or therapeutic benefits and can be legally accessed only with a Home Office licence, which is generally issued for research or industrial purposes.
Shortly after these changes came into effect on 14 December 2016, representatives from the research community contacted the Home Office and the ACMD, informing them that a large number of research compounds not suspected as being synthetic cannabinoids were inadvertently captured under the generic definition. As a result of the controls placed on these compounds, institutions had to obtain Schedule 1 licences to conduct certain aspects of their research. The licensing process ensures that there is a minimised risk of misuse and diversion of, and harm from, controlled drugs. However, the Government have no desire to unnecessarily impose licensing requirements where compounds do not pose risks of harm. Accordingly, it is important that we amend the generic definition to remove a regulatory burden on the research industry relating to compounds that were never intended to be controlled. On that basis, the ACMD recommended in December 2017 that the scope of the generic definition be reduced.
The order amends the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 to reduce the breadth of compounds controlled as third-generation synthetic cannabinoids. The ACMD’s amended definition will ensure that compounds which have been found to cause harm will continue to be caught by the generic definition. I assure the Committee that the Government are acutely aware of the continued harms posed by the third generation of synthetic cannabinoids, and I want to make it clear that the order does not revoke the generic definition. Harmful synthetic cannabinoids such as Spice and Mamba will continue to be controlled through the generic definition.
The order, if accepted and made, will come into force on 15 November. To complement it, a further statutory instrument will be introduced to make parallel amendments to the generic definition under Schedule 1 to the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 2001 and in the Misuse of Drugs (Designation) (England, Wales and Scotland) Order 2015. As a result, the compounds currently captured unintentionally will no longer require a Home Office licence for the conduct of research as they will no longer be controlled.
I hope that I have made the case to amend the generic definition of the third generation of synthetic cannabinoids to remove the compounds that were unintentionally controlled from the generic definition. I commend the order to the Committee.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for explaining the draft statutory instrument.
It is regrettable that, in 2016, the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs advised the Government to include such a wide definition of third generation synthetic cannabinoids. Between 40,000 and 90,000 compounds captured by this wide definition were not synthetic cannabinoids and therefore were not intended to be controlled under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. In addition, it inhibited research by requiring researchers to obtain a Schedule 1 licence.
That highlights a series of issues with the Government’s approach to drug misuse. First, the ill-thought-through Psychoactive Substances Act, while making previously so-called legal highs illegal, did not make the possession of such substances an offence—only their manufacture, sale and supply, even though some of the substances are more dangerous than the substances controlled under the Misuse of Drugs Act that they were designed to replace.
Secondly, as a result, the ACMD still has to play catch-up with synthetic alternatives to controlled drugs, such as synthetic cannabinoids, which need to be controlled under the Misuse of Drugs Act because they are so dangerous. To get ahead of the game, on the basis of what the Minister said and what is contained in the material published by the Home Office on the SI, the ACMD appears to have gone to the other extreme and banned swathes of innocuous substances.
Thirdly, these synthetic alternatives to controlled drugs were created only because the controlled drugs that they were designed to replace were illegal. For example, I know a doctor who has had to deal with a number of patients with serious psychiatric problems caused by these synthetic alternatives; they took the synthetic alternatives because they were legal at the time, but they would not have had psychiatric problems if they had stuck to the controlled drugs that the synthetic alternatives were designed to replace. My understanding is that the synthetic cannabinoid Spice, which the Minister mentioned, induces far more psychosis and is far more addictive than even the strongest form of cannabis, for example. Can the Minister confirm that?
Fourthly, this sort of mistake further undermines the credibility of the system of controlled drugs under the Misuse of Drugs Act. Drugs are being classified primarily on the basis of politics rather than scientific evidence. For example, the previous Labour Government downgraded cannabis from class B to class C on the basis of scientific evidence only for the same Labour Government, under a new Prime Minister, to reclassify it back to class B for political reasons. Some drugs, such as GHB or GBL, that cause a large number of deaths—particularly among gay men, including a former partner of mine—are in class C while MDMA or ecstasy, which cause far fewer deaths, are in class A. We do not oppose the correction of this mistake by means of this SI but we clearly state it again: drug misuse should be treated as a health issue, not a criminal justice issue; all the efforts of government and law enforcement should be focused on harm reduction, not criminalisation; and the Government need to expand their review of drug misuse to include law changes, including potentially legalising and regulating controlled drugs.
The Liberal Democrats are not the only ones saying this. Last week, a survey showed that twice as many people were in favour of the legalisation of cannabis than against it. Research published last week showed that fewer teenagers used cannabis when it was legalised in the United States. The debate on drug misuse is changing. We believe that it is time that the Government paid attention to that.
My Lords, I too thank the Minister for her explanation of the content and purpose of the draft order, which we do not oppose. It amends the Misuse of Drugs Act by narrowing the previous definition of synthetic cannabinoids, as the previous definition has had the effect of requiring compounds that are not of concern to be licensed as class B drugs.
Following the control of the first generation of synthetic cannabinoids in 2009 and of the second generation in 2013, the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs first published advice in 2014 on the third generation of synthetic cannabinoids—a group of compounds commonly referred to, as the Minister said, as Spice and Mamba, which mimic the effects of cannabis. The ACMD recommended that these compounds be captured by way of a generic definition as class B drugs under the Misuse of Drugs Act. It also recommended that the compounds be placed in Schedule 1 to the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 2001, meaning that they can be legally accessed only with a Home Office licence, which is generally issued for research or industrial purposes.
Following the ACMD’s recommendations, the changes came into effect on 14 December 2016 but, as has already been said, shortly after their implementation the ACMD and the Home Office were told by research bodies that the breadth of the definition meant that it captured a large number of research compounds, many of which were not synthetic cannabinoids. The effect of this was that research institutions had to obtain Schedule 1 licences when they should not have needed to do so.
The ACMD recognised that its advice that led to the 2016 changes had unintended consequences. As a result, it made a further recommendation in December 2017 to the effect that the scope of the generic definition be reduced. Accordingly, this order amends the generic definition of third-generation synthetic cannabinoids by replacing the term “univalent” with a defined number of substituents. This will apparently reduce the number of compounds unintentionally captured by the generic definition, estimated by industry at more than 40,000 substances, while retaining those that have not been found to cause harm. As the Minister said, the revised definition does not alter the position for class A drugs or the licensed medicines previously excluded.
When this order was discussed in the Commons, the Minister said,
“so that while those compounds that have been found to cause harm are captured by it, fewer compounds are unintentionally captured”.—[Official Report, Commons, 3/7/19; col. 1263.]
In view of the Commons Minister’s words, how many compounds will still be unintentionally captured by the amended order that we are discussing now, and what level of inconvenience or difficulty will that continue to cause the research community in the pharmaceutical and healthcare sector in respect of having to continue, where necessary, to apply for Schedule 1 licences? How cumbersome, time-consuming and time-delaying is the process of applying for Schedule 1 licences, the need for which this order is designed to reduce but apparently not eliminate, in respect of compounds “unintentionally captured” by the 2016 changes? Bearing in mind that the ACMD made its recommendation, which led to the Government making this draft order some 18 months ago, why has it taken as long as it has to reach this stage?
The ACMD’s 2014 recommendations did not come into effect until mid-December 2016. Again, what was the reason for the apparent delay of at least two years? If consultation took place during that lengthy period, did any individuals or organisations raise the problem about the breadth of the definition that the research community raised shortly after mid-December 2016? If not, why did the ACMD—or anyone else—not realise the problem that this order seeks to address before its recommendations were implemented? Did the changes that were brought into effect in mid-December 2016 properly reflect the ACMD’s recommendations of two years or more previously? If not, is that one reason why the problem of the breadth of the definition came to light only after the mid-December 2016 changes came into effect?
This draft order does not seek to address the issue of the use, or rather misuse, of drugs. The UK now has, I believe, the highest recorded level of mortality from drug misuse since records began. I hope that we will soon hear from the Government the different approaches, based on what would most effectively reduce harm, that they intend to consider and adopt in response to a drug situation that appears to be getting worse.
I thank both noble Lords for their points. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made the point that this is regrettable—I agree. It is never a good place to be in, having to amend legislation for this reason. He is right that research was taking far longer because of the application process. That is why we have the order today. He also made the point that psychiatric problems would not be as problematic as they are with synthetic versions. However, I have thought back to several examples that I am aware of, for example, skunk weed, which has caused psychiatric problems. He asked whether I could confirm that Spice is more addictive than non-synthetic cannabis. It is indeed stronger than some other drugs. That is why it is controlled under the Misuse of Drugs Act, in line with the expert advice. The SI does not change the control of Spice.
He also made the point that drugs policy should be aimed at reduction. Of course, reduction of the use of drugs is at the heart of what we are trying to achieve, particularly—
I said the aim of policy should be harm reduction, not reduction in use.
The two probably go hand in hand—the harm of drugs and the use of them are quite parallel to each other—but I take the noble Lord’s point. He made a slightly different point and maybe I just took licence because I could respond in the way that I did. He also talked about the legalisation of cannabis. He knows that the Government do not intend at this point to legalise cannabis. In fact, the statutory instrument is not about the legalisation or otherwise of cannabis but, again, he took the opportunity to bring the issue up.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked why it has taken so long to get here, given that the recommendation was made back in December 2017. The initial recommendation from the ACMD in December 2017 acted as interim advice, covering a range of proposed solutions for the Home Office to consider. Officials then liaised with the ACMD on the feasibility of the proposals and the ACMD made short-term recommendations amending the generic definition and longer-term recommendations. Following those recommendations, from spring 2018 the Home Office engaged in a targeted consultation with the research community on the proposals, which confirmed at the end of 2018 that it supported the short-term solution of amending the generic definition. Steps were then taken to make this legislative amendment. The unintentional capture did not come to light until after the introduction of the legislative changes in 2016. After receiving representations from the research community, the Home Office and the ACMD then acted.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked how many compounds will still be unintentionally caught by the MDA. The nature of a generic definition is such that it is not possible to specify an exact number of compounds. I will write to him with further detail once I have confirmed that point. We are continuing to work with the ACMD on longer-term solutions. With that—
(5 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberI do not think residents affected by anti-social behaviour would agree with the noble Earl. It is important that these powers are kept in force, as residents should be able to live their lives without the effects of anti-social behaviour—literally on their doorsteps in some cases.
My Lords, I have been in your Lordships’ House only for almost six years, but I have lost count of the number of times that we have explained to the Home Office how its legislation as drafted could be misused. The Government then say that they do not intend the legislation to be used in that way. Trusting local authorities or the police to use legislation only in the way intended is no longer good enough. When will the Government incorporate measures into legislation to ensure that it cannot be misused?
The noble Lord may be referring to the rough sleeping strategy and how the Home Office uses it. The Home Office is not looking to trick rough sleepers into providing their data to be used for enforcement purposes—a criticism that has been made against us. However, we have been working with local authorities and charities to design an information-sharing protocol that protects the rights of vulnerable individuals but also allows for the effective operation of the RSS.
(5 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the criminal justice system acknowledges that women subject to coercive control who attack their abusive partners may be the victims of crime rather than perpetrators. What are the Government doing to encourage all the agencies in the criminal justice system to acknowledge that vulnerable young people who commit criminal acts under the coercive control of criminal gangs may also be victims rather than perpetrators?
The noble Lord and I have discussed this at length, and I do not disagree that someone who is caught up in county lines activity or similar types of activity is both a victim and perhaps a perpetrator through the coercion of a third party. He will know that the knife crime prevention orders—I know he disagreed with them—were introduced in an attempt not to criminalise children but to divert them out of the activity in which they had become involved or into which they had been coerced.
(5 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, on the first point, the hearings are inquisitorial and enable the inquiry to test witnesses and their evidence. All core participants are provided with the evidence; their legal teams are permitted to propose questions for the witnesses and apply to the chair for permission to put them. Regarding the point that the noble Lord made yesterday, I cannot comment on the handling of specific investigations but, as I said then, current police guidance is very clear and adopts a similar approach to that advanced by the petition to which the noble Lord refers. Suspects’ identities should not be released before charge, save in exceptional circumstances and with proper oversight. I am not aware of evidence to suggest that the police are not following that guidance.
My Lords, for too many years, victims of child sexual abuse have been ignored; it is now their time to be heard. What consideration have the Government given to special provisions where serious allegations of child sexual abuse are made against those who have died or are otherwise unable to defend themselves?
I wholeheartedly agree with the first part of the noble Lord’s question. For too long, those victims have been ignored. On the anonymity to which he refers—we talked yesterday about his Bill—I explained in my Answer to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, about the presumption of anonymity, save in exceptional circumstances.
(5 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, first, I should apologise: I said that 10,000 signatures were needed; I meant 100,000 signatures. On the noble Lord’s point about independence and the presumed culpability of those who have been accused, the report stipulated that no inference of guilt was to be drawn but that the individual would have been interviewed under caution.
My Lords, does the Minister agree that being accused of many offences, including those of dishonesty, can have a devastating impact on someone’s reputation? Will she meet me to discuss whether the Government will support my Private Member’s Bill that would provide anonymity after arrest, which gives allegations credibility, until someone is charged for all offences unless a judge orders otherwise?
I would be very happy to meet the noble Lord—in fact, we met before his Bill had its Second Reading.
(5 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberI totally agree with my noble friend that this issue is a problem for churches, but I would say that both rural and urban churches probably suffer from it. The sentencing guidelines on theft highlight that where a theft of heritage assets causes disruption to infrastructure, this should be taken into account when assessing the level of harm caused. I would be very happy to meet my noble friend and a delegation.
My Lords, in her Answer to a Question last week about the dramatic increase in catalytic converter theft, a Minister—it was not the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford—stated:
“Metal theft is down by 73% since the scrap metal Act was introduced in 2013”,
as the noble Baroness has just said. However, when challenged by the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner of Worcester, that Minister went on to say that,
“metal theft has increased by 30% over the past year”.—[Official Report, 20/6/19; cols. 841-42.]
I accept that both statements may be true, but is it not misleading to rely on the change since 2013 to create the perception that metal theft is not a current cause for concern when, clearly, it is?
I do not think that my noble friend was trying to confuse the two figures. She acknowledged that although metal theft was up 30%, it was still down 73% since 2013. The two statements are not incompatible.
(5 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the Minister for explaining this order. I now understand why the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, wanted to speak first—I too am relying on the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee’s 53rd report, so I will try to say things in a slightly different way.
I understand that the purpose of the order is to ensure that those placed on a barred list by the Disclosure and Barring Service in England, Wales and Northern Ireland are not also placed on the barred list in Scotland by Disclosure Scotland for exactly the same reason—so-called double barring—so that, if there is a successful appeal in one jurisdiction, the person does not have to go through a second appeal process in the other jurisdiction. I also understand that this protection against double barring was supposed to have been brought in in 2012 and is being done now simply because of an oversight, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, pointed out.
I further understand that the current computer systems do not allow automatic checking of the Disclosure and Barring Service against the Disclosure Scotland barred list but relies on the DBS, for example, asking Disclosure Scotland to do a manual search of their list if it believes the subject has a Scottish connection. There is no date, other than beyond January 2020, for changes being made to the IT systems to allow automatic checking, as the contract with the current IT company has been terminated but the system is being maintained by the current company until the new one takes over in 2020.
While I can understand the reasoning behind the protection against double barring, is it not in the overriding interests of public safety for the name to appear on both lists, rather than relying on the Disclosure and Barring Service making a specific request of Disclosure Scotland if, and only if, they suspect a Scottish connection, at least until the IT issues have been sorted out?
To avoid the scenario where a successful appeal to the Disclosure and Barring Service does not result in the barred person being removed from the Disclosure Scotland list, if the person is barred for exactly the same reason in Scotland, what is to stop the Disclosure and Barring Service, as a matter of course, alerting Disclosure Scotland whenever there is a successful appeal against inclusion in the England, Wales and Northern Ireland list, and vice versa? The Government have failed for seven years to implement the protection against double barring. What difference will another six months or so make, until a reliable IT system is in place that can automatically check one list against another, particularly as there seems to be a perfectly reasonable workaround—or have I misunderstood?
My Lords, I thank noble Lords who have raised questions on this SI. Like the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser, I requested that the whole thing be translated into English so that I could fully understand it—noble Lords will agree that the language is quite technical. I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for his general support for consistency being employed through the use of this statutory instrument.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked when the issue was identified and what the reason was for delaying the introduction of the SI. It was identified in May 2018 and was the result of a move of departments—to the Home Office. Departmental responsibility changed following its enactment and we think, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, that it was an oversight. Once the failure was identified, the Government brought forward the order at the earliest opportunity to give effect to paragraphs 6 and 12 of Schedule 3 to the SVGA.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, rightly asked about safeguarding gaps. No safeguarding gap is created by this order not having been in place. Individuals in Scotland, or England and Wales, who pose a risk of harm have continued to be subject to rigorous consideration and, where appropriate, included on the barred lists. It was an interim measure—although a rather long one—done by MoU. It is now, quite properly, done by statutory instrument in your Lordships’ House and in the other place.
The noble Lord also asked about out-of-court disposals. I totally agree with him that it is vital that employers have the right information when they are recruiting people to work closely with children, or indeed other vulnerable groups. That is why, in addition to details of convictions and cautions, the enhanced DBS check is referred to local police forces to include any information the chief officer believes to be relevant to the application, and ought to be disclosed. That might include details of a serious offence dealt with by a community resolution or other out-of-court disposal.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, also raised the question that was asked of my honourable friend in the other place, Victoria Atkins MP, about the international exchange of criminal records. She will write to the House on the subject and the response will be shared. I do not, I am afraid, have that answer in front of me at this point.
(5 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in November 2018, the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration was quoted in the Telegraph as saying that Britain’s borders had been left open to illegal immigrants because of a chronic staff shortage at ports. The Border Force replied that it was recruiting 1,000 officers nationally,
“to meet normal staff turnover”,
as well as an additional 300 front-line officers. More than six months on, how many short of the new 1,300 Border Force officers are we, and what continuing gaps in the UK border does that leave?
I hope the noble Lord will be pleased to know that we have recruited, and are in the process of training and bringing up to speed, 900 Border Force officers. In addition to that, we are preparing for the summer and EU exit. He will also know that, in respect of e-passport gates, we have expanded eligibility to include the B5J plus Singapore and South Korea, increasing e-passport gate capability, which should make travel through the border a lot more streamlined.
(5 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberI do not have the number with me and I am not sure that the reason for persecution because of faith will be available. However, I will certainly have a look for my noble friend.
My Lords, human rights appeals and EU free movement appeals are allowed in more than 50% of cases. Despite what the noble Baroness has said, the former suggests a continuation of the hostile environment culture at the Home Office and the latter sheer incompetence. Why is the Home Office not learning from these cases and adjusting its initial decision-making criteria accordingly? Any learning organisation would see a steady decline in the proportion of successful appeals, not an increase.
Human rights appeals are often quite lengthy and those which end up before the tribunal come with new information to be presented, sometimes just a couple of days before the actual hearing, resulting in the higher number of wins on appeal. However, I totally accept the point and I do not think that I have shied away from the fact that our performance could be better. We are doing a number of things to improve our appeal rate win.
(5 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord is absolutely right that I join him in wholeheartedly condemning the attacks in London and Southampton. Perhaps the London one was the most surprising of all, given London’s diversity and its generally tolerant and liberal approach; it is being widely reported as both homophobic and misogynistic. There may be other factors but that is for the court to determine. The noble Lord will know that the hate crime action plan sets out our plans to tackle all forms of hate crime. We refreshed it last year; in addition, our VAWG refresh, which was issued in March, includes sexual harassment. We are committed to conducting a study of sexual harassment.
My Lords, racially and religiously aggravated offences carry a maximum penalty that is one step higher on the sentencing ladder than the same offences if motivated by homophobia, transphobia or disability hatred. The Conservative Party, in both its 2015 and 2017 manifestos, said that it was going to review this. Why are the Government presiding over a situation where homophobic, transphobic and disability hate crime are treated as being less serious than race or religious hate crime?
My Lords, the noble Lord will know that I do not think they are in any way less serious. However, I acknowledge the concerns over the parity of different strands of hate crime within existing legislation. That is precisely why we asked the Law Commission to conduct a full review of hate crime legislation and where there might be gaps. I know that it will consult widely later this year and make recommendations to government on this next year.
(5 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe prime objective of the boats which find people in the English Channel is to save lives at sea. That is always the prime objective.
My Lords, the Statement describes how dangerous the Channel crossing is and says that 30 people have been returned to France and other member states under the Dublin regulation. How many asylum seekers have been allowed to remain in the UK and what is the UK doing to provide safe routes for these people, so that they do not have to risk their lives crossing the Channel? What do the Government intend to do if the UK is no longer a member of the EU, no longer party to the Dublin regulation and no longer able to return asylum seekers to other member states?
I do not have the actual number for how many asylum claims have been successful but, as I said to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, most of the people who arrive claim asylum and we attempt to determine those claims within six months. On the Dublin regulation, clearly we will meet our obligations on asylum for people who claim it in this country. Returns under Dublin actually make up a relatively small proportion of the people who we go on to return, but we will continue to work with the French and other European partners on returns. In terms of safe routes, at the heart of this issue is that people should claim asylum in the first safe country where they arrive and not make dangerous journeys across the Channel, which is of course one of the most congested shipping lanes in the world. It is an incredibly dangerous place in which to be in a small boat.
(5 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Baroness makes a good point. She will know that we have asked the Law Commission to look at various types of hate crime. Misogyny is among the things they could look at to see whether there is anything further we can do in legislation to enhance the types of crime we consider hate crimes.
My Lords, coercive control can sometimes be so subtle and perpetrators so manipulative that victims may not even be aware of it themselves. Does the Minister agree that compulsory sex and relationship education is an essential part of keeping young people safe from this type of offence?
The noble Lord is right that coercive control can be so subtle that the victim of it does not realise, sometimes until many years down the line, that financial control or mental manipulation is happening to them. Sex and relationship education is to be made compulsory. Every young child needs to know what a healthy relationship looks like, as opposed to a coercive or manipulative one.
(5 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, there are a number of factors involved in what is not a satisfactory situation. As I said to the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, I am not going to pretend that it is a satisfactory situation. Some of the technological solutions and the infrastructure have run mainly according to plan, but there is now the testing phase, which is going to be done incrementally. That is probably the right way to do it, so that if any part of it is not running as planned, it can be changed. But there are a multitude of problems, for which a multitude of solutions are needed.
My Lords, Motorola owns the current Airwave communications system used by the emergency services, and it is also a main supplier for the new system. It is being paid £1.4 billion to keep the existing system going beyond its contracted date, and stands to benefit even more if the project is delayed further. How did the Home Office get itself into a contract that rewards one of the main suppliers for delays?
What the noble Lord points out is correct. As I said to the noble Lord, currently a change notice is being prepared for signing to reset the situation. I think that Motorola acquired the contract after it had the Airwave contract, rather than at the point when the contract was signed. But a change notice is being issued to try to resolve the situation.
(5 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberFirst, I commend the noble and learned Lord. Despite his efforts the other day, he was not able to get in when I answered the Urgent Question—or it may have been a Statement. However, he has now asked his Question and I am able to focus on it. He is absolutely right to raise the issue of consent. The JSC does not specifically cover consent but there is a discussion on privacy issues and its recommendation on this issue is, essentially, to have good guidance. The noble and learned Lord mentioned guidance and I will quote from the Select Committee’s report, which said:
“It is important that those who come forward to report serious offences, particularly those of a sexual or otherwise sensitive nature, are treated by investigators with respect and sensitivity. Their personal information should be handled in the same way and in accordance with their rights to privacy, where that is consistent with the interests of justice. The law is clear in that the right to a fair trial is an absolute right which cannot be violated to protect the right to privacy. We heard differing views on whether disclosing certain private information was always necessary to uphold the right to a fair trial, and this emphasises the need for clear guidance on this point”.
My Lords, if social media indicates consent to sexual activity between the two individuals concerned, both before and after an alleged sexual offence, surely it would be proportionate to examine it and disclose it. Trawling social media for patterns of behaviour would surely not be proportionate, as it does not tend to prove or disprove the matter at issue: namely, whether consent was given on the occasion in question. Does the Minister not agree?
The noble Lord makes an important distinction between trawling social media and identifying evidence that could be used in a trial. As I said to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, the NPCC and the CPS have invited a number of organisations to discuss their concerns around this, and I am sure that what the noble Lord talked about will come up in these discussions.
(5 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am not sure how my noble friend’s two points tie together. He talks about an identity number, and of course a national insurance number is a form of identity number. Certainly it proves a person’s right to work in this country. I am not sure how a separate national identity number would add to the mix; nor am I sure how my noble friend thinks that national insurance numbers are corrupt, unless he is saying that they are used corruptly, but I am sure that the same would also potentially be true of national identity numbers.
My Lords, the police are trialling new fingerprint technology that allows police officers to use their smartphones to identify people in less than a minute if they have a criminal record. Heathrow Airport is introducing voluntary facial recognition instead of passports and boarding passes. Does the Minister agree that identity cards are a bit old hat, as is the legislation to control the use of facial recognition and other biometric recognition, which is in urgent need of attention?
The noble Lord makes a very good point about the new technologies that the police and airports are using. I heard about the trial of facial imagery at Heathrow Airport. Now, every time you go through a gate at an airport, a machine recognises you by your face. However, he is absolutely right that the governance of the use of facial imagery, fingerprints and the new emerging technologies has to be looked at very carefully.
(5 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberI thank the noble Lord and welcome him back to his place on the Front Bench. He asked several questions, the first being “Why the delay?” This is an issue of widespread fraud—setting up and using these test centres and colleges— that took place over several years. He will know that, under this Government and indeed under the coalition Government, we have now closed more than 900 such colleges since 2011.
On those who may be wrongly accused, the noble Lord will recall the report by Professor Peter French, which concluded that the number of false matches was likely to be very small and that the system would give people the benefit of the doubt, so the number of people wrongly accused was likely to be extremely low. The courts have always said, even when finding against the Home Office on individual facts of case, that sufficient evidence should be there to make an accusation of fraud, but it is up to the individual then to rebut it. However, we recognise the concerns; we do not refute the concerns raised by a Member of the other place. That is why the Home Secretary has now asked for further advice and why the NAO is also investigating, and the Home Secretary will respond when he has sight of both that advice and the NAO’s findings.
The noble Lord asked whether a settlement was reached. It was. For reasons of commercial confidentiality, I cannot discuss that, but I will see whether I can find out more for him.
The noble Lord also talked about the hostile environment. This is not about being hostile to people who want to work or study in this country. To use a study visa in order to work is to try to game the system, which is exactly what was going on here and why we closed down so many of those colleges.
My Lords, Fatema Chowdhury came to the UK from Bangladesh in 2010 and finished her law degree in 2014 at the University of London. She was at one stage detained for a week after being accused of cheating in the English test, which she denies. I appreciate that the Minister cannot comment on individual cases, but can she say how likely it is that an individual had to cheat in an English language test but then went on to successfully complete a double degree at the University of London? Why is the hostile environment towards immigrants created by the Home Office still alive and kicking?
My Lords, the issue at the heart of this was not the questioning of people’s competence in English but the fact that a fraud was committed. I cannot say to the noble Lord how many people found themselves in detention, because we do not disaggregate those sorts of figures. Of course, as for individual cases, I am not at liberty to discuss them.
(5 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, while we accept that this is a complex issue, the facts are undeniable. It is estimated that only one in five rapes is reported to the police, with fewer than two in every 100 cases reported to the police resulting in a prosecution, let alone a conviction. This development is not going to help. While there may be an argument in some cases where consent is at issue—as the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said—there can be no justification for a blanket requirement. What consultation has taken place with women’s groups, such as the End Violence Against Women Coalition, about the potential impact such a requirement will have on the willingness of rape victims to come forward or to continue with a prosecution once the rape is reported to police?
The noble Lord strikes the balance of where we should be—in other words, encouraging women to come forward and, when they do, feeling that their case will be dealt with properly through the criminal justice system. I hope I can comfort him by saying that it is not a blanket requirement. On consultation, the groups that were invited to comment on the form included Rape Crisis, the End Violence Against Women Coalition, the Survivors Trust and Galop, as were Dame Vera Baird and the ICO. The ICO has an ongoing investigation into how this data is used and the CPS has committed to reviewing the forms and the process in the light of that.
(5 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberI agree with the noble Lord and thank him for all he does in this area. The sooner that appointment is made, the better.
My Lords, families are key to the prevention and deceleration of radicalisation. Does the Minister not think that to allow foreign fighters to return from the so-called Islamic State to face justice, deradicalisation and reintegration is far more likely to make the UK safer, rather than depriving them of British citizenship, which runs the risk of maintaining or increasing hostility towards the UK?
Obviously, people do return, and those who return face the most robust force of the law on why they have travelled to Syria. On deprivation, these decisions have been made 150 times since 2010, and the Home Secretary does so with the most robust information and advice before him.
(5 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy noble friend makes a good point. Countries such as the US offer travellers leave to go for a fixed period of time so they can use their passport right up to the 10-year limit. It would therefore be rather confusing to make ours valid for 10 and a half years. I know exactly the point she is making, though.
My Lords, by the end of the year, some British passports will be blue, some will be maroon, some will have “European Union” on the front and some will not. Does the Minister agree that this will be confusing to not only British passport-holders but foreign security personnel, and that this increases the risk of forged passports going undetected because of the variety of official documents?
I give the British public more credit for their intelligence than does the noble Lord. Of course, the Croatian passport is not burgundy, it is blue, and there is a reason for that. The Croatians did not want the association with communism writ large on their passports in the form of the red colour. Some people might rather like it, though. I do not think that it is confusing. The wrong thing to do would be to scrap a load of remade passports. There is absolutely no law against what we are doing. We intend to continue to make the blue passport available from later this year, and I look forward to ordering mine.
(5 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, why do companies need injunctions? If the protest is lawful, the police should facilitate it. If it is illegal, the police should take action against those involved. Is current legislation inadequate, or are there insufficient police resources?
Lancashire police received nearly £3 million in special grant in the year 2018-19, so I do not think the resources are inadequate. The two processes need to run alongside each other—both the application to the court by the organisation concerned, and indeed the upholding of law and order by the police.
(5 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberNot only have the overall detention figures gone right down—they are lower than since the collation of figures began in 2009—but the number of children in detention has gone down drastically. The safeguards have also improved since those times. The noble Lord is absolutely right to ask this, because the safeguards and the well-being of children are absolutely paramount, whether a child is in detention or not.
My Lords, with consistently more detainees being released into the community from immigration detention than are being removed from the UK, does the Minister accept that this suggests that the initial decisions to detain frequently lack rigorous assessment of why detention is necessary and justified?
As I said, the figure of 92% of people being released from detention, who have been there perhaps for immigration bail or other forms of review, is the result of our not wanting to keep people in detention and doing so only to remove them.
(5 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, when we debated the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Bill, we argued that the power given to Border Force to detain people for up to six hours should be based on reasonable suspicion, while the Government argued it should be able to detain people without any suspicion. Is the detention of the pro-remain supporter at Gatwick not an example of how Border Force can now, thanks to the Government, lawfully overstep the mark?
(5 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. This is a shameful episode in our country’s history, where those who came here to help the UK were wrongly denied the right to remain. I pay tribute to my noble friend Lady Benjamin for her tireless and successful campaign for a Windrush Day. It is sad that this scandal casts a shadow over what is meant to be a celebration of everything the Windrush generation and their descendants have contributed to the UK. It is difficult to see how the wrongs of unlawful deportation, where some of those affected have died in poverty overseas, can be made right. Rather than accepting claims from the estate of those who have passed away and from close family members, will the Government approach those affected and proactively offer compensation?
While the Government await the results of Wendy Williams’ review, there are some things that they could and should do now. They need to address the ongoing “hostile environment” created by such measures as the right to rent scheme. As Liberal Democrats, we argued when the scheme was being discussed in this House that, as a recent High Court case has found, forcing landlords to carry out immigration checks on potential tenants is likely to be discriminatory, not just against immigrants but against black and minority ethnic Britons. Why are the Government appealing against that finding when they say that they are dismantling the hostile environment?
Can the Minister also explain why Windrush generation individuals who received settled status without being given the ability to prove it are now being asked to prove that they are of “good character” and why, if they fail to do so, they could be refused right of abode, settlement or citizenship? On page 14 of 19, the Windrush scheme application form states:
“Please give any other information which will help us decide whether you are of good character. Please use an additional sheet if necessary”.
I thought those who had a right of abode in the UK would automatically be given the right to remain. Perhaps the Minister can explain what is going on.
The Government accept that the roots of the Windrush scandal lie in a policy that saw people receive settled status without giving them the ability to prove it. Will they therefore accept the Liberal Democrat amendments to the Immigration and Social Security Co-ordination (EU Withdrawal) Bill currently before the other place, so that EEA and Swiss nationals and their family members who are granted settled or pre-settled status under the EU settlement scheme are provided with physical documented proof of that status, so that they can prove it?
A compensation scheme is one thing. Government action to prove they have learned lessons is quite another.
I thank both noble Lords for their questions and join the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in commending the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, for all the positive work that she has done in this area. She is a joy to work with and a great advocate for the members of the Windrush generation.
Turning first to the question of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, about exactly how the scheme will work, I rarely use a prop in this place, but I happen to have one on me. I refer him to the complete guide to the Windrush compensation scheme, which can be found both in physical copy and on the GOV.UK Windrush compensation scheme website. The rationale behind this came about through the consultation to learn at first hand from the various stakeholders how the scheme might work best and most efficiently. Making the application form as easy to complete as possible was the number one priority, while reaching out proactively to people was the second.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, asked about the various events taking place. Clearly an event is being held in Parliament today with the Home Secretary, and 15 community events have been planned over the next three months. They are open to anyone of any nationality. The first will be held in Lambeth Town Hall this Friday and a full schedule will be published shortly on GOV.UK. He also rightly made a point about social media. It is the best way to get information out as quickly as possible and we are using it to publicise the scheme. I will be tweeting and I hope the noble Lord will retweet my message because we all have a leadership role to play in this.
The FCO is also working to promote the scheme overseas because we want as many eligible people as possible to claim. So that they can do so, promotional materials are being sent to all posts. Tomorrow, the Immigration Minister will brief the Commonwealth high commissioner in the UK. We are placing adverts for the scheme and the events in core publications. Here in the UK, we will write to those who have already been supported through the task force to let them know about the compensation launch, as well as to those who have signed up for updates on Windrush. The onus is on us all to go through the channels we know to publicise the launch of the scheme.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, also asked about the definition of “close family members”. They include a mother, a father, a child, a brother or sister, a wife or husband, a civil partner and unmarried long-term partners living together. All fall within the remit; if someone has been affected by some of the detriment relating to the Windrush generation, in turn their close family members will also have been affected.
I have answered the question about social media. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked me about the events taking place. Oh, the Box got it wrong and I was right: it was the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. In any event, it is helpful for all of us to know what events are going on and where. I have a list of the various places: Bradford, Birmingham, Bristol, Leicester, Manchester, Swansea, Cardiff, Newport, Belfast, Nottingham, Glasgow and London.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked about the hostile environment. This has been batted around quite a lot. As my right honourable friend the Home Secretary said earlier, successive Governments do not have clean hands over what has been described as a hostile environment. Unfortunately, it started under Labour and finished under the current Home Secretary. Being in a compliant environment is far more appropriate.
The noble Lord also talked about the “proof of good character” provision. There has always been a good character test for a reason. Clearly, if someone fails it through criminality, that needs to be brought to the fore.
He also talked about the physical document. A lot of discussion has taken place about this issue in terms of the EU settlement scheme. People feel uneasy that they do not have a physical document. In fact, what the Government are bringing forward is the use of a digital token. Such a token cannot be lost like a physical document and it will assist people in whatever area of life they need help with, be that work, rent and so on. The digital token can be checked for that specific purpose, although obviously there is a data protection issue here. I recognise that some people do not like not having something physical in front of them, but of course they will be notified by email or letter that their claim has been processed and has gone through. However, I accept the point being made by the noble Lord. He also asked whether we will support the Lib Dem amendment to the forthcoming immigration Bill. We shall consider it when it comes to your Lordships’ House, and I am sure we will have a great discussion on it.
That is a very good point. I do not know whether there is a right of appeal. Obviously there are a number of different categories, some of which will be yes or no because it is cut and dried, but others may not be. I will write to the noble Lord on the appeal process.
Will the Minister give me further clarification on the good character issue? Clearly if somebody is a British citizen or has a permanent right to remain in the UK, which a lot of these Windrush people have, even if they are convicted of a criminal offence, they cannot be deported. Why are the Windrush generation being asked about previous convictions and to prove their good character before they are given written confirmation, if you will, of what is the case: that they are British citizens or that they have the right to remain?
(5 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberI have to admire my noble friend for managing to weave in something that is so important to him. To make a very serious point, the whole aim of this is to have the highest standards of policing in our forces.
My Lords, the Scottish Justice Minister has ruled out direct entry into Police Scotland at inspector and superintendent level, because he considers experience of policing to be essential. He says:
“While training is, of course, important, officers must carry the authority and the respect of communities they serve, and also of their colleagues”.
I strongly agree. Why does the Home Office not agree?
(5 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberI totally understand my noble friend’s point, and I know the feelings there are in this House about this matter. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, has a Private Member’s Bill going through the House; on some of its substance, HMICFRS will undertake a review, and the Government want to wait until the outcome of that before taking any further action.
My Lords, it is clear from the Gatwick Airport drone incident in December that current guidelines—even the updated guidelines that the noble Baroness talked about—are not sufficient to protect those falsely accused of any offence from adverse publicity. How many more innocent people are going to have their lives ruined before the Government legislate?
The noble Lord comes back to his Private Member’s Bill, in the sense that he is talking about the media. His Bill deals with media reporting before charge and after arrest. Again, I say to him that DCMS is minded to wait until HMICFRS has reviewed police guidance on media relations before considering whether further action should be taken.
(5 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will now speak to the amendments regarding kirpans, and in doing so express my gratitude to the noble Lords, Lord Kennedy and Lord Singh, and my noble friend Lady Verma. They have all been tireless in their promotion of this issue; I hope that the amendments will provide an outcome satisfactory to everyone. In particular, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Singh, for his advice and to the organisation Sikhs in Politics, which has engaged positively with officials on the development of these amendments.
As noble Lords will recall, we held a round table on the issue of kirpans following the debate on these clauses in Grand Committee. This identified a gap in the current defences in that the cultural practice of gifting large ceremonial kirpans by Sikhs to eminent non-Sikhs was not covered by the “religious reasons” defence. These amendments will therefore create a defence for a person of Sikh faith to present another person with a curved sword in a religious ceremony or other ceremonial event, as covered by Section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
These amendments will also create a defence for Sikhs of possessing such swords for the purposes of presenting them to others at a ceremony and for the recipients of such a gift to possess swords that have been presented to them. The amendments also ensure a defence is available for the ancillary acts, such as manufacture, sale, hire or importation, where those acts are for the purpose only of making the sword available for such presentation. Finally, the amendments enable the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland to commence the provision in relation to Northern Ireland, other than in relation to importation, which is a reserved matter.
As noble Lords will be aware, the amendments do not mention the word “kirpan”. Kirpans vary considerably in their size and shape, with the only common factor being their association with the Sikh faith. It would not be possible to include a defence for kirpans without defining them legally. However, we are clear that these defences are specifically aimed at kirpans and we will include a reference to kirpans in the final Explanatory Notes for the Bill. We will also make it clear in the statutory guidance that defences of “religious reasons” and gifting by ceremonial presentation include, in particular, the possession, supply and gifting of kirpans for those purposes. We will certainly continue to engage with Sikh organisations, including Sikhs in Politics, when we develop the statutory guidance. I hope that, given what I have said, noble Lords will be able to support these amendments. I forgot to mention the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in my thanks, so I do that now.
I turn to the amendments on compensation arrangements. Amendment 10 will amend Section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, so that any future order made under this section which has the effect of banning possession in private of an offensive weapon may also make provision for the surrender and payment of compensation for such weapons. This amendment therefore provides statutory authority to introduce surrender and compensation arrangements for any future orders bringing additional offensive weapons into full prohibition. Without this amendment and the authority it provides, there could be doubt as to whether compensation could be paid for any future prohibited offensive weapons.
I should point out that this amendment differs slightly from the existing provisions found under Clause 48, which allow for compensation payments to be made for offensive weapons which the Bill prohibits private possession of. Clause 48 requires the Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers or the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland to provide for such payments by regulations. However, this amendment provides that the Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers or the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland may make provision for surrender arrangements and the subsequent payment of compensation.
This is an important difference as it allows the authority discretion in deciding whether or not to pay compensation for future items that become prohibited by way of an order. There may be exceptional circumstances in which it is considered that payment is not required under Article 1 of the Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights. However, it is anticipated that in most circumstances, a payment would be appropriate, as is the case for weapons the possession of which is prohibited under this Bill. None the less, providing this discretion to pay or not to pay compensation for future items is important.
Amendments 14 to 19 will ensure that cyclone knives fall within the compensation and surrender arrangements as they stand in the Bill. Noble Lords will recall that cyclone knives were prohibited by virtue of the Bill through a government amendment in Committee in this House. This minor amendment will allow for compensation to be paid to owners of these knives, in the same way that the compensation arrangements apply to the other offensive weapons which the Bill provides private possession of.
Amendment 20 then amends the date by which a person needed to have owned or contracted to acquire a cyclone knife in order to claim compensation. The date, 20 June 2018, is already set out in the Bill, and continues to apply to these weapons, private possession of which was prohibited by the Bill on introduction. The date of 22 January 2019 will apply to cyclone knives. This will allow anyone who owned or contracted to acquire a cyclone knife, up until the date that the government amendment prohibiting them was introduced, to claim for compensation.
Amendments 21 and 22 are consequential. Amendments 26 and 27 relate to Northern Ireland. Clauses 47 and 48 will come into force upon Royal Assent. However, these amendments allow the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland to commence these provisions locally.
I remind noble Lords that the compensation regulations which we have published in draft are subject to the affirmative procedure following assent to the Bill. Accordingly, they will need to be debated and approved by both Houses before they can come into force. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for the amendments relating to kirpans—even though the legislation does not refer to kirpans as such—because of the importance to the Sikh community of presenting the ceremonial curved sword as a mark of esteem.
Representatives from the Sikh community have also pointed out the difficulties that some Sikhs have in carrying a kirpan on their person as part of their religious observance. Although it is accepted that it has not been a problem in terms of prosecution, the fact that possession of a bladed article or pointed instrument is an offence—without the need for any criminal intent—has created difficulties for Sikhs when visiting attractions such as Madame Tussauds and the London Eye. Sikhs have been barred from going into those attractions because of having a kirpan on them. The security guards are working on the basis that the law states that possession of a pointed instrument or a bladed article is an offence, and therefore a person is not allowed to bring it in. I do not know whether there is any scope here. The Minister has already mentioned the Explanatory Notes for the final legislation, including instructions about what is and is not a kirpan. Could anything be mentioned in those notes regarding the issue that some Sikhs have with regard to entry to those sorts of premises?
(5 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberI most certainly will. Obviously, the police are operationally independent of the Home Office, and I do not know why they would be setting targets for this. The noble Baroness referred to the letter of Lord Justice Fulford, which says that 17 juvenile covert human intelligence sources, or CHISs, have been used in the past three years. When she refers to targets, I assume she means targets upwards, but I will certainly look into the matter.
My Lords, the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child states that all those under the age of 18 should be treated as children, yet the Government allow the police to recruit 16 and 17 year-olds as informants without an appropriate adult being present. Accepting that it does not have to be a parent or guardian if they are also involved in criminality, can the Minister explain why such children cannot be questioned as a suspect in a criminal investigation without an independent adult being present but they can be recruited as an informant?
The noble Lord and I have gone over this on a number of occasions; the situation reflects the emergence into adulthood of 16 and 17 year-olds. That said, where anybody undertakes covert human intelligence, there is always an independent assessment of various aspects of their personality, their willingness and their ability to undertake such a difficult task.
(5 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I beg to move that the House approves the draft Immigration, Nationality and Asylum (EU Exit) Regulations 2019. Delivering a deal with the EU remains the Government’s priority. We are nevertheless preparing for a range of scenarios. As the Prime Minister has pointed out, the legal default in UK and EU law is that the UK will leave without a deal on 29 March unless something else is agreed.
UK domestic law has given effect to our obligations in the fields of immigration, nationality and asylum arising from our membership of the European Union. The UK has also been subject to directly effective EU law. When we leave the EU, aspects of our legislation and retained direct EU law will fail to operate effectively. They will contain deficiencies if they are not modified or revoked by this instrument.
These regulations make changes to a range of measures in domestic primary and secondary legislation to prevent, remedy or mitigate deficiencies in law arising from the UK’s exit from the EU. They ensure that our statute book operates on exit day if the UK leaves the EU without a deal until new legislation on these issues is commenced.
First, the instrument makes the technical changes required to correct wording in our legislation that describes the UK in terms of our membership of the EU or the European Economic Area. The changes do not alter the effect of the legislation. Similarly, it makes technical amendments to domestic legislation that refers to EU rights that are retained by the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018.
Secondly, this instrument revokes relevant retained EU legislation relating to immigration. It also revokes a number of instruments that give effect to the UK’s membership of EU asylum acquis and which will be inoperable on exit. This is because, by leaving the EU, the UK also leaves the asylum acquis. This instrument therefore revokes the Dublin regulation and the Eurodac regulation.
The instrument makes a number of transitional and saving provisions—
(5 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberI can give an absolute assurance to the noble Baroness that those obligations, which we take seriously and have done for decades, will continue to apply in giving people who need it asylum or refuge. That is why I just went through the various channels and resettlement schemes that we have engaged in. It does not diminish our will to give people who need it refuge and asylum in our country.
I shall move on, but I stay on Dublin. I think it was the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, who asked about any other international agreements affecting asylum that would be affected by Brexit.
No, it was not; I am making that up, but I think someone asked it. As a signatory to the 1951 UN refugee convention and the ECHR, we are committed to continuing to fulfil our responsibility. The UK is part of a number of EU readmission agreements with third countries; we are working to replace a number of them with bilateral agreements.
I think this goes to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. Our attitude is not changing towards asylum seekers because of Brexit. She will know, because I have said it before, that in 2017, the UK received the fifth highest number of asylum claims in the EU, and since 2016, we have accepted more Dublin transfers than we have returned, as I referred to earlier. In the year ending June 2017, we resettled more than 16,000 refugees from outside the EU, more than any other EU member state and more than a fifth of all resettlement to the EU. We can also be proud of our leading role in supporting children affected by the migration crisis. Since the start of 2010, the UK has granted more than 51,000 children resettlement, refugee status or alternative forms of protection.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, definitely asked about admissibility, and I think the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, referred to it as well. We have always believed that people should be prevented from making claims in more than one country and on multiple occasions. Asylum should always be claimed in the first country that a migrant reaches, as the noble Baroness said. It is vital that our new system does not encourage asylum-seekers who have already reached a safe country to choose to move elsewhere, so we will continue to assess each asylum claim on its individual merits, as set out in the Home Secretary’s Statement to the House on 7 January.
If an individual has travelled through a safe third country and failed to claim asylum, that will be taken into account in assessing the credibility of their claim. This is a widely held principle accepted by the UNHCR, and it is important to send a clear message to smugglers and traffickers and discourage secondary movements. The standards for protection and assistance will in no way be diminished by the UK’s exit from the EU.
On returning asylum-seekers, the UK is attempting to negotiate an ongoing EU-UK readmission agreement which will replace the current Dublin return capability, and this would ideally be underpinned by a biometric system like Eurodac, although clearly it will not be identical to Eurodac. Inadmissibility rules are domestic law and will still be in place regardless of whether the UK leaves the EU.
Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, asked why we are using an SI, not the Bill, to legislate. It is important to ensure that the statute book is operable on exit date, especially in a no-deal scenario. As the Bill has just completed its Committee stage in the Commons, we do not expect it to make it in here by 29 March. With that, I hope that I have answered all the questions and I commend the Motion.
(5 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord is indeed right. Our gods, whoever they are, care about how we treat each other and work together. On the question of whether “prevent” is too weak or has become too divisive, what is often forgotten is that many of the referrals—in fact, almost half now—arise from concerns about the far right. I hope that the noble Lord will feed into the review when it comes.
My Lords, what lessons have the Government learned from the numerous attempts to appoint the chair of the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse that will help to ensure that the independent inquiry into Prevent has the trust and confidence of the communities most affected?
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am most grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for these amendments. I am particularly grateful to him and the Sheffield knife manufacturers for coming to meet me the other week for what I thought was a very helpful and constructive meeting.
We are returning to something we debated in Committee: whether trusted traders should be exempt from the prohibition in the Bill of arranging delivery of bladed products to residential premises or a locker. When we considered these amendments previously, I said that test purchases continue to show that a significant number of online sellers fail to undertake adequate checks to ensure that knives are not sold to under-18s. The most recent test purchases of online retailers, conducted in late 2018, showed that 42% of the retailers sampled failed the test and sold knives to persons under 18.
As the noble Lord has explained, his amendments seek to address this problem by saying that where we know someone is a responsible retailer they should be able to continue to send their products to a person’s home address or a locker. This would apply only to the dispatch of bladed products under Clause 18 and not to the sending of corrosive products to a residential premise under Clause 3—presumably on the basis that the noble Lord is content that corrosives should not be sent to a person’s home.
These amendments would transfer the responsibility for complying with the legislation, and for ensuring that all sales are handled properly, from the seller to the Government. They would do this by requiring the Government to set out the details of the proposed trusted trader scheme, which would then allow for the delivery of bladed products to residential premises. A trusted trader scheme would require sellers to demonstrate that their age-verification systems and procedures, from the point when they receive the order to the point that their designated delivery company hands the item over, are robust and that they can guarantee that the knife will not be handed over to a person under 18.
The Government are not persuaded, in the light of the results of recent test purchase operations, that sellers can provide such reassurance in a systematic and consistent way. Only by requiring age verification at the point where the item is physically handed to a person at a dedicated collection point is it possible to guarantee that a bladed product will not be handed over to a person under 18. Setting up, administering and overseeing a trusted trader scheme would create a further burden on the Government or local authorities, with inevitable cost implications. Simply being part of a scheme, or being in possession of a seal of approval as a trusted trader, does not guarantee compliance with the conditions of the scheme. Many of us know this to our cost, having hired a plumber or builder accredited by a trusted trader scheme. Such a scheme would impose regulatory burdens on participating businesses. In addition, it would need to be administered by an independent regulatory body or by local authorities, albeit with the expectation that participating businesses would be required to meet the cost of running it.
I hope that I have provided a clear explanation of why the Government do not consider that the noble Lord’s amendments would provide the necessary assurance that young people under 18 cannot get hold of knives using online sellers. In coming to this view, I have reflected on the recent helpful meeting with Sheffield knife retailers—which I am very grateful to the noble Lord for arranging—in which something was said about Amazon’s view on the issues this amendment raises. He knows that I cannot promise anything, and we are yet to have a definitive statement on it, but I hope that this being the case, he will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Before the noble Baroness sits down, could she just qualify what she said about the test purchase results? Was this a failure in age verification at the point of purchase or at the point of handover?
The noble Baroness also talked about a burden on the Government to design an age verification scheme, but is that not exactly what this Bill does with knives that are bought overseas and that are handed over at residential premises?
Thirdly, could the Minister again tell me why age verification at handover point is likely to be better than age verification on the doorstep?
Such a scheme would impose an additional burden. The noble Lord talks about other burdens; I am not denying that there will be burdens on various people from the introduction of whatever scheme comes in, but this would very much pass on that burden to local government.
As I understand it, the failures in online test purchases have lain at the point of sale.
It comes back to the noble Baroness’s point about consultation. In developing the guidance, we must and will engage with business and organisations such as the BRC. The intention is that it will be developed with them. We could have a circular argument here about whether things should be directly specified in the Bill or how helpful the guidance will be in helping retailers and the criminal justice system, but guidance generally will help the Government keep pace with developments.
Amendment 86 is similar to Amendment 81 and again seeks to require the Secretary of State to issue guidance. We have already debated government Amendment 106, which will enable the Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers and the Northern Ireland Justice Department to issue statutory guidance on certain parts of the Bill, including those dealing with offences of remote sale and delivery of knives. We intend that there should be guidance to retailers on what items are prohibited from dispatch to residential premises or a locker under Clause 18. I think the government amendment is adequate to cover this.
I apologise for persisting but the Minister referred to table knives being excluded from this prohibition. The table knife that I was given to eat my roast beef with in a restaurant yesterday could cause serious harm to an individual by cutting. Is it or is it not therefore a table knife? This will inevitably lead to a decision by major retailers such as John Lewis not to deliver any knife of any description to residential premises for fear, as the Minister said, that if there is a prosecution the supplier will have to provide a defence in court to the offence. Not many suppliers will be prepared to take that risk.
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Lucas for returning us to this difficult issue about what we do in relation to overseas sellers of knives. Noble Lords will recall that the issue is that while we can place requirements, such as those under Clause 18, on remote sellers based in the UK, we cannot do the same in relation to overseas sellers. This is because we cannot practically take extraterritorial jurisdiction over sellers based abroad. We have tried to address this through the provisions in Clause 21. These provisions make it an offence for delivery companies in the UK, which are operating under specific arrangements to deliver bladed articles on behalf of overseas sellers, to deliver those articles into the hands of a person under the age of 18.
We accept that this is not the complete answer to the problem because overseas sellers can simply send the items unmarked through the international mail. This is exactly the situation that my noble friend’s amendment seeks to address. It would provide a power to confiscate bladed articles that are sent from overseas to a UK residential address and which are, first, not subject to specific arrangements between the delivery company in the UK and the overseas seller and, secondly, not labelled to show that age must be verified on delivery.
Although it is not clear from the amendment, the power is presumably to be exercised by Border Force because the amendments refer to detecting the articles in transit from overseas. The amendment would mean, in effect, that only bladed articles sold overseas which are subject to specific delivery arrangements in the UK would be allowed. I can therefore sympathise with the intention behind this amendment.
However, there are a number of problems with the amendment. At present, Border Force can seize two types of bladed articles. It can seize weapons prohibited under Section 141 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, such as zombie knives and death stars, and Section 1 of the Restriction of Offensive Weapons Act 1959, which covers flick knives and gravity knives, because the importation of these weapons is banned. It can also seize any weapon which it believes is evidence in relation to a criminal offence.
This amendment would mean that Border Force would have a power to seize items which are not prohibited by law and where they are not evidence in relation to a criminal offence. This would mean that a wide range of items which are going to a residential address in the UK from overseas could be seized and handed to the police to be destroyed. The amendment is not limited to overseas sales, so it would mean that bladed articles sent from a relative overseas to someone in the UK could also be seized. It would mean that someone bringing back a bladed article from their holiday, such as a souvenir, could have it seized or that a fencer returning from a competition overseas with their swords could have them confiscated by Border Force. It would mean that articles which have been legally sold overseas and legally bought by someone in the UK could be seized.
Secondly, the amendment assumes that there is some way of detecting such articles. Not all items coming into the UK are scanned, so unless Border Force happens to come across bladed articles as part of routine searches, they are unlikely to be detected. Even if such items were detected, Border Force would need to ascertain whether they were being sent to a residential address. For example, it would need to decide whether 12 High Street is a residential or business address. Finally, it would need to establish whether they were subject to specific arrangements between a delivery company and the overseas seller. It would then have to have arrangements for handing the articles to the police for destruction. This would all have significant resource implications for Border Force. It is for all these reasons that I am afraid I cannot support my noble friend’s amendment. I hope that in these circumstances he will withdraw it.
Before the Minister sits down, will she explain why the Government cannot exert extraterritorial jurisdiction over foreign websites when they are doing exactly that when it comes to online pornography on overseas websites? In that case the BBFC, acting on behalf of the Government, gets in touch with the online pornography website and threatens them that unless and until they have approved age verification on their sites, BBFC will instruct UK internet service providers to block access to those websites from the UK. Why cannot a similar system be used to block overseas companies which are known to be selling prohibited weapons to the UK?
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is absolutely correct, as Part 3 of the Digital Economy Act provides. In her response, the Minister said that the sender would not know whether they were sending to a residential address. A UK business has exactly the same problem, yet she was using this to justify blocking UK sales. I do not see how she can apply one rule to UK companies and another to foreign companies. We need to be even-handed.
As I understand it, we cannot. We have had the example of pornography. The system I am referring to relates to online sales. Am I right in thinking that the system referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, relates to streaming? He will correct me if I am wrong.
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness. These are paid-for websites. People are paying for a service—there is an exchange. There is another option—I am grateful to the Minister for reminding me. Most financial transactions involving foreign websites are processed by UK credit card companies and so forth. The other way of ensuring that these transactions do not take place even though the company is beyond the UK’s jurisdiction is to ask UK card companies not to process payments to those particular companies. That is the second string to the BBFC bow in order to stop under-18s in the UK from, effectively, buying pornography from overseas websites. Similarly, the Government could put pressure on UK card companies to not process payments to overseas companies which are selling prohibited weapons to under-18s in the UK.
The noble Lord will agree that not all their sales would be of prohibited items.
To assist the Minister further, I can assure her that there are more websites worldwide providing pornography than there are providing offensive weapons, yet that has not prevented the Government taking action.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, for his intervention. I was not making a glib comment about a trawl; regarding the examples of card companies and delivery companies, we are taking action where we can, but I acknowledge, as I have all the way through the Bill, that we are trying to find the right balance. It is not absolutely perfect, but we are using everything in our armoury to help us guard against the sale of knives to those aged under 18.
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberI thank the noble Lord for his question, because there is a disproportionate number of young people as both victims and perpetrators of knife crime. The young chap who was killed on Saturday night in my neighbourhood is just one example. I have talked about the £22 million early intervention youth fund to support communities on early intervention and prevention with young people. There will also be the £200 million youth endowment fund over 10 years, which the Home Secretary has announced and which will enhance that, along with a consultation on the new legal duty to underpin a public health approach to tackling serious violence. The notion that any one department or measure is the answer to this is not true at all, as the noble Lord will absolutely know. This issue is more complex and it transcends government departments. We all need to work together on it, but he is absolutely right to start with young people.
My Lords, I too thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. It talks about early intervention with young people, yet since 2010 there has been a 26% reduction in government support to local authorities. It talks about the police having the resources to tackle serious violence, yet compared to 2010 there are 20,000 fewer police officers in front-line roles. It talks about a statutory public health duty, but there is no mention of additional resources to support that duty. This Government are responsible for creating the environment where this knife epidemic has been able to take hold, and they should take responsibility for funding solutions. For example, why will the Government not adopt the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, to have centrally funded, ring-fenced money for community police officers? We need visible policing in high-risk areas to reassure communities and to build trust and confidence, so that the police and communities can work together to take knives off the streets.
The noble Lord is absolutely right to point to early intervention, and I mentioned some of the funding streams that either have gone forward or will be going forward to that end. He also talks about the police; both I and the Home Secretary have absolutely acknowledged the pressure that the police have been under, particularly over the last couple of years. As the Home Secretary said, he will be making up to £970 million available next year. It is a shame that the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, is not in his place, but I pay tribute to him and the work that he did while he was Metropolitan Police Commissioner on reducing some of the problems of knife crime in communities in London. I am sure that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary and my honourable friend Vicky Atkins will be in discussion with the noble Lord on some of the learning points from his tenure for how we can address this really terrible growing issue.
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberTurning to my noble friend’s question, if your home is also your registered business address, then clearly is it both. The noble Lord actually raised that point in Committee. The residential address can be either just a residential address or both a business and a residential address.
Returning to my other point about someone being prohibited from selling a product to a home address, we want to avoid any liability regarding checking age falling on the delivery company when the item is handed over. This is because delivery companies indicated in our discussions with them that they might simply refuse to deliver items on behalf of sellers if the legal responsibility for checking age falls to them. We are willing to accept this risk in relation to overseas sales because we are less concerned about the impact on overseas sellers, should their trade be affected, but for UK sales we do not want to place a liability on deliverers because there is a risk that they will then refuse to deliver any bladed items. The Government position is therefore that any liability for ensuring that any remotely sold corrosive and bladed products in the UK are not sold and delivered to under-18s should fall solely on the seller.
I have one final point to make, about a meeting that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, and I had with the Sheffield knife manufacturers. As a result of that meeting, I want to satisfy myself of the position in relation to a couple of major delivery companies to ensure that that has not changed. Nothing in the meeting led me to doubt the position, but I just want to clarify that. In the meantime, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for his qualified support for these amendments. As far as the explanation from the Minister was concerned, however, if you are a sole trader, you could be considered to be conducting your business from your home address. The Inland Revenue would be the only ones who knew that, and that information would be confidential. Therefore, there is no way that a delivery company could establish beyond reasonable doubt whether your residential address was a business address or not. As with a lot of this Bill, it clearly has not been thought through. The Minister has completely avoided the fact that this significantly disadvantages UK businesses as opposed to overseas ones. If they do not inform the UK delivery company what is in the parcel, there is absolutely no comeback on the delivery company whatsoever. Anything can be delivered to a residential address, whether it is a bladed article or a very strong acid ordered from an overseas business.
The Government say they want to avoid putting a liability on delivery companies, but this legislation puts liability on delivery companies if they are delivering corrosive substances or bladed articles from overseas. The only difference concerns whether the company is from the UK or overseas. Again, the Minister failed to answer how age verification at a collection point is more secure than on the doorstep. She completely failed to address the issues I raised. However, there are far more important things to get on to so at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, the government amendments in this group introduce knife crime prevention orders. Noble Lords will recall that these amendments were debated in Grand Committee on 6 February but were withdrawn because it was clear that they did not attract universal support, as the procedural rules in Grand Committee require. The government amendments before us today are the same as those debated in Grand Committee. Given that we have already had a substantial debate on these new civil orders, I do not intend to go through every aspect of them. However, it is worth stating again why the Government have brought forward these measures and to summarise how they will work.
All noble Lords will appreciate that we face a significant increase in knife crime at present, particularly in London but also in other major cities and across the country. It is sad to say that hardly a day goes by without further horrific examples of the devastation that such crimes cause, not only to individual families but to entire communities. We must do everything we can to stop this increase in violent crime.
The latest police recorded crime figures published by the Office for National Statistics in January for the year ending September 2018 show that there have been close to 40,000 knife-related offences. This is an 8% increase compared to the previous year. The number of homicides where a knife or sharp instrument has been used has increased by 10% in the last year to 276 offences. Of all recorded homicides in the latest data, more than four in 10 involved a knife or a sharp instrument. Police-recorded offences involving the possession of an article with a blade or point rose by 18% to approaching 20,000 offences in the year ending September 2018. This rise was consistent with increases seen over the past five years and is the highest figure since the series began in March 2009.
It is vital that the police have the powers they need to prevent knife crime and protect the public from the devastating effects of violent crime on our streets. When we prosecute young people for knife crime, it is already too late for families when their sons and daughters are lying in hospital or dead on the street. This is tearing some of our communities apart and if there are measures available that might help to tackle this issue, then we must not hesitate to put them in place.
These new civil prevention orders will enable the police to more effectively manage those at risk of being drawn into trouble and help steer them away from crime, and the Government make no apologies for bringing them forward. The orders are aimed at three groups of people: young people who have been carrying a knife; habitual knife carriers of any age; and those who have been convicted of violent offences involving knives.
In the case of young people, the police may have intelligence that a young person routinely carries a knife but for a variety of reasons they have been unable to charge them with a possession offence. Before risky behaviour escalates, a KCPO, as they are called, could be in place to divert the person away from a life of prolific offending.
As I have indicated, people who the police deem to be habitual knife carriers could also be subject to a KCPO. This would include people who may have previous convictions for knife crime or where the police have intelligence that they regularly carry knives. The KCPO would enable the police to manage the risk of future offending in the community. This is the cohort that the police see as their main target for these orders. They estimate that there are about 3,000 habitual knife carriers across England and Wales, although that is not to say that all that cohort would be made subject to a KCPO.
It may be helpful if I explain briefly how the orders will work. An application for a KCPO can be made by a relevant chief officer of police to a magistrates’ court or, in the case of young people, the youth court. A court may make an order only if it is satisfied that the defendant had a bladed article without good reason in a public place or education premises on at least two occasions in the preceding two years, and that the order is necessary to protect the public or prevent the defendant committing an offence involving knives. A KCPO can also be made on conviction where the defendant is convicted of a relevant offence and, again, the court thinks the order is necessary to protect the public or prevent the defendant committing an offence involving knives.
A KCPO may require a defendant to do anything described in the order and/or prohibit the defendant doing anything described in the order. The KCPO can include any reasonable prohibition or requirement which the court is satisfied is necessary, proportionate and enforceable. An order could therefore include things such as curfews or restrictions on going to a particular place.
A KCPO can also include positive requirements, and we think these are particularly important. A positive requirement could be attending some form of knife awareness training or a programme to move young people away from knife crime. Some of these programmes are already being funded under the serious violence strategy, and we are keen to build on the excellent work that is already under way to help divert young people from violent crime and is often provided by groups which have first-hand experience of dealing with knife crime in their communities. Where a KCPO imposes such a requirement it must specify a person who is responsible for supervising compliance with the requirement. For instance, if the requirement is attendance at a knife awareness intervention, the person designated to supervise compliance may be the youth worker providing the intervention.
KCPOs will have a maximum duration of two years and must be reviewed by the courts after 12 months. KCPOs issued to under-18s will be expected to be subject to more regular reviews, an issue which we will address in guidance. There are provisions for variation, renewal or discharge of KCPOs on application by the defendant or the police. There are also provisions for appeal against the order. Breach of the order, without reasonable excuse, is a criminal offence subject to a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment.
Young people are clearly an area of great concern to a number of noble Lords. The police tell us that the age at which people carry knives is getting lower. We also know from hospital data and from the police that younger and younger children are involved in knife crime as both victims and perpetrators. If we are serious about tackling the epidemic of knife crime on our streets, the measures we take must apply to young people.
I must point out that the civil orders available for dealing with sex offending apply to children as young as 10 and last for up to five years rather than the maximum of two years available under KCPOs. Likewise, the maximum penalties are up to five years in prison rather than the two years we have with KCPOs. I know that noble Lords might argue that sex offending is different and somehow more serious. I am not sure that argument is true given the number of knife-related deaths that we are now witnessing in our cities.
I know that noble Lords will also argue that it would be better to go the anti-social behaviour injunction route, which of course applies to children as young as 10. The argument here is that having contempt of court rather than a criminal offence for breach would make the orders more palatable because it would mean that children would not get a criminal record. The advice that we have had from police, some of which we heard yesterday at the round table, is I think advice that we should listen to very carefully. It is that making it a criminal offence to breach an order is important if we want the order to be taken seriously. I do, however, understand concerns about the application of these orders to young people. That is why we set the minimum age of 12, and that is why youth offender teams will need to be consulted on any orders against defendants under the age of 18. It is why we have said we will consult publicly on the guidance with community groups and youth organisations and others before these orders are brought into force.
This Government are determined to do all they can to protect the public and keep people safe. We must seize every opportunity to end the senseless cycle of violent crime that is corroding our streets. Knife crime prevention orders are not the complete answer to violent crime, but they most certainly will help. I beg to move.
My Lords, I said a lot about knife crime prevention orders in Committee. Tonight I am going to focus on pre-conviction knife crime prevention orders. Despite the Government’s claims to the contrary, they will result in many young people being criminalised instead of being diverted away from the criminal justice system. How can we be so sure? Because they are almost a carbon copy of anti-social behaviour orders, which did exactly that—criminalised swathes of young people for breaching a civil order imposed on them on the balance of probabilities but where a breach of the order was a criminal offence, exactly the same as these provisions.
A court has to be satisfied only on the balance of probabilities that, on at least two occasions, the defendant had a bladed article with them without good reason or lawful authority in a public place on school or further education premises. If they were caught in possession of a knife, they could be prosecuted. This is not about young people being stopped and searched and being found with a knife. This is about hearsay evidence, information from informants, the police being tipped off that someone is a knife carrier. An interim order can even be imposed without the defendant’s having the chance to put his side of the story. Imposed on the balance of probabilities, a breach of the conditions can result in a criminal record and up to two years in prison.
These are anti-social behaviour orders reinvented. They are primarily aimed at young people, as young as 12. It may have been a long time ago, but we were all young once. Young people make mistakes; they can be reckless, forgetful, mischievous. The orders would impose, on people who are more chaotic than responsible adults, conditions such as: being at a particular place between particular times on particular days; being at a particular place between particular times on any day; presenting themselves to a particular person at a place where they are required to be; participating in particular activities between particular times on particular days; prohibiting them from being in a particular place with particular people; participating in particular activities; using particular articles or having those articles with them. An order that imposes prohibitions can include exemptions to those prohibitions. They have to tell the police within three days if they use a name which has not previously been notified to the police, or they decide to live away from their home address for more than a month. What does,
“uses a name which has not previously been notified to the police”,
even mean? What if their schoolmates give them a nickname that they have become known by? Do they breach the order if they use that name? The young person is going to need a PA and carry a list of conditions with them at all times which they have to constantly refer to, to make sure that they do not breach the order.
Children are children. These orders can be imposed on young people who have never been in trouble with the police and have never been convicted of a criminal offence, and they could be sentenced to custody because they did not turn up for football practice as the order required them to do or because they were told not to associate with certain people but those people kept following them around. It would be easy for me or other noble Lords, let alone a child, to breach some of these conditions if they were imposed on us, and these orders would last a minimum of six months and up to two years.
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy noble friend is right to raise this matter because we have to constantly keep our laws under review to keep up with the fast-moving methods by which terrorists will seek to destroy the unity of this country. Laws are kept under review. Noble Lords have talked about an espionage Bill and a treason Bill. Certainly the CT Bill in which my noble friend took part was significant in updating some of our laws.
My Lords, yesterday the Minister implied that it was difficult to prosecute those involved with ISIS as we had, in effect, no extradition arrangements with Syria. That is why the Government had to deprive people of their British citizenship. Many of these people want to return to the UK but the Government are preventing them from returning to face justice by depriving them of their citizenship. Is the Government strategy confused or is it just me?
It might be the noble Lord because it is difficult to prosecute people in Syria, where we have no consular access. People have been prosecuted when they come back to this country and have been put into programmes such as Channel to try to rehabilitate them. There are a number of different remedies available to the Government and the Home Secretary to bring people to justice.
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Viscount’s assertion is absolutely correct. Under international law, someone cannot be rendered stateless unless they are a dual citizen with citizenship of another country. However, I disagree with his view that the Home Secretary’s decision was wrong in all sorts of ways. Clearly, anyone who goes out to Syria and voices their support for ISIS is a danger to the UK if they return home.
My Lords, what does the Minister make of the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, on today’s “Today” programme? He said that rather than depriving subjects of their British nationality, we should take responsibility for our citizens; otherwise, other countries will start doing the same to us, depriving British dual nationals of their other citizenship and dumping their problems on us.
I agree with much of what the former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation said. However, on taking responsibility for our citizens, if our citizens decide to take responsibility for themselves and go to one of the most dangerous parts of the world and engage with proscribed organisations, that is their decision. Therefore, given that we have no consular access in Syria, it is very difficult in any circumstances for the UK Government to take responsibility for one of our citizens who decides to travel beyond our reach.
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberI pay tribute to the noble Baroness and all that she has achieved on some of the recommendations that have come out of the report. On the three recommendations she talked about, there are several things going on. She will have seen the race disparity audit, which is published by the Government and continually updated on the government website to show exactly where the disparities lie and where improvements need to be made. Last year, the NPCC produced a diversity, equality and inclusion strategy led by Chief Constable Gareth Wilson. It attempts, across all areas of the police, to increase inclusion and diversity. The superintendents’ association and college have a mentoring and coaching scheme precisely to improve the recruitment of BME staff. The figure has improved, but the noble Baroness is right to ask the question because we have much further to go.
My Lords, I am told that, recently, almost 50% of all black and minority-ethnic officers of superintendent rank and above in the Metropolitan Police were under investigation of one kind or another. It is also alleged that a recent promotion selection process in the Metropolitan Police contained a test that was known to be culturally biased, and that some BME officers who passed every other part of the assessment were failed because they did not pass the culturally biased part. Will the Minister look into what appear to be allegations of institutional racism?
My Lords, these are very serious allegations indeed and I will of course look into them. If officers are under investigation, it may be more difficult for me, but the allegation that 50% of BME staff at superintendent rank or above are under investigation is very concerning.
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the central point here is whether or not we are in breach of the European Convention on Human Rights. My view is that we are not. Article 1 of the 13th protocol does not prevent member states providing assistance to a third country, where that assistance contributes to the use of the death penalty by that country. Even if the amendment related to the use of the designation power, under Section 52 of the 2016 Act—which would be the gateway for the flow of information from the UK—it would still not prevent designation in the absence of assurances about the use of our material. That is not to say that we will be sharing information for the pursuit of the death penalty. Noble Lords have heard, on many occasions, that I am not going to pre-empt our negotiations with the US, but this shows that not only is the amendment unnecessary but it may not do what its sponsors hope.
The case of the foreign fighter, which the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, talked about, shows that we are compatible with the ECHR, for the reasons outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said that any agreement would have to be put before Parliament. That is absolutely the case. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, talked about this being the negotiation stage. I would put it further back than that: it is the pre-negotiation stage. It is a framework Bill, on the basis of which treaties would be negotiated and made.
My Lords, will the Minister confirm that, when a treaty is put to Parliament, if the House of Commons approves it, then it does not matter what the opinion of this House is; the treaty is ratified even if this House votes against it? I obviously agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, that whether this is a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights has yet to be tested in court—certainly not at the European level. Will the Minister explain why the then Foreign Secretary had to say that seeking death-penalty assurances in the ISIS case was unique and exceptional, if the Government were not concerned about people executed on the back of evidence provided by the United Kingdom?
My Lords, the noble Lord is absolutely right. The treaty would be put to the Commons; the Lords could certainly have a view but that might not be taken into account by the Commons. That is nothing unusual. The Commons quite often exerts its supremacy.
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord is absolutely right to point out that as we approach Brexit we should be mindful of some of the events that might happen around it. We will shortly have a director in post at JMOCC, which I hope gives him some comfort. The nature of a crisis would determine the co-ordination response.
My Lords, the Minister will have seen a report in the Sunday Times that the Government have reduced a promised £22 million towards a public health approach to tackling knife crime to £17 million. Is that where the Home Office found the money to pay the Ministry of Defence? If so, can she explain why the Government see keeping desperate refugees out of the UK a priority over saving the lives of British youngsters on our streets?
My Lords, when I saw the article in the Sunday Times, I realised it was wrong. The noble Lord is absolutely right to state that £22 million was committed. It still is committed; £17 million of it has already been allocated. That is not to say that the additional £5 million will not be forthcoming, because it will. In terms of desperate refugees, I think he might be referring to the PNQ that he is about to ask, but these are serious criminals.
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I beg leave to ask a Question of which I have given private notice.
My Lords, it would not be appropriate to comment on individual cases, particularly those subject to ongoing legal proceedings. It may be helpful to know that a number of factors impact on a person’s planned removal from the UK. This does not mean that the original decision to remove the individual was incorrect. If barriers to their removal are resolved and they are not granted a form of leave, the person remains subject to deportation as required under the UK Borders Act 2007.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. Yet, lawyers representing some of those due to be deported say that the reprieve is permanent. Yesterday, I asked the Minister how the Government could be sure that those they intended to deport as foreign national offenders were actually foreign nationals, bearing in mind the mistakes that had been made with the Windrush generation. The Minister said that she had been assured that all those being deported were foreign nationals. Yesterday, in the other place, the Home Secretary said that the law required him to deport foreign nationals convicted of serious offences and that if he did not deport them, he would be breaking the law. As I say, overnight it has been reported that five of those due to be deported are no longer going to be deported. Can the Minister explain: did the Government mislead the House, or has the Home Secretary broken the law?
I have not misled the House, nor has the Home Secretary broken the law. I thought I had made clear in my original Answer that the original decision to remove an individual is not incorrect, but there may be factors that need to be resolved, such as fresh asylum claims and other reasons why a fresh appeal might be lodged, which might mean that someone is not deported but might ultimately be deported. Therefore, neither is true.
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, the new clauses to be inserted into the Bill by Amendments 73A to 73U introduce knife crime prevention orders. These new civil preventative orders will provide the police with the powers they need to more effectively manage people engaged, or at risk of engaging, in knife crime and help steer them away from crime.
As noble Lords in the Committee will agree, knife crime is devastating for victims, their families and for our communities. We must do all that we can to combat this epidemic. The latest police recorded crime figures, published by the Office for National Statistics in January for the year ending September 2018, show that there were 39,818 knife-related offences—an 8% increase compared with the previous year. Noble Lords will not have failed to notice the headlines in the Evening Standard on Monday.
The number of homicides where a knife or sharp instrument was used has increased by 10% in the last year to 276 offences. Of all recorded homicides in the latest data, over four in 10 involved a knife or sharp instrument. That proportion is higher than the previous year when the figure was 37%. Police-recorded offences involving the,
“possession of an article with a blade or point” ,
rose by 18% to 19,644 in the year ending September 2018. That rise is consistent with increases seen over the last five years and is the highest figure since the series began in the year ending March 2009.
The total number of homicides in London in 2018 was 134. The Metropolitan Police had the largest volume increase, accounting for 35% of the total increase. In 2017, there were a total of 116 homicides.
It is vital that the police have the powers they need to prevent knife crime and protect the public from the devastating effects of violent crime on our streets. It is already too late when we prosecute young people for knife crime. The police have asked for a new order which will help them to manage those at risk of knife crime in their communities.
Knife crime prevention orders will provide the police with the powers they need to steer people away from knife crime, where there is evidence that they carry a knife. The orders are aimed at those young people most at risk of engaging in knife crime, people the police call “habitual knife carriers” of any age, and those who have been convicted of a violent offence involving knives. Their simple purpose is to help protect the public, and to help respondents leave a dangerous lifestyle involving knife-related crime. In the case of young people, the police may have intelligence that a young person routinely carries a knife but, for a variety of reasons, they have been unable to charge them with a possession offence. Before risky behaviour escalates, a KCPO could be in place to divert a person away from a life of prolific offending.
People whom the police deem to be habitual knife carriers could also benefit from KCPOs. These are people who may have previous convictions for knife crime, or on whom the police have intelligence that they regularly carry knives. The KCPO would enable the police to manage the risk of future offending. This is the cohort that the police see as their main target for these orders. It is estimated that there are some 3,000 habitual knife carriers across England and Wales. The orders will enable the courts to place restrictions on individuals such as curfews and geographical restrictions, but also requirements such as engaging in positive interventions. KCPOs are not a punishment, but a means to support the individual who is subject to an order to stay away from crime.
It may be helpful if I explain how the order will work. KCPOs are available on application and on conviction. An application for a KCPO can be made by a relevant chief police officer to a magistrates’ court or, in the case of young people, the youth court. A court dealing with an application may make a KCPO only if two conditions are met. The first is that the court is satisfied to the civil standard—on the balance of probabilities—that the defendant had a bladed article, without good reason, in a public place or education premises, on at least two occasions in the preceding two years. The second condition is that the court considers the order necessary to protect the public or prevent the defendant committing an offence. An application can be made with or without notice, but it will be made without notice only on an exceptional basis. If an application is made without notice to the defendant, the court may only make an interim order, which will take effect on service and will last until a full hearing takes place.
A KCPO is also available on conviction following an application from the prosecution, and where two conditions are met. The first condition is that the defendant is convicted of a relevant offence. This means a violent offence, or an offence where a bladed article was used by the defendant or another in the commission of the offence, or the defendant or another had a bladed article with them when the offence was committed. The second condition is, again, that the court considers the order necessary to protect the public or prevent the defendant committing an offence.
A KCPO may require a defendant to do anything described in the order, and/or prohibit the defendant from doing anything described in the order. The KCPO can include any reasonable prohibition or requirement which the court is satisfied is necessary, proportionate and enforceable. A KCPO which imposes a requirement must specify a person who is responsible for supervising compliance with the requirement. For instance, if the requirement is attendance of a knife awareness intervention, the person designated to supervise compliance may be the youth worker providing the intervention.
KCPOs will have a maximum duration of two years and must be reviewed by the courts after 12 months. KCPOs issued to under-18s are expected to be subject to more regular reviews. There are provisions for variation, renewal or discharge of KCPOs on application by the defendant or the police. There are also provisions for appeal against the making of the order. A breach of the order without reasonable excuse is a criminal offence subject to a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment.
KCPOs are closing a gap in the law that has hindered the police in taking an active rather than a reactive approach to diverting people away from knife crime and managing the risk of knife crime offending. They provide an opportunity to take a proactive and preventive approach, re-engaging with them at an early stage and helping to protect those most at risk of using knives and, of course, of falling victim to them.
There are other civil orders available, such as gang injunctions and criminal behaviour orders, but not all individuals in the targeted cohort are gang members. Criminal behaviour orders could be used in some cases, but such orders are available only when a court is sentencing a person for an offence. It is important that the police have the right tools for the right situations and can make use of them.
Of course, the police have a range of powers to deal with knife crime, including the existing offence of possessing a bladed article in public without good reason, and stop and search powers under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. However, given the unacceptable scale of knife crime, it is important that the police have a broad sweep of possible powers to use as circumstances dictate. KCPOs will be a valuable addition to the tools available to the police to disrupt harmful behaviours, while avoiding the premature criminalisation of individuals. We expect them to be targeted at a relatively small but high-risk cohort.
This Government are determined to do all that we can to protect the public and keep people safe. This is why we are redoubling our efforts to end this senseless crime. The introduction of KCPOs has been welcomed by the National Police Chiefs Council and the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners. On behalf of the NPCC, Deputy Assistant Commissioner Duncan Bell said:
“The introduction of knife crime prevention orders will provide us with further means to help deter young people from becoming involved in knife possession and knife crime”,
while West Yorkshire’s Labour PCC has said that he fully supports the new knife crime prevention orders.
I commend the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, who is not in his place, for his prescience in tabling Amendment 77, which also calls for the introduction of KCPOs. I hope one of the noble Lords on the Labour Front Bench will agree that we should grasp the opportunity provided by the Bill to legislate now for KCPOs, so that we can do everything in our power to stop the tragic loss of life and serious injury caused by knife crime that is all too evident on our streets. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for meeting me to discuss these amendments before today’s debate. It will come as no surprise to her that we vehemently oppose them and will object, should she insist on them at this stage.
Noble Lords will recall ASBOs, anti-social behaviour orders, introduced by the then Labour Government in the face of an epidemic of anti-social behaviour. They were opposed for many reasons. They were an order that could be made on the basis of the balance of probabilities against very young children with no previous convictions, yet the breach of one of those orders was a criminal offence with a custodial sentence attached. In effect, the criminal burden of proof—beyond reasonable doubt—was circumvented by making the order subject only to the civil burden of proof, while a breach of the order resulted in a criminal conviction. As a result, hundreds of young people acquired a criminal record through that unfair and unreasonable route. This was rightly seen as disproportionate, and the subsequent coalition Government—in a move championed by the then Home Secretary, Theresa May—removed ASBOs from the statute book.
Other reasons for scrapping ASBOs included their ineffectiveness in curbing anti-social behaviour, the high rate of breach of the conditions of the orders, the difficulty in monitoring compliance and the resources required to ensure their enforcement. In some communities, having an ASBO was seen as a badge of honour, and peers looked up to someone if he had acquired one.
My Lords, I have not found the comments destructive, although I thank my noble friend for the points that he made. I will not press the government amendments today. I take on board completely the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, about the timing of the amendments. We will bring the amendments back on Report when again we will have a full chance to discuss them. The practice of noble Lords speaking only once on Report has fallen slightly by the wayside because noble Lords seem to speak several times in Committee and on Report.
To sum up today’s debate, we all seek the same end, but the means by which we would get there differ. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, at the outset for clarifying a number of points that I did not know the answer to. He has saved me having to write to the Committee. I also thank my noble friend Lady Newlove for the very real-life experience with which she speaks and which we never fail to be moved by.
It is clear from the debate that some of the support for KCPOs is qualified. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick—and the theme was carried on by other noble Lords—said that KCPOs seek to criminalise children. As the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, said, their aim is quite the reverse. They are to prevent young people getting into criminality.
I never suggested that the aim of the orders is to criminalise young people. I said that young people being criminalised is the inevitable outcome of the orders.
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord raises an important point in the light of the various anti-Semitic incidents that have taken place recently. Ministers have agreed to fund security measures on an exceptional basis, as part of the Westminster ceremonial streetscape project. I am not entirely certain whether that project extends down to the Victoria Tower Gardens, but I shall find out for him. However, it is important that such places are fully protected. Assessments of the threat in and around Westminster are of course carried out every day.
My Lords, we have all seen the ugly scenes outside Parliament of parliamentarians being subject to abuse. The worrying thing about the enhanced security in the vicinity of Parliament is the number of officers who are being taken away from policing their local communities, or having yet more days off cancelled, to provide the security necessary because of the mishandling of Brexit by this Government. Will the Home Office reimburse the Metropolitan Police for dealing with these problems, which the Government have created?
My Lords, I think that is a bit of a low blow. It is certainly understood that any protective measures needed will have to be paid for by the authorities which commission them. If the Metropolitan Police is needed, its time and effort will therefore have to be paid for. I have seen many demonstrations outside the Houses of Parliament on a range of issues and I thank the police, who stand ready to protect the public and Members of Parliament from them.
(5 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberI thank the noble Viscount for his clarification. Certainly, the approach that we took post Windrush was that the task force took not a lenient but a generous view when people came forward to try to prove their status and right to remain in this country. There was not a culture of saying no, but of saying yes when people tried to get that documentation approved.
My Lords, the Home Secretary insisted in the other place that the planned charter flights to deport people from the UK to Jamaica would involve only foreign national offenders, and the Minister has just talked about the sorts of individuals involved. But how can the Government be sure that they are foreign nationals, bearing in mind that hundreds of the Windrush generation who were entitled to live in the UK have been wrongly deported, made unemployed and denied benefits? How can the Government give British citizenship to those brought to this country as infants or children and pay compensation to those wrongly denied work and benefits but at the same time deport offenders who have similarly lived all their adult lives in the UK and have no memory of living anywhere else?
The noble Lord asked how we can prove that everyone who is the subject of the debate today is a foreign national offender. I am reliably informed—and I have asked repeatedly—that all the people who will be deported are foreign national offenders. The answer is yes. They are not only foreign national offenders but serious criminals. On the subject of people who came here as infants or children, obviously someone who was here before 1973 would have an assumed status, but just because you came here as an infant or child does not exempt you from the provisions in the UK Borders Act 2007, which the Labour Government rightly brought in to ensure that people convicted and sentenced to 12 months or more should be deported.
(5 years, 7 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, says, these amendments return us to the debate we had on Monday about the proper construction of the offences in the Bill. We had a good discussion on Monday, and I will not cover the ground in the same detail as I did then.
Amendment 40A would alter the defence provided in relation to the sale of bladed articles. Section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 provides that it is an offence to sell, with some exceptions, articles with a blade or point to persons under the age of 18. It is a defence for a person charged with an offence to prove that he or she took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid committing the offence. Clause 14 modifies the operation of the defence in relation to remote sales to include a number of conditions that must be met as a minimum. Amendment 40A removes the post-charge element of the defence and instead requires the enforcing agency to make a judgment whether the seller took all reasonable precautions before a charge is made.
I understand the noble Lord’s intention, but the defence provided in the Criminal Justice Act 1988 has been in place for quite some time. I am not aware of any problems or concerns with how the police, prosecutors and the courts apply the legislation. It has been in place for over 30 years, so it cannot be said that we are introducing a new construct into the criminal law.
Amendments 42A and 43F provide that failure to take all reasonable precaution in relation to the offence of delivering a bladed product to a residential address would be criteria to be taken into account before a person is charged. This is in contrast to the defence provided under Clause 18, which can be invoked when a person is charged with the offence.
Amendments 57B and 57C apply the same principles to Clause 20, which is concerned with the delivery of bladed articles sold by sellers based outside the UK. Clause 20 applies to delivery companies that have entered into an arrangement with a seller based abroad and provides that it is a criminal offence for a delivery company to deliver a bladed article into the hands of a person under 18. It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under Clause 20 to prove that he or she took all reasonable precautions and exercised due diligence to avoid committing the offence.
In practice, the enforcing agency—the police, the CPS or local authorities—will always consider whether the seller or the person who delivers the article has taken reasonable steps and exercised due diligence before bringing a charge. It would not be in the public interest to bring a prosecution if the enforcing agency considers that it is very likely the court will find that the seller had taken all reasonable precautions to avoid committing the offence. As I said before, this type of defence has been in place for some considerable time in relation to the sale of articles with a blade or point, and we are not aware of any issues in its operation.
In short, the approach taken in the Bill both in relation to knives and corrosives is well precedented. The existing law has operated for 30 years without difficulties, and it would further complicate the law and lead to confusion if we now adopted a different approach in the Bill. I suspect—as in the discussion on Monday—noble Lords will want to return to this issue, but for now I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, for his brief intervention and to the Minister for her response.
The fact that the defence is similar to that in the Criminal Justice Act 1988, but contrary to almost every other piece of legislation on the statute book, including the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 which specifically deals with offensive weapons—that is, you are not guilty if you have a reasonable excuse for your actions—does not persuade me, I am afraid, that the Government are right in this case and that we are wrong. The Minister mentioned that the prosecuting authorities would not bring a prosecution if the person had taken all reasonable steps, but that does not stop the person being arrested and detained before that charging decision is made. The problem is still there. It is contrary to most criminal law on the statute book and it is the current legislation, rather than the amendment, that adds to the confusion. We will return to this on Report, but at this juncture I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, for explaining the trusted trader scheme. I hope to set out the context of the provisions of the Bill. I agree with the Committee that evidence is important to this end.
It is already an offence to sell a knife to somebody under the age of 18, but we know that some sellers are not doing enough to stop children buying knives online. Evidence from online test purchase operations shows that a worrying number of online sellers sampled failed to have effective age-verification procedures in place. Trading standards conducted two online test purchase operations in 2008 and 2009. A test purchase operation commissioned by the Home Office conducted in 2014 showed that 69% of the retailers sampled failed the test. This was a slight improvement on the exercise five years previously but showed that a large majority of online test purchases failed and retailers were breaking the law.
A further test purchase operation was carried out in December 2016. The results showed that 72% of retailers tested failed to verify the age of the purchaser at the point of accepting the order and only 19% went on to require further evidence of age and refuse the sale when the evidence was not produced. Recent test purchases targeting online retailers conducted in late 2018 under the Government’s new prosecution fund show that 42% of the retailers sampled failed the test and sold knives to persons under the age of 18. We have evidence that online retailers are selling to people under the age of 18.
Can the Government give any evidence about how many under-18s are buying knives online other than those people masquerading as being under 18 and carrying out test purchase operations?
All the information I have is the test purchases. If test purchases show a failure in the system, that suggests to me that there is an ongoing failure in the system. It does not matter whether the person is actually 18 or is pretending to be; if the system is failing, the system is failing. If an online seller is selling to someone who says they are under 18, the system is failing and the Government are concerned by that. We know that test purchases show that under-18s are being sold knives. In most cases, it is not possible to determine whether the knife purchased is being used in crime, but we have evidence that young people say that buying a knife online is easy. That information was obtained when we were researching the knife-free campaign.
We know through the test purchases that the sellers are breaking the law and we hear the evidence from young people. With the provisions in the Bill, we are sending a clear signal to online sellers that their age- verification processes must improve. The fact that there is still a high rate of failure should be a matter of concern to noble Lords and tell us that the provisions in the Bill are needed. It is not enough for retailers selling remotely simply to ask the purchaser to tick a box to say that they are over 18. It is unacceptable when it comes to delivering the article simply to hand it over to a person without verifying their age or, worse, simply to push the package through the letter box or leave it on the doorstep without any checks about the age of the recipient. We know the tragic consequences of not having strong checks in place to prevent under-18s buying knives online, from the beginning of the transaction through to the end of the sale process.
I utterly understand the thinking behind the noble Lord’s amendment, but it would in effect transfer the responsibility for complying with the legislation and responsible sales from the seller to the Government, by requiring the Government to set out the details of the proposed trusted trader scheme, which would then allow for the delivery of bladed products to residential addresses. The scheme would require sellers to demonstrate that their age-verification systems and procedures, from the point when they receive the order to when their designated delivery company hands the item over at the point of delivery, are robust and that it is not possible that a knife will be handed to a person under 18. In the light of the results of recent test purchase operations, however, we are not persuaded that sellers can provide such reassurance in a systematic and consistent way. We believe that only by requiring age verification at the point where the item is physically handed to a person, at a dedicated collection point, is it possible to guarantee that a bladed product will not be handed over to a person under 18.
There is another point. Setting up, administering and overseeing a trusted trader scheme would create burdens of its own, although I accept the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that it could be self-funding.
I am sorry—well, I would have accepted the point. In addition, simply being part of a scheme or being in possession of a seal of approval as a trusted trader does not guarantee compliance with the conditions in the scheme. I hope that I have been able to set out the Government’s explanations—
I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way. She repeated something that she mentioned on Monday, which I questioned but did not receive a response on. Why is age verification at the point of handover at a delivery point likely to be more thorough or more successful than age verification at the point of handover at the front door of a residential premises? The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, suggested a scheme whereby the delivery agent would take a photograph of the driving licence or passport to show proof of age at the front door. I accept from what the noble Baroness has said that the age-verification process that online retailers put in place must be thorough and rigorous and that there must be penalties for those who fail to comply, but I do not understand the blanket ban on delivery to residential premises when people have carte blanche to order online and collect from what could be a local newsagent. Last week, I ordered something from Amazon and collected it from a convenient store where the people are very busy. I do not see what advantage there is, when it comes to age verification, for such an article to be handed over at a collection point rather than at the front door of a residential premises.
My Lords, I do not want to be unhelpful to my noble friend the Minister, but can she point to any cases involving knife crime where the knife was acquired online?
I hope that I have outlined what the Government have found through these test purchase failings. They have improved over recent years, but there is undoubtedly a basic failure in the system of the online purchase. Regarding the sanction for current failures in the system, it is a criminal offence, although it has been shown not to be a terribly compliant environment. It is far easier to have robust arrangements in place at a central delivery point rather than on each and every doorstep. That is the thinking behind the delivery point rather than the residential address.
I am grateful to the Minister. There is no such thing as a central delivery point. When you ask for these articles to be delivered to a delivery point, they are all over the place. There are five within a mile of where I live—corner shops are the places where these items are being delivered. In support of that, does the Minister have any information on these test purchase operations? Specifically, how many of these knives were successfully delivered to somebody who appeared to be under the age of 18 at a residential premises, and in how many of the offences were the knives delivered to a collection point? This might provide the evidence that the Government seem to have that it is much safer for it to be delivered to a collection point than to the front door of a home.
(5 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, Cressida Dick, has said that the way in which we currently quickly extradite and arrest people will have to be replaced, but it will be more costly and slower and will potentially put the public at risk. Does the Minister agree? Will the Government admit that the UK will be less secure outside the European Union, deal or no deal?
I do not necessarily agree with the second statement, but one thing I can say to the noble Lord is that the way to avoid no deal is for the House of Commons, which is currently deliberating on it, to agree to a deal.
(5 years, 7 months ago)
Grand CommitteeWould it help the Committee to suggest that the Government have put in Clause 4 exactly the sort of things the delivery courier should be looking at to take reasonable precautions?
My Lords, that is where the guidance comes in. All roads are leading back to the guidance. I hope I can leave it there.
My Lords, as we have discussed, Clause 3 makes it an offence, where a sale is carried out remotely, for a seller to deliver, or arrange for the delivery of, a corrosive product to residential premises or to a locker. Given the concerns over the use of corrosive substances in violent attacks and other criminal acts, to restrict access effectively we believe that it is necessary to stop delivery to private residential addresses. This does not mean that corrosive products cannot be purchased online in the future, merely that individuals will be expected to collect the product from a collection point where their age can be verified before the product is handed over to them. This provision is important as it will ensure that checks are made and that the purchaser will need to prove that they are 18 or over in order to be able to purchase and collect a corrosive product. If the purchaser cannot collect the corrosive product in person, they would have to be able to send a representative who is also over the age of 18.
We have also included an exemption within the provision to ensure that deliveries to businesses that are run from home—such as a farm—would not be affected by the prohibition on delivery to a residential address, for example, where corrosive products are ordered by small family-run businesses, such as metal working, soap making or even farms, in the case of the noble Earl, Lord Erroll. We have also provided defences that are available in cases where the individual has taken all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid committing the offence.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, questioned why both Clause 3 and Clause 4 are needed. Clause 3 relates to the dispatch of corrosive products bought online in the UK to a residential premises or locker in the UK. We cannot apply the same restrictions on sellers who are based overseas without taking extraterritorial jurisdiction for this offence. Such a step would be inappropriate for a sales offence such as this and, in any event, there would be practical difficulties mounting a prosecution given that an overseas seller would not be within the jurisdiction of the UK courts. Clause 3 is therefore supported by Clause 4, which makes it a criminal offence for a delivery company in the UK to deliver a corrosive product to a person under the age of 18 where that corrosive product has been bought from a seller overseas and where the delivery company knows what it is delivering. The purpose of Clause 4 is to try to stop overseas sellers selling corrosives to under-18s in the UK and having them delivered to a person under the age of 18. There is no overlap between Clauses 3 and 4; we think that both are needed. Clause 3 deals with UK online sales and Clause 4 deals with online sales from overseas sellers.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, again brought up the use of home as a business, which he has mentioned to me before. It will be a matter for the seller under Clause 3 to satisfy themselves that the delivery address is being used for a purpose other than residential purposes. If they cannot satisfy themselves, they should not deliver to that address. Again, it is something that we can deal with in the planned guidance. He also mentioned to me previously his concerns about Amazon’s terms of trade in relation to the sale of alcohol. We are clear from evidence of test purchases of knives that we cannot rely on such terms of business to ensure that the law on age-related restrictions is properly adhered to in the case of online sales.
My Lords, I have to confess to being even more confused than I was before. Is the Minister saying that you can purchase corrosive substances from a seller overseas and have them delivered to your residential premises, but you cannot get corrosive substances delivered to your residential address if you order them from a UK seller? That appears to be the effect of Clauses 3 and 4.
My Lord, if I may have a second go, until very recently I did not support particular protections for shop workers. Being from a policing background, I know we have taken the steps in the law to protect law enforcers, and recently there has been a Bill to protect all emergency workers in this way. But here we are talking about people who are intent on violence; they are looking to get their hands on knives or corrosive substances to commit violence. That is the sort of person that these shop workers are likely to confront, and that is why I am now convinced that this is the right thing to do.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, said I would say that there is no problem. I am not going to say that, but I am very grateful to him for explaining his amendment. He attaches particular importance to affording greater protection for retail staff, and his noble kinsman, the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of Cradley, raised this question last week. It was a very good opportunity to discuss the issue, which is of great concern. I understand the concerns of retailers and their staff about being threatened or attacked in the course of their duties, including as part of verifying a person’s age when selling a corrosive product. As my noble friend Lord Deben said, it may be those very people who want to buy these things who will be those who mete out the abuse on retail workers. Nobody should have to experience this sort of behaviour at their place of work, especially when providing a service to members of the public.
As I said at Second Reading, the Minister for Crime, Safeguarding and Vulnerability held a roundtable on 11 December with David Hanson MP, Richard Graham MP and representatives from the retail sector, including USDAW and the British Retail Consortium, to discuss what more we can do ensure greater protection for shop workers. Last week, I met USDAW to see what more we can do to ensure these greater protections. Following the discussion at the roundtable I am very happy to update the Committee. We will be taking forward the following actions: first, the call for evidence, which I spoke about last week and is intended to help us ensure that we fully understand this issue and look at all the options for addressing it; secondly, that we provide funding to the sector to run targeted communications activity to raise awareness of the existing legislation that is in place to protect shop workers; and thirdly, we are refreshing the work of the National Retail Crime Steering Group, co-chaired by the Minister for Crime, Safeguarding and Vulnerability and the British Retail Consortium. An extraordinary meeting of the group, focused exclusively on violence and abuse towards shop workers, will take place on 7 February. That discussion will help to shape the call for evidence.
In addition, the Sentencing Council is reviewing its guidelines on assault. A consultation on a revised guideline is anticipated to commence this summer. These measures are intended to complement existing work under way to tackle this issue. For example, the Home Office is providing funding of £1 million for the National Business Crime Centre over three years between 2016 and 2019. The centre was launched by the National Police Chiefs’ Council in October 2017 to improve communication between police forces on business crime, promote training and advice, and help to identify national and local trends.
In addition, through the national retail crime steering group, which includes representatives from across the retail sector, the police and others, we are taking forward a range of work to strengthen the collective response to these crimes, including: the creation of a “crib sheet” for retailers to use when reporting violent incidents to the police so that they get the information they need to support a timely and appropriate response; exploring options for improving consistency in the recording of business crime by the police, which will include a short pilot analysis of forces applying business crime flags; and the development of guidance on impact statements for businesses to increase their use. These statements give businesses the opportunity to set out the impact a crime has had and are taken into account by courts when determining sentences.
I know that there are concerns about the adequacy of the existing legislation for protecting those selling age-restricted products. The call for evidence is intended to help us understand better how the existing law is being applied and whether there is a case for reform, including in the context of the sale of age-restricted products. However, I want to provide some reassurance about the legislation we have in place, without dismissing noble Lords’ points. A wide range of offences may be used to address unacceptable behaviour towards shop staff—including those who sell age-restricted items—covering the full spectrum of unacceptable behaviour, from using abusive language to the most serious and violent crimes.
Some of the existing offences available include behaviour that causes another to fear the immediate infliction of unlawful violence, which is already an offence of common assault under Section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. Where shop workers are threatened or experience abusive language, this may be captured by the offences under the Public Order Act 1986. There is also the Offences against the Person Act 1861, which means that assaults against shop workers could be considered as assault occasioning actual bodily harm under Section 47 of that Act. In addition, courts have a statutory duty to follow sentencing guidelines when considering any penalty to be imposed further to criminal conviction, unless it is not in the interests of justice to do so. In all cases, the fact that an offence has been committed against a person serving the public may be considered an aggravating factor for the purpose of passing sentence.
In answer to my noble friend Lord Deben and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, the specific offence in Amendment 3 could be counterproductive and encourage prosecutions for the new obstruction offence with a maximum penalty of a fine—I think that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, made that point as well—rather than a more serious offence, such as assault, which carries a higher penalty. That said, and going through the list of offences that this may capture, we understand retailers’ concerns about the risk of their staff being threatened or attacked—particularly, as the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, said, for smaller retailers, such as corner shops. The call for evidence is intended to improve our understanding of the issue and identify potential solutions. We will seek to issue the call for evidence as soon as is practically possible.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked whether shop workers were law enforcers. It is a moot point on which I think we will agree to differ. I was trying to make the point that they are not policemen but they have to uphold the law. With that, I hope that I have given the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, enough to help him to withdraw his amendment.
(5 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am very happy to meet USDAW, which I fully expected might be one of the things I would do during the passage of the Offensive Weapons Bill. The noble Baroness will know that attacking a person serving the public is already an aggravating factor in sentencing guidelines. The Minister for Crime, Safeguarding and Vulnerability will be discussing the way forward on the call for evidence with the national retail crime steering group. We do not have a closed mind on a way forward and I look forward to meeting USDAW and hearing its concerns about this serious matter.
My Lords, when shop workers enforce the law—for example, on the sale of age-restricted items—they are acting as law-enforcement officers. Does the Minister think that when shop workers perform these duties, they should have similar legal protections to those afforded to other law enforcers?
I do not agree that they are acting as law-enforcement officers. One could take that to its ultimate conclusion and say that everyone who upholds the law is acting as a law-enforcement officer. They are simply saying that, for example, the sale of alcohol, tobacco and, in future, corrosive substances, to underage people is against the law. As I said to the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of Cradley, the call for evidence will bottom out exactly what is needed in the future. Nobody wants to see shop workers or any workers who deal with the public being abused in any way. I look forward to a constructive way forward on this.
(5 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord raises one of the most important things: a trend in hate crime that we are seeing is the perceived anonymity of online hate crime. Particularly for children who are bullied, which the Question of the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, was about, that is carried with them all day because they bring their phones home, and that can produce some dark thoughts in their minds. The online harms White Paper is due shortly, and I very much look forward to working with the noble Lord on the legislation.
My Lords, can the Minister explain why 23% of recorded homophobic hate crimes resulted in a charge in 2014, but only 13% resulted in a charge in 2017? What impact does the Minister think these statistics will have on the confidence of the perpetrators of homophobic hate crime and the fear felt by victims?
Like the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, the noble Lord raises an important question. In general, the changes in the charge rates are likely to be the result of improved crime recording by the police, and of forces taking on more complex crimes, such as sexual offences, which of course take longer. We welcome the fact that more victims are coming forward and reporting crimes to the police. However, as I said to the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, the CPS and the police are working together to look at this disparity.
My Lords, there are certain aggravated offences in the hate crime area. We absolutely accept that the things the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, was talking about are hate crimes, but they do not currently carry the aggravated offence.
My Lords, there was a commitment in the Conservative Party manifesto to make homophobic hate crime an aggravated offence. Are the Government going to fulfil the promise they made in their manifesto or not?
Yes, my Lords, but the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, was talking about a different type of aggravated offence.
(5 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberI thank my noble friend for his supportive words. Of course, we all recall what happened with Operation Sophia. We are working with the French because they feel exactly the same as we do—that this situation needs to be dealt with swiftly and carefully.
My Lords, according to news reports, these desperate people are saying to reporters that they are risking their lives to travel across the channel because they are not being dealt with humanely or justly in France. If it turns out that France is not taking a humanitarian approach to this and the UK is, is that a reason why we should not allow these people to seek asylum in this country?
Secondly, how will the UK leaving the European Union affect such traffic, bearing in mind that the Dublin III regulation applies to EU countries? Presumably it will no longer apply to us when we are outside the EU.
(5 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. It says that,
“for the first time for more than 40 years, we will be able to say who can, and who cannot, come to this country”.
Can the Minister confirm that, currently, EU citizens and their families who want to stay for more than three months must have sufficient resources if they are not working so that they are not a burden on the state, and that EU citizens and members of their family can be expelled from the UK on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health? Can she also confirm that the UK can refuse, terminate or withdraw any free movement rights in the event of an abuse of those rights, or fraud? In other words, does she accept that we have considerable say over who can and who cannot come to or remain in this country as a member of the European Union?
The Statement says that the new policy will bring annual net migration down to more sustainable levels,
“as we committed to do in our manifesto”.
The Conservative Party manifesto promised to cut net migration to below 100,000, but the Statement also says:
“There will be no cap on numbers”,
for skilled immigration. Do the Government think immigration will go up or down as a result of a “no cap on numbers” immigration policy?
How can the future immigration system make sure, as the Statement says, that immigration works in the best interests of the UK when the policy is determined by the Home Office? Surely the number of doctors and nurses needed, and of those needed to work in social care, should be determined by the Department of Health and Social Care, for example, and not by the Home Office?
If immigration is to be restricted by salary level only, what about the thousands of immigrants who work in the construction, hospitality and social care sectors, and in the NHS, on low salaries? Highly skilled does not necessarily mean highly paid. Do the Government expect EU countries to prevent British workers earning less than the equivalent level of salary working in the European Union?
What is the estimated cost to the public sector and industry of having to engage with the visa system compared with the current visa-less system of employing EU nationals?
The Statement says that the policy will operate from 2021 but will be phased in to give individuals, businesses and the Government the time needed to adapt. Does that mean that the policy will operate from 2021 or only parts of it? If so, which parts?
How many years will it take for the Home Office to recruit and train the additional staff to implement the new systems required? By how much will the Home Office have to expand to grant permissions to EEA and Swiss nationals and their family members before they can come to the UK? How many people did this amount to in the last year for which the Government have figures? How many EEA and Swiss nationals do the Government anticipate will be refused entry under the new scheme to help reduce net migration?
By how much will the Home Office have to expand to process applications and enforce the temporary 12 months-on, 12 months-off scheme for low-skilled and seasonal workers? How many of those workers, who will not be able to access any benefits despite paying British tax and national insurance, will be put off by the new arrangements, not least by the fact that they will not be able to return to the UK for 12 months? What is the Government’s impact assessment? Can the Government confirm that there is intended to be no low-skilled immigration in the future and what the impact will be on public services and UK businesses?
It is clear that this White Paper has not been thought through. It is impractical, unnecessary and cannot possibly be implemented in full for many years to come. Like Brexit, immigration policy based on this White Paper will be damaging to our economy, to our public services and to public confidence.
I thank both noble Lords for their questions. I contrasted the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, with those made by the shadow Home Secretary in the House of Commons, who said that, whether you are a doctor from Poland or a doctor from Pakistan, a single immigration system will work for you. The noble Lord then went on to say that he supported a single immigration system based on skills and not on where you are from.
Both the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked why it had taken so long to get to this point. Noble Lords will remember that the MAC reported just in September. It was important to hear its advice. Moreover, the immigration White Paper suggests a change in the immigration system that we have not seen for a generation—more than 40 years—so it is important that the White Paper discusses all the various aspects that will affect the new system.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, talked about UK citizens working in the EU. Clearly, the EU will have its own arrangements for UK citizens, but we have tried today to outline the system for anybody in the world who wants to come to work and live in the UK.
Both noble Lords mentioned the target. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary made it clear this morning that we are committed to our manifesto pledge of controlling immigration to sustainable levels and that we favour a skills-based system that meets the needs of the UK economy.
Both noble Lords talked about the £30,000 salary threshold. That was a suggestion that will go out to consultation. We will hear various views on that figure from businesses across the country. The noble Lords also mentioned NHS workers. Nurses and certain medical practitioners are already on the shortage occupation list, which will continue to operate.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, talked about the disincentive to students. Far from this country providing a disincentive to students, we have seen the number of students from outside the EU grow year on year. So I do not accept that point.
Both noble Lords talked about temporary workers, be they construction workers or other types of temporary worker. We will keep that under review: of course it is important that people who come here for a short period, even if it is to fill gaps in the labour market, meet the needs of the economy. We expect a full review from the MAC on that in due course. In the interim we will be listening to businesses about what their needs are and what their experiences have been during that time.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, talked about EU citizens, who must currently have sufficient funds to come here and can have those rights curtailed. Therefore, we have control of our migration system. However, free movement rules under the current system are quite broad and we need to take back control of our borders. We will not be in the European Union, although we fully view ourselves as being in Europe. He asked about additional staff. We will ensure that we have the staff to meet our future needs. Announcements have been made in the last couple of days about providing additional resource for Brexit and I am sure that, as time goes on, we will have more detail on that.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, also asked about the numbers of Swiss and EEA nationals refused. Under free movement we have very limited ability to refuse Swiss and EEA nationals who want to come to the UK, but in future they will have to meet the UK Immigration Rules, which will be the same for the whole world.
(5 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank both noble Lords for their points. I agree with the sentiment of what the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said about the role of communities. They are important in assisting the police and security services in countering not only terrorism but extremism. Amendment 33A would require the Home Secretary to lay a report before both Houses of Parliament each year setting out how the ports powers under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and Schedule 3 to this Bill have been exercised.
Reiterating some of what I said earlier, the Government agree with the sentiment behind the amendment, but I hope the noble Lord will agree that it is unnecessary. We entirely agree that transparency and accountability are appropriate in governing the exercise of the new hostile activity ports powers, as is the case with the existing counterterrorism powers. I reiterate, however, that such mechanisms are already in place through the work of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation with respect to Schedule 7, and the future role of the IPC for Schedule 3. Part 6 of Schedule 3 already requires the IPC to review the use of the powers by making an annual report. We envisage this working in a very similar way to the role of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, who reports annually on the use of counterterrorism powers under the Terrorism Act, including those in Schedule 7.
Noble Lords should be reassured that the commissioner, like the independent reviewer, will be afforded full access to any Schedule 3 record on request and information on how the powers have been exercised. The scope and content of these reports will be at the discretion of the commissioner, as they have been for a number of years regarding Schedule 7. The annual reports by the independent reviewer are augmented by the quarterly statistical bulletins, published by the Home Office, on the operation in Great Britain of police powers under the Terrorism Act 2000. The latest bulletin was published on 6 December and, incidentally, recorded a further 25% decrease in the number of Schedule 7 examinations compared with the previous year. The number of Schedule 7 examinations has now fallen by 79% since the data was first collected in the year ending 30 September 2012. The published data already includes information about the ethnicity of examinees and the number of detentions.
As I said earlier, we are considering with the Home Office chief statistician the appropriate arrangements for publishing statistics on the exercise of the Schedule 3 powers, but we would expect to publish equivalent statistics to Schedule 7. The statistical reports in respect of Schedule 7 do not currently identify the religion of examinees, but we are ready to explore this with the Home Office chief statistician, the police and others. I hope that, on this basis, the noble Lord feels happy to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her explanation. What comes across to me in her response to this and other amendments is that there is a degree of transparency and accountability, in that the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation will look at the Schedule 7 powers and the IPC, presumably, will examine those under Schedule 3. It is all very well for the Government, the independent reviewer or the Investigatory Powers Commissioner to be satisfied that these powers are being used appropriately, but they are not the people who need to be convinced that they are being used fairly: it is the communities—particularly the Muslim community—that need to be convinced. Publishing the religion of people being subjected to these powers is crucial if we are to get the Muslim community to work with us to defeat terrorism.
As I said when I introduced the amendment, people, or groups, can switch almost overnight. For example, the attempted bombings on 21 July 2005 were a carbon copy of those on 7 July, which did not go according to plan. They were supposed to involve four bombs on the Underground, and the copycat attacks on 21 July involved three on the Underground and one on a bus because of what happened on the 7th. That is how quickly the first attack was copy-catted by another group. It is the friends, neighbours and close associates of these lone wolves and groups of friends who will pick up on the changes in their behaviour that show they are moving from being radical to being violent and potentially deadly. It is therefore absolutely essential that we do everything we possibly can to win the trust and confidence of the communities from which these people come.
I am encouraged by the Minister saying that the Home Office statistician will be looking at the issue.
The Minister said that the Government will be looking at this with the chief statistician and the police. Can she give a timeframe for that? If she cannot do so now, can she come back to the House before too long with an idea of when we might expect some further information on this work?
(5 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. I should declare an interest as, having been a police officer for more than 30 years, I am a police pensioner.
As the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, asked, can the Minister confirm that the Treasury has increased the amount that police forces have to contribute to police pensions? According to the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners and the National Police Chiefs Council, that will amount to £165 million in 2019-20 and £417 million in 2020-21. The Government are providing £153 million to assist with increased pension costs, which is a shortfall of £12 million in the next financial year, and there is nothing in this settlement for the year after. How are police forces expected to plan ahead when they will potentially have to give back an additional £430 million to the Treasury for police pensions?
In a letter today from the Home Secretary and the Minister of State for Policing and the Fire Service, the Government say that they are increasing the government grant to PCCs, which is,
“the first real terms increase in the Government grant funding since 2010”.
Yet the Statement that the Minister has just repeated says:
“Every police and crime commissioner will see their government grant funding protected in real terms”.
Which is it: protected or increased? If it is the latter, by what percentage in real terms is it being increased? Can the Minister confirm that since 2010 central government funding for the police service has fallen by 30% in real terms, according to the National Audit Office, with overall funding down 19% in real terms, taking into account the police precept?
The Statement says that this year every force’s funding was protected in real terms. A more accurate picture can be given by looking at the picture since 2015. The number of police officers has fallen a further 4%, the number of community support officers has fallen by 18% and the number of special constables has fallen by 27%. Partly as a result of public spaces now being devoid of uniformed officers, knife crime is up 62%, firearms offences are up 30% and homicides are up 33% over the same period. Demand is rising and becoming increasingly complex, as the Government admit. There are crucial capability gaps, particularly in detectives and investigations, and the government response to this crisis is woefully inadequate.
Instead of making real progress in reversing the devastating cuts that this Government have imposed on the police service, they push responsibility for any meaningful increase in police funding on to police and crime commissioners and council tax payers. They say:
“The decision to raise local tax will be up to locally elected PCCs and they will have to make the case to their electorate and be accountable for delivery of a return on that public investment”.
In other words, the Home Office is saying, “Don’t blame us for increases in council tax and don’t blame us if you don’t notice any difference”.
Meanwhile, the Government are wasting millions of pounds propping up the existing out-of-date emergency service communications network while a new network, which relies totally on a commercial mobile phone network, is years behind its planned implementation. What would have happened to our emergency services if the new communication system had been in place by now, as planned, and had been based on the O2 network, which lost all 2G, 3G and 4G connectivity last week?
The police service and the brave officers who put their lives on the line every day to protect us are at breaking point. When will the Government realise that the police service needs a substantial real-terms increase in central government funding and a guarantee to cover all unexpected increases in pension costs in order to avert a crisis?
I thank both noble Lords for the points that they have made. The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, talked about the Government’s own part in this situation—that is, the funding position that we find ourselves in—and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made the very similar point that we had caused a crisis in public safety. I have to say to both noble Lords that 2010 saw the advent of the new coalition Government of the Conservatives and the Lib Dems after one of the worst economic crashes that I have known in my lifetime. Any responsible Government would have had to have taken measures to take that in hand and control it. Both noble Lords are right that funding has been tough, but I could not say that the blame should all be laid at this Government’s door. We have tried to live within our means as opposed to overspending and ultimately creating problems for the next generations through public debt and the deficit.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, talked about how the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe—
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, we need to be careful to balance the two issues. I know why the noble Lord picked “insult” and “abuse” because they sound quite strong words, but insult and abuse and hatred are quite different things. I take the noble Lord’s point: on the face of it, they seem quite strong words.
My Lords, I was the police spokesperson after the 7 July bombings in 2005 in London when 52 innocent people lost their lives. I was asked in a press conference whether I felt that it was the result of Islamic terrorism. I said that I thought that the phrase “Islamic terrorism” was a contradiction in terms. I went on to say that I believe that the UK is a much better, more law-abiding country because we have a strong Muslim community. I believe that now as much as I did then. Does the Minister agree?
I do agree with the noble Lord that the conflation of Islamism and Islamic is widespread. Not only should we understand where the two terms come from—Islamism, of course, comes from the collapse of the Ottoman empire—but that Islam itself is a peaceful religion and Muslims in this country contribute to the variety and diversity of our country.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberI thank noble Lords who have spoken in this debate and particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for moving her amendment. She has set out her position on this clearly and consistently, but I hope that your Lordships will indulge me if I rehearse the reasons why the Government cannot support the amendments.
As the noble Baroness said, Clause 1 amends Section 12(1)(a) of the Terrorism Act 2000, under which it is currently an offence to invite another person to support a proscribed terrorist organisation. An invitation in this context may be explicit or indirect, and may be implicit or opaque, but for a conviction to be secured the prosecution must be able to prove that the person intended to influence others to support the terrorist organisation. I recognise that, when considered in the abstract, this may appear to be the right threshold for the offence. However, in its operation it has been shown to leave a significant gap in the ability of the police, the CPS and the courts to act against hate preachers and radicalisers, as noble Lords have pointed out. This is because such individuals will often be careful to err on just the right side of the law. They will express opinions and beliefs which, in the judgment of a reasonable person, would be likely to have the effect of encouraging others to support proscribed terrorist groups but will stop short of statements which would go far enough to allow the CPS to prove that they intended such encouragement. This is despite them clearly and unambiguously risking harm to the public by virtue of their expressions.
This gap is illustrated by some of the cases to which I have previously drawn the House’s attention, and which were described by Assistant Commissioner Neil Basu in his evidence to the Public Bill Committee in the House of Commons. I urge noble Lords to examine that evidence carefully. In those cases, it was not possible to prosecute prolific and high-profile preachers of hate who had made highly inflammatory public speeches which were very clear about the speaker’s own support for terrorist organisations and methodology and which were on any reasonable assessment likely to cause their audience to be influenced to support a proscribed organisation. They included open admiration for Daesh and other terrorist groups and praise for their methods, ideology and activities.
However, I hope I will reflect the views of many noble Lords when I say that the current position strikes the wrong balance if it allows such obviously harmful behaviour to go unchallenged. This is behaviour that can have a powerful effect in initiating or moving along the process of radicalisation. There are radicalisers and hate preachers who have, time and again, been shown to have played a prominent and influential role in the backgrounds of those who have been convicted of planning or carrying out terrorist attacks.
Clause 1 is intended to close the gap I have described by bringing within the ambit of the Section 12(1)(a) offence individuals who are reckless as to whether they will cause this harm to arise. We have previously debated what is meant by “reckless”, but I think it is worth briefly setting this out again, before I turn to my concerns with the noble Baroness’s proposed amendments to Clause 1.
To answer the noble Baroness’s question, the term “reckless” is a well-established and well-understood concept in the criminal law, and one with which the courts are familiar, in particular as a result of clear case law established by the then Appellate Committee of this House in 2003 in the case of R v G and another. A person acts recklessly where he or she is aware that in the circumstances there is a risk that their conduct will result in the proscribed outcome, and they none the less engage in that conduct in circumstances where a reasonable person would not.
So, under Clause 1, a person might act recklessly if, in the course of addressing an audience consisting primarily of individuals whom he believes are of an Islamist extremist mindset, he speaks of his own support for Daesh, believing he has a degree of influence over the audience and being aware of the risk that members of the audience will be influenced by him to support Daesh. I hope noble Lords will not disagree when I say that a reasonable person would not, and should not, proceed to make that speech in those circumstances. A person who none the less does so would therefore be doing so recklessly. It may not be possible to prove beyond reasonable doubt an intention to influence their audience to support Daesh, but I consider it appropriate and proportionate that the courts can hold them to account if they are reckless in this way. Clause 1 will ensure that this is the case.
Turning now to Amendment 1, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, set out a concern that the reference to a statement that is “supportive” of a proscribed organisation might risk a person being found guilty of a terrorism offence having tweeted their support for a legitimate political objective which happens to be shared by a proscribed terrorist organisation. She gave the examples of support for an independent Kurdistan and for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from the Occupied Territories, both of which are entirely legitimate standpoints but which are also objectives of, respectively, the PKK and the military wings of Hamas and Hezbollah. I have previously assured her, and I am happy to repeat those assurances, that this is not the case. In her example, there would be no suggestion that the person supported terrorist methods to achieve the political objectives to which they aspired or that they supported any proscribed terrorist organisation. There would, therefore, be no basis on which a reasonable person might equate such a statement with support for the PKK or for the proscribed wings of Hamas or Hezbollah or might anticipate that a listener would be influenced to support those organisations. As such, the statements would not meet the recklessness test and would clearly not be caught by Clause 1.
The noble Baroness further highlighted in Committee that the existing Section 12(1)(a) offence refers to,
“inviting support for a proscribed organisation”,
whereas Clause 1 refers to,
“opinion or belief that is supportive of a proscribed organisation”.
She suggested that “supportive” is, intentionally, a broader wording, which will cast the net of the offence more widely than would be the case if the word “supports” were used instead.
I think we are all clear that there is no difference in meaning in the context of the drafting. The existing Section 12(1) offence criminalises those who invite others to support a terrorist group. That word has the wider meaning that the noble Baroness described, repeating what the court said in Choudary, but in the new offence, we are talking about an opinion or belief. As a matter of syntax, an opinion or belief cannot support an issue; a person supports something. That is why parliamentary counsel has used the word “supportive” here. There is no intention to introduce a wider concept than the existing offence. Crucially, new Section 12(1)(b) requires that a person will be encouraged to support a proscribed group by the expression.
However, I can offer the noble Baroness a clear assurance that it would in any event have no meaningful impact on the effect of the clause, the scope of the offence or the range of causes that would be caught by it. This would be exactly the same whichever formulation were used.
Amendment 2 would remove the recklessness test and replace it with one that effectively repeats the existing position in the Section 12(1)(a) offence, so it would still be necessary to prove the same deliberate act of invitation to support.
The noble Baroness has made it clear that she does not support the purpose of Clause 1, and I respect that view, even if I do not agree with it, but I should make it clear to noble Lords that the amendment would entirely nullify the utility of this clause and, as such, were it to be made, we might as well simply strike the whole clause from the Bill.
I hope that with that explanation, noble Lords are satisfied and the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Before the noble Baroness sits down, perhaps she might address the remarks of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge.
I heard what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, had to say, but I do not agree. I hope that the reasons I set out explained why I do not agree.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for taking us through an explanation of his amendment and explaining it with reference to Amendment 15 and his point about people who have a reasonable excuse.
In relation to viewing terrorist information in Clause 3 and entering or remaining in a designated area in Clause 4, the amendments would reconfigure the offences. Rather than the person who committed the offence of engaging in prohibited conduct being acquitted because they use the defence of having a reasonable excuse, there would instead be an exception—they would not be capable of committing the offence in the first place in circumstances where they have a reasonable excuse.
In relation to the offence of publishing images under Clause 2, there is currently no “reasonable excuse” defence. Rather, the offence is committed only if an image of an article is published in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation. Amendment 3 would insert the same reasonable excuse exception that I have just described, which would operate in addition to the reasonable suspicion requirement concerning the circumstances in which the image is published.
Noble Lords have set out their arguments that there should be, at the outset, no question that a person might be guilty of an offence if they have a reasonable excuse for engaging in the activity covered by these offences. It has been argued that that approach will prevent the CPS from charging a person in these circumstances rather than the person potentially being charged and then having to invoke a “reasonable excuse” defence. I recognise that the approach of structurally rearranging the legislation may seemingly provide a greater degree of comfort to a person who finds themselves under suspicion in respect of one of these offences despite having a reasonable excuse, but I am not persuaded that these amendments would secure the outcome sought in relation to Clauses 3 and 4.
Amendments 4, 5, 8 and 9 are unnecessary as they would, in practice, make no material difference to the position of subjects of investigations and of defendants facing a charge under these clauses or on the matters that the prosecution will need to prove and that the court will need to resolve.
We have debated how the existing safeguards influence investigative and prosecutorial discretion, and how they prevent cases from proceeding where there is evidence that the person has a reasonable excuse. The amendments in my name which expand on these provisions in Clauses 3 and 4, and which we will shortly come to, will strengthen these safeguards further by providing indicative lists of reasonable excuses.
I shall go briefly over this ground again. Charges may be brought only if the CPS determines that the full code test is met. This is met only if there is evidence to provide a reasonable prospect of conviction, and if so, whether a prosecution would be in the public interest. Those are very important points. If there is evidence to suggest that the person has a reasonable excuse for engaging in the otherwise prohibited conduct, there will not be a reasonable prospect of conviction because they will be able to successfully invoke the “reasonable excuse” defence. Furthermore, it would not be in the public interest and would be fundamentally inappropriate for prosecutors to charge a person who they believe is likely to be innocent of any criminal conduct as a result of having such a defence. The effect of this is the same as that envisaged by the noble Lord’s amendments. In either case, the CPS will not bring a prosecution if there is evidence that the person has a reasonable excuse which the CPS considers could not be disproved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
Furthermore, neither the existing model nor that proposed by the noble Lord provide immunity from either investigation or prosecution purely on the basis that the person states that they have a reasonable excuse. Under either model, the police will need to investigate the person to establish what activity they have been involved in and whether they may have a reasonable excuse for it, and to gather evidence.
It will rightly remain open to the CPS to prosecute if it believes, following the investigation by the police and on the basis of the evidence gathered, that the person does not have a reasonable excuse, despite any assertion that the person might make to the contrary. Under either model it would then be for the person to advance their reasonable excuse, for the prosecution to disprove it beyond reasonable doubt, and ultimately for the jury to determine whether or not it is a reasonable excuse. Unless we were to introduce a unilateral immunity from prosecution for any person who declares themselves to be innocent, this must always be the position and the noble Lord’s amendments would not change it.
Although these amendments would not make a significant change to the practical operation of the law in this area, they would depart from the commonly taken approach in the criminal law where offences provide a “reasonable excuse” defence. In particular, they would overturn what is a well understood and settled position, with clear case law, in relation to Section 58 of the Terrorism Act, which Clause 3 amends. I do not think that it would be wise to do so unless there was a very persuasive case for it, which I do not think is being made here.
I turn finally to Amendment 3. Clause 2 in its current form does not make any provision in relation to reasonable excuses. But it is not an offence of strict liability and it cannot be committed by the mere fact of publishing an image. Rather, it is committed only in particular circumstances which the prosecution is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt. These are where the image is published in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation.
We have previously debated the operation of this aspect of Clause 2, and I am happy to reiterate the Government’s clear position that it will provide both certainty and protection for those who have a legitimate reason to publish images of flags or other articles associated with proscribed organisations, and who are not themselves members or supporters of the organisation. This clear limitation on the scope of the offence is the best way to provide a safeguard for individuals such as journalists or historians, and the addition of a reasonable excuse provision is not necessary in addition. Indeed, it would be likely to overcomplicate and undermine the operation of the offence.
The Government do not consider that a person should in fact have a reasonable excuse for publishing such an image in circumstances which do not meet the criteria of the offence; that is to say, where a court is satisfied that the circumstances give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of a terrorist organisation. Indeed, I would query whether there is a scenario which would not be covered by the existing safeguard but which should be considered a reasonable excuse. I cannot think of one. For those reasons, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
I am grateful to the Minister for her explanation. The Government seem to be relying on the CPS charging decision, which is very different from the decision that an operational police officer in an uncontrolled environment makes at the time about whether to arrest or not to arrest. The Minister said that there was no material difference, which there is not in terms of successful prosecution. However, it makes a difference to the likelihood of a person being arrested or people being deterred from engaging in completely legitimate activity for fear that they may be arrested, whether they have confidence in the police making the right decision or not.
The Minister talked about a commonly taken approach in law, yet I gave the example of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953, where a person does not commit an offense of possessing an offensive weapon if they have “lawful authority” or “reasonable excuse”; that is determined by the operational officer on the street at the time. I am afraid that I find few of the Minister’s arguments compelling. However, we will return to this issue, particularly in relation to designated areas, when we come to the fifth group of amendments. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support my noble friend’s comments. We on these Benches have for some time had a concern about the so-called conveyor belt theory that radical, non-violent, extreme views necessarily lead to radicalisation and violence. Many groups in this country hold what most of us would consider to be extreme views, such as fundamentalist Christian groups and ultra-Orthodox Jewish groups, where we have no concerns at all that their extreme views will lead to radicalisation and violence.
There are other factors at play that receive no consideration as far as the Bill’s measures are concerned. We also express our concern that the Bill would tend to put people off debating extreme views, during which the counternarrative can be expressed, peoples’ dangerous views can be openly debated and their ideas shown to be false. The Bill and other measures like it are likely to close down that debate. Ultimately, a battle of ideas is the way to address the underlying issues rather than the approach the Bill takes.
I thank both noble Lords for their explanation of these amendments. One of the things that the noble Lord, Lord Alderdice, challenged the Government on was the rationale behind our counter- terrorism work. Perhaps it would be useful to set out some of that for him.
As stated in Contest, government and academic research has consistently indicated that there is no single sociodemographic profile of a terrorist in the UK, and no single pathway or, indeed, “conveyor belt” leading to involvement in terrorism. Terrorists come from a broad range of backgrounds and appear to become involved in different ways and for differing reasons. Few of those who are drawn into Islamist terrorism, for example, have a deep knowledge of the faith.
While no single factor will cause someone to become involved in terrorism, several factors can converge to create certain conditions under which radicalisation can flourish. These include background factors such as aspects of someone’s personal circumstances that might make them vulnerable to radicalisers, such as being involved in criminal activity; initial influences such as people, ideas or experiences that influence an individual towards supporting a terrorist movement; and an ideological opening or receptiveness to extremist ideology.
Most individuals who experience this combination of factors will not go on to become involved in terrorism because there are protective factors that safeguard against their doing so. These range from having no opportunity to develop extremist contacts to having other, more important priorities in their lives, such as their family, career or community. A small number of people who lack these protective factors may become radicalised. In these circumstances, a range of social and ideological influences can combine to intensify commitment to a terrorist cause and provide opportunities for them to act.
The process of radicalisation is driven by universal psychological needs for identity and belonging—those words are very important in this context—meaning and purpose, and, of course, self-esteem. Where these are met by constructive sources radicalisation will not flourish, but we also know that as a person deepens their involvement in terrorism this process will typically include voracious consumption of online propaganda. When in a group, further engagement in terrorism is also likely to include the individual isolating themselves from non-extremists and participating in low-level activity such as the radicalisation of others, or facilitation, fundraising, et cetera. There is some research to indicate that lone-actor terrorists have a higher incidence of certain mental and developmental health conditions than the general population, but I must stress that no one should assume that a terrorist suffers from a mental health condition or that a person with a mental health condition is a terrorist.
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, helpfully proposed an amendment in Committee to close a gap he had identified on accounts which a terrorist offender is entitled to operate but does not hold in their own name—for example, because they are an authorised signatory to the account of the relative or employer. I recognised then that there might well be merit in the amendment and committed to take it away to consider it further. I have just done that and find myself in agreement with the noble Lord that this is indeed a gap in the current Bill and that his suggestion will close it and improve the Bill.
Amendment 27 therefore implements his suggestion, for which I am very grateful, and I commend the amendment to the House.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister, but I cannot possibly claim credit for the amendment: it is actually the work of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. That having been said, we are very grateful that she listened to our arguments. We hope that noble Lords will realise that we on these Benches look to be hopeful, not necessarily negative about legislation. We hope that closing this loophole shows that we are working together to try to improve legislation.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberI do not want to prolong the agony for the Minister, but the point about America is that the tax people pay there does not pay for healthcare. That is why people have to have insurance. Immigrants come to this country, get jobs and pay national insurance and income tax, which pays for healthcare. But only immigrants have to pay a charge in addition to the national insurance and income tax they pay to fund the health service. Can the Minister explain why?
Temporary immigrants have to pay the healthcare charge, but anyone with indefinite leave to remain or who is a citizen of this country contributes to the NHS through general taxation. We are not going to agree on this.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I am grateful to the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs for its advice, which has helped to inform the draft order before us. The order was first laid before Parliament on 17 October and will control pregabalin and gabapentin as class C drugs under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. Should the order be made, pregabalin and gabapentin will be subject to permanent control under Schedule 2 to the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 through an amendment to Part 3, which specifies the drugs that are subject to control under the 1971 Act as class C drugs.
The order follows the recommendation from the ACMD to control the two drugs under class C of the 1971 Act, as their harms are comparable with those of other substances controlled as class C drugs. To help those with a legitimate medical need access these drugs, and subject to Parliament’s approval of the order before the Committee now, we will schedule both drugs under Schedule 3 to the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 2001 through regulations.
Pregabalin and gabapentin are prescription medicines which are used to manage a number of disabling long-term conditions, including epilepsy. They are also licensed for the treatment of general anxiety disorders. In its advice, the ACMD identified a number of harms—in particular, it drew attention to the dangers that can arise when the drugs are used in combination with other central nervous system depressants. In these circumstances, they can cause drowsiness, sedation, respiratory failure and death.
The ACMD also highlighted the risk of addiction that pregabalin and gabapentin presented, as well as the potential for illegal diversion and medicinal misuse. Its advice also drew attention to the concerns of health staff in prisons who reported a high number of prisoners being prescribed the drugs without a thorough assessment of their needs.
Across the United Kingdom, there have been significant increases in the prescription of both drugs: pregabalin prescriptions have increased from 2.7 million in 2012 to 6.25 million in 2017, while gabapentin prescriptions have risen from 3.5 million in 2012 to over 7 million in 2017. In tandem, there has been an increase in the number of deaths related to pregabalin and gabapentin since 2009. In the last five years there have been 408 deaths where pregabalin was mentioned on the death certificate, and 203 in the case of gabapentin. This compares with four and one for pregabalin and gabapentin respectively in 2009.
By controlling the two drugs, we will restrict the potential for misuse by making diversion and their illicit supply more difficult but without compromising access for those who have a legitimate need to access the drugs for healthcare purposes. Parliament’s approval of this order will enable UK law enforcement to take action against those who illegally supply these drugs and against those who illegally possess them. Possession of a class C drug is an offence resulting in up to two years in prison or an unlimited fine, and the supply or production of a class C drug is an offence resulting in up to 14 years in prison or an unlimited fine.
If approved, the order will send a clear message to the public that the drugs should only be in the possession of those who have been legitimately prescribed them. We hope that the significant supply offences for class C drugs will make people think twice before they consider diverting pregabalin and gabapentin into the illegal market.
The measure to control these drugs is scheduled to come into force in April 2019. Given the widespread use of the two medicines, this will help to provide the healthcare sector with sufficient time to implement the new requirements. I can assure Members that all relevant information will be communicated to other stakeholders and the wider public. The Home Office will issue a circular with legislative guidance for the police and the courts. Guidance will also be published following engagement with interested parties about the effect of the legislation in preparation for it coming into force in April. In addition, the Government will continue to update its messaging on the harms of these substances.
I hope I have made the case to control these harmful drugs and I commend the order to the Committee.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for explaining the order to us. As she has said, this puts two substances into class C of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, on the recommendation of the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs.
We support any evidence-based scientific approach to reducing the harm caused by drugs, legal or illegal. My question is very simple. The noble Baroness talked about a very clear message being sent to the public, but why do the Government not always act on the scientific, evidence-based assessment of the ACMD?
The problem with drugs classification under the Misuse of Drugs Act is threefold. First, based on independent scientific assessment, drugs are not classified according to the potential harm that they cause. For example, GHB—gamma-hydroxybutyrate—is believed to cause a significant number of deaths—perhaps as many as several a week in the UK alone. Yet it is classified as a class C drug. Cannabis which, to my knowledge has not been the direct cause of any drug-related death, is a class B drug. Because of this, and several other misclassifications of which I could give examples, the classification of drugs under the Misuse of Drugs Act has fallen into disrepute among those who might arguably be helped most if they knew that the classification of drugs was based on how dangerous they were.
At this stage, I should point out an interest to the Committee. A former partner, who then became my best friend and who was very experienced in the use of recreational drugs, died from an accidental overdose of GHB.
Secondly, because the classification system does not reflect potential harm, only potential sentence, it has become irrelevant to most drug users. They quite simply work on the basis that the penalty is irrelevant to them as they have no intention of getting caught.
Thirdly, any drug classified under the Misuse of Drugs Act carries a heavier penalty than a new psychoactive substance covered by the Psychoactive Substances Act 2016 in that possession of a new psychoactive substance is not an offence, whereas possession of any drug classified under the Misuse of Drugs Act is an offence. This is even though some of the new psychoactive substances are more harmful than drugs classified under the Misuse of Drugs Act.
Our drugs laws are a mess, the Government’s drugs strategy is ineffective and, if we are to stop our young people dying, we need a fundamental rethink. We called for a scientific, evidence-based review of our drugs laws when we debated the Psychoactive Substances Bill—a proposition both the Conservative and Labour Benches refused to support. Therefore, I note with interest the comments of the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Home Office, Victoria Atkins, in the other place, when this order was discussed by the Tenth Delegated Legislation Committee on 12 November this year, at 6.05 pm, where she said that the Government have announced,
“an independent review of the misuse of drugs in the 21st century”. —[Official Report, Commons, Tenth Delegated Legislation Committee, 12/11/18; col. 4.]
Can the Minister provide the Committee with further details of who will be conducting this review, what their terms of reference are, and any other details that may be of interest?
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I think that I have stood at this Dispatch Box before and said that it is up to local police forces to set priorities for their local areas, because they will differ from area to area. It is important to note—I have said this before as well—that both the Home Secretary and the Policing Minister recognise the increasing calls on police time and the different demands facing them, particularly in light of events in the past year. There is an additional point about how the police operate. It will not be any surprise to the noble Lord that some police forces are far more effective than others, and it is important to think of ways in which they could collaborate, make better use of technology and be more efficient as time goes on.
My Lords, in the current scenario in which there is significant rationing of policing services because of central government cuts to police budgets, it is no longer acceptable for the Government, and the Home Office in particular, to wash their hands of the consequences. When will the Home Office provide the leadership needed and tell the police service what it should stop doing, because it cannot do everything that the public want with the resources it has been given?
The Home Office has no intention of telling the police what they should stop doing because, as I said to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, there will be different priorities in different areas. It is up to local police forces to decide what those are. As for the other acknowledgement by the Home Office, which is that the police are facing new demands and have faced increasing calls upon their time over the last year or so, both the Policing Minister and the Home Secretary fully recognise this and are working with the Treasury to get a better settlement.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe Government’s assessment at this point in time—I refer again to my right honourable friend the Home Secretary and my honourable friend the Policing Minister—is that the police have had huge increases in demand. The pattern of crime is changing, as the noble Lord pointed out. Knife crime is a particular issue in London and county lines are spreading the problem across forces. I know that the Home Secretary and the Policing Minister recognise this and are looking to work on the funding picture.
My Lords, public health approaches such as those mentioned earlier can take a decade to produce significant results and meanwhile, young people are dying. Effective, targeted stop and search based on community intelligence requires a significant investment in community policing to build trust and confidence in the police and restore the flow of information about who the knife carriers are, so that the knives can be taken off the streets. When will the Government make such an investment? This is a clear example of where more resources could save lives.
I acknowledge that a public health approach is not a quick fix, but in Scotland, where there has been a public health approach for some time, it has been incredibly effective. I know that officials have been talking with the Scottish violence reduction unit and sharing its experience and insight into just how effective a public health approach can be.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, in opposing the additional powers conferred by Schedule 3, for some of the reasons she has just mentioned. We have already debated whether the powers in Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act are used appropriately in every case. From complaints made to me, I believe that there is increasing concern that Schedule 7 powers may be being used arbitrarily—particularly against black and other ethnic minority passengers—resulting in missed flights with no compensation.
As the briefing provided by Liberty suggests, Schedule 3 covers a potentially vast and uncertain range of behaviours. Paragraph 1(1) refers to,
“a person who is, or has been, engaged in hostile activity”.
As the noble Baroness said, the Bill defines hostile activity as any act which threatens national security, the economic well-being of the UK or which constitutes a serious crime, where the act is,
“carried out for, or on behalf of, a State other than the United Kingdom or … otherwise in the interests of a State other than the United Kingdom.
However, the person need not be aware that they are engaged in hostile activity, and the state for which the hostile act is being carried out need not even be aware that the hostile act is being carried out. As the Bill is worded, someone from Paris or Frankfurt travelling to the UK to encourage UK businesses to relocate to their city in the face of Brexit will be caught by these provisions, because his mission would threaten the economic well-being of the UK and would be in the interests of another state—France or Germany. In a later group, the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, has an amendment in relation to what the definition of hostile act should be, and we will return to this subject then.
This schedule and the powers it contains, according to the Home Office briefing we were provided with, is supposed to be a response to the attempted assassination of Sergei and Yulia Skripal, yet almost all commentators agree that this was an act of terrorism already adequately covered by Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act. Perhaps the Minister can give an example of a hostile act that has been committed against the UK that was not an act of terrorism.
The fact sheet provided by the Home Office suggests that these provisions are needed because:
“The UK faces a sustained threat from hostile actors seeking to undermine our national security in a wide variety of ways”.
Can the Minister explain how every and all acts that threaten the economic well-being of the UK are a threat to national security, and why the wording used in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 is not used here—for example, with regard to the issuing of bulk interception warrants under Section 138(2) of the 2016 Act, where the issue of a warrant has to be,
“in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom”,
but only so far as those interests are relevant also to the interests of national security?
My Lords, we have already debated a number of points related to the new ports powers under Schedule 3 to the Bill. Groups of amendments to come will address other aspects of these provisions. That being the case, I will limit my remarks in responding to this stand part debate to explaining the overarching case for these new powers to combat hostile state activity. Schedule 3 will serve to address a current gap in our ability to tackle the threat from hostile state actors by introducing provisions to allow an examining officer to stop, question, search and detain persons at a UK port or the border area in Northern Ireland to determine whether they are or have been engaged in hostile activity.
For the purposes of this legislation, a person is or has been engaged in hostile activity if they are or have been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of a “hostile act” that is or may be carried out for or on behalf of a state other than the United Kingdom, or otherwise in the interests of a state other than the United Kingdom. An act is a hostile act if it threatens national security, threatens the economic well-being of the United Kingdom, or is an act of serious crime. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, asked about the types of activity that would threaten the economic well-being of the UK. Acts of that kind include those which damage the country’s critical infrastructure or disrupt energy supplies. The power absolutely will not be used to target the legitimate activity of foreign businesses, an example of which was given by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. The noble Baroness also asked whether the power will be used in a discriminatory fashion. The response is an emphatic no, it will not. That is because selection based solely on ethnicity, religion or other protected characteristics is quite clearly unlawful. Selection for examination will be informed by a number of considerations, including available intelligence about hostile activity, as listed in the criteria set out in the draft code.
The events in Salisbury were a stark reminder of the impact that hostile activity can have on the safety and security of our communities. The use of a military grade nerve agent on UK soil demonstrated very clearly the lengths to which hostile actors such as the Russian state will go in order to achieve their illegitimate ends. We should not underestimate this threat. The Director General of MI5, Andrew Parker, set out the position in stark terms in a speech delivered in Berlin in May:
“We are living in a period where Europe faces sustained hostile activity from certain states. Let me be clear, by this I … mean deliberate and targeted malign activity intended to undermine our free, open and democratic societies; to destabilise the international rules-based system that underpins our stability, security and prosperity … Chief protagonist among these hostile actors is the Russian Government”.
It is not often that the general public are so exposed to the work of hostile actors. These actions highlight a contempt for public safety, the rule of law and international norms. However, they are consistent with the activities of the Russian state and others which our operational partners work tirelessly to counter.
In introducing these new powers, the Government are seeking to provide the additional capability needed better to detect, disrupt and deter the threats from these hostile actors. As the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, put it in his evidence to the Home Affairs Select Committee in January, if it is accepted that we need powers to stop and examine people at ports to combat terrorism, should not the police have similar powers to stop people on a similar basis who pose an equal but different threat to national security? In the Government’s view, the answer to the question must be an unequivocal “yes”.
It is worth reiterating that the provisions of Schedule 3 are not entirely novel. They will in many respects mirror existing powers to stop and question persons at the border to determine whether they are terrorists, but will instead be used to determine whether a person is or has been engaged in hostile state activity.
The Government are not saying that, simply because we have these powers for counterterrorism purposes, it justifies expanding them to hostile activity. Rather, we are saying that we have experience in exercising these powers; we already know the vital role that they play in countering the activities of terrorists, and we have taken into account the views of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation on the exercise of the powers to ensure that the subject of an examination is appropriately safeguarded.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked for examples of hostile activity that would not be considered a serious crime or even be captured under current UK law or constitute terrorism. Examples might include unauthorised disclosure under the Official Secrets Act 1989; foreign intelligence officers building relationships with government officials with a view to influencing decision-making or recruiting them as an agent, or foreign intelligence officers receiving protectively marked information or stealing research plans for the UK’s next aircraft carrier. Section 1 of the Theft Act 1968 is applicable to tangible and in-action property, but does not cover information. It may be possible to prosecute a person for theft of the medium on which sensitive information is recorded, but the offence would carry limited sentencing.
The threat to this country from hostile state activity is greater now than it has ever been. It is therefore vital that the police are equipped to disrupt and deter such activity.
The noble Lord provides a very good example. It might not amount to reasonable suspicion, but there would certainly be a pattern of activity or information which allowed that officer to stop the individual.
Will the Minister answer my question about why the wording from the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 is not used? It attaches to the consideration of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom the further consideration of the interests of national security to differentiate between acts such as I described, of envoys from Paris and Frankfurt trying to steal UK business, and the example given by the Minister of somebody looking to target the electricity infrastructure.
The Minister said that the powers could not be used to target people on the basis of race and religion because it would be illegal. In which case, can she explain why, in one police force area, you are 25 times more likely to be stopped and searched if you are from a black or minority ethnic background than if you are white? Why is that happening when it is illegal?
Police stop and search is very often intelligence based. There may be areas where there is a higher than average proportion of black people. Quite often, some of the gang activity is black on black, but you cannot be stopped because you are black.
The force I am quoting from is Dorset, if that helps the Minister.
That does help me, and of course it is where the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, lives. The noble Lord makes a very good point in that instance. As for envoys trying to steal business, there is nothing wrong with healthy business competition, but undermining the economy, through critical infrastructure, is entirely different. He also asked about the IP Act and I will write to him on that. The answer just handed to me contains a quotation from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, who wrote:
“If Schedule 7 is being skilfully used, therefore, one would expect its exercise to be ethnically ‘proportionate’ not to the UK population, nor even to the airport-using population, but rather to the terrorist population that travels through UK ports”.
That is a far more eloquent description of the proportionality. I will write to the noble Lord about the IP Act.
My reading of the amendment is that it would differentiate between a Schedule 7 encounter, where the person is not entitled to silence and has to answer questions because they commit an offence if they do not, and the informal process that leads up to a Schedule 7 encounter.
I thank noble Lords for their points on this amendment. I start by saying to the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, that the IPC has been consulted throughout the drafting of the code.
The interactions between noble Lords probably go to the root of the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. The section on screening outlined in the Schedule 3 code, which mirrors the existing guidance for the equivalent CT powers, is there to provide ports officers with clarity on the distinction between questions that can be asked by police officers in the ordinary course of their duties with a view to deciding whether to examine someone and questions that are permissible only once a Schedule 3 examination has commenced; that is, those questions designed to elicit information to enable an officer to determine whether the person is or has been concerned in hostile activity.
We have all come across police officers as we go about our daily lives and are used to seeing them on local streets and in tourist hotspots or protecting our national infrastructure. Wherever officers are on the ground, it is reasonable to expect them to interact with the public. It is not only a reasonable expectation but a vital aspect of front-line policing.
Such interactions will vary and depend on the specific purposes. They may range from polite conversation between an officer and a member of the public to a situation where an officer wants to query why a person is acting in a certain way or why they are present in a certain place. In such circumstances, police officers do not rely on specific powers of questioning; rather, they are simply engaging members of the public during their ordinary duties, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, pointed out. It is no different when officers are stationed at UK ports.
It would be unusual if officers did not interact with the public in this way. It would be even more unusual if front-line officers were not able to use those interactions to determine whether any further action was needed. It is unfortunate that, in trying to clarify this distinction between what would constitute questioning or interaction during ordinary police duties and questioning that can take place only once a Schedule 3 examination has commenced, the language and intention of the code have somehow been misunderstood.
Let me be clear: what is referred to as “screening” in the draft code is not a prescribed process or procedure that ports officers must adopt before selecting a person for examination. It is a clarification of what questions can be asked, if appropriate, prior to selection for examination, as against the questions that can be asked only during an examination.
It is quite possible that a ports officer will speak to members of the public at a UK port in the course of their duties with no intention of selecting them for an examination of any kind. Of course, the person’s behaviour might lead the officer to consider use of a police power, but Amendment 63A could have the unfortunate implication that, in other contexts and absent specific statutory powers, officers are unable to talk to the public or request to see their documents in the ordinary course of their duties to determine whether they need to take the further step of invoking their legal powers. It would define such questioning as being part of the Schedule 3 examination itself, rather than something that takes place before an examination. All that said, even though I do not agree with the amendment, we will consider whether further clarity is needed in the code before formally laying it before Parliament for a debate and approval by both Houses. I hope that, with that assurance, the noble Lord will be content to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, briefly, I agree in principle with the intention behind the amendments, at least on confidential journalistic material and material that is subject to legal privilege. However, I recognise the dilemma of how you determine whether it is confidential information unless you just take the person’s word for it. Clearly, if you just accepted the person’s word that the matter was confidential, anybody could get away with not handing over documents. I do not think that Amendment 69A could work in practice in real time, but there is a real problem here that needs an explanation and some reassurance.
My Lords, I hope that I can reassure noble Lords with my explanation, but I thank those who have raised their concerns about the use of Schedule 3 powers to compel a journalist to reveal their material, including confidential material.
In drafting the Bill, we have been alive to such concerns and at pains to ensure that adequate safeguards, which I think noble Lords are talking about, are in place to protect confidential material, including confidential journalistic material. As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, pointed out, the new retention powers in respect of confidential information require the authorisation of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, who has to be satisfied that certain conditions are met before granting that authorisation.
In earlier debates on the powers under Schedule 3, I explained that a number of foreign powers and hostile actors are becoming even more bold and inventive in their methods. For example, as I outlined earlier, intelligence officers and their agents actively use the cover of certain professions, including journalism, the law and others. To ensure that our police officers are equipped to detect, disrupt and deter such activity, it is critical that they are able to retain, copy and examine documents or other articles that may include confidential journalistic or legally privileged material. That is why Schedule 3 introduces new powers and mechanisms to allow for such action to be taken where the article, which may include confidential material, could be used in connection with a hostile act or to prevent death or significant injury.
I recognise that the protection of journalistic material held by any individual examined under ports powers is a sensitive matter and one where we clearly need to get the safeguards in the Bill right. I want to be clear that the powers in Schedule 3 are not intended to disrupt or impede the vital work of journalists in any way. Journalistic freedoms of speech and expression are the absolute cornerstone of our democracy, which should be protected in the exercise of any police powers. The provisions in the Bill, however, are aimed at those who seek to abuse our legal frameworks to put our national security at risk and who are often trained to do so.
Amendment 68 would allow a person to refuse a request for documents or information where the information or documents in question consist of journalistic material, as defined by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act and the Investigatory Powers Act, or are subject to legal privilege. In practice, this would prohibit the examining officer from verifying that the material in question was confidential and would require the officer to take the examinee at their word. Amendment 69A is similar and, while it does not quite go as far as allowing a person to refuse to provide requested documents or information, it would prohibit an examining officer from verifying that that material was confidential. Instead, it would be for the IPC to determine the question.
Restricting powers in this way would be problematic, particularly where the examinee is a trained hostile actor. Amendment 68 would provide a ground for a person to refuse to hand over documents or information simply by claiming that the material is journalistic or legally privileged. Furthermore, it would mean that the examining officer could not seek to examine such material, where there was a need, by retaining the material and applying for IPC authorisation. Amendment 69A is also concerning, as it would impose a restriction on the examining officer such that they were unable to establish their own reasonable belief that the article consisted of confidential material. The police have a duty to protect our citizens and prevent crime. They cannot be expected to take at face value the word of someone they are examining who, in some cases, will be motivated to lie.
It is important to note that there are additional safeguards to govern the retention of property under Schedule 3 that consists of, or includes, confidential material. The IPC will authorise the retention and use of the material only if satisfied that arrangements are in place that are sufficient for ensuring that the material is retained securely, and that it will be used only so far as is necessary and proportionate for a relevant purpose—that is, in the interests of national security or the economic well-being of the United Kingdom; for the purposes of preventing or detecting serious crime; or for the purposes of preventing death or significant injury.
The Government are of the view that it is reasonable to expect that an examining officer will need to review material, to conclude one way or the other that specific items are, or include, confidential journalistic or legally privileged material. That being said, the draft Schedule 3 code of practice is clear:
“If during the process of examining an article it becomes apparent to the examining officer that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the article consists of or includes items that are confidential material, the examining officer must cease examining and not copy these items unless he or she believes there are grounds to retain it under either paragraph 11(2)(d) or (e)”.
The provisions in paragraph 11 of Schedule 3 contain the retention powers involving oversight by the IPC and the safeguards that I described earlier. I acknowledge that handling confidential material requires vigilance and discretion to safeguard it against unnecessary examination or retention, which is why the mechanisms under paragraphs 12, 13 and 15 of Schedule 3 in relation to these retention powers require prior authorisation of the IPC to be sought, save in exceptional circumstances, before an examining officer is able to examine such material.
We are therefore confident that the safeguards provided for in Schedule 3 and the associated draft code of practice are sufficient to protect the work and privacy of legitimate journalists and lawyers, and are consistent with the Court of Appeal’s judgment in the Schedule 7 case of Miranda that,
“independent and impartial oversight … is the natural and obvious adequate safeguard”,
in examining cases involving journalistic material.
Amendment 69 would extend this bar to information and documents where the material falls under the definition of journalistic material, as defined by the PACE and IP Acts. Such a position would go much further than safeguarding the examinee against self-incrimination. By extending the statutory bar to cover information or documents that are considered journalistic material, Amendment 69 could prevent evidence of a hostile act being used in criminal proceedings where it had been acquired through the legitimate examination of confidential material on the authorisation of the IPC. This would significantly undermine the ability of the police and the CPS to prosecute hostile actors who have used journalistic cover to disguise their criminal activities and been uncovered through the Schedule 3 examination powers.
In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, an officer can proceed to verify that material is confidential, subject to IPC authorisation, and look at confidential material, even if satisfied of the credentials of the journalist who might nevertheless be a hostile state actor.
Amendment 71 concerns the definition of “confidential material” in paragraph 12(10) of Schedule 3 and the associated protections. For the purposes of Schedule 3, confidential material adopts the definition of the IP Act. This definition covers, for example, journalistic material and communication that the sender intends the recipient to hold in confidence. As I explained, this material would fall under the definition of confidential material. It cannot be used or retained by an examining officer unless authorised by the IPC.
With those explanations—I am sorry they were so lengthy—I hope that the noble Baroness will feel happy to withdraw her amendment.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberBecause they are implicit in the Bill and, I guess, Schedule 7.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have contributed to this short debate. Perhaps reasonable suspicion of a particular individual is going too far, but I suggest to the Minister that the nationality of those suspected of coming to the UK to do harm to the UK, their arrival time and where they have come from might be the sort of intelligence that Assistant Commissioner Basu was talking about as fragmented and incomplete, not information about a particular individual. Whether that amounts to reasonable suspicion is arguable.
To give a personal example, every time I tried to go to the United States, I was taken to one side and all my personal property was gone through. This addresses the point about alerting people to the fact that they may be under suspicion. If it happens once, you think it might be random; when it happens every time, you begin to think that there might be some suspicion. There is a redress system where you write to the Department of Homeland Security. It writes back to you some months later saying, “We can’t say whether you were under suspicion or not, whether you are on the list or not, or whether you have been taken off the list or not”. This is not giving away the methodology, or giving some intelligence to terrorists, but insisting that there is something more than simply an arbitrary approach to the situation.
I am getting increasing reports from individuals suggesting that examination might be being used arbitrarily or without due care, which is the other expression used by the noble Baroness. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, makes a very powerful point. If the guidance says that stop and searches should not be arbitrary, why not have that in the Bill? I understand what the noble Baroness says, but how many people have the time, inclination or means to take civil action against the Border Force in circumstances where they feel that they are being improperly targeted? Surely it would be much better to have it in the Bill.
In summary, I will carefully reflect on what the noble Baroness and other noble Lords have said, and at this point I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful for the explanation that the noble Baroness has given. Obviously, Schedule 7 does not allow a suspect the right to silence that is normally afforded to somebody who is suspected. Safeguards therefore need to be put in place. My query is on new subsection (3), at line 14 on page 20 of the Bill; what does this mean? It says:
“An answer or information may not be used by virtue of sub-paragraph (2)(c) unless … evidence relating to it is adduced, or … a question relating to it is asked, by or on behalf of the person in the proceedings arising out of the prosecution”.
I accept that the Minister read that out very slowly and carefully, but it reminds me of my mother, who, when speaking to somebody who does not speak English, speaks loudly and clearly in English again to try to get them to understand, but unfortunately it does not really help. Perhaps the noble Baroness, together with officials, can see whether there is some way in which that can be deciphered for me.
I certainly will, although I resent being compared to the noble Lord’s mother.
(5 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberRegarding conversations, the British Transport Police hosted a police and public consultation forum on 2 November. It was a policing seminar on stop and search where debates were had on the effectiveness of stop and search on emerging knife crime and violence. As part of the seminar, the possibility of removing the requirement for reasonable grounds was debated within the group, but it was not put forward by senior officers and was only part of an informal discussion with stakeholders. The Home Office was not in attendance, and the NPCC issued a corrective statement to editors.
My Lords, I also thank the Minister for repeating the Statement. She talked about government reform of stop and search, and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, referred to action taken by the former Home Secretary, now the Prime Minister. Is the Minister aware that there has been a 75% reduction in stop and search since 2010-11, but no reduction in the number of black people stopped and searched, so that black people are now nine times more likely to be stopped and searched for certain offences than white people?
The argument is put forward that stop and search tends to be in high crime areas with socioeconomic deprivation, which have a higher percentage of minority groups. Is the Minister aware that the top-ranked forces for black/white disproportionality are Dorset and Suffolk? We are facing a knife-crime crisis in this country. In 2010-11, half of stop and search was for drugs. In 2016-17, almost two-thirds of stop and search carried out by police was for drugs, not for weapons, and the rate at which drugs were actually found was lower for black people being stopped and searched than for white people.
The Statement that the Minister has just repeated said that stop and search is a valuable tool provided that it is used properly. Does the Minister agree that these statistics tend to suggest that stop and search is not being used properly to deal with the epidemic of knife crime? If so, what do the Government intend to do to address the problem?
As the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, rightly pointed out, the move to a much more intelligence-led stop and search has been more effective. But on the point about the number of black people being stopped and searched, we are quite clear that nobody should be stopped on the basis of their race or ethnicity. Forces must make sure that officers use those really quite intrusive powers in ways that are fair, lawful and effective.
The figures cited by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, were highlighted by the Race Disparity Audit. I am sure he knows that. They make clear the importance of the transparency introduced by the reforms to stop and search which enable forces to monitor and explain the use of the power. He has just outlined a couple of forces in which there is a huge increase in the proportion of black people stopped and searched compared with the rest of the population. It is absolutely right that the police must explain the use of the power and make efforts to improve it.
My Lords, the notion of searching everybody who goes through an Underground station would, I am afraid, be unfeasible. In addition to knives, there are other metal things that people might carry in their pockets. I can foresee that system as being entirely unworkable. I go back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser: intelligence-led stop and search is the most effective way to deal with some of the problems we are seeing.
As nobody else appears to be burning to ask a question perhaps I may ask the noble Baroness to comment on the fact that the percentage of stop and search that is done to look for weapons is abysmally small and that drugs are the reason given for 75% of stop and search, notwithstanding the link between the two?
I agree that the percentage for weapons is not high, but the percentage is an awful lot higher in terms of the number of arrests made. It is becoming a more effective system. I agree with the noble Lord that the number of arrests made as a consequence of stop and search could be higher.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I think that the noble Lord would agree that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary and the policing Minister have acknowledged the increasing calls on police time and resources, particularly over the past two years, but our analysis points to a range of factors driving serious violence, most notably in the drugs market. The Government, therefore, understand that police demand is changing and becoming much more complex. Noble Lords will know—I have said it before—that the Minister for Policing and the Fire Service has visited police forces across England and Wales and that was why the funding settlement of more than £460 million in 2018-19 was arrived at. Early intervention is, however, crucial in this area, particularly for young people.
My Lords, these deaths are a tragedy, and our thoughts are with all those affected. Clearly there are long-term issues, which the noble Baroness has referred to, but if we are to get knives off the street we need the police and communities to work together so that stop and search can be accurately targeted at those actually carrying the knives. How can this be done when community policing has been devastated by the Government’s cuts to police budgets? There is nothing in the Government’s anti-violence strategy about increasing police resources.
My Lords, the noble Lord points to something important about stop and search—it has to be intelligence-led and there have to be sufficient police officers to deal with it. In terms of the community, the noble Lord points to something very important. Community projects to tackle knife crime may be one of the most effective ways of dealing with this scourge that has blighted communities for the past few years.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI thank both noble Lords for their contributions to the debate, and thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for what I believe are helpful amendments. I appreciate that they are intended to ensure more comprehensive coverage of the information to be notified.
Amendment 36 relates to the notification of the details of any motor vehicle which a registered terrorist offender is the registered keeper of, or acquires the right to use. Sadly, we have seen the use of motor vehicles as weapons in a number of recent terror attacks. Here in Parliament we have seen first-hand the devastating impact that such an attack can have, in the Westminster Bridge attack which took place last year. The benefits are obvious, ensuring that convicted terrorists are required to inform the police of any vehicle of which they have use.
I therefore fully recognise and support the intention of Amendment 36. It is essential that the provision should extend properly to vehicles which are borrowed or hired, which is the point the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made. Hired vehicles were used in both the Westminster Bridge and Finsbury Park attacks last year. The terrorists responsible for the London Bridge attack attempted to hire a much larger vehicle than the van that was eventually used in the attack. This was just in the UK. We have also seen the use of vehicles as weapons in the Nice truck attack in July 2016, the Las Ramblas attack in August 2017 and the Berlin Christmas market attack.
I assure the noble Lord that this issue was carefully considered in the drafting of Clause 12, and that the existing reference to vehicles which the terrorist offender acquires the right to use will fully cover vehicles that are borrowed or rented. The Explanatory Notes to the Bill make this point. I therefore suggest that Amendment 36 is not needed, and I hope the noble Lord will feel content to withdraw it.
Amendment 38 similarly relates to a possible gap in the information to be notified to the police, in this instance relating to financial accounts. As currently drafted, this clause specifies that an offender must provide details of any account that they hold with a financial institution, or that is held by a company through which they run a business. Amendment 38 would expand this to refer also to any financial account which the registered terrorist offender is entitled to operate. The noble Lord has explained that this is intended to cover a scenario where a terrorist seeks to use an account which is not held in their name but over which they have effective control, for example because it is held in the name of their child or a relative for whom they have a power of attorney.
I thank the noble Lord for this amendment, which may have considerable merit in ensuring that the notification requirements cover all accounts which a terrorist offender might be able to use for terrorism purposes. The amendment requires more detailed consideration but, for now, I hope the noble Lord will not press it pending that consideration, and on the assurance that I will let him know the outcome of that consideration ahead of Report.
I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark, for his support, and for the comments of the Minister. I welcome the fact that the Government will look carefully at Amendment 38. On Amendment 36, I ask that the Government also look at whether, when somebody hires a car, the contract says effectively that the person does not have the right to use that vehicle for an illegal purpose; that could be a gap in the legislation as drafted. I hope that the Minister will appreciate that we are trying to be helpful and supportive in suggesting these amendments.
I think that my noble friend in fact agrees with my point, if I am not mistaken.
Can the Minister just confirm that, even for those terrorism offences that might be considered more minor—not that any terrorism offence is minor— there is no chance at all of rehabilitation for those individuals: that they will for ever, or for a very considerable time, pose a risk and that a complete change of behaviour is not possible?
I have to say that there is always a chance of rehabilitation, given the deradicalisation programmes that go on, but there will always be an element of risk, I would suggest.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the Minister talked about an additional 600 staff being recruited in 2018-19. Does she not agree that there were in fact 450 fewer full-time equivalents in Border Force in 2017-18 than there were five years ago, despite a significant increase in the number of people coming across the border?
I did not actually talk about 600 staff; I talked about 900 in three lots of 300. In fact, the number permanently employed in Border Force at the end of 2017-18 was 7,700, and the forecast for 2019 is 8,600.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, under Clause 2 it will be an offence to publish an image of an item of clothing or other article associated with a proscribed organisation,
“in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of”,
the organisation, as noble Lords have pointed out. This provision updates for the digital age the existing offence at Section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which criminalises the display in a public place of such an item in such circumstances. That existing offence applies only partially in cases where a person publishes an image online. While it would be likely to catch a person who publishes an image of, for example, a Daesh flag displayed on the streets, it could be argued not to apply to publication of an image of the same flag displayed within a private home, even if both images are made available to the general public by publishing them online in the exact same way.
The purpose of Clause 2 is to put beyond doubt the application of Section 13 to any case where a person publishes an image of something which it would be unlawful to display in person. It does this by inserting a new offence into Section 13 as its new subsection (1A). This is important to ensure that the law applies properly to contemporary online activity. In the 18 years since the Section 13 offence was enacted, we have of course seen an exponential growth in the importance of the internet in day-to-day life, and sadly its role in radicalisation and the spreading of terrorist propaganda is no different. This includes publishing images of flags and logos associated with proscribed terrorist organisations. We therefore need to update our legislation to reflect these developments and to ensure that all public spaces, including those online, are properly covered by laws which prohibit the publication of such material. Amendment 7 would simply remove this provision in its entirety, rather than seeking to amend or improve it, leaving the gap I have just described and leaving our terrorism legislation out of date and incomplete.
Amendments 8 and 9 would add a reasonable excuse defence to the new Subsection (1A) offence I have outlined. Both specify certain examples of reasonable excuse. Amendment 6 includes instances where publication of the image was not intended to be in support of a proscribed organisation, whereas Amendment 7 makes this category an absolute exemption.
Noble Lords have indicated that their intention is to ensure that the offence does not catch those with a legitimate reason to publish images of items associated with proscribed terrorist organisations, in particular in the context of historical or academic research or family photographs, or who otherwise publish such images without nefarious intent. I am very happy to support both the sentiment and the intention behind these amendments. The Government have no desire to criminalise people for simply going about their legitimate professional activities or their normal family life, but these amendments are not needed to secure that outcome. In fact, the same outcome is already secured by Clause 2.
To explain why that is so, it is important to note that the mere publication of an image associated with a proscribed organisation is not enough on its own to constitute an offence under the existing Section 13 offence or the new offence that will be added to it by Clause 2. The offence will be made out only if the image is published in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the individual is a member or supporter of the proscribed organisation. This provides a clear and effective safeguard. For example, in a case where a journalist features an image of a Daesh flag in a news report on the activities of the group or an academic publishes such an image in a book or research paper, it would be clear from the circumstances that they are not a member or supporter of Daesh. Similarly, where a person publishes, say, an old family photo of an ancestor standing next to an IRA flag, the offence would not bite unless all the circumstances of the publication suggest that that person is a member or supporter of the IRA.
On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, about the sensitivity of symbolism, pictures et cetera and Northern Ireland, if he will indulge me, I will move on to the specific Northern Ireland point on the next amendment.
This approach provides no less certainty to such individuals that they will not be caught by the new offence than would the proposed reasonable excuse defence, and it offers the advantage that the same formulation—
Will the Minister address the example I gave at Second Reading and again today of somebody who does not realise when taking a selfie that there is an ISIS flag behind them on their friend’s wall? In what way would it be clear that those circumstances are not intended to lead to a reasonable suspicion that the people in the photograph are supporters of ISIS?
I was going to explain it in my own words, but I think the notes agree with me. On the innocent selfie with the ISIS flag in the background, the offence is clear: it is committed only where all the circumstances in which an image is published give rise to reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or a supporter of a terrorist organisation. The picture in and of itself is not the offence. I hope I have explained that clearly to the noble Lord.
My Lords, briefly, I support the amendment. Judging from the Minister’s non-verbal reaction to it, the consultation proposed seems extremely sensible given the history in Northern Ireland. On whether or not the police will use these powers in a public order situation, the police are very experienced—I declare an interest as a former advanced public order trained police officer who dealt with such situations—and, clearly, a decision has to be made on the basis of the circumstances at the time whether items can be safely seized without escalating the situation. The police service is very well equipped in deploying professional photographers and others gathering video evidence which can be used instead of, or in addition to, seizing those items. So although I agree with the sentiment behind the amendment concerning Northern Ireland, I do not share the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, about the seizure of items potentially escalating a situation.
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has explained, the amendments relate to the new power to seize flags and other articles provided for in Clause 2(4). Under Section 13(1) of the 2000 Act, it is an offence to wear or display in a public place an item of clothing or other article in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation. The seizure power in Clause 2 is intended to ensure that the police and the CPS have the best evidence to pursue a prosecution for a Section 13(1) offence.
Of course, the police already have powers to seize evidence following an arrest, but in some circumstances, particularly in the context of policing a march or demonstration, arresting an individual may not always be an option if the legal tests in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 for making an arrest are not satisfied; or arrest may not be the appropriate policing response at that time if, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, pointed out, it is judged that it would provoke further disorder. In such a case, if the police wish to take action against a person displaying an item such as a flag or banner, instead of arresting the individual, the officer may choose to report them for summons on suspicion of committing an offence under Section 13(1) of the 2000 Act.
The new power introduced by Clause 2(4) would enable the officer, in these circumstances, to seize an item such as a flag which they reasonably believe to be evidence of the Section 13(1) offence in the absence of an arrest. The officer must be satisfied that seizure is necessary to prevent the evidence being concealed, lost, altered or destroyed. By preventing the loss or destruction of such items, this power will better support investigations and will provide and better preserve more evidence to help take forward prosecutions.
After the debate, I shall go back and check, but those are the ones we have consulted on this aspect.
Of course, this will be a discretionary police power like any other, and its application in Northern Ireland will be an operational matter for the PSNI, but we will consult and update those partners further, as necessary, prior to the provision coming into force.
The change that Clause 2(4) makes to Section 13 of the 2000 Act is to confer a power on the police to seize flags or other articles associated with a proscribed terrorist organisation as evidence of an offence under Section 13(1). This is intended to ensure that the police and CPS have the best evidence to pursue a prosecution.
Of course, the police already have powers to seize evidence following an arrest, but in the context of policing a march or demonstration, it might not always be an option if the legal tests in the PACE Act 1984 for making an arrest are not satisfied, or arrest may not be the appropriate policing response at that time.
In such a case, if the police wish to take action against a person displaying such a flag, instead of arresting the individual, the officer may choose to report them for summons on suspicion of committing an offence under Section 13(1) of the 2000 Act.
I think I may have been given papers which are forcing me to repeat what I just said.
Ignoring what I just said—I am not sure how that happened—I hope that, with the explanation I have given, the noble Lord will feel happy to withdraw the amendment.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe reason I have not given the noble Lord those figures is because I cannot give them. We are certainly looking through the aviation strategy to provide improvements and looking at the service level agreements that we have made.
My Lords, those entering the UK from outside the EU and the EEA are stopped at the border to check that they are not moving here permanently and that they are not going to work here illegally, hence the queues. What plans have the Government put in place, if we leave the EU, to ensure that EU citizens are not moving here permanently or moving here to work illegally, bearing in mind that the Government have promised that there will be no border between the EU and the UK on the island of Ireland?
I am sure that the noble Lord will agree that, when passengers come into this country, Border Force ensures that this country maintains its safety and security for all. The arguments around the CTA are well trodden, with the Government not wanting a hard border between Ireland and the UK. Of course, the CTA existed before the EU itself, and will do after we leave.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI will make three points to my noble friend. First, I join him in paying tribute to the staff of the Home Office. So often they get forgotten and come in for an awful lot of stick in Parliament from one extreme end of the argument or the other—that is, that we are being too soft or too hard on people wishing to come to this country.
My noble friend talked about China. I am about 99% certain that China is part of our visa waiver pilot. I will get back to him on that, but I am pretty certain that it is. Therefore, some of the problems that his colleague faced should not have been the case. I will look into it and get back to my noble friend.
My Lords, my noble friend Lady Hamwee asked the Minister whether those affected would receive a personal apology rather than the general one that the Home Secretary has given. Will the Minister answer that question? On a more general point, the Statement seems to suggest that officials were to blame for not following policy, but surely Ministers are responsible for implementation and the culture at the Home Office, not simply for policy. Are the Government admitting that they are guilty of not having a grip on the operation of the Home Office? Ministers cannot, should not and must not blame officials for their own failures.
I absolutely concur with the last point the noble Lord made. We are the representatives of the Government. We are not blaming officials. We are looking at the wider system. Guidance which was wrong was corrected and we are looking to see whether there is other guidance that is wrong and needs to be corrected. I again pay tribute to the staff of the Home Office. This is not a blame game. We are trying to put right something that is clearly wrong. I do not know whether the Home Secretary is planning to issue a personal apology, but he clearly publicly apologised today and I believe that that apology was most sincere.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord makes a very good point: unless we can understand the root causes of this, it is very difficult to tackle it. There have been several similar cases of the abuse of children. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary has said:
“I will not let cultural or political sensitivities get in the way of understanding the problem ... I’ve instructed my officials to explore the … characteristics of these types of gangs and if the evidence suggests that there are cultural factors that may be driving this type of offending, then I will take action”.
My Lords, according to the Sunday Times, the Chancellor of the Exchequer thinks that the police would help their case for more money if they were more responsive to local residents and investigated crimes such as burglary, rather than labour-intensive investigations into historical sexual offences. Does the Minister agree?
I have to apologise to the noble Lord because, although I read the Sunday Times, I did not read that particular article. But nobody can be in any doubt about the commitment of this Government commitment to tackling this type of abuse, and in particular that of my right honourable friend the Home Secretary. Child sexual abuse has been declared a national threat and the Government are investing millions of pounds to enable officers to actively seek out and bring these types of offenders to justice. Last February, the Government published our tackling child sexual exploitation progress report and we have announced a £40 million package of measures to protect children and young people from sexual abuse, exploitation and trafficking, and to crack down on offenders. This has included £7.5 million for a new, ground-breaking centre of expertise that will identify, generate and share high-quality evidence of what works in preventing and tackling child sexual abuse and exploitation. We have put a significant increase in resources into the NCA, leading to a near doubling of the CEOP command’s investigative capability, and an additional £20 million has been committed up to 2020 to maintain this. There is a further £20 million of transformation funds going into the regional organised crime units, which do a superb job in bringing to justice perpetrators who target children online.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, unusually, I shall be supporting Amendment 1 but I shall also speak to Amendments 2 and 3 in this group. My noble friend Lady Hamwee and I have added our names to Amendment 1 in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Kennedy, but we feel that the amendment to Clause 1 as drafted does not go far enough.
Before I come to that, however, I wish to say that I wholeheartedly support what the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has said about the provisions of the Bill. Bearing in mind that they are likely to be mutual, in that similar provisions would be in a Bill in a country with which we are going to enter into a treaty, it is very important to have a death penalty assurance in that treaty, which is what the amendment seeks to do. In addition to what the noble Lord has said about UK Ministers saying that we in the UK are opposed to the death penalty, Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, together with Protocol 13 to which the UK is a signatory, provides for the total abolition of the death penalty. In early meetings with the Minister, we were led to believe that that death penalty assurance would be part of any treaty. However, we feel we need that reassurance in the Bill.
As I say, we took the unusual step of both supporting and amending the Labour amendment on the basis that we both agree on the principle of Amendment 1— that the Government should not enter into a treaty that would require UK companies to provide electronic data to law enforcement in a country that had the death penalty unless the treaty contained assurances that the death penalty would not be implemented if data provided by UK companies was used. We believe that the prohibition on entering into a treaty with a country that has the death penalty should be broader than just the data covered by Section 52 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, which is what Amendment 1 covers, because that provision covers only the interception of communications in the course of transmission—wiretaps, listening in to telephone conversations and that type of electronic data. A British company could hold personal information about an individual that could be crucial in an investigation for an offence that carries the death penalty in the country making the request. Such electronic data would not necessarily be in the course of transmission but held on servers in the UK.
Our Amendment 2 would therefore include,
“any other enactment which provides for the collection of electronic data”.
Amendment 3 makes it clear that the prohibition on entering into a treaty would not apply if an assurance had been given that the death penalty would not be imposed whether either intercepted communication or any other kind of electronic data had been provided under the Act. That amendment is consequential on Amendment 2.
We want to ensure that no UK company is complicit in providing electronic data of any kind that could lead to someone being executed. I beg to move.
I thank both noble Lords for speaking to their amendments today and express my gratitude to all Members of the House for their contributions both in Committee and today on Report—I think it is the same two noble Lords, but perhaps there are one or two more.
I stress to the House the importance of the UK-US data access agreement. The agreement will allow the UK authorities access to valuable evidence and intelligence directly from US communication service providers. The House should be made aware that the vast majority of CSPs and their data reside in the US, not the UK. The Bill gives our law enforcement a strategic advantage in the fight against the threat we face.
Indeed, in almost every serious criminal investigation, we expect those we investigate to be using services provided by CSPs based in the US. The agreement will make a significant contribution to the detection, investigation, prevention and prosecution of serious crime and terrorism. The Government have been working towards the agreement with the help of US CSPs and the US Government for several years following the recommendation from the then Prime Minister’s data envoy Sir Nigel Sheinwald.
All Governments and any future Governments have the duty to put the security of their people first. It will always be in the public interest to ensure that our police and agencies have access to the necessary intelligence and evidence in order to fulfil that duty. Just as it was under the previous Labour Government and as it is today, Ministers must always be mindful of the current threat environment they find themselves in. That is why we believe that better scrutiny of these agreements and accountability for future treaties is the best way to ensure that the Government’s principles are tested, rather than prescribing a rigid format for treaties that have not yet even been mooted, let alone being currently under negotiation.
Of course, the Government’s objective is to obtain a satisfactory death penalty assurance, but negotiations are ongoing and not yet concluded. Playing the discussions out in public may make it much harder to conclude them effectively.
Let me be clear to the House: there will be an assurance in the agreement. We can expect it to rule out the direct use of information obtained under the agreement as evidence in a prosecution where the death penalty might apply. Parliament will scrutinise the final detail of any agreement and the assurance it contains. We have already tabled an amendment today clarifying that the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 process will always apply to relevant international agreements, ensuring that Members have two opportunities to scrutinise a treaty.
But I am willing to go further. Noting the concerns that noble Lords have expressed, the Government will commit to bringing forward an amendment in the Commons. Such an amendment would not pre-empt negotiations with the US, or any future agreement with another country, but would instead absolutely guarantee that Parliament has the chance to conduct proper, thorough scrutiny of relevant agreements and death penalty assurances.
The amendment I envisage would ensure that Ministers cannot make regulations to designate any agreement with a country which retains the death penalty for incoming requests without first laying before Parliament the agreement and details of any assurances obtained. There would then be a defined period during which Parliament would have a chance to examine those details, and this could include scrutiny by any relevant committees.
Finally, the Secretary of State would be obliged to consider any recommendations made by a committee in relation to the assurances before laying regulations to designate the agreement. Of course, the regulations themselves would then be subject to the usual process of parliamentary scrutiny, during which time Members of both Houses could consider any recommendations and respond to them.
Ultimately, it is right that Parliament has a say on the difficult decision between not concluding negotiations on agreements and securing the death penalty assurances we would like. Both the amendments tabled by Labour and Liberal Democrat Peers could lead to our being unable to conclude a data access agreement with the US. If we find ourselves in that situation, law enforcement agencies and the UK intelligence community will continue to be denied timely access to valuable evidence and intelligence.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said that Section 52 of the IPA covers only material intercepted in the course of transmission. That is not entirely correct. It can authorise obtaining stored communications as well as intercept. As I said, there is a balance to be struck here. That is why I ask Members not to tie the Government’s hands in negotiations. Instead I will commit to amending the Bill in the Commons to ensure that Parliament has ample opportunity to scrutinise any future treaty and, if relevant, its death penalty assurance.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister. Unless she wishes to contradict me, I think she just said that these treaties are very important to the extent that the British Government are prepared to allow people to be executed on the basis of data provided by British companies to overseas law enforcement. The essence of these amendments is that that should not be allowed and we want that reassurance on the face of the Bill.
I do contradict the noble Lord. I am asking noble Lords not to tie the Government’s hands in negotiation.
Forgive me, but I do not see the difference between what I said and what the Minister has just said, unless she wants to clarify further.
We are concerned about this because of the recent case of Kotey and Elsheikh, in which the American authorities asked for information from the British on two people who were part of an ISIS cell. The Home Secretary decided that the information would be provided without a death penalty assurance. We are concerned that what might considered a one-off case which contradicts the British Government’s usual global opposition to the death penalty is now going to be enshrined in treaties. I understand what the Minister said about Section 52 of the Investigatory Powers Act, but that is not our understanding and I therefore wish to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 2.
I thank both noble Lords for their points. There has been nothing in our own domestic law that requires a UK provider to comply with an overseas order. There will therefore be no conflict with domestic law if a CSP decides that complying with a foreign order would put it in breach of its obligations under the GDPR.
The existence of any conflict with UK data protection law does not have the effect of making the order from the other country invalid. Equally, the existence of the order does not compel the UK CSP to ignore its data protection obligations under UK law. It will be for the CSP on which an order is served to reconcile and comply with all legal obligations it is under. It could apply for the variation or revocation of the order, or use the dispute resolution mechanism that we expect all specific international agreements to include. That said, we do not think that this is likely to be necessary in practice. The GDPR contains several “gateways” which permit the cross-border transfer of personal data, including in response to a request or order from overseas law enforcement.
I know the noble Lord’s concerns about data protection, and I absolutely sympathise with him. We have discussed this before, and I think that ultimately we all want the same thing: adequate protection for the privacy rights of individuals. I hope that my explanation will satisfy the noble Lord that the Bill does not in any way threaten data protection rights, which are robustly protected by existing legislation. UK CSPs will continue to be bound by the GDPR and the Data Protection Act. Therefore, I hope that the noble Lord will feel happy to withdraw Amendment 12.
I am grateful to the Minister. I understand that she has just said that a communications service provider could refuse to comply with an order coming from overseas if the CSP believes that that would bring it into conflict with the GDPR and the Data Protection Act, so I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am very grateful to the Minister. Can she clarify? Under the old system, the assistant chief constable or equivalent would have to renew the authorisation every month; under the new system, it is my understanding that the assistant chief constable will only be involved every four months if there is a renewal and is not involved on a monthly basis as under the old system.
I have this answer somewhere, if the noble Lord will bear with me. It is a statutory requirement for the authorisation to be at the rank of assistant chief constable. I think the noble Lord knows that. The monthly review is not a statutory requirement, but as a further safeguard we have included it in the updated code of practice.
I am very grateful to the noble Baroness. The question was: is the monthly review undertaken by the assistant chief constable or by the officer who sought the authorisation to use the child as a CHIS?
I understand that the monthly review is done by the assistant chief constable. Have I still not answered the noble Lord’s question? The monthly review might be carried out by the authorising officer, but it is not a statutory requirement.
I am very sorry. My understanding was that the monthly review is done by the officer who applied to use the CHIS, not by the assistant chief constable. Have I got that wrong?
I do not know whether the noble Lord has that right or wrong. I will have to come back to him on that point. Just so he does not think I am derelict in my duty, I did ask that question but I will have to come back to him on it.
I turn to the second question, which was not about the changes that we have made but about the existing distinction in the safeguards, where an appropriate adult must be present in all meetings with a juvenile under the age of 16, but not for those aged 16 and 17. The noble Lord compared this with rules around the interview of juveniles under caution, where interviews of all under-18s require an appropriate adult to be present. I point out that 16 and 17 year-olds can absolutely request that somebody be present—a social worker, an appropriate adult or even a lawyer—but it is not mandated. That probably will not satisfy the noble Lord, but the law recognises that parental responsibility diminishes as a child matures. There are therefore a number of areas where the law treats over-16s differently from under-16s. For example, they can apply for their own passports or join the military.
Internal police guidance on deploying juvenile CHIS contains detail on how to safeguard and promote the well-being of the juvenile CHIS, including how to assess their maturity and capacity to give informed consent, which the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, mentioned, a requirement to ensure that handlers are properly trained to deal with young people—they have day-to-day responsibility for the CHIS and must raise any issues surrounding matters including the safety and welfare of the CHIS with those responsible for authorising their deployment—and requirements to consider all aspects of safeguarding the young person.
I understand that it would be police operational, but I will clarify for the noble Baroness whether operators in the children’s sector were also involved.
The updates to the CHIS code of practice in 2014 and 2017 were subject to formal public consultation, with no concerns raised about either the use of juveniles as CHISs or the safeguards that apply. But this provision has been in place for 18 years and it has probably had more scrutiny in the last two months than it ever had during those 18 years—and that is a good thing.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, also outlined an absolutely harrowing case study. I understand that those issues, if we are talking about the same ones, are being considered by the undercover police inquiry and that the Home Office is co-operating fully with the inquiry. We have responded to requests for information and have given the inquiry access to our files and records.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, raised the issue of further oversight. I think that I went through that point when we last debated this. It would not be a simple matter; it would be one for primary legislation. Nevertheless, I take his point. I hope he feels that, under the leadership of Governments of different political colours, the safeguards have been enhanced and are robust, and that there is strong and effective oversight in the form of Lord Justice Fulford.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, talked about the public consultations on the provision. It was subject to statutory public consultations—most recently in 2017-18—and views from all were absolutely welcome. It is not incompatible with existing legislation—but, as I have just said, this House has given it more scrutiny than any other.
I have two more scraps of paper. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked about the authorising officer. The authorising officer should, where possible, be responsible for completing subsequent renewals and any other related security or welfare issue—but I do not think that that answers his question. I now know what that question was, and the other scrap does not answer it, either, so I will get back to him on that specific point.
This House has given this really serious issue the time, scrutiny and questioning that it deserves, after 18 years of it passing largely unnoticed by either House of Parliament. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Haskel, for raising this in the first instance and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for raising it today.
My Lords, I too thank the noble Lord, Lord Haskel, and the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee for bringing this provision to the attention of the House. As he said, using children in this way puts them in danger, and if any of us were in any doubt about that, the harrowing story that my noble friend Lady Hamwee told the House clearly indicates that.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, made the important point that surveillance commissioners formerly and now judicial commissioners review the deployment of child CHISs after the event. There is now a recognised definition of a child as a person under 18. We should be talking about child CHISs, not juvenile CHISs, in this debate. An eminently sensible suggestion was made. Under the Investigatory Powers Act, many surveillance powers are subject to the double lock whereby both a senior officer and a judicial commissioner agree to the use of the surveillance technique. Why can that not be used in this case?
The Minister kept talking about the enhanced safeguards provided by these regulations. We still do not know whether the independent senior officer—the assistant chief constable—will be looking at these cases every four months instead of, as previously, having to look at them every month because the assistant chief constable could authorise for only one month at a time. We still do not know who is doing the review. If it is being done by the officer who applied to the assistant chief constable, rather than by the assistant chief constable himself or herself, I do not think anybody could describe that as an enhanced safeguard.
The Minister said that a child being interviewed under caution for a criminal offence is not comparable with being recruited as a CHIS. It is far more dangerous to be recruited as a CHIS than it is to be interviewed. The fact that 16 and 17 year-olds can be recruited as CHISs without an adult being present but cannot be questioned about a criminal offence does not strike me as an enhanced safeguard. Whether the legal framework governing the authorisation and use of juvenile CHISs, when taken as a whole, is clearly capable of being exercised in a way that is consistent with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child is an issue that the courts will be asked to consider. Therefore, on that question we perhaps do not need to take things further today.
I am very grateful to the Minister not only for the time to debate this twice, once in Grand Committee and once in the Chamber, but for the time she has spent discussing these issues with me and trying to clarify what we need on the record. Unfortunately, I do not feel that we have got there this evening. There are unresolved matters which the Minister has agreed to write to noble Lords about. At this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the Motion.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI certainly recognise the point that the noble Lord makes about the feeling that people are promoted from the inside and, therefore, that perhaps officers do not apply from other forces. On female turnover, we should welcome the fact that we have a female commissioner of the Met police, which is fantastic news. The chair of the National Police Chiefs’ Council is also a woman, and the director-general of the NCA is also female. However, I understand the noble Lord’s point. I also think that chiefs themselves have a role to play in attracting and encouraging talent coming up through the pipeline. The College of Policing published a code of ethics, guidance on flexible working and guidance on the use of positive action to increase the recruitment and retention of underrepresented groups, including females.
My Lords, it has always been the case that incumbent chief officers have had an advantage over outside candidates, but this has been made worse by the fact that there is a one-to-one relationship between the police and crime commissioner and his or her chief officer team. Why will the Home Office not reimpose the requirement that a national Home Office-led assessment is part of the selection process? Even the noble Lord, Lord Sugar, has a panel of experts to help him decide who his apprentice will be.
The PCC, in recruiting his chief constable, has to be mindful of the quality of candidate he is recruiting. The thing about PCCs, which was not true of police authorities when they existed, is that the public can hold them to account at the ballot box.
(5 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberI think that the noble Lord might have meant 2015 but I absolutely take his point. A review, which of course it would be open to the PCC to instigate, may consider whether any of the allegations that he talks about—the remaining six—would have justified a decision by the Crown Prosecution Service to prosecute. But as I said to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, the ability of the reviewer to do this would depend on the evidence that was brought forward.
My Lords, there is no doubt that the chief constable has not been effectively held to account for Operation Conifer. The Minister says that it is not a failure of the Home Office. It must therefore be a failure of the police and crime commissioner. Is it not time to break up the often too cosy one-to-one relationship between chief constables and police and crime commissioners and revert to police authorities?
In the time that PCCs have been established, they are generally accepted to have worked well.
(5 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child states that the interests of the child must be paramount in all decisions and actions that affect children. When the Government recently decided to weaken the safeguards on using child informants, despite the environment in which they operate becoming more dangerous, they consulted the people who use these child informants but not one organisation or individual that is responsible for their welfare. Can the Minister explain how this is putting the needs of the child first?
I absolutely dispute what the noble Lord has said because, far from weakening the safeguards, we have strengthened them by ensuring that the appropriate adult is someone who is professionally qualified to take on the role. The UK ensures that the principles of the convention are considered and realised through the approach taken, both in the legislation and in other measures, to ensure that children’s rights and interests are safeguarded.
(5 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy noble friend makes two very good points, the first being about justice being seen to be served for the Windrush generation, to which my right honourable friend the Home Secretary is utterly committed. To that end, he has asked Wendy Williams to conduct a review and report back by March. I agree with my noble friend, too, that clarity for both our elected officials and unelected officials gives the public confidence in Parliament. The Prime Minister said earlier today:
“I reassure my right hon. Friend that the Home Secretary has been looking at this issue, and the Cabinet Secretary is looking at this. We are committed to publication, but the form of that is currently being considered”.
My Lords, the action of the Home Office in relation to the Windrush generation may be welcome, but how many others who were legally in this country but without documentation from areas other than the Caribbean have been similarly wrongly deported or deprived of the means to live in this country? What assurance can the Minister give that the appalling treatment of the Windrush generation has not been repeated in relation to others?
The noble Lord makes a point that he has made before, and it is a very good one. Certainly, the review being carried out by Wendy Williams will teach us some lessons for the future to ensure that this never happens again. In addition, as I think I mentioned the other day, this issue makes clear the importance now of identity assurance.
(5 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberTo address the last question first, both the Policing Minister and the Home Secretary recognise the demands on the police. They have said it before and my right honourable friend the Policing Minister said it again today. Not only is the picture of crime changing, but the police have had to deal—so bravely—with the various terrorist attacks we have had over the past year. When it comes to understanding demand, I have said before that my right honourable friend the Policing Minister visited all 43 forces in England and Wales leading up to the comprehensive settlement for 2018-19, which provided that £460 million increase. Looking forward to the next spending review, he stated in December last year that he would revisit plans to change the funding formula at the time of the next spending review. I have outlined the 2018 settlement, but in 2019-20 he will seek to maintain the protection of the broadly flat police grant, alongside the same flexibility of the precept that happened this year.
My Lords, the NAO report finds that central government funding for the police service has fallen by 30% in real terms since 2010-11, resulting between March 2010 and March 2018 in a 15% reduction in police officers, a 40% reduction in PCSOs and a 21% reduction in other police staff. Despite what the Minister has just said, the NAO says the Government have,
“no national picture of what forces need”.
Do the Government agree with the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, who said yesterday:
“This is not a service that needs reform, this is a service that needs support and needs resources … the NAO report shows this”?
Will the Minister finally admit that the Government can no longer argue that the police service has sufficient resources to deliver an effective service? The NAO says that the Government do not have a clue whether or not the police service has sufficient resources.
(5 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord is absolutely right that this facility continues to operate. To that end, the Commission has been very clear that it wants to continue co-operation on internal security, including extradition and Europol. I also point out that, at the recent press conference on 31 August, Michel Barnier recognised the progress in our discussions on security. Our focus now should be on trying to define an ambitious partnership.
My Lords, a European arrest warrant has been issued for the two Russians suspected of being responsible for the Wiltshire poisonings. But Norway and Iceland, both of which are in the EU single market and the Schengen area, have been waiting for 13 years to be part of the European arrest warrant—and they are still waiting because they are not members of the EU. What chance does the UK have of retaining the EAW if we are outside the EU, the single market and the Schengen area?
The noble Lord points out the issue of the two Russians. Of course, as well as an EAW an Interpol red notice was issued for those two people. The UK has made a significant contribution to Europol. It is important to note that in 2017 the UK was the highest contributor of data relating to serious and organised crime to Europol’s analysis project. We are also in the top three member states that contribute intelligence each day to different databases in Europol, and the UK is driving or co-driving almost half of all EU law enforcement projects in the fight against serious and organised crime. That is a very good reason why we should continue.
(5 years, 11 months ago)
Grand CommitteeWhile we are waiting, am I right in thinking that in the recent Facebook case it was not that the service provider did not want to provide the information that would be of use to UK law enforcement but that domestic law in America did not allow it to provide that information, and that in the overwhelming majority of cases to which this legislation would apply we anticipate that the service provider would be more than keen to provide the data, provided it can be done lawfully, and that this mechanism provides the lawful means of doing that?
I think the noble Lord is probably quite right. It goes back to what I was saying at the beginning of my response. If there were doubts about compliance, or that began to become apparent, MLA would be the process that we would revert to if this was not forthcoming. Ditto, the American side would probably institute the MLA process to ensure compliance.
(5 years, 12 months ago)
Grand CommitteeI understand the point that the noble Lord is making. I, not least, look forward to the discussion that we are going to have.
My Lords, I am very grateful for the comments of all noble Lords on this group of amendments. I do not want to prolong the agony; I accept that the Bill is about outgoing requests but in order for outgoing requests to be complied with, there would be an expectation by the foreign state that a similar application to the UK would be met. We are potentially talking about UK service providers providing evidence to a foreign state that would enable that state to carry out the death penalty on a suspect. Having agreements based on trust and mutual respect, rather than a legally binding agreement, where if there are differences of opinion about what particular terms mean there would be some form of dispute resolution—no more reassurance than that—while the IP Act 2016 could impose restrictions, but might not, all seems rather vague and general. When we are talking about someone’s life potentially being ended, we would seek more concrete reassurances that evidence provided by the UK is not going to lead to that.
I understand that the intention is to have an agreement with the United States of America as a whole. However, bearing in mind that the death penalty is an issue in some states but not others, and that other agreements would be on a case-by-case basis—presumably on the basis of the human rights record of the states that the agreement was entered into with—it seems odd that a blanket agreement could be entered into with the USA when there is that crucial difference between states as to whether the death penalty could be carried out. Obviously, we are in Committee, which is about understanding concerns and the Government’s position. We need to further develop that in meetings and on Report. In the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I hope that this amendment will not require any further meetings or probing on Report. The Bill provides that an appropriate officer is able to apply for an overseas production order where an indictable offence has been committed, where proceedings in relation to that indictable offence have been instituted or investigated, or where the order is sought for the purpose of terrorist investigations. Therefore, the clause is already limited to officers who are exercising law enforcement functions. In fact, the clause already makes clear that where a listed appropriate officer has functions other than for law enforcement purposes, it is only where the appropriate officer is exercising functions in relation to the investigation or prosecution of criminal conduct that they may apply for an overseas production order. For example, a person appointed by the FCA can conduct both civil and criminal investigations and the clause ensures that they can apply for an overseas production order only in connection with criminal investigations or prosecutions. I hope that that provides reassurance.
My Lords, I am very grateful for that explanation provided by the Minister. The meeting of 20 minutes we have scheduled before Report will not be further extended as a result of this amendment and I beg leave to withdraw it.
My Lords, Amendment 11 is in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Hamwee. We debated long and hard in this House about when and how law enforcement agencies and the security services can secure authority to access bulk data. The Investigatory Powers Act 2016—not to be confused with the investigatory powers Act 2018, which exists only on BBC1 on Sunday evenings—contains some safeguards against state access to bulk data and it is essential that those safeguards are not circumvented by the Bill. The Government will no doubt say that accessing bulk data held overseas is not the purpose of the Bill, but what other reassurances can the Minister give that the powers under the Bill will not be used inappropriately by law enforcement agencies? Amendment 11 seeks to achieve this by amending Clause 3(2), changing the definition of “electronic data” to exclude bulk data. I beg to move.
Again, I hope that I can provide clarity on the noble Lord’s amendment. When applying for an overseas production order an officer must specify or describe the electronic data sought under an order. In addition, the judge must be satisfied that a number of requirements are met before making an order under Clause 4. These include that the judge must be satisfied that the person against whom the order is sought has possession or control of all or part of the data specified in the application; that the data requested is likely to be of substantial value; and that it is in the public interest for all or part of the data to be produced. It is very difficult to see how a judge could be satisfied that these requirements are met if they were considering an application for an order seeking bulk data.
The reason is that bulk data requests are for sets of information, often about a large number of individuals who may or may not be known to law enforcement agencies. The Bill has been drafted to require appropriate officers to consider carefully what data they are targeting—which, of course, is not the case with bulk data—and where the information is stored, in order to help with the investigation and prosecution of serious crime, in addition to demonstrating that the data will be of substantial value to the investigation and in the public interest. It feels to me that there are sufficient safeguards in place, because of the processes I have outlined, and I hope that the noble Lord will feel happy to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, I am grateful for the Minister’s explanation. I am not sure that it entirely satisfies us about the potential for misuse of the legislation, but we will reflect on what she said and perhaps discuss it with her before Report.
If there is any doubt in this matter, as I understand it from the briefing that we had from the House of Lords Library, the UK’s Deputy National Security Adviser, giving testimony to the US House of Representatives’ Judiciary Committee in June 2017, said that the UK Government were “in full agreement” with the US Department of Justice that a UK-US bilateral data sharing agreement should limit access to targeted orders for data and not bulk access to data.
I thank the noble Lord because that underlines my point.
If that is the case, there is no reason why it should not be stated in the Bill.
I am sorry, but I think I need to intervene. All sorts of things could be stated in the Bill, but given its purpose, I do not think it is necessary. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, pointed that out.
With the greatest respect to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, he is talking about a bilateral agreement with United States of America and not a global reassurance given by every country with which we might enter into an agreement. Therefore, my concerns remain but, at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for his points and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for his intervention. The effect of Amendment 19 would be to exclude confidential journalistic material from the scope of an application and order. I should first point out that Clause 4 reflects the position in the PACE Act 1984. Journalistic material can already be sought under Schedule 1 to PACE through special procedure, and under Schedule 5 to the Terrorism Act 2000, when it is held by a company or person based in the UK. The Bill extends this to circumstances where the data is held by an entity based outside the UK and where a relevant international arrangement is in place.
I do not think that we should introduce in the Bill a difference between material that can be obtained—subject of course to appropriate requirements and safeguards—when it is held in the UK, as opposed to being held by an entity based on the country with which we have entered into an agreement. I should also stress that similar standards are set out in the Bill as already exist in domestic legislation, and that the term “reasonable grounds for believing” is readily used by our court system. Reasonable belief requires more than just a guess or a hunch. It will require the judge, marshalling all the facts before them, to come to an assessment on whether the information sought does or does not contain this type of data. It is not the first time that that standard has been used in legislation, and of course it will not be the last. Where confidential journalistic material is sought, the Bill requires that such applications can only be made on notice. That means that anyone put on notice, which can and may include the journalist whose data might be sought, has the opportunity to make representations to the court as to whether it is appropriate for the data to be obtained.
The effect of Amendment 33 as drafted would be that an application for an overseas production order that included confidential journalistic material had to be made on notice to a data controller and the data subject. I understand the sentiment behind the amendment but I do not agree that it is required, for two reasons. First, the rules of court will set out the process by which a judge can ensure that anyone affected by the order is notified of any given case. Consideration of notice by the judge relating to such a request is left to his or her discretion to allow for the circumstances where notice to a data controller, data subject or anyone else is deemed appropriate by the judge when granting an overseas production order. I think giving the judge discretion to determine which is appropriate in any given case is the right approach.
Secondly—this is a point that I have made before and will make again—we are providing in the Bill the means to serve an order on a company based outside the UK in a country with which we have a relevant agreement, in the same way as is currently the case with a company based in the UK. In those cases the respondent and any other person affected by the order would ordinarily be given notice and therefore the opportunity to make representations, unless under rules of court the judge is satisfied that there are good reasons for not doing so—for example, because of the risk of prejudice to the investigation. We are proposing that the same should apply to overseas production orders.
The intention of Clause 12 is to require an application for an overseas production order to be made on notice where there are reasonable grounds for believing that the electronic data sought consists of, or includes, confidential journalistic data. The effect of the clause as drafted is that notice should be served on the respondent—that is, the person who would be required to produce the data if the order is made. In most cases, this would be a service provider rather than the customer on whose behalf the data is stored. However, a requirement to give notice to the respondent under Clause 12(1) does not preclude the judge considering the application from exercising his or her own discretion under rules of court. Under rules of court they may require notice to be given to other persons who may be affected by an order requiring the production of confidential journalistic material, including a person who in his or her professional capacity has acquired that data. It will be a matter for the judge’s discretion, but he or she is likely to insist on notice being given unless the applicant can demonstrate that doing so would prejudice the investigation—for example, where the journalist himself or herself is the subject of the investigation or prosecution.
An example of where it might not be appropriate is where there is a hacking investigation and the journalist might actually be the subject of an inquiry. The judge may decide that putting someone on notice could potentially harm the investigation or risk the dissipation of the material. It is the Government’s intention, however, to ensure that where an application relates to confidential journalistic data, notice can and should be served on journalists and on whoever the judge deems appropriate given the circumstances of the application. The PACE Act 1984, for example, requires service to be made on the respondent only, otherwise notice requirements are set out in court rules.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made an important point about sanctions to comply. It is difficult to construct a proportionate regime to ensure nondisclosure prior to an order being made and, in practice, law enforcement would not apply for an order where there was an unacceptable risk of damaging disclosure. I ask noble Lords not to press their amendments and I shall consider their comments before Report, if that is amenable to them.
I am very grateful to the Minister for her explanation and her offer to consider further the issues that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and I have raised in connection with these issues. Obviously, Amendment 19 is a probing amendment, a mechanism by which to debate these issues, but with the promise of further discussions to come before Report—perhaps the Minister could also establish whether the Government have consulted the National Union of Journalists on these issues—I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I reiterate that we oppose the death penalty in all circumstances. The Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Bill is about outgoing requests. It gives UK law enforcement authorities the power to request electronic data stored abroad where an international arrangement exists for use in UK investigations and court cases. We will ensure that any future international agreement is consistent with our long-standing policy of opposing the death penalty.
Perhaps I may also comment on the change of approach. We have not changed our approach. I refer noble Lords to the Overseas Security and Justice Assistance Guidance, which incidentally is long-standing. Part a) says:
“Written assurances should be sought before agreeing to the provision of assistance that anyone found guilty would not face the death penalty”.
Part b) reads:
“Where no assurances are forthcoming or where there are strong reasons not to seek assurances, the case should automatically be deemed ‘High Risk’ and FCO Ministers should be consulted to determine whether, given the specific circumstances of the case, we should nevertheless provide assistance”.
My Lords, we are told that the UK did not want to try these people in the UK because we were concerned that we did not have enough evidence. Clearly, the Americans also thought that they did not have enough evidence—otherwise, why would they seek assistance from us? If UK and US pooled intelligence is sufficient to convict the accused, the Home Secretary could have avoided this political and moral dilemma by asking the US for its intelligence and agreeing to try the accused in the UK. Why did he not do so? Did the Home Secretary and the Prime Minister decide that the death penalty should be an option?
My party’s position is clear: we oppose the death penalty in all circumstances in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights Article 2 and Protocol 13, to which the UK is a signatory. We take a principled position on this issue. Can the Minister please clarify the Government’s position?
In addition to what I have just said, the UK’s position is that we will bring the perpetrators of very serious crimes to justice and we will work with our international partners to do so.
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for explaining these regulations to the House. I am not as concerned as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, about whether this is a pilot as my understanding is that there will be a period of three years from now for EU citizens to register and overcome any of the problems that may arise during the pilot scheme, so I am slightly more relaxed on that front. Can the Minister confirm that the continued operation of these regulations will be subject to satisfactory negotiations being concluded with the European Union and each of the 27 remaining EU countries, which will decide on a country-by-country basis what conditions they will impose on UK citizens’ residence in their countries if we leave the European Union? As the Minister will know, some European Union countries already require UK workers to register while others do not.
Can the Minister confirm that the database of photographs of EU citizens applying for leave to remain in the UK will be kept not just for the purpose of initial identification to ensure that the applicant matches their national identity document, but in perpetuity? Can she also confirm that every employer in the United Kingdom is expected to carry out a check of every prospective employee against Home Office databases to ensure that the individual has the right to work in the UK, whether they are a citizen of the UK, the EU or any other country?
The Minister has already confirmed that only non-EU members of EU citizens’ families will be required to supply a set of fingerprints along with a photograph. If I understood her correctly, this is to ensure that they have not been involved in crime or that in other ways it would not be desirable for them to remain in the UK. Again, will these fingerprints be retained on a database after they have been checked against, for example, criminal records? If the answer to both those questions— about photographs and fingerprints—is yes, are this Government changing their position on having a national identity card database, because this sounds like the beginning of that process?
The regulations are about EU citizens’ status in the UK if we leave the European Union. I therefore hope that the Minister will accept that the following question is within the scope of this debate. Can she confirm whether I correctly understood from the briefing by officials that she kindly arranged that there will be free movement of EU citizens into the Republic of Ireland, even if the UK leaves the EU: that there will be no immigration checks on anyone either at the border between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland or at any crossing point between Northern Ireland and the rest of the United Kingdom?
Can she therefore confirm that there will be no way that the UK could control inward immigration from the EU via the Republic of Ireland even if we leave the EU, that the only immigration controls will be those carried out by banks, landlords, the NHS and employers, and that, therefore, an unlimited number of EU nationals could live indefinitely in the UK if they came through the Republic of Ireland?
Can she also confirm that the UK’s border security will be totally reliant on the checks carried out by Republic of Ireland immigration officials who, in any event, will be unable to question any EU citizen as to their reason for entry under free movement rules? Presumably, the Irish Government have always been happy to share responsibility for guarding the EU’s external borders, but what discussions have the UK Government had with the Irish Government about their immigration officials effectively policing the UK border from the Republic?
I thank both noble Lords for their questions. The first question from the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, was about an evaluation of the private beta phase, or the pilot phase, which I can confirm will run from 28 August until October. On amendments to extend the scheme any further, we will provide further information in due course about our plans for the phased rollout of the EU settlement scheme later this year so that, in line with the draft withdrawal agreement, it is fully open by 30 March next year. Those plans will absolutely reflect the experience of the pilot phase and the learning that we draw from those who choose to apply under the scheme during that phase.
There will not be a formal report back, but any extension of the scheme will be subject to parliamentary consideration of the required changes to the Immigration Rules for the scheme, further to those for the private beta phase laid on 20 July. We will explain clearly any changes and the reasons for making them at that point.
I understand that any changes at all in the Immigration Rules for the scheme will be laid out, and why they will be laid out. We will need new Immigration Rules to extend the pilot to other groups, which is what I think the noble Lord was asking.
My Lords, I am now slightly confused. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way. Presumably, if the pilot works perfectly with this pilot group of EU citizens, it can then be rolled out to cover all EU citizens without any further regulation. Is that the case?
My Lords, I understand that this is a specific pilot scheme for a specific purpose, so it would then have to come back for extension to other groups. It will be the same thing, but for other groups. I hope that that explains it clearly. It will come back.
On the question of the receipt and retention of the photograph, there are three reasons why we need to receive and retain them. First, as part of the basic checks required to protect the scheme from abuse, we will compare the photograph with the one in the applicant’s identity document to confirm that they are one and the same person. Secondly, by keeping a record of the photograph, we can help secure the person’s identity and the status we have granted them against any attempt by another person to use those in a fraudulent application. Thirdly, the photograph will be contained in the secure digital status they receive under the scheme and will thereby provide a convenient means by which they can, for example, evidence their right to work to an employer. I will say a bit more about that shortly.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked about the photograph not meeting requirements and being chucked out. There will be a lot of guidance on how to take a photograph that matches and meets the requirements. If an applicant submits a photograph that is not sufficient, the Home Office will proactively contact them in a positive way—which I think the noble Lord was also driving at. I will underline that we are looking for a reason to grant this status, not refuse it. If there are any problems of any sort with an application, we will contact the applicant to help them resolve the matter, rather than reject it. I think that that was at the heart of the noble Lord’s question.
The noble Lord also asked about costs to the applicant. The agreement reached with the EU allows a fee of up to the cost of an equivalent document for UK nationals. We have used the cost of a passport of £75.50 as a point of reference. A fee of £65 to apply for status under the EU settlement scheme is in line with the current costs of obtaining permanent residence documentation, and it will contribute to the overall costs of the system. The fee for a child under 16 will be half that: £32.50. Where an applicant is granted pre-settled status under the scheme, from April 2019 there will be no fee when they apply for settled status. Applications will be free of charge for those who hold valid permanent residence documentation or valid indefinite leave to enter or remain, or for the children in local authority care. To charge a lower fee than the current fee that EU citizens are charged for permanent residence documentation would disadvantage those who have already paid the £65 fee to require that documentation to confer their exercise of free movement rights. To charge a higher fee would disadvantage those who have followed our advice since the referendum that they did not generally need to apply for EU documentation.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked about the consultation. We have been engaging with stakeholders throughout the process, including the user groups we have established, involving EU citizens’ representatives, embassies, employers, and others. These groups are helping us to develop the scheme and get it right. We have engaged with EU citizens at every stage of the development process and will continue to do so. We will also continue to expand our communications to ensure that EU citizens are aware of the scheme, how it will operate and what information they will need to provide, and so that they are reassured that they will have plenty of time in which to apply for their new UK immigration status.
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberI have a feeling that we do not release the number of staff that we have in our detention estate, but I will double check. If we do I will get those figures to the noble Lord.
My Lords, with the greatest respect, we should be looking for outcomes, not outputs. We should be looking for results, not activity. So why is the number of people being detained for more than six months still increasing? I accept what the noble Lord, Lord Deben, said about this potentially being an increasing problem, but can the Minister tell the House what percentage of people are being detained, as opposed to those who are not? Is that percentage increasing or decreasing?
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I beg leave to ask a Question of which I have given private notice.
My Lords, the Office for National Statistics has pointed to improvements to police recording and increased willingness of victims to report certain crimes such as sexual offences and domestic abuse as important factors in explaining trends in police recorded crime. However, there has been a genuine increase in serious violent crimes, so we have announced new laws to address them. The serious violence strategy represents a step change in the way that we respond.
My Lords, overall crime is increasing and violent crime, as the Minister has just said, is increasing at an alarming rate of more than 10%. The crime survey does not reflect this because of the underrepresentation of young men, who are predominantly the victims of violent crime. Nor are murder and manslaughter offences reflected in it. Crimes that are more complex to investigate, such as rape, are an increasing proportion of the total, requiring more police resources to investigate them. Meanwhile, the proportion of offences resulting in a court appearance fell from 11% to 9%, the lowest since comparable records began in 2015. Despite government claims to the contrary, central government funding for core policing continues to fall in real terms, with the number of police officers at the lowest level since comparable records began in 1996. At the same time, Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services said in its State of Policing report of 2017:
“On the whole, the inspections we have carried out during the past year show that the effectiveness and efficiency of the police service are improving”.
When will the Government accept that the continued, damaging, real-terms cuts to core policing budgets are helping to drive up crime, and when will they reverse them?
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for his Question. I say at the outset that the Government understand that police demand is changing and increasingly complex, as the noble Lord said. That is why, after the Police Minister spoke to all forces in England and Wales, we provided a comprehensive funding settlement which will increase total investment in the police system by more than £460 million in 2018-19. That includes £50 million for counterterrorism, £130 million for national priorities and £280 million in force funding for increases in council tax precept income. He will have also heard the Home Secretary saying that he understands what the demands on the police have been, particularly over the last year with all they have had to deal with, and that he will prioritise this in the next spending round. However, the overall picture is that public investment in policing has gone up from £11.9 billion in 2015-16 to £13 billion in 2018-19. The workforce of the police has remained broadly stable over the past year. I add that many forces have indicated that they either plan to protect the number of police officers or will in fact recruit further in the coming year.
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Grand CommitteeI thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate, in particular the noble Lord, Lord Haskel, who introduced some of the committee’s concerns. I apologise for the quite unsatisfactory Explanatory Memorandum, about which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and to a certain extent the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, gave very good explanations and far more of the context, which is a learning point for me and for the Home Office. I repeat the point that all noble Lords made about the welfare of the child being paramount. The noble Lord, Lord Haskel, said that he is a parent; I am too. It is the most important thing that we are discussing.
I will start by addressing the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Juveniles) Order 2018, which the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee expressed concern about and which has, in the main, been the subject of interventions today. Over the past 18 months, at the Security Minister’s instigation, the Government have been conducting a review with operational partners of the covert human intelligence source, or CHIS, authorisation framework to consider whether it is working as effectively as it could. This included consideration of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Juveniles) Order 2000 which put in place a set of enhanced safeguards that apply specifically to the authorisation of a CHIS under the age of 18, demonstrating that the ability to authorise people under the age of 18 as a CHIS is not something new. That has become clear in the course of discussions.
While investigators might wish to avoid the use of young people as a CHIS, we must recognise that, unfortunately, some juveniles are involved in serious crimes both as perpetrators and as victims. Consequently, young people might have unique access to information that is important in preventing and prosecuting gang violence, terrorism and child sexual exploitation offences. Noble Lords will undoubtedly be aware of reporting in the media recently—this was mentioned in the debate—on the escalating county lines phenomenon which, along with the associated violence, drug dealing and exploitation, has a devastating impact on young people, vulnerable adults and, of course on the communities they affect.
The existing juvenile CHIS regime allows for the use of a juvenile CHIS to be authorised for just one month at a time as compared to a 12-month authorisation for those over the age of 18. This can make their deployment more difficult to manage, which in turn can be unhelpful both to them and to law enforcement. It can also act as a deterrent to law enforcement seeking CHIS authorisation in some circumstances where immediate results might not be obtained during a one-month period, even if a longer, carefully managed deployment could provide a significant operational dividend.
To reduce the pressure to obtain immediate results from such an authorisation while still ensuring the protection of the juvenile, we are increasing the maximum length of a juvenile CHIS authorisation from one month to four months, requiring an authorisation to be reviewed at least monthly which will enable these deployments to be conducted in a more measured way. I will go into more detail on that in a second. Additionally, we have strengthened the protections around the appropriate adult required to be present at all meetings between the source and the public authority tasking them, and we are keeping the existing prohibition on all sources aged under 16 being tasked in relation to a parent or person with parental responsibility, which reflects the increasing independence of young people between the ages of 16 and 18 and that parental authority reduces accordingly—the point about 15 going on 25. I hope that reassures noble Lords that these changes are not about administrative convenience.
We think that these amendments will improve the operational effectiveness of the juvenile CHIS regime, while strengthening the protections for young people in this area and the safety and welfare of young people undertaking this important and dangerous role. This remains absolutely paramount.
Can the Minister explain how deployments are more difficult to manage if they are authorised for only one month? Presumably the deployment can continue and there is a review by an assistant chief constable or a commander to renew the authorisation, without interfering with the juvenile or the deployment. In those circumstances there would be no pressure to produce results within a short space of time if all we are saying is that the authority can be renewed by this more senior officer at the end of one month on an ongoing monthly basis, but it is very important that somebody of that seniority—that removed from the investigation—objectively decides that that authorisation should continue.
For the convenience of the Committee, I will go through the process. Authorisations for the juvenile CHIS should be granted at an enhanced level, which is set out in annexe A of the code of practice. For example, for a police force this would be by an assistant chief constable, in comparison with the adult CHIS, where an authorisation would be considered by a superintendent. The code of practice requires that, where possible, the authorising officer who grants the authorisation should be responsible for considering subsequent reviews and renewals. That is how each month the whole thing is revisited to continue for a further month, up to four months. But all these processes need to be documented and considered by the handler, the controller and the authorising officer within the public authority and will be fully open to inspection by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner as well. This creates, in our view, a comprehensive framework of safeguards which ensure that the conduct is necessary and proportionate to protect the interests of that young person. With regard to increasing the maximum, they may not be able to finish off what they started within just one month and hence a monthly review, up to four months, is in place. The noble Lord is looking slightly confused so I will let him intervene.
Can the Minister confirm that the monthly review would be undertaken by an assistant chief constable or commander?
I still do not understand the difference between the current system, where that authorisation would have to be renewed by a commander or assistant chief constable each month, and a four-month authorisation that is reviewed every month.
Under the current system it is only one month, whereas under the new system it would be up to four months but with a review every single month—and, yes, by the same senior officer.
I think I understand it. I apologise to noble Lords. The current system is limited to one month. The new system would be up to four months, but with a review every month.
I am very grateful to the Minister. At the moment, an assistant chief constable or a commander can authorise a juvenile CHIS to be deployed for a month. At the end of that month there can be an application from the handler to the senior officer to renew the authorisation so that it has the effect of continuing for another month, and so forth, for as long as it is necessary. The new system that the noble Baroness is suggesting is a four-month authorisation with a review by the commander or assistant chief constable at the end of each month. What is the difference between the two systems?
Perhaps I can assist. The handler decides that the CHIS needs to be in a gang for three months. The handler will know that, under the current system, at the end of each month, for three months, they will have to go back to the commander or assistant chief constable to renew the authorisation. What is the problem with that system that is overcome by the changes being suggested?
I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, because he seems to put things so clearly. I get the noble Lord’s point. Perhaps I may think about it and write to noble Lords, because I now understand exactly the point that the noble Lord is making—thanks to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge.
I will now move on to the appropriate adult point. We have strengthened the protections around the appropriate adult required to be present at all meetings between the source and the public authority tasking them. I think that I have already said this. We are keeping the existing prohibition on all sources aged under 16 being tasked in relation to a parent or person with parental responsibility. This reflects the increasing independence of a child approaching the age of 18.
I will now touch on the issue of consistency of approach.
I am very sorry; I know that it is late. I quoted from the draft revised code of practice. Paragraph 4.3 states:
“Public authorities must ensure that an appropriate adult is present at any meetings with a CHIS under 16 years of age”.
An appropriate adult has to be present at the interrogation of a criminal suspect under 18 years of age. My question was: why is there a difference between the two?
The noble Lord did ask that and I did not answer it satisfactorily. I will write also on that point.
Perhaps I could move on to the oversight regime. The independent oversight of these investigative powers was first legislated for by the Police Act 1997, and the powers are now overseen by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, who also oversees the powers provided for in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. The commissioner, like those oversight commissioners his role has replaced, provides the guarantee of impartial and independent scrutiny of the use of these tactics. The oversight commissioners have published reports annually, and, in his final oversight report in 2017, the Surveillance Commissioner commented that,
“standards of compliance have steadily improved in my view, and addressing it generally, they are high”.
The Government accept that the Explanatory Memorandum originally laid alongside the juvenile CHIS order did not go far enough and, as the noble Lord, Lord Haskel, said, the revised version was laid last week. It provides greater detail on the changes made by the order and on the use of juveniles as CHISs more generally. However, I have to make it clear that the Explanatory Memorandum should not be read alone. As I have set out, those charged with authorising and handling young people who act as CHISs have access to extensive guidance available to them to ensure that juveniles are safeguarded. The Explanatory Memorandum is clearly not the right place for the detail that the code contains. Such detailed guidance on the use of these sensitive tactics is necessarily not in the public sphere, as to do so may undermine operational practices and have the potential of putting the CHIS in harm’s way.
The fact that these two orders were laid at the same time is not a fluke—rather, it is the continued development of a suite of statutory safeguards and associated guidance, revised and updated to ensure that these powers are used proportionately and in accordance with the law.
I will now turn to some of the issues which were raised by noble Lords. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, talked about using children as spies—and this relates to the numbers. I can say to noble Lords that the numbers are extremely low. We do not disaggregate by age, but as I say, the numbers are low.
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thought I did know the answer and that I had reiterated it on several occasions. On the question of why not HMICFRS, the Secretary of State can at any time, under Section 54(2B) of the Police Act 1996, require HMICFRS to undertake an inspection on a specific police force or forces, which can be limited to particular matters or activities or a particular part of the force that he or she is concerned about. This power enables the Home Secretary to commission urgent inspection activities, and such inspection reports must be published. The Secretary of State also has powers under Section 54(3) of the 1996 Act to direct HMICFRS to carry out,
“other duties for the purpose of furthering police efficiency and effectiveness”.
My Lords, in light of the noble Baroness’s last answer, why have the Government not used these powers to enable HMIC to go to that force and carry out the inspection, as she suggested? Legally, it is not possible to libel the dead, but in practice it clearly is. It is not time that the Government considered a change in the law?
As regards not being able to libel the dead, that has always been the case, but we keep legislation under review. The reason why this will not be done by HMICFRS is that it can carry out an inspection either of the whole force, part of the force or a particular activity of the force, and in this instance the Home Secretary does not see that this would be appropriate.
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberThe Home Office Committee is reported as saying that, unless the Home Office is overhauled, the scandal will happen again for another group of people. For example, there is nothing in this Statement about the fact that officials in the Home Office are being put under pressure by being given targets for removals from the UK. How can officials use their discretion and compassion if they have to deport another 10 people by the end of the week?
The noble Lord will have heard the previous Home Secretary talk about previous targets for removal, which there were, and which had stopped for this year—they had been ceased. There were no targets for the deportation of criminals. But the noble Lord got to the nub of the point. The Home Office and the new Home Secretary have said that we need to take a far more humane approach to dealing with people—because these are people and not just numbers. I hope the noble Lord will agree that the way in which the Windrush issue has been dealt with under the leadership of the new Home Secretary has been more than humane. He has put a prime focus on ensuring that anybody inadvertently removed by the compliant environment measures that were in place are proactively sought, and remedial action will be taken to ensure that, through the compensation scheme, any hardship they have suffered will be recompensed in due course. The noble Lord is right in the sense that the culture needs to be changed—the new Home Secretary talked about that as well—to understand and recognise that we are dealing with human beings here.
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberI most certainly can. As the noble Lord will know, there are established processes for PCCs to make an application for additional funding if they face unexpected and exceptional expenditure—and I am sure this is such expenditure—which would otherwise create a serious threat to the force’s financial stability and its capacity to deliver normal policing.
My Lords, I shall continue the theme of funding. We continue to believe that the police are underfunded, particularly considering that 60% of funding for police services comes from central government and that amount is reducing in real terms. Police officers on mutual aid operations to ensure President Trump’s safety are being housed in gymnasiums. There are hundreds of officers in one space on camp beds. Male officers are having to pass through sleeping areas designated for female officers. Some female officers are being accommodated on the floor of squash courts where there are no beds, simply a mat on the floor for them to sleep on. These officers are having to spend three nights in these conditions and are then expected to work 12-hour shifts. Why has the Home Office not proactively stepped in to ensure that forces have sufficient funds to provide civilised accommodation for these officers? How do the Government expect police officers to treat the public fairly if this is the way the Government treat them?
I totally sympathise with the noble Lord’s point. Police officers who work in the line of duty to protect the public should absolutely be given decent accommodation. I shall quote the NPCC’s spokesman:
“Some of the accommodation pictured today for officers supporting the major operation for the US Presidential visit is not acceptable and below the standard of other accommodation for this operation”.
I understand that Essex Police is working at speed to resolve this and to ensure that the affected officers will be decently accommodated. The spokesman also thanked the officers who raised this issue because what the noble Lord outlined is utterly unacceptable.
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, there have been so few speakers this afternoon that anyone would think there might be a football match on tonight. However, I thank both noble Lords for their very constructive comments and questions. I have been furiously writing everything down and I hope I also have the answers but if I have not, I will follow them up in writing.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked whether this could allow for an agreement with the EU. Obviously, we are going through negotiations with the EU on Brexit, but it is absolutely possible that we could eventually make an agreement either with specific countries or with multiple states in the EU. That is almost certainly a possibility. He also quite sensibly asked whether this will affect the adequacy judgment in the context of Brexit. It is about getting data from outside the UK into the UK, but UK providers responding to requests under any agreement would need to comply with data protection law, which is of course aligned with EU standards, as we saw when we were going through the Data Protection Bill recently.
The noble Lord also asked how the Bill affects the evidence proposal published by the Commission. EU member states and wider international partners are considering this very question of cross-border access to electronic data. The European Commission has published proposals on this issue which we are currently considering. The UK’s opt-in applies to the regulation and the Government are committed to taking all opt-in decisions on a case-by-case basis, putting the national interest at the heart of the decision-making process. We are currently scrutinising the regulation, and we will make a decision on whether to participate in due course. The proposed evidence directive could be implemented before the end of the envisaged implementation period.
The noble Lord also asked whether contempt of court is enough if the CSP has no assets in the UK, which slightly goes to the point the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, made about seizing assets. Both are a possibility, but we anticipate working closely with overseas providers to create a high compliance environment. Given the general support for this, we hope that is the case. It is possible that some providers may have no UK assets, but those firms are unlikely to be within reach of any enforcement mechanism. We can always resort to MLA in the case of non-compliance.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked about what happens if you get more evidence than you asked for. The data received will be subject to the usual data protection laws and existing laws on data handling and retention. Law enforcement will be provided with guidance on how to handle data when using an overseas production order. I think he also asked about what happens if you need multiple different requests.
The question was: if you identify further offences from the information that you have requested, would you then need to go back to a judge to enable that evidence to be used?
My view would be that, yes, you would because it would be a new request, but I will confirm that in writing. I would not wish to give the noble Lord misinformation at the Dispatch Box.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked how the US or other countries will be able to get information from the UK. The proposed agreement will be reciprocal and we would expect any country with which we have an international co-operation arrangement also to benefit from this more streamlined process for data and evidence gathering. The condition for any international arrangement or future arrangement is that each country recognises the other’s rule of law—that is an important concept for the Bill—due process and judicial oversight for obtaining and dealing with information and evidence with regard to serious crime. Each agreement will be specific in scope in respect of the circumstances in which it can be used. Section 52 of the IP Act 2016 will be used to designate international agreements, and that will be the basis for another country to request information from UK service providers. The Secretary of State has the power to impose additional conditions when designating an agreement under that section.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, asked what would happen if the other country had a lower threshold for what is regarded as reasonable belief. What do we do if this arrangement is all about the mutual recognition of legal systems? The UK would not agree to any arrangement where the threshold for obtaining data did not provide similarly protective standards to those in the UK. The agreements will recognise a shared acceptance of the laws in another country with which we are entering into an agreement. It will recognise the other’s rule of law, due process and judicial oversight for obtaining and dealing with information and evidence with regard to serious crime.
Under any proposed agreement the UK would require the other country to set out the powers it intended to use in pursuance of requests made under the agreement. The UK would also ask the other country to commit that it would not rely on another power unless agreed by both parties. In addition, it would specify the evidential standard required before requests were made and ensure that the UK was satisfied with those standards before designating an agreement for incoming requests.
The noble Lord asked which countries we are negotiating agreements with. We expect the first relevant international arrangement to be with the US, unlocking the potential for streamlined access by UK law enforcement, but any future international arrangements would, like the agreement with the US that we have been discussing, be based on the recognition that robust protections for privacy are present in each country. Of course, not every country would meet those high standards, and any agreement that we reached with another jurisdiction would be subject to parliamentary scrutiny in the usual way. As discussed, that usually involves laying the agreement in Parliament for 21 sitting days without either House having resolved that it should not be ratified.
The noble Lord asked what powers exist to nullify incoming requests. The Bill is about requests from the UK rather than to the UK, but UK-based providers will not be compelled to comply with overseas orders and, if they do, must comply with data protection law. The agreement itself will be subject to the usual scrutiny by Parliament, as I have said.
The noble Lord also asked about the timescales for production orders versus MLA. Under an overseas production order, the standard time for compliance is seven days. However, the judge may shorten or extend this time depending on the circumstances of the case. Therefore we expect this to be a much quicker process compared with MLA, which can take up to 10 months unless there is a particular urgency. The noble Lord asked how many we were anticipating. We anticipate approximately 40 to 50 outgoing requests for electronic data. I will write on the other point regarding MLA numbers. I am guessing that there are more because it has a broader scope, but I will write to the noble Lord.
I have tried to cover every point; I am not sure that I have but I will of course follow up in writing any that I have not. In the meantime, I beg to move.
(6 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I too thank the Minister for repeating the Statement made earlier in the other place. This is clearly a shocking and unexpected development, and our best wishes go to the couple and those who responded—and continue to respond—to this incident.
I understand that the incident is ongoing and we should not make assumptions, but does the Minister agree that there appears to be a lack of motivation, which might suggest that this is not a deliberate poisoning? In the last 10 minutes or so, the police have said that the couple have been contaminated by handling a contaminated item. Somebody from the Chief Medical Officer’s staff told the “Today” programme this morning that in high concentrations the nerve agent can be absorbed through the skin but in lower concentrations it has to be ingested. Is there any indication that the victims may have injected the substance? It would clearly be reassuring to members of the public if that was the case.
On the one hand, a chemical weapons expert is quoted by the BBC as believing that the latest victims could have come across the Novichok that poisoned the Skripals after it had been haphazardly disposed of. On the other hand, a Russian scientist who first exposed the Novichok programme cast doubts on that theory, saying that Novichok would have decomposed in the four months since the attack on the Skripals. The Minister talked about the expulsion of Russian diplomats across the globe as a consequence of what happened before, but what if the Russian scientist is right that this is a fresh batch of the nerve agent? What would the international implications of that be? The Russian scientist told the BBC that this must have been a separate incident because Novichok was unstable, especially in damp conditions. Can the Minister add to this?
I know that it is difficult, as I am about to tell the House in the debate that follows this Statement, to provide clear information in the early days following such an incident. That is difficult to do but the public need to be told whether this is a new attack, which could throw doubt on the whole matter, or whether it is an accidental poisoning caused by leftovers from the Skripal attack. Residents are very concerned. What can the Minister say to reassure them? When we had the previous nerve agent attack, we learned more from the media than we learned from the Minister’s Statement in the House. Can she provide the House with some additional information that will help your Lordships to understand what has happened and reassure the residents in the area affected?
I thank the noble Lords, Lord Kennedy and Lord Paddick, for their very constructive comments and questions, as is usual following this type of incident and the making of such a Statement to your Lordships’ House.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, talked first about the names of the victims. I know that they have been in the press but we have not confirmed their names. He and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, talked about local residents being very concerned. Of course they will be concerned; they have had two almost identical incidents in their vicinity in the last few months. I hope that the words of Dame Sally Davies and the police have provided some comfort to them that the risk is low, while saying that people should remain vigilant and not touch things such as syringes, which might be dangerous, and that if they see anything they are concerned about or feel unwell, they should immediately contact the helpline.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, mentioned the different location and he is absolutely right. Not only did the events of the weekend take place in a different location but the couple in question do not appear to have visited any of the original sites. He also asked whether there would be constant reassurance of the public and constant updates to them as time goes on. We have seen over the past couple of days that the police and Dame Sally Davies have been very forthcoming in the information that they have given to the public. Any funding or assistance required will of course be forthcoming. Some 100 counterterrorism police detectives have been deployed and mutual aid from other police forces has been sent to Amesbury to assist.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, mentioned a crucial point: the local economy. I know it suffered the first time round and people will be very concerned. Another department, MHCLG, provided a lot of assistance in the aftermath of the previous event and I expect it will deploy similar assistance to the local area following this one.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked several questions, some of which I will not be able to answer. One was about whether it was a deliberate poisoning. The police have said that the poisoning was due to handling a contaminated item. He spoke about injecting the poison and made a point about the Russian scientist who said that in his opinion it was a fresh batch. I cannot substantiate any of those points. As the investigation proceeds the facts will become much clearer and it is not for me to comment on them at this stage.
(6 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberThere are 254 e-gates operating across the country, including the juxtaposed controls. E-gates respond to the patterns of people-flow across the border. Although some of the e-gates are sometimes closed, one finds that when demand increases, they re-open. That is a wise way of managing traffic across the border.
My Lords, further to what the Minister has just said, is it not true that there needs to be a certain number of immigration officers per e-gate and that, in fact, the e-gates are not all open when they should be because of a lack of staff? What discussions have the Government had with Heathrow Airport Ltd about increasing the number of Border Force staff at the airport, bearing in mind that the Border Force is struggling with two runways, let alone three?
The noble Lord is absolutely right that there are immigration officers at e-gates and that e-gates are sometimes closed but, as I explained, this is in relation to the projected flow of passengers across the border, and sometimes if a plane has been delayed, it can create congestion at the border. We have 250 e-gates, but we are investing in staff at the border in the coming year.
(6 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberI thank my noble friend for that question, and for forewarning me of it. I have talked about cost and civil liberties but, in addition to the things which my noble friend talked about, I draw attention to the fact that an increasing number of transactions and interactions, including the majority of identity frauds now occur online, where documents are far less effective in proving identity. I will take back what my noble friend said, but we should recognise that there is now a thriving market in fraud with actual, physical documents.
My Lords, in 2005 experts at the London School of Economics estimated that the introduction of an ID card scheme would cost up to £18 billion. Taking account of inflation and the total absence of any Brexit dividend, does the Minister agree that £26 billion would be better spent on the National Health Service?
The quite swingeing costs were certainly a consideration when the coalition Government decided to scrap identity cards or take them no further. I do not know about the £20 billion figure, but abolishing the scheme saved the taxpayer at the time £86 million and removed the need for a total investment of £835 million. What the Government choose to spend the money on will be a collective matter for the Government.
(6 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberAs I said to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, these are political choices that will be decided in the course of the negotiations. I think that both sides will be realistic in the final analysis and in what is ultimately agreed. I have full confidence in that.
My Lords, the European arrest warrant, as Mr Barnier said yesterday, is based on trust underpinned by the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice and the concept of EU citizenship and free movement. As the Government have rejected all these foundations, how do they expect to retain access to the European arrest warrant after we have left the EU?
As to the European arrest warrant and other matters, as I said to the other two noble Lords, these are political choices. What we have in the EAW and other matters, such as ECRIS and SIS II, is strong co-operation between us and our European Union partners. I know the noble Lord will agree with me when I say that the most important thing when we leave the European Union is that we have a safe Europe in which our citizens can live.
(6 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberI thank the noble Lord for his words of congratulation. The history that he tells is interesting. Successive Governments have not done this and today is an historic day in the advancement of a substance that may prove to have huge benefits for all kinds of conditions. I worked with sufferers of multiple sclerosis for 10 years and the use of cannabis-derived products—and now Sativex—helped to ameliorate some of their spasms. They did not want to get high; they just wanted to stop the spasms that happened day and night.
I recommend that we look at the original report because I bet there will be a bit of déjà vu when we do. I thank the noble Lord for his comments and his sound advice.
My Lords, it would be appropriate to draw a parallel with opium. The fact is that heroin—a derivative of opium—is a dangerous and addictive illegal drug, whereas morphine has a medical use derived from opium. Here we are talking about the medical derivatives of cannabis—which it would be helpful to move to a different schedule—and not about the legalisation of recreational use.
The Statement says that there are currently no legally recognised medicinal or therapeutic benefits, but it also says that the Home Secretary has issued an emergency licence to allow Billy Caldwell’s medical team to access cannabis based on medicine to treat life-threatening seizures caused by a severe form of epilepsy. As a consequence, Billy has now been discharged from hospital. Can the Minister explain why the clear medicinal and therapeutic benefits of cannabis are not legally recognised?
The noble Lord underlines precisely why we are where we are today. Clearly, for those two little boys it has had obvious benefits and—once the doctors and the clinicians who are treating them are satisfied that those benefits of the cannabis-based medicine are real and that without them they would go back to their previous suffering—that entirely underlines why this review is well worth doing.
The noble Lord is right to make the point about opium, which of course is schedule 2—which states that it has medical benefits—but is class A in terms of control. Cannabis is schedule 1 but class B. He is also right that this review is well overdue and I look forward to some of the work that will be done over the coming months. It will take time because cannabis is a complex drug and it is important that the proper process is followed and sound clinical judgments are arrived at.
(6 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the Government have no intention of scrapping the scheme. The first phase of the scheme, in the West Midlands, was subject to evaluation by Home Office Analysis and Insight to test its impact on discrimination, vulnerable groups and homelessness, as well as its impact on the sector and local authorities. The Home Office report published on 20 October 2015 found no evidence that the scheme was having any adverse impact on any of these. It is important that noble Lords note that the right to rent scheme is relatively new. It should not be seen in isolation but as one of a number of provisions that deter illegal immigration and restrict the number of illegal migrants establishing a settled life in the UK.
My Lords, the chief inspector’s report calls for monitoring and evaluation of the right to rent measures in terms of racial and other discrimination. He, like many in this House when the issue was debated, is concerned that risk-averse landlords could refuse to rent to black and minority ethnic tenants or those who have foreign-sounding names. Will the Minister tell the House how the Government are monitoring racial and other discrimination, and what baseline data they are using to determine whether discrimination has increased as a result of the right to rent scheme?
As I said to the noble Baroness, an evaluation by the Home Office found no evidence of discrimination. We have found no levels of discrimination to date but we intend to reconvene the panel and monitor the effects of the scheme, as we do with any legislation.
(6 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord rightly raises a number of concerns. We know there have been challenges in recruiting additional firearms officers. To date, we have recruited 650 and hope to reach 1,000 by the end of this year. Developing a pipeline of skills is very important when we are looking to recruit. In doing so, we want firearms officers to feel that they can do their job with the safety of a legal framework around them.
My Lords, police firearms officers are volunteers who make split-second decisions to protect us all. Does the Minister not agree that they deserve some legal protection in return?
I think the final part of my answer to the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, made precisely that point. We absolutely acknowledge the way the police have to make—in the blink of an eye—what are sometimes life-and-death decisions. They had a particularly challenging time last year during the several terrorist attacks that took place in this city and in Manchester. I think the noble Lord, Lord Harris, acknowledged in his report how well the police responded in those situations.
(6 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberI pay tribute to my noble friend’s work over the years involving young people. I am certainly happy to meet him to learn from his expertise in this area. I think it is true to say that the true scale of exploitation, including the number of victims, remains an intelligence gap. The National Crime Agency pointed this out. I would be happy to meet my noble friend to discuss it.
My Lords, many young people are unaware of the realities of gang membership: discipline enforced by stabbings, the rape of women and girls, and street dealers whose lives are put at risk while those who supply them with illegal drugs take most of the profit. Is the Minister aware of the work of Growing Against Violence—GAV, a charity of which I am patron—which works in schools to destroy the myths around gang membership in order to dissuade young people from getting involved with gangs, knives and drug dealing? Is this not exactly the sort of work that the Government should be supporting?
The noble Lord is absolutely right that any work such as GAV’s is to be commended. We are not only developing some of the existing good practice but expanding our knowledge of the extent to which county lines are affecting our most vulnerable children. The noble Lord is right to point out that drugs market violence may be facilitated and spread by things such as social media—another area on which we need to clamp down.
(6 years, 3 months ago)
Lords ChamberI cannot disagree—in fact, I do not think that anyone would disagree—with the noble Lord that watching the “Panorama” programme was very uncomfortable. It was shocking, and I do not think that anyone would disagree with that. He asked why the contract was extended for two years and whether other options were considered. The two-year extension to May 2020 was to allow for the reprocurement of services. It is not an unusual amount of time when such a reprocurement is being undertaken.
The procurement and the longer-term contract will be for the provision of the operation, management and maintenance of Brook House and Tinsley House and the pre-departure family accommodation at Tinsley House, as I pointed out. It is to allow the Home Office to consider any relevant conclusions from the independent reviews by Stephen Shaw and Kate Lampard. The Home Office has received the Stephen Shaw report, and both are due to be published in the summer. All bidders in the current competition were told of this decision on 4 May.
The noble Lord rightly asked what the Government are doing in the light of the shocking findings by “Panorama”. Since the programme aired, the Home Office has worked closely with G4S to ensure that it responds vigorously and at pace to the issues highlighted by “Panorama”. The former Home Secretary, and Ministers Brandon Lewis and Caroline Nokes, have met G4S senior managers regularly to review progress, and that oversight will be maintained. We have set out very clear expectations for G4S in responding to the issues at Brook House highlighted by “Panorama”, and we are currently satisfied that G4S has responded well. It has appointed a new manager and dismissed nine members of staff; enhanced staffing levels with recruitment and training plans in place; introduced body-worn cameras for staff to provide more transparency and assurance around procedures there; refreshed and promoted its whistleblowing procedures, with additional training provided at the centre by the Jill Dando Institute; put in place an improved drugs strategy; and, as I mentioned, commissioned the independent review by Kate Lampard, which will report this summer. I think I have now answered all the noble Lord’s questions.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for repeating the Answer. The Government’s explanation for releasing this information on the Friday of a bank holiday weekend—because the decision was made during purdah—begs the question: why was it made during purdah? Can the Minister explain how granting a two-year extension to G4S to run these facilities, despite the undercover BBC report, is consistent with the fact that the new Home Secretary no longer wants a hostile environment for illegal immigrants? Whoever gets the contract, is this not what happens when people are detained not knowing how long they are going to be detained, and with more than 160 people a year being detained for four months or more? Surely an absolute limit on immigration detention, as exists in most civilised countries, would provide the incentive the Home Office clearly needs to resolve these cases quickly one way or the other.
I thank the noble Lord for his questions. He asked why there is a two-year extension, especially when G4S was the subject of the “Panorama” programme. I hope I have outlined to the noble Lord, through my answer to the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, what the Government’s expectations of G4S will be in this period—and the full reprocurement will provide a solid basis for further progress on all the issues I have outlined. We will continue to monitor the progress and the performance carefully. The conclusions, in due course, of Kate Lampard’s review and Stephen Shaw’s wider follow-up review will provide further opportunities to learn the lessons and embed good practice, both at Gatwick and across immigration detention more widely.
The noble Lord made the point about the hostile environment, and I have said several times since the new Home Secretary has been in post that that is not a term he wants to see, because of the connotations. He is more interested in a compliant environment, with people complying with immigration rules. As for people not knowing how long they will be detained, we are clear that people are detained for as short a time as possible. It must be noted that 92% of people in detention are not there for more than four months. Indefinite detention is against the law: it is not something that we do. Therefore, people are in detention for as short a period as possible.
(6 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberI thank the noble Lord for that question. First, he asked what the Home Office will be doing to right the wrongs. The new Home Secretary has made some things very clear. He has made it quite clear that he does not like the term “hostile environment”, which he feels does not reflect the values of this country. The term was not invented recently; it was coined some time ago—under a Labour Home Secretary, I must say, but that is by the by, because Home Secretaries have used the term ever since. He has made it quite clear that, in line with the values that he and most of us share, there should be a compliant rather than a hostile environment.
The noble Lord also asked about putting people before numbers. My right honourable friend also made it quite clear, as did the previous Home Secretary only last week, that we want a humane environment. Some of the mechanisms set up for the Windrush generation will make it as easy as possible for people to get the documentation they need. Where necessary, officials will liaise with other government departments to ease the burden on those people who are here as of right. The noble Lord talked about the compensation scheme—in fact, he asked me about it at the end of last week. The Home Secretary has reiterated his commitment to a compensation scheme. He will be consulting on the scheme and, as I said, an independent person will be in place to oversee it. I hope that answers the noble Lord’s questions.
My Lords, the Windrush fiasco is the result of Home Office deportation targets. If officials are given targets and the case before them qualifies on the face of it for deportation, and they are short of their quota for that week or month, how can they be expected to use their discretion to act humanely, even in the face of exceptional humanitarian circumstances? Of course, illegal immigrants should be pursued, but how can targets for removals be consistent with a compassionate approach to exceptional cases? The Minister said that the new Home Secretary has said that he will do whatever it takes to put this right. Does not she agree with me that, to put this right, we need to abandon removal targets in the Home Office?
One thing that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary also made clear yesterday was that he wants to look at those targets, take a view on what targets have been set or are being set, and take a view on the whole issue of targets going forward. I am sure your Lordships’ House will have more information on that, as he embeds himself—he has been there only just over 24 hours—and makes decisions on his priorities and where the policy will go.
(6 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberI could not agree more wholeheartedly with the noble Lord. He and I are of Irish descent and first-generation Irish respectively. In fact, when we look around your Lordships’ House and this country, there would not be many of us if we did not have immigration.
My Lords, is the Minister aware that domestic law in most Muslim-majority countries is based on modern western legal systems and that sharia is actually a moral code that requires Muslims, among other things, to be just and fair in their dealings with everyone and always to promote what is good and to prevent what is wrong? Will she join me and the overwhelming majority of this House in celebrating the appointment today of the first British-Pakistani, born of Muslim parents, to hold one of the great offices of state?
I certainly agree with the first part of the noble Lord’s question and am very pleased to be able to join him in welcoming Sajid Javid as our new Home Secretary. While I have an opportunity, I also pay tribute to my right honourable friend Amber Rudd.
(6 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Ministers have set out their ambition for increasing returns, but have not set the Home Office specific numerical targets. The idea of government setting removal targets goes back a number of decades. For example, in 2003 Tony Blair set a target of halving the number of asylum seekers within a year, while in 2007 Jacqui Smith made a commitment to remove 4,000 FNOs within a year. Senior managers in the Home Office have set targets in the past to drive performance locally, including last year, but have now moved away from doing so for this reporting year.
My Lords, if the Home Secretary is to resign, I am not sure what she should resign over: the fact that targets for removal were set or that she did not know that such targets existed, even when they were displayed on posters on the walls of the Home Office. In addition, the BBC has reported today on an inspection report by the Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration from December 2015 showing targets for voluntary departures of people regarded as having no right to stay in the UK. They are not local targets but overall Home Office targets for removal of illegal immigrants from the UK—contrary to what the Minister has just said.
Does the Minister accept that, if officials are given targets for the number of people they must deport, it will be very difficult for them to use their discretion and be compassionate? The current culture at the Home Office is rotten to the core and Ministers, not officials, need to take responsibility.
I echo the noble Lord’s point about discretion and compassion. I agree with him: I am not sure what the Home Secretary should resign over because she has done a wonderful job. She has made it quite clear that, if there is a culture such as the one which has been worried over, that culture will change. We want the Home Office to remove more people who are here illegally, but I repeat that Ministers have not set specific targets for this year. We are clear that we would like the number of removals to increase. Reducing the size of the illegal migrant population and the harm that it causes is a key component of an effective immigration system, and what the public would expect as a matter of fairness.
On the posters to which the noble Lord referred, local managers may use visual tools to heighten team activities, which could include but not be limited to staff movements, work activity and performance. But, as my right honourable friend the Home Secretary said this morning, she will look at the performance environment as a matter of urgency.
(6 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have seen the Immigration Minister’s case pile—not case file—and it is true that many cases come in through the Immigration Minister’s box. It is really important, particularly in a situation like this, that those with genuine cases are dealt with quickly. I hope that there are not people out there seeking to capitalise on this situation.
My Lords, will the Minister comment on the staff survey results published in the Independent today which show higher levels of discrimination and harassment among staff in the Home Office than in any other government department? Does this not prove that the Government have created a hostile environment inside the Home Office as well as in the country as a whole?
My Lords, as an immigrant working in the Home Office I cannot comment on the staff survey because I have not seen it. This Government want to create a hostile environment not for people who have every right to be here but for people who seek to pervert the system of legal immigration. Yes, we want to create a hostile environment for illegal migrants, but we want to make every effort to ensure that people who are here lawfully are supported, particularly the Windrush cohort in confirming their settled status in this country.
(6 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberI should clarify that it is the Independent Office for Police Conduct rather than misconduct, as the noble Lord knows. The IOPC can investigate a matter referred to it, but it also has call-in powers to require referral. In terms of investigating a police force, the IOPC is independent of government and the Home Secretary does not have the power to direct it to investigate a force or any of its officers. The key functions of the IOPC include providing independent oversight of the police complaints and discipline system, considering appeals when people believe that a police investigation into a complaint has got it wrong, and carrying out its own investigations into the most serious and sensitive matters relating to police conduct.
My Lords, I understand the concern of noble Lords about the reputation of the right honourable Sir Edward Heath, but what about Bishop Bell, Lord Brittan or Sir Cliff Richard? It pains me to say this, but the police and the media cannot be trusted to comply with their own regulations on this issue. Will the Minister meet me to explore how my upcoming Private Member’s Bill to legally preserve anonymity before charge might be supported by the Government?
I am always happy to meet the noble Lord; we meet regularly. I understand all the cases that he talks about, which have gone through various mechanisms of investigation, and am happy to meet him to talk about his Private Member’s Bill.
(6 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am certainly aware of the very strong feeling in your Lordships’ House. I am also aware, and have made it clear to others, that there is a clear process in place should the PCC wish, as he indicated a year ago, to set it in train.
My Lords, this is not the only case. In the Cliff Richard case in the High Court yesterday, it was revealed that the police had tipped off the BBC, resulting in South Yorkshire Police feeling “forced” to tell the BBC when Sir Cliff’s home was going to be raided. Does the Minister not agree that the National Police Chiefs’ Council’s guidelines are clearly insufficient and that the time has come for legislation, as recommended by Sir Richard Henriques, to prevent the publication of the names of subjects until they have been charged with an offence, unless authorised by a Crown Court judge?
There is certainly a presumption of anonymity before charge. I know the noble Lord will appreciate that it is not appropriate for me to comment on that specific case as it is currently the subject of legal proceedings.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am glad that the Minister mentioned technology. At the moment, because of EU citizens’ free movement, they use the e-passport gates at Heathrow, whereas non-EU citizens have to prove that they are not coming here to work illegally before they are admitted and cannot use the e-gates. Non-EU citizens can queue for more than two hours at the passport gates. How long will the queues be when EU citizens cannot use the e-gates?
My Lords, what this Government want when we exit the European Union is for there to be a smooth process at the border. The noble Lord is absolutely right to mention the e-gates because they have been a great innovation and demonstrate how technology is so helpful at the border, saving customers a huge amount of time. Obviously, the Government want to see a smooth process at the border.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberOn the national counterterrorist reaction and response, I think the noble Lord will agree that generally the overall response was excellent. There was an issue with the telephony system. Part of that issue was that there was no backup system. That has been thoroughly reviewed and a backup has been put in place. It was not something we would have wished to have happened on such a terrible night. I hope that that sort of issue will never arise again because of the measures we have put in place.
My Lords, I associate myself with the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark. As a senior policer officer, I have been directly involved in the immediate response to terrorist incidents, including the attacks on London on 7 July 2005, and the aftermath is typically chaotic for several hours. Secondary explosive devices and/or marauding gunmen are real possibilities, as we saw in the November 2015 Paris attacks. If either of those alternative scenarios had transpired in this case, the criticism could well have been of the police and the ambulance service for putting their unarmed crews in danger. Does the Minister agree that these are extremely difficult calls to make but that once the decision has been made by the police, who are the lead agency in such situations, that decision needs to be communicated to all the emergency services so as to provide a united response? Can the Minister tell the House who in government is taking responsibility for ensuring that communication between emergency services is effective in these situations?
I pay tribute to the noble Lord and the part that he played in the Metropolitan Police. He must have some incredible experience of such things. He is absolutely right about the immediate aftermath, which is why there are various phased processes for the police and emergency services to go through afterwards. On the terrible possibility of a secondary attack, he is completely right to point out that communication is key, and the joint emergency services interoperability principles come into play. Events such as the 7/7 bombings, through which I am sure the noble Lord was operational, identified the need to improve that joint working between the emergency services. The JESIP, as it is called, was set up to improve how the police, fire and ambulance services work together when responding to those multiagency incidents when they are not specifically CT focused. That was not the case in this instance; it is most relevant in major incidents involving mass fatalities and significant numbers, such as those seen in Manchester and London last year—therefore, providing a key component to the UK’s ability to adequately prepare for a terrorist incident.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, in bringing forward this statutory instrument the Government are seeking to restore the long-established principle that responsibility for enforcing fire safety regulations across the whole of the Crown’s custodial and detention estate should lie with those who have been appointed or authorised as Crown inspectors by Ministers in England and in Wales. At present, Crown inspectors in England and Wales are not the enforcing authorities for fire safety in the small number—about 7%—of custodial and detention premises where the Government have contracted out the provision of services to private providers.
That this was a significant issue became apparent in 2016 when responsibility for Crown inspectors in England transferred to the Home Office. Crown inspectors, the Home Office and the Ministry of Justice instigated an investigation into the contractual arrangements in place for the provision of custodial or detention operations. As a result of this detailed review of contracts and ownership arrangements, it became clear that a number of contractual arrangements had been put in place for the operation of these premises, which had had the effect of transferring ownership or occupation for the purposes of the fire safety order away from the relevant Crown departments to private companies. Where this has happened, the responsibility for enforcing compliance with fire safety regulation has similarly been transferred away from our dedicated teams of Crown inspectors, and lies instead with the individual local fire and rescue authorities in which the relevant premises are located. This is not what was intended when the fire safety order was enacted in October 2006.
At that time, the then Government were clear that, irrespective of any contractual arrangements that were in place with the private sector for the provision of services, they wanted Crown inspectors to be the sole enforcing authorities in these types of premises. Indeed, they went so far as to spell this out in the guidance on enforcement that they published, to which all those with enforcement responsibilities under the fire safety order are required to have regard.
Now we are aware that the policy intent no longer aligns with the law, we want to rectify the position and ensure that the original policy of Crown inspectors inspecting, and where necessary enforcing, fire safety regulation across the whole of the Government’s custodial estate is re-established. We want to ensure that there is absolute clarity, both now and in the future, about the scope of enforcement responsibilities for the fire and rescue authorities and the Crown inspectors. This order therefore amends article 25 of the fire safety order to set out specific legal definitions of the full range of custodial premises for which the Crown inspectors are to be responsible. These will be established beyond doubt and will not, as is currently the case, be contingent on the often complex contractual leasing or ownership arrangements that may now be in place. Essentially, this order delivers through legislation the clarity that was intended by the 2007 policy guidance on enforcement.
It is the Government’s intention, shared by our counterparts in Wales, for there to be a single national organisation in each of our areas of jurisdiction: an organisation charged with the responsibility and invested with the specific skills and expertise necessary to provide three key things.
First, we want Ministers and relevant departments—which of course have the ultimate responsibility for fire safety in these types of custodial and detention premises—to benefit from the strategic oversight of fire safety compliance across the whole of the Crown’s custodial estate that is available where a single national body is in place. Secondly, we want there to be a clear and easily accessible route established for ensuring that any concerns relating to fire safety in our custodial estate can be raised immediately and addressed promptly by those with day-to-day responsibilities for fire safety management. Where reluctance or poor communication militates against appropriate action, we want an immediate escalation mechanism—direct to Ministers, if necessary—to be in place and delivered through our national fire and rescue advisers. In England, this means the Chief Inspector of the Crown Premises Fire Inspection Group. In Wales, as in Scotland, it means the Welsh Government’s Chief Fire and Rescue Adviser. Thirdly, we want a dedicated cadre of fire safety inspecting officers, each with the necessary training, maintained and regularly updated, to operate safely and effectively in this unique type of premises, where the risk to life in the event of a fire is generally high.
The order will re-establish robust national arrangements across all of the Government’s custodial estate. As such, it will specify the full range of custodial premises for which the Government are responsible, providing absolute clarity on the scope of the Crown’s responsibility for inspection and enforcement. This will ensure that our dedicated team of experienced Crown inspectors are clear that they have the powers to ensure that appropriate fire safety standards are in place to protect the lives of those living in, working on or visiting the Government’s custodial or detention estate. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for introducing the order. I heard from what she said that this anomaly, whereby privately run prisons and custodial premises were not being inspected by national inspectors, was stumbled across when responsibility for Crown inspectors was transferred from the Ministry of Justice to the Home Office. Will she confirm that that is the case, and is it not a little worrying? How long might it have continued if that transfer had not taken place? Clearly, it is very important to have consistency across all privately run prisons and other places of detention, rather than to have the potential for different standards being applied by local fire and rescue services. On that basis, we support the order.
My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I am very happy to support the order before the Grand Committee. It is certainly very sensible to have the experts in fire safety and security to be looking after the whole of the estate. I am very happy to support it.
I have one query; it is a little disappointing—I refer to page 5 of the impact assessment at paragraph 1.9. I am surprised that we still have this ridiculous “one in, three out” rule. It does not apply here because the Government have clearly tested it against that ridiculous rule. It is an example of the worst kind of ideological, political dogma. You would have thought, in the aftermath of a tragedy such as Grenfell, we would not be using it, but clearly the Government still are. I hope that any regulation is in force at any time because it is necessary and proper. I cannot believe we still have this arbitrary rule. It is a matter of much regret, which I will probably take up elsewhere. Other than that, I am very happy to support the order, but I was surprised to see this when I read through the papers this morning.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I beg leave to ask a Question of which I have given private notice.
My Lords, no one in need of urgent help should have their emergency call unanswered. While answering 999 calls is an operational matter for the police, we have maintained protection for police spending so that forces have the resources that they need to carry out their important work. It is for the police to determine how best to allocate their resources and manage their communications with the public.
My Lords, today Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services has highlighted major concern that policing is under significant stress.
“About a quarter of forces are all too often overwhelmed by the demand they face”,
and are not meeting the one-hour standard for responding to 999 calls that require an immediate response, with one force taking an average of 14 hours to respond to such calls. Although these calls are not those where life is immediately in danger, they include domestic assaults where a partner has left the scene but could return at any moment, a category of call that has increased by 88% over the past year.
This week, the UK Statistics Authority ruled that the Government misled the public with the claim of an extra £450 million for local forces when, in fact, central government funding is falling in real terms—and has been for years. Would today, as we remember the sacrifice of PC Keith Palmer, be a good day for the Government to finally admit that the police service is now underfunded and say that they are going to increase central government funding for the police service?
I first join the noble Lord in remembering today the sacrifice that Keith Palmer made to protect people in the Palace of Westminster. There will be a memorial in, I think, about 20 minutes’ time in Westminster Hall to remember the attack a year ago. The MPCC and the APCC called for £440 million of extra funding in 2018-19, with additional counterterrorism funding and increases in council tax precepts on top. They wanted this funding for an extra 5,000 front-line officers for proactive policing by 2020. The funding increase for next year is made up of main government grant, protected at flat cash; up to £270 million from increase in council tax precept income; a £15 million increase in counterterrorism police funding; and a £130 million increase in national priorities, mostly special grant, for exceptional costs and technology. On the point about domestic violence, I totally agree with the noble Lord. We have provided £11 million through the police transformation fund to support new police interventions to tackle domestic abuse, with a focus on early intervention and prevention.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, on the basis that the House cannot get enough of the European Union at the moment, I ask whether the Minister has seen the Reuters article dated 19 January entitled “Social media companies Facebook, Twitter, Google’s YouTube have accelerated removals of online hate speech in the face of a potential European Union crackdown”. Does she agree that pressure brought to bear on social media companies by the 28 countries of the European Union is likely to be far more effective than the UK dealing with these companies alone?
I hope I can assure the noble Lord that in fact the UK does not come from a position of thinking that it can deal with these things alone. It is not just a European problem; it is a global problem. On the European point, one of the key aims of the EU code of conduct on countering illegal hate speech online is to increase the proportion of illegal hate speech online that is reported within 24 hours. We fully support that.
(6 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I too thank the Minister for repeating the Statement and pay tribute to the emergency services, an issue I shall want to return to shortly. We are also concerned for the police officer and the other victims, their families and friends.
I appreciate that the investigation is ongoing, but can the Minister confirm that one of the victims was a Russian citizen who was a British spy or double agent, and that President Putin has in effect made death threats against such individuals? The Government should be telling Parliament as much as they can about such incidents, not as little as they can get away with while hiding behind the fact that there is an ongoing investigation.
The Statement talks about well-rehearsed CBRN procedures, but these are deployed when it is a known CBRN threat. What reassurance can the Minister give that such procedures will be reviewed so that first responders are not put in danger, as the police officer who first attended this incident has clearly been put in danger? The Statement talks about protecting British citizens, but what risk assessments are carried out on Russian citizens living in the UK, particularly those who may have risked their lives to assist the UK in the past?
We on these Benches have repeatedly expressed concern about reductions in Border Force, with reliance placed on electronic gates and remote ports and small airfields not having sufficient protection—a situation that is likely to be made worse if we continue to Brexit.
I understand that hostile foreign powers might produce very convincing fraudulent documents to get their assassins into the UK, but can the Minister speculate how on earth a highly toxic nerve agent was smuggled into the country, assuming it was not stolen from a government facility in this country? Is the Minister satisfied that Border Force is properly funded and that our borders are secure?
I pay tribute to the emergency services but I also pay tribute to the security and intelligence services. In the interactions that I have had with those services, I am confident that we have among the best security and intelligence services in the world. Clearly, however, in an arms race with hostile foreign powers, we need to ensure that those services are properly funded.
I pay particular tribute to the police service—as in this case, they are often the first to arrive at the scene of incidents, never knowing what dangers they face. I wish the officer in this case a speedy recovery. The Government have continued to say that we need fewer police officers because crime is falling, but this incident is just one example of the police being the service of last resort. They have to deal with people in distress and, as we saw last week, respond to people trapped in the appalling weather—nothing to do with crime. These brave police officers never know the sorts of dangers that they are facing and can end up, as this officer has, seriously ill in hospital. Sometimes they give up their lives in order to protect us, as Keith Palmer did nearly a year ago in this place. Yet the Government appear in the eyes of operational police officers to be treating the police service with contempt—freezing their salaries, cutting their pensions and reducing police budgets in real terms. Will the Minister tell the House when the Government are going to reverse their anti-police agenda?
First, I echo the words of the noble Lords, Lord Kennedy and Paddick, in praising our emergency services in the highest possible terms for what they risked to help these two individuals, which of course led to one of the policemen being taken ill. He is still in hospital. It brings into play the question of the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, about the danger to our emergency services and whether all risk assessments are done to mitigate such injury to the police.
Certainly I can say that in the CBRN area these procedures are constantly reviewed and people are trained to the highest possible level—but in an emergency like this we can all appreciate that sometimes people’s lives will be at risk. People are put in danger, and that is why we have the highest regard for the police. The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, talked about police budgets. The police told us last year the number of additional police officers needed to do their job. We feel that in the budget they can attain this year they will have those police numbers—and more—to do the job that they do. That does not detract from the fact that the injury to this police officer, and indeed the death of PC Palmer some months ago, bring into sharp focus the dangers that police put themselves into.
The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, asked me to reiterate the Government’s determination to bring the perpetrators to justice. I said that in my Answer to the Question earlier and I repeat it now: we are absolutely determined to bring the perpetrators to justice.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked whether I could confirm that one of the individuals was a Russian spy. I am not in a position to comment further on the victims, other than in the Statement where I confirmed their names.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, also asked about borders, how the substance came into the country and how sure we are of effective border control. I am not prepared to comment on an ongoing operation; I know that the House got slightly exasperated with me earlier, but I cannot. We adopt a rigorous approach to border security, and agencies work together at the border to manage a range of threats, including those posed by terrorism and serious and organised crime. This includes carrying out 100% immigration and security checks at the primary control point, advanced checks where available and intelligence-led targeting at ports. Border Force has at its disposal a range of capabilities to detect, target and identify substances and materials that could cause harm.
(6 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberI know that the PCC has been in correspondence with other noble Lords. I am reluctant to talk about individual correspondence at the Dispatch Box. I am sure the noble Lord will understand why that is, but I think he will also understand why this Question has come up again today.
My Lords, I would like to broaden this out. Can the Minister explain how party-politically aligned police and crime commissioners can effectively hold chief constables to account? We have a situation at the moment with Labour and independent police and crime commissioners blaming central government real-terms cuts to police budgets for reductions in policing services, while Conservative police and crime commissioners toe the Conservative Party line, claiming that budgets are being maintained. Who is really to blame for drastic cuts in police numbers? Is it inefficient chief constables or is it the Government?
My Lords, there certainly are PCCs who stand under party-political banners. There are also independent PCCs. I do not think that there are any Lib Dem PCCs, although the Lib Dems are very good at political campaigning. It is for PCCs to hold their chief constables to account. It is also for police and crime panels to scrutinise PCCs, and they do.
(6 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I beg leave to ask a Question of which I have given private notice.
My Lords, the Government take detainee welfare extremely seriously. Any detainee who chooses to refuse food and fluid, for whatever reason, is closely monitored by on-site healthcare professionals. There are a number of established ways in which detainees can make representations on their individual case and about conditions of detention. Individuals are detained only for the purposes of removal from the UK.
My Lords, about 400 people are detained at Yarl’s Wood detention centre, nearly all of them women. One Algerian woman came to this country at the age of 11 and has been here for 24 years. It was not until she applied for a passport that she was found to be undocumented and detained at Yarl’s Wood. She has been there for three months so far. Does the Minister agree that one of the main reasons for the hunger strikes is that people are being detained unfairly, unreasonably and indefinitely? One woman has described it as like being kidnapped, not knowing when it will end or what will happen to her. The Minister will, of course, say that the Home Office detains people only for as short a period as possible, but at the end of 2017 one person had been in immigration detention for four and a half years. Does the Minister agree that it is time to introduce a 28-day limit on immigration detention, except in wholly exceptional circumstances?
There may be a multitude of reasons for refusing food and fluid. As the noble Lord has pointed out, they may be in protest against their detention but there may also be dietary and religious reasons.
(6 years, 6 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, this fees order is to be made using the charging provisions in Sections 68 to 70 of the Immigration Act 2014 and its purpose is to make only a relatively small number of changes to the Immigration and Nationality (Fees) Order 2016, which, along with the Immigration and Nationality Fees (Amendment) Order 2017, remains in place. The changes are needed to ensure that the charging framework set out in secondary legislation for immigration and nationality fees remains current and supports plans for the next financial year.
The Committee will wish to be made aware that there is an error in the draft order and its Explanatory Note. Following further review of the section of the order that deals with circumstances in which a fee may be set in respect of the provision of biometric identity documents, it has been identified that the change we were seeking to make by Article 2(4)(a) has no effect. This is because of the way in which the related legislation—the Immigration (Biometric Registration) Regulations 2008—operates. The intention was to permit the Home Office to charge a fee when a person fails to collect their biometric residence permit within the required time limit, which is not intended as a penalty or fine, but is in line with fees charged for replacement biometric residence permits, where the department incurs extra production costs. However, the Immigration (Biometric Registration) Regulations do not in fact require an application in those circumstances—hence there is no service for which a fee could be charged. Though the Explanatory Note states that Article 2(4)(a) does have an effect, this is incorrect. Before such a change can take effect we will need to amend the Immigration (Biometrics Registration) Regulations 2008. In the interests of transparency for all, the accompanying Explanatory Memorandum has also been amended to clarify the issue.
The 2016 order continues to set out the overarching framework and maximum amounts that can be charged for immigration and nationality functions over the current spending review period, as previously agreed by Parliament. Changes made by this order are intended to clarify existing powers in connection with entry clearance to the Bailiwick of Guernsey, the Bailiwick of Jersey and the Isle of Man. The order will update powers to charge fees when offering premium services in relation to the islands and also make clear that the current definitions of a “sponsored worker”, “unsponsored worker”, “sponsor” and a “certificate of sponsorship” apply in respect of applications to the Isle of Man. Two further changes will delete obsolete provisions, for which no fee is currently set within regulations.
The 2016 order also permits a fee to be set for the acceptance of applications at a place other than an office of the Home Department. This provision currently allows the Home Office to charge a fixed fee when delivering an entirely optional, premium service to enrol biometrics at a place of convenience to service users. Under plans to modernise services offered, the order will now allow for fees to be set at an hourly rate. This will provide greater flexibility and allow a fee to be charged at a level that is commensurate with the time taken to deliver such services.
To be absolutely clear, this change does not affect the Home Office’s basic services, for example, as provided to applicants who enrol their biometric information at a local post office. The amendment is applicable only to those who seek to enrol their biometrics at a place of convenience that they themselves want to specify.
Finally, the order will also update the power to charge for services offered on behalf of certain Commonwealth countries and British Overseas Territories, where such services may not be offered within consular premises.
To recap, we are seeking to make a small number of changes to the 2016 order and maintain the framework for immigration and nationality fees. We are not seeking to make changes to the overarching charging framework, nor to the maximum fee levels that were agreed by Parliament and set out in the 2016 order, other than in respect of the premium service fee about which I have spoken. Individual fee levels to be charged over the course of the next year will be set by new regulations that are due to be laid before Parliament in March 2018.
I commend the order to the Committee.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for explaining the order and for her confession about the error in it. We have a fundamental objection to the approach that the Government are taking to move to a position where fees are charged to cover the costs of providing border, immigration and citizenship services. The security of the UK border is one of the most important mechanisms by which the Government keep us safe and we should not expect those who want to do the right thing and apply for leave to remain and, eventually, citizenship, some of whom come to this country as destitute refugees, to be forced to fund what is fundamentally the duty of the Executive.
Having said that, I understand that these regulations make only one change to the overall fee structure, where the biometric capturing part of an application comes to you and where the eye-watering fixed fee of £10,500 is to be replaced by an extraordinary hourly rate of £2,600. Will the Minister confirm that this is not the actual cost of providing the service, but a fee based on what the market can bear? Will she also explain why the Home Office is not maximising the profit from such a service to enable it to reduce fees in other areas, rather than giving this lucrative money-earner away to a private company? I understand that there needs to be two people to carry out the biometric capture, but if this is purely on the basis of cost recovery are we paying Home Office officials £1,300 an hour? Can I apply for a vacancy?
We support these regulations as far as they go and we look forward to the main event, when the actual fee levels for 2018 are set out in the forthcoming regulations next month. I give the Minister notice that those regulations are likely to be a completely different ball game.
My Lords, I too thank the Minister for setting out the reasons behind this order and for the clarification she gave in her opening remarks. I too was fascinated by the level of fee charged changing from an overall maximum fee of £10,500 to a fee of £2,600 per hour. Some of us have occasionally done per diem work—I suppose we are not unused to it now—but our eyes can only water at the thought of such an hourly rate. It would be good to know where the justification comes from.
I also add to a point made by the noble Lord, which is that essentially a commercial provider is going to do the work. Although the Home Office will retain full oversight and jurisdiction, the relevant fee will relate to the cost associated with the commercial partner travelling to the location of choice as requested by the applicant. The mind boggles. Can they go anywhere? Without detracting from the quality of the people who will be applying for this service, it makes one wonder what exactly the commercial provider is there to do. Is this rate seriously based on the cost of that commercial provider? Does it build in a profit? It must. I must say that the Explanatory Memorandum begs more questions than it answers on those details.
(6 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberI am very aware of the noble Lord’s advice and recommendations on governing bodies and a single person on a governing body. Governing bodies have to make a judgment as a whole on the health, safety and protective measures that they need to put in their schools. As for guidance, clearly the last year has been unprecedented in terms of security generally and our schools are no less vulnerable. The DfE is currently reviewing its health, safety and school security advice, giving consideration to how guidance material can improve advice that is given to schools.
My Lords, the matter that the noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, is referring to is recommendation 121 of his comprehensive report about London’s preparedness to deal with terrorism. Recommendation 11 of that report states that it is essential that UK policing is able to maintain the required international arrangements that currently work to keep us safe. There is no precedent for a non-EU country that is outside Schengen to have access to the essential intelligence databases SIS II and ECRIS, and the European Commission has said that a non-member state cannot have the same rights as a member state. Does the Minister accept that whatever the desired outcomes, we are likely to be less safe if we leave the EU? It is about not what everybody wants but what is legally possible.
In terms of London’s preparedness, the noble Lord will know that there has been quite an uplift in the CT policing budget. In terms of the EU, he will also know through the various debates we have had that the UK has been a leader in work across Europe in law enforcement and counterterrorism data sharing. We have had the pleasurable experience of the passage of the Data Protection Bill, during which law enforcement and other matters were discussed. We very much want to continue that to the extent that we have put the law enforcement directive into UK law.
(6 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberSometimes the problem with interventions is that you do not get around to saying what you were going to say. Perhaps noble Lords will be patient. The noble Lord, Lord West, put it very succinctly and illustrated what we mean by bulk data.
Where the content of a communication is to be examined when it is of a person known to be in the British Isles, a separate targeted examination warrant must be obtained, which is in itself subject to approval by the Secretary of State and a judicial commissioner. The codes of practice that I have been outlining today provide additional safeguards on the use of bulk powers relating to filtering data, the training that must be obtained by those examining it and how bulk data should be handled, retained and destroyed.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, also asked if warrants allowed interference with devices of innocent people and asked how that was compliant with the ECJ ruling—the question on everyone’s lips. Equipment interference is subject to stringent safeguards and any warrant must be necessary and proportionate and must be approved by a judicial commissioner. This House has, of course, approved those strong safeguards.
I see the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, looking quite interested, because the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Butler, asked about the Liberty challenge to the IP Act and the Government’s response to it. The judgment handed down by the Court of Appeal on Tuesday this week—I presume that that is the one that they are referring to—relates to the challenge brought against the DRIP Act. It has now been replaced by provisions in the Investigatory Powers Act, and therefore the judgment relates to legislation that is actually no longer in effect. The provisions in the Act challenged by Liberty, which will be heard at the end of February in the High Court, relate to targeted communications data and, therefore, are not relevant to the debate today.
I move on to the technical capability regulations. I was asked whether they would stifle innovation. To be clear here, none of the regulations that we are discussing today in and of themselves place any burden on industry. To suggest that the Investigatory Powers (Technical Capability) Regulations 2018 would damage companies operating in this country is to misunderstand what the provisions in those regulations actually do. Those regulations do not themselves impose any requirements on telecommunications or postal operators. Rather, they set out what obligations could be imposed on an operator through a technical capability notice. The power for the Secretary of State to give such notice is set out in the Investigatory Powers Act itself, and has therefore already been approved by Parliament. There are stringent safeguards in the Act regulating the use of technical capability notices to minimise the impact on businesses, including that the notice must be necessary, proportionate and approved by a judicial commissioner. As I have already said, before giving a technical capability notice to a relevant operator, the Secretary of State must consult that operator. In addition, the Secretary of State must consider a number of factors before deciding to give a notice. Those factors include the technical feasibility and likely cost to the operator complying with the notice, which goes to the heart of ensuring that a notice does not damage a company’s interests.
The Act also makes it clear that the Secretary of State must ensure that arrangements are in force for securing that relevant operators receive an appropriate contribution in respect of their costs incurred in complying with the Act, as the Secretary of State deems appropriate. Such costs include those incurred in relation to complying with a technical capability notice. The Government’s policy is that the appropriate contribution is calculated on a case-by-case basis to ensure that the operator makes neither a loss nor a gain from complying with the Act. A number of the draft codes of practice that we have debated today include an entire chapter on technical capability notices, giving further information about their use, including details of the cost recovery process and the sorts of activities it is anticipated that the Government would fund as part of an operator maintaining a capability.
I may be repeating myself here, but the noble Lord, Lord Butler, asked about making sure that the codes of practice on retention records are made consistent with this week’s ruling. The judgment related to the retention of communications data by telecommunications operators is not being debated today. The CJEU ruling was not about safeguards for equipment interference or for access to bulk communications data. The IP tribunal considered the specific issue of whether the CJEU judgment applied to bulk communications data and has made a further reference to the CJEU on this very point and on whether the bulk communications data regime is within the scope of the judgment’s safeguarding requirements.
My Lords, I realise that I am intervening a bit late, but I did not want to interrupt prematurely, as I did before. Will the Minister comment on techUK’s specific suggestion that the regulations impose an additional aspect to the technical capability notice, in that the Home Office will be alerted to changes in innovation in systems and development? I do not think that the noble Baroness has addressed that specific issue.
(6 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord is right that these crimes can become in themselves a fashion or a trend. With regard to the options open to the judiciary, clearly precedents can be set in respect of the types of crime committed in terms of future sentences meted out.
My Lords, I understand that the Metropolitan Police is having some success with police on scrambler bikes dealing with this type of crime, but its overall vehicle fleet is having to be cut because of budget cuts, to the extent that some criminals are being de-arrested because there is no prisoner transport available. I understand the Government will insist that they are maintaining police funding, but the Metropolitan Police says that it has suffered £600 million in cuts since 2010, with another £400 million in cuts in the pipeline. Who is right about police funding, the Government or the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis?
My Lords, as I said yesterday, police forces across the country have requested increases in funding and, as I outlined yesterday, that is what they have got, with the potential offered by some of the technologies available to them to release 11,000 police officers to do whatever jobs individual forces feel are appropriate. On the noble Lord’s point about scrambler bikes and in the context of the first part of my answer, I know that this is a particular problem in London and if police forces feel that that is the investment they should make then they should be free to do so.
(6 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the Policing and Crime Act 2017 provides police officers and other law enforcement with certain powers in the maritime environment so that they are able to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute criminal offences that take place on vessels where the courts in England and Wales have jurisdiction. These provisions close a gap in enforcement powers, ensuring that law enforcement officers are capable of functioning effectively to tackle crime on sea as on land. This is because Section 30 of the Police Act 1996 places a geographical restriction on the exercise of police powers, limiting these to England and Wales and the adjacent waters; that is, the territorial waters which extend to 12 nautical miles.
The maritime provisions, once commenced, will give the police and other law enforcement at sea similar powers to those available to enforcement officers in relation to drug trafficking and modern slavery. The difference is that these powers cover all offences under the law of England and Wales. In summary, these are: the power to stop, board, divert and detain a vessel; the power to search a vessel and obtain information; and the power to arrest and seize any relevant evidence.
The Policing and Crime Act enables law enforcement officers to use these powers in relation to certain ships in international and foreign waters as well as the territorial waters of England, Wales and Scotland. Principally, the vessels will be UK flagged, but law enforcement will also be able to act on non-flagged vessels and foreign ships in certain circumstances in international waters as well as territorial waters. These powers are important because crimes such as rape, murder, firearms offences and grievous bodily harm can take place on UK-registered ships beyond the territorial waters limit, just as they can within those waters or on UK soil. There are other crimes specific to the maritime context, such as illegal fishing, unsafe vessels, piracy and marine theft, which the police must be able to tackle just as effectively as when the crime is committed on land.
Before these new powers are brought into force, a code of practice issued under Section 94 of the Policing and Crime Act will need to be put in place for English and Welsh law enforcement officers to follow when arresting a person under Section 90 of the Act. The code must set out certain rights and entitlements of persons arrested under Section 90, particularly the information to be made available to them on arrest. The Government have now prepared this code of practice, and it was placed before the House on 16 November 2017, together with these regulations. The regulations are necessary to ensure that the code of practice will be in force at the same time that the maritime powers in the Act are commenced.
The code provides guidance as to the information that should be given to a suspect at the time of their arrest. It makes it clear that suspects should be provided with a summary of their rights and warned if it may take more than 24 hours to bring them to a police station. The code will ensure that law enforcement officers provide suspects with information; this includes ensuring that those detained understand what is said to them. Officers will also be obliged to make arrangements to safeguard the health and welfare of arrested persons.
To ensure that the code will be practical and effective, the Government have consulted the law enforcement agencies that will use this code, representatives of the legal profession, devolved Administrations, other external organisations and interested government departments.
Police Scotland is currently drafting equivalent but non-statutory guidance concerning the exercise of its maritime enforcement powers, and we are working closely with the Scottish Government to ensure that this guidance is appropriately aligned. The Northern Ireland provisions will also be covered by non-statutory guidance. The Northern Ireland maritime provisions will be commenced separately to those of England, Wales and Scotland, at a date determined by the Northern Ireland Executive.
The maritime powers in the Policing and Crime Act are essential if we are to ensure that our police and other law enforcement are equipped to be effective at tackling criminality, to enforce the law and to protect the public. However, when these powers are used, it is vital that they are used properly, particularly when a person’s liberty is restricted as under the power of arrest, and that is why the code of practice and these regulations are so important. I ask noble Lords to support the new code, and I commend the regulations to the House.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing these regulations. I am not sure how illegal fishing is to be enforced against just as effectively as if it was committed on land, but I accept the general point.
We raised concerns during the passing of the primary legislation regarding the extent of these powers, bearing in mind that, as the Minister has said, they allow a law enforcement officer to arrest a person for anything that is an offence in England and Wales on a United Kingdom ship in British waters, in foreign waters or even in international waters. I raised the prospect during those debates that there could be a special constable on a cruise ship pulling out of Southampton who gets into an argument with someone who pokes him in the eye, and who then decides to arrest that individual and orders the “Queen Mary 2” to return to Southampton. The regulations and the power in the Act would allow that. There is nothing in the guidance to officers on the use of discretion, or indeed on whether the powers should be restricted to more serious offences.
The other slightly worrying issue in the draft code is the reference to the Act including,
“a power to require a person on the ship to provide information about themselves and about anything on the ship. The purpose of this is to enable law enforcement officers to take control of the ship”.
I hope that the special constable will not be steering the “Queen Mary 2” into Southampton, with his common assault suspect.
More seriously, in addition to those concerns about the rank of the officer who is using these powers, there is the seriousness of the offence. While I accept that the sorts of offences that the Minister mentioned—rape, murder, firearms and grievous bodily harm—are very serious offences, it is not an exclusive list.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the threat level in the UK, which is set by the independent Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre, remains at severe. This means that a terrorist attack in our country is highly likely and could occur without warning.
While we can never entirely eliminate the threat from terrorism, we are determined to do all we can to minimise the threat to the UK and our interests abroad, and to disrupt those who would engage in it. Recognising that terrorism is a global threat that is best tackled in partnership, it is also important that we demonstrate our support for other members of the international community in their efforts to tackle terrorism wherever it occurs. Proscription is an important part of the Government’s strategy to disrupt terrorist activities.
The four groups we propose to add to the list of terrorist organisations, amending Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000 are, first, al-Ashtar Brigades. This includes a number of aliases of this group: Saraya al-Ashtar, the Wa’ad Allah Brigades, the Islamic Allah Brigades, Imam al-Mahdi Brigades and al-Haydariyah Brigades; secondly, al-Mukhtar Brigades, including Saraya al-Mukhtar; thirdly, Hasam including Harakat Sawa’d Misr and Harakat Hasm; and Liwa al-Thawra. This is the 22nd order under the Act.
Proscription sends a strong message that terrorist activity is not tolerated wherever it happens. Under Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000, the Home Secretary has the power to proscribe an organisation if she believes that it is concerned in terrorism. If the statutory test is met, the Home Secretary may then exercise her discretion to proscribe the organisation. The Home Secretary takes into account a number of factors in considering whether to exercise this discretion. These include the nature and scale of an organisation’s activities and the need to support other members of the international community in tackling terrorism. The effect of proscription is that a listed organisation is outlawed and is unable to operate in the UK. It is a criminal offence for a person to belong to, invite or provide support for, or arrange a meeting in support of, a proscribed organisation. It is also an offence to wear clothing or carry articles in public, such as flags, which arouse reasonable suspicion that an individual is a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation.
Proscription sends a strong message to deter fundraising and recruitment for proscribed organisations, and the assets of a proscribed organisation can become subject to seizure as terrorist assets. Proscription can also support other disruption of terrorist activity, including, for example, the use of immigration powers such as exclusion from the UK where the individual is linked to a proscribed organisation and their presence in the UK would not be in the public interest. Given its wide-ranging impact, the Home Secretary only exercises her power to proscribe after thoroughly reviewing the available evidence on an organisation. This includes information taken from both open sources and sensitive intelligence, as well as advice that reflects consultation across government, including with intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The cross-government Proscription Review Group supports the Home Secretary in her decision-making process. The Home Secretary’s decision to proscribe is taken only after great care and consideration of each particular case—but, given the impact the power can have, it is appropriate that proscriptions must be approved by both Houses.
Having carefully considered all the evidence, the Home Secretary believes that al-Ashtar Brigades, al-Mukhtar Brigades, Hasam and Liwa al-Thawra are currently concerned in terrorism. As noble Lords will appreciate, I am unable to comment on specific intelligence, but I can provide a summary of each group’s activities in turn.
The first group that this order proscribes is the al-Ashtar Brigades and its aliases. The al-Ashtar Brigades is a Bahrain-based Shia militant organisation that was established in 2013. Its aim is to overthrow the Bahraini al-Khalifa ruling family through violent militant operations. It lists the ruling al-Khalifa family, Bahrain security forces and Saudi Arabia as targets for attack. The group has been responsible for numerous attacks in Bahrain for which it has claimed responsibility, including a jail-break of 10 convicted terrorists which led to the death of a police officer in January this year; an IED attack in a bus station in Sitrah, which was claimed by the group under the name Wa’ad Allah Brigades in February; and an attack on a police vehicle near the village of al-Qadeem in July. More generally, the group has promoted violent activity against the Bahraini Government, as well as the British, American and Saudi Arabian Governments on social media.
The second group is al-Mukhtar Brigades, also known as Saraya al-Mukhtar. The al-Mukhtar Brigades is also a Bahrain-based Shia militant organisation that was established in 2013. It lists the al-Khalifa ruling family, Bahraini security forces and Saudi Arabia as targets for attack. The group’s activities include the continued promotion and glorification of terrorism via social media throughout 2017.
The third group to be proscribed is Hasam and its aliases. Hasam is an extremist group targeting the Egyptian security forces and the overthrow of the Egyptian Government. The group announced its creation on 16 July 2016 following an attack it conducted in Fayoum governorate, Egypt. In September 2016, the group claimed responsibility for the attempted assassination of assistant prosecutor General Zakaria Abdel-Aziz, and the attempted assassination of the former Grand Mufti of Egypt, Ali Gomaa, a month earlier. The group has claimed responsibility for over 15 attacks. Between March and September this year in Cairo, it carried out small-arms fire attacks in March, May and July and IED attacks in March, June and September; the latter exploded close to the Myanmar embassy in Cairo.
The last group to be proscribed is Liwa al-Thawra, which is another extremist opposition group using violent tactics against Egyptian security forces, and seeking an end to the Egyptian Government. It announced its creation on 21 August 2016, following an attack in Monofeya, Egypt. The group has claimed responsibility for attacks, including bombings and assassinations. They include an attack in Monofeya, Egypt, in August 2016; the assassination of Egyptian Brigadier General Adel Regali in October 2016; and, in April 2017, the bombing of the Egyptian police training centre in Tanta, Egypt.
In addition to adding these groups, we propose to remove Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, which is an offshoot of the political Hezb-e Islami Party, formed in 1977 in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. HIG is anti-western and desires the creation of a fundamentalist Islamic state in Afghanistan. Since 2001, its main objective has been the removal of western forces and influence in Afghanistan, as well as restoring Islamic law. HIG has been proscribed in the UK since October 2005. However, on 22 September 2016, the group agreed a peace deal with the Afghanistan Government. After careful consideration, the Home Secretary has concluded that there is not sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that HIG is currently concerned in terrorism as defined by Section 3(5) of the Terrorism Act 2000. Under Section 3 of the Terrorism Act 2000, the Home Secretary also has the power to remove an organisation from the list of proscribed organisations, if she believes that it no longer meets the statutory test for proscription. Accordingly, she has brought forward this order and, if approved, this means that being a member of, or providing support to, HIG will cease to be a criminal offence on the day the order comes into force. The decision to de-proscribe HIG was taken after extensive consideration and in light of a full assessment of available information.
The Government do not condone any terrorist activity, and takes a cautious approach to de-proscription. De-proscription of a particular group should not be interpreted as condoning any previous terrorist activities of that group. The British Government have always been clear that HIG was a terrorist organisation. Groups that do not meet the threshold for proscription must remain within the law and are not free to spread hatred, fund terrorist activities or incite violence as they please. The police have comprehensive powers to take action against individuals who engage in such activity under the criminal law. We are determined to detect and disrupt all terrorist threats, whether home-grown or international. Proscription is just one weapon in the considerable armoury at the disposal of the Government, police and security service to disrupt terrorist activity. The Government continue to exercise the proscription power in a proportionate manner, in accordance with the law. We recognise that proscription potentially interferes with an individual’s rights, in particular the rights protected by Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and should be exercised only when absolutely necessary. The order before the House today demonstrates that, when proscription is no longer necessary, we are prepared to act to de-proscribe groups that are no longer concerned in terrorism.
In conclusion, I believe it is right that we add the four groups, the al-Ashtar Brigades, al-Mukhtar Brigades, Hasam and Liwa al-Thawra, and their aliases, to the list of proscribed organisations in Schedule 2 to the Terrorism Act 2000. Equally, we believe that it is proportionate to remove HIG from that list. Subject to the agreement of this House, the order will come into force on Friday 22 December.
My Lords, noble Lords will be pleased to hear that I will be brief. However, these are very serious matters. As the Minister just outlined, this measure can interfere with people’s human rights. Therefore, I have to ask: can she tell us any more about the four organisations being proscribed? I understand that the first group has been involved in attacks in Bahrain and is suspected of financing terror in Qatar; the second group has also been involved in attacks in Bahrain; the third group has been involved in attacks in Egypt; and the fourth group has been involved in attacks on the army and the police in Egypt. However, clearly, this order primarily has effect in the United Kingdom. Is the Minister able to say whether there is any evidence that these groups are active in, or have supporters in, the United Kingdom that would require such draconian steps to be taken? However, I understand that it may not be possible to give those details for security reasons, as she said.
As regards the group being de-proscribed, again it is good to see that the Government are actively considering groups that have been proscribed in the past, and are prepared to de-proscribe where the evidence suggests that is merited. My only concern is that the reasons the Minister gave for de-proscribing the organisation to which she referred raise questions about the amount of evidence available to support the proscription of the other organisations, bearing in mind the alternative measures that can be taken against individuals, in particular, who might be supporting terrorism in the United Kingdom.
I do not want the noble Baroness to regard this as a challenge to what she has just said; I am merely asking for confirmation. Is it really regarded as a security issue to give any indication of which of the five factors set out in the Explanatory Memorandum weighed with the Home Secretary in her decision? I ask that in the context of the noble Baroness’s opening statement, when she referred to supporting international partners in the fight against terrorism, which is one of the five factors. One could take it as a pretty good hint that that was a factor, but that would then be inconsistent with the noble Baroness’s statement that she cannot say which of the factors weighed in the mind of the Home Secretary on this issue.
My Lords, perhaps I can assist. I do not know whether it is beyond my pay grade to suggest something to the Minister but perhaps she could consult after today’s proceedings and, if there is any other information that she can possibly put into the public domain, perhaps she can write to us.
That is a very helpful suggestion from the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, will understand that I am cautious on these occasions. I would not want to breach national security at the Dispatch Box, but if there is any further general information that I can give, I will give it.
(6 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord makes a valid point about our offshore patrol vessels—and there are no plans to get rid of them. However, my point, which I hope I was not making lightly, was that the most effective work we can do at the border is intelligence-led work that is successful at pinpointing areas of high risk.
My Lords, in April last year the then Home Secretary, Theresa May, confirmed in the other place that in 2016-17 the Border Force agency’s revenue budget, which covers staffing, would be 0.4% less compared with 2015-16. However, the Government insist that Border Force spending has been protected because spending on technology such as electronic passport gates has increased. Can the Minister explain what happens at many of the ports of entry where there are no electronic passport gates in the light of the reduction in Border Force staff? Can she also confirm that most of the time, even where there are electronic passport gates, there are not enough staff to keep them open?
On the first part of the noble Lord’s question, he is absolutely right that we have invested in technology such as e-gates, and just before the Calais clearance, my right honourable friend Amber Rudd in the other place stated that £36 million would be committed to support France in the Calais camp clearance. However, on his main point, which is about people being at ports and borders at all times, if we lined this country wall to wall with people, it would still not be as effective as going after the intelligence-led risk, which operates so well.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, in his tweet criticising our Prime Minister, President Trump talked about “radical Islamic terrorism”. Does the Minister agree that there is a difference between Islam, a religion, and Islamism, a violent political ideology that seeks to overthrow democratically elected Governments and liberal values, and that the expression “Islamic terrorism” is both a contradiction in terms and deeply unhelpful? We must clearly differentiate between violent criminals and the followers of a religion.
The noble Lord is absolutely right to make that distinction between Islam and Islamist extremism. I make the point that the overwhelming majority of Muslims in this country are law-abiding, peaceful people who abhor Islamist extremism. The Prime Minister has always been clear that where these ideologies exist, they must be tackled head on. That is precisely what the UK Government are doing at home and in co-operation with our international partners. For example, I previously mentioned the co-operation to remove terrorist content from websites. The noble Lord is absolutely right to point out the distinction. We must all see what has happened for what it is.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, these regulations were laid before Parliament on 12 October. The drug dealing telecommunications restriction orders—DDTRO—respond to an operational requirement of the police and the National Crime Agency to support them in tackling the issue of “county lines” drug dealing and its related violence and criminal exploitation.
As noble Lords probably know, “county lines” is the police term for urban gangs supplying drugs to suburban areas and market and coastal towns, using dedicated anonymous mobile phone lines. We are particularly concerned about this form of drug dealing because of the high-harm nature of this activity. County lines gangs target and exploit children and vulnerable adults, who are then at high risk of extreme physical and sexual violence, gang recriminations and trafficking. In the National Crime Agency’s latest threat assessment of county lines, three-quarters of police forces in England and Wales reported exploitation of vulnerable people in relation to county lines, including children as young as 12.
The mobile phone line is central to county lines activity, with some prominent lines making in excess of £5,000 per day. However, the phone number has limited personal data associated with it and the handset is typically located well away from street-level drug-dealing activity. Such factors make it hard for the police to gain possession of the handset and to pursue criminal prosecutions against an individual for the activity on the line. Where it is possible to do so, and where there is sufficient evidence, the police will pursue prosecution. However, where prosecution is not possible, the police and the NCA have been clear that closing down the phone lines will seriously disrupt county lines drug dealing and the associated violence and exploitation.
With that background in mind, I turn to the details of the regulations before us. The DDTRO Regulations are made pursuant to Section 80A of the Serious Crime Act 2015, which sets out the power to make regulations which enable courts in England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland to issue DDTROs. In essence, the regulations provide the civil courts with the power to make a drug dealing telecommunications restriction order, and set out the process and procedure for doing so.
The applicant for a DDTRO—that is, the police or the NCA—will have to satisfy a court that on the balance of probabilities the device has been used, is likely to have been used, or is likely to be used in connection with drug-dealing offences. The court will also have to have reasonable grounds to believe that the order would prevent or restrict the use of a communication device in connection with drug-dealing offences.
It is important that the initial DDTRO application hearing is conducted in private and without notice to ensure that the phone owner does not know that their line will be closed. If forewarned, the phone owner is likely to take action to negate the order by changing phone numbers in advance. The regulations also provide a number of safeguards to ensure swift resolution if a phone owner is impacted in error. This includes the ability for the applicant authority to disapply the order of its own volition, as well as the right of an affected person to appeal an order at a public hearing.
I hope noble Lords will approve these regulations. They will give the police a vital tool in their efforts to tackle county lines drug dealing and protect vulnerable individuals from being exploited by county lines gangs. I therefore commend these regulations to the Committee.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her explanation. I have some specific questions about these orders and a general comment about the Government’s approach to illegal drugs and related issues. We support these measures but we have wider concerns.
As the Minister has explained, these regulations allow law enforcement agencies to make an application to a court to disconnect mobile communication devices, such as mobile phones, where there are reasonable grounds to believe that an order would prevent or restrict their use in connection with drug dealing. These orders can be made without notice to the people affected, in private and at the request of the applicant, without any details being disclosed to anyone. I can understand the need to protect covert human intelligence sources who may be involved in supplying information to the enforcement agencies and I also understand what the Minister has said—that if people were told in advance, it might enable them to change their telephone numbers in advance—but surely this is going to be only a marginal benefit, as it will soon become apparent to the drug dealer that their phone has been disconnected. Unless I do not understand the issue fully, it would not take very long not only for an alternative number to be secured but for the suppliers and clients to be notified of what the new number is. What is the real advantage of keeping the whole process secret—other than protecting sources—set against the benefits of having, as far as possible, an open justice system? Can the Minister explain how these measures present any more than a minor irritation to the drug dealers? In her explanation, she talked about these measures seriously disrupting drug dealers, but surely it would be very quick and easy to re-establish their lines of communication.
Moving on to wider issues, these measures are symptomatic of the Government’s approach to illegal drugs—tinkering around the edges in the vain hope of appearing to be doing something. But the inescapable fact is that there is an insatiable demand for illegal drugs, from young people who smoke small amounts of cannabis to the rich and famous who use cocaine. The fact that these drugs are illegal is no longer a consideration for millions of recreational drug users in the UK. As with most forms of prohibition—as we have learnt from history—stemming demand is clearly ineffective and, as a result, the law is being brought into disrepute. Addiction to illegal drugs, on the other hand, should be treated as a health issue and not a criminal justice issue. It is the sufferer’s addiction that is the issue and not the drugs that they are addicted to.
As with any insatiable demand, there will clearly be a supply. The only effective way to deal with illegal drug supply is to take out the whole distribution network from source to street. During the period of the “peace dividend”, between peace in Northern Ireland and the rise of Islamist terrorism and the far right, the police and the security services were able to mount a limited number of operations that did just that—take out importers, distributors and street dealers. The combination of the diversion of the security services back to their core function of anti-terrorism and the reduction in police resources means such operations are no longer possible.
There was a story in the Times this week on this very issue of county lines, which reported:
“Thousands of children and teenagers are being used by criminal gangs as drug runners ... The National Crime Agency ... believes that the ‘county lines’ drug trade, in which urban gangs move Class A drugs and cash between inner-city hubs and out-of-town locations, is out of control”.
I spoke a few weeks ago in Parliament to some young people whose lived experience is that drug dealing, with all its inherent risks and dangers, presents the best way to make money as far as they are concerned, whether to support a reasonable lifestyle or to put food on the table for their families. Prison was seen by them as a place where they can meet with their friends. As one young woman recently released from Holloway prison explained, it was somewhere where she had “the best time”, to quote her exactly. She added, admitting the irony, that when her local police station was the base for a safer neighbourhood team and she saw uniformed officers on a regular basis she felt safer, but not anymore.
In a society where discrimination against the young, and black and minority ethnic people, persists in the job market, where young people’s lives are blighted by criminal records acquired at a young age, and which, from young people’s perspective, gives them little or nothing and no hope of making a decent living by legitimate means in the future, they believe drug dealing to be a legitimate option. All this creates a parallel society where young people feel they have to arm themselves with knives and guns to make themselves feel safe, whether they are engaged in drug dealing or not, resulting in record numbers of young people dying on the streets from knife crime and of people dying on our streets from taking illegal drugs because there is no control of the strength or composition of the drugs they are taking. What is the Government’s response to this alarming picture? It is to cut off the phones of drug dealers, if and only if they find out what numbers the dealers are using—something that can be rectified by drug dealers within hours.
There is a crisis in this country enveloping increasing numbers of young people. Of course we should make life difficult for drug dealers and these measures may have a marginal impact, but a major rethink about the legalisation and regulation of drugs, the treatment of addiction, the incarceration and criminalisation of young people, providing opportunities for young people to earn decent money legitimately, and the decimation of community policing, is desperately needed.
(6 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberI thank the noble Lord for his questions. He is absolutely right: it is indeed a very serious matter and the Government do not take it lightly. He will have noticed that the WMS of 21 November was a fulsome Statement and there is now an investigation going on which will take some time. He questioned the abolition of the FSS. The alleged manipulation predates the closure of the FSS, which was never involved in family cases—that was Trimega. He talked about Trimega being part of Randox. I must make it clear that at this point Trimega was not part of Randox. Trimega closed and Randox set up: yes, the two individuals were employed at Randox, but Trimega was not part of it.
The noble Lord also asked whether the numbers would ever be known. They may never be known accurately, but we think that approximately 10,000 tests were affected. The nature of what allegedly went on here means that we can never make this fool-proof because, as the regulator herself said, no reasonable set of quality standards could be guaranteed to prevent determined manipulation by skilled but corrupt personnel.
My Lords, while we agree that determined, skilled and corrupt practitioners in the public sector could equally have produced such a scandal, and that the performance of the former public sector Forensic Science Service was not without criticism, what lessons have already been learned, and what new safeguards are already in place, to prevent this happening again? The Minister said that the Government are considering what lessons can be learned, but surely there are immediate steps from the initial findings that can be implemented—and should have been implemented by now. What action have the Government already taken to reassure the public?
As the noble Lord points out, because this is an ongoing investigation the full lessons of what went on here cannot be appreciated yet. However, the Government have, of course, taken steps since January 2017, when we found out about this alleged manipulation. We supported the police’s initial response to the news of manipulation, including officials advising of the impact on the marketplace and the regulatory impact. The Home Office advised the NPCC in the creation of the silver groups working on the operating protocol for forces, the forensic service providers and the CPS. We facilitated the agreement of commercial terms between Randox and the independent testing companies and sat on the technical advisory group of forensic experts which advised the gold group on the retesting strategy.
As the Statement said, the DfE has liaised with local authorities in England to review their records and will consider what action needs to be taken from there. The MoJ, together with the DfE and HMCTS, has worked closely with the police to identify family and civil court cases where a toxicology test was undertaken by Trimega. We have advised the NPCC gold group and the team that is working with the CPS to ensure that the appropriate disclosure is made. We have asked all forensic toxicology suppliers to review their practices and have asked the Forensic Science Advisory Council to consider a number of measures to strengthen provisions to reduce the risk of malpractice and to help rapid detection. We are supporting the UKAS internal review and have briefed the Lord Chief Justice and the President of the Family Division of the High Court. We have done a lot since we found out about this.
(6 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy noble friend makes the crucial point that where people are falsely accused and have their names in the media, their lives can literally be ruined. Noble Lords may have seen things in the paper over the weekend. The College of Policing guidance provides that, where an investigation identifies a false allegation, it may be appropriate to support a prosecution for attempting to pervert the course of justice. Steps should be taken to test the validity of statements and corroborative accounts and to establish an accurate picture. The decision to support a prosecution would be an operational matter for the relevant chief officer.
My Lords, Sir Richard Henriques did an independent review of the Metropolitan Police’s conduct in these matters. His conclusion was that:
“Until anonymity is enforced by statute, it is inevitable that many accused will lose their anonymity at an early stage of an investigation”.
Why will the Government not legislate?
My Lords, we touched on that extensively on the then Policing and Crime Bill; the noble Lord was part of that debate. The police’s decision on whether to name a suspect is a matter for the chief officer, who must authorise any such disclosure. Following some of the debate, and ongoing with the College of Policing’s authorised professional practice guidance on relationships with the media, the College of Policing recently undertook a consultation on a fresh iteration of the guidance. That guidance is clear that the rationale for naming an arrested person before they are charged must be authorised by the chief officer, and that the authorising officer must also consult the Crown Prosecution Service if considering the release of a name.
(6 years, 12 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is extremely unhelpful and can be divisive when such stories hit the media. With regard to how that might fit into Prevent, the Prevent programme is fundamentally about supporting vulnerable individuals and safeguarding them from being drawn into terrorism. It is safeguarding in a similar way to how we would safeguard people from drug abuse or physical and sexual abuse. I will not comment on individual cases, but that would be the clear distinction between the two.
My Lords, can the Minister remind the House why the Government refuse to allow an independent review of Prevent, as recommended by the former reviewer of terrorism legislation, and why they refuse to publish their own review? At the moment, we have criticism of Prevent which the Government say is without foundation, but that assertion is in itself without foundation.
(7 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is important to recognise that the work undertaken is entirely voluntary. It is not to supplement the work of the contractors. Contractually, the IRC providers must make a minimum number of opportunities available for detainees to participate voluntarily in this paid activity. As I explained to the noble Baroness, detainees’ position regarding pay rights is not the same as for those who are not in detention.
My Lords, perhaps I can give the Minister another opportunity to answer the Labour Front Bench question. Can she confirm that most of the immigration centres are run by private companies, in which case, what happens to the additional profit that these companies make from employing inmates at £1 an hour instead of employing someone on at least the minimum wage to do the same tasks?
My Lords, I have to repeat myself: people are not compelled to work; it is entirely voluntary. The money that they are paid is not in line with rates of pay for the non-detention population and therefore is entirely different. The work is not there to prop up these private companies’ profits, but they are obliged to make these opportunities available should detainees wish to avail themselves of them.
(7 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this country has seen some unprecedented events during the past three months in terms of the terrorist attacks and the terrible incident at Grenfell Tower. The police and emergency services not only have stepped up to the plate but have been under a lot of pressure in that time, both mental and physical. In the light of the recent attacks, we are engaging with the police about the demands that they face, to ensure that they continue to have the resources that they need to keep us safe.
My Lords, I do not believe that the Minister answered the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Blair, so perhaps I may rephrase it. If the Government are not considering appointing admirals of the fleet who have never commanded a warship or field marshals who have never led troops into battle, why are they considering appointing chief constables who have no experience of policing?
My Lords, the direct entry scheme would not apply to chief constables or the commissioner of the Metropolitan Police; the senior officer roles I talked about do not include them under current legislation. I hope that that helps to answer the noble Lord’s question. I will address one aspect of the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Blair, that we talked about in our meeting, which was the pipeline of suitable people coming through. Recruitment is now under way for the 2017 cohort of the direct entrant inspectors and superintendents, with demand considerably increased compared to 2016. This direct entry scheme will see the recruitment of 19 superintendents across the nine forces as well as 56 inspectors, bringing people with fresh ideas and experience, but that does not deny the need for those skills which will have to be brought to the force, or the need for these people to complete the PNAC and the SCC.
(7 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe noble Lord, as always, makes insightful points. Of course there is a big difference between religion and culture and it is often in the attempt to conflate the two that we come up against such horrible types of terrorist activity. The Prime Minister said the other day that we must be prepared to have difficult conversations and I totally agree. Just because conversations are difficult does not mean that we should not have them, and they may lead to a much smoother way forward.
My Lords, the Government realise that the only effective sanction against overseas pornographic websites that refuse to implement age verification is to ask UK internet service providers to block those sites. Bearing it in mind that it would be disproportionate to block sites such as Facebook and YouTube, how do the Government intend to deal with terrorist and extremist propaganda if technology companies do not do enough?
The noble Lord is absolutely right. I pay tribute to my right honourable friend the Home Secretary, who has spent an extensive amount of time over the past few weeks and months talking to communications service providers. Only on Monday, Twitter, Facebook, Microsoft and YouTube announced the formation of a global internet forum, primarily to counter terrorism but also, through that collaborative way forward, to tackle some of the things that the noble Lord mentioned, such as extreme pornography.
(7 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I, too, thank the Minister for repeating the Statement and express the condolences, thoughts and best wishes of those on these Benches to all those affected by these tragedies. I also express our thanks and admiration to the emergency services involved in each of these incidents, particularly the armed officers who had to take the difficult, split-second decision to shoot the suspected perpetrators of the London Bridge/Borough Market attack. Our thoughts should also be with those officers and their families.
I have four questions. Can the Minister confirm that central government funding for the police service is increasing in real terms? What account has been taken of the additional financial pressures on the police service, such as the apprenticeship levy, and the additional operational pressures, such as the public inquiry into covert policing and the post-event investigations into these terrorist incidents? Is it not time to restore community policing, an invaluable source of community intelligence, after a cut of 20,000 police officers and 24,000 police support staff since 2010? Does the Minister agree with the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis that the Met is struggling because of a lack of resources? We welcome David Anderson’s role in reviewing the handling of recent terror attacks. We welcome the idea of a commission for countering extremism, but we need to understand what that means. We also welcome an independent, evidence-based review of Britain’s counterterrorism strategy, including an independent, evidence-based review of Prevent. Can the Minister give any more detail about the commission and can she confirm that the review will be independent and evidence-based?
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for the points they have made. The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, made some very constructive points about police numbers and having the resources to meet the needs of the police in the work they do. Since 2010, police forces have increased the proportion of officers working at the front line and proved that you can continue to cut crime with a smaller, more agile workforce. This is going to be important as we consider capabilities going forward. Since 2015—I hope this goes to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—we have protected overall police spending in real terms. We have increased the counterterrorism budget, and we have funded an uplift in the number of armed police officers. We have also increased the budget of our security services. There are more officers and staff involved in counterterrorism policing than ever before. However, the challenge is not simply about maintaining police numbers. As the nature and complexity of the threat changes, as noble Lords have said, so does the nature of the skills needed to tackle that threat. We have all seen that in recent weeks. We are in an ongoing and constructive dialogue with the police, including the Metropolitan Police. I do not recognise the cuts that the noble Lord talked about, but we will be talking to the police about ensuring that the right powers, capabilities and resources are in place.
The noble Lord talked about the David Anderson review, which will look into why the attacks took place and whether further work needs to be done. It will look into the historical aspect; not just things that have happened over the last few weeks but those in the past as well. Going forward, the review will also look at how we protect our citizens and whether any changes, including legislative changes, are needed as we proceed. But of course it is very early days. We want a thorough review, not a quick one, to make sure that we get things right in the future and respond to changing threats and those which might emerge.
The noble Lord also talked about the Manchester attacker and whether he was known. I hope noble Lords will understand that these matters are subject to police inquiry and that it would be wrong of me to start discussing any of these details, but of course the review will look into what the answers are. I think I have answered both noble Lords’ questions, but I might have missed one from the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy. If he wants to repeat anything, I would be very happy to answer.