Manchester Arena Attack Review

Lord Paddick Excerpts

Wednesday 28th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

On the national counterterrorist reaction and response, I think the noble Lord will agree that generally the overall response was excellent. There was an issue with the telephony system. Part of that issue was that there was no backup system. That has been thoroughly reviewed and a backup has been put in place. It was not something we would have wished to have happened on such a terrible night. I hope that that sort of issue will never arise again because of the measures we have put in place.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

My Lords, I associate myself with the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark. As a senior policer officer, I have been directly involved in the immediate response to terrorist incidents, including the attacks on London on 7 July 2005, and the aftermath is typically chaotic for several hours. Secondary explosive devices and/or marauding gunmen are real possibilities, as we saw in the November 2015 Paris attacks. If either of those alternative scenarios had transpired in this case, the criticism could well have been of the police and the ambulance service for putting their unarmed crews in danger. Does the Minister agree that these are extremely difficult calls to make but that once the decision has been made by the police, who are the lead agency in such situations, that decision needs to be communicated to all the emergency services so as to provide a united response? Can the Minister tell the House who in government is taking responsibility for ensuring that communication between emergency services is effective in these situations?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I pay tribute to the noble Lord and the part that he played in the Metropolitan Police. He must have some incredible experience of such things. He is absolutely right about the immediate aftermath, which is why there are various phased processes for the police and emergency services to go through afterwards. On the terrible possibility of a secondary attack, he is completely right to point out that communication is key, and the joint emergency services interoperability principles come into play. Events such as the 7/7 bombings, through which I am sure the noble Lord was operational, identified the need to improve that joint working between the emergency services. The JESIP, as it is called, was set up to improve how the police, fire and ambulance services work together when responding to those multiagency incidents when they are not specifically CT focused. That was not the case in this instance; it is most relevant in major incidents involving mass fatalities and significant numbers, such as those seen in Manchester and London last year—therefore, providing a key component to the UK’s ability to adequately prepare for a terrorist incident.