Football Governance Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Twycross and Baroness Brady

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

My Lords, before we have any further interventions, I thank my noble friends Lord Bassam of Brighton and Lady Taylor of Bolton, as well as the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, for their amendments. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Maude of Horsham, for his contribution on this group, which sparked a lively debate, and for giving notice of his intention to oppose the Question that Clause 53 stand part of the Bill. It is useful to remember why we are here, but my comments will focus on the amendments in this group. It is imperative that the regulator can raise the funds necessary to deliver its regulatory functions, so I thank my noble friends and the noble Lords who have raised this important issue.

Turning first to Amendments 250 and 254 in the name of my noble friend Lord Bassam, I want to reassure him that the existing drafting in Clause 53(3) is comprehensive, in the Government’s view, and provides the necessary mechanism for raising these funds. Clause 53(3) also acts as an important constraint on what the regulator can charge clubs for. We believe that the amendment would risk bypassing this safeguard. We also want to be clear that, under the existing drafting, any such central fund could not be used as a form of lifeboat fund to prop up clubs in distress. It is the Government’s opinion that a zero-failure regulator, as implied, would create moral hazard and encourage the very risk-taking that the regulator is trying to address.

On Amendment 252 in the name of my noble friend Lady Taylor of Bolton, the Government acknowledge the importance of any charges on clubs being transparent and proportionate, and offering value for money. These values should be at the heart of any public body. This must be achieved while maintaining the regulator’s operational independence and flexibility, which is why it would not be appropriate to prescribe an exact methodology in legislation for charging the levy. Doing so would remove the regulator’s ability to explore other, possibly more effective and proportionate, methods of charging. The Bill already requires the regulator to have regard to clubs’ financial resources and position in the pyramid. I am confident that this will be sufficient to ensure that the levy is fair and proportionate. I hope this will give my noble friends reassurance that these costs will not be burdensome to clubs.

Amendment 256 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, would require the regulator to consult with the Chancellor of the Exchequer specifically, as opposed to the Treasury, when making, amending or replacing levy rules. Consulting with the Treasury on levy rules is standard practice for a regulator, and this approach has been agreed with the department. The Chancellor, as head of the Treasury, will have full oversight of the Treasury’s response to the consultation. The Chancellor is accountable for the decisions of the Treasury and any consultation with the Treasury is likely to have the approval of the Chancellor. Therefore, the Government’s view is that the existing requirement to consult with the Treasury is sufficient to ensure value for money.

Finally, on whether Clause 53 should stand part of the Bill, this clause will allow the regulator to charge a levy to licensed clubs that covers the regulator’s running costs. This follows the precedent of other regulators such as the FCA, the CMA and Ofcom.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

I thank the Minister for allowing an intervention. Has there been any further development on the cost of the regulator? I know that we have asked the question on numerous occasions, but we have not had a reply. It would be very good for clubs to know what the Government expect the regulator to cost. The Minister mentioned the FCA; that costs £762 million a year. I hope it will not be that much.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I was going to come on to that. I anticipated that if the noble Lord, Lord Hayward, was here, he would ask me that question. If I can carry on through my speech, with the noble Baroness’s permission, I will address that later in my remarks.

We think it only fair that industry should cover the cost, as opposed to taxpayers. Football is a wealthy industry, and the cost of regulation would represent just a tiny fraction of its annual revenue of over £6 billion. However, this legislation puts robust checks and balances on the regulator. It will be limited to raising funds to meet a set of tightly defined costs that are necessary for regulatory activity only. The regulator will not have a blank cheque; it will be subject to numerous safeguards, including annual auditing by the National Audit Office, and its annual accounts will be laid before Parliament. This will provide the necessary transparency and scrutiny to deliver value for money.

Clause 53 also requires the regulator to have regard to a club’s individual financial position and the league it plays in when setting the levy charges that a club must pay. This should ensure a proportionate approach where no club, big or small, is asked to pay more than what is fair and affordable. As noble Lords are aware, the regulator will be the one that decides on the methodology and, ultimately, the cost of the levy.

I understand, however, that there is a clear desire, as expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, the noble Lord, Lord Hayward, and other Members of your Lordships’ Committee, to have a much better understanding of how the costs may be borne at different levels of the game. I will endeavour to provide more clarity on this issue. Therefore, after further discussions with the shadow regulator, I will write to noble Lords to provide further clarity on costs ahead of Report. I will also place a copy of this letter in the Libraries of both Houses and would be happy to meet noble Lords or take any questions.

This is a complex issue and we cannot fetter the discretion of the regulator. The letter, when it comes, cannot therefore be considered a definite estimation of costs. It will merely be illustrative, in an attempt to be helpful to this Committee and provide your Lordships’ House—and the clubs that will be regulated—with some clarity and reassurance before we get to Report.

For the reasons I have set out, I am unable to accept the amendments in this group. I therefore hope that noble Lords will not press them.

Football Governance Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Twycross and Baroness Brady

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I appreciate that the noble Baroness, Lady Evans, may take a different view and I completely understand people’s concerns that it will be a front-stop—as a spoiler alert, and with apologies to my noble friend, I am not going to accept these amendments; we will come to that in a moment. However, we genuinely think that the model we have established is very similar, apart from the possible inclusion of the parachute payment—for want of a better word; it is not the phrase used in the Bill, but that escapes me for a moment—should the “state of the game” report suggest to the regulator that it needs to allow that to be taken into account.

My view is that the model we have presented should incentivise the leagues and the parties to come to an agreement themselves, and that opportunity to do so does not go away once the regulator is established. That is the design of the model and an essential part of it, as it was in the previous iteration of the Bill, so this is absolutely intended as a backstop process. We can go on to debate that in later groups as well as in this group. I am happy to do that and to meet people individually to go through why we think this will be a backstop and not a front-stop whereby the minute the regulator sets off in motion, everybody will claim that they want to have the backstop triggered.

However, there are things that the regulator will need to take into account if somebody asks for the backstop process to be triggered. It is not the necessarily the case that the regulator would have to accept that that process was set in motion. The whole model is designed around the principle of trying to get people to come to an agreement themselves. It is really important to ensure—

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

I thank the Minister for giving way. If she was right, we would have a deal in place by now. This has been the model for two years, so it is definitely a barrier to conversations. There is a view that whatever the Premier League agrees with the Football League, that, in effect, becomes its insurance policy. It then triggers the backstop and goes straight to the regulator, knowing that it will never get less than it has been offered and could get more. We will be in a perpetually revolving door of triggering mechanisms that will never give any club any certainty of its income, which will be very dangerous and very bad for football.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

It is important for us to go through how the regulator’s backstop powers and power of last resort would work. I appreciate that the noble Baroness is entirely right that an agreement has not come into place, and that might be—or might not be—because of people waiting to see what form the regulator takes and the exact iteration of the wide range of views we have heard tonight and on previous occasions.

If, under the Government’s intended model for the backstop, the relevant leagues cannot reach an agreement, they can apply to trigger the backstop—the noble Baroness is quite right on that. If certain high thresholds are met, of which the regulator must be satisfied, the backstop can be triggered, but let me go through what would happen first: the relevant leagues would enter a period of mediation and, if there was still no agreement, they would move to a final proposal stage.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

I thank the Minister for allowing me to intervene. Rick Parry went before the Select Committee and said he would trigger the backstop in any event—even if he got more money from the Premier League in the meantime—because there is no risk to the EFL in the backstop.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I am not going to comment on what people did or did not say in that committee meeting at this point. The backstop would be applied only if certain high thresholds were met. The regulator will be an independent regulator and it will have strict measures to meet—high thresholds which it must be satisfied of if the backstop is to be triggered. If there is still no agreement, the parties will move to a final proposal stage and, at that point, the regulator would convene an independent expert panel and invite final proposals from both relevant leagues with accompanying analysis, and the independent expert panel would choose the most appropriate proposal. This model incentivises both parties to compromise, as unreasonable proposals would not be chosen.

The whole model, which is almost identical in every detail to how the previous Government were planning to do this, is intended—

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I appreciate the noble Lord’s point, but if the EFL triggers the backstop or makes a proposal in bad faith, it could end up worse off if the Premier League’s proposal is more reasonable, so this does not encourage the EFL or Premier League to be confrontation or divisive. I am sure we will come back to this at a later stage, probably this evening, but definitely when we come back in the new year on Report.

I am really happy to sit down with noble Lords and talk this through, but I will continue to use my speaking notes for some time and then, I hope, give some reassurance that we are considering this carefully. I am always happy to meet with noble Lords, as is the team that has been working on this. As noble Lords are aware, a number of the officials working on this have been doing so right the way through from the fan-led review, so this is a really good example of the consistency of advice both to this Government and the previous Government, notwithstanding the fact that not everybody here liked the Bill’s previous iteration.

To return to my speaking notes—although I am fairly sure I have got slightly out of order now—we think that this approach encourages future collaboration. We might need to agree to disagree on that point and come back to that debate.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

The Minister says that she believes that the mechanism will deliver collaboration. For my benefit, please could she name a single example of a binding final offer process working in UK regulatory terms, and its use in the UK to deliver the outcomes she is talking about?

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

The Competition and Markets Authority has used it.

The process proposed by this group of amendments, excluding Amendment 260, would allow the regulator to intervene at its discretion and would require it to take into account the potential use of any revenue distributed. It is the Government’s view that this is regulatory overreach and a fundamental change to the intent of the process as drafted.

The other amendments from my noble friends Lord Bassam and Lady Taylor seek to change the structure of the backstop process from a two-party mediation and final proposal/order process to one that could apply to any number of relevant parties. I understand the overall intent of these amendments and have chosen to address them as a group to ensure that that intent is understood comprehensively, and that the Government’s position is in turn communicated coherently.

To clarify, the Premier League, the English Football League and the National League can all apply to trigger the backstop process. Any of the specified competition organisers can submit an application to trigger the process, and simultaneous instances of the backstop process could be triggered to cover the relationships between each of the leagues. The process is inherently designed as a two-party process. Fundamentally, distribution agreements are agreed between two individual leagues and the process is designed to facilitate these agreements. As the final offer process is set up and designed between two parties to facilitate a decision between two proposals on the basis of relevant principles, it would not be effective for the regulator to engage in this process with more than two parties. This is also, in part, why it would not be appropriate for the regulator to make a third offer. Without the incentive of the two-proposal process, parties are likely to stay at polarised positions, rather than find areas for compromise. However, when the two proposals submitted are the only choices, the pragmatic decision is to submit the most reasonable proposal possible. This is the incentive we wish to create.

I now turn to Amendments 292, 296 and 314, tabled by my noble friends Lord Bassam and Lady Taylor of Bolton. While there is a slight difference between “special” and “compelling”, we are satisfied that the bar is set sufficiently high with the use of “special”, which is the more usual terminology in these sorts of provisions. There is likely to be no tangible difference in outcomes, and therefore these amendments would be minor, insignificant changes to the wording of the Bill. As such, the Government believe the current drafting is sufficient. This is also the case for Amendment 264. While we understand the intent behind this amendment, we are content that the current drafting in the Bill sufficiently captures all revenue relevant for consideration during the backstop process. The proposed drafting change would not capture any revenue sources not already captured by the existing wording.

I turn now to Amendments 261, 262, 276 and 315. Amendment 276 seeks to significantly broaden one of the conditions by which the backstop process could be triggered. Condition 2 is specifically designed to be triggered by a material reduction in relevant revenue, as this poses a significant threat to the financial sustainability of the pyramid. Amendment 315 would, if the distribution process was ended due to incomplete or inconsistent proposals, require the regulator to issue a distribution order based on its expert panel’s own proposal, rather than ending the process. This would prevent the regulator ending the final proposal stage without an order, even if both leagues have chosen not to submit proposals.

These amendments, and the others referenced, would increase the likelihood of an enforced rather than an agreed solution. The Government’s preference is for an industry-led solution. It is our view that the regulator should have a role in facilitating the final proposal process only where no agreement can be reached on distribution, and that the process should be the least interventionist it can be while remaining effective. This approach encourages future collaboration and prevents the leagues relying too heavily on the regulator in the future.

I turn now to Amendments 284 and 286. While I agree that the state of the game report is a usual source of information to be considered as part of the distribution agreement process, it is our position that these amendments are unnecessarily prescriptive. As it stands, the Bill does not make specific reference to the report being included as a potential question for consideration. However, the existing drafting does not in any way exclude consideration of the state of the game report, and the regulator must have regard to it as part of its general duties. I would expect the state of the game report to be considered by both the leagues applying to trigger the backstop process, and the regulator, given its relevance. However, to include this expectation beyond what is already set out in primary legislation would be inflexible.

Turning to Amendment 267, while the Government understand the broader intention to involve fans in as many areas of the Bill as possible, it would not be appropriate for the regulator to be mandated to consult a group which is neither directly financially involved nor a governing body. This is not to say that fans should not make their views known to the regulator, and there will be many instances, such as in the state of the game consultation, where we expect the regulator to be able to consider a number of perspectives. This includes the views of fans on the financial situation in English football. Furthermore, the proposed drafting requiring consultation with representatives of regulated clubs is duplicative, given that the Bill as drafted already requires the consultation of the leagues.

Finally, Amendment 319 seeks to remove the provision that explicitly outlines that leagues can come to an alternative agreement at any time in the backstop process. The ability of leagues to come to an agreement independently has been protected in the legislation itself intentionally, to highlight that an industry-led solution is both preferred and encouraged. We believe this explicit protection will encourage the leagues to reconsider at every step of the process whether regulatory intervention is necessary, ideally bringing them closer to an independent agreement that works for all of football.

I hope that my responses have reassured my noble friends and other noble Lords that the Government’s approach is appropriate and provides the necessary protections, and that my noble friends will not press their amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

Clearly, it does not need to wait for the state of the game report to decide whether they are relevant. The approach we have adopted in the Bill means in practice that if the regulator has clear evidence, whether from a different source or from the state of the game report, that parachute payments are causing sustainability issues to the wider pyramid, it will now be able to address them. In our view, this was a potentially serious gap in the legislation that we feel has now been rectified. I stress “potential”.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

What the Minister said would be fine if the regulator was making a balanced determination, but because the Government have created a binary process whereby one proposal can be accepted, it could choose to abolish them. The Government have created that risk, and it is an intolerable risk.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

We went through in quite a lot of detail how the backstop mechanism would be triggered. I know we have more to come, as the noble Lord, Lord Maude, said, but in my view, it is not unreasonable for the regulator to be able to consider them. However, the regulator does not need to consider them.

On the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Brady —clubs and planning, and how they can deal with their financial future if parachute payments could change as part of the backstop process—while the Government understand the desire to ensure that regulated clubs have as much time to adjust to change as possible, we acknowledge that significant time has already passed without a financial distribution agreement. Ensuring a timely and satisfactory agreement is in the interests of football and the wider public. The backstop process is a built-in transition period specifying that parachute payments cannot be reduced within one year of the distribution order coming into effect.

We understand concerns around the future of clubs that may already have factored parachute payments into their forward-looking financial planning before a potential order that could lower payments had been issued. We would expect the leagues to maintain effective communication with clubs throughout the backstop process, which, alongside the built-in transitory provision, will mean that clubs should have ample time to adjust if parachute payments are deemed in scope. There will not be any sudden reduction in payments without warning. I feel that that should provide some reassurance to noble Lords and to the clubs.

On the definition of relevant revenue, football is a fast-paced industry, so it would be erroneous to assume that the definition of relevant revenue might not need to change. If broadcast revenue ceases to be the primary source of revenue stream in the game, the definition would need to be amended to ensure the process remained a viable regulatory intervention. Furthermore, there are already significant safeguards in place to ensure that this power is not used incorrectly. For example, consultation with the regulator, the Football Association and specified competition organisations is required before the power can be utilised.

With noble Lords’ indulgence, I want to say a bit about the consultation process. On a number of occasions it has been stated in your Lordships’ House that there has been insufficient consultation. Particularly in response to a point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, I want to put on the record that this Football Governance Bill is the culmination of years of work, including a huge amount of consultation. During that time, there has been extensive regular engagement with key stakeholders, including clubs that will be subject to the regulation. All clubs have been provided with a number of formal opportunities to share their views, particularly as part of the fan-led review and the formal consultation process on the football governance White Paper, where all 116 clubs in the top five leagues at the time were invited to give their views on the proposals. Over that period, DCMS Ministers and officials have had many hundreds of meetings with clubs, leagues, fan groups and other stakeholders from across football, and we continue to engage with the industry now, so this number is constantly growing.

Clubs have had five years to write to or meet DCMS to make their position known. No club that has requested a meeting has not had one. Indeed, some Premier League clubs were recently invited to meet officials and turned down the invitation, which I stress is their right. We have met and continue to meet a range of clubs, at all levels of the football pyramid, that will be subject to regulation.

The leagues have a role to play here. We would expect them to support their clubs in their understanding of the development of the regime and in their engagement with the Government, as well as to keep their clubs updated on any engagement that the leagues have had with the Government. Indeed, this is what has been explicitly asked of us at times by some of the leagues. Richard Masters, the CEO of the Premier League, Rick Parry, chair of the EFL, and Kevin Miles, CEO of the Football Supporters’ Association, have all praised the Government’s constructive approach to engagement with the clubs and the leagues.

This is not the end of the process or of the consultation. There are still lots of opportunities for clubs to have their say as the legislation passes through Parliament and work continues to establish the regulator. Even once the regulator is established, its approach will be advocacy first, aiming to work constructively with clubs on an ongoing basis to resolve issues wherever it can.

I have asked for an answer to the noble Baroness’s question about the response to the letter, and I will have to revert to her after the debate. Given the lateness of the evening, I have not been able to get a response on that.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

Is that the letter I sent on 2 December about UEFA or the letter that the seven clubs sent to the Secretary of State to which she is going to reply? Maybe the Minister can tell me that afterwards.

It is a statement of fact that the Secretary of State has met only seven clubs for half an hour. I am not talking about other officials. I have to say that there was zero consultation on including parachute payments in the Bill. There may have been other meetings, but between the two Bills that was a significant change that has caused lots of difficult conversations within the leagues.

The Minister said that there was no deal in place. There is a deal; it has been in place between the Premier League and the EFL since 2018, and it has a three-year notice period—just so she knows.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I asked officials to draw up the words that I said on consultation because, night after night, group after group, it has been said to me that there has been insufficient consultation on the Bill. I went back and asked whether I could stand up and say that there has been sufficient consultation on the Bill. What consultation happened? When has it happened? How has it happened? Who has it been with? I am confident there has been a huge amount of consultation on the Bill and I will continue to state that when I am asked. I will follow up things that people feel have not been followed up, but any club that wanted to have a meeting has had one, and some have said they did not want one. I will sit down and allow the noble Lord to finish, but I am not going to accept that there has not been sufficient consultation.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

I am sorry to intervene, but I want to say again that on the specific issue of parachute payments there was no consultation with either the Premier League officials or the Premier League clubs that attended that meeting before this went into the Bill. I am not saying that there was not consultation on other areas, but this is a significant change to the Bill that had zero consultation with the Premier League or Premier League officials.

[Lord Markham (Con)]

It may be that it should be a matter of fact and we can find out one way or the other. The question is: how much consultation has happened specifically on the parachute payments? Obviously, they have been a recent introduction. My understanding from my noble friend is that there was just that 30-minute meeting, at which this was barely raised. I would be grateful if the Minister could ask her officials directly.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 271, 307 and 316 in this group. My noble friend Lord Maude is right: the Premier League’s distribution outside our ecosystem is the highest amount of money of any other sporting competition in the world, and no regulator has forced the Premier League to do that.

My amendments seek to embed principles into the backstop mechanism. My aim in doing so is to ensure that it operates in a way that is proportionate, legally defensible and fit for purpose. At the heart of the amendments lies a simple but critical idea: any intervention by the IFR on this issue must be guided by clear, fair and transparent principles.

The backstop mechanism in its current form lacks sufficient criteria to direct the IFR in exercising its powers. It dictates that the IFR must choose the proposal that is “more consistent” with its principles. But what are those principles? The first is to “advance the IFR’s objectives”, and we have already discussed at great length how nebulous those objectives are. The second is not to place any “undue burden” on the parties’ commercial interests. The third is to ensure that relegated clubs have a one-year transition for any changes to parachute payments. That is it. There is no other guidance for the regulator in making this enormous and binary choice. This is quite incredible, and it creates huge risks, not only for the clubs and the leagues but, more importantly, for the very integrity of the regulatory process itself.

Let me begin with a fundamental principle of protecting property and contractual rights. It is vital to understand that the revenues subject to redistribution under the backstop are not collective funds but revenues generated solely by the Premier League and the Premier League clubs. So the backstop is not a neutral act; it is interference in the property rights of Premier League clubs only.

Under Article 1 of Protocol 1 in the Human Rights Act—A1P1—any interference with those rights must therefore be justified on clear and compelling public policy grounds, and adhere to principles of proportionality and necessity. There are concerns that this crude mechanism, with so few transparent criteria, is legally challengeable under A1P1, even more so now as a result of parachute payments being included, and that is not a good thing; it is in everybody’s interests for this backstop to be legally defensible. But without robust principles to guide the IFR’s decision-making, any determination risks being challenged, leaving the IFR open to judicial review and the entire system mired in uncertainty and delay.

A1P1 case law also emphasises the principle that less intrusive measures must be considered before more significant interventions are imposed, so this is also enshrined in my proposed amendment. The backstop mechanism, as drafted, establishes a binary process that compels the IFR to choose between two competing proposals, but it provides no framework for the IFR to tend towards the least intrusive option, particularly in relation to respecting the Premier League’s property rights as the sole funder of financial redistribution. That is a very dangerous oversight.

Without explicit guidance to the IFR that it should tend towards the least intrusive measure, particularly in its treatment of Premier League revenues, there is a real risk that the backstop could lead to legal overreach. Including this principle in the Bill would provide the IFR with a clear steer, reflect the unique role of the Premier League as the funder of any distribution order and ensure that the mechanism operated in a way that respected property rights.

The principle of good faith is another cornerstone of these amendments. The binary nature of the backstop mechanism incentivises brinkmanship rather than genuine negotiation. These amendments seek to create a framework that rewards constructive engagement and discourages posturing. Without this principle, the backstop risks becoming a tool for division rather than collaboration.

Another critical safeguard in the amendments is the requirement that any backstop decision must not force clubs into breaching their own league’s or UEFA’s existing financial rules and covenants, including profit and sustainability rules or the IFR’s own licence. A sudden and drastic redistribution could reduce Premier League clubs’ revenues, which in turn could destabilise their own business plans, which in turn leads them to breach the profitability and sustainability rules in their own leagues. That would lead to fines, sanctions or even points deductions for Premier League clubs. It would be a remarkable irony if a mechanism intended to promote sustainability instead penalised clubs for failing to meet their own financial obligations.

Finally, let me address the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Maude, which would ensure that the backstop could not be used as a first resort. The IFR must first regulate clubs in the EFL to ensure that they are financially responsible and not conveniently reach for the Premier League’s revenues before it has even sought to impose those controls. If the IFR cannot deliver sustainability through its own regulatory tools, what confidence can we have in its ability to manage a redistributive mechanism fairly or effectively? My noble friend’s amendment rightly prioritises the use of all other tools before triggering the backstop.

These amendments would provide the IFR with the steers that it will desperately need to navigate one of the most consequential issues in football. Without these amendments, or something very similar, the backstop risks sinking into a legal and political quagmire. We should all be aligned in preventing that outcome, so I hope the Minister will listen carefully and sympathetically to these arguments.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, and the noble Lord, Lord Maude of Horsham, for these amendments, and the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, for giving notice of his intention to oppose that Clauses 56 to 60 stand part of the Bill.

I will start with Amendments 271 and 316, from the noble Baroness, Lady Brady. I thank her for clearly stating some of her core concerns about the backstop process through these amendments and hope to reassure her that the existing drafting of the Bill already addresses her concerns without the need for this additional clause. First, I will cover her concern regarding the explanation of suitable alternative regulatory solutions when I address subsequent amendments. On her other concerns, current drafting of the Bill already requires the regulator to trigger the process only if its ability to advance its objectives would be threatened if it did not. Final proposals are already required to advance the regulator’s objective of ensuring financial sustainability and resilience. They also have to ensure that they do not place an undue burden on the commercial interests of either league. We have been mindful of property rights when designing the backstop, which is why the process can be triggered only in specific circumstances and why, even when the high threshold for triggering the process is met, commercial interests must still be considered. We consider this to be a suitably high bar to ensure that the regulator takes adequate consideration of regulated clubs’ property rights and commercial interests.

I understand that the noble Baroness is especially concerned about the issuing of a distribution order that may force clubs into non-compliance with the league’s own internal rules. We would expect the regulator’s decisions to be internally consistent in terms of advancing its objectives, so we cannot see a scenario where the regulator would issue a distribution order that required a club to become non-compliant with its licence conditions. However, there may need to be some adaptation by regulated clubs and competition organisers to renew the regulatory landscape.

If a distribution order issued to ensure the financial sustainability of football put a club at risk of breaching a league’s rules, we would expect competition organisers to work with the club in question and the regulator to understand the decision and its impact. Just as we may expect adaptation by clubs transitioning from unregulated to regulated, we may also expect to see the adaptation of competition organisers.

The amendment implies a scenario where a distribution order results in clubs becoming non-compliant with existing financial regulations. The regulator is already required, as part of its decision on whether to trigger the process, to consider whether the lack of arrangement has arisen as a result of bad faith. Therefore, we are confident that the existing drafting of the backstop proposal process is sufficient to ensure that the regulator already considers the factors outlined in this amendment.

I turn to Amendment 307. While I understand the desire to ensure the proposals chosen at the final proposal stage of the backstop process meet the objectives of the regulator, I believe that the existing drafting already suitably addresses this concern. Final proposals are already required to advance the financial sustainability and resilience of the football pyramid, under existing Clause 62(2)(a). I do not think that the proposed change in wording would lead to significant altered proposals or subsequent distribution orders; therefore, I do not consider that the change is necessary.

I turn to Amendment 288A, from the noble Lord, Lord Maude of Horsham. I understand the desire to ensure that the backstop process is triggered only as a last resort, as this is how the process has been designed and is intended to be used. However, one of the existing conditions that must be met for the regulator to trigger the process in response to an application is that its ability to deliver at least one of its objectives would be jeopardised if the backstop was not triggered. We would expect that, as part of the assessment under this condition, the regulator would review whether existing financial regulations and other regulatory tools could be utilised to better effect instead.

While in service of the same goal, the wording of this amendment is unnecessarily restrictive, requiring the regulator to exhaust all possible other regulatory approaches, and it adds a regulatory burden by requiring the consideration of an expansive array of approaches without prioritisation. This forces the regulator to spend additional time and resources considering options unlikely to resolve the conflict in question. We believe that the current wording already allows the regulator to make its own considered assessment of relevant options before triggering the process.

I now turn to the clause stand part debates and will respond to the noble Lord, Lord Markham. Part 6, of which Clause 56 is the first clause, relates to financial distributions and the backstop mechanism in its totality. I understand the desire on both sides to apply appropriate scrutiny to a part of the Bill that could significantly impact the future financial landscape of football. I hope that, throughout the debate on the backstop process on this and future Committee days, I will be able to demonstrate that the approach taken in Part 6 is the most proportionate and effective approach possible.

These backstop powers have been introduced to help ensure that an agreement can be reached between the leagues in regard to the distribution of revenues from the selling of TV broadcast rights. An agreement of this nature is vital to ensure the future financial sustainability of the football pyramid. The process has been designed to incentivise reasonableness, encourage industry solutions and tackle any bargaining imbalance between leagues. The design of the process is a final offer mechanism, a process that has been shown to incentivise negotiation. It achieves this by removing the ability of the negotiating parties to rely on the third party, in this case the regulator, to design a solution for them. We do not want football to become reliant on the regulator to decide its agreements.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, for her amendments and for her introduction to what was, thankfully, at this time of the night, with apologies, a very short debate—so far.

These amendments are intended to allow leagues to reach an agreement to extend the time that must pass before the backstop can be triggered. While I entirely understand the desire for negotiations to be a league-led process, the timeframe outlined in the Bill has been chosen to ensure that the regulator can intervene in cases where an agreement has not been reached for a significant period. We believe that it is the correct amount of time to get a good view of how potential agreements have affected sustainability, while ensuring that a new agreement is reached in a timely manner. Crucially, many noble Lords have talked about certainty in the regime. We consider that five years provides enough certainty to all parties.

Finally, we have concerns that allowing industry to come to a different timeframe could lead to an element of coercion towards much longer agreements, nulling the presence of the power. The Government’s view is that the five-year timeframe is critical to the effective functioning of the backstop as a regulatory intervention.

For the reasons I have set out, I am unable to accept the amendments and hope that the noble Baroness will withdraw Amendment 280. But, first, I also wish all noble Lords a very happy Recess. I genuinely look forward to continuing the debate in the new year and thank the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, for his kind words.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response and for engaging with the points raised in this debate. However, it will not surprise her that I remain completely unconvinced.

This decision does not deliver certainty: quite the opposite. It enshrines short-term thinking and locks football in a perpetual cycle of instability, with both sides forever negotiating under the shadow of the backstop. As I said, it is a recipe not for certainty but for fractiousness and mistrust.

The Minister also referenced the nature of football’s landscape as the reason to limit agreements, but I am not sure that can be right. I urge her to think again. This new backstop is the Government’s gamble that the Premier League has achieved escape velocity and can absorb anything that even its own Government can throw at it. However, the Premier League is not a cow to be milked. It is a national treasure to be protected. English football deserves much better. I am sure that we will be discussing this issue again on Report, but, for now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Football Governance Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Twycross and Baroness Brady

Committee stage
Monday 9th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I understand that the FA’s position on this point has not changed.

We completely agree that, in the course of regulating, the regulator should not unduly harm the ability of regulated English clubs to compete against their rivals and to succeed in those competitions. This is why Clause 7(2)(a) already relates to avoiding effects on the sporting competitiveness of one regulated club against another. This would cover the “differential impact” to which the noble Baroness’s amendment refers.

Clause 7(2)(b) also relates to avoiding

“adverse effects on the competitiveness of regulated clubs against other clubs”.

This includes against international competitors, as the Explanatory Notes clarify. These provisions already achieve the aims of the noble Baroness’s amendment to minimise impacts on competitiveness, and in fact do so more holistically, recognising that competitiveness matters beyond just the relatively small proportion of clubs competing in, or vying for, European football.

On the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, while I remain confident that nothing in the Bill as drafted would jeopardise the participation of English clubs in international competitions, I do understand his concerns. On UEFA and FIFA, we are speaking to the relevant authorities and will give noble Lords the reassurance on the specific points raised by the noble Lord in the coming weeks before Report.

For the reasons I have set out, I am unable to accept the noble Baroness’s amendment and hope that she will withdraw it.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response and other noble Lords for their contributions. However, I am deeply concerned about the assurances offered. While the Minister again claims that UEFA is comfortable with the Bill, the assertion is at odds with what we know. UEFA has explicitly raised objections to aspects of the Bill, including the risk of state interference breaching its rules. The correspondence exists, yet the Government refuse to publish it. If UEFA is so comfortable with the Bill, why the lack of transparency? Why not share its position openly with the House?

The Minister may be interested to know that, a couple of days ago, I spoke to Mark Bullingham, the CEO of the FA. He told me that only UEFA itself, not the FA, can confirm whether the Bill breaches its statutes, and that he believes that it will not give that confirmation because it will not want to give up its leverage. That is deeply worrying.

This amendment does not create complexity; it adds clarity. It ensures that the regulator considers the unique and unavoidable fact that Premier League clubs operate under dual compliance requirements—domestic regulation and UEFA licensing. Ignoring this reality risks leaving clubs exposed to significant conflicts with the governing bodies, which creates confusion and the instability that the Minister says the Bill seeks to avoid.

The claim that Premier League clubs are not disproportionately impacted is demonstrably incorrect. Only Premier League clubs are subject to UEFA licensing requirements, only they face the prospect of disqualification from European competitions, and only they are exposed to the dual pressures of domestic regulation and international oversight. They also fund the competition and the pyramid. This is not about prioritising one group of clubs over others; it is about recognising that their unique position requires tailored consideration.

The Premier League is not just a league; it is global powerhouse and the financial engine of our football pyramid. The risks of conflict with UEFA and FIFA are real, and they are uniquely borne by Premier League clubs. This amendment does not create division; it addresses it. It ensures that the regulator has the tools and the mandate to navigate these challenges fairly and effectively. I urge the Minister to reconsider her position as we progress towards Report and to reflect on the broader consequences of dismissing these concerns. But, for now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Football Governance Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Twycross and Baroness Brady

Committee stage
Monday 2nd December 2024 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Culture, Media and Sport (Baroness Twycross) (Lab)]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, for tabling this amendment. I also particularly welcomed the personal account of the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan. I thank all those who contributed, including the noble Lord, Lord Maude of Horsham, who has considerable expertise in regulation. The description from the noble Lord, Lord Birt, of the benefits of regulation, including a strong board and what advantage that might bring, was particularly helpful.

In response to the noble Lord, Lord Goodman, we will cover the scope of specified competition in the next group, so your Lordships’ Committee will come to that shortly.

The amendment seeks to add an explicit requirement for the regulator to have “due regard” to the potential economic harms of overregulation and to report on this. It is an important point to be aired, and I welcome the opportunity to respond to the concerns the noble Lord has. I absolutely agree that overregulation is something to be avoided. It is why the regulator’s general duties and regulatory principles provide sufficient safeguards to prevent this.

The regulation ensures that the regime is proportionate. In particular, Clauses 7 and 8 emphasise the need for the regulator to act in a way that avoids, as far as reasonably possible, adverse effects on investment and competitiveness, and that it should act proportionately.

The noble Lord, Lord Jackson, asked about overregulation and was echoed by the noble Baroness, Lady Brady. The regulator’s general duties require it to have regard to how regulation might affect, among other things, financial investment in English football. Its regulatory principles clearly state the importance of advocacy and the need for the regulator to engage with stakeholders. It must act, as I said, in a proportionate manner. All these measures provide a safeguard against overregulation.

The noble Lords, Lord Hayward and Lord Maude, asked about burdens or potential costs on small clubs and the risk of disproportionate burdens. In addition to the explicit regulatory principle guiding the regulator to be proportionate, the entire system has been designed with this proportionality in mind. For example, the licence conditions placed on clubs will vary depending on their unique circumstances. Where clubs are smaller or lower-risk, the regulator’s requirements will reflect this. This means that the regulator will not impose unnecessary burdens on smaller or already well-run clubs.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

A comment was made about there being no concern for costs outside the Premier League. However, Mark Ives, the general manager of National League, said:

“We are concerned about the costs … The expectation of how much it is going to cost clubs at a National League level is a huge concern—it may be a small amount of money, but it is a lot to the clubs. We are worried about mission creep within the Bill and the additional bureaucracy. There is a lot of duplication of work, such as the licensing system—there’s an expectation for clubs to do two lots of licensing”.


Dagenham & Redbridge chief executive officer, Steve Thompson, said:

“We are worried that the Bill will be so onerous. Some National League clubs work on two or three people and some volunteers … It does really worry me that some of our small clubs will not survive with the regulation and the reporting that is required”.


There may be a proportionate cost, with clubs in the Premier League from the top down paying proportionately but, whatever the cost, there is concern throughout the leagues.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

The noble Baroness raises a particular concern. I am not suggesting by any means that people will not need time to get used to and understand the burdens or costs on smaller clubs but, as I felt I had outlined, I hope that, with enough clarity, the licence conditions—that includes the costs placed on clubs— will vary depending on their unique circumstances. I am sure we will have further opportunities to discuss that as we go forward. Hopefully we can give your Lordships’ Committee and the clubs some reassurance on that point.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

I am very grateful to my noble friend for giving way. Was it not said at some stage during the consideration of the predecessor Bill before the election that it would be a good idea if the regulator was up and running and got some experience of the regime being introduced before considering extending it?

A few minutes ago, we heard that Members opposite thought that this would be too great a burden on smaller clubs. So perhaps it is a good idea to consider when the time is right and what experience the new regulator will have.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

It was the smaller clubs, as well as us, that said it would be a burden to them. I read out what the National League’s general manager said about his clubs and their concerns.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I will address the issue of why the regulatory regime is currently intended to be limited to the top five tiers of football and not to include the National League North and the National League South. The issues we are concerned with arise most typically and markedly in the professional game where the financialisation of clubs is greatest. We recognise that the top five tiers is not necessarily a perfect proxy for the professional game, since some semi-professional and professional clubs can move between these leagues. However, we consider it the most appropriate and proportionate place to draw the line and the place where it would not result in some clubs in the league being subject to regulation and others not. We do not currently believe that extending the scope beyond the top five tiers would be proportionate to the burden on smaller clubs below the National League.

On Amendment 19—and apologies if I am repeating parts of my speech, because it is some time ago that I was actually on my script—in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, I understand his desire to have upfront clarity on the face of the Bill.

Turning to Amendment 21, I thank my noble friend Lady Taylor for putting forward this amendment. As I am sure my noble friend is aware, the Secretary of State would have the ability to specify competitions that are in scope of the regulator and we believe that the top five tiers is a sensible and proportionate place to draw the line.

In relation to the points on hybridity, questions of hybridity are for the examiners, not for the Government. If the amendment is made, there will be a process to be followed that will decide whether the Bill is hybrid and needs to go through the hybrid procedures. Initial advice is that the Bill would be thought to be hybrid and I understand that, following the tabling of Amendment 19 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, and Amendment 21 in the name of my noble friend Lady Taylor, issues have been raised about their hybridity.

The noble Lord, Lord Goodman, asked whether we had discussed with the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee ahead of the process. We would not discuss committee reports with clerks before they draw them up.

I know that noble Lords want to continue to work constructively on the Bill—

Football Governance Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Twycross and Baroness Brady

Committee stage
Wednesday 27th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

There is nothing in the Bill that conflicts with English clubs or the English national side competing in international games, as the rules of the international bodies stand currently.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

Have UEFA told the Minister that, or is that her understanding?

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

As I said, UEFA had a meeting with the Minister for Sport. My understanding from that meeting, at which I was not present, is that this was confirmed. It has not raised other concerns. If any noble Lord knows of other concerns that it has raised directly with them, please get in touch afterwards.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I can only repeat that I know that the Minister for Sport is clear that she had a positive and constructive meeting with UEFA, and that we will continue to work with it. The only other point I was aiming to make on this matter, rather than repeating what I had already said, was that when the Government say that we want to keep the Bill within its current scope, this is clearly partly to avoid mission creep, with the unintended consequence that we might then stray into areas that are problematic. When we debate subsequent groups, please note that it is front and centre of our minds that we are very clear that this Government will do nothing to jeopardise the ability of English clubs or the England team to play in international competitions, whether they are European, world-level or at the Olympics. I hope that noble Lords accept that there is no intention to do anything that will jeopardise that. The advice we have had is that this will not be the case. The engagement with UEFA is essential, and it is aimed at ensuring that there are not any unintended consequences that would damage the ability of English clubs or national teams to compete in UEFA, FIFA or Olympic competitions.

This legislation does not impose undue third-party influence on the FA, and therefore does not breach FIFA or UEFA statutes, which the FA has confirmed. In any case, there is an additional safeguard already in place in the Bill, in that the regulator must have regard to its duty to avoid any effect on sporting competitiveness of regulated clubs. For the avoidance of any doubt, and to ensure that there is no possibility of any clauses that may concern these sporting bodies, we have already taken action. As previously noted during the debate, we have removed a clause from the previous Bill which allowed government foreign policy and trade considerations to be considered when approving takeovers. The regulator will be fully independent from Government and tightly focused on the financial sustainability of the game.

On Amendment 24 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, I say that we are extremely confident that no powers or potential actions taken by the regulator would be in breach of the rules, and thus preclude England’s national teams from competing in international competitions. We are mindful of UEFA’s governing principles around undue third-party influence, and this has shaped how we are setting up the regulator.

I am proud that this is a Labour Government Bill that we are taking through this House, as was noted, with agreement from the previous Government. This legislation will not impact the intention for our teams to play in UEFA competitions. For the reasons I have set out, I am unable to accept the noble Lords’ amendments and hope that they will not press them.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

Just before the Minister sits down, can she confirm if she could, and would, place in the Library the letter that the Secretary of State received from UEFA, so all Peers have a chance to read it? I know the Minister stated that this was not alarming, but I think the majority of people would find it alarming.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

The noble Baroness refers to my point about this not being alarming. I do not want fans to be alarmed by our discussion. It was a private letter from UEFA; there is no intention for it to be published. I assure noble Lords that this Government will not do anything to jeopardise the FA’s membership of UEFA or the participation of English teams in UEFA competitions.