Football Governance Bill [HL]

Baroness Brady Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I refer the Committee to my interests as detailed in the register. I support Amendments 187ZA and 187ZB, tabled by my noble friend Lord Moynihan, which propose a sensible and very necessary adjustment to the presumptions under- pinning the ownership test.

These amendments address an important issue in the Bill, ensuring that the ownership process is fair, reasonable and aligned with best practices in other regulated sectors. As my noble friend has said, as it stands, Clause 32(5) means that if the independent football regulator fails to determine an application for a new owner or officer within a set timeframe, the applicant will be automatically treated as unsuitable. This is a really problematic approach. It assumes that any delay is the fault of the applicant or reflective of their unsuitability when, in reality, delays can occur for many good reasons. Quite often, they are entirely outside the applicant’s control or, indeed, the control of the selling club.

Simple cases can, of course, be done quickly, but acquisitions of football clubs can be complex undertakings. Applications for ownership done well involve a detailed examination of financial records, governance structures and regulatory compliance. Imposing arbitrary deadlines does not speed things up; it just risks poor decisions being taken on very consequential issues without all the facts. Indeed, taking time to get it right is in the best interests of all involved: the club, the fans and the broader football ecosystem. To penalise an applicant simply because the IFR runs out of time is neither fair nor proportionate.

The Premier League allocates significant resources to operate its own owners’ and directors’ tests. I have spoken to it about this issue and, of course, so has DCMS. It has told me that the league sees no benefit whatever in arbitrary deadlines and has explicitly told the Government that unless this is staffed and resourced intensively, the IFR will almost definitely hit the deadline in a range of cases. Of course, this will be compounded by the fact that the Premier League will be running its own process without a statutory deadline, meaning the IFR would be ruling people to be unsuitable for no good reason while the league would still be performing its test. This is a recipe for chaos and, I am afraid to say, litigation.

This presumption of unfitness if a statutory deadline is not met could have significant unintended consequences. Let us imagine a scenario where a club is on the brink of critical ownership transfer—perhaps its survival depends on transferring the ownership—and the only prospective buyer is deemed unsuitable purely because the IFR failed to meet its deadline. In the last Committee debate, the Minister said:

“Although the risk of clubs going into administration will be greatly reduced, it may still happen”.—[Official Report, 16/12/24; col. 54.]


For a club to go into administration because the regulator has not met its deadline would be unfair, and catastrophic for its supporters. Even if it did not result in immediate administration, it could leave the club in limbo, unable to secure necessary investment and potentially sliding into financial difficulty or worse.

This issue is not confined to the immediate impact on clubs. There are also wider reputational and practical implications for prospective owners and officers. Being deemed “unsuitable” by default could carry consequences far beyond football, affecting their credibility and standing in other sectors. That is not how a fair and just regulatory process should operate.

The amendments before us propose a simple but important correction. By reversing the presumption, they would ensure that applicants were not unfairly penalised for delays that were outside their control. Instead, if the IFR fails to make a determination within the specified timeline, the applicant would be treated as suitable by default. As my noble friend Lord Moynihan said, that is much more aligned with practices in other regulated sectors. For example, in merger control, if the Competition and Markets Authority fails to make a decision within the statutory time limit, the merger is automatically allowed. That ensures that the time limits are meaningful but that regulatory delay does not create unnecessary barriers or unfair outcomes.

It is important to emphasise that this amendment does not undermine the integrity of the ownership test. The IFR will still be able to make a determination based on the suitability of the applicant, but it will no longer have the ability, in effect, to penalise applicants or clubs because of its own delays. It would, in truth, be far better not have a timeframe at all, for the reasons I have outlined. However, if there is to be one, we must reverse the presumption and place incentives in the right place.

I hope the Minister will recognise the value of these amendments, and the much greater fairness and reduced risk they would bring to the process. It is a small but crucial change that will help ensure the ownership process operates in way that is both reasonable and just. I urge the Government to give the amendments the consideration they warrant.

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, in this matter. It cannot possibly be fair to have a regulatory system in which, if the regulator does not perform and reach a decision within the specified time, for reasons that are not the responsibility of the applicant, the application fails. That is plainly unjust and, as the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, says, it is contradictory to the approach adopted in competition law, where the regulator has short time limits and must comply with them. The alternative is to have a more open-ended system, whereby the regulator can take more time if it is necessary to do so in exceptional circumstances.

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[Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay (Con)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 190 I will speak to my further amendments in this group, Amendments 191, 195 and 198. I will also speak to Amendment 204, which is in the name of my noble friend Lord Markham, to which I have added my name as well.

The amendments in this group focus on the criteria that the regulator will take into consideration when determining the suitability of a potential owner of a regulated club. My Amendment 190 is intended as a probing amendment, to tease out the reasonings behind the Government’s removal of what was Clause 37(2) in the previous version of the Bill. While the wording of this amendment is exactly the same as that of the subsection that was taken out when the present Government introduced their version, I want to be clear that I am not necessarily arguing that I want to see it reinserted. My intention here is to use this opportunity to understand why the Government took it out, and to ask the Minister a few questions for the sake of the Committee to elaborate on the Government’s position.

The Government have said that the previous requirement for the regulator to have regard to the foreign and trade policy objectives of the United Kingdom and its Government was one of the main concerns that UEFA had with the previous version of the Bill, and that removing the provision has pacified it. But has it fully pacified UEFA? We have not yet had sight of the letter from UEFA to the Secretary of State, which the Committee has heard about a number of times. My noble friend Lady Brady sent her own correspondence to the noble Baroness, Lady Twycross, on 2 December, asking her to publish that letter and to place a copy in the Library so that the Committee can see it, but I do not believe my noble friend has yet received a response. It would be very helpful for the whole Committee to be able to see that letter, so we can be reassured about what exactly UEFA has said in that regard.

At present, it is not clear whether this provision was the only part of the previous Bill with which UEFA was not content or whether there are further parts of the Bill currently before us with which it is still unhappy. It would be useful to know how strong UEFA’s opposition was to the old provision on trade policy and so on. Did the Government remove it because UEFA threatened to exclude England from European competitions if, and only if, it remained in the Bill, or was UEFA’s opposition weaker and focused on other aspects of the Bill? I would be grateful if the Minister could elaborate on that for the Committee, and I hope that my noble friend Lady Brady will receive a response before Report.

My Amendment 191 would insert the word “relevant” to Clause 37(2)(c). This requires the regulator to consider whether a prospective owner or officer has been party to any civil proceedings in a court of law. The intent of including “relevant” here is to give a more precise wording, and indeed a bit of leeway. Our concern is that the current wording permits a wide range of court proceedings to be considered by the regulator—for example, divorce or child custody would surely be a civil proceeding. Making this simple change would focus the scope on civil proceedings which are directly related to somebody’s ability as an officer or owner of a regulated club.

I seek through Amendment 195 to prevent the regulator amending the considerations relevant to owner and officer determinations. This follows the theme that we have carried through this Committee of ensuring maximum clarity for clubs which are going to be regulated, and ensuring that the powers granted to the regulator by Parliament are not expanded in future. To allow that would be to grant the regulator a blank cheque to demand more and more requirements as it wishes.

The last amendment in my name in this group is Amendment 198, which would remove the provision stating that the regulator may not refuse ownership of a regulated club because of a prospective owner’s connection with the Government of a particular territory. I am sure we can all think of particular countries or territories at present which would indeed be grounds for immediate disqualification—this perhaps flows from the debate we had on group 2. For instance, at present, connection with the Government of the Russian Federation would surely be an open-and-shut case—would the Minister not agree? We want to ensure that the regulator is independent of our own Government, of course, but I do not see why the regulator should be prohibited in law from considering factors such as this in the determinations that it makes.

Amendment 204, in the name of my noble friend Lord Markham, prevents the regulator prohibiting multi-club ownership models. There are currently a large number of Premier League and English Football League clubs which are owned by individuals or consortia that own other clubs. There has been some controversy in this area, I gather, but we should be alive to the benefits of the model—one of which is a reduction in financial risk. It gives the ultimate owner of a club greater protection from one of their clubs being relegated or suffering a slump in revenue. Because there is a common owner, other clubs in the multi-club model can act as a buffer to absorb losses in one of the other clubs. There is, consequently, less risk of that owner facing difficulties and having to sell the club or, even worse, that club going into administration. Multi-club ownership models can absorb financial risk, thereby aiding the regulator to achieve the goals we want to see it achieve in regard to financial stability Surely the regulator should not prohibit this. I beg to move.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 191, which seeks to add the word “relevant” to Clause 37(2)(c). This would be an important adjustment that would bring additional clarity and guidance to the IFR, as it develops its ownership test. The clause currently requires the independent football regulator to consider

“whether the individual is or has been a party to proceedings (other than criminal proceedings) in any court or tribunal”.

This is a strikingly broad provision. It would allow any civil proceedings, regardless of their nature or relevance, to count against someone in an ownership determination; it may even be that the individual in question seeking ownership has brought the civil action or tribunal that, as a result, is likely to disqualify them from owning a football club. It is a very concerning approach. Amendment 191 would provide a much-needed safeguard against unintended and disproportionate outcomes.

Let me take this opportunity to ask the Minister again the question I asked earlier in Committee—it is quite a fundamental question. Is the ownership test provided for in this Bill going to be subjective or objective? That was not made clear by the Minister when I asked the question before, so I would really like clarity—surely it cannot be both. Without this clarity, we risk creating an ownership framework that is open to arbitrary and inconsistent application, which would undermine investor confidence and, ultimately, the credibility of the regulator.

This concern is particularly acute when we consider the clause as it stands. Most successful businesspeople who have lived rich and varied commercial lives will have been involved in civil proceedings at some point, somewhere in the world. These could range from contractual disputes to regulatory disagreements or employment tribunals, and very often instances where they were not at fault whatever but had to defend their interests or bring such cases themselves. Are we seriously suggesting that such proceedings should disqualify them from passing an ownership test?

This is not a hypothetical concern. Civil proceedings can be entirely routine and, in many industries, reflect the complexity of modern business rather than any moral or professional failing. The absence of the word “relevant” means that such cases could be treated as a disqualifying factor, even when they have no bearing whatever on the individual's ability to responsibly own or direct a football club. This is not aligned with practice in any other regulatory sectors and will create an entirely unnecessary barrier to investment.

Clarity on the scope and purpose of the ownership test is essential for not just the regulator but the entire football ecosystem, including investors, leagues and clubs. Noble Lords have already highlighted serious issues with the current drafting, not least the lack of definition of “significant influence”. On the very unclear situation of Newcastle United, the Minister confirmed that the Crown Prince would be subject to the owners’ test, and the issue of significant influence would mean that this is the case. At least that situation was clarified and he knows where he stands.

Amendment 191 provides an opportunity to address at least one aspect of this mixture of problems by narrowing the scope of Clause 37(2) to focus only on what is genuinely relevant. This small change would provide greater clarity, fairness and confidence for all stakeholders in football. I encourage the Minister to reflect on this issue and the broader issues around this element of the Bill. As we move towards Report, it would be helpful to hear how the Government intend to address the now quite numerous concerns about the scope and application of the ownership test in the Bill.

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[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

My Lords, before we have any further interventions, I thank my noble friends Lord Bassam of Brighton and Lady Taylor of Bolton, as well as the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, for their amendments. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Maude of Horsham, for his contribution on this group, which sparked a lively debate, and for giving notice of his intention to oppose the Question that Clause 53 stand part of the Bill. It is useful to remember why we are here, but my comments will focus on the amendments in this group. It is imperative that the regulator can raise the funds necessary to deliver its regulatory functions, so I thank my noble friends and the noble Lords who have raised this important issue.

Turning first to Amendments 250 and 254 in the name of my noble friend Lord Bassam, I want to reassure him that the existing drafting in Clause 53(3) is comprehensive, in the Government’s view, and provides the necessary mechanism for raising these funds. Clause 53(3) also acts as an important constraint on what the regulator can charge clubs for. We believe that the amendment would risk bypassing this safeguard. We also want to be clear that, under the existing drafting, any such central fund could not be used as a form of lifeboat fund to prop up clubs in distress. It is the Government’s opinion that a zero-failure regulator, as implied, would create moral hazard and encourage the very risk-taking that the regulator is trying to address.

On Amendment 252 in the name of my noble friend Lady Taylor of Bolton, the Government acknowledge the importance of any charges on clubs being transparent and proportionate, and offering value for money. These values should be at the heart of any public body. This must be achieved while maintaining the regulator’s operational independence and flexibility, which is why it would not be appropriate to prescribe an exact methodology in legislation for charging the levy. Doing so would remove the regulator’s ability to explore other, possibly more effective and proportionate, methods of charging. The Bill already requires the regulator to have regard to clubs’ financial resources and position in the pyramid. I am confident that this will be sufficient to ensure that the levy is fair and proportionate. I hope this will give my noble friends reassurance that these costs will not be burdensome to clubs.

Amendment 256 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, would require the regulator to consult with the Chancellor of the Exchequer specifically, as opposed to the Treasury, when making, amending or replacing levy rules. Consulting with the Treasury on levy rules is standard practice for a regulator, and this approach has been agreed with the department. The Chancellor, as head of the Treasury, will have full oversight of the Treasury’s response to the consultation. The Chancellor is accountable for the decisions of the Treasury and any consultation with the Treasury is likely to have the approval of the Chancellor. Therefore, the Government’s view is that the existing requirement to consult with the Treasury is sufficient to ensure value for money.

Finally, on whether Clause 53 should stand part of the Bill, this clause will allow the regulator to charge a levy to licensed clubs that covers the regulator’s running costs. This follows the precedent of other regulators such as the FCA, the CMA and Ofcom.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

I thank the Minister for allowing an intervention. Has there been any further development on the cost of the regulator? I know that we have asked the question on numerous occasions, but we have not had a reply. It would be very good for clubs to know what the Government expect the regulator to cost. The Minister mentioned the FCA; that costs £762 million a year. I hope it will not be that much.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I was going to come on to that. I anticipated that if the noble Lord, Lord Hayward, was here, he would ask me that question. If I can carry on through my speech, with the noble Baroness’s permission, I will address that later in my remarks.

We think it only fair that industry should cover the cost, as opposed to taxpayers. Football is a wealthy industry, and the cost of regulation would represent just a tiny fraction of its annual revenue of over £6 billion. However, this legislation puts robust checks and balances on the regulator. It will be limited to raising funds to meet a set of tightly defined costs that are necessary for regulatory activity only. The regulator will not have a blank cheque; it will be subject to numerous safeguards, including annual auditing by the National Audit Office, and its annual accounts will be laid before Parliament. This will provide the necessary transparency and scrutiny to deliver value for money.

Clause 53 also requires the regulator to have regard to a club’s individual financial position and the league it plays in when setting the levy charges that a club must pay. This should ensure a proportionate approach where no club, big or small, is asked to pay more than what is fair and affordable. As noble Lords are aware, the regulator will be the one that decides on the methodology and, ultimately, the cost of the levy.

I understand, however, that there is a clear desire, as expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, the noble Lord, Lord Hayward, and other Members of your Lordships’ Committee, to have a much better understanding of how the costs may be borne at different levels of the game. I will endeavour to provide more clarity on this issue. Therefore, after further discussions with the shadow regulator, I will write to noble Lords to provide further clarity on costs ahead of Report. I will also place a copy of this letter in the Libraries of both Houses and would be happy to meet noble Lords or take any questions.

This is a complex issue and we cannot fetter the discretion of the regulator. The letter, when it comes, cannot therefore be considered a definite estimation of costs. It will merely be illustrative, in an attempt to be helpful to this Committee and provide your Lordships’ House—and the clubs that will be regulated—with some clarity and reassurance before we get to Report.

For the reasons I have set out, I am unable to accept the amendments in this group. I therefore hope that noble Lords will not press them.