Football Governance Bill [HL]

Baroness Brady Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 15th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I refer the Committee to my interests as declared on the register. I want to address a comment made by the noble Baroness. The assertion that the Premier League has made no substantial proposals during negotiations is not true and not borne out by the facts. The Premier League has put forward multiple comprehensive proposals alongside detailed financial models and heads of terms, which were also provided to DCMS. Each was designed to significantly increase solidarity contributions while ensuring financial controls that the additional funding encouraged sustainability and not wage inflation.

I am informed that the EFL did not keep its clubs fully apprised of the proposals made by the Premier League, nor did the EFL at any stage recommend the Premier League’s proposals to its member clubs or recommend to its board that they may be accepted. So there has been progress, and offers have been made by the Premier League that have not been put by the EFL. It is categorically wrong to suggest that any delay is wholly or in part because of the Premier League.

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[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 302, 303 and 304 in my name, which would deliver two improvements to the backstop mechanism: a funder preference model and the ability for the regulatory panel to select elements of both parties’ proposals. These changes are intended not only to mitigate the extreme risks inherent in the current model but to enable a balanced, effective and generous approach to Premier League funding for the football pyramid.

I reiterate that Premier League clubs, and the league itself, are not opposed to regulation per se, and there are versions of the Bill, and indeed the backstop, that could be made to work. I say that notwithstanding the fact that the Premier League already shares its revenues more generously than any other major football league. The current voluntary approach to the distribution of our revenues has helped make the Championship the sixth richest league in Europe. The Premier League and its clubs are not afraid of doing the right thing. I believe that we would back ourselves to be fair, generous and innovative in addressing the needs of the pyramid. While we may not like it and believe it to be unnecessary, we are not remotely frightened of a regulator that is empowered to determine the right answer.

However, that is not what the Bill enables. The reality is that this untested idea is just not the right way to achieve the Government’s aims. As drafted, this backstop poses intolerable risks to the Premier League, its clubs and the wider football ecosystem. At its core, the backstop represents an unprecedented and untested intervention in what has historically been a voluntary and collaborative arrangement for revenue distribution. Far from coming up with the right answer, the pendulum arbitration model forces the IFR to choose one proposal in its entirety: either the Premier League’s or the EFL’s. This binary approach is not only crude but inherently adversarial. It incentivises extreme and divergent proposals, turning negotiations into high-stakes brinkmanship.

It is important to remember that this model does not simply decide funding levels; it also governs critical aspects of the football pyramid’s structure, such as merit rakes, the conditions of funding and even the existence or form of parachute payments, which we will return to in the next group. As I said in Committee before Christmas, this mechanism therefore periodically throws all the pieces of the pyramid into the air, with enormous uncertainty as to where they might land.

The inclusion of parachute payments in the backstop has only amplified these risks. We know that abolition or near abolition is not a hypothetical risk, because it is the clear position of the EFL. Make no mistake: its vision would fundamentally level down the Premier League, stripping smaller clubs of the tools they need to survive and thrive, and replacing aspiration with survival as the ceiling of ambition. This is why a proposal for a funder preference model warrants serious consideration.

My amendment would require the regulator to select the Premier League’s proposal so long as it meets all the regulatory objectives: in other words, so long as it delivers, in full, against the issues identified by the regulator. A funder preference model does not mean that the Premier League gets its way; it simply means that, as the sole funder—the people whose property rights are being interfered with—its proposal for meeting the sustainability needs of the pyramid would be given preference if, and only if, it delivers all the regulator’s objectives.

This approach would mitigate the risk of an extreme proposal being selected but only if the Premier League continues to step up to the plate. Importantly for the Government and the industry, it would also reduce the likelihood of prolonged legal challenges. Crucially, with parachute payments now included in the Bill, a funder preference model could still oblige the Premier League to adopt the parachute system if the “state of the game” report identifies challenges, but it would do so without the intolerable risk of the near abolition or the destabilising consequences that would follow. In other words, it would enable a balanced calibration of the parachutes rather than creating threats to them.

Also important is my amendment to give the panel the ability to combine elements from both proposals, rather than necessarily be obliged to choose one proposal or the other in its entirety. The noble Lord, Lord Birt, compellingly demonstrated the case for a more sophisticated approach, alongside proper principles and criteria to guide the panel in its decision-making. My amendment is different in that the IFR would be far less involved in designing a solution itself but it would also allow for more tailored solutions that address the needs of both parties. This seems far preferable to forcing the regulator into a binary choice.

The Premier League and its clubs’ track record demonstrate that it already has incentives to balance its own needs with the needs of a thriving, well-funded pyramid. The Premier League is not perfect but it has consistently stepped up to find the right answer for the whole game to the tune of £1.6 billion of funding over three years. We invented solidarity payments; no one forced us to. We created a stadium infrastructure fund that has helped over 1,000 community clubs. No one made us do it. We designed community programmes that have reached over 2 million young people. No one mandated it. We said that we would stand behind the pyramid and not let any club go to the wall during Covid. None did, because we stepped up to the plate and gave funding to the clubs that needed it. No one made us do that either.

We recognise our responsibility as a leader and steward of our national game. From that vantage point of stewardship, it is obvious that the backstop as currently designed is not the right answer for English football. It seems obvious to noble Lords right across this Committee too. As has been pointed out, not even the EFL likes this crude model. The unfortunate reality is that this particular backstop model seems to have no support—zero. We therefore need to change course. The Government should reconsider, especially as UEFA has asked them to, and work with football to come up with a much better and a far less risky solution for the whole game.

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Moved by

[Baroness Brady]

311: Clause 62, page 51, line 35, leave out “one year” and insert “three years”

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 312. These amendments would ensure that any distribution order affecting parachute payments is introduced with a three-year, rather than one-year, transition period, and that an order would come into effect only from the start of a new football season.

Before I give the Committee my experience of why that is so important, having spent 32 years running Premier League and EFL clubs, I want to make the point that I think there is a total misunderstanding in the Committee about parachute payments. Parachute payments are not about helping clubs get promoted into the Premier League; they are about helping Championship clubs that are promoted into the Premier League to have the ability to invest to give them a chance to stay in the Premier League. You cannot invest to stay and be competitive in the Premier League if you do not know that there is some sort of safety net to help you in the event of relegation. My Amendments 311 and 312 are, in my view, essential to safeguarding the stability and sustainability of English football, particularly for those clubs that face the challenges of relegation.

As I have said before in the House, parachute payments are not a luxury or a reward for failure. They are an essential tool that encourages the competitiveness, investability and financial sustainability of English football. Without them, relegation would create a financial free-for-all and a cliff edge that could devastate clubs, their communities and the broader ecosystem. Without them, newly promoted clubs cannot invest in their squads to ensure that they have any chance of remaining in the Premier League.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

Will the noble Baroness acknowledge that they distort competition in the Championship?

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

I do not say that they do or do not. I am saying that, if they were not there, you would have to invent them. If a club is promoted from the Championship to the Premier League and cannot invest in its team to stay in that league, it is automatically almost certain to be relegated. If an established club, such as those mentioned earlier, is relegated, without the parachute payment it will be in financial trouble. Some 50% of all administrations come as a result of relegation; that is why parachute payments are fundamentally important. They are designed to manage the financial shock of relegation, where clubs could lose significant revenues, almost overnight, while their costs remain fixed.

For a recently promoted Premier League club, squad costs alone average £115 million a year, with most player contracts running for three to five years. Relegation means that clubs face an average shortfall of £165 million over three years, even with parachute payments included in that equation. It is important to recognise, therefore, that they do not help clubs avoid a painful transition but soften the blow to a degree. Without them, the financial impact would escalate from being very painful to being catastrophic.

[Lord Bassam of Brighton (Lab)]

I remind the noble Baroness that parachute payments have not always been at the level they currently are. In 2010-11 parachute payments were something like £30 million; by 2020-21 they had escalated to £233 million, which is an eightfold increase. This was during a period in which player wages only doubled. The noble Baroness’s point about the need to ensure that there is no cliff edge around financial commitments to players is not entirely valid. Why did the parachute payments need to grow so rapidly and by so much during that period?

I do not argue against the principle of parachute payments; I recognise their importance and the need to soften the blow that is a product of relegation. But the noble Baroness must accept that they have a distorting impact on promotion bids by Championship clubs. Over the last seven seasons, 14 of the 21 clubs promoted were in receipt of parachute payments, where previously that was not the case.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

As the noble Lord pointed out, wages have increased. Newly promoted Premier League clubs have an average wage bill of £115 million and transfer fees have gone through the roof. That is why the costs are fixed. If a club is relegated, it cannot terminate its players’ contracts; they are honoured, as clubs are obliged to pay those contracts. The parachute payment helps soften that blow. Parachute payments put restructuring responsibly at the forefront of clubs’ minds. Relegated clubs have to sell players, but they also have to buy players, reduce their wage bill and recalibrate costs to adapt to life in the Championship. What these payments really do is help clubs avoid wholesale disinvestment, panicked fire sales or, worse, administration.

Parachute payments work. They do not distort competition; they enable it. That is why versions of parachutes are used all over Europe and throughout the EFL system. Clubs such as Brentford, Brighton, Nottingham Forest and Crystal Palace have all demonstrated that well-run, innovative clubs can rise through the Championship without parachutes and build competitive, successful teams in the Premier League. Parachute payments are a stabiliser for relegated clubs, not a barrier to promotion.

Without these payments, the competitive balance, investability and appeal of both the Premier League and the Championship would be put at risk. Investors in the Championship recognise that parachute payments provide the essential scaffolding for strategic investment. These payments enable clubs to build towards promotion with confidence, knowing that there is a safety net. Parachute payments create the conditions for clubs to invest in players, infrastructure and long-term strategic plans, with the assurance that one challenging season in the Premier League will not unravel their progress and render all that investment worthless.

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[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I committed earlier this evening to come back to the noble Lord, Lord Hayward, on whether the shadow regulator would join the Chancellor’s meeting with regulators tomorrow. My understanding is that the Chancellor’s invite has gone only to regulators who are currently operational. Therefore, the shadow football regulator has not been invited to the specific meeting to which the noble Lord referred. I would add, however, that I have heard many good points made on growth during the Committee stage of the Bill and look forward to returning to further discussions around that point on Report.

In relation to the group under discussion, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, for bringing her concerns regarding the future financial sustainability of relegated clubs to my attention with this amendment. I note the clarity from the noble Lord, Lord Markham, in relation to the Opposition opposing parachute payments being included in the Bill. As I made clear in my response to the previous group, the Government agree—and I hope this gives the noble Baroness some reassurance—that parachute payments play an important role in supporting the survival of relegated clubs. This point was also made by my noble friend Lord Bassam of Brighton, even though he had a different perspective from the noble Baroness, Lady Brady.

I highlight first that in the Government’s view it is not inevitable that the backstop would address parachute payments. They will be addressed only if they have been identified as a relevant question for resolution, which will happen only if they are proven to have a substantial impact on the sustainability of the pyramid.

The noble Lord, Lord Addington, asked some pertinent questions, not least relating to the survival of clubs. If parachute payments are deemed relevant for consideration, the Bill currently specifies that they cannot be reduced within a year of the distribution order coming into effect. This point was made by the noble Baroness, Lady Brady. This amendment would extend this period to three years, triggered at the beginning, rather than the end, of a season.

While I genuinely understand the core concern behind this amendment, we must balance the desire to ensure that relegated clubs have as much time to adjust to changes as possible with the need to ensure a new, timely, satisfactory agreement. We would expect the leagues to maintain effective communication with clubs throughout the backstop process which, alongside the existing year-long transitionary period, will mean that clubs have ample time to adjust if parachute payments are deemed in scope. There will be no sudden reduction in payments without warning.

Before I finish, I again urge the leagues to come to an agreement on a new package of financial support under their own steam, which is in the long-term interests of the game. However, for the reasons I have set out, I regret that I cannot accept these amendments and hope the noble Baroness will not press them.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions made by noble Lords on this group. To the noble Lord, Lord Addington, I say that, in my experience, if you cut some of the ropes on a parachute it certainly does not provide for soft landing; it results in a crash. That is what I think I am trying to help avoid here.

I thank the Minister for her response and I am sorry that we do not yet seem to agree. I want to emphasise again that, while the Government seem to believe they have prevented parachutes from being abolished under this legislation, they have literally created a Bill that allows the regulator to choose between only two proposals. One of the proposals is going to come from the organisation that called parachute payments “an evil that needs to be eradicated”. The Bill specifically enables the kind of system that the Minister says the Government do not want to see, and that really is an intolerable risk to the Premier League clubs, newly promoted clubs and relegated clubs.

It may be helpful to stand back and remind the House that this Bill principally seeks to address financial sustainability across the game. Yet, the removal or severe restriction of parachute payments would undermine that very goal. Around 50% of football administrations follow a relegation event. Take away parachutes or alter them without proper transition periods and that number will, sadly, undoubtedly rise. For the Premier League clubs at the lower end of the table, a one-year transition period will fundamentally alter all their risk calculus. These clubs invest heavily in players, infrastructure and youth development, knowing that the current system provides some financial security in the event of relegation. Remove that security and I call tell you that the calculation changes. Risk taking diminishes, investment shrinks and competitiveness suffers. That is exactly the same for newly promoted clubs. It is impossible to invest in your squad if you do not have that safety net, if it is not successful for you.

I continue to believe that these amendments are a necessary safeguard. Of course, much greater changes to the backstop are required, but a transition is a vital element to examine. These amendments would provide the time and clarity needed for clubs to adapt responsibly, protect the legitimate expectations of all shareholders and preserve the stability of the football ecosystem.

I urge the Government to give these measures further consideration, please, as part of a fundamental reconsideration of the backstop, just as UEFA has explicitly called for, to ensure that this Bill really can achieve its intended purpose of promoting sustainability across the game. I will withdraw this amendment today, but I say respectfully to the Minister that I really hope that she reflects carefully on my amendments.

Amendment 311 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Brady]

322: Clause 84, page 68, line 15, at end insert—
“(ea) any decision made under sections 62 and 63;”

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 322 would enable scrutiny of backstop decisions through merits-based review by the Competition Appeal Tribunal. I will also speak to my consequential Amendments 324 to 326 and 333 to 335. Let me seek again to give noble Lords a picture of what I believe is at stake.

The Premier League represents a remarkable British success story, yet the Bill introduces a mechanism that could unravel three decades of innovative ecosystem building in a single regulatory decision. Every few years, a regulator will be forced to make a binary choice between two competing visions for English football. One vision, that of the Premier League, seeks to preserve the delicate balance that has made it the best and most compelling league in the world. The other, explicitly stated by the EFL, aims to fundamentally restructure football’s finances and systems, describing key stability measures as “evil” and seeking their “eradication”.

This is not some narrow funding dispute; what the Government may so far have failed to understand is that this is about the very architecture of English football. It could eliminate the financial scaffolding that enables newly promoted clubs to compete. It could destroy the stability mechanisms that give investors confidence to back ambitious Championship clubs. It could force smaller Premier League clubs to abandon investment and aspiration. This is why merit-based reviews matter profoundly.

Under the Bill, even the most extreme regulatory decision could be challenged only on narrow procedural grounds. Let us think about what this means: a panel could select a proposal that devastated relegated clubs, and those clubs would have no meaningful right of appeal even if that decision threatened their very existence. The Competition Appeal Tribunal would offer a better solution. It brings expertise in complex economic matters and an understanding of how regulatory decisions ripple through competitive markets. Its oversight would drive better decision-making, ensure genuine fairness and protect the investment that makes English football thrive.

This speaks to a broader principle: football is not a utility delivering water through pipes. It is a dynamic ecosystem where success depends on calibration of risk and reward, yet the Bill repeatedly treats football like a water company, relying on judicial review as the primary check on regulatory power—and we all know how well water regulation is going. This creates a fundamental mismatch.

We are asking a regulator to make complex commercial decisions that could reshape our national game, yet we deny affected parties any meaningful right to challenge those decisions on their merits. This occurs throughout the Bill on all sorts of matters relating to ownership, financial regulation, licensing and stadia. Almost nothing, including this multi-billion pound decision about the distribution of the Premier League’s own revenue, is subject to merits-based reviews. Let me say again: I do not oppose regulation. These amendments are a limited attempt to ensure that regulation can operate fairly and sustainably.

As I said earlier this evening, the Premier League has consistently demonstrated its commitment to the wider game through solidarity payments, infrastructure funds and community programmes that reach millions, to the tune of £1.6 billion every three years. During Covid, we ensured that no club went to the wall, but good stewardship is a two-way street, and this statutory regulator requires proper safeguards. Without merits-based review, we risk regulatory decisions that could inflict profound damage on the game we love. The backstop could become a weapon for levelling down, rather than building up, replacing aspiration with survival as the pinnacle of a club’s ambition.

English football is at an important juncture with this Bill. Get it wrong and we risk something precious: not just the Premier League’s global success but the entire pyramid’s vitality. This amendment provides one —and only one—essential protection against regulatory overreach. There are plenty more needed, but I urge the Government and other noble Lords to support it.

[Lord Markham (Con)]

My Lords, Clause 84 details the provisions that may be brought before the Competition Appeal Tribunal. However, as drafted the Bill does not include any decisions made under Clauses 62 or 63 for appeals that may be heard before the tribunal. Given the implications of these two clauses, relating as they do to the distribution of revenue, it is wholly inadequate that the determinations made under them are not subject to an external appeals process. Therefore, my Amendment 323, and the amendments in this group tabled by my noble friend Lady Brady, ensure that any decisions made by the committee of the expert panel relating to distribution orders are reviewable under Clause 84.

I do not dispute that the Bill already provides for distribution orders under Clause 62, and for reviewable decisions under Clause 81. The latter clause states that reviewable decisions are any decisions listed in the table in Schedule 10, and Schedule 10 does include decisions made under Clause 62. However, this relates only to internal reviews. Schedule 10 also states that any internal review of distribution orders is to be carried out by a different committee of the expert panel. Therefore, although the composition of the deciding and reviewing committees must be different, the review will still be carried out by the same body.

Therefore, the Bill currently gives competition organisers the right to appeal only to a component of the regulator. This cannot be right. The imposition of a distribution order under Clause 62 is surely the measure that most affects competition; requiring one league to distribute its money to another league will impact its competition ability. Surely, then, any distribution decision should be reviewable by the Competition Appeal Tribunal.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, and the noble Lord, Lord Markham, for tabling these amendments. I recognise that the intent of the amendments in this group is to ensure that decisions related to the distribution backstop are appealable and subject to a merit standard of appeal, rather than being based on judicial review principles. I understand that this comes from a belief that a merit standard of appeal is necessarily preferable because it would allow the Competition Appeal Tribunal to opine on the merits of the case, rather than just on whether the correct procedure was followed, and thereby arguably offers better protections for affected parties. In this instance, I do not believe that this is the right process.

In truth, it means that a tribunal, which most likely has less technical expertise and background knowledge of the specific issues surrounding financial distribution in football than the regulator, will be able to substitute its own decision for that of the regulator’s. For example, if the regulator were to choose one of the two proposals as part of the backstop process, and make an order imposing that distribution arrangement, the Competition Appeal Tribunal could overrule this and choose the other proposal. Indeed, if we consider how this would most likely play out, the aggrieved competition organiser whose proposal is not selected would be very likely to lodge an appeal regardless.

These amendments would be tantamount to making the Competition Appeal Tribunal the ultimate deciding authority on the financial distribution arrangement in football. This would, in effect, mean cutting out the middleman and having the courts decide how much money should flow down the football pyramid. It is unclear to me why noble Lords, or indeed anyone, would think a court making this decision a better option, rather than the expert panel of the independent football regulator, or why this would necessarily lead to a more robust, more favourable or fairer outcome. It is simply the case that there are certain decisions better suited to certain standards of review.

We have engaged with legal experts and senior members of tribunals while developing the Bill. They agreed that the courts are not necessarily well placed to substitute the decisions of expert regulators on matters of technical regulatory judgment, and that a judicial review standard of appeal would be more appropriate for those types of decisions. This is also a common approach taken across other regulators. For example, the majority of decisions made by Ofcom are subject to appeal on judicial review standards.

By contrast, some of the possible enforcement decisions that the regulator can take under the Bill represent highly punitive actions. For these highly punitive, less technical and less market-specific enforcement decisions, a merits appeal is more appropriate. For example, we are of the view that courts are far better placed to opine on whether the severity of a punishment is appropriate to the infringement than on whether a certain distribution of revenue is better for the financial sustainability of English football. Ultimately, an appeals process should provide the appropriate opportunity to challenge whether a regulator is acting fairly and within its statutory remit. It should also be a focused and efficient process that does not excessively delay the final resolution of decisions or hinder the regulator in achieving its objectives.

While providing effective assurance of the regulator’s decision-making process and judgment, the appeals system should not unduly undermine the expert independent regulator. The Bill effectively balances these different considerations, including through the standard of appeal. The amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, would also make every decision under Clauses 62 and 63 reviewable, subject to the statutory route of appeal to the Competition Appeal Tribunal. This includes minor and operational decisions such as the giving of notice or extending the period to submit proposals. For the same reasons I have already outlined—balancing fairness, efficiency and appropriate deference to the regulator—we do not believe this is necessary and it is not the approach we have taken in the Bill.

Amendment 326 would be contrary to Amendments 322, 324 and 325. The Competition Appeal Tribunal could not simultaneously review a decision on judicial review principles and on the merits. On Amendments 333, 334 and 335, as I have set out, we disagree with the intention to make every decision under Clauses 62 and 63 a reviewable decision on the merits. However, if that were the intention, additions to the consequential amendments of other Acts, or the Competition Appeal Tribunal rules, certainly would not be the way to do it. For these reasons, I cannot accept the amendments and I hope that noble Lords will not press them.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the Minister’s response, although I confess that I remain far from reassured. The logic of the Government’s position appears to be that procedural correctness matters more than getting the right answer for English football. Consider what we are being asked to accept: a regulator with new, unprecedented powers to reshape our national game, yet its decisions can be challenged only if its ticks the wrong procedural boxes.

The Premier League drives investment throughout the pyramid. It enables clubs such as Brighton, Brentford and Nottingham Forest to climb through the lower leagues without parachutes and compete at the highest level because of the security they provide. It funds grass-roots facilities in every corner of Britain. It projects British soft power globally in a way that no other cultural export can match. Yet under this Bill a single regulatory decision could fundamentally alter the mechanisms that make all that possible.

The Minister suggests that a judicial review provides adequate protection, but what comfort is that to a relegated club facing financial ruin because a regulator chose to abolish parachute payments? What protection does it offer less well-established Premier League clubs forced to abandon investment because the regulator selected a proposal that makes relegation catastrophic?

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[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Goodman’s amendments and the principle of a sunset clause.

“The delegation of particular tasks to separate bodies, while a regular feature, is yet only the first step in the process by which a democracy … relinquishes its powers”.


So wrote FA Hayek in chapter five of his magnum opus The Road to Serfdom in 1944. Think of how much truer it is today than it was then. By one account, we have had a new quango every week since the election, and it is a one-way system. They are never undone, and they are not undone because of the dynamic that, once an organisation like that exists and is in place, its primary purpose becomes the defence of its own existence and its own budget. That is why we have sunset clauses at all. It is the only way in which, realistically, you can put in a hedge in case the calculation on which you passed legislation or created a quango turns out to be false.

In this case, it may or it may not. The noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton, tells us that the legislation is terrifically popular and that the fans are demanding it and want immediate action; the noble Lord, Lord Hannett of Everton, says that it has been polled and everyone is in favour of it. That may be—I do not know, as I am not any kind of expert—and I am perfectly happy to accept the possibility. Equally, we should be cognisant of the figures that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, cited: 20,000 people of the 2 billion who watch Premier League games is one in 100,000—someone will tell me if my maths is off. It may be that that is a self-selecting and unrepresentative sample.

It is certainly the case, as any pollster will tell you, that people are very bad predictors of how they will feel in a hypothetical situation. If people are asked for an opinion now, and polled in the abstract on whether they think there should be some regulation of football, they might think that it would be a way of preventing rogue owners driving clubs into bankruptcy and so it seems a good idea. But what happens if, two or three years from now, the regulator does what almost every other regulator in this country’s history has done and expands its remit well beyond the powers laid down and discussed in your Lordships’ House? What if fans are then looking at a regulator that is doing things that were never envisaged? There are regulators laying down rules on net zero and gender quotas—and we have already had demands for clubs to monitor the diversity of their season ticket holders and so on. Fans will realise that, hang on, this is not what they signed up for. What then will be the mechanism and check on this legislation?

The only way of doing that is to have some kind of automatic lapsing; in other words, to allow this House and the other House to come back and say either that the legislation is working, so it should be renewed, or that it is not working, so it should be allowed to lapse. This should not be a controversial proposal. I do not doubt for a second the sincerity of noble Lords on all sides who have argued that this is a popular and necessary Bill. If it is, they should have the courage of their convictions. If it is, there will be no question—for all the reasons that my noble friend set out at the beginning—but that the regulator should remain in operation or that the Minister will keep it that way.

We must allow for the possibility that we may have got this wrong. It costs very little and would satisfy all sides. It is something that ought to be able to command consent in this Committee and beyond. I hope that the Minister will give it serious consideration.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, before I speak to the amendments in this group, I want to address the accusation from the noble Lord, Lord Watson, that West Ham United has put its season ticket prices up mid-season. That is categorically untrue. We have the cheapest adult season ticket in the league, at £345. Since we moved into the London stadium, we have sold 35,000 season tickets for £99 to juniors. We have two “kids for a quid” games every year in the Premier League at the club. We are more than doing our bit.

[Lord Watson of Invergowrie (Lab)]

If I have got that wrong, I unequivocally apologise to the noble Baroness. I was reading an article about football supporters, including of West Ham, who were protesting about changes to season tickets. Maybe it is not within this season but next season, but there were fairly significant changes being put forward, and the argument was that children were not being given cheaper prices, which will stop them becoming regular fans at football matches. If what I said was wrong, I apologise.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

I accept the noble Lord’s apology.

The hour is late, but as we debate this idea of a sunset clause, we should pause and reflect on what is truly at stake. We are all here during extra time because all of us—bar one, I think—love football. It is a cultural touchstone, an economic powerhouse and a source of immense national pride. At its best, football connects communities, inspires individuals and projects the best of Britain to the world.

The Premier League is only one part of English football. I operated in the EFL system for many years and know that it is hugely important to our pyramid, as is the National League. But the Premier League is special for our country: with its global reach, this fizzing, vibrant competition has an extraordinary ability to draw interest, investment and innovation into the game. It not only powers the football pyramid but supports £8 billion in gross value added to the economy, contributes over £4 billion annually to the Exchequer and supports more than 90,000 jobs. The Premier League’s influence extends far beyond the pitch, creating an affinity for the UK and showcasing our ability to create a product that the world wants to watch.

We all know the background and the well-made case for some sort of regulatory intervention, but with this particular Bill we are now at a crossroads. I am passionate about this and live it every day, so I can see the risks very clearly. But I also know that this is a well-intentioned piece of legislation with aims that we can all support. The reason we have been so forensic and questioning during Committee is that it genuinely has the potential to inadvertently damage the structures that have made English football the envy of the world. We are not imagining these deficiencies in the Bill, or the risks that could play out. This is why I am interested in the idea of assessing whether this legislation and the IFR have achieved their goals or inadvertently harmed the game we all love.

The Government have rightly made economic growth their overriding priority. In a time of global economic turbulence and domestic fiscal and productivity challenges, it is vital that we protect and nurture the UK’s most successful industries. Football is clearly one of these: a global export that not only generates revenue but enhances Britain’s soft power and investor appetite for the UK on the world stage. It is against this backdrop that I must express surprise at the puzzling reluctance so far of the Government to listen to the concerns we have been expressing.

At a time when the Prime Minister has asked all regulators to focus on growth—and has also apparently asked Ministers to cancel all anti-growth measures—here we are, about to create a regulator that has no growth duties or objectives. We even read in the newspapers that the Chancellor has told regulators this week that they need to go further and faster in stripping back unnecessary rules and creating an environment where companies can take risks.

But this new regulator will be principally charged with risk reduction and, effectively, a new form of taxation on specifically one part of football, the Premier League. This is a mandate that seems inherently restrictive, redistributive and therefore anti-growth. The signal this will send to global investors could be troubling. If we overreach in regulating one of the UK’s greatest success stories, what might that say about our ability to protect and nurture other industries?

Poorly executed regulation would not just chill investment in football; it would ripple out into broader perceptions of the UK as a place to do business. A sunset clause is an interesting idea. It is clearly important that we do not undermine the regulator from the get-go. We all want this to work. But it is important that an appropriate review and accountability mechanism is found, so that a future Government can assess whether this Bill is delivering the sustainability it promises or whether it is in fact creating regulatory uncertainty and systematic risk, and damaging investment—in which case, we would want to see urgent remedial action.

As I have said this evening, the Premier League and its clubs are not opposed to change. What we do ask, though, is for change to be thoughtful, measured and informed by the realities of what makes football so successful. This Bill has the potential to do some good, but it also carries significant risks that, I say to the Minister, deserve to be engaged with seriously and constructively.

Today, the Premier League is competing not only with domestic leagues but international competitions, other global events and new forms of entertainment in what is a rapidly changing media industry. The UK has created something so special in the Premier League. We should not stifle our ability to adapt in order to deal with these new threats. We should not be complacent when it would be so easy to be knocked off course. We should not gamble that the Premier League is now an unstoppable juggernaut, immune to even the unintended consequences of its own Government’s actions. Empires rise, but they also fall.

It has been said that the Premier League has become the goose that is laying English football’s golden egg. I would encourage all noble Lords to think about it that way, rather than as a cow to be milked or a magic money tree to be shaken. Above all, we should look after it. We should nurture it. Dare I say that perhaps we should even think about how we can help it, not hurt it? We should work together to ensures that it continues to be so successful. To do so, it is obvious that we need some sensible changes to this Bill, and I sincerely hope we can achieve them together as we move towards Report.

[Lord Markham (Con)]

It is late, so I am sure that all noble Lords will be pleased to know that I will keep my comments short.