Football Governance Bill [HL]

Baroness Brady Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Addington (LD)]

My Lords, I am not very bothered by having a muscular regulator; I want an efficient one that gets things done and looks after the lower clubs. There is a disagreement between us that has been there all through this Committee.

I regard the series of amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, as a smorgasbord from which we should select something that is actually going to get us to have a look at what is going on. There are lots of options and I have put my name to one of them. Making sure that we get the regulator right and get money going down to preserve something we regard as good is the primary objective. It is not just to take money off the Premier League; it is to make sure that the structures below survive.

If the Government think these amendments are not the right way to progress, hearing why from the Minister would be sensible. Nobody is quite happy with the backstop power in the regulation structure at the moment. Everybody is a little bit upset about it. People who were happy are now not happy. The Premier League and EFL are having great fun not talking to each other or disagreeing. I have no real objection to a slightly more muscular approach. I do not think it is a light touch that is required; it should be efficient.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group cover a wide range of issues relating to the backstop. While I understand the intentions behind many of these amendments, I fear that they collectively risk making an already contentious and divisive mechanism even more complex and counterproductive.

I respect that Ministers believe they have designed a balanced mechanism that places incentives in the right place, but I think what we will come to unpack is that that is wholly mistaken. I believe this Committee will see that this backstop has not and will not incentivise industry-led agreements, which is supposedly its overreaching policy purpose. I believe we will see that it will not result in a balanced, pragmatic solution that will be good for football.

It will instead drive posturing, game playing and the development of extreme and damaging solutions. We will see that this backstop is legally untested and uncertain, and it could sink football and the regulator into a legal and political quagmire that could drag on for years. Worst of all, we will see that this backstop has already poisoned, and will continue to poison, the well of football bodies’ relationships, when we all need to work together for our continued collective success.

I will briefly address some of the amendments in this group. The proposal to expand the scope of the backstop to include multiple parties all at once—for example, the National League, or potentially the FA and, even in the future, the women’s game—is concerning. This risks creating division where none currently exists. The Premier League, far from being at odds with these stakeholders, has made intensive and carefully considered efforts to support them, just as it has with the EFL.

Just a few months ago, the Premier League announced a £12.6 million package for the National League system over three years, a substantial increase on previous arrangements. For the women’s game, the Premier League has provided significant financial assistance, including a £20 million interest-free loan to help the new Women’s Professional Leagues Limited in its formative years.

These are examples of proactive, voluntary agreements that demonstrate collaboration rather than conflict. This set of amendments would encourage all stakeholders to start competing, simultaneously claiming the Premier League’s revenues, fracturing relationships and introducing adversarial dynamics where none currently exist.

This is not the way to build a sustainable and co-operative football ecosystem. Indeed, I will make a prediction: it is far more likely that the National League will seek to trigger the backstop in relation to the EFL, which does not provide any financial support to the leagues below it. The idea of the IFR triggering the backstop mechanism independently is particularly troubling. The purpose of the backstop, as described in the Bill, is to act as a last resort when the parties fail to reach an agreement; it is not supposed to be a front- stop. Allowing the IFR to bypass this voluntary process would undermine its very purpose and disincentivise genuine negotiation.

The idea that any change—not even a reduction—in revenue received by one party could automatically trigger the backstop is, frankly, unworkable. Revenue distributions in football are dynamic and fluctuate according to complex interrelationships. The amounts change every year, almost always upwards. A mechanism that automatically treats any change as a potential trigger would, with the greatest of respect to the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, be absurd. It would trigger perpetual uncertainty, which is the last thing that football needs.

Finally, and more positively, the suggestion that the IFR could impose its own settlement deserves careful scrutiny. I have tabled my own, slightly different amendments to that effect, which will be debated in a later group. I fully agree with noble Lords that the binary mechanism in the Bill is unworkable for football. However, with respect, I am not sure that this particular amendment would place incentives in the right place. To allow the IFR to impose its own settlement only where both parties’ proposals are inconsistent with the IFR’s objectives would allow parties to offer unrealistic proposals. It would mean they could anchor with a very extreme demand, knowing that the IFR would be forced to step in and create a compromise. This would further entrench division.

What is striking about the amendments in this group is that they demonstrate a fundamental dissatisfaction with the mechanism in the Bill from all sides of the House, as well as the main competition parties involved. The Premier League has raised serious concerns about the divisive nature of the backstop, while the EFL has, I believe, inspired the amendments in this group. It too sees significant flaws in the process as designed. This really should give the Government significant pause for thought.

Let us not forget that English football’s success has been built on collaboration and solidarity. UEFA has made this very point about the deficiencies of the current Bill’s mechanism. A backstop requires thoughtful, proportionate regulation that respects the autonomy of its stakeholders. These amendments, and indeed the existing backstop mechanism, would disrupt that delicate balance. I urge the Government to reflect carefully on whether the backstop as designed is fit for purpose. It should be fostering co-operation, not driving division. If that requires revisiting the mechanism, we should do so without hesitation. Football’s future really does depend on getting this right.

[Lord Maude of Horsham (Con)]

My Lords, I want to pick up one particular word that my noble friend Lady Brady raised: divisive. There is no doubt that this Bill has turned what was intended to be a backstop—a last resort or nuclear option, however it was described—into something that can be used pre-emptively. Some of the amendments proposed tonight—which would make it more aggressive and interventionist, and more able to be used pre-emptively—have behind them the sense that this is bound to be aggressive, antagonistic and adversarial. I want to contest that.

The truth is that, wherever a club is in the pyramid of English football, it has an interest in the whole pyramid being strong. There is no benefit to the Premier League in keeping lots more money to itself and weakening the rest of the pyramid, because it depends on the pyramid; its strength is drawn from all the way through the pyramid. It is really important that we try to take ourselves away from the sense that there is a finite pie of limited size and so we should work out how to enable different parts of it to get more for themselves.

English football—the whole pyramid—has seen tremendous growth. It had the huge challenges of the pandemic, but it survived and came out strong. As we have repeatedly said, the Premier League is not just the most successful football league in the world but the most successful sporting league in the world. The Championship is the sixth most successful and richest league in Europe. It is strong and it will grow more, but it will not do so if the whole mindset behind how this is constructed just puts one set of interests against another. The aim should be to ask how we grow the pyramid further and encourage the different parts of it to work together and see the mutual benefit, to make two plus two add up to five, rather than—as I fear the danger is in how this is constructed—add up to three. I urge the Government to take this away and look again at how it is constructed.

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[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I appreciate that the noble Baroness, Lady Evans, may take a different view and I completely understand people’s concerns that it will be a front-stop—as a spoiler alert, and with apologies to my noble friend, I am not going to accept these amendments; we will come to that in a moment. However, we genuinely think that the model we have established is very similar, apart from the possible inclusion of the parachute payment—for want of a better word; it is not the phrase used in the Bill, but that escapes me for a moment—should the “state of the game” report suggest to the regulator that it needs to allow that to be taken into account.

My view is that the model we have presented should incentivise the leagues and the parties to come to an agreement themselves, and that opportunity to do so does not go away once the regulator is established. That is the design of the model and an essential part of it, as it was in the previous iteration of the Bill, so this is absolutely intended as a backstop process. We can go on to debate that in later groups as well as in this group. I am happy to do that and to meet people individually to go through why we think this will be a backstop and not a front-stop whereby the minute the regulator sets off in motion, everybody will claim that they want to have the backstop triggered.

However, there are things that the regulator will need to take into account if somebody asks for the backstop process to be triggered. It is not the necessarily the case that the regulator would have to accept that that process was set in motion. The whole model is designed around the principle of trying to get people to come to an agreement themselves. It is really important to ensure—

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

I thank the Minister for giving way. If she was right, we would have a deal in place by now. This has been the model for two years, so it is definitely a barrier to conversations. There is a view that whatever the Premier League agrees with the Football League, that, in effect, becomes its insurance policy. It then triggers the backstop and goes straight to the regulator, knowing that it will never get less than it has been offered and could get more. We will be in a perpetually revolving door of triggering mechanisms that will never give any club any certainty of its income, which will be very dangerous and very bad for football.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

It is important for us to go through how the regulator’s backstop powers and power of last resort would work. I appreciate that the noble Baroness is entirely right that an agreement has not come into place, and that might be—or might not be—because of people waiting to see what form the regulator takes and the exact iteration of the wide range of views we have heard tonight and on previous occasions.

If, under the Government’s intended model for the backstop, the relevant leagues cannot reach an agreement, they can apply to trigger the backstop—the noble Baroness is quite right on that. If certain high thresholds are met, of which the regulator must be satisfied, the backstop can be triggered, but let me go through what would happen first: the relevant leagues would enter a period of mediation and, if there was still no agreement, they would move to a final proposal stage.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

I thank the Minister for allowing me to intervene. Rick Parry went before the Select Committee and said he would trigger the backstop in any event—even if he got more money from the Premier League in the meantime—because there is no risk to the EFL in the backstop.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I am not going to comment on what people did or did not say in that committee meeting at this point. The backstop would be applied only if certain high thresholds were met. The regulator will be an independent regulator and it will have strict measures to meet—high thresholds which it must be satisfied of if the backstop is to be triggered. If there is still no agreement, the parties will move to a final proposal stage and, at that point, the regulator would convene an independent expert panel and invite final proposals from both relevant leagues with accompanying analysis, and the independent expert panel would choose the most appropriate proposal. This model incentivises both parties to compromise, as unreasonable proposals would not be chosen.

The whole model, which is almost identical in every detail to how the previous Government were planning to do this, is intended—

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[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I appreciate the noble Lord’s point, but if the EFL triggers the backstop or makes a proposal in bad faith, it could end up worse off if the Premier League’s proposal is more reasonable, so this does not encourage the EFL or Premier League to be confrontation or divisive. I am sure we will come back to this at a later stage, probably this evening, but definitely when we come back in the new year on Report.

I am really happy to sit down with noble Lords and talk this through, but I will continue to use my speaking notes for some time and then, I hope, give some reassurance that we are considering this carefully. I am always happy to meet with noble Lords, as is the team that has been working on this. As noble Lords are aware, a number of the officials working on this have been doing so right the way through from the fan-led review, so this is a really good example of the consistency of advice both to this Government and the previous Government, notwithstanding the fact that not everybody here liked the Bill’s previous iteration.

To return to my speaking notes—although I am fairly sure I have got slightly out of order now—we think that this approach encourages future collaboration. We might need to agree to disagree on that point and come back to that debate.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

The Minister says that she believes that the mechanism will deliver collaboration. For my benefit, please could she name a single example of a binding final offer process working in UK regulatory terms, and its use in the UK to deliver the outcomes she is talking about?

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

The Competition and Markets Authority has used it.

The process proposed by this group of amendments, excluding Amendment 260, would allow the regulator to intervene at its discretion and would require it to take into account the potential use of any revenue distributed. It is the Government’s view that this is regulatory overreach and a fundamental change to the intent of the process as drafted.

The other amendments from my noble friends Lord Bassam and Lady Taylor seek to change the structure of the backstop process from a two-party mediation and final proposal/order process to one that could apply to any number of relevant parties. I understand the overall intent of these amendments and have chosen to address them as a group to ensure that that intent is understood comprehensively, and that the Government’s position is in turn communicated coherently.

To clarify, the Premier League, the English Football League and the National League can all apply to trigger the backstop process. Any of the specified competition organisers can submit an application to trigger the process, and simultaneous instances of the backstop process could be triggered to cover the relationships between each of the leagues. The process is inherently designed as a two-party process. Fundamentally, distribution agreements are agreed between two individual leagues and the process is designed to facilitate these agreements. As the final offer process is set up and designed between two parties to facilitate a decision between two proposals on the basis of relevant principles, it would not be effective for the regulator to engage in this process with more than two parties. This is also, in part, why it would not be appropriate for the regulator to make a third offer. Without the incentive of the two-proposal process, parties are likely to stay at polarised positions, rather than find areas for compromise. However, when the two proposals submitted are the only choices, the pragmatic decision is to submit the most reasonable proposal possible. This is the incentive we wish to create.

I now turn to Amendments 292, 296 and 314, tabled by my noble friends Lord Bassam and Lady Taylor of Bolton. While there is a slight difference between “special” and “compelling”, we are satisfied that the bar is set sufficiently high with the use of “special”, which is the more usual terminology in these sorts of provisions. There is likely to be no tangible difference in outcomes, and therefore these amendments would be minor, insignificant changes to the wording of the Bill. As such, the Government believe the current drafting is sufficient. This is also the case for Amendment 264. While we understand the intent behind this amendment, we are content that the current drafting in the Bill sufficiently captures all revenue relevant for consideration during the backstop process. The proposed drafting change would not capture any revenue sources not already captured by the existing wording.

I turn now to Amendments 261, 262, 276 and 315. Amendment 276 seeks to significantly broaden one of the conditions by which the backstop process could be triggered. Condition 2 is specifically designed to be triggered by a material reduction in relevant revenue, as this poses a significant threat to the financial sustainability of the pyramid. Amendment 315 would, if the distribution process was ended due to incomplete or inconsistent proposals, require the regulator to issue a distribution order based on its expert panel’s own proposal, rather than ending the process. This would prevent the regulator ending the final proposal stage without an order, even if both leagues have chosen not to submit proposals.

These amendments, and the others referenced, would increase the likelihood of an enforced rather than an agreed solution. The Government’s preference is for an industry-led solution. It is our view that the regulator should have a role in facilitating the final proposal process only where no agreement can be reached on distribution, and that the process should be the least interventionist it can be while remaining effective. This approach encourages future collaboration and prevents the leagues relying too heavily on the regulator in the future.

I turn now to Amendments 284 and 286. While I agree that the state of the game report is a usual source of information to be considered as part of the distribution agreement process, it is our position that these amendments are unnecessarily prescriptive. As it stands, the Bill does not make specific reference to the report being included as a potential question for consideration. However, the existing drafting does not in any way exclude consideration of the state of the game report, and the regulator must have regard to it as part of its general duties. I would expect the state of the game report to be considered by both the leagues applying to trigger the backstop process, and the regulator, given its relevance. However, to include this expectation beyond what is already set out in primary legislation would be inflexible.

Turning to Amendment 267, while the Government understand the broader intention to involve fans in as many areas of the Bill as possible, it would not be appropriate for the regulator to be mandated to consult a group which is neither directly financially involved nor a governing body. This is not to say that fans should not make their views known to the regulator, and there will be many instances, such as in the state of the game consultation, where we expect the regulator to be able to consider a number of perspectives. This includes the views of fans on the financial situation in English football. Furthermore, the proposed drafting requiring consultation with representatives of regulated clubs is duplicative, given that the Bill as drafted already requires the consultation of the leagues.

Finally, Amendment 319 seeks to remove the provision that explicitly outlines that leagues can come to an alternative agreement at any time in the backstop process. The ability of leagues to come to an agreement independently has been protected in the legislation itself intentionally, to highlight that an industry-led solution is both preferred and encouraged. We believe this explicit protection will encourage the leagues to reconsider at every step of the process whether regulatory intervention is necessary, ideally bringing them closer to an independent agreement that works for all of football.

I hope that my responses have reassured my noble friends and other noble Lords that the Government’s approach is appropriate and provides the necessary protections, and that my noble friends will not press their amendments.

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Again, I know the Minister understands this. Like all of us, she has the good of the game at heart. I know her team understand this as well. I look forward to hearing her on this very important issue. I beg to move.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 263 in the name of my noble friend Lord Markham, which seeks to exclude parachute payments—the financial lifeline provided to relegated clubs—from the definition of “relevant revenue” under the backstop. This amendment is essential to addressing the profound risk created by the current drafting of the Bill.

Parachute payments are not just a feature of football finance, they are a key part of the scaffolding that delivers the competitiveness, the investability and the financial sustainability of the English football ecosystem. Without them, relegation would become a financial free-for-all—a cliff edge that would devastate many clubs and their communities. Parachute payments are designed to manage the significant financial shock of relegation, where clubs can lose enormous amounts of revenue almost overnight, yet their overheads stay the same.

I speak from some personal experience here. At West Ham United, we have known the daunting realities of relegation. Without parachute payments, the response in 2011 would have been wholesale disinvestment, a disorderly fire sale of players, job cuts, and a complete halt to critical investments in infrastructure. That is exactly how clubs start to spiral. Parachute payments do not come close to eliminating the pain of relegation but they provide some breathing space to make difficult but measured adjustments.

Yet this Bill places the very existence of parachute payments on the table, making them a part of the binary backstop process that pits two competing visions of football finance against one another. This is an intolerable risk. The EFL has been explicit that its proposal in this process would be for massive reductions in parachute payments, based on the argument that the financial gap between the Premier League and the Championship should be closed. But this argument fundamentally misunderstands the problem. The central issue here is not the gap itself, which reflects the commercial realities of two very different leagues, but whether clubs can transition effectively between those levels, between those two leagues.

Here the evidence is clear. Parachute payments work. If they did not exist, you would simply have to invent them. Crucially, parachute payments do not lock up promotion opportunities. Look no further than the examples of Luton Town and Ipswich Town from each of the last two years. Well-run, innovative clubs have every chance of success in the Championship, which is a highly competitive and appealing league.

Parachutes are not a significant distortion but a significant stabiliser, providing clubs with the tools to manage transition responsibly and sustainably. The EFL’s proposal is essentially to level down the Premier League to meet the Championship; to stretch out the bottom half of the Premier League. But that would destroy the top-to-bottom competitiveness that makes the Premier League the most watched and admired league in the world. Enabling such a proposal, as this Bill now does, expressly privileges the Championship over the Premier League. That is an astonishing position to take. It risks reducing the quality of the game at the top of the pyramid and undermining the ability of clubs to compete both domestically and internationally.

Let us also consider the impact on investment. Investors are rational. They are drawn to football because of its structures, parachute payments central among them, that provide clear pathways for responsible investment and sustainable growth. Without parachute payments, the Championship clubs become less investable. Why would anyone seriously invest in a club that cannot make the financial journey to the Premier League without risking complete collapse on relegation? The logic of the previous Bill was that, if there are challenges with parachute payments—challenges that the Government’s state of the game review may or may not identify—these can be addressed through increased solidarity payments. The exclusion of parachute payments in the previous Bill meant that the very existence of parachute payments was not placed at risk. It recognised the critical value of parachute payments to protect their role in managing these vital transitions. But now parachute payments are suddenly on the table. It is a hugely significant change of policy.

I know that the Minister would prefer that I should refrain from pointing this out, but the process by which this expanded backstop mechanism has been introduced has been alarmingly inadequate. As we know, the Secretary of State held just one 30-minute meeting with seven hand-picked Premier League clubs between July and October. The backstop was one of the many things that were discussed at the meeting, but at no time during the meeting were we given any warning that this decision was even being considered, let alone added to the Bill. Those seven clubs wrote to the Secretary of State following the meeting, which was five or six months ago, and we still have not had a reply. We also know that UEFA explicitly advised Ministers to reconsider the previous mechanism before parachute payments were even included. But, instead of narrowing the scope, the Government have significantly broadened it. I ask again: why? Parachute payments do not create financial irresponsibility. They are its enemy. They do not distort competitiveness; they enable it.

If you are Championship club newly promoted into the Premier League, you need to know that you can invest in your team to give you any chance to be competitive and to stay there. Clubs invest when they are promoted only because they know that they can rely on the parachute payment to cover some of the investments they have made in order to be competitive in the Premier league. Those investments are almost always in transfer fees and players’ wages. Clubs need that parachute to cover those things if they are relegated. If you do not have a parachute payment to soften the blow, you know that you cannot make the necessary investment in your team and in transfer fees when you get into the Premier League to try to stay there. You know your team will not be competitive enough, because you know that, if you are relegated without a parachute payment, you will face the real risk of administration.

Parachute payments help soften the blow. Without them, you cannot cut your overheads in any way, because there is no cause to terminate players’ contracts—that is part of the PFA agreement. So this means that, if you get promoted into the Premier League knowing you cannot contribute to the competitiveness of the Premier League—the idea that on any day any club can beat any other—you are going to affect the competitiveness and the global appeal of the Premier League, as my noble friend Lord Markham said, but, most of all, you are going to damage your own club.

Parachute payments do not reward failure. They allow clubs to recover, rebuild and stay financially sustainable. Frankly, I think that is the whole purpose of Bill. So I urge the Government to reconsider and to protect the stability of the football ecosystem, protect the ability of clubs to manage the transition between leagues responsibly, and protect the investment in both the Premier League and the Championship, which make English football the global success story that it is today.

[Lord Maude of Horsham (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lady Brady, who speaks with passion and deep expertise. I support this amendment.

I suspect I am not the only football supporter sitting in your Lordships’ House who had never heard of parachute payments until I started to get my head around the Bill. It took me a little time to get my head around the concept. I have listened very carefully to, and interrogated, the arguments for it, and understand them. The essence seems to me that it is simply a fact—an irrefutable fact and not readily to be changed—that there is a huge gulf in the financial rewards that come to a club in the Premier League compared with one that is in the Championship. One might regret that, but the only way you could possibly change it would be, as my noble friend said, by levelling down and reducing the competitive tension that there is in the Premier League.

The arguments that my noble friends Lord Markham and Lady Brady made about how parachute payments can narrow the gulf between Premier League and Championship are powerful and compelling. But the truth is that, without the ability for clubs that have been promoted to invest to become competitive, you would not have the competitive tension within the Premier League that is part of what makes it so successful. We have said repeatedly, but it bears repeating, that the Premier League is the goose that lays the golden eggs that reward the rest of the pyramid. If we damage that, we inflict damage not just on the Premier League but on the whole of English football, and that is what we have to be incredibly careful of.

There is a high degree of mobility within the Premier League. I say this with regret as a supporter of a club that is always regarded as in the top six but is languishing —temporarily, I hasten to say—in 10th. It is, as we know, the hope that kills you, not the despair. Nottingham Forest were promoted two or three seasons ago and are now fourth in the Premier League, in a Champions League spot—there is strong mobility. Could they have done that without the confidence to be able to invest and to grow the team and the players? This is part of the magic of it, and to suggest that this is somehow a game and a racket and that it should be put in jeopardy is not to understand the magic of a degree of competitiveness that exists in English football all the way through the pyramid.

This is something that the clubs and leagues have themselves come up with, and it is something that works. The idea—frankly, this thought applies to quite a lot of what the Bill is about—that what has worked and been proven to work will somehow suddenly be improved by the introduction of a state regulator might turn out to be true, but all the evidence of history suggests that it will not.

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[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

Clearly, it does not need to wait for the state of the game report to decide whether they are relevant. The approach we have adopted in the Bill means in practice that if the regulator has clear evidence, whether from a different source or from the state of the game report, that parachute payments are causing sustainability issues to the wider pyramid, it will now be able to address them. In our view, this was a potentially serious gap in the legislation that we feel has now been rectified. I stress “potential”.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

What the Minister said would be fine if the regulator was making a balanced determination, but because the Government have created a binary process whereby one proposal can be accepted, it could choose to abolish them. The Government have created that risk, and it is an intolerable risk.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

We went through in quite a lot of detail how the backstop mechanism would be triggered. I know we have more to come, as the noble Lord, Lord Maude, said, but in my view, it is not unreasonable for the regulator to be able to consider them. However, the regulator does not need to consider them.

On the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Brady —clubs and planning, and how they can deal with their financial future if parachute payments could change as part of the backstop process—while the Government understand the desire to ensure that regulated clubs have as much time to adjust to change as possible, we acknowledge that significant time has already passed without a financial distribution agreement. Ensuring a timely and satisfactory agreement is in the interests of football and the wider public. The backstop process is a built-in transition period specifying that parachute payments cannot be reduced within one year of the distribution order coming into effect.

We understand concerns around the future of clubs that may already have factored parachute payments into their forward-looking financial planning before a potential order that could lower payments had been issued. We would expect the leagues to maintain effective communication with clubs throughout the backstop process, which, alongside the built-in transitory provision, will mean that clubs should have ample time to adjust if parachute payments are deemed in scope. There will not be any sudden reduction in payments without warning. I feel that that should provide some reassurance to noble Lords and to the clubs.

On the definition of relevant revenue, football is a fast-paced industry, so it would be erroneous to assume that the definition of relevant revenue might not need to change. If broadcast revenue ceases to be the primary source of revenue stream in the game, the definition would need to be amended to ensure the process remained a viable regulatory intervention. Furthermore, there are already significant safeguards in place to ensure that this power is not used incorrectly. For example, consultation with the regulator, the Football Association and specified competition organisations is required before the power can be utilised.

With noble Lords’ indulgence, I want to say a bit about the consultation process. On a number of occasions it has been stated in your Lordships’ House that there has been insufficient consultation. Particularly in response to a point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, I want to put on the record that this Football Governance Bill is the culmination of years of work, including a huge amount of consultation. During that time, there has been extensive regular engagement with key stakeholders, including clubs that will be subject to the regulation. All clubs have been provided with a number of formal opportunities to share their views, particularly as part of the fan-led review and the formal consultation process on the football governance White Paper, where all 116 clubs in the top five leagues at the time were invited to give their views on the proposals. Over that period, DCMS Ministers and officials have had many hundreds of meetings with clubs, leagues, fan groups and other stakeholders from across football, and we continue to engage with the industry now, so this number is constantly growing.

Clubs have had five years to write to or meet DCMS to make their position known. No club that has requested a meeting has not had one. Indeed, some Premier League clubs were recently invited to meet officials and turned down the invitation, which I stress is their right. We have met and continue to meet a range of clubs, at all levels of the football pyramid, that will be subject to regulation.

The leagues have a role to play here. We would expect them to support their clubs in their understanding of the development of the regime and in their engagement with the Government, as well as to keep their clubs updated on any engagement that the leagues have had with the Government. Indeed, this is what has been explicitly asked of us at times by some of the leagues. Richard Masters, the CEO of the Premier League, Rick Parry, chair of the EFL, and Kevin Miles, CEO of the Football Supporters’ Association, have all praised the Government’s constructive approach to engagement with the clubs and the leagues.

This is not the end of the process or of the consultation. There are still lots of opportunities for clubs to have their say as the legislation passes through Parliament and work continues to establish the regulator. Even once the regulator is established, its approach will be advocacy first, aiming to work constructively with clubs on an ongoing basis to resolve issues wherever it can.

I have asked for an answer to the noble Baroness’s question about the response to the letter, and I will have to revert to her after the debate. Given the lateness of the evening, I have not been able to get a response on that.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

Is that the letter I sent on 2 December about UEFA or the letter that the seven clubs sent to the Secretary of State to which she is going to reply? Maybe the Minister can tell me that afterwards.

It is a statement of fact that the Secretary of State has met only seven clubs for half an hour. I am not talking about other officials. I have to say that there was zero consultation on including parachute payments in the Bill. There may have been other meetings, but between the two Bills that was a significant change that has caused lots of difficult conversations within the leagues.

The Minister said that there was no deal in place. There is a deal; it has been in place between the Premier League and the EFL since 2018, and it has a three-year notice period—just so she knows.

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[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I asked officials to draw up the words that I said on consultation because, night after night, group after group, it has been said to me that there has been insufficient consultation on the Bill. I went back and asked whether I could stand up and say that there has been sufficient consultation on the Bill. What consultation happened? When has it happened? How has it happened? Who has it been with? I am confident there has been a huge amount of consultation on the Bill and I will continue to state that when I am asked. I will follow up things that people feel have not been followed up, but any club that wanted to have a meeting has had one, and some have said they did not want one. I will sit down and allow the noble Lord to finish, but I am not going to accept that there has not been sufficient consultation.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

I am sorry to intervene, but I want to say again that on the specific issue of parachute payments there was no consultation with either the Premier League officials or the Premier League clubs that attended that meeting before this went into the Bill. I am not saying that there was not consultation on other areas, but this is a significant change to the Bill that had zero consultation with the Premier League or Premier League officials.

[Lord Markham (Con)]

It may be that it should be a matter of fact and we can find out one way or the other. The question is: how much consultation has happened specifically on the parachute payments? Obviously, they have been a recent introduction. My understanding from my noble friend is that there was just that 30-minute meeting, at which this was barely raised. I would be grateful if the Minister could ask her officials directly.

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[Lord Maude of Horsham (Con)]

My Lords, I find my noble friend’s arguments very persuasive, and I will ask just one question. I do not know what the answer is, so others who know much more about this will correct me if I am wrong. My understanding is that no one made the Premier League make the already unprecedentedly large distribution from it down to the EFL. There was no regulator or Prime Minister threatening legislation that forced that to happen. It was because the Premier League saw it as in its interest to have a strong pyramid. It did not see this as “us against them”; it wanted competition within the pyramid but not between the segments and the different layers. I therefore question the idea that you somehow have to force a better distribution when it is plainly in the Premier League’s interest—and the way it has historically behaved illustrates that it understands that it is—to commit, through a voluntary agreed distribution, to the money trickling and cascading down through the pyramid. That illustrates that this is not necessary.

The danger is that the money that is creamed off by the regulator to sustain it—and is drained off from the clubs to comply with its demands—will mean that there is less to distribute. That money is already efficiently and pretty fairly distributed by agreement, so I am persuaded by my noble friend’s arguments that this part of the Bill is not only unnecessary but potentially very harmful.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 271, 307 and 316 in this group. My noble friend Lord Maude is right: the Premier League’s distribution outside our ecosystem is the highest amount of money of any other sporting competition in the world, and no regulator has forced the Premier League to do that.

My amendments seek to embed principles into the backstop mechanism. My aim in doing so is to ensure that it operates in a way that is proportionate, legally defensible and fit for purpose. At the heart of the amendments lies a simple but critical idea: any intervention by the IFR on this issue must be guided by clear, fair and transparent principles.

The backstop mechanism in its current form lacks sufficient criteria to direct the IFR in exercising its powers. It dictates that the IFR must choose the proposal that is “more consistent” with its principles. But what are those principles? The first is to “advance the IFR’s objectives”, and we have already discussed at great length how nebulous those objectives are. The second is not to place any “undue burden” on the parties’ commercial interests. The third is to ensure that relegated clubs have a one-year transition for any changes to parachute payments. That is it. There is no other guidance for the regulator in making this enormous and binary choice. This is quite incredible, and it creates huge risks, not only for the clubs and the leagues but, more importantly, for the very integrity of the regulatory process itself.

Let me begin with a fundamental principle of protecting property and contractual rights. It is vital to understand that the revenues subject to redistribution under the backstop are not collective funds but revenues generated solely by the Premier League and the Premier League clubs. So the backstop is not a neutral act; it is interference in the property rights of Premier League clubs only.

Under Article 1 of Protocol 1 in the Human Rights Act—A1P1—any interference with those rights must therefore be justified on clear and compelling public policy grounds, and adhere to principles of proportionality and necessity. There are concerns that this crude mechanism, with so few transparent criteria, is legally challengeable under A1P1, even more so now as a result of parachute payments being included, and that is not a good thing; it is in everybody’s interests for this backstop to be legally defensible. But without robust principles to guide the IFR’s decision-making, any determination risks being challenged, leaving the IFR open to judicial review and the entire system mired in uncertainty and delay.

A1P1 case law also emphasises the principle that less intrusive measures must be considered before more significant interventions are imposed, so this is also enshrined in my proposed amendment. The backstop mechanism, as drafted, establishes a binary process that compels the IFR to choose between two competing proposals, but it provides no framework for the IFR to tend towards the least intrusive option, particularly in relation to respecting the Premier League’s property rights as the sole funder of financial redistribution. That is a very dangerous oversight.

Without explicit guidance to the IFR that it should tend towards the least intrusive measure, particularly in its treatment of Premier League revenues, there is a real risk that the backstop could lead to legal overreach. Including this principle in the Bill would provide the IFR with a clear steer, reflect the unique role of the Premier League as the funder of any distribution order and ensure that the mechanism operated in a way that respected property rights.

The principle of good faith is another cornerstone of these amendments. The binary nature of the backstop mechanism incentivises brinkmanship rather than genuine negotiation. These amendments seek to create a framework that rewards constructive engagement and discourages posturing. Without this principle, the backstop risks becoming a tool for division rather than collaboration.

Another critical safeguard in the amendments is the requirement that any backstop decision must not force clubs into breaching their own league’s or UEFA’s existing financial rules and covenants, including profit and sustainability rules or the IFR’s own licence. A sudden and drastic redistribution could reduce Premier League clubs’ revenues, which in turn could destabilise their own business plans, which in turn leads them to breach the profitability and sustainability rules in their own leagues. That would lead to fines, sanctions or even points deductions for Premier League clubs. It would be a remarkable irony if a mechanism intended to promote sustainability instead penalised clubs for failing to meet their own financial obligations.

Finally, let me address the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Maude, which would ensure that the backstop could not be used as a first resort. The IFR must first regulate clubs in the EFL to ensure that they are financially responsible and not conveniently reach for the Premier League’s revenues before it has even sought to impose those controls. If the IFR cannot deliver sustainability through its own regulatory tools, what confidence can we have in its ability to manage a redistributive mechanism fairly or effectively? My noble friend’s amendment rightly prioritises the use of all other tools before triggering the backstop.

These amendments would provide the IFR with the steers that it will desperately need to navigate one of the most consequential issues in football. Without these amendments, or something very similar, the backstop risks sinking into a legal and political quagmire. We should all be aligned in preventing that outcome, so I hope the Minister will listen carefully and sympathetically to these arguments.

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, and the noble Lord, Lord Maude of Horsham, for these amendments, and the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, for giving notice of his intention to oppose that Clauses 56 to 60 stand part of the Bill.

I will start with Amendments 271 and 316, from the noble Baroness, Lady Brady. I thank her for clearly stating some of her core concerns about the backstop process through these amendments and hope to reassure her that the existing drafting of the Bill already addresses her concerns without the need for this additional clause. First, I will cover her concern regarding the explanation of suitable alternative regulatory solutions when I address subsequent amendments. On her other concerns, current drafting of the Bill already requires the regulator to trigger the process only if its ability to advance its objectives would be threatened if it did not. Final proposals are already required to advance the regulator’s objective of ensuring financial sustainability and resilience. They also have to ensure that they do not place an undue burden on the commercial interests of either league. We have been mindful of property rights when designing the backstop, which is why the process can be triggered only in specific circumstances and why, even when the high threshold for triggering the process is met, commercial interests must still be considered. We consider this to be a suitably high bar to ensure that the regulator takes adequate consideration of regulated clubs’ property rights and commercial interests.

I understand that the noble Baroness is especially concerned about the issuing of a distribution order that may force clubs into non-compliance with the league’s own internal rules. We would expect the regulator’s decisions to be internally consistent in terms of advancing its objectives, so we cannot see a scenario where the regulator would issue a distribution order that required a club to become non-compliant with its licence conditions. However, there may need to be some adaptation by regulated clubs and competition organisers to renew the regulatory landscape.

If a distribution order issued to ensure the financial sustainability of football put a club at risk of breaching a league’s rules, we would expect competition organisers to work with the club in question and the regulator to understand the decision and its impact. Just as we may expect adaptation by clubs transitioning from unregulated to regulated, we may also expect to see the adaptation of competition organisers.

The amendment implies a scenario where a distribution order results in clubs becoming non-compliant with existing financial regulations. The regulator is already required, as part of its decision on whether to trigger the process, to consider whether the lack of arrangement has arisen as a result of bad faith. Therefore, we are confident that the existing drafting of the backstop proposal process is sufficient to ensure that the regulator already considers the factors outlined in this amendment.

I turn to Amendment 307. While I understand the desire to ensure the proposals chosen at the final proposal stage of the backstop process meet the objectives of the regulator, I believe that the existing drafting already suitably addresses this concern. Final proposals are already required to advance the financial sustainability and resilience of the football pyramid, under existing Clause 62(2)(a). I do not think that the proposed change in wording would lead to significant altered proposals or subsequent distribution orders; therefore, I do not consider that the change is necessary.

I turn to Amendment 288A, from the noble Lord, Lord Maude of Horsham. I understand the desire to ensure that the backstop process is triggered only as a last resort, as this is how the process has been designed and is intended to be used. However, one of the existing conditions that must be met for the regulator to trigger the process in response to an application is that its ability to deliver at least one of its objectives would be jeopardised if the backstop was not triggered. We would expect that, as part of the assessment under this condition, the regulator would review whether existing financial regulations and other regulatory tools could be utilised to better effect instead.

While in service of the same goal, the wording of this amendment is unnecessarily restrictive, requiring the regulator to exhaust all possible other regulatory approaches, and it adds a regulatory burden by requiring the consideration of an expansive array of approaches without prioritisation. This forces the regulator to spend additional time and resources considering options unlikely to resolve the conflict in question. We believe that the current wording already allows the regulator to make its own considered assessment of relevant options before triggering the process.

I now turn to the clause stand part debates and will respond to the noble Lord, Lord Markham. Part 6, of which Clause 56 is the first clause, relates to financial distributions and the backstop mechanism in its totality. I understand the desire on both sides to apply appropriate scrutiny to a part of the Bill that could significantly impact the future financial landscape of football. I hope that, throughout the debate on the backstop process on this and future Committee days, I will be able to demonstrate that the approach taken in Part 6 is the most proportionate and effective approach possible.

These backstop powers have been introduced to help ensure that an agreement can be reached between the leagues in regard to the distribution of revenues from the selling of TV broadcast rights. An agreement of this nature is vital to ensure the future financial sustainability of the football pyramid. The process has been designed to incentivise reasonableness, encourage industry solutions and tackle any bargaining imbalance between leagues. The design of the process is a final offer mechanism, a process that has been shown to incentivise negotiation. It achieves this by removing the ability of the negotiating parties to rely on the third party, in this case the regulator, to design a solution for them. We do not want football to become reliant on the regulator to decide its agreements.

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Moved by

[Baroness Brady]

280: Clause 57, page 47, line 32, leave out “five years” and insert “the applicable period (see subsections (7) and (8))”

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 280 and 281 in my name seek to reinsert the ability for the Premier League and the EFL to agree distribution arrangements for longer than five years without triggering the automatic availability of the backstop mechanism. These amendments are essential to restoring common sense, legal certainty, aligned incentives and, crucially, to restoring trust between football’s governing bodies.

When I first read the revised Bill, I thought I must be mistaken. “Surely”, I thought, “no Government would propose that two consenting parties mutually agreeing a long-term financial arrangement should be actively disincentivised from doing so by the automatic availability of a dispute mechanism”—and yet, astonishingly, here we are. Removing the freedom of football stakeholders to agree arrangements for more than five years by mutual consent cannot possibly be about fairness, transparency or sustainability. This is purely a device enabled by an active decision of the Government to turn the backstop into a ratchet. It ensures that no long-term agreement between the Premier League and the EFL, no matter how mutually beneficial, can ever provide genuine stability or be truly relied upon.

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[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Brady, for her amendments and for her introduction to what was, thankfully, at this time of the night, with apologies, a very short debate—so far.

These amendments are intended to allow leagues to reach an agreement to extend the time that must pass before the backstop can be triggered. While I entirely understand the desire for negotiations to be a league-led process, the timeframe outlined in the Bill has been chosen to ensure that the regulator can intervene in cases where an agreement has not been reached for a significant period. We believe that it is the correct amount of time to get a good view of how potential agreements have affected sustainability, while ensuring that a new agreement is reached in a timely manner. Crucially, many noble Lords have talked about certainty in the regime. We consider that five years provides enough certainty to all parties.

Finally, we have concerns that allowing industry to come to a different timeframe could lead to an element of coercion towards much longer agreements, nulling the presence of the power. The Government’s view is that the five-year timeframe is critical to the effective functioning of the backstop as a regulatory intervention.

For the reasons I have set out, I am unable to accept the amendments and hope that the noble Baroness will withdraw Amendment 280. But, first, I also wish all noble Lords a very happy Recess. I genuinely look forward to continuing the debate in the new year and thank the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, for his kind words.

[Baroness Brady (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her response and for engaging with the points raised in this debate. However, it will not surprise her that I remain completely unconvinced.

This decision does not deliver certainty: quite the opposite. It enshrines short-term thinking and locks football in a perpetual cycle of instability, with both sides forever negotiating under the shadow of the backstop. As I said, it is a recipe not for certainty but for fractiousness and mistrust.

The Minister also referenced the nature of football’s landscape as the reason to limit agreements, but I am not sure that can be right. I urge her to think again. This new backstop is the Government’s gamble that the Premier League has achieved escape velocity and can absorb anything that even its own Government can throw at it. However, the Premier League is not a cow to be milked. It is a national treasure to be protected. English football deserves much better. I am sure that we will be discussing this issue again on Report, but, for now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 280 withdrawn.