Ukraine

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Monday 28th April 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

That is a very important point. It is a chilling aspect of Russia’s statements on this crisis, and I have indeed discussed it with the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Ukraine. I commend them again for their restraint and their refusal to rise to provocation. They have been doing their best to create and maintain law and order in their country without giving a pretext for Russian intervention in eastern Ukraine, and so far they have done a very good job under intense domestic political pressure.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

Several ISAF countries are heavily reliant on Russian heavy lifting capacity and access to airspace as part of their withdrawal from Afghanistan. Is there any evidence that Russia is using that airspace and capacity as a bargaining counter in the negotiations?

[Mr Hague]

Not so far. I am not aware of any interruption of co-operation on Afghanistan. Our co-operation with Russia on that and other international issues, such as the E3 plus 3 negotiations with Iran, is being maintained by us and by Russia, uninterrupted by the Ukraine crisis.

Ukraine

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Tuesday 18th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

That gives me the cue to run through, and make clear to the House, the spurious arguments Russia has advanced for its actions, including on the Budapest memorandum.

First, Russia says that it has acted in defence of Russian compatriots who were in danger from violence and facing a humanitarian crisis. However, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities has stated that there is

“no evidence of any violence or threats to the rights of Russian speakers”

in Crimea. Indeed, there is no evidence of Russian compatriots being under threat anywhere in Ukraine, or of attacks on churches in eastern Ukraine, as Russia has alleged. It is not true that thousands of refugees are fleeing Ukraine into Russia, nor is there any threat to Russian military bases in Crimea, since the Ukrainian Government have pledged to abide by all existing agreements covering those bases.

Numerous international mechanisms exist to protect the rights of minorities, and Russia’s own actions are the greatest threat to stability in Ukraine. On top of evidence of gangs of thugs being bussed across the Russian border to provoke clashes with communities in eastern Ukraine, over the weekend the Ukrainian Government reported that Russian forces have seized an oil and gas facility 5 miles outside Crimea.

Secondly, to respond to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Hexham (Guy Opperman), Russia claims not to be bound by any of its previous agreements with Ukraine, including the 1994 Budapest memorandum, on the grounds that the new Government in Ukraine are illegitimate. However, the interim Government, formed when former President Yanukovych fled his post, were approved by an overwhelming majority in a free vote in the Ukrainian Parliament including representatives from Yanukovych’s Party of Regions. The Government have restored the 2004 constitution and scheduled presidential elections. Their legitimacy and their commitment to democracy are clear.

Moreover, treaties and international agreements are between states, not between Governments, and a change in Government does not in itself affect the binding force of those agreements. The commitments in the Budapest memorandum still stand, and Russia has flagrantly breached its pledge, in the words of the memorandum, to

“refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine”.

Thirdly, although Russia still denies that its troops are in Crimea, the Russians maintain that former President Yanukovych, whom they describe as the

“legitimate president of Ukraine”,

is entitled to request military assistance from Russia. That, too, is false, since the Ukrainian constitution is clear that only the Ukrainian Parliament has the authority to approve decisions on admitting foreign troops. The President has no such right, nor does the Crimean Parliament. In law and as a matter of logic it is clearly ludicrous to argue that a President who abandoned his post and fled has any right whatsoever to make any decisions about the future of that country, let alone to invite foreign troops into it.

Fourthly, Russia argues that the people of Crimea have a right to self-determination and that it is their basic right to choose to join Russia, citing Kosovo as an alleged precedent, but there is no equivalence whatsoever between Crimea and Kosovo and, as Chancellor Merkel has said, it is “shameful” to make the comparison. NATO intervention in Kosovo followed ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity on a large scale. An international contact group, including Russia, was brought together to discuss the future of Kosovo after the conflict. The independence of Kosovo followed nine years of work by the Kosovan authorities to satisfy the conditions of independent statehood and mediation by a UN special envoy. None of these circumstances applies to Crimea.

In all those areas, Russia is attempting to find justifications in precedent or law to excuse its actions in Ukraine and to muddy the waters of international opinion. What we are actually witnessing is the annexation of part of the sovereign territory of an independent European state through military force. The fall of President Yanukovych and the change of Government in Ukraine was a massive strategic setback for the Russian Government, who had made no secret of their desire to prevent Ukraine from moving towards closer association with the EU. Seen in that light the annexation of Crimea is a bid to regain the advantage, to restore Russian prestige and permanently to impair Ukraine’s functioning as a country, and given that Russia still maintains it has the right to intervene militarily anywhere on Ukrainian soil, there is a grave risk that we have not yet seen the worst of this crisis.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

Given that the Foreign Secretary referred to the unilateral redrawing of boundaries, which we have not seen for the last 25 years, neighbouring countries will become very important. Although Turkey is a member of the OSCE, have there been other, more detailed, discussions with Turkey as to how it could help the EU and the US efforts?

[Mr Hague]

Yes, there have been many discussions, including regular conference calls between EU Foreign Ministers and Secretary Kerry, which have also included my Turkish colleague, Foreign Minister Davutoglu, so Turkey’s opinions are very closely aligned with the ones I have been expressing. It of course has a particular affinity with the Tatar minority in Crimea, so Turkey is extremely anxious about this situation. It must choose its own measures, however: it is not a member of the European Union and it will choose, of course, its own measures as a sovereign state.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Alexander]

First and foremost, we must avoid a situation in which escalation continues as a result of the arrival of Russian troops in eastern Ukraine. Secondly, there must be a meaningful dialogue between the Ukrainian authorities and the Russian authorities, and I will explain what I mean by that in the course of my remarks. Thirdly, there must be a recognition that the international community remains unyielding in its opposition to the illegal referendum that took place in Crimea last weekend. Alas, the Kremlin has not yet recognised or acted on any of those steps, but I hope that it will do so in the coming days. Why do I make that point? Ukraine’s future still hangs in the balance, so today’s debate is welcome and takes place at a crucial time.

The recent trajectory of Ukrainian politics hinges on the events of 21 November when Yanukovych’s Cabinet abandoned an agreement on closer trade ties with the EU, and instead sought closer co-operation with the Russian Federation. Days later, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians descended on Maidan square, and for months the various protests endured and grew on the streets of Kiev. On 20 February, in a vibrant European capital, Government snipers turned their fire on protesters and the day ended with makeshift morgues lining the pavements of that historic city. On 27 February, just four days after the end of the Sochi winter Olympics, Russian troops effectively occupied Crimea under the false pretence of protecting its Russian-speaking population.

Ukraine faces a generational choice: in the decades ahead, can it face both east and west? Russia, too, is faced with two alternative futures: greater integration or greater isolation within the existing international order. It is right that the international community’s approach to date has been characterised by engagement with Russia where possible but by appropriate diplomatic pressures where required, which is why I welcome the draft UN resolution criticising the referendum in Ukraine’s Crimea region. Recent events in Ukraine are a key test of resolve for the European Union in particular. This clear and flagrant breach of international law has happened on Europe’s doorstep, and the burden of responding to the crisis rests heavily on European Union leaders.

It is worth acknowledging from the outset that getting agreement among the EU 28 is always difficult, particularly when a number of member states are vulnerable to Russian action on issues such as energy supply. I therefore welcome the steps that have already been agreed by the EU, including the suspension of negotiations with Russia on visa liberalisation and targeted asset freezes and visa bans against those responsible for threatening Ukraine’s territorial integrity and independence.

Despite those important steps, I regret that, to date, the EU’s unity in condemning Russia’s military aggression has not been matched by a shared resolve to act more decisively in extracting costs and consequences for Russia’s actions. Only four days before this week’s Foreign Affairs Council, Chancellor Merkel made it clear that if Russia continued on its current course, it would cause

“massive damage to Russia, both economically and politically.”

Following her comments, and ahead of the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting, the press quoted reports that more than 100 names were being considered for targeted measures by the EU. At that Foreign Affairs Council meeting, a list of 21 individuals was agreed, and only 13 of them were Russian. Given that the objective of the sanctions is to alter the calculus of risk in the minds of the Russian leadership, it would be unfortunate if confused messages were sent to Moscow, however inadvertently, at this critical time.

[Ms Gisela Stuart]

My right hon. Friend mentioned the importance of the EU speaking with one voice. Does he not think that it was slightly naive of the French, German and Polish Foreign Ministers to take action without bringing the United States into the meeting? That would have shown unity not only within the EU but with our allies in north America.

[Mr Alexander]

I have no criticism of the French, German and Polish Foreign Ministers. We saw from the dynamic on the streets of Kiev that that potential agreement was overtaken by events, including the fleeing of the President from Ukraine. I do not believe that any reasonable criticism can be levelled at the European Union for somehow ignoring or being unwilling to work with our friends, colleagues and allies in the United States. Indeed, one of the brighter shafts of light amid the darkness has been the degree of effective co-operation between European leaders and the US Secretary of State John Kerry in the recent days and weeks. This is a big geopolitical moment and, as the Foreign Secretary made clear, all of us in the west—in the European Union and the United States—have a strong interest in upholding the international order that has lasted in Europe since the second world war.

Ukraine

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Tuesday 4th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

As my hon. Friend can gather, we are engaged in every channel of diplomatic dialogue and that will continue. As I have said, I will be in Paris tomorrow at the same time as Foreign Minister Lavrov. Our diplomatic efforts with Russia will continue at all times.

However, as other Members have said, it is right to have a response that goes beyond that. That is why we have announced certain measures in respect of the G8, why the EU has made an announcement about the visa regime and why I have said that other options are on the table. Such a challenge to international order and the maintenance of the UN charter and international law cannot possibly go ahead without costs and consequences.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

France is currently negotiating a €1 billion deal for two Mistral-class ships to be delivered to the Russian navy. Has the Foreign Secretary had any indication that France is considering whether it is appropriate to go ahead with that deal or whether to make it part of the sanctions negotiations?

[Mr Hague]

We have had no indications from France about that matter. As the hon. Lady will have gathered, there will be further extensive meetings, including between the European Heads of Government at the European Council on Thursday. Arms export licences will, of course, be one of the issues that European nations have to consider. It is important that we consider them together and have a united approach, but we must examine that issue.

Oral Answers to Questions

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Tuesday 4th March 2014 Commons Chamber

[Hugh Robertson]

No, I cannot. We continue to encourage the Afghan Government to sign that agreement for all the reasons my hon. Friend mentions. We believe it is clearly an important part of the future of Afghanistan moving forward, and we will continue to encourage the Afghanistan Government to sign it as soon as possible.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

This Friday morning there will be a meeting to commemorate the life of Alex Petersen, one of the young men who lost their lives in Kabul in January. That highlights the fact that those at risk are not just the civilians who work for the British Government, but the civilians who work for contractors and in other peace-building capacities. Will the Government focus on them as much as on British UK Government personnel?

Syria

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Monday 13th January 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

I join my right hon. Friend in paying tribute to what some of the leading members of the National Coalition have achieved, in the most difficult circumstances imaginable, in helping to bring together, in a country without any free political institutions, a coalition of people committed to a democratic and pluralist future for Syria. For the reasons my right hon. Friend described, it is important for people in other countries to help keep a moderate opposition in being and in business. We have contributed to that in various ways and, as I mentioned, we are ready to do so again, but we need assurances about how our assistance will be used. If the opposition go to Geneva II and the regime is not prepared to work on the basis of creating a transitional governing body drawn from regime and opposition, I think many people across the world will draw the conclusion that they should give increased support to that moderate opposition in the face of diplomatic blockage from the Assad regime.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

I am grateful for the update but so far I am still searching for a coherent British policy on Syria. If we want to be anything other than willing participants in the failure of the international community, would it not be a good start simply to say that the future of Syria will not include Assad?

[Mr Hague]

We have been saying for a couple of years that Assad has no role in the future of Syria. After all, the proposition that will be before us at Geneva II is the establishment of a transitional governing body formed by mutual consent from regime and opposition. It is inconceivable that any opposition group, however moderate or extreme, would give its consent to Assad’s being part of that transitional governing body. Nor is it realistic, after the death of 125,000 people and years of torture, abuse and murder, to think that Assad could ever again unite the people of Syria. I think it is clear to us and to most observers that he has no role in the country’s future.

Our policy is very clear: to promote the political solution, to help keep a moderate opposition in being, to deliver humanitarian assistance, and to assist with the destruction of chemical weapons stocks. On those things I think we are fairly united across the House.

European Council

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Tuesday 7th January 2014 Commons Chamber

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

(Urgent Question): To ask the Prime Minister if he will make a statement on the European Council meeting of 19 and 20 December 2013.

[The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)]

I have been asked to reply. The European Council focused on three things: defence; economic and monetary union; and EU enlargement and association agreements. On defence, the Prime Minister made it clear that NATO would remain the bedrock of our national defence. As a result of United Kingdom lobbying, NATO’s Secretary-General Rasmussen was invited to attend and address the Council as a symbol of the importance of the European Union’s efforts, which complement rather than duplicate the role of NATO in our collective security. It is right for European countries to co-operate on defence issues such as tackling piracy, and this country has consistently supported other European allies, including the French efforts in Mali. However, it is important that defence co-operation is driven by nations themselves, on a voluntary basis, according to their own priorities and needs, and not by the Brussels institutions.

My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister ensured that the conclusions excluded any ambiguous language or proposals that could lead to new bureaucracy, new EU institutions or increased EU competence on defence and security matters, including any ambitions to own dual-use capabilities such as remotely piloted air systems. The conclusions of the Council were clear that nations, not the EU institutions, were in the driving seat of defence policy and would remain there.

On economic and monetary union, the United Kingdom is not in the eurozone and will not be joining the euro, but we want our trading partners in Europe to have a strong and stable currency and we support their efforts to achieve that, provided that Britain’s interest are properly protected. My right hon. Friend ensured that there would be no financial liability for this country from banking union or from any future euro area mechanism of loans or guarantees for eurozone countries The conclusions also reiterate the importance of making the EU more competitive, including cutting red tape for business.

On enlargement and association agreements, the European Council welcomed the initialling of association agreements with Moldova and Georgia, and made it clear that the EU’s offer to Ukraine remained open. The United Kingdom has long supported enlargement because the prospect of EU membership has proved a huge driver for peace, prosperity and reform across our continent. My right hon. Friend made it clear that he continued to support enlargement and saw it as one of the European Union’s greatest strengths. At the same time, however, he argued that when new countries join the EU in future, we should look again at the transitional arrangements for the free movement of workers. He argued, too, that the free movement of workers was different from the free movement of people seeking the best benefit deal. Other member states share our concerns about this matter, and we look forward to continuing those discussions over the coming year.

--- Later in debate ---

[Ms Stuart]

Delightful as it is to see the Europe Minister here today, it is the Prime Minister who is meant to make statements following European Council meetings. Why is the Prime Minister not here today? If he has a good excuse for not being here today, why could he not have made a statement yesterday? Is it now Government policy not to make statements following European Council meetings, even though the House has observed that practice for many years? It would be particularly regrettable if that were the case, given that we no longer have pre-Council debates.

Does the Minister think, on reflection, when he reads the written ministerial statement, that even if the Prime Minister had to make such a statement, the one published in Hansard is not brief, but tawdry? It really is quite an insult, particularly when compared with the official Council conclusions. The written statement makes it clear that there will be no EU ownership, no EU headquarters, no reference to Europe’s armed forces, no European pooled acquisition mechanisms, no EU assets and fleets, no EU drones and no EU air-to-air refuelling tankers. Of course, that leaves one to wonder what there will be, given that this meeting was the first since the Lisbon treaty came into force where the Council had a themed debate focusing on defence.

How does the Government’s statement square with the Council conclusions, which say:

“The European Council remains committed to delivering key capabilities and addressing critical shortfalls through concrete projects by Member States, supported by the European Defence Agency.”?

Given that whole list of noes, including on the institutions, what is the role and function of the European Defence Agency? Similarly, given that there are meant to be no EU drones, what are we to make of the Council conclusion that we remain committed to a 2020 to 2025 time frame for the

“preparations for a programme of a next-generation European Medium Altitude Long Endurance RPAS; the establishment of an RPAS user community”

group and European Commission regulations on that?

The Council conclusions also state:

“The European Council welcomes the Commission communication ‘Towards a more competitive and efficient defence and security sector’. It notes the intention of the Commission to develop, in close cooperation with the High Representative and the European Defence Agency, a roadmap for implementation”

of a more co-ordinated defence industry. Will the Minister comment on the clear contradiction between the written ministerial statement and the conclusions?

I have two final points to make. First, how does the statement square with the French Prime Minister’s demand for the setting up of a permanent fund to finance operations such as France’s operation in the Central African Republic? Secondly, did the Prime Minister have any discussions with the new German Defence Minister, Ursula von der Leyen, who until that point had been personally very deeply committed to a united states of Europe?

[Mr Lidington]

First, I am grateful for the hon. Lady’s words of welcome. Let me respond to her first question by reminding her that since May 2010 my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has made no fewer than 18 oral statements here following Councils that took place while Parliament was sitting—that is double the number of such oral statements given by his immediate predecessor. It has been the practice of successive Governments not to make an oral statement following Councils taking place during a recess, and my right hon. Friend therefore made a full written ministerial statement on Monday, which set out in detail the key outcomes from this Council.

On the hon. Lady’s important points about common security and defence policy, the key is to understand the distinction between ownership by the EU of defence capabilities, which we do not support and have resisted successfully, and co-operation by European countries in providing greater defence and security capabilities. What was good about the conclusions both of the December European Council and of the previous week’s Foreign Affairs Council on CSDP matters was that they made it very clear that the EU first had to work with, and not duplicate, the efforts of NATO and work alongside other partners in different parts of the world. Secondly, they made it clear that the EU would look for ways in which to encourage co-operation on capabilities, for example, on drones, which she mentioned. That is not some new EU-directed operation, but a facility that individual members of the EU can decide whether or not to take part in. There is no secret plan to direct some Euro drone out of the Berlaymont; it is very different. It is about co-operation between willing member states.

On the defence industry point, the conclusions made it clear that the European defence sector needed to become more competitive and efficient. The language that we successfully negotiated makes it clear that rather than there being any question of European national champions, the defence sector must comply with European law, which means that there must not be illegal state subsidies, except where subsidies are explicitly protected under the treaties. The language also makes it very clear that we, or indeed any other country, are not in any way constrained from continuing to work with the United States or other international partners on our defence industries. When the hon. Lady comes to look in more detail at the conclusions, I hope that she will agree that it was a good outcome for the United Kingdom and a successful negotiation.

North Korea

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Monday 16th December 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Swire]

My right hon. Friend talks about a military response. We are doing everything in our power to avoid any regional instability or military response by any side in the region. There are several worrying areas in that part of the world, and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is contributing to the general instability. We work closely with our partners in the six-party talks and liaise closely with both the Republic of Korea and our American allies, and we shall continue to do that.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

Will the Minister have slightly more robust conversations with the BBC, encourage it to look at the issue of transmitters into North Korea and point out to it that BBC documentaries and drama, however entertaining they may be, are not really the answer? What is needed is the World Service and access.

[Mr Swire]

The hon. Lady will no doubt be aware that we have these discussions with the BBC. As I say, my noble Friend Lord Alton of Liverpool has been leading on this, and the BBC has taken a view and is communicating it to him. There are reasons to do it and there are reasons not to do it, but at the end of the day, the BBC has the independence to decide where and to whom to broadcast.

Iran

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Monday 25th November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

At the risk of sounding like the ugly fairy godmother at the christening—[Hon. Members: “Never!]—may I ask the Foreign Secretary to tell us what discussions would take place if the reintroduction of sanctions were required, and how speedily does he think that could proceed?

[Mr Hague]

That is a perfectly legitimate question. We are talking about either sanctions that will be suspended—not lifted or abolished—or about the unfreezing of a specified amount of frozen assets on a one-off basis. The sanctions relief that is being offered to Iran can easily be reversed if it does not abide by the commitments into which it has entered.

Iran and Syria

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Monday 11th November 2013 Commons Chamber

[Mr Hague]

On the question about Saudi Arabia and other states, those countries are part of the core Friends of Syria group and among the 11 countries that came to London at my invitation a few weeks ago. I discuss the situation regularly with His Royal Highness Prince Saud, the Saudi Foreign Minister, and we have all agreed that our support should go through the supreme military council of General Idris and the Syrian National Coalition. Those 11 countries have agreed that we should not support other groups in Syria, particularly extremist groups, so we look to our partners in the group to live up to those commitments. On the question about Iran, our discussions on Syria have been centred, as I mentioned earlier, on Iran supporting the outcome of Geneva I as the basis for a political settlement in Syria, but it has not yet given that support.

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

Of course it is important to prepare for peace and useful to talk about mutual agreement, but right now there is a civil war in Syria. Given that we have clearly stated that President Assad and those close to him will have no role in that future, what incentive is there for Assad not simply to fight to the bitter end?

[Mr Hague]

This is not a position that we have just adopted in this country. The Geneva I communiqué of June last year sets out plans for a transitional authority formed from regime and opposition, as I pointed out earlier, and by mutual consent. It therefore does not exclude everyone in the current Syrian regime, but it would clearly be impossible—on the basis not only of Geneva I, but of any practical political consideration—to unite Syria again around an Administration centred on President Assad. After so much blood has been spilled and after a country has become so divided, it is inconceivable that that could happen. This is only the practical politics of the matter, and that is something that needs to be faced up to.

National Parliaments and the EU

Baroness Stuart of Edgbaston Excerpts

Tuesday 16th July 2013 Westminster Hall

[Ms Gisela Stuart (Birmingham, Edgbaston) (Lab)]

It is a great pleasure to have this debate under your chairmanship, Mr Chope.

The ageing process has some charming aspects, one of which is that a new idea arrives and I sit and think, “I think I have heard this somewhere before.” If someone hangs around long enough, they may even find that not only have they heard the idea before but that they have heard it before before. I had that feeling when I heard of the latest strengthening of national Parliaments within the European Union context. At that stage I decided to break one of my basic rules: over the years I have never taken part in an EU debate without saying something that I have not said before. I recommend that practice to others, but on this occasion I thought I would pull together some thoughts on national Parliaments and some of the problems over the past few years.

Yet again, the role of national Parliaments is essentially being used as a fig leaf to hide accountability for decision making at the European level. The fig leaf is being used by national Governments, and we should not fall for it. I had a feeling of déjà vu 10 years ago, when I went to the Convention on the Future of Europe. One of the five working groups was on the role of national Parliaments, and an old hand sidled up to me and said, “Remember the dud they sold John Major?” I said, “No, I don’t remember the dud they sold John Major.” And the old hand said, “Well, during Maastricht they introduced the concept of subsidiarity and proportionality, which was supposed to appease the national Governments. There was also then a review of competences across Whitehall.”

It was funny—I thought I had heard that before. The dud they sold Major was on the principle that national Parliaments should be given a role on policing subsidiarity and proportionality—the Convention on the Future of Europe was in 2002 or 2003—so I said, “When has the principle ever been invoked?” I was then told that it had been invoked only once, during the British presidency, when there was the bright idea that we wanted to standardise the water temperature for sea lions in zoos. That was a step too far even for Britain and was deemed to be out of order on the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality.

Subsidiarity and proportionality are being chucked at an interesting case that is currently going through—the representation of women on company boards. I find that quite extraordinary. The rights of women are now seen to be something at the behest of national Governments. I thought we had already reached equality. Please give me equality, but not because of subsidiarity.

I will give a bit of history. In 1994, after Maastricht, national Parliaments were supposed to come to the rescue; and in 2002-03, they were supposed to come to the rescue again with a card system of yellow cards, red cards, vetoes and all those kinds of things. Yet again, we hear that national Parliaments are supposed to be strengthened, but in this place we are talking less about Europe than ever before. Previously, a small, select group of people would gather on Wednesdays ahead of a European Council meeting, and occasionally we would tell each other something that we had not said before. We considered the programme of the European Council. There were afternoon debates, and Ministers had to tell the Commons what was about to happen. Regularly, on the following Monday, the Prime Minister would give a statement on the results. Some Members will remember that we used to have great fun at those pre-Council meetings, because the Danes would usually have published the Council conclusions on their website ahead of the Council meeting. We made fun of that, but at least we talked about it.

What happens now is that debates ahead of a Council meeting are deemed to be Back-Bench business. I spent three consecutive Thursdays complaining about that to the Leader of the House, and I kept getting the same answer—that it is part of the Wright recommendations. We have overturned other parts of the Wright recommendations, so why are they suddenly sacrosanct? On top of that, the Prime Minister did not give a Council statement back in June because he said it was so boring, and he has combined the subsequent Council statements with hefty, serious foreign policy statements on other issues. The last Council statement was combined with a statement on Afghanistan. Both issues would have deserved a statement in their own right. National Parliaments are supposed to be coming to the rescue, yet Parliament is speaking less about the matter.

[Emma Reynolds (Wolverhampton North East) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that that retrograde step is particularly regrettable given that other Parliaments have actually started to improve their scrutiny? She mentioned the Danish Parliament, but the German Parliament now scrutinises the German Government’s negotiating strategy more closely ahead of European Council meetings.

[Ms Stuart]

Indeed. Ten years ago, the British Parliament was seen as having some of the toughest and most extensive scrutiny functions. We were also the first Parliament to open an office in the European Parliament so that we had representation there. Ten years ago we were a model that other people looked towards, and now we have fallen behind. We are doing less than others.

[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

I am sure the hon. Lady would not want to move on to another subject without noting that the European Scrutiny Committee has now set up an inquiry into European scrutiny, to which she has given some very good evidence. Furthermore, last night the European Scrutiny Committee and two other Committees worked together to ensure that we changed the Government’s approach to the whole business of opt-outs and opt-ins and that the Government accepted the amendment that had essentially been drafted by the European Scrutiny Committee.

[Ms Stuart]

I fear to tread on the subject of the European Scrutiny Committee in the hon. Gentleman’s presence, because I know I would get it wrong. I would also rather rely on his intervening to tell the Chamber about the Committee’s work. It is significant that last night it was agreed that the negotiating positions had to be brought back to Parliament, but we all know that we are still only talking to each other in Committee Rooms rather than on the Floor of the House.

What would really improve national Parliaments? I am caught between a rock and a hard place, because I do not want national Parliaments to become separate institutions within the architectural framework of the EU. The EU has the Commission and the Council, but national Parliaments provide the majorities to form the Governments that send Ministers to the Council. There is, however, a little-known organisation that is known only to those who have been to some of its meetings—COSAC, which is the conference of European scrutiny committees.

Ten years ago, I was trying to broker a deal in that working group between national Parliaments so that COSAC would be strengthened in the red and yellow card system, but for that the MEPs would have had to leave COSAC. It is difficult for COSAC to arrive at a decision, because there are, say, four representatives from each country, two from the Government and two from the Opposition. If there is a coalition Government, in our case the representatives could be a Tory, a Lib Dem and two Labour Members, so there are probably three views among the four representatives. Consensus then has to be reached across 27 or 28 countries within extremely tight time limits. What then happens is that MEPs are the only people who are sufficiently united in their view and who caucus—they are usually united in the view that the European Parliament is good and national Parliaments are bad. The card system will not work unless the national Parliaments that exercise the veto have a network to talk to each other. If that network has an in-built number of MEPs who can outvote the national parliamentarians, it simply will not work. I do not know whether it is possible to change the job that COSAC does in such a way, but we will see.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

I am following the hon. Lady’s remarks carefully. She refers to scrutiny as a key issue, but in Strangford, which has an agricultural and fishing base, it is not scrutiny that we want but changes in legislation to reduce red tape and bureaucracy. Does she feel that we can change things through the scrutiny that she refers to? If we cannot change things, scrutiny is no good.

[Ms Stuart]

The hon. Gentleman has gone to the nub of the matter. We need to decide what we think the role of national Parliaments is. Is it only to scrutinise? If so, we need to widen the base so that more Members take part more regularly. Or is it to get Governments to change their decisions at times? I think that it needs to be the latter, but a number of things have to happen to allow that. Early information is key.

We also need information about how people actually act in the Council of Ministers. I have sat in the Council of Ministers, and I know that there is rarely a vote. If there is, it is seen as a failure by the civil servants that they have allowed the situation to arise. They do a head count to see whether they have a qualified majority, and if they do not think they will get the decision they want, they give in gracefully.

That takes me to what really needs to change. We need a proper Europe Minister. That is not to cast any aspersions on the current Europe Minister, but the position is a fallacy. Why are matters involving the European Union, which deals essentially with domestic legislation, placed in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office? Numerous Governments have tried at times to get the Europe function out of the Foreign Office. From what I gather, the trade union of Foreign Office Ministers usually gets together and it does not happen, but there is a question to be addressed there.

If the Europe Minister is in the Foreign Office and makes decisions and strikes bargains regularly, they might say, “There’s an idea here that affects agriculture on which we want some compromise”, or it might be on cigarette advertising, the working hours of junior doctors or any number of issues on which we can get a deal. Such deals are struck across various Departments. At that level of political bargaining, the House has no ability to scrutinise, take a role or even know what happens. We are simply given the end results. A Europe Minister should have accountability for our permanent representative in Brussels, UKRep, which does all those dealings, and be answerable to the House of Commons for the bargains struck. There was a stage when a previous Prime Minister, Tony Blair, seriously envisaged such a role, but for whatever reason it did not happen.

I can hear the outcry: “You can’t politicise UKRep!” I am not saying that I would do it the way that the Finns do it, for example—they call their civil servant before them every Friday morning—but Select Committees can call civil servants. There could be a regular slot for UKRep representatives when they come on a Friday to brief Whitehall Departments about what they have done. They could stay until the Monday morning or come on the Thursday afternoon to give evidence. If we do not want to do it at the civil service level—actually, I would rather do it at the political level—there should be a Minister who is answerable to the House across Whitehall Departments for negotiations, compromises and deals struck in Brussels. It would be such a far-reaching brief that the Minister would almost function as a Deputy Prime Minister.

[Mr Cash]

I am extremely interested in what the hon. Lady is saying, and I have often thought along similar lines. However, does she acknowledge that due to the critical mass of the European Union’s relationship with the United Kingdom, the Prime Minister and Downing street ultimately want to control all those matters? I suppose that that is understandable from their point of view. During the constitutional treaty discussions and the run-up to Lisbon, it was thought that the Foreign Secretary was out of the loop, because Tony Blair and the right hon. Member for Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath (Mr Brown) were in discussions but the Foreign Secretary was scarcely involved at all.

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[Ms Stuart]

That is not my recollection. The biggest thing that happened during the convention was the Iraq war, which meant that people’s attention was rightly drawn to other things. However, as I was representing national Parliaments and not the British Government, I had access to the Departments across Whitehall in a way that even a Cabinet Minister probably never has. I had a snapshot of what was happening in various Departments at any given time, and then I saw how people negotiated and traded things.

There is nothing wrong with that, but if we do not know what deals are being struck, we can neither approve nor disapprove. What happens is not uniquely British: every Government comes back with a success that they regard as an ultimate success for their own negotiating position, and think that they have shown all the others how they have failed. Anything that they do not like, they blame on the European Union. We will never be at ease with the decision-making process unless we actually know what is going on. We take notice only of the things that we do not like; there is no cognizance of the things that we do like.

This is about the Europe Minister and the accountability of UKRep. This place needs to get its head around how we can break open that decision-making process and make it accountable here. I think that I am right in saying that we still do not even know whether one of our Ministers was at the Council meeting or whether he or she was represented by a civil servant. Is that information available?

[The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)]

Parliament is usually told in advance by a Minister from the appropriate Department who will be in the UK chair for a meeting of the Council. Certainly, for the Foreign Affairs Council and General Affairs Council, I routinely table a written ministerial statement to Parliament that says whether the Foreign Secretary or I will be in the chair. In the subsequent report to Parliament about what happened at Council meetings, we have sometimes said that for a certain item on the agenda, the permanent representative was in the chair.

[Ms Stuart]

That is helpful. I hope that it applies not just to the Foreign Affairs Council but to all meetings that are open, so that we can know afterwards whether the Minister or a civil servant was there.

To give one example, I was on a committee considering defence procurement across Europe. Countries have a veto and can say that it is in their national interest for a particular piece of defence procurement not to come within the single market rules. There was a reference to how often the UK had used that veto, and I wanted to find out through written answers how often that veto was used by other countries, because without comparison with other countries a single figure is utterly meaningless; one cannot tell whether it is excessive or very low.

I think that the UK used its veto about nine times. If France had used its veto 315 times, there would have been something wrong. If France had never used it, I would want to ask a few more questions about why we had. The answer came back that the information was not available. The Foreign Office felt that it was not its job to answer for the European Union, but as an MP, I had no means at that stage to go further and find that information. Similarly, the Dutch had not fully signed up to that agreement. When I tried to find out why, I was told that that was an issue for the Dutch Government. That is a legitimate answer, but it does not allow us to understand how we are represented and how other countries are working on that.

Even if the Prime Minister does not wish to create a new role for a Europe Minister with responsibility across Whitehall—I can see why he might not want to do so, because it takes power away—let us consider the notion of the red card, yellow card or whatever colour it is. The card is meant to be a mechanism by which national Parliaments can say to the Commission, “Thus far, and no further. Step back again.”

When the red card system was first mooted, the Commission was up in arms, because it felt that it was insulting to suggest that it would ever bring anything forward that would breach the principles and could be objected to by two thirds of national Parliaments, or whatever. It subsequently got off its high horse and accepted the principle—but no more than the principle, that we can wave a card, because there is no duty on the Commission to withdraw its proposals or to come back with better proposals. Following the speech of the Foreign Secretary in Berlin, I gather that we now have ideas for an improved version of the red and yellow cards, and I look forward to hearing more about that.

Instead of the card system, however, perhaps the British Government will consider discussing with the Commission the idea of a delete button for legislative proposals. When we have a general election and the Government go, so do their manifesto commitments and legislative proposals; the slate is wiped clean. At the European level, there is no such delete button. Proposals that are not agreed in one parliamentary session, simply refuse to die. A classic example of that is the hallmarking directive, which comes up again every so often, because some countries have a particular interest. We can either negotiate something to death, so that it is almost meaningless, or we end up introducing something that, 10 years ago, when first introduced, was a good idea, but now no longer is.

One example was the effect of the working time directive on junior doctors. Negotiations on the working time directive started in the ’90s, with legitimate concerns about lorry drivers driving for too long, and so on. It was not until 1999 that I ended up trying to negotiate on opt-out for junior doctors, because we could tell that the working hours requirements would mean that the increase in doctors, which the Labour Government was bringing in, would be totally consumed in the first few years. We wanted the directive to be phased, but we then had court judgments that extended it even further. The political impact of that decision did not become apparent until almost 20 years after the original directive.

If democratic accountability means getting rid of decision makers when we think that they have made bad decisions, by the time a European Union decision on some things kicks in, it really is the Schleswig-Holstein question and only three people know the answer: one is mad, another is forgotten and the third is dead. If we had a process of completion that gave us some parliamentary input, we would know where the start and end points were, so we would know where we could use our influence and get the Government to take a stance.

I hope that the Minister will tell us more about the red card, but I also hope that he will say more about whether he envisages Parliament having a role in affecting the decisions of the Government before they go into negotiations. Unless we know beforehand, not only in the European Scrutiny Committee but through a mechanism by which what is about to happen is discussed on the Floor of the House, we cannot influence it. By the time the Minister goes to Brussels, the deals have been struck. Any Ministers who have attended European Council meetings know that they go on the plane, they read their papers, they arrive in Brussels and UKRep gives them a brief with the lines to take. Anyone who tries to unravel anything is told, “That’s the deal; that’s it.” At that stage, anyone short of the Prime Minister cannot unravel the deal.

I want to leave the Minister with a final, incredibly radical thought—a radical retrograde step to some perhaps. At the recent Königswinter conference, I chaired one of the groups and, by way of introduction, I asked everyone to say, going around the table, one thing that they really loved about the European Union and one that they would get rid of tomorrow if we could. The group was half Germans and half Brits, and to my absolute astonishment there was a consensus around the table that the one thing that we should get rid of was the European Parliament. Then I realised the real difference between the Germans and the Brits. We talked about the connection never being made and how a double mandate was the way to link things, but for the Germans the double mandate was to use some MEPs as national MPs, while for the Brits it was to use some nationally elected parliamentarians at the Brussels level.

We must look at the workings of the European Parliament. It will simply not do that our contact with it is getting less and less. With the closed list system, fewer and fewer people know who their MEPs are. The relationship is not only fractured, but virtually non-existent. I am interested to hear what the Minister has to say even about some basic things. He may want to correct me, but we do not automatically issue passes for the House of Commons to Members of the European Parliament, so they have to queue up with everyone else. If we want a proper a dialogue, they ought to be here. I remember that we would not let MEPs have dining rights or book a room, because we thought that they would invade this place in order to enjoy the cuisine. [Interruption.] I give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Blackley and Broughton (Graham Stringer).

[Graham Stringer (Blackley and Broughton) (Lab)]

I was not going to intervene, but my hon. Friend generously gave way before I asked.

I have two points to make on scrutiny and accountability. The European Parliament does not see itself as being accountable to national Parliaments; in reality, it is in competition, which is why many national parliamentarians around Europe are not in favour of the European Parliament, because it sees its future as taking over our role. Secondly, the rights of MEPs in this House were taken away some time ago.

[Ms Stuart]

The reason why I asked for the debate was to bring in some historical perspective, because since I have been in the House this is the third time that national Parliaments have been resurrected as the panacea for dealing with unaccountability. In the Scrutiny Committee, we have improved our function, but we have not extended that to the whole House. In fact, we have reduced the accountability of Ministers, and of the Prime Minister in particular, through debate in the House, in order for us to know what the Government are doing at the European level. Unless we have some structure or another to do that, we will simply never be at peace or feel that we know what decisions are being made on our behalf, whether we want to influence the decision or to scrutinise it.

[Mr William Cash (Stone) (Con)]

I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston (Ms Stuart) not only for securing the debate, but for the way in which she has deployed her arguments. She has been in the House for about 10 years, I suppose—

[Ms Stuart]

Seventeen years.

[Mr Cash]

Seventeen years! I am only getting close to 30 years. It is extremely refreshing to hear such cogent and well thought out concern about the whole European issue, which has dogged our political debates for the 30 years or so that I have been in the House—whether there is any connection, I cannot say. Today, the one thing that saddens me slightly and, I dare say, her, too, is that so few people are participating in a debate about what is at the heart of our democratic system. I regard this matter as being not “about Europe” but about Britain, and about democracy, which is not peculiar to any one country.

Our democratic systems have, in real terms, emerged since the 19th century, because of John Bright and others. I mention his name because the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston represents part of his old constituency, before it was Birmingham Central. His fight for the working-class vote was in essence the beginnings of our democratic system. The Conservative party, under Disraeli, gave in to the pressures. There is no need to go into the detail, but it was incredibly important and was based on the assumption that when people went into the polling booth and cast their vote secretly in a ballot box—that was the system that was devised in the late 19th century to ensure that the people had their say—we had a democracy. Other countries have run parallel with that, so the issue is not exclusively British but applies elsewhere in the whole of the European continent and the rest of the world.

I fear that with the movement towards bigger regional systems, even those who claim that they want world government ignore national identity, traditions and democratic systems, and therefore in essence national Parliaments, at their peril. The European Union, which I voted for as the European Community in 1975—I said yes—has since moved inexorably along a trajectory towards more and more centralisation and less and less national involvement.

The Minister for Europe is here. He and I have engaged in debates and discussions on the matter since at least 1988 or 1989, when I was first elected chairman of the backbench committee on European affairs in hostile circumstances. It was interesting that the national parliamentarians who then represented the Conservative party elected me in a secret ballot because I had put out a note explaining why I was standing, which was all about national Parliaments. I had written a pamphlet for the Bow Group called “A Democratic Way to European Unity: Arguments against Federalism” and I followed that up the following year with another called “Against a Federal Europe—The Battle for Britain”. I think I can fairly say—I do so without presumption—that what I set out in those two documents has remained the central problem.

The difference is that the evidence now demonstrates the analysis of where we were going wrong, which was further and further integration, and that was in the 1988 to 1991 period. Since then, we have had Amsterdam, Nice and Maastricht, and we have had the constitutional and Lisbon treaties. Irrespective of the evidence, both economic and political, there is increasing distrust not only in the United Kingdom but throughout the whole of Europe. I need not give all the Eurobarometer’s figures, but 72% of those in countries such as Spain and Italy have now decided that they do not trust the European Union. I presume to say that riots, unemployment and the rise of the far right are all things that I said would happen when I wrote those pamphlets back in 1988-91 and since.

Despite all that, as well as the Bloomberg speech and the movement towards a referendum—I believe that there will be a money resolution this afternoon on the European Union (Referendum) Bill—if I am being completely objective, nothing has changed except public opinion. The facts demonstrate that those of us who have argued this case consistently over a long period have been proved right. I am not saying, “I told you so.” The matter is far too serious for that because, as the hon. Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston said, it is about our democratic system.

National parliamentarians are elected by virtue of manifestos in general elections. We ultimately control taxation and spending. That is what determines the nature of our economy, and it also determines public services. If circumstances arise in which the economic and political situation in this country, let alone other countries, becomes dysfunctional and as a result we cannot deliver the prosperity that people want, not only will they become completely alienated from laws that are generated to exclude them from participation in a prosperous business and social environment, but the entire fabric of the European system will disintegrate.

The real problem is the treaties. The issue is no longer just a call for reform. I was anxious for reform, and I have called for renegotiation for as long as I can remember, because I thought the treaties would go wrong. Now that they have gone so wrong, there is no prospect of their improving the situation and, as I will explain, there is absolutely no sign that any Government in any European country are seriously grappling with the intrinsic problem at the heart of the treaties. Governments talk about renegotiation, but we are past that. The reality is that we must leave the existing treaties—I make this point in the context of our national Parliament and our own country—because unless other countries are prepared to face up to the fact that there has been a cataclysmic failure of the system, they will not be impelled to make the changes that are needed to achieve what I still believe in: co-operation on the European continent and in trade.

I need not go into the arguments about trading, because we are talking about national Parliaments, but one reason why the British Chambers of Commerce and others have become so deeply disillusioned by the European Union in business terms is precisely the legislation that has come about as a result of being passed under the aegis of the treaties. Those treaties, because of the concrete framework of the acquis communautaire, cannot be changed without unanimity among all member states, and there is absolutely no intention whatever to make fundamental changes to the treaties.

--- Later in debate ---

[Emma Reynolds]

The hon. Gentleman has not even allowed me to finish my point. If he considers the proposals from the Centre for European Reform, he will see that they are not about a talking shop. With great respect, I know that he sits on COSAC, which my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston mentioned, and that committee needs to be vastly improved from its current formulation and in its make-up. Mr Grant says that it does not give MPs a big enough stake, is only consultative and is often treated “disdainfully” by MEPs—his word, not mine.

There is clearly a great—[Interruption.] Would the hon. Member for Stone (Mr Cash) at least give me the courtesy of listening to my response to his intervention? There is clearly a great problem with the current set-up, and having a presence in Brussels of national parliamentarians who could have a vote and scrutinise more closely the decisions taken by our and other Governments deserves closer consideration, rather than just saying that it would be a gathering of fools—a statement with which I profoundly disagree.

I recently met the Speaker of the Dutch House of Representatives, and she has an appetite, as do colleagues in other member states with whom I have discussed the matter, for Parliaments to work more closely together. The Government could give greater consideration to the successes in the Dutch, Danish and German Parliaments. For example, in the Netherlands, the standing committees—akin, I think, to our Select Committees—choose proposals from within the Commission work programme that they see as priorities and about which they might have concerns, and they refer them to their European affairs committee.

Our departmental Select Committees are not involved enough in proposals at an early stage, or even at later stages, and I would be grateful if the Minister could say something about what the Government could do to drive greater consideration and scrutiny on a policy-by-policy basis, given that, as has been said, a lot of European policy is not foreign policy—as my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Edgbaston said, it is an anomaly that it is often treated as such. Our departmental Select Committees could learn from the experience of the Netherlands.

[Ms Gisela Stuart]

My hon. Friend reminds me of another idea, which at some stage was discussed. What does she think of the suggestion that, rather than us going to Brussels, the Commissioners come here at the beginning of the work programme? They could give evidence to a Select Committee, or be here in Westminster Hall and answer MPs’ questions about the forward programme.

[Emma Reynolds]

I welcome that suggestion, and the idea should be considered. European Commissioners do come to our Parliament, but not systematically.

In Denmark, before European Council meetings the Prime Minister has to go before the European committee to discuss her negotiating strategy, and in the German system, the Bundestag now has much greater power to scrutinise the Government’s negotiating strategy for those meetings. Our Prime Minister, when he had just been elected as party leader, told the party to “stop banging on” about Europe, and there are rumours in today’s press that the first report on the balance of competences, which we all await with bated breath, has been put off until after the summer, apparently because Ministers are fearful of their own Back Benchers. I would be interested to hear why a dispassionate, objective assessment of the balance of competences should be put off in that way. The Government again seem to be putting the party interest before the national one. We are worried that they feel compelled to delay the initial report, and we are greatly interested in what the Minister has to say about that.

This debate comes at a particularly important time, because the eurozone member states are likely to pursue further integration among the eurozone 17. Their Parliaments, and those in non-eurozone member states such as ours—there are 10 others, including Croatia—will need to scrutinise better what happens and what the dynamic is between non-eurozone and eurozone member states.

In conclusion, it deserves to be repeated that it is regrettable that the Government have abolished the pre-Council debates. I would like to see them reintroduced. Scrutiny in Committees, such as the one chaired by the hon. Member for Stone, is all well and good but nothing substitutes scrutiny on the Floor of the House. The Government should learn from the Dutch, Danish and German examples, drive better and closer co-ordination between national Parliaments from across the 28 member states, make the yellow card system work better and consider introducing a red card system.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Lidington]

Well, that is something best avoided in any meeting with parliamentarians, if humanly possibly.

I will try to respond to the various points that were made, in particular by the hon. Lady. She posed a number of questions and challenges, some of which focused on how we do European business here in Westminster, and others that centred on what might be done in the broader European Union context, and how national Parliaments should fit into the legislative process and decisions taken at European level.

I shall start with the hon. Lady’s points about how we deal with European business here at Westminster. Her most important point was that it was vital to find a way to engage and involve a rather larger number of Members in European business. I have to confess that when I go in to the Chamber for a debate on Europe, or in to a Committee, I feel at times like a cut-price version of Henry V before Agincourt. It is a matter of:

“We few, we happy few”

that are gathered together, and it is very familiar faces, from both sides of the House, that tend to feature. It is, however, not a Government matter, but a problem for Parliament. Parliament must take more seriously its collective responsibility as an institution to see, rightly or wrongly—individual hon. Members will have their own views on this—that we live in a world in which European Union business should be treated as mainstream political business, and not as something that can be quietly shoved off to some annexe next door and left to specialists to get on with in peace and quiet. The decisions that British Ministers of any party take in the Council of Ministers have an impact on the lives of the constituents of every Member of this House and I agree, therefore, with the thrust of what the hon. Lady said.

I disagree with the hon. Lady, however, in that I feel that the focus should not be just on the Chamber. The Chamber is clearly important, but we need to consider the role of Committees, including departmental Select Committees. In various evidence sessions with the European Scrutiny Committee over the past couple of years, I have tried to emphasise my growing belief that part of the answer lies in persuading the departmental Select Committees to give greater priority to that aspect of their work that covers European Union business. That is a matter for Select Committees, and it would be wrong for the Government to get into the business of seeking to give them instructions—the powers are already there within the terms of resolutions. It is primarily for those Committees to take ownership of those agendas and drive them forward. They can by all means invite European Commissioners to give evidence and by all means go to Brussels every now and then to take evidence and meet informally with people in the European institutions who are involved in legislation.

I look forward to the forthcoming report from the European Scrutiny Committee on the scrutiny process. I am sure that many of the matters that have been touched on this morning, such as whether we should move towards a mandate model of scrutiny along the lines of what the Scandinavian countries have, will be addressed in that report, and I obviously do not want to pre-empt the Government’s response to it. I say to the hon. Member for Wolverhampton North East (Emma Reynolds) that one of the characteristics of that mandate system—she rightly drew attention to some of its virtues—is that the sessions between the Minister and the committee to discuss a negotiating mandate take place in closed session. The public and press are not admitted and the report is not public, at least until after the negotiations are concluded.

[Ms Gisela Stuart]

Each of these systems has advantages and disadvantages, but could the Minister address where he would assume the collective memory of Parliament on these debates resides? The decision-making process in Brussels is so long, even with one term. Where would he focus that collective memory?

[Mr Lidington]

That is a very good point. To my mind, it means that one needs to focus the collective memory of elected Members through the members of the Liaison Committee, which is composed of relatively senior Members of Parliament, and through the system of the Committee Clerks. If we look at our Parliament’s representation in Brussels, we have some very talented people representing the two Houses, but that amounts to three staff. The Bundestag and the Bundesrat have 18 or 19 people between them, and that is on top of the German federal representation and the representative offices from each of the German Länder that are present in Brussels. Again, Parliament should consider the question of whether our level of representation and the number of people we have on the ground in Brussels are sufficient, but the Government cannot, or should not, issue instructions on that.

The hon. Lady asked whether COSAC could be improved, and my answer is definitely yes. It is an imperfect organisation, and it could be strengthened through reforms to the secretariat or through a formal power to summon commissioners, rather than expecting commissioners by convention to come and give evidence. It is not just about the formal meetings of COSAC, because if any system of red or yellow cards is to be effective, there has to be a culture of talking and working together that means that different parliamentary representatives, and in particular the chairs of the relevant committees, are used to having contact with each other in networking and co-ordinating an approach to a particular Commission draft measure.

The hon. Lady asked about the role of the Europe Minister, and she was very fair in how she put it. There is a perfectly legitimate debate to be had in this country about where that office sits. Some argue that it should sit in the Foreign Office. Others argue that it should sit in the Cabinet Office and so be directly accountable to the Prime Minister. Some argue that it should be a self-standing Department or be located in Brussels, in effect performing the political office of the permanent representative. In France, Germany, Poland and Spain my counterparts sit in their respective Foreign Ministries. In Sweden, however, the Europe Minister sits in the Prime Minister’s office and reports directly to the Prime Minister, although she represents a different political party from the Prime Minister in the current coalition.

The key thing is not where the Europe Minister sits, but how the right level of co-ordination and accountability is achieved across Government. The Europe Minister could be put in the Cabinet Office, but that raises the question of how the work at Brussels, which is certainly cross-departmental in Whitehall terms, is co-ordinated with the bilateral diplomatic work that has to be done with 27 other member states, because European business cannot be done in Brussels alone. I would be worried about a gap opening between a Minister dealing with Brussels business and a Minister dealing with our diplomatic efforts on, for example, Germany. We try to co-ordinate our conversations with German Ministers across all relevant political dossiers. When I see German counterparts, I do not talk strictly about Foreign Office business; I talk about financial services, the European budget and whichever European issues are high on the agenda at that moment.

The key is to have effective co-ordination through a Cabinet system, which we do through the European Affairs Committee of the Cabinet. I repeat the point I have made elsewhere: the permanent representative, who is a professional civil servant, follows the mandate set by the Cabinet. If he wishes to move from the mandate he has already been granted, he has to go back to Ministers and seek their agreement and authority to go beyond it.

On the question of yellow and red cards, under the current system national Parliaments or chambers of national Parliaments can submit a reasoned opinion that a draft directive or regulation fails to comply with the principle of subsidiarity. They have to submit that within eight weeks of the formal communication from the Commission about a draft measure. One third of the voting weight of national Parliaments needs to be signed up for the Commission to be compelled to carry out a formal review, and the reasoned opinion may only be submitted on the grounds of subsidiarity. We could make more use of reasoned opinions than we do. I know that my hon. Friend the Member for Stone is meticulous in looking at the legal grounds of a directive and whether it meets the subsidiarity test.

The Westminster Parliament has so far submitted fewer reasoned opinions than some Parliaments in other member states, but we could look to reform the system. Is eight weeks long enough? Should we not give national Parliaments longer to consider their response? There is an obvious problem with recesses. Should we reduce the threshold below a third? Should we widen the grounds for challenge? If we have subsidiarity, why not have proportionality as well? Why not have some sort of test on excessive burdens on business, or on whether there is evidence that a draft measure would have a harmful impact on European growth? Why not make provision for the yellow card to become a red card under certain circumstances, with an outright veto that national Parliaments could impose? Could we give national Parliaments the power to impose an emergency brake in certain circumstances?