Serious Crime Bill [Lords]
Baroness Primarolo Excerpts(9 years, 9 months ago)
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Sir Edward Garnier
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell). I am sorry that he has been misdescribed as my hon. Friend the Member for North East Cambridgeshire (Stephen Barclay) on the Annunciator. I do not think that either he or my hon. Friend has any doubt about who they are, and, having listened to the hon. Gentleman speak in the House for the past 20 or so years, I certainly have no doubt as to who he is. Had he been able to be here on time today, his ears would have been burning as the Minister and others praised him for his campaign on this matter. However, it is a pleasure to see him here now, even if he has been described as Stephen Barclay on the Annunciator.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Dawn Primarolo)
Order. Members do not need to get excited. One of the Annunciators is correct; the other is not working. However, I know what is going on, so we can proceed.
Sir Edward Garnier
As my father used to say, Madam Deputy Speaker, “There is no point in having two clocks if they both tell the same time.”
I want briefly to respond to what my hon. Friend the Member for North East Cambridgeshire said about his new clause 28. Having spent quite a lot of my time as a Government Law Officer and having subsequently taken an interest in financial crime, I was much taken by what he had to say. My only suggestion would be that, rather than limiting himself to a further 31 days, he should propose—
Fiona Bruce (Congleton) (Con)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Dawn Primarolo)
With this it will be convenient to discuss New clause 25 —Termination of pregnancy on grounds of sex of foetus—
‘(1) The Secretary of State shall arrange for an assessment to be made of the evidence of termination of pregnancy on the grounds of the sex of the foetus in England, Wales and Scotland.
(2) The arrangements made under subsection (1) shall be such as to enable publication of the assessment by the Secretary of State within 6 months of the date of Royal Assent to this Act.
(3) The Secretary of State shall consider the assessment made under subsection (1) and—
(a) determine and publish a strategic plan to tackle substantiated concerns identified in the assessment made under subsection (1); or
(b) publish a statement and explanation in relation to why a plan under subsection (3)(a) is not required.
(4) Any strategic plan under subsection (3)(a) must include, but need not be limited to, steps—
(a) to promote change in the social and cultural patterns of behaviour with a view to eradicating prejudices, customs, traditions and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority of women and which may amount to pressure to seek a termination on the grounds of the sex of the foetus;
(b) to ensure best practice exists in identifying women being coerced or pressured into seeking a termination on the grounds of the sex of the foetus, or at risk of being so, and in the provision of protection and support to potential victims; and
(c) to promote guidance to service providers, health professionals and other stakeholders.
(5) The Secretary of State must lay a copy of the plan, determined under subsection (3)(a), before each House of Parliament within 6 months of the publication date of the assessment under subsection (2).’
Fiona Bruce
New clause 1, which I wish to be put to a vote, is supported by more than 100 MPs. The arguments for it are straightforward. First, it is to clarify beyond doubt, in statute, that sex-selective abortion is illegal in UK law. This new clause is not seeking to change the law on abortion, as some have said, but to confirm and clarify it. It also provides the Government with an opportunity to address the problem by bringing forward best practice regulations and guidance to support and protect women at risk.
New clause 1 is necessary because there is no explicit statement about gender selective abortion in UK law. The law is being interpreted in different ways because when the Abortion Act 1967 was passed, scans to determine the sex of the foetus were not available. That has led to a huge amount of confusion and mixed messages. That is despite the fact that the Government have repeatedly said that abortion on the grounds of gender alone is illegal. Health Ministers have said so; the Prime Minister has said so; the Department of Health has published guidance to that effect; and the chief medical officer has written to doctors about it. Despite all of that, abortion providers and others, staggeringly, are still refusing to accept the Government’s interpretation of the law.
Only last week, the country’s largest abortion provider, the British Pregnancy Advisory Service, republished its controversial guidance in a booklet entitled, “Britain’s abortion law: what it says and why”. The following question is posed: is abortion for reasons of foetal sex illegal under the Abortion Act? To this, it answers, “No, the law is silent on the matter.” The former Director of Public Prosecutions, Keir Starmer, has said:
“The law does not in terms expressly prohibit gender-specific abortions.”
Sir Edward Garnier
The arguments that the hon. Lady is making are those that I have read and that have persuaded me against supporting new clause 1, which I had originally intended to do when it was first mooted. I am persuaded that the real difficulty we face is getting evidence to court, and nothing that my hon. Friend the Member for Congleton (Fiona Bruce) has said will improve the quality of the evidence. I horribly disapprove—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Dawn Primarolo)
Order. This is not an opportunity for the hon. and learned Gentleman to make a speech. This debate must end at 9 o’clock and many Members wish to speak, so interventions must be brief. I think that we have the gist of what he was saying—
Ann Coffey
I think that the hon. and learned Gentleman has made his point.
I agree that the connection between cultural preferences for one sex and the factors that might then lead to a state of inconsolable distress for the pregnant woman needs to be better understood to enable us to protect women from coercion and to support them in their pregnancies. We should certainly look at the facts before agreeing to any change in the wording of the 1967 Act, because we must be careful not to worsen the situation for already vulnerable women.
New clause 1 assumes that restating that sex-selective abortion is illegal will offer women protection from pressure to terminate their pregnancies, but women subject to intolerable pressure to abort will continue to be subject to coercion. My concern is about how women would interpret the inclusion of the new clause. They might feel that Parliament has legislated that if the sex of the child is at all an issue, irrespective of their mental distress, they will not have access to a termination. Sometimes it is not what legislation says that has a powerful effect on behaviour, but what people believe it says. That might lead them to pursue alternative routes as a first resort, rather than a last one. We do not want to go back to the days of the botched backstreet abortions that took place prior to the 1967 Act, which throughout the ages have been the resort of desperate women. I remember the lengths to which women would go to terminate their pregnancies prior to that Act, in spite of the risks to their own health.
If the assessment that we propose uncovers substantiated concerns that there is pressure to seek terminations on the grounds of gender, we need to put in place a plan to deal with what is giving rise to those pressures and how we can better support women who might be being coerced. That is the proposal in the second part of new clause 25. I hope that in bringing forward those proposals there would be extensive consultation with women from all cultural backgrounds.
Finally, I would like to share a story with Members. On a recent train journey I started talking with an Asian woman who was originally from Bangladesh. In the course of the conversation she showed me a photo of her three daughters, who are now grown up. I said that they were beautiful and how lucky she was to have three daughters, at which point she looked very distressed. She then told me that she had never enjoyed any of her pregnancies because she knew that she was carrying a girl and that her then husband saw girls as being of no value and, in turn, viewed her as having no value as a wife because she had not produced a son. He eventually abandoned her. However, I am happy to report that my travelling companion went on to have her own career and that her girls are confident young women who are finding their own ways in life.
When I asked her what she thought could be done about those attitudes to girls, she said that the answer was education, education, education. She of course is right. We understand that from our own history of fighting for women’s equality—a fight that many of us still feel is a work in progress. I hope that this cross-party amendment will be supported by the House and that it will mean that when the Secretary of State reports back in six months’ time on her assessment, with accompanying proposals, we will be better informed about a way forward in addressing concerns that I agree we should not ignore. No woman should feel pressured into seeking a termination for any reason, including gender.
Several hon. Members
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Dawn Primarolo)
Order. May I ask Members to make their comments very brief, because the debate will end at 9 pm and I want to get in as many as I can?
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
Many Members, including myself, strongly support new clause 1 as a means of clarifying the law to make it absolutely clear that sex-selective abortion, which is plainly discriminatory, is illegal in the United Kingdom. In so doing, we seek to inspire the Government to develop interventions that will address the issue of why boys are more desired than girls—the issue of son preference.
In setting out my position, I want to address head on the argument that the new clause will criminalise women. That is not the case: the legal standing of women would in no way be changed, but doctors would instead be held to account, and rightly so. Sex-selective abortion is already illegal in the United Kingdom. In fact, the Prime Minister suggested in March 2014 that abortion on the grounds of gender was not only unacceptable, but illegal. It is alarming that medical organisations, such as the British Medical Pregnancy Advisory Service and the British Medical Association, have suggested that that is not the case, or that at the very least the law is silent on the matter. That must be addressed.
Deregulation Bill
Baroness Primarolo Excerpts(10 years, 6 months ago)
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Chris Williamson
The Solicitor-General says he wonders about the Labour party, but I wonder about him. Listen, if the Solicitor-General is so concerned and thinks that this is such a wonderful piece of legislation and the prescribed list is so clear, why does he not think that painting and decorating is a hazardous occupation? Does he not think that maritime is a hazardous occupation? If this is the prescribed list will he tell us, as I challenged him to in my contribution, what is not on it? Painting and decorating is not on it and that is clearly a hazardous occupation. What else is not on it? He says that there are no hazardous occupations that are not covered by the list.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)
Order. This is becoming a speech. It is supposed to be an intervention. We have heard the speech once and we do not need to hear it again.
The Solicitor-General
On some of the early points that were made, this is a matter—
The Deputy Leader of the House of Commons (Tom Brake)
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment (a) to new clause 1, after subsection (4) at end insert—
‘(4A) The Secretary of State shall, within six months of this section coming into force, lay a Report before both Houses of Parliament setting out—
(a) what information has been shared or is intended to be shared by virtue of this section,
(b) by what process the Commissioners and Secretary of State agreed on the information to be shared,
(c) which departments and agencies will have access to that information and for what purpose,
(d) whether some or all of that information was shared or will be shared in anonymised form,
(e) whether that information included or will include—
(i) confidential information, or
(ii) personal data (including sensitive personal data) as defined in the Data Protection Act 1998, and
(f) how the provisions of this section fit with the Government’s data sharing strategy.’.
Government amendments 5 to 9, 74, 10 and 11, 27 to 35, 55 and 56.
Tom Brake
New clause 1 provides for an information-sharing gateway between Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the Secretary of State to support the new apprenticeship funding arrangements. The gateway was previously contained within clause 4 of the Bill, and new clause 1 allows it to operate independently from the arrangements in clause 4. As I set out in Committee, routing funding through employers will mean that the Secretary of State will make arrangements with HMRC, and regulations will set out how the administration of the scheme would operate. The Government published a technical consultation on apprenticeship funding reform in March, which sought views on two payment mechanisms: PAYE—pay-as-you-earn; and an apprenticeship credit. The consultation closed on 1 May. We are analysing the responses and expect to announce our next steps later this year.
Clause 4 provides for the use of HMRC systems to administer the apprenticeship payments, but we must also provide for appropriate information flows. The use of HMRC systems means that information will need to be shared between HMRC and the Secretary of State for the purposes of administering the payments. New clause 1 provides for the disclosure of information between HMRC and the Secretary of State or persons providing services on behalf of the Secretary of State in connection with approved English apprenticeships.
The new clause also allows the information-sharing gateway to operate independently of arrangements in clause 4. That will allow flexibility, should it be needed, in any future arrangements. As new clause 1 sets out, information can be shared only provided it is in connection with approved English apprenticeships. The routing of apprenticeship funding to employers will mean that the Government will need to have the facility to check an employer’s credentials. For example, the Government will want to know that the person they are paying is who they say they are, and the new clause will allow the Government to cross-check information with HMRC data.
New clause 1 is a sensible way to validate employer and apprentice data, potentially minimising the burdens on employers and helping to reduce the potential for fraud. As is normal in relation to HMRC information, the information-sharing gateway is provided for in primary legislation and ensures that taxpayers’ information is safeguarded, with a criminal sanction protecting against unlawful disclosure of identifying information. Amendments 10 and 11 are consequential on the new clause, and would leave out the information-sharing gateway provisions in clause 4.
The Opposition’s amendment (a) to new clause 1 seeks a reporting requirement in connection with the new information-sharing gateway that the Government are introducing in the new clause. To direct apprenticeship funding via employers securely and in a way that safeguards public funds, government must be able to verify an employer’s identity and credentials. New clause 1 will allow the Government to do that by providing for an information-sharing gateway between HMRC and the Secretary of State, so that information already held by government can be used to validate payments without placing additional reporting burdens on employers—the Government want to avoid that. Subject to the detailed design and operation of the payment system, which is still to be confirmed following the recent consultation, examples of the types of data that may need to be shared in order to validate payments and manage the risk of fraud include: employers’ PAYE references; apprentices’ national insurance numbers; and details of the amounts that have been paid.
The Opposition amendment is not necessary. Many hon. Members will be aware that information sharing within government is quite normal, provided there are sufficient safeguards. The House will note that the new clause only allows HMRC to share information for the purposes of the Secretary of State’s functions in relation to approved English apprenticeships. HMRC can disclose information only to the Secretary of State or a person providing services on behalf of the Secretary of State—not to anyone else. The Secretary of State, or his service provider, can only disclose information to HMRC to request information from it or for the purposes of arrangements for the administration of apprenticeship payments made under clause 4.
Dr David Kelly
Baroness Primarolo Excerpts(13 years, 5 months ago)
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The Attorney-General
My hon. Friend asks me to stray from the role that brought me to the Dispatch Box as the guardian of the public interest and into the realm of politics. I shall restrain myself from doing so.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dawn Primarolo)
Attorney-General, thank you very much. I know that the whole House appreciates the detailed answers and your statement today. It is widely appreciated.
Postal Services Bill (Programme) (No. 2)
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),
That the following provisions shall apply to the Postal Services Bill for the purpose of supplementing the Order of 27 October 2010 (Postal Services Bill (Programme)):
Consideration of Lords Amendments
1. Proceedings on consideration of Lords Amendments shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion three hours after their commencement at today’s sitting.
Subsequent stages
2. Any further Message from the Lords may be considered forthwith without any Question being put.
3. The proceedings on any further Message from the Lords shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour after their commencement.—(Mr Dunne.)
Voting by Prisoners
Baroness Primarolo Excerpts(13 years, 9 months ago)
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Mr Peter Lilley (Hitchin and Harpenden) (Con)
As I read the judgments in the cases of Hirst, and Greens and M.T., I was struck by the supreme irony of what the European Court of Human Rights was proposing. The judges in that Court clearly surpass even the Red Queen in “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland” in their ability to believe two impossible things before breakfast. On the one hand, they say that the right to influence the laws under which we live by helping to choose the people who make those laws is so important that even criminals should retain it. On the other hand, they say that even the law-abiding people of this country have no right of last resort to decide the laws of their country if they are overridden by the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. One can believe one or other of those views, but one cannot uphold both views consistently at the same time.
How did we get into this pickle? As we have heard, after the war Lord Kilmuir codified what were seen to be British liberties and rights in the presumption that two things would follow, the first being that enshrining them in the European convention on human rights would bring the advantage of British liberties to
“lesser breeds without the law”,
as Kipling had it. Secondly, it was assumed that the convention would have no effect on the people of this country because it enshrined the laws and liberties that we already had so there would be no need to change them. It was assumed that whereas the European Court could overrule courts in other countries with judiciaries who did not have experience in human rights or who were open to intimidation or bribery, we did not have that problem so there would never be any conflict between our courts or laws and the Court.
As we know, things have not worked out like that. In becoming a signatory to the convention, we did not just enshrine and encode the liberties that we had, we changed the way in which, and the basis on which, laws were made, and we changed the people who made them. British liberties evolved through Parliament making laws and the courts elaborating on and clarifying them, as well as through common law, but they were always subject to Parliament being able to have the last word and to make the law if it did not agree with what the courts had done. Our liberties did not result from giving courts the right to explicate an abstract list of rights. They were not given a right to strike down, invent or rewrite laws, but that is what we did, without realising it, when we signed up to the convention after the war—and that is what the European Court of Human Rights is empowered to do.
Rights are not absolute. One right must always be balanced against another. The rights to free speech and free expression must be balanced against the right to privacy or the right to our reputation under the laws of libel. That balance, reconciliation and limiting of extremes is essentially a political matter and it has always, in the last resort, been made by a political body—Parliament. We have done that reconciliation if it needed to be done, but it is no longer up to us—we are no longer allowed to do so. Instead, that power to make a political judgment rests with courts, which are not elected and which lack political skills or sensitivities. That is wrong, and that is why the long-term solution is for us to leave the treaty on the European Court, to entrench the convention rights in our law and to leave our courts to interpret them with Parliament having the ultimate right to disagree, as it does, if it wants to.
I have a question for Government Front Benchers. On what basis are we told that we have to sign up to the Court’s judgment in the short term because we will face a huge damages claim if we do not? In all the judgments I have read, the Court has explicitly refused to award damages. It has said that the ruling was sufficient justification in itself and that the prisoners did not need any damages. It considered whether exemplary and punitive damages should be imposed, not so much because the prisoners merited it but to force us to concede, and it concluded that it should not do so. The practice direction that goes to the Court says that it considers it
“inappropriate to accept claims for damages with labels such as”—
