I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment (a) to new clause 8, leave out
“offers or provides sexual services to”
and insert
“prepares to engage in, or engages in, sexual activity with”.
Government new clause 9—Duty to notify police of female genital mutilation.
Government new clause 10—Guidance about female genital mutilation.
New clause 2—Official Secrets Act 1989 (additional defence)—
‘(1) The Official Secrets Act 1989 is amended as follows—
(2) After section 8, insert—
“(8A) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under any provision of this Act to prove that he knew, or had reasonable cause to believe, that the information, document or article disclosed was—
(a) germane to an official investigation of, or inquiry into, historic child abuse, and
(b) provided only to an officer of such an investigation or inquiry.”’
New clause 3—Child sexual exploitation—
‘(1) In section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act 1059 (Loitering or soliciting for purposes of prostitution), after “female)”, insert “, aged 18 or over,”.
(2) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.
(3) In section 48 (Causing or inciting child prostitution or pornography)—
(a) in the title of the section, for “prostitution” substitute “sexual exploitation”; and
(b) in subsection (1)(a), for “become a prostitute” substitute “be sexually exploited”.
(4) In section 49 (Controlling a child prostitute or a child involved in pornography)—
(a) in the title of the section, for “child prostitute” substitute “sexually exploited child”; and
(b) in subsection (1)(a), for “prostitution” substitute “sexual exploitation”.
(5) In section 50 (Arranging or facilitating child prostitution or pornography)—
(a) in the title of the section, for “child prostitution or pornography” substitute “the sexual exploitation of a child or sexual images of children”; and
(b) in subsection (1)(a), for “prostitution” substitute “sexual exploitation”.
(6) In section 51 (Sections 48 to 50: interpretation), in subsection (2), for “prostitute” substitute “sexually exploited child”; for “prostitution” substitute “sexual exploitation”.
(7) References in any Act, Regulation, Order or other legislative instrument to the sections and titles mentioned in this section shall be interpreted as referring to the sections and titles as amended by this section.”
New clause 11—Child protection: 16 and 17 year olds living with their families—
‘(1) The Children’s Act 1933 is amended as follows.
(2) After section 1 insert—
“1A Cruelty to a person aged sixteen or seventeen
(1) If any person A, who has attained the age of eighteen years and is personally connected to a child B aged sixteen or seventeen, wilfully assaults, ill-treats (whether physically or psychologically), neglects, abandons, or exposes him, or causes or procures for him to be assaulted, ill-treated (whether physically or psychologically), neglected, abandoned, or exposed, in a manner likely to cause him unnecessary suffering or injury to health (including injury to or loss of sight, or hearing, or limb, or organ of the body and whether the injury is of physical or psychological nature), that person shall be guilty of an offence, and shall be liable—
(a) on conviction or indictment, to a fine or alternatively, or in addition thereto, to imprisonment for any term not exceeding 10 years;
(b) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding £400 pounds, or alternatively, or in addition thereto, to imprisonment not exceeding six months.
(2) For the purposes of this section—
(a) A and B are considered to be personally connected if at the time of the offence they live together, and
(i) A has parental responsibility for B
(ii) A is a relative of B
(iii) A is or has been married or civil partner to B’s parent.
(b) A shall be deemed to have neglected B in a manner likely to cause injury to his health if he has failed to provide adequate food, clothing, medical aid or lodging for him or if, having been unable otherwise to provide such food, clothing, medical aid or lodging, he has failed to take steps to procure it to be provided to B.
(3) A person may be convicted of an offence under this section—
(a) notwithstanding that actual suffering or injury to health, or the likelihood of actual suffering or injury to health, was obviated by the action of another person;
(b) notwithstanding the death of B.
(4) In subsection (2)—
“parental responsibility” has the same meaning as in the Children Act 1989;
“relative” has the meaning given by section 63(1) of the Family Law Act 1996”.
New clause 15—Encouragement of Female Genital Mutilation Warning Notices and Orders (EWNs and EWOs)—
In the Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003, after section 2A (offence of Encouragement of Female Genital Mutilation) insert—
“2B Power to issue an Encouragement of Female Genital Mutilation warning notice
(1) A member of a police force not below the rank of superintendent (“the authorising officer”) may issue an Encouragement of Female Genital Mutilation warning notice (an “EWN”) under this section.
(2) An EWN may be issued to a person (“A”) who is aged 18 or over if the authorising officer has reasonable grounds for believing that A has been encouraging the genital mutilation of women and girls as defined in section 1.
(3) Before issuing an EWN, the authorising officer must, in particular, consider any representations made by A as to the issuing of the EWN.
(4) The authorising officer must take reasonable steps to obtain the representations mentioned in subsection (3).
(5) An EWN must prohibit A from encouraging the genital mutilation of women and girls.
2C Contents and service of an Encouragement of Female Genital Mutilation warning notice
‘(1) An EWN must state—
(a) the grounds on which it has been issued;
(b) that a constable may arrest A without warrant if the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that A is in breach of the EWN;
(c) that an application for an Encouragement of Female Genital Mutilation warning order (an “EWO”) under section (application for an EWO) shall be heard within 48 hours of the time of service of the EWN and notice time and place of the hearing will be given to A, and shall state that the EWN continues in effect until that application has been determined.
(2) An EWN must be in writing and must be served on A personally by a constable.
(3) On serving A with an EWN, the constable must ask A for an address for the purposes of being given notice of the hearing of the application for the Encouragement of Female Genital Mutilation warning order.
2D Breach of an Encouragement of Female Genital Mutilation warning notice
‘(1) A person arrested by virtue of section (contents and service of an EWN) for a breach of an EWN shall be held in custody and brought before the magistrates’ court which will hear the application for the EWO under (application for an EWO)—
(a) before the end of the period of 24 hours beginning with the time of the arrest; or
(b) if earlier, at the hearing of that application.
(2) If the person is brought before the court by virtue of subsection (1)(a), the court may remand the person.
(3) If the court adjourns the hearing of the application by virtue of subsection 6(8), the court may remand the person.
(4) In calculating when the period of 24 hours mentioned in subsection (1)(a) ends, Christmas Day, Good Friday, any Sunday and any day which is a bank holiday in England and Wales under the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971 are to be disregarded.
2E Application for an Encouragement of Female Genital Mutilation warning order
‘(1) If an EWN has been issued, a constable must apply for an Encouragement of Female Genital mutilation warning order (an “EWO”).
(2) The application must be made by complaint to a magistrates’ court.
(3) The application must be heard by the magistrates’ court no later than 48 hours after the EWN was served pursuant to section (contents and service of an EWN).
(4) In calculating when the period of 48 hours mentioned in subsection (3) ends, Christmas Day, Good Friday, any Sunday and any day which is a bank holiday in England and Wales under the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971 are to be disregarded.
(5) Notice of the time and place of the hearing of the application must be given to A.
(6) The notice is deemed given if it has been left at the address given by A under section 4(3).
(7) If the notice has not been given because no address was given by A under section 4(3), the court may hear the application for the EWO if the court is satisfied that the constable applying for the EWO has made reasonable efforts to give A the notice.
(8) The magistrates’ court may adjourn the hearing of the application.
(9) If the court adjourns the hearing, the EWN continues in effect until the application has been determined.
(10) On the hearing of an application for an EWO, section 97 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 (summons to witness and warrant for his arrest) does not apply in relation to a person for whose protection the EWO would be made, except where the person has given oral or written evidence at the hearing.
2F Conditions for and contents of an Encouragement of Female Genital Mutilation warning order (EWO)
‘(1) The court may make an EWO if two conditions are met.
(2) The first condition is that the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the conditions set out in section 3(2) are met.
(3) The second condition is that the court is satisfied that making the EWO is necessary to protect women and girls from harm as a result of the encouragement of FGM by A.
(4) An EWO must state that a constable may arrest A without warrant if the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that A is in breach of the EWO.
(5) An EWO may be in force for—
(a) no fewer than 14 days beginning with the day on which it is made; and
(b) up to a maximum of seven years from that date.
(6) An EWO must state the period for which it is to be in force.
2G Breach of an Encouragement of Female Genital Mutilation warning order
‘(1) A person arrested by virtue of section (conditions for and contents of an EWO) for a breach of an EWO must be held in custody and brought before a magistrates’ court within the period of 24 hours beginning with the time of the arrest.
(2) If the matter is not disposed of when the person is brought before the court, the court may remand the person.
(3) In calculating when the period of 24 hours mentioned in subsection (1) ends, Christmas Day, Good Friday, any Sunday and any day which is a bank holiday in England and Wales under the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971 are to be disregarded.
2H Further provision about remand
‘(1) This section applies for the purposes of the remand of a person by a magistrates’ court under section (Breach of an EWN) or (Breach of an EWO).
(2) In the application of section 128(6) of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 for those purposes, the reference to the “other party” is to be read—
(a) in the case of a remand prior to the hearing of an application for an EWO, as a reference to the authorising officer; and
(b) in any other case, as a reference to the constable who applied for the EWO.
(3) If the court has reason to suspect that a medical report will be required, the power to remand a person may be exercised for the purpose of enabling a medical examination to take place and a report to be made.
(4) If the person is remanded in custody for that purpose, the adjournment may not be for more than three weeks at a time.
(5) If the person is remanded on bail for that purpose, the adjournment may not be for more than four weeks at a time.
(6) If the court has reason to suspect that the person is suffering from a mental disorder within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 1983, the court has the same power to make an order under section 35 of that Act (remand to hospital for medical report) as it has under that section in the case of an accused person (within the meaning of that section).
(7) The court may, when remanding the person on bail, require the person to comply before release on bail or later, with such requirements as appear to the court to be necessary to secure that the person does not interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of justice.
2I Guidance
‘(1) The Secretary of State may issue guidance relating to the exercise by a constable of functions under section (Power to issue an EWN).
(2) A constable must have regard to any guidance issued under subsection (1) when exercising a function to which the guidance relates.
(3) Before issuing guidance under this section, the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) the Association of Chief Police Officers;
(b) the National Crime Agency; and
(c) such other persons as the Secretary of State thinks fit.”
New clause 16—Offence of encouragement of female genital mutilation—
‘(1) The Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 is amended as follows:
(2) After section 2 (offence of assisting a girl to mutilate her own genitalia) insert—
“(2A) Offence of encouragement of female genital mutilation—
(a) a person is guilty of an offence of encouragement of female genital mutilation if he makes a statement that is likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to mutilate the genitalia of a girl;
(b) A person commits an offence if—
(i) he publishes a statement to which this section applies or causes another to publish such a statement; and
(ii) at the time he publishes it or causes it to be published, he—
(a) intends members of the public to be directly or indirectly encouraged or otherwise induced by the statement to mutilate the genitalia of a girl; or
(b) is reckless as to whether members of the public will be directly or indirectly encouraged or otherwise induced by the statement to mutilate the genitalia of a girl.””
New clause 17—Mandatory reporting of suspected child abuse—
‘(1) A person commits an offence if—
(a) he is involved in the provision of regulated activity as defined by section 5 of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006 for which he is paid;
(b) he is a provider of regulated activity as defined by section 6 of the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006;
(c) he becomes aware that a child has been harmed in connection to the regulated activity; and
(d) he does not inform a relevant authority of this harm.
(2) A person does not commit an offence under this section if—
(a) he can demonstrate he acted in the best interests of the child, or
(b) he complied with relevant professional guidelines or institutional guidelines for the reporting of abuse as he believed them to be, complying with institutional guidelines for the reporting of abuse can include informing another individual with relevant safeguarding responsibilities.
(3) In this section “harm” means conduct which amounts to one of the following offences—
(a) cruelty to and neglect of children;
(b) cruelty to children/young persons;
(c) child abduction;
(d) rape of a female child under 16;
(e) rape of a female child under 13;
(f) rape of a male child under 16;
(g) rape of a male child under 13;
(h) sexual assault on a male child under 13;
(i) sexual assault on a female child under 13;
(j) sexual activity involving a child under 13;
(k) sexual activity involving a child under 16;
(l) sexual exploitation of children;
(m) abuse of position of trust of a sexual nature; and
(n) sexual grooming.
(4) The Secretary of State may, by way of regulation, make guidance as to the interpretation of subsection (2) or amend subsection (3).
(5) Any regulations made under subsection (4) must be subject to an affirmative procedure of both Houses of Parliament.
(6) In this section “relevant authority” means—
(a) the local authority with safeguarding authorities;
(b) the local police force; and
(c) the Disclosure and Barring Service.
(7) A person guilty of an offence under this Part of this Act shall be liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both such imprisonment and fine;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years.”
New clause 19—Child abduction warning notice—
In the Child Abduction Act 1984, after section 2 (offence of abduction of child by other person) insert—
“2A Power to issue a child abduction warning notice
(1) A member of a police force not below the rank of superintendent (“the authorising officer”) may issue a child abduction warning notice (“a CAWN”) under this section.
(2) A CAWN may be issued to a person (“A”) aged 18 years or over if the authorising officer has reasonable grounds for believing that—
(a) A has without lawful authority or reasonable excuse been found in the company of a child (“C”); and
(b) C is reported missing and is found on two or more occasions to be in the company of A; or
(c) there is reason to suspect that C‘s behaviour is, by reason of association with the defendant, giving significant cause for concern.
(3) Before issuing a CAWN, the authorising officer must, in particular, take reasonable steps to gather and consider—
(a) representations made by the person with lawful authority for C; and
(b) representations made by A as to the issuing of the CAWN.
(4) A CAWN must prohibit A from being in the company of C.
2B Contents and service of a child abduction warning notice
‘(1) A CAWN must state—
(a) the grounds on which it has been issued;
(b) that a constable may arrest A without warrant if the constable has reasonable grounds for believing that A is in breach of the CAWN;
(c) that an application for a child abduction warning order under section 2D will be heard within 48 hours of the time of service of the CAWN and a notice of the hearing will be given to A;
(d) that the CAWN continues in effect until that application has been determined; and
(e) the provisions that a magistrates’ court may include in a child abduction warning order (CAWO) under sections 2D and 2E.
(2) A CAWN must be in writing and must be served on A personally by a constable.
(3) On serving A with a CAWN, the constable must ask A for an address for the purposes of being given the notice of the hearing of the application for the child abduction warning order.
2C Breach of a child abduction warning notice
‘(1) A person arrested by virtue of section 2B(1)(b) for a breach of a CAWN must be held in custody and brought before the magistrates’ court which will hear the application for a child abduction warning order (CAWO) under sections 2D and 2E—
(a) before the end of the period of 24 hours beginning with the time of the arrest; or
(b) if earlier, at the hearing of that application.
(2) If the person is brought before the court by virtue of subsection (1)(a), the court may remand the person.
(3) If the court adjourns the hearing of the application by virtue of subsection 2D(8), the court may remand the person.
(4) In calculating when the period of 24 hours mentioned in subsection (1)(a) of this section ends, Christmas Day, Good Friday, any Sunday and any day which is a bank holiday in England and Wales under the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971 are to be disregarded.
2D Application for a child abduction warning order
‘(1) If a CAWN has been issued, a constable must apply for a child abduction warning order (“a CAWO”).
(2) The application must be made by complaint to a magistrates’ court.
(3) The application must be heard by the magistrates’ court no later than 48 hours after the CAWN was served pursuant to section 2B(2).
(4) In calculating when the period of 48 hours mentioned in subsection (3) of this section ends, Christmas Day, Good Friday, any Sunday and any day which is a bank holiday in England and Wales under the Banking and Financial Dealings Act 1971 are to be disregarded.
(5) A notice of the hearing of the application must be given to A.
(6) The notice is deemed given if it has been left at the address given by A under section 2B(3).
(7) But if the notice has not been given because no address was given by A under section 2B(3), the court may hear the application for the CAWO if the court is satisfied that the constable applying for the CAWO has made reasonable efforts to give A the notice.
(8) The magistrates’ court may adjourn the hearing of the application.
(9) If the court adjourns the hearing, the CAWN continues in effect until the application has been determined.
(10) On the hearing of an application for a CAWO, section 97 of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 (summons to witness and warrant for his arrest) does not apply in relation to a person for whose protection the CAWO would be made, except where the person has given oral or written evidence at the hearing.
2E Conditions for and contents of a child abduction warning order
‘(1) The court may make a CAWO if two conditions are met.
(2) The first condition is that the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that one or more of the criteria in section 2A(2)(a)-(c) are satisfied.
(3) The second condition is that the court thinks that making the CAWO is necessary to protect C from harm as a result of association with A.
(4) A CAWO must state that a constable may arrest A without warrant if the constable has reasonable grounds for believing A is in breach of the CAWO.
(5) A CAWO may be in force for—
(a) no fewer than 14 days beginning with the day on which it is made; and
(b) until the date of the 16th birthday of C.
(6) A CAWO must state the period for which it is to be in force.
2F Breach of a child abduction warning order
‘(1) A person arrested by virtue of section 2E(4) for a breach of a CAWO must be held in custody and brought before a magistrates’ court within the period of 24 hours beginning with the time of the arrest.
(2) If the matter is not disposed of when the person is brought before the court, the court may remand the person.
(3) In calculating when the period of 24 hours mentioned in subsection (1) ends, Christmas Day, Good Friday, any Sunday and any day which is a bank holiday in England and Wales under the Banking and Financial. Dealings Act 1971 are to be disregarded.
2G Further provision about remand
‘(1) This section applies for the purposes of the remand of a person by a magistrates’ court under section 2C(2) or (3) or 2F(2).
(2) In the application of section 128(6) of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 for those purposes, the reference to the “other party” is to be read—
(a) in the case of a remand prior to the hearing of an application for a CAWO, as a reference to the authorising officer; and
(b) in any other case, as a reference to the constable who applied for the CAWO.
(3) If the court has reason to suspect that a medical report will be required, the power to remand a person may be exercised for the purpose of enabling a medical examination to take place and a report to be made.
(4) If the person is remanded in custody for that purpose, the adjournment may not be for more than three weeks at a time.
(5) If the person is remanded on bail for that purpose, the adjournment may not be for more than four weeks at a time.
(6) If the court has reason to suspect that the person is suffering from a mental disorder within the meaning of the Mental Health Act 1983, the court has the same power to make an order under section 35 of that Act (remand to hospital for medical report) as it has under that section in the case of an accused person (within the meaning of that section).
(7) The court may, when remanding the person on bail, require the person to comply before release on bail or later, with such requirements as appear to the court to be necessary to secure that the person does not interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of justice.
2H Guidance
‘(1) The Secretary of State may issue guidance relating to the exercise by a constable of functions under sections 2A to 2F.
(2) The guidance must set out the behaviours associated with “giving significant cause for concern”, including, in particular, behaviours associated with giving cause for concern of sexual exploitation or grooming.
(3) A constable must have regard to any guidance issued under subsection (1) when exercising a function to which the guidance relates.
(4) Before issuing guidance under this section, the Secretary of State must consult—
(a) the Association of Chief Police Officers;
(b) the National Crime Agency; and
(c) such other persons as the Secretary of State thinks fit.””
This amendment establishes child abduction warning notices (CAWNs) on a statutory basis, addressing concerns raised in the House of Lords on the issue, by introducing a two-stage process providing judicial oversight, without compromising the ability of the police to issue a CAWN without delay. The proposed process is similar to that in place for Domestic Violence Prevention Notices/Domestic Violence Prevention Orders (DVPN/DVPO).
New clause 22—Offence of child exploitation—
‘(1) A person commits an offence if they exploit a child.
(2) A child may be in a situation of exploitation whether or not—
(a) escape from the situation is practically possible for the child; or
(b) the child has attempted to escape from the situation.
(3) The consent or apparent consent of the child to the exploitation is irrelevant.
(4) “Child Exploitation” includes but is not limited to, the exploitation of the prostitute of others or other forms of sexual exploitation; the exploitation of labour or services including begging or practices similar to slavery, servitude or forced or compulsory labour; the exploitation of or for criminal activities including benefit fraud; the removal of organs; forced or servile marriage or enforced surrogacy; exploitation for unlawful adoption; and exploitation by enforced drugs smuggling, manufacture, production or distribution.
(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years.”
New clause 26—Automatic Special Measures: controlling or coercive behaviour cases—
The Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 is amended as follows—
In section 17, after “offence” insert “an offence of controlling or coercive behaviour in an intimate or family setting contrary to section 73 of the Serious Crime Act 2015.””
New clause 27—Offence of abduction of child by other person—
‘(1) In section 2 of the Child Abduction Act 1984, after subsection (1), insert—
“(1A) Subject to subsection (3)(a)-(c), a person, other than one mentioned in subsection (2), commits an offence if, without lawful authority or reasonable excuse, he takes or detains a child between the ages of sixteen and eighteen—
(a) so as to remove him from the lawful control of any person having lawful control of the child; or
(b) so as to keep him out of the lawful control of any person entitled to lawful control of the child.”
(2) In section 2(3) of the Child Abduction Act 1984, for paragraph (b) substitute—
“(b) that, at the time of the alleged offence under subsection 2(1), he believed that the child had attained the age of sixteen,
(bA) that, at the time of the alleged offence under subsection 2(2), he believed the child had attained the age of eighteen,””
Amendment 20, in clause 72, page 63, line 27, leave out “the” and insert “a risk of”.
Amendment 21, in clause 73, page 78, line 22, leave out
“he or she was acting”
and insert
“their behaviour was necessary in order to act, and”.
Amendment 22, page 78, line 23, in clause 73, at end insert—
“(aa) a reasonable person in possession of the same information would think that A’s behaviour was necessary in order to act in B’s best interests.”
Government amendments 2 to 10.
Amendment 33, in schedule 4, page 117, line 15, at end insert—
“59A In Schedule 2 of that Act (sexual offences to which provisions about extra territoriality application apply) in paragraph 1(d), insert—
“(iii) section 68 (possession of paedophile manual) of the Serious Crime Act 2015.””
Provisions in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 enable certain child abuse offences committed outside the UK to be prosecuted in England and Wales in some circumstances. This amendment enables these extra-territorial provisions to apply to the new offence of possession of any item that contains advice or guidance about abusing children sexually contained in Clause 68 of this Bill.
Government amendments 11 to 19.
I am conscious that a number of right hon. and hon. Members wish to speak, so I will keep my opening remarks as brief as possible. I am doubly conscious of the need to ensure that, as has been mentioned, we have meaningful debates on other groups of amendments.
New clause 8 responds to the compelling case made in Committee by the hon. Member for Stockport (Ann Coffey), to whom I am grateful, that we should remove from the statute book references to the phrase “child prostitution” and limit the scope of the offence of loitering or soliciting for the purposes of prostitution, so that it applies only to adults. As I made clear in Committee, children who are sexually exploited, whether for financial gain or other reasons, should not be referred to as prostitutes. They should be regarded as victims.
New clause 8 will have substantially the same effect as the hon. Lady’s new clause 3, and in one important respect it goes even further. As well as replacing the anachronistic references to “child prostitute” and “child prostitution” in the Sexual Offences Act 2003, the new clause will remove references to “child pornography”, to which similar considerations apply.
I thank the Solicitor-General and the Government for tabling new clause 8. It will make a big difference to the language we use when talking about children who are sexually exploited. I know that victims of child exploitation are pleased that the new clause has been introduced, so I thank the Government on their behalf as well.
I am extremely grateful to the hon. Lady, and I pay tribute to her for the work that she has done, most recently in the report that she prepared about child sexual exploitation in Greater Manchester.
New clause 9 will require persons working in regulated professions to notify the police if they discover in the course of their work that an act of female genital mutilation appears to have been carried out on a girl under the age of 18. The new duty will help to ensure that professionals are clear about their responsibilities when they encounter cases of FGM in under-18s, and that those cases are reported to the police, thereby supporting investigations.
The consultation on what a mandatory reporting duty should look like closed on 12 January, and we received nearly 150 responses, including from health care professionals, education professionals, the police, charities and members of the public. We have considered those responses carefully, which is reflected in our approach to the new clause.
The new duty will require regulated health and social care professionals and teachers in England and Wales to report known cases of FGM to the police. Depending on the specifics of the case, a report to the police will not necessarily trigger a criminal investigation immediately. When a report is made, the police will work with the relevant agencies to determine the most appropriate course of action, which may include referral to medical experts for diagnosis of whether FGM has taken place. That is important, because we want to reassure those involved in the detection and exposure of this appalling child abuse that although prosecution and criminal investigation are important, they are not the only means that we have to deal with this scourge.
My hon. and learned Friend will understand that new clause 9 deals only with circumstances in which FGM appears to have been carried out, not with those in which there is a risk of it being carried out, to which I shall refer later.
I look forward to my hon. Friend’s contribution and will respond appropriately when I have heard his full argument.
We recognise that some individuals captured by the new duty may be less likely than others to encounter cases of FGM. The duty will apply only to cases identified in the course of an individual’s professional duties. There will be no new requirement for professionals to look for visual evidence, and we do not expect them to do so.
Where professionals fail to comply with the duty, it will be dealt with in accordance with existing disciplinary procedures. That is in line with the approach favoured by the vast majority of respondents to the consultation and will ensure that appropriate sanctions are imposed in accordance with the circumstances of an individual case. The Government expect employers and the professional regulators to pay due regard to the seriousness of breaches of the new duty.
New clause 10 will confer on the Secretary of State a power to issue guidance on FGM to relevant individuals in England and Wales, and will require them to have regard to it. That guidance will take the form of updated multi-agency guidelines, which will explicitly capture good safeguarding practice, including for non-regulated practitioners. In addition, the existing frameworks for the purpose of dealing with child abuse will, of course, continue to support appropriate safeguarding responses.
I wish only to repeat, in a sense, what I have already said, namely that this measure will not, in itself, deal with the problem of girls who are at risk.
My hon. Friend has made his point again. We may well have to differ on the issue of the threshold with which his amendment deals, but I will outline my arguments when I have heard all that he has to say.
Amendment 10 relates to the new offence of sexual communication with a child, which was added to the Bill in Committee. While there was cross-party support for the new offence in Committee, there was some debate about whether it should be possible for a prosecution to be mounted in England and Wales in respect of conduct engaged in abroad—that is, whether such conduct should be subject to extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Below amendment 10—which, obviously, I support—on the amendment paper is my amendment 33. My hon. and learned Friend will recall the discussion that we had in Committee. My amendment contains essentially the same wording as before, applying extraterritorial jurisdiction to the paedophile manual. Will he comment on that now?
I thank my hon. Friend for the work that he has done in ensuring that extraterritorial jurisdiction has been applied to a range of sexual offences. In a nutshell, our view is that the case for applying extraterritorial jurisdiction to the possession of paedophile manuals has not been made out. We do not expect it to be generally applicable to that type of offence. We think it far more relevant to an offence of communication, given that communications no longer respect national borders, but can take place throughout the world through the internet and social media.
I was explaining the context in which we considered the issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction. It was in the light of speeches made by my hon. Friend the Member for Mole Valley (Sir Paul Beresford) and the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston (Seema Malhotra) that we reconsidered the issue, and concluded that it should be extended to the offence of sexual communication. Amendment 10 gives effect to that.
I hope that the House will welcome these important amendments. I look forward to hearing from other Members who have tabled amendments in this group, and I will respond to them as best I can when I wind up the debate.
During our debates on the Bill, I have been drawing to Ministers’ attention the exploitation of adults—not elderly adults who cannot help themselves through old age, but young adults—by quacks and bogus counsellors. I rather hoped that the Solicitor-General and other members of the Government would address that issue. I see that the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, my hon. Friend the Member for Staffordshire Moorlands (Karen Bradley), is present. She has experienced the distinct displeasure of having to listen to me going on about this, but I will continue to go on about it until a decision is made. Will the Solicitor-General update me on the Government’s thinking about the exploitation of vulnerable adults who are brainwashed by those quacks and bogus counsellors, to their emotional, psychological and financial disadvantage?
I understand that the Government are still considering that issue. The definition of “vulnerable” may, of course, be something of a vexed question. It has tended to apply to adults with learning difficulties, but I understand my hon. and learned Friend to be referring to it in the wider context in which people are brainwashed or duped by cults and other organisations. It is not a straightforward issue, as I know he understands, but the Government are giving consideration to it, so I am grateful to him for raising it.
With those remarks, I will draw my speech to a close.
Well, I will not say the occurrence was unprecedented, but a lawyer finishing his speech earlier than expected is certainly a rarity.
The hon. Gentleman finished just before I expected him to and the Minister will now wind up this group of amendments. There has been considerable demand to contribute to the separate groupings, so perhaps I can say publicly what I would otherwise have said privately, namely that if the Minister is able to wind up on behalf of the Government so that it is possible for us to move on by 7 o’clock—perhaps even earlier—we will dance round the mulberry bush in joyous appreciation of his efforts.
Best endeavours, Mr Speaker, best endeavours.
I thank all right hon. and hon. Members for taking part in this wide-ranging debate. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Birmingham, Selly Oak (Steve McCabe) for a thoughtful contribution. The Government have committed to a full 12-week consultation within 18 months of the Bill receiving Royal Assent. We are coming to the end of this Parliament and into purdah, and practical issues arise, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Chesham and Amersham (Mrs Gillan) said. However, the Government are committed to moving on a consultation as soon as practical obstacles are removed—we cannot be clearer than that. I am somewhat puzzled about Labour Members’ undue haste to move their new clause. My right hon. Friend has already mentioned some deficiencies that she has found in the provision, and I will not reiterate her points. I say simply that we need a proper consultation on the issue and for all voices to be heard. For FGM and mandatory reporting provisions we held a consultation that gave us clear evidence to act, and to create and change the law on mandatory reporting. We must do exactly the same for child abuse.
We all agree that these issues are sensitive, important, and involve new obligations on professionals who work in this difficult field, and we must approach them carefully and with evidence. I therefore strongly urge Opposition Members to consider the matter carefully before dividing the House or supporting the new clause. With great respect the provision is premature, bearing in mind that a consultation will occur as soon as possible.
Will my hon. and learned Friend comment on my suggestion that those on the two Front Benches should work together on drawing up the terms of reference for the consultation, because I am sure that would help speed up the procedure? It may not be possible to bring something out before the election, but at least working together would show that it is a cross-party effort and give great comfort to those watching this debate.
I am interested in suggestions from any quarter about the terms of reference for a consultation. I want it to be meaningful and comprehensive, which is why there will be a full 12 weeks to allow many people to make submissions. I am open to all constructive suggestions, wherever they come from. As my right hon. Friend said, this issue is about much more than mere party politics, and I hope that that gives her the assurance she seeks.
I am listening carefully to the Minister, and of course we all want to get this issue right. I am struck by the fact that the Government managed to have a consultation on the reporting of FGM, and the Bill now contains amendments to take that forward. It seems to me a missed opportunity that we are not able to do that with mandatory reporting at the same time.
I hear what the hon. Lady says and take her remarks in the spirit that I know she intends. We are moving on these issues, and much has been achieved in the past few years in acknowledging that we are dealing with children and can no longer have a sort of double standard when it comes to their protection. In Committee we debated so-called “ostensible consent”, which at one time was in sentencing guidelines. That has gone from the law—indeed, a case I conducted in the Court of Appeal last week made it absolutely clear that for young children the concept of consent in sexual activity has no place in the law of England and Wales. Let me reiterate my point: we are making progress and there will be a consultation as soon as possible. I therefore urge the hon. Lady and Opposition Members not to divide the House on the new clause.
On new clause 2, I listened carefully to the impassioned speech of the hon. Member for Bassetlaw (John Mann). It was the sort of speech that we need to hear in this House because it reiterated not only his determination to uncover child abuse—whether historical or current—but the determination that we should all have to follow evidence wherever it may lead without fear or favour.
As we know, the Official Secrets Act is intended to protect certain classes of particularly sensitive information such as security and intelligence matters, and it provides for a number of offences that prevent current or former Crown servants or Government contractors from disclosing certain information without lawful authority. It does not prevent protected information from being disclosed to an officer of an official investigation or inquiry into historical child abuse. In particular, information may be disclosed where the disclosure is made in accordance with that person’s official duty or is otherwise authorised. Departments and Ministers can permit current and former civil servants and Government contractors to share knowledge and documentation with an inquiry. As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary made clear in her statement to this House on 4 February, official authorisation would be given for the Goddard inquiry.
On the historical institutional abuse inquiry in Northern Island, the Attorney-General has already made a public undertaking that no evidence given by a person to the inquiry will be used as evidence against them in any criminal proceeding, including any offence under the Official Secrets Act. Indeed, the Attorney-General would be ready to consider any similar request from Justice Goddard if one were made. I assure the hon. Member for Bassetlaw that the Government are committed to assisting Justice Goddard’s inquiry and all other inquiries into child abuse. We are satisfied that the Official Secrets Act is not, will not, and should not be a bar to evidence being provided, but I am grateful to him for raising that important issue.
Let me turn to new clause 11, in the name of the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Mr Llwyd). As he said, this has been covered in Committee. I reiterate that anomalies will inevitably exist when it comes to how we classify children and young people in law. I am afraid there is no one age division to fit all circumstances. Despite the fact that, with his usual cunning, he has come up with a slightly different way of dealing with some of the mischiefs I mentioned in Committee, I am still concerned that, in genuinely attempting to correct one anomaly, we might end up creating another. We still believe that in this area of the law we need to focus on the protection of children and young persons under the age of 16.
In that spirit, I will come on to new clause 27, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Nicola Blackwood). Her tenacity knows no bounds. She has done a lot of work to expose the scourge of child sexual exploitation in both her local area and nationally. I am grateful to her for once again raising this issue. We need to have the correct balance between additional protection, and recognition of the relevant rights and responsibilities of young people in this age group. We have given much thought to this matter. The key question for the Government is whether we think the police have sufficient powers to replace restrictions and prohibitions on people who pose a risk to vulnerable young adults aged 16 and 17. We think that the new sexual risk orders—I will come on to them in a moment—will provide the police with the powers to tackle predators. Breach of such an order will carry a sentence of up to five years’ imprisonment. We think the right balance is being struck with the combination of child abduction warning notices and sexual risk orders. We therefore do not think that we need to change the law on child abduction at this stage. That allows me neatly, I hope, to deal with new clause 19, tabled by the hon. Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion).
The Solicitor-General is aware that the combination of child abduction warning notices and risk of sexual harm orders leaves a gap for 16 to 17-year-olds where it is impossible to prove sexual risk and where there is a need for immediate action without going to court.
I remind my hon. Friend that other mechanisms and other types of order exist, and ask her to bear it in mind that the law was reformed by the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, which is just coming into force. There are other tools available to the police and enforcement authorities. We have to be careful not to seek to be over-reliant on one particular type of order. Reading carefully the recommendations and observations made by Louise Casey in the Rotherham report published only two weeks ago, there are certain concerns about an over-reliance on child abduction warning notices, as opposed to taking more direct action that has the force of statutory breach and criminal sanction on breach.
New clause 19 was tabled by the hon. Member for Rotherham. I am grateful to her for providing information she wished me to consider. I confirm that we plan to implement the new sexual risk orders before the end of this Parliament. As we all know, that is a very short space of time indeed. I reassure her that we will publish guidance on their use and we will work with the police to review their effectiveness, including in the context of how child abduction warning notices are used. As a result of our productive meeting, Barnardo’s will be consulted as a part of that process.
The hon. Member for Stockport (Ann Coffey) made a point about references to the phrase “child prostitution” in a number of other Acts and regulations. The Government’s amendments to schedule 4 pick up the references to child prostitution in primary legislation, and we have a power in clause 79(2) to amend secondary legislation. That should help to clean up and clear up references to child prostitution in a number of regulations.
I will put on the record the assent of the hon. Lady. I am grateful to her for all her work on this matter.
I will move on briefly to the proposals in new clauses 15 and 16 to tackle the encouragement or promotion of FGM. In Committee, the hon. Member for Feltham and Heston (Seema Malhotra) rightly said:
“encouragement to commit an offence is not an issue of free speech.”––[Official Report, Serious Crime [Lords] Public Bill Committee, 20 January 2015; c. 157.]
However, we need to distinguish between actual active encouragement and the expression of a distasteful opinion. As the law stands, there must be some direct connection between the encouragement or assistance and the principal offence. We believe that that is the right approach. It is settled law that applies to a whole range of criminal offences. We are not convinced of the need to go beyond that and create an offence or introduce civil measures that prohibit any or all encouragement, regardless of the intention behind it. It is too general, in our view, and there will be evidential difficulties. Members of this House and practitioners in the field are familiar with the term FGM, but it is not, of course, a term that would necessarily or colloquially be used by those who support, or have sympathy with, that form of abuse. We therefore need to think about the practicalities and the realities of seeking to prove such a general offence in the field. I am not convinced, with respect to those who moved the new clauses, that they would achieve their aim.
Amendment 20 was tabled by my hon. Friends the Members for Stone (Sir William Cash) and for Mid Derbyshire (Pauline Latham). We heard a characteristically impassioned speech from my hon. Friend the Member for Stone. I remind him that it is a passion we all share. A large number of Members—including the Under-Secretary of State for Health, my hon. Friend the Member for Battersea (Jane Ellison), who will be speaking to a later group of amendments, myself and others—all share his passion to see an end to FGM. With respect, the test that would be applied in his amendment would not help. The phrasing and terminology of FGM protection orders replicates provisions we already have in law in relation to forced marriage protection orders. It is clear that we are talking about prevention and the protection of young women and girls from FGM. Therefore, and with respect to him, references to risk are wholly otiose.
I would like to give way, but I am afraid I am going to stick to the Speaker’s exhortation and stick to time.
It is not only the proposed legislation, but as a result of a significant public awareness programme being—
I am afraid I cannot give way to my hon. Friend.
Coupled with a widespread public awareness programme, the provision will deal with the mischief my hon. Friend rightly talks about without unnecessarily complicating the Bill by otiose references to risk. It is simply not necessary.
The Opposition spokesperson, the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson), tabled amendment (a) to Government new clause 8. I entirely understand the spirit with which she wishes to move her amendment. The Government’s aim is to replicate the offence in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 in a way that removes the offending phrase “child prostitution”. What we do not seek to do is widen or create a new offence. The danger of her amendment is that it would involve a substantive change in the law. For that reason, we do not support it.
Briefly, on new clause 22 with regard to child exploitation, the Modern Slavery Bill will deal in large measure with the abuse identified by all corners of the House. We do not think—this is supported by the Director of Public Prosecutions, the National Crime Agency, the National Policing Lead for Modern Slavery and the independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner—that the new offence would add anything other than confusion to the existing legislative position.
I hope I have already answered my hon. Friend the Member for Mole Valley (Sir Paul Beresford) with regard to amendment 33. I listened to him carefully. We have made progress. We think the most likely scenario involving paedophilic manuals and individuals who travel abroad is that they will come into possession of such a manual either in this country by downloading it or by bringing it in to this country. We therefore think that some of the problems he rightly talks about will be covered.
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman. Given that the point has been raised, I should say that separate Divisions on any non-Government new clauses will come at 9 pm. I have shortly to leave the Chair, but I shall return at, or shortly after, 9 o’clock, and it is my very strong wish that the many discrete issues should be tested through the division of the House. If Members want to test the will of the House, within reason there should be that opportunity. He can therefore rest content for the next couple of hours that the opportunity of a Division upon his important matter will come erelong. I hope he is now happy.
New Clause 23
Throwing articles into prisons
After section 40CA of the Prison Act 1952 (inserted by section 75 above) insert—
“40CB Throwing articles into prison
(1) A person who, without authorisation, throws any article or substance into a prison is guilty of an offence.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)—
(a) the reference to an article or substance does not include a reference to a List A article, a List B article or a List C article (as defined by section 40A);
(b) the reference to “throwing” an article or substance into a prison includes a reference to doing anything from outside the prison that results in the article or substance being projected or conveyed over or through a boundary of the prison so as to land inside the prison.
(3) In proceedings for an offence under this section it is a defence for the accused to show that—
(a) he reasonably believed that he had authorisation to do the act in respect of which the proceedings are brought, or
(b) in all the circumstances there was an overriding public interest which justified the doing of that act.
(4) A person guilty of an offence under subsection (1) is liable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to a fine (or both);
(b) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or to a fine (or both).
(5) In this section “authorisation” means authorisation given for the purposes of this section; and subsections (1) to (3) of section 40E apply in relation to authorisations so given as they apply to authorisations given for the purposes of section 40D.”” —(Karen Bradley.)
This New Clause creates a new offence of throwing any article or substance into a prison without authorisation (so far as not already prohibited under the Prison Act 1952). The offence would be triable either way with a maximum penalty (on conviction on indictment) of two years’ imprisonment.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Government new clause 24—Codes of practice about investigatory powers: journalistic sources.
New clause 4—Investigation of crime: journalistic and privileged material—
‘(1) After section 22(5B) of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (obtaining and disclosing communications data) insert—
“(5C) An authorisation granted or notice given under subsection (3), (3B) or (4) for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime may not authorise or require any activity which is likely to result in journalistic source information or privileged information being obtained or disclosed, unless a judge has permitted the grant of the authorisation or the giving of the notice in accordance with section 22A.
(5D) For the purposes of this section “journalistic source information” means information which identifies, or might reasonably be expected to lead to the identification of, the source of confidential journalistic material, within the meaning given by section 100 of the Police Act 1997.
(5E) For the purposes of this section “privileged information” means—
(a) information amounting to or contained in matters subject to legal privilege within the meaning given by section 98 of the Police Act 1997; and
(b) confidential personal information, within the meaning given by section 99 of that Act, acquired or created in the course of, or otherwise obtained in connection with, a person‘s acting as a minister of religion, as a healthcare professional or as a Member of the House of Commons.”
(2) After section 22 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 insert—
“22A Judicial protection of journalistic and privileged material
(1) This section applies where—
(a) a person wishes to grant an authorisation or give a notice under section 22(3), (3B) or (4) for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime; and
(b) the authorisation or notice is likely to result in journalistic source information or privileged information (as defined in section 22(5D) and (5E)) being obtained or disclosed.
(2) The person may apply to a Circuit Judge for permission to grant the authorisation or to give the notice.
(3) The application must—
(a) be in writing;
(b) set out the grounds on which it is made;
(c) be made on notice to any person to whom the authorisation or notice would be granted or given or who might reasonably be expected to be required to comply with it, unless the applicant certifies that there is reason to believe that giving notice under this paragraph might seriously prejudice a criminal investigation; and
(d) comply with any other provision, including as to timing, made by rules of court.
(4) A judge may give permission under this section only if satisfied that—
(a) the grant of the authorisation or the giving of the notice is necessary for the purposes of the prevention or detection of serious crime;
(b) obtaining the data in question by the conduct authorised or required by the authorisation or notice is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by so obtaining the data; and
(c) it is right to give permission, having regard to the importance of the public interest in—
(i) protecting the confidentiality of journalists’ sources;
(ii) maintaining legal professional privilege; or
(iii) protecting the confidentiality of personal information in the circumstances specified in section 22(5E)(b).
(5) It is an offence for a person who is given notice of an application under this section to conceal, destroy, alter or dispose of the material to which the application relates except with the permission of a Circuit Judge; and
(a) this subsection ceases to apply if the application is dismissed or withdrawn or if an authorisation or notice granted or given in reliance on this section has been complied with; and
(b) a person who is guilty of an offence under this subsection is liable—
(i) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, to a fine or both; or
(ii) on summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum.”’
This Clause would provide for judicial oversight for police and other authorities’ access to communications data which might involve the identification of journalist sources, as recommended by the Interception of Communications Commissioner. It provides the same level of protection for legally privileged and medically privileged communications and for communications between people and their ministers of religion or their MP.
New clause 5—Code of practice on investigatory powers: journalistic and privileged material—
‘(1) The Secretary of State must ensure that any code of practice under section 71 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 that deals (expressly or otherwise) with the use of powers under that Act in relation to the prevention or detection of serious crime, includes provisions designed to protect the public interest in—
(a) the confidentiality of journalists’ sources;
(b) legal professional privilege; and
(c) the confidentiality of personal information obtained in connection with a person’s acting as a minister of religion, as a healthcare professional or as a Member of the House of Commons.
(2) In complying with subsection (1) the Secretary of State must—
(a) consult the Interception of Communications Commissioner appointed under section 57(1) of that Act; and
(b) have regard to any relevant report of an inquiry submitted by that Commissioner to the Prime Minister.’
This new Clause provides that the RIPA Code of Practice includes provisions which protect the public interest in the confidentiality of journalists’ sources and the other privileged communications.
New clause 18—Excluded persons (involvement in serious crime): publication of names—
‘(1) Where the Secretary of State has exercised prerogative powers to exclude from, or deny entry into, the United Kingdom any foreign national on grounds of a reasonable belief that the named person has benefited from, or has a material connection to or involvement in, one or more serious crimes, including but not limited, to the commission of—
(a) an act or acts deliberately undertaken to foster extremism or hatred;
(b) an act or acts deliberately undertaken to facilitate, contribute to, support, encourage or promote terrorism;
(c) an act or acts of torture or any other international crime or serious violation of international human rights law; or
(d) a money-laundering offence or any other offence relating to serious or organised crime or more than one such offence,
the Secretary of State shall, subject to subsection (2), publish the name of each such person, and the ground or grounds for exclusion, within one month of the exclusion coming into effect.
(2) The publication of the name of an excluded person under subsection (1) may be deferred by the Secretary of State, where there are reasonable grounds for believing that such publication would present a risk to—
(a) national security or public safety;
(b) enable suspects in a United Kingdom criminal investigation to avoid arrest, or
(c) materially reduce the prospects of a conviction in an existing criminal prosecution in the United Kingdom,
for no longer than is required to materially mitigate the risk or risks identified in this subsection and, in any case for no longer than up to a maximum of six months.
(3) In the case of a deferred publication of the name of an excluded person, the Secretary of State shall, on publication of such a deferred name, also publish a statement identifying which risk, or which of the risks, identified in subsection (2) applied in making the decision to defer publication.
(4) This section shall apply to persons already excluded from, or denied entry into, the United Kingdom, on grounds included in subsection (1), from the date on which it comes into force.’
New clause 20—Prevention of firearms offences—
‘In the Firearms Act 1968 insert—
“28B Assessing public safety
(1) When assessing the threat to public safety under sections 27, 28, 30A, 30B or 30C the Chief Police Officer must ensure that a range of background checks are performed.
(2) Where these checks uncover substantiated evidence of violent conduct or domestic violence, the Chief Police Officer should refuse the licence application unless exceptional evidence can be brought forward by the applicant as to their suitability to possess a weapon.
(3) When assessing public safety within this section the Chief Police Officer must follow any guidance issued by the Secretary of State.
(4) The Secretary of State must ensure adequate resourcing of licence applications and consult with Chief Police Officers to ensure the level of fees collected by the Police under sections 32 and 35 are sufficient for the Police to recoup the costs they incur through the administration and assessment of firearms licences issued or applied for under this Act.”’
New clause 21—New psychoactive substances—
‘(1) It is an offence for a person to supply, or offer to supply, a synthetic psychoactive substance, including but not restricted to—
(a) a powder;
(b) a pill;
(c) a liquid; or
(d) a herbal substance with the appearance of cannabis,
which he knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, to be so acting, that the substance is likely to be consumed by a person for the purpose of causing intoxication.
(2) This section does not apply to alcohol, tobacco, or any drug currently scheduled under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 or the Medicines Act 1968 or any substance, product or foodstuff specified by the Secretary of State following consultation with the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs.
(3) A person guilty of an offence under this Part of this Act shall be liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum, or to both such imprisonment and fine;
(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years.’
New clause 28—Proceeds of Crime: detection and prevention of money-laundering measures—
‘The Proceeds of Crime Act is amended as follows—
“(6A) Where the National Crime Agency has reasonable grounds to believe that—
(a) activity that gave rise to a Suspicious Activity Report is related to money-laundering; and
(b) there is a realistic prospect of investigating the case effectively,
the Agency may seek an order from the court for an extension, for a period of up to a further 31 days, of the moratorium period under section (6).
(6B) An order under subsection (6A) may be granted where the court is satisfied that that criteria in that subsection have been met.”’
Government amendments 1 and 23 to 31.
In the interests of brevity, I will concentrate on new clause 24 and the related amendments, and I will look forward to hearing from right hon. and hon. Members during the debate.
New clause 24 relates to the use of powers under part 1 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000—RIPA—to identify journalists’ sources. New clauses 4 and 5, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert), cover the same ground. I do not believe there is any issue of substance between him and his supporters and the Government on this topic. Indeed, I venture to suggest that the whole House is united on the underlying issue: a free press is fundamental to our democracy, and nothing should be done that might endanger that.
For that reason, when the independent interception of communications commissioner issued a report earlier this month recommending judicial authorisation of requests for communications data intended to establish the source of journalistic material, the Government immediately accepted the recommendation in full. In conducting his inquiry into access to journalistic material, the commissioner did not find widespread or systemic abuse. In fact, the inquiry found very few cases in which police forces had sought to obtain communications data for the purposes of determining journalists’ sources. The commissioner stated that
“police forces are not randomly trawling communications data relating to journalists in order to identify their sources”.
Nevertheless, the commissioner found some cases where insufficient care and attention had been given in applications and where there was not due consideration of the implications for freedom of expression.
Primary legislation is required to give effect to the commissioner’s recommendation relating to judicial authorisation. The issue for the House is how best to give effect to that recommendation. It is an issue that many right hon. and hon. Members feel strongly about, and I welcome this opportunity to pay tribute to the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell), who has been tenacious on behalf of the parliamentary branch of the National Union of Journalists.
We have to accept, however, that we are coming to the end of this Parliament and that the legislative options are limited. The Bill is concerned with serious crime, and amendments are therefore necessarily restricted to that subject. For that reason, I cannot accept new clause 4. Under RIPA, the police and others can acquire communications data in relation to the prevention and detection of all crime, as well as for other purposes, such as in the interests of public safety. Were we to accept the new clause, the police would be permitted to identify a journalist’s source only in a serious crime case. As such, it would not be possible to provide in the Bill for judicial authorisation of the acquisition of communications data for the purposes of determining the source of journalistic information in a non-serious crime case.
Under RIPA, a serious crime is one for which an adult with no previous convictions could expect to receive a custodial sentence of three years or more. This rules out legislating in the Bill on applications for communications data to identify a journalist’s source relating to investigations for relevant offences under, for example, the Official Secrets Act 1989, the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Computer Misuse Act 1990. The commissioner referred specifically to investigations under the Computer Misuse Act in paragraph 7.3. It would not be satisfactory to create such a situation, and nor would we be acting on the commissioner’s recommendation were we to do so.
I hope my hon. Friend will understand if I do not, given the limited time frame and because I know he will make a contribution later. I hope I will cover his concerns in my remarks, and I look forward to hearing his comments.
Our solution is new clause 24, which I freely confess is modelled on my hon. Friend’s new clause 5. It provides that any code of practice issued under RIPA dealing with the use of RIPA investigatory powers in relation to the prevention or detection of serious crime should include provisions protecting the public interest and the confidentiality of journalists’ sources. It also requires the Secretary of State to consult the commissioner and to have regard to any relevant reports that he has made.
As hon. Members might know, we launched a consultation last November on a draft RIPA acquisition of communications data code. We received more than 300 responses, and I am grateful to everyone who took the trouble to submit a response. The draft code included new wording about the requirement for extra consideration to be given in cases involving the communications data of journalists and those in other sensitive professions. However, we were clear that we would not finalise the code until we had had time to consider the consultation responses fully and, equally importantly, had been able to consider the commissioner’s recommendation. I can assure the House that we are keen to finalise and bring forward the revised code as soon as possible. It will require the approval of both Houses of Parliament before it comes into effect.
I recognise, however, that we should do more to give rapid effect to the commissioner’s recommendation. Accordingly, we will require law enforcement agencies to use production orders, which are judicially authorised under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—or the equivalents in Scotland and Northern Ireland—for applications for communications data to determine journalistic sources. I hope that this will provide welcome reassurance.
Nevertheless, this is not a long-term solution. PACE applies only to indictable offences, is for evidential, rather than intelligence purposes, and has specific access considerations. The ultimate solution, therefore, is legislation that will give full effect to the commissioner’s recommendation. Regrettably, that will have to wait until after the election, but the Government have today published a draft clause for that purpose so that there can be no doubt about how we intend to proceed as soon as the opportunity arises. I hope that the combination of the requirements imposed by new clause 24, the interim use of production orders and a firm commitment to future legislation will reassure those who are concerned, and that on the basis of what I have said my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) will not press new clauses 4 and 5.
Will the Minister say something about the time scale? As of when will production orders be required, and will the secondary legislation on the code of practice be in place before the election, so that we can pass it in time?
If my hon. Friend does not mind, I will come back to those points when I have heard all his comments. I will respond to all his concerns together, if that is acceptable to him.
New clause 23 would create a new offence of throwing an article or substance into a prison without authorisation. It is designed to address the significant and increasing problem of the presence of new psychoactive substances in our prisons. In applying to any article or substance, the new offence will also capture wider threats to prison security and good order. It will add to the existing criminal offences in the Prison Act 1952, which make it an offence for a person to convey into a prison certain specified items, including controlled drugs, alcohol or mobile phones without authorisation. The maximum penalty for the new offence will be two years’ imprisonment, sending a clear message to would-be traffickers.
We feel that it is important to have the ability to deal with the problem in criminal law. We have identified it as a problem, and we want to ensure that we can deal with it.
Government amendment 1 does not require much explanation. It is a technical amendment to the provisions in part 4 of the Bill relating to the seizure and forfeiture of substances used as drug-cutting agents. It simply provides that in Scotland, applications to a sheriff under clauses 60, 61, 63 and 64 must be made by summary application, as distinct from other forms of application such as an initial writ or small claim.
I commend the Government amendments and new clauses to the House. I look forward to hearing what right hon. and hon. Members throughout the House have to say about their new clauses, and to responding to them.
The Opposition support Government new clause 23. I want to make some brief comments about Government new clause 24 and new clauses 4 and 5, which, as the Minister said, all relate to how the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 is being used to access journalists’ source material or materials subject to legal privilege.
The issue has been around for a while, and Labour called for, and got agreement from the Government on, a broader review of RIPA by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. In the meantime, the interception of communications commissioner has published a report containing two recommendations: first, that access to journalistic source material should require prior approval from a court, and, secondly, that when communications data are sought, they should not relate to an investigation to determine a source of journalistic information when, for example, the journalist is a victim of crime or is suspected of committing a crime unrelated to their occupation. It was recommended that chapter II of part I of RIPA may be used, so long as the designated person gives adequate consideration to necessity, proportionality and collateral intrusion, including the possible unintended consequences of the conduct. The revised code contains very little guidance about what those considerations should be, and that absence needs to be addressed. As I said, Labour called for the fundamental review of RIPA by David Anderson QC, and it has consistently called for the intelligence commissioners to be given a more prominent role. We therefore welcome the interception of communications commissioner’s report and accept his recommendations. That is an example of the role that the commissioners should be playing.
New clauses 4 and 5 are intended to implement the commissioner’s recommendations. New clause 5 demands that a new code of conduct be written, in consultation with the interception of communications commissioner. The Government have essentially accepted that point in tabling new clause 24. New clause 4 would amend RIPA to introduce judicial oversight. However, as I understand it, and as the Minister indicated, it has been limited by what can be included under the scope of the Bill. It would therefore apply only when data were sought for the purposes of preventing or detecting a crime, which is only one of eight justifications for accessing data. Essentially, the limitations of the Bill mean that we cannot fully implement the commissioner’s recommendations. I would be grateful if the Minister explained why the Government did not seek the leave of the House to extend the scope of the Bill—as I understand it, they could have done so by tabling a motion of instruction.
New clause 21 is about new psychoactive substances. We have tabled it to enable effective action to be taken against the sellers of legal highs. It would mean that legal highs could be controlled in the same way as solvents, making it much easier to prosecute and close down sellers and prevent them from using the excuse that a substance is not for human consumption. A similar approach has been adopted in Ireland, and the number of head shops there has fallen from 100 to six. The new clause was drafted in conjunction with the Angelus Foundation, and we also took advice from the UK Drug Policy Commission.
It is a pleasure to speak in the debate. I shall confine my comments to the proposal for journalists to be protected under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, because I think that is very important.
I know that we have to proceed fairly quickly, but it is worth my setting out the facts. There was a great deal of public concern when it became clear that Met police had been using RIPA to look into journalists’ sources during Operation Alice. For instance, they examined the phone records of Tom Newton Dunn, political editor of The Sun. Kent police also obtained records during Operation Solar. According to a report by the interception of communications commissioner, 19 forces made more than 600 requests for information about journalists’ phone records to try to identify their sources., and that has had a very large-scale and worrying effect.
I pay tribute to, in particular, the Press Gazette and the National Union of Journalists, which launched the Save Our Sources campaign. They were right to do so, because this is a fundamental issue. If police and other authorities can gain access to journalists’ records, how can anyone feel safe when contacting a journalist to blow the whistle, in the knowledge that their information may simply be passed on? People would have to feel an immense amount of trust to do that.
I am pleased that we are making some progress on this important matter, but the extent of the progress that has been necessary has been frustrating. My party has had policies to ensure that we get this right since last year, when my Liberal Democrat colleague Lord Strasburger tabled amendments that were rejected by the Conservative Minister Baroness Williams—not Shirley, but Susan. We made a number of other attempts, and Conservative Ministers said that they wanted to act, but unfortunately it was not until we tabled new clause 5 that we forced something to happen. Not until the Deputy Prime Minister spoke out in favour of the new clause and we managed to persuade three Select Committee Chairs to support it—the Chairs of the Home Affairs, Justice and Culture, Media and Sport Committees—did we secure some partial agreement. Nevertheless, I am pleased that the Government have given way on the new clause, although, as is their wont, they have slightly rewritten it.
I welcome what the Minister said about the code of practice, but will she tell us when it will be introduced? Can she give a clear assurance—I did not hear her give one earlier, although there is such an assurance in the letter that has just been passed around—that it will definitely be in place before the end of this Parliament, having been approved by both Houses? I should be grateful if she made it absolutely clear that the code of practice will not be delayed, because we need to act.
We hope that the code will be in place before the general election, but that will obviously be subject to parliamentary approval.
I thank the Minister, and I will hold her to at least seeking parliamentary approval in time. I accept that she cannot guarantee that both Houses will vote for the code, but I should be very alarmed if Parliament were not keen to ensure that journalists were included.
The Minister also spoke about the requirement for production orders to be used in the meantime. That is welcome, because the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 currently protects journalists so that their sources cannot be sought without judicial authorisation, but may I ask the Minister whether the use of such orders is a policy requirement as of today, whether it will require legislative change, and what time scale will be involved? I hope she will confirm that she has made a policy announcement that will take immediate effect. She does not seem to wish to intervene at the moment, but I hope that she will give answers to those questions by the end of the debate, so that I can decide whether any amendments or new clauses need to be put to a vote.
The Minister said that legislation would not be possible until the next Parliament. She was right to identify a technical drafting issue. The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) was also right to say that the Government could have fixed that had they really wanted to, but we are where we are, and I accept that, as things are, we will be leaving serious crime to be treated differently from other issues. I hope that the Minister will confirm that the draft clause—of which I have been handed a copy—will be published so that the whole House has a chance to look at it. It is a welcome step, but it does not seem to be clear about article 10 rights, and I think that it will need to be improved in that regard.
I hope that the Minister will make the time scale clear, so that the House can make the right decision. It is important for us to protect journalists, and I pay tribute to those who worked so hard to ensure that that could happen. I hope that we can take a full step now, rather than a slightly small, grudging step.
My hon. Friend is unnecessarily modest in his ambitions. Instead of proposing 31 days, he might have proposed any such other period as the court might think just in all the circumstances. The thrust of his argument is, however, unassailable and I wish him well with his discussions with the Government. New clause 28 makes a good deal of sense.
I am honoured to be a co-signatory to new clause 18, particularly having just heard the speech by my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab). He has experience not only as an international lawyer but as someone who has prosecuted in some pretty terrible cases dealing with crimes in the former Yugoslavia. When he speaks, we should listen, pay attention and follow what he has to say, and what he had to say tonight was unimpeachable. I stress, as he did, that if we are to exclude people—be they foreign nationals or, under the current legislation, our own nationals—we should know who they are. Secret justice is not justice.
The new clause contains a proposed new subsection that would allow the Secretary of State to defer publication of the name of the excluded person on particular grounds. I suggest that that proposal would deal with any problems that anyone might suggest the new clause could create. The reason he has never received a cogent answer to his questions to Ministers and officials is that there is not one, and he has highlighted that. The Government should therefore have a little think about what he had to say and what is contained in his new clause.
I would say only one thing about new clause 24, and I am sorry that the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington probably will not agree with me on it, albeit that we are both pretty keen on the freedom of the press. The code of practice would be an altogether more attractive concept if I could actually read it and see what it said before this thing came into legislation. The Minister properly spoke about the time limits surrounding us as we move towards the general election in May, but I used to complain in opposition, I complained in government and I complain now that secondary legislation, statutory instruments and codes of practice are subsidiary rules that hang in locked boxes from legislative trees and are not a good thing. If we are to persuade people that this measure is a good thing, we should have sight of the code of practice as soon as possible. I know that Ministers never want to commit themselves to time schedules, but this is an example of where, before the general election and before this Bill becomes an Act, we should see the fruits of the consultation process and what the code of practice should look like.
Finally, and with a degree of diffidence, I wish to discuss new clause 23. When I intervened on the Minister to ask what offences the new clause would add to, I was not given an answer—well, I was given an answer, but not to the question I asked. I was not surprised by that, because I, like my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton, suspect that there is not an answer. This is what I call an early-day motion new clause. It is what is called, “Government sending out a message.” Governments can send out messages, but they do that on television, on the radio and in the newspapers, and they get their spin doctors to do it; legislation is supposed to be clear, non-repetitive and able to be clearly understood by the prosecuting authorities, the police, the courts and those who might be tempted to commit the offence that the clause hopes to describe.
I assume that an offence of “Throwing articles into prisons” is intended to prevent or persuade people not to throw caches of drugs, razor blades, mobile telephones and other contraband over prison walls or into prison property—so far, so good. We all know that that is already a crime, not just under the Prison Act 1952, but under various other pieces of criminal legislation. To take a ludicrous example, if I were to throw a copy of the Prison Act 1952, as amended, over the walls of Gartree prison in my constituency, would I be caught by this? On the face of it I would and I would be liable, on indictment, to a term of imprisonment
“not exceeding two years or to a fine (or both)”.
Sadly, the magistrates court does not exist in Market Harborough any more and I would have to be carted all the way to Leicester to be, on summary conviction, imprisoned for up to 12 months or given a fine.
It appears from the new clause that if I were to throw not “The complete works of William Shakespeare”, because that is a heavy volume, but a Shakespeare play over the prison wall, I would be committing an offence. I went to 65 of the prisons in England and Wales when I was a shadow spokesman responsible for prisons in the period leading up to the 2010 election, but I never went into or came out of a prison, young offenders institution or secure training unit without being wholly aware of the notices on the gates setting out what it was unlawful to bring into those places. Even though it might be suggested that lobbing a benign article such as “The complete works of William Shakespeare” over the prison wall was something done with an overriding public interest or with some other legitimate excuse, I do wish we could stop passing legislation that already exists just because it feels like a good thing to do. If we are going to take up the time of Ministers and officials in drafting this sort of stuff, why do we not draft something useful like new clause 18, proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton, and get that into legislation, rather than this sort of guff?
Given the time and the debates that I know are to follow, I shall endeavour to answer as many points as I can, but it is highly likely that I will be brief in my comments. I will, however, commit to write to right hon. and hon. Members should I fail to address specific points in this quick winding-up speech.
I did refer to the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) and I hope he will have a look at that. He talked about the notification of journalists whose communications data are sought. It has never been the practice in this country for those whose communications data are sought to be notified, and we do not intend to depart from that. However, as he recognised, this matter will need to be dealt with in the next Parliament. We have today published a draft clause which provides for judicial authorisation in cases where communications data are sought for the purpose of determining a journalistic source. No doubt he will take the opportunity that future legislation will present to press his point again. I think we all agree that the solution we have before us today is not the perfect one, but we want to legislate in some way before the election and this is the most appropriate and perhaps only way we have of doing so.
The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson), the shadow Minister, asked why the Government did not seek to extend the scope of the Bill. We took advice from the Public Bill Office on whether it would be possible to extend the scope through an instruction and thereby enable a Government new clause to be brought forward to give fullest effect to the interception of communications commissioner recommendation. The Public Bill Office advised that the scope of the Bill could not be extended in that way. We tried, but, unfortunately, that was not possible.
My hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) asked about the timing of the production orders. The code will put in place the requirement to use production orders in cases where communications data are sought for the purposes of determining a journalistic source. The shadow Minister, also asked about the detail of the code of practice. We will shortly publish a revised code of practice that takes account of both the consultation responses and the recommendations of the IOCC. It will contain more detail on the factors to be considered in cases involving journalistic sources.
My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Harborough (Sir Edward Garnier) talked about the throwing of packages over the wall. I have to tell him that in 2014 approximately 250 cases of new psychoactive substances being thrown into prison were recorded, compared with just 36 cases the previous year. There has been a significant increase in that number and in minor disorder and assaults in prison over the past year, and increased NPS use has been linked to some of those incidents. New psychoactive substances are not currently controlled drugs, which is why they do not fall within the legislation we would normally use.
I hope my hon. and learned Friend will not mind if I do not take an intervention from him at this stage, just so that I can ensure we get on to the next group.
New clause 18 was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Esher and Walton (Mr Raab) and we have discussed this point in Westminster Hall. He will be familiar with the tribunal decision to uphold the Home Office and Information Commissioner’s decision on the neither confirm nor deny response to a freedom of information request on information held by the Department. It is a long-standing policy of this Government not to disclose the details of individual immigration cases, including in respect of those excluded from the UK. New clause 18 would have serious implications for the security of our borders and therefore to the national security of the country.
If my hon. Friend does not mind, I will not give way, because I need to finish by 8 o’clock, and I know that there are other hon. Members who wish to speak.
Let me give my hon. Friend this example. There is a further risk that publication of individuals excluded from the UK may undermine international relations and foreign policy objectives. That risk is intensified if the excluded individual has connections with a foreign Government or well known organisation that may be working in partnership with the UK to broaden our interests abroad. That is one example. Also, ongoing investigations into the activities of an individual could be jeopardised if they became aware of the fact that they were on the list. While I appreciate the objective of the new clause and the commitment to transparency, the Home Secretary’s primary objective in the use of her exclusion powers is to protect the UK from those individuals who wish to damage our national security or undermine our values. The new clause would weaken her ability to do so and could put the British public at risk.
Turning to new clause 20 on firearms licensing, I put it to the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North that the amendment is unnecessary. The police already have the ability to take into account evidence of violence and domestic violence when considering firearms applications, and rigorous new guidance was issued in July 2013 providing greater detail on how police should handle such cases.
The Government welcome the principle behind new clause 21, but the expert review panel made it clear in its report last October that the ban on the supply of new psychoactive substances needs careful consideration. Our priority is to frame correctly any new offence and ensure that it is robust yet proportionate and embedded in a comprehensive legislative package. The Government are moving swiftly so that the necessary primary legislation is ready to be introduced at the earliest opportunity in the new Parliament.
Finally, let me turn now to new clause 28 on money laundering, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for North East Cambridgeshire (Stephen Barclay). The two of us have had many conversations about this. He knows that we are consulting on the suspicious activity reporting regime, and I urge him to respond to that consultation, as I am very keen to include all of those points.
In the light of my explanations, I ask my hon. Friends the Members for Esher and Walton, for North East Cambridgeshire and for Cambridge and the hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North not to press their amendments, and I commend the Government amendments to the House.
Question put and agreed to.
New clause 23 accordingly read a Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 24
Codes of practice about investigatory powers: journalistic sources
In section 71 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (issue and revision of codes of practice), after subsection (2) insert—
“(2A) A code of practice under subsection (1) that relates (expressly or otherwise) to the exercise and performance, in connection with the prevention or detection of serious crime, of powers and duties conferred or imposed by or under Part 1 of this Act—
(a) shall include provision designed to protect the public interest in the confidentiality of journalistic sources;
(b) shall not be issued unless the Secretary of State has first consulted the Interception of Communications Commissioner and considered any relevant report made to the Prime Minister under section 58.”” .—(Karen Bradley.)
This New Clause requires a code of practice made under section 71 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 relating to the exercise of powers in Part 1 of that Act in relation to the prevention or detection of serious crime to include provision to protect the public interest in the confidentiality of journalistic sources.
Brought up, read the First and Second time, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 1
Termination of pregnancy on the grounds of the sex of the unborn child
‘Nothing in section 1 of the Abortion Act 1967 is to be interpreted as allowing a pregnancy to be terminated on the grounds of the sex of the unborn child.’—(Fiona Bruce.)
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
I think that the hon. and learned Gentleman has made his point.
I agree that the connection between cultural preferences for one sex and the factors that might then lead to a state of inconsolable distress for the pregnant woman needs to be better understood to enable us to protect women from coercion and to support them in their pregnancies. We should certainly look at the facts before agreeing to any change in the wording of the 1967 Act, because we must be careful not to worsen the situation for already vulnerable women.
New clause 1 assumes that restating that sex-selective abortion is illegal will offer women protection from pressure to terminate their pregnancies, but women subject to intolerable pressure to abort will continue to be subject to coercion. My concern is about how women would interpret the inclusion of the new clause. They might feel that Parliament has legislated that if the sex of the child is at all an issue, irrespective of their mental distress, they will not have access to a termination. Sometimes it is not what legislation says that has a powerful effect on behaviour, but what people believe it says. That might lead them to pursue alternative routes as a first resort, rather than a last one. We do not want to go back to the days of the botched backstreet abortions that took place prior to the 1967 Act, which throughout the ages have been the resort of desperate women. I remember the lengths to which women would go to terminate their pregnancies prior to that Act, in spite of the risks to their own health.
If the assessment that we propose uncovers substantiated concerns that there is pressure to seek terminations on the grounds of gender, we need to put in place a plan to deal with what is giving rise to those pressures and how we can better support women who might be being coerced. That is the proposal in the second part of new clause 25. I hope that in bringing forward those proposals there would be extensive consultation with women from all cultural backgrounds.
Finally, I would like to share a story with Members. On a recent train journey I started talking with an Asian woman who was originally from Bangladesh. In the course of the conversation she showed me a photo of her three daughters, who are now grown up. I said that they were beautiful and how lucky she was to have three daughters, at which point she looked very distressed. She then told me that she had never enjoyed any of her pregnancies because she knew that she was carrying a girl and that her then husband saw girls as being of no value and, in turn, viewed her as having no value as a wife because she had not produced a son. He eventually abandoned her. However, I am happy to report that my travelling companion went on to have her own career and that her girls are confident young women who are finding their own ways in life.
When I asked her what she thought could be done about those attitudes to girls, she said that the answer was education, education, education. She of course is right. We understand that from our own history of fighting for women’s equality—a fight that many of us still feel is a work in progress. I hope that this cross-party amendment will be supported by the House and that it will mean that when the Secretary of State reports back in six months’ time on her assessment, with accompanying proposals, we will be better informed about a way forward in addressing concerns that I agree we should not ignore. No woman should feel pressured into seeking a termination for any reason, including gender.
I welcome the opportunity to speak in this debate, and I will try to do so relatively briefly in order to allow more Back-Bench contributions. New clause 1, which stands in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Congleton (Fiona Bruce), and new clause 25, which stands in the name of the hon. Member for Stockport (Ann Coffey), both relate to the very important matter of addressing the abhorrent practice of sex-selective abortion.
The Government have been consistently clear that abortion on the grounds of gender alone is already illegal. The Department of Health repeated that in guidance issued in May 2014, and it is important to stress that all independent sector providers have agreed to comply with, and operate on the basis of, the Department’s guidance and that they must do so as part of their licensing conditions. The Care Quality Commission monitors compliance with that, including through its inspection visits.
On the welcome guidance that was published, I understand from freedom of information requests, and from an e-mail sent on 21 January, that there was a request for joint badging of that guidance to ensure that all the stakeholders signed up to it. Why did that not happen? Why was it left only to the Department to publish it?
It was the Department’s own guidance, which is why the Department published it. In the course of forming the guidance, we spoke with all the people we would be expected to speak to.
The chief medical officer for England has written twice to all doctors—in February 2012 and November 2013—reminding them of their responsibilities under the 1967 Act and reiterating the Government’s position on gender-selective abortion, and that was reiterated by professional bodies.
The Department has also undertaken detailed analysis to investigate whether the gender birth ratio in the UK varies by the mother’s country of birth beyond the range that might be expected to occur naturally. The analysis, first published in May 2013 and updated in 2014, concluded that, when broken down by the mother’s country of birth, no group was statistically different from the range we would expect to see naturally occurring. The Department has quite rightly committed to repeat that analysis annually when new birth data become available. However, I stress that the Government will remain vigilant, will continue to monitor data and will be fully open to any other evidence that comes to light.
My hon. Friend the Member for Congleton cited poignant anecdotal reports of sex-selective abortion, as she did on her ten-minute rule Bill. As I said to her at the end of that debate, I urge her and anyone with evidence of individual cases to report this to the police to investigate. I invite her once again to come to the Department with such evidence.
I am very grateful to hear from my hon. Friend that ground E would not be jeopardised. The Government have access to good legal advice—[Interruption.] I trust that they have access to good legal advice, and it must be the case that the Government have a position on the matter. I am grateful to hear from my hon. Friend that that particular anxiety is completely misplaced.
I am concerned about the fears that some people have about the practical implications of the new clause, and I think others share that concern. I hope to come on to that
The Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists highlighted the potential impact on abortions for foetal abnormality—I hear the point that was made on that in two interventions—where an inherited gender-related condition may be indicated, and the possibility that the new clause, if passed, may result in further concerns. The RCOG says:
“Parents with a family history of such a condition may not have the option of Ground E.”
The RCOG also says, in relation to how doctors might feel about the practical implications, that
“doctors deciding not to provide this aspect of gynaecological care”
might do so
“because it is deemed to be too ‘risky’ to them professionally.”
The House will want to be aware of these and other concerns regarding the practical implications of the new clause from the body that represents the doctors who provide these services and whom we entrust with the training, support and education of our future work force.
Does the Minister agree that one of the issues is that there are some types of X-linked genetic disorders affecting only one sex that cannot be detected by genetic testing for the specific condition in question, and that that is where the uncertainty arises? In other words, it would be entirely on the basis of the sex of the child. That is why the concern and uncertainty would be increased by the new clause.
My hon. Friend exactly describes the concerns as they have been expressed to me by the RCOG.
It may be helpful for me to give the House some figures on abortions in our country. The House is aware that the vast majority of abortions—91%—are carried out at under 13 weeks’ gestation. This is before the gestational age at which the sex of the foetus is routinely identified at the second scan, at around 18 to 21 weeks’ gestation. Disclosing the sex of the foetus is a local decision and is based on clinical judgment about the certainty of the assessment and the individual circumstances of each case. Some 98% of all abortions were carried out at under 18 weeks’ gestation in England and Wales in 2013. It is also the case that 98% of abortions performed in the independent sector in 2013 were carried out at under 18 weeks. By contrast, in 2013, 94% of reported abortions for foetal abnormality were performed in NHS hospitals. In the light of this, the House would want to consider that the new clause could be thought likely to have greatest potential impact on those health professionals working in our NHS, rather than on independent sector providers.
As the hon. Member for Stockport explained, new clause 25 would require a further assessment of the evidence that terminations are taking place on the ground of the sex of the foetus alone. I have already outlined the analysis that the Department of Health is undertaking on an annual basis in this area. We will also take into consideration any other evidence that comes to light. I stress to the House that we take the issue of coercion and abuse very seriously. Women who present for an abortion will always have the opportunity to speak to a health professional on their own at some point during the consultation. From my perspective as public health Minister, this is the sort of issue that would sensibly be considered as part of any further review, and the Department of Health is already considering what further sources of evidence can contribute to our knowledge on this important issue.
Does the Minister accept that clauses 73 and 74 of this Bill precisely help to protect women from family coercion to have an abortion?
That is a useful point to draw out about other parts of this important Bill.
It is for the House to decide whether it wants to place the commitment to a further review on a statutory footing by supporting new clause 25.
As is the convention with such issues of conscience, as a Government we do not take a position either for or against new clauses 1 and 25. If the matter is pressed to a Division, Government Members will have a free vote. However, I hope that it has been helpful to hon. Members in forming their own opinion on these two new clauses for me to set out the Government’s actions to date in this area, the facts in relation to the gestations at which most abortions are performed, and the concerns raised by professional bodies. As I have said, it is for the House to decide whether it wants to support either of the new clauses, or indeed both or neither of them, but I reiterate that abortion of a foetus on the grounds of gender alone is already illegal.
The impassioned speeches that we have heard in this debate are testament to what a sensitive and complex matter this is. New clause 1 would amend the Abortion Act 1967 and proposes that a pregnancy could not
“be terminated on the grounds of the sex of the unborn child.”
New clause 25 would require a review of the evidence relating to abortion on the grounds of gender alone and for this to be followed by a strategic Government plan that addresses concerns about the prevalence of termination on the grounds of the sex of the foetus in England, Scotland and Wales.
I am in favour of new clause 25 as the best way to address concerns about sex-selective abortions. Outwardly, the intentions behind new clause 1 might seem reasonable. However, a wide range of well-respected organisations and experts have raised concerns, pointing out a number of unintended and troubling consequences. The organisations include the Royal College of Midwives, the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, the British Medical Association, the TUC, the End Violence Against Women Coalition, Genetic Alliance UK, Imkaan and the Southall Black Sisters, among many others.
Conservative: 151
Labour: 30
Liberal Democrat: 12
Democratic Unionist Party: 4
UK Independence Party: 2
Social Democratic & Labour Party: 2
Scottish National Party: 2
Plaid Cymru: 1
Labour: 178
Conservative: 78
Liberal Democrat: 29
Scottish National Party: 2
Plaid Cymru: 1
Independent: 1
Green Party: 1