Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill
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Baroness Lister of Burtersett
My Lords, in moving Amendment 15A, I shall speak also to Amendment 15C in my name and that of other members of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, two of whom apologised that they had to leave. Amendments 15A and 15C together would require the Secretary of State to have due regard to the principle of academic freedom, as already recognised by Parliament in Section 202(2) of the Education Reform Act 1988, when issuing guidance or directions under this section. It was quoted earlier, but I remind noble Lords that it includes a duty,
“to ensure that academic staff have freedom within the law to question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions”.
I believe that it was inserted by your Lordships' House and it would be appropriate if we were to do the same now.
I would argue that Amendments 15A and 15C are perfectly compatible with the Government’s own Amendment 15D. They would simply add to it by making explicit reference to the important duty to uphold academic freedom in the 1988 Act, which is currently missing. This is a duty that is very important to academics, as it puts flesh and bones in the context of higher education on to the more abstract duty of freedom of speech contained in the 1986 Act and referred to in the Government’s own amendment.
I think that we have all been guilty at times of conflating the two principles of freedom of speech and academic freedom. If I may say so, the Minister does so in his letter of 3 February to me and other noble Lords—and here I thank him for finding a few minutes yesterday to discuss the amendments with me. The letter refers to the impact that the Prevent duty might have on academic freedom of speech. Although the two principles overlap, there is also a clear distinction, which it is important to understand because it is at the heart of why the amendments matter. Here, I have to part company with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who is not in his place, when he suggested that one necessarily implies the other.
While I have always counselled my students against relying on Wikipedia, on the principle of “do as I say” rather than “do as I do”, I turn to it now because it provides a helpful working definition of academic freedom. It says that it is,
“the belief that the freedom of inquiry by faculty members is essential to the mission of the academy as well as the principles of academia, and that scholars should have freedom to teach or communicate ideas or facts (including those that are inconvenient to external political groups or to authorities)”.
It spells out:
“Academic freedom and free speech rights are not coextensive … Academic freedom involves more than speech rights; for example, it includes the right to determine what is taught in the classroom”.
In Committee, I illustrated my worries by citing a discussion of the Charlie Hebdo attack that colleagues instigated, open to all staff and students in my school at Loughborough University. What was at issue here was not so much the freedom of speech of staff and students as the academic freedom to feel safe to instigate such a discussion that might be interpreted as potentially drawing some students towards ideas that conceivably might lead them towards violent terrorism. If the duty to uphold academic freedom as well as freedom of speech was written into the Bill itself, it would, I hope, give some assurance to both lecturers and students that it is still safe to have such controversial discussions. If it is not written in, I fear a chilling effect on both—lecturers playing safe and not instigating debate on such controversial topics related to terrorism, or something like it, because of feeling pressure from university management not to take risks of this kind, and/or students feeling afraid to engage honestly and openly. This would then have the counterproductive effect, which was discussed quite a lot in Committee, of pushing extremist views underground rather than allowing staff and students to discuss them critically. Indeed, a Hansard Society student on placement with me put it very well. He said, “You prevent the peers of the extremists from engaging with them and you cripple their ability to persuade them to abandon extremist views”. Earlier, that point was made very eloquently by the noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, and the noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Dinton, who are not in their places.
I will also illustrate the point with reference to the draft guidance. Paragraph 57, for example, makes it clear that the Home Office expects universities to carry out a risk assessment of where and how their students might be at risk of being drawn into not just violent extremism but non-violent extremism, which, as Universities UK has consistently pointed out, is not generally unlawful. The noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, earlier referred to this bit of the guidance as hopeless. It is easy to see how in a university with risk-averse management—which is probably true of much of university management these days—this could translate into pressure on individual academics not to offer certain courses or lectures or to pursue certain research grant applications, or to discourage certain topics of inquiry by doctoral students.
The Government’s free speech amendment is helpful in relation to the draft guidance in so far as it refers to visiting speakers and events but it does not address the academic freedom issues that are the stuff of everyday academic life as lived and breathed by academics and students. Robert Moretto’s legal advice, to which I referred in our earlier debate, suggests that, as currently drafted, the guidance “seeks to avoid” the kinds of issues raised by the tension between the Prevent duty and existing freedom of speech and academic freedom duties of such concern to noble Lords. It therefore gives the individual academic little clarity. The Government’s amendment goes some way towards providing that clarity but I suggest that if the Minister could go away and come back at Third Reading with something that incorporated these amendments too, it would do the job even better.
Because of the tight timescale with fast-tracking, it has not been possible to have the kind of more in-depth informal discussion that would have been normal between the stages of the Bill. My noble friend Lady Smith of Basildon has already referred to the problems that this has created. I think that the problems have been as much for the Minister and his team as for anyone else. It would be such a shame if, for this practical reason, we lost the opportunity to strengthen the Bill in a way that I believe is totally compatible with the Government’s aims.
If the Minister felt able to go a bit further—again, I appreciate how far he has already moved on this part of the Bill—it would give some reassurance to the academic community who are so anxious about this Bill and who I fear will have been very disappointed at the outcome of the debate on the second group of amendments. I beseech the Minister to be as flexible as possible, but if it really is impossible will he at least commit to ensuring that the guidance states that due regard must be had to the principle of academic freedom as recognised in the Education Reform Act 1988, although this does not address the question of directives, as these amendments do. I beg to move.
Baroness O'Loan (CB)
My Lords, I support the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, on Amendments 15A and 15C, to which I have added my name. I thank the Minister for listening and for giving effect through his new amendments to at least part of the arguments which we raised on freedom of speech in the context of the Prevent duty in Part 5. But as the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, has said, there remains the issue of academic freedom, which was discussed in the debate on the earlier group.
Academic freedom was given statutory protection under Section 202 of the Education Reform Act. It imposes a duty on university commissioners to,
“have regard to the need … to ensure that academic staff have freedom within the law to question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions, without placing themselves in jeopardy of losing their jobs or privileges they may have at their institutions”.
This protection is vitally important to academics. There can be no doubt that policies, opinions and even moral values change, and with those changes come the need to challenge existing wisdom and to seek new ways and new processes within the law.
We see that particularly in university teaching and research, where the good academic enthuses his or her students through proper exposure to their research, often in ground-breaking areas where the conventional wisdoms no longer provide the necessary answers. Academics need the freedom to bring into their lecture theatres voices and ideas which may even offend received wisdom and the necessary challenge can then take place. Above all, they need to be sure that in pushing the boundaries for the common good they do not place in peril their livelihoods and their careers.
These amendments are of the utmost importance. Some 540 of the UK’s most senior academics signed a letter in Tuesday’s Guardian warning that the Bill would place an unlawful and unenforceable duty on universities. They call for the Government to take steps to ensure that academic freedom remains uncompromised by efforts to tackle extremism in the UK. I hope that the Minister will accept that Amendments 15A and 15C would enhance the proposed arrangements in respect of the Secretary of State’s guidance and directions to universities in the context of the Prevent duty and would protect academic freedom while not hindering the very proper fight against terrorism.
The amendments would give assurance to academics, young and old, in the work they must do, which can be both brave and challenging, and I would like noble Lords to look at some of that work. It is not easy to challenge what may be received wisdom in communities which have been radicalised, but equally it is not easy to challenge received wisdom in communities where there is an illusion but not the reality of democracy. I am sure noble Lords know where I am going: I am going to Northern Ireland.
In the late 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, the Northern Ireland civil rights movement, and ultimately the universities, played a profoundly important role in challenging the status quo in Northern Ireland using non-violent methods. I wish to refer noble Lords to a description of non-violent methods for this purpose. It states that,
“non-violent extremism … can create an atmosphere conducive to terrorism and can popularise views which terrorists exploit”.
For decades there were those in the universities and colleges who said that Bloody Sunday was a tragedy and an outrage and that the Government of the United Kingdom, in the publication of the report on the atrocities of Bloody Sunday, had done a terribly wrong thing. That was, if you like, a challenge to democracy as it stood at the time, and those academics were sometimes in a difficult place. There is no doubt that the articulation of the fact that the Bloody Sunday shootings were unlawful may well have been used as a justification for violence by those who subsequently went to violence and extremism of the most violent kind, but that does not mean that the efforts by academics to bring these matters to the attention of society and to have the truth told should have been condemned and prevented because they might have drawn people into terrorism. There is something more fundamental at stake here.
Noble Lords also know of the allegations of wrongdoing on Iraq and our entry into the war in Iraq. You could argue that the identification of what happened that led us into the Iraq conflict and brought us out of it, leaving a serious state of disarray and a huge tragedy behind it, was wrong—we await the report of the Chilcot inquiry—but you could also argue that the challenge of going into the war in Iraq, which many noble Lords opposed, and what happened in Iraq was a justified challenge, and yet it may well have given rise to a justification for extremism even in this country.
The essence of freedom of speech and freedom of expression and academic freedom is that the truth will be protected and cherished, and that people will have the right to say things which even Governments find very difficult to take and which ultimately may be proved to be true.
Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)
My Lords, it has been an interesting debate. I particularly want to look at Amendments 15A and 15C in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Lister, Lady O’Loan, Lady Buscombe and Lady Kennedy. This seems to be very similar to the debate we had earlier, and to the ones we had last week and at Second Reading, about how we define academic freedom and freedom of speech. My impression from listening to what the Minister has had to say in responding and from what I think he intended by his amendment—my noble friend Lady Lister made this point—is that this is about looking at those things together, as a whole. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I think, made the point that he took the Minister’s amendment—Amendment 15D—to incorporate academic freedom as well as freedom of speech. So our discussion here, in some ways, is not about the principle—I think the Minister has made clear his view on the principle of this—but about making sure that the detailed legislation is correct.
I must say that I do not agree with the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, about what the consequences of that could be. I do not think it would prevent a discussion of the origins of the Troubles in Northern Ireland or that it would have those dire consequences. However, the perception among some academics that it may do is quite worrying.
Baroness O'Loan
If a university has a group of people who want to hold a meeting, or if an academic wants to bring a speaker in, and the purpose is to challenge vociferously something which the Government have done, could that not conceivably constitute non-violent extremism? Could the university not, under the directions to be issued by the Secretary of State, find itself in a position where it has to determine whether or not it allowed that meeting to take place? That is all I was saying.
Baroness Smith of Basildon
It is quite a leap to say that a challenge to the Government automatically becomes something extreme. We are challenging the Government here today in terms of the debate we are having but, from what the Minister has been saying during this debate, that challenge to the Government is not being seen as extremism at any point. However, my noble friend Lady Lister made the point about the perception among academics of their freedom being curtailed. My noble friend was very clear in her comments about what she was seeking: to be absolutely clear in the Bill, or if need be in guidance, about that academic freedom and about the need, as quoted in the Education Reform Act 1988,
“to ensure that academic staff have freedom within the law”—
as was said earlier, all freedom of speech is qualified within the law—
“to question and test received wisdom, and to put forward new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions”.
I do not think, from what the Minister is saying, that he wants in any way to curtail that. This seems to be largely a technical point and one that, I hope, can be easily resolved. I hope he will address it in comments that he makes today. Perhaps he will be able to take it away and reflect on it or, indeed, ensure that it will be in guidance. However, some reflection on this point, which seems to me to be entirely compatible with his Amendment 15D, would be very helpful.
Baroness Hamwee
I welcome the government amendments. In my clumsy way, I tried to deal with the issues raised by the independent reviewer about his remit and the new board at the last stage. The Minister referred to two of the five issues that the independent reviewer sought to cover, which I tried to cover at that last stage. I am flattered that he suggested that my Amendment 16A comes from my own interest and concerns about the Justice and Security Act and the disclosure of sensitive material, closed material proceedings, special advocates and all the rest of it, as well as my concerns about immigration and nationality law. I indeed have those concerns but I cannot say that this is a self-started amendment. I was asked to pursue the subject. The independent reviewer has made clear that he wants this. He does not seek to go beyond the counterterrorism area. I hope that the amendment is clear on that. His blog has already been quoted and I shall quote from it too. He wrote:
“It is however a shame that the Reviewer was not also given the opportunity to review the operation of other powers, including immigration powers, to the extent that they are used for counter-terrorism purposes. I have no evidence whatsoever that any of those powers is used in an improper manner. But in such a sensitive and secret area, it is as well to have the assurance that only independent review can provide”.
He continues by quoting from his report of last July, which said:
“More than one person of a suspicious cast of mind has suggested to me that the unreviewed powers (for example, the use of the Royal Prerogative to withdraw passport facilities) are likely to be used for the purposes of doing the Government’s ‘dirty work’”.
I suggest my amendment because the independent reviewer has a holistic approach to this whole area. Individual case oversight and different reviewers, to which my noble friend has referred, while reassuring, do not meet the points that the reviewer has in his mind. He clearly looks at how the whole of counterterrorism legislation is operating and has ranged beyond the relatively narrow legislative remit that he has had in the past. Previously, I have heard him say that he is not seeking a turf war with other reviewers but, equally, he does not see these things in silos, which is why this amendment has come forward. I beg to move.
Baroness O'Loan
My Lords, I support the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. This amendment derives from the work of the Joint Committee on Human Rights in scrutinising the Bill. We took evidence from a number of people, including the independent reviewer. It was his recommendation about the major gaps in his function which should be filled which led to the creation of this amendment. I did not put my name to it to lead it because, in my innocence, I thought that there was a possibility that we might get to it earlier in the evening when I would be engaged in a committee. I have much to learn about your Lordships’ House.
As the noble Lord, Lord Ashton, rightly says, the independent reviewer had identified these major gaps. The Government have also accepted and recognised those gaps. I think that the independent reviewer has been looking at the whole architecture of counterterrorist legislation and has tried to ensure that there is—I do not like to use the word holistic—a complete, effective and standard-based approach to the review, which I do not think is provided by individual case-by-case judicial proceedings.
The opportunity here is simple and it would not add a great deal to the work of the independent reviewer were the Government to consider again this amendment. As the Minister has said, the office of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation is very highly respected in the country. I have worked very closely with some of the predecessors of David Anderson QC and I know how very significant that work is.
We are just asking for two issues to be moved into the remit of the independent reviewer under this amendment. As the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has said, the first concerns Part 2 of the Justice and Security Act 2013, which deals with closed material procedures. Those procedures apply in litigation, which very often is litigation that is seeking compensation in claims against the Government and other authorities, and where there is a problem that there is material the disclosure of which will be damaging to the interests of national security.
Lord Ashton of Hyde
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken. They were broadly in support—although I fear that we may not be able to persuade the noble Lord, Lord Butler, that this is a good idea. However, I will come to what the independent reviewer thinks of it later.
One thing that is important to say right at the beginning will answer, to a certain extent, the points made by my noble friend Lord Thomas, the noble Lord, Lord Butler, and some other noble Lords as well, about the information that the board itself will be able to see. We think that it is important that any individuals appointed to the board are provided with an appropriate level of security clearance; so the independent reviewer is cleared to see classified information—and, if necessary, the same will apply to members of the board. Of course, the independent reviewer has a great deal of influence on who is appointed to the board. The Home Secretary will work on his recommendation, although of course it is ultimately the Home Secretary’s decision. I think that covers most of the points made by my noble friend Lord Thomas. I am grateful for his support on that.
The noble Baroness, Lady Smith, mentioned what she said at Third Reading about communities—sorry, I meant what she said in Committee. Third Reading is on Monday; we go from week to week in no time at all. The present reviewer sees that issue. On the point about the board working under his direction and control, I do not see any reason why that should change. He will be able to use the benefits of the members of the board to continue with those areas that he wants to focus on. One reason we have removed the annual necessity for reviews, with the exception of the Terrorism Act, is that the independent reviewer will now be able to conduct thematic reviews instead of just purely linking them to individual bits of legislation. Again, I take the point about the relationships that he has built up over the years—including with foreign countries. As to him being chairman of the board and using board members as support, I do not see any reason why that should change, either.
There was talk about whether the secretariat would supply support and whether the members of the board will be there to provide advice or work for him. I think that both are the case. They will work under his direction and control, and he will also be able to appoint people who have particular skills in different areas that he can draw on. For example, he might be able to appoint someone who is—this was nearer to his original idea—a junior barrister who is appropriately security cleared. However, I take the point that one might not describe that in common parlance as a board, but the name is what we have. Several noble Lords talked about the label on the tin representing what is inside. On that subject, privacy and civil liberties are obviously important in connection with terrorism legislation. If you open the tin which is so labelled and see inside, “Chaired by and under the direction and control of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation”, you would get a pretty good idea of what the board is about.
Moving on to my noble friends Lady Hamwee and Lady Ludford, I fear we will not be able to go as far as they want. We extended the remit of the independent reviewer and think that it is right to draw limits on that. I agree that a one-off review is not the same as a review by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. Equally, judicial oversight is not the same, but it is oversight and reassurance for each individual case on those closed material proceedings. It has value. At the moment, we have drawn the line where we have, for the reasons I said: mainly because of overlap and duplication. We think that the way we have done it at the moment concentrates on those—
Baroness O'Loan
How can there be duplication if the Government were to include Part 2 of the Act and appoint the independent reviewer to review it? There is nobody currently reviewing that legislation and there will not be for five years, so how can that be duplication? It will not avoid duplication but simply prevent review.
Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill
Baroness O'Loan Excerpts(10 years, 5 months ago)
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Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
My Lords, I support Amendment 14, to which I have added my name. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for combining his original amendment with the amendment by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Once again, I declare an interest as emeritus professor at Loughborough University.
In Committee, the consensus in favour of amending this part of the Bill was striking. Noble Lords did not consider that the Government had made a persuasive case for putting a statutory duty on higher education institutions—moving “from co-operation to co-option”, as the noble Baroness, Lady Sharp, put it. Where was the evidence base? Until the evidence for the necessity of such a statutory duty is marshalled, to use the Minister’s phrase, it is not possible to assess it.
Concerns were raised on grounds of both practice and principle. Warnings were given on unintended consequences and counterproductive effects, including the erosion of trust between staff and students, which could undermine any attempts to engage with students who might be tempted down the road towards terrorism. I do not think that anyone was reassured by ministerial assertions that academic freedom and freedom of speech would not be endangered. Indeed, I think that it is fair to say that the majority of those who spoke were in favour of the total exclusion of the HE sector. However, I am a realist, and, given the Minister’s welcome commitment to reflect and bring forward an amendment, which he has done, in a spirit of compromise, I have not retabled the JCHR amendment designed to exclude HE institutions from the duty altogether, or to provide a narrower exemption for their academic functions.
We all agree on the value of academic freedom and freedom of speech. As yesterday’s letter to the Guardian, signed by 524 professors—I can tell the House that trying to organise 524 professors is like herding cats, so to get them all to sign was quite an achievement—put it:
“One of the purposes of post-compulsory education is to foster critical thinking in staff, students and society more widely. Our universities and colleges are centres for debate and open discussion, where received wisdom can be challenged and controversial ideas put forward in the spirit of academic endeavour”.
Since last week’s debate, I have received a copy of a legal opinion provided for the University and College Union—my former union—by Robert Moretto QC, who has advised government departments, including the Home Office, in the past. I pay tribute to UCU for showing leadership on this matter. The opinion states:
“It is difficult in my view to square the Prevent duty with academic freedom enshrined in, for example, the Education (No. 2) Act 1986”,
and that,
“the Prevent duty as set out in the Draft Guidance appears to envisage that decisions may be taken”,
which prevent lawful speech.
The opinion also raises questions about possible incompatibility with the Human Rights Act in particular situations. This opinion lends weight to the JCHR’s concerns that the legal uncertainty created by the new duty in relation to existing duties concerning academic freedom and freedom of speech will have a seriously inhibiting effect on bona fide academic debate.
This takes us to the nub of what we have to decide today. While I very much welcome the fact that the Minister has tabled an amendment which makes explicit reference to the freedom of speech duty in the Education (No. 2) Act, it does not provide the clarity that HE institutions need. Here I am afraid that I part company with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. An obligation to have regard is a familiar device of the legislative drafter when faced with duties which might conflict in practice. We see it in Sections 12 and 13 of the Human Rights Act, for example. The problem is that it still means that the Bill says nothing about the hierarchy of duties, and it leaves it to other things to influence decisions where the duties come into conflict. In effect, this means the Home Secretary’s guidance.
I note that the amendment in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Macdonald and Lord Pannick, refers to “due regard”, as does the new Prevent duty in Clause 25(1). There was an exchange a moment ago about “particular regard” and “due regard”, and I have to admit that I did not understand the Minister’s explanation of where he saw the difference. I am not quite sure why the Government have chosen “particular regard” in this instance as opposed to “due regard”. I think that the Minister said that he regards “particular regard” as stronger than “due regard”. It would be helpful if he could confirm that later, because my understanding is that “due regard” carries greater legal clarity because of the case law interpreting the same phrase in the public sector equality duty. If he can confirm that by using “particular regard” he wants it to be stronger than “due regard”, I would be happy with that.
Amendment 14 provides the necessary clarity by making it explicit that the new Prevent duty is subject to the existing freedom of speech duty. In Committee, the Minister said there are good reasons why the freedom of speech duty should not be elevated above the Prevent duty, principally that freedom of speech is not open-ended or absolute. Of course the existing freedom of speech duty is subservient to the laws the Minister listed in Committee, including criminal law on the use of threatening words or inviting support for a proscribed terrorist organisation, and the civil law on defamation. In other words, there is already a duty to secure freedom of speech within the law.
This amendment would not change that, but it would make it clear that the Prevent duty could not be used to prevent lawful speech, and the importance of protecting lawful speech is underlined by Universities UK in its response to the draft guidance. I cannot see why the Government should resist that if they genuinely believe in protecting freedom of speech and academic freedom in our universities. Universities are looking for clarity and an explicit statement in law that in the context of higher education, freedom of speech and academic freedom within the law carry greater weight then the Prevent duty. The amendment has the support of Universities UK, UCU and million+.
We have an important decision to make today. Universities and other institutions are looking to us to provide them with the clarity they need to operate the new Prevent duty in a way that does not have a chilling effect on academic freedom. When he has heard the debate, and in light of the strength of feeling expressed in Committee, I hope that the Minister might be prevailed upon to reflect further before Third Reading, even though I accept that he has already moved some way from the original position of the Government—and once more I thank him for that.
Baroness O'Loan (CB)
My Lords, I speak to Amendment 14 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. I have put my name to this amendment, which is designed to give absolute clarity to the continued protection under the law of freedom of speech in our universities, something which the Joint Committee on Human Rights strongly recommended in its legislative scrutiny report. This amendment is very simple. The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, has spoken clearly on its effect. It locates the statutory duty to protect freedom of speech squarely in Clause 25. It gives clarity to the fact that the new statutory Prevent duty, subject to the existing obligations of universities, polytechnics and colleges to take such steps as are reasonably practicable to ensure freedom of speech within the law, is secured for members, students and employees of the establishment and for visiting speakers.
I thank the Minister for his movement and recognition of some of what was said in Committee. However, throughout his amendment he adverts to the duty in relation to freedom of speech in universities which is imposed by Section 43(1) of the Education (No. 2) Act 1986, in terms both of the relationship between the new duty and the duties imposed under that Act on the universities, and of making the Secretary of State have “particular regard” to that duty in any guidance or directions issued. The difficulty I have is that surely universities must not only have particular regard but also comply with their obligations under Section 43. Therefore if they are trying to have due regard to a duty to prevent people being drawn into terrorism at the same time as having particular regard to something which they must do anyway, there is a conflict for them in the hierarchy, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, referred.
With respect, the amendment tabled by the Minister, Amendment 15D, is not as clear or effective as Amendment 14. I urge him to think very carefully about its limitations, and to accept the very real concerns articulated by so many leading academics and university vice-chancellors and chancellors that this Bill will seriously affect freedom of speech in the country. It will also affect our international reputation as the guardians of freedom of speech. The Prevent duty, as articulated in this context, would be a very blunt instrument. It will not prevent terrorists from using our universities as breeding and grooming grounds. That is best done by using more sophisticated means to identify and infiltrate groups who seek to recruit to terrorism through coffee shops, bars and things like that. We have a real battle to fight, but we must be cautious in the processes that we use so as to secure maximum impact in the fight, not to generate further unnecessary problems.
Lord Bates
It could be. I do not know what was in their minds.
The pressure and stipulation that are contained even in the consultation document issued in December, which we went out to consultation on—sadly, I have then gone and pre-empted the consultation by assuring your Lordships that certain sections of it would not apply—are a much lighter touch. There is no question, none at all, of the Government telling people who to have on their campus, in their university or in their college to speak. All we ask is that they have systems and procedures in place by which they ensure that the people who come on to their campus—
Baroness O'Loan
I thank the Minister for giving way. Surely it is not the case that all the Government are asking is that they have some procedures; surely it is the case that under the Bill the Secretary of State will have the power to direct universities as to what they do, and therefore it is that power that makes a difference.
Lord Bates
On that element, the noble Baroness is correct; there is a power there. If you make it a statutory duty, there needs to be some element of saying, “Well, so what if they brush aside their statutory duty?”. What if they brushed aside their statutory duty on a whole range of things? We have talked about that: the Public Order Act 1986; the Protection from Harassment Act 1997; the Terrorism Act 2006, which talks about inviting support for a proscribed organisation or punishing statements encouraging terrorism or disseminating terrorist material; and the Public Order Act 1988, or “breach of the peace” law—these are all Acts that contain a duty. What if organisations fail to observe the health and safety Act, and an inspector comes and says—I realise that I have tested the House.
Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill
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Baroness O'Loan (CB)
My Lords, I have put my name to Amendments 104, 105 and 115, which seek to protect universities and other further and higher education institutions from being bound by this part of the Bill in the context of an academic function and protection of freedom of speech, and to Amendments 107 and 109, which seek to exclude from Schedule 3 to the Bill certain universities and other colleges in England, Wales and Scotland. I do not think that this provision applies to Northern Ireland. I hope that the Minister will correct me if that is not the case.
The Bill seeks to put the Prevent programme on a statutory footing and I suspect has a greater impact than the Minister is willing to recognise. I have read carefully the letter which the Minister wrote to Members on making universities subject to the duty, which included a lot of statistics in relation to the number of people convicted of al-Qaeda-associated terrorist offences. I make one observation in relation to those figures. They do not necessarily indicate that the students were radicalised at university. There is evidence of terrorist organisations using universities to develop young people to be significant terrorist leaders because terrorism requires not just snipers and bombers but leaders, managers, logistics, procurement and all sorts of things, and that is the kind of skill you can pick up at university, so I think the issue is much more complex than is suggested.
Looking at Prevent on its own, the definition of terrorism includes non-violent terrorism, as the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, said. I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the problem as I see it is that these amendments are designed to address a threat to freedom of speech and all the consequences that would follow from that. I will speak of those consequences, in part from my experiences as a chair at a university, albeit an Irish university, and as a former university academic. I taught for 20 years in a university. During that period, we had several terrorist bombs. We lived daily with the terrorist armed threat, particularly in relation to our students who were members of the security forces and the police. It is profoundly important, as we contemplate the unintended consequences that might result from this clause, that we do not politicise our universities in a way which would make them the target of attacks such as that on Lee Rigby and other attacks, such as bombings and suicide attacks. I do not say that to be scaremongering, but because it is profoundly important that we recognise that the war that is being fought against democracy is a war which is changing its tactics. There is a lot of evidence that it will move much further on to our territory.
The function of a university in educating its students includes the provision of safe space in which students can debate and discuss very sensitive issues. My experience has been that, very often where issues are particularly sensitive, students can almost be afraid to engage with them. They need that space and the recognition that it is right to engage with these issues. I think of my experience in trying to teach constitutional law to students in Northern Ireland. One half of the class sat on one side of the room and the other half sat on the other side of the room and there was to be no meeting of minds about what I was trying to teach them. There was a terror of articulating any views lest that be taken back to somebody and consequences might follow. It is vital that students develop the confidence to address and to challenge issues, to test propositions, so that they can take a greater part in the debate within and without the university and, when they leave university, in constitutional governance.
That is where we are now in England, Wales and Scotland. We need people who have been exposed to challenging argument and have the capacity and the confidence to think and to articulate views which are the product of reasoned judgment rather than bias and prejudice. Although we may think we know what we are talking about when we speak of terrorism, some of yesterday’s terrorists are today’s world leaders. What does that mean for our understanding and what does it mean for those in universities who contemplate non-violent political action against democracies or systems of law in other countries which they are articulating in their own university? Are they to be regulated by the universities because they may be perceived as possibly supporting terrorism? How will the universities know the answer to that?
We have to ensure space in our universities for debates. The JCHR says in its report that,
“universities are precisely the places where there should be open and inclusive discussion of ideas. Broad terms such as ‘extremist’ or ‘radical’ are not capable of being defined with sufficient precision to enable universities to know … whether they … risk … being found to be in breach of the new duty”.
The JCHR talks of the inhibiting effect of the Bill as,
“lecturers and students worry about whether critical discussion of fundamentalist arguments, or of the circumstances in which resort to political violence might be justified, could fall foul of the new duty”.
The noble Baroness, Lady Warsi, spoke very articulately on the definition of extremism. It is not an exclusive definition. It refers to opposition to British values, including democracy and the rule of law, but it is not exclusive. Universities will have to work out what other values are included in this definition. Even the chief constable of the Greater Manchester Police, Sir Peter Fahy, has expressed concern that this will leave too much discretion to the police when they are trying to deal with very difficult situations. In effect, the Bill will force them to make decisions when they are conducting policing operations which are more political policy decisions than operational policing decisions. That analogy also applies to universities.
The National Union of Students, echoing calls by Universities UK and others, notes that any statutory guidance applying to universities needs to appreciate the particular freedoms of speech appropriate to an academic context, including allowing students and staff to speak freely on controversial issues. That needs to be retained in order to prevent the chilling effect on university campuses whereby people become wary of discussing difficult issues. Ignorance, prejudice, discrimination and unfounded fears can be the unintended products of restricting freedom of speech. Paradoxically, they can play their part in encouraging individuals to the cause of fundamentalism and even violence. We have seen that across the world.
Lord Bates
My Lords, it has been an excellent debate, which I will reflect on. The noble Baroness should not be so pessimistic and think that we are not going to reflect on this or that the notes simply say, “Resist”. That might have been the case under the previous Government, of which she was a member, but in the enlightened spirit of co-operation that is now engendered in Whitehall, that is not the case here.
In introducing this amendment, the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, referred to the meeting that we had on 15 January. I am a born optimist—mine is the blood group “B positive”—and I take the view that if we explain and people understand what is actually in the provisions, they will feel less chilled by them. The meeting was very well attended—in fact, it was the best attended and most interesting Peers meeting that I can remember. Of course, it provoked a lively debate and I reflected very carefully on it. One of the outcomes was the letter that I chose to send out last night, which has been referred to by a number of noble Lords, who have pointed to the restatement of the fact:
“We are firmly of the view that universities’ commitment to freedom of speech means that they represent one of our most important arenas for challenging extremist views and ideologies”,
simply because of that; and that we fully support,
“the existing duty in the Education (No 2) Act 1986 on universities to promote freedom of speech”.
I went on to reflect on the point, which a number of noble Lords have referred to, about the practicalities of how that is done. As several noble Lords recognised, even Ministers might struggle in giving speeches 14 days in advance; that might be pushing it a bit too far. I said that certainly we wanted to make sure that the requirements were less onerous —although, given that we are in a consultation phase until 30 January, I did not want to prejudge what the outcome was going to be.
Let me make one point that I think goes to the heart of where we are in this debate. External Speakers in Higher Education Institutions is another bit of guidance, provided by Universities UK and in operation at present. It says that actions that institutions take might include:
“Requesting a script or précis from the speaker outlining what they intend to say and requiring them to sign an undertaking”—
we are not going that far—
“acknowledging that their speech will be terminated if they deviate from it … Briefing the chair in advance of the event, making clear that they have a responsibility to ensure that no speaker or other person present at the event infringes the law; this briefing could highlight the circumstances under which they must stop the event, issue warnings to participants on their conduct or request the withdrawal or removal by stewards (or the police if necessary) of the person(s) concerned”.
That is pretty heavy stuff. It is in Universities UK’s guidance for external speakers that is already in place and applies to the 75% of universities which are part of that element.
Before I make specific remarks on the issues that have been raised, I turn to the Prevent duty under Part 5. When people were having these freedom of speech arguments in the context of universities, I do not think that we necessarily envisaged the type of situation that we might now be in and the level of threat, which is severe, that we now face and which gives rise to this legislation. Under Prevent, as was in many ways acknowledged by the previous Government, as well as dealing with the law and prosecution, you must engage in discussion with these groups and challenge their views. That was where Prevent came from and that is where we are going. Schedule 3 provides that this will apply to local government, criminal justice—probation, prisons—education and childcare, health and social care, and the police but people are proposing that universities should be exempt. These might be areas where there is some difference. I am trying to be straight with your Lordships about where the differences might arise between us.
Baroness O'Loan
How does the Minister envisage universities engaging with these groups to help them to see the error of their ways—it was envisaged that they might go into communities and talk to groups—without in some way being at risk of breaching the guidance which is implicit in this draft law?
Lord Bates
I will try to go on to explain about the guidance to the noble Baroness. I recognise her academic experience, which is particularly relevant, in teaching constitutional law in Northern Ireland; that must have particular relevance to what we are talking about here, and I listen very carefully to what she has to say. We are not seeking here to curtail or limit but to say that the institution should have guidance in place. Particular individuals should be responsible, a bit like what is described in the Universities UK guidance, but the institution ought to have some procedures and safeguards, if only for good order on the campus, when these matters are being discussed or when controversial matters are raised.
Immigration Bill
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Baroness O'Loan (CB)
My Lords, I spoke on the first day in Committee but was unable to attend on the day this clause was discussed, as I was recovering from surgery. Nevertheless, as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, I have put my name to these amendments because it is profoundly important that the Bill which comes to be enacted following your Lordships’ deliberations takes into account the issues which arise. As the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, has said, this would most effectively be done through the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.
The outstanding issues have been graphically illustrated by the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, but I will refer very briefly to them. The Government have so far declined to provide any indication of the number of people whose citizenship was taken away from them while they were abroad, on the basis that they are all cases in which the information on which the Secretary of State relied was information which should not be made public. The Government say that they are “unable” to put the numbers into the public domain,
“for reasons of national security and operational effectiveness”.
However, I do not believe that the release of this number, or of many other numbers, will in any way impact on national security.
The Government also indicated in their response that it is anticipated that the new power will usually, and possibly always, be exercised on the basis of closed material. As noble Lords will recall, this is not a procedure which has commended itself to many and is one which carries with it the risk of unfairness. The Joint Committee remains concerned that exercising the power,
“in relation to naturalised British citizens while they are abroad … carries a very great risk of breaching the UK’s international obligations to the State who admitted the British citizen to its territory”.
The first two amendments to which I put my name, Amendments 56ZA and 56ZB, therefore seek to ensure United Kingdom compliance with our international obligations and to ensure the adequacy of the safeguards against arbitrariness in decision-making by requiring that, if it is to be done,
“the deprivation of citizenship is a necessary and proportionate response to such conduct”.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights does not accept the Government’s argument that the clause is compatible with its international obligations to countries that have admitted British citizens whose citizenship is subsequently removed.
The Government assert that out-of-country deprivations of citizenship do not engage the European Convention on Human Rights because it does not apply extraterritorially other than in exceptional circumstances. However, the case which they propose as an authority for this view is by no means an authority for the broad proposition that the ECHR is not engaged by an out-of-country deprivation of citizenship that leaves an individual stateless, as the case itself did not concern a deprivation which left the individuals concerned stateless. Moreover, there have been cases involving extraterritorial jurisdiction. I point your Lordships to the East African Asians case, in which the UK was found to have breached the right not to be subjected to “inhuman or degrading treatment” in Article 3 of the ECHR when it removed the right of abode in the UK from British citizens. Were Parliament to enact Clause 60 as drafted, it would be the first measure adopted by the UK in recent years that gave rise directly to an increase in the number of stateless people in the world.
Amendment 56ZC is about retrospectivity. The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, has already made the point that, under current law, a naturalised British citizen who does not also have another nationality is not liable to being deprived of their citizenship. Yet that is what the Government assert. The law says that they cannot be made stateless by deprivation of UK citizenship which has been conferred. The amendment seeks only to ensure that a person could not lose their citizenship as a consequence of actions which they were unaware could result in such loss, particularly since the information and intelligence which will lead to the decision-making will, in most cases, be withheld from them through the closed procedure.
The final amendment is about children. The Government do not consider an amendment such as this necessary to ensure that the best interests of any children affected are treated as a primary consideration. The Government cite the “children duty” in Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 as applying already to the Secretary of State’s decision-making in respect of deprivation decisions. However, as the noble Baroness has already said, the Section 55 duty applies only to children who are in the United Kingdom. It does not apply if the children affected, who may be British citizens, are abroad at the time, as they very well might be when the power is being exercised in relation to an individual who is abroad at the time of deprivation. Amendment 56ZD is very simple. It seeks to extend the duty in Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act to children who are outside the UK at the time when the Secretary of State makes the decision affecting them. Can the Minister explain how else such children could be protected?
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I have Amendments 57A and 57B in this group and share the concerns that have been expressed about the substance and transparency of the new clause and what the point of it is. In Committee, I asked that question rhetorically. I now ask—I hope it is not a rhetorical question—why we should not use a TPIM, as we have that legislation on the statute book. The conduct of the individuals concerned seems to fall into the same area, and this indeed raises the same issue—that the individual has not been prosecuted. If TPIMs are not to be used, it is bound to raise the suspicion that the power will mainly be exercised when an individual is out of the country.
The charitably funded Bureau of Investigative Journalism has identified 17 cases, mainly through FoI and court records, in 15 of which the individual was overseas at the time of the deprivation under the provisions as we now have them. If these individuals are regarded as such a high risk, I think we can assume that, having lost their status, they would be subject to close surveillance, certainly if they are in this country. If they are overseas, that might raise even wider matters.
I understand from officials—I thank them as well as the Minister—that if an individual, having been made stateless through this procedure, is in the UK, he will have limited leave to remain. I was referred to the relevant Immigration Rules. Under paragraphs 404 and 406, a person who is,
“a danger to the security or public order of the United Kingdom”,
will be refused leave to remain. Can the Minister tell noble Lords whether that person is then disqualified from leave to remain and what happens to him?
I understand from the old UKBA casework instruction on restricted leave that that will apply, and that restrictions and conditions can be imposed, including a residence restriction. Noble Lords will recall concerns about residence restrictions under the old control order regime. One of the concerns about those restrictions was the impact on the family of the individual subject of an order. Can the Minister explain what will happen to the family of an individual if, on the one hand, he is in this country and if, on the other, he is abroad? Does the family qualify for leave to remain in the circumstances of the individual being a danger to security or public order, as I have quoted? I mention all this because the impact on families was a concern about control orders, TPIMs and terrorist asset-freezing. Reporting on that has been a component in reviews, which we have seen, by successive independent reviewers.
The Bureau of Investigative Journalism mentioned to me two examples of the impact on families. One was of a Sudanese-born man who lost his citizenship. The bureau told me that a Home Office official said in evidence in court that the Government waited until he was overseas before removing it. He had taken his wife and four children to Sudan for the summer. That left the children effectively exiled as well. The other example was of a British-born man whose youngest son was born here and who remains a British citizen. He has developmental disorders and is dependent on both his parents. His mother wishes to return to the UK for treatment for the son but she cannot do so without her husband. One does not want to be too hearts and flowers about this. The issue that we are being asked to consider is a tough one, but I think that the issue goes wider than just the individuals involved. I asked the Minister whether individuals and a family might be left without resources and so left destitute. Can he share with the House the Government’s position on that, particularly if the deprivation has been made while the individual is abroad?
Immigration Bill
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Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 1, I shall speak also to Amendment 4. The group includes Amendments 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8 as well. This is a point at which I feel I should be instigating some sort of cabaret to retain your Lordships. Maybe a tea dance would be more appropriate for this company; I do not know.
Clause 1 provides for a new section to go into the 1999 Immigration and Asylum Act for the removal of persons unlawfully in the United Kingdom. It replaces the current Section 10 of that Act, which is headed, “Removal of certain persons”. That change is significant, and the new section would certainly give rather broader powers. Amendment 1, my first amendment, would require the Secretary of State to give notice of the removal, which should be in writing and give the date and time of the removal. At this stage, at any rate, I have referred to this as the “approximate” time in order to anticipate, and therefore not waste time on, an argument that a plane might be delayed. Talking about time without qualifying it was therefore inappropriate—that is not of course the point of this.
Amendment 4 is about notice to a family member, which new Section 10(6)(c) in effect makes optional. New Section 10 gives powers to remove the individual and family members who are not defined. None of the amendments in this group is about not removing persons who are unlawfully here, which is a different argument, but about who is to be removed and how. The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has expressed concerns about the provisions not being in the Bill. We have of course already seen draft regulations. They are in the pack that my noble friend has arranged for noble Lords to see, which contains a whole group of statements of intent, regulations, codes, statements of fact and so on. I thank him for that. I forgot to take it home with me on Friday but I read it, or the right bits, before tabling these amendments.
The Delegated Powers Committee found it,
“difficult to understand why operational experience should have any effect on who is to be treated as a family member”,
and recommended that the definition in the draft regulations be placed in the Bill. That seems to be an appropriate provision. Draft Regulation 4 requires notice to be given to a family member facing removal, which reflects what is currently in the 1999 Act, but the Bill provides only that regulations “may” provide for that notice. I hope that the Minister can explain to the Committee why this should not be a requirement. It seems an absolutely fundamental point and other noble Lords will have seen briefing to the effect that it has been made by the judiciary as well.
There is also a draft regulation providing that the giving of notice invalidates any leave to enter or remain, in the case of the family member previously held, that is currently in Section 10(8). Again, why should safeguards currently in primary legislation not be included in the Bill?
There are always provisions about service of notices in the draft regulations, although I do not know whether they are usual. It may not be a point for debate in Committee today but I could not help noticing that the draft regulations provide for recorded delivery of the notice that requires signing for, but there is deemed service. There must be a risk, for instance, that someone else in the house will sign for receipt of notice of something that is crucial to the person who may not actually receive it. There are deemed service provisions elsewhere in the regulations.
Less technically perhaps, there are directions for removal ceasing to have effect if the family member ceases to belong to the family. Again, that is a current provision and it would be absolutely appropriate for it to be in the legislation. In the Commons Committee, the Minister gave a number of assurances. Of course I accept them, but Governments change, as sometimes do regulations as well.
I cannot recall if the sword of Damocles fell at the end of the tale, but I am concerned about how long it may hang—perhaps for a very long time—and whether it may hang at all over a family member who has a right to leave, enter or remain in the country in his or her own right. This group extends further than these two amendments. Although we may appear to be starting the Bill almost half way through the journey—in the philosophical as well as the practical sense—that someone seeking to enter or remain in our country will make, these are very important issues. I beg to move.
Baroness O'Loan (CB)
My Lords, I wish to speak to Amendments 5, 6 and 7 in my name, and in that of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister. I speak as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. These amendments were recommended in the eighth report of that committee on the legislative scrutiny of this Bill. Following the Government’s response to the committee, it produced a further legislative scrutiny report and again recommended these amendments.
The intention in Clause 1 is very simple: to simplify processes for removing people who are in the United Kingdom unlawfully and provide for removal of members of the person’s family, which provides a new Section 10 to the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999. The question of which member of an individual’s family can be removed following the removal or planned removal of an individual is to be decided in accordance with a number of policies. For example, a family member who has been a victim of domestic violence in accordance with the definition in the Immigration Rules will not be removed. Similarly, a member who is no longer in a family relationship will not be removed. There will undoubtedly be debate in your Lordships’ House about who can and cannot be removed under these provisions. Of course, the Government have stated that removals will be in accordance with existing immigration law and our international obligations.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
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Lord Taylor of Holbeach
My Lords, Clause 91 introduces a new discretionary ground for possession for offences connected with a riot. The existing grounds for possession for anti-social behaviour are discretionary and require that the anti-social behaviour must have occurred in the locality of the property. This means that thuggish behaviour committed against neighbours or in the immediate vicinity of a tenant’s home may currently be a basis for eviction.
However, similar offences likely to have a devastating effect on whole communities such as looting, or other riot-related criminal activity, committed by tenants further from their homes would not usually be taken into account. I do not think that that is right. It is important that people who wreck other people’s communities through riot-related offences should face the same consequences that they would if they carried out such behaviour in their own neighbourhoods.
It is not just the Government who are of this view. Following the 2011 riots, the e-petition entitled “Convicted London rioters should lose all benefits” received over a quarter of a million signatures, the second greatest number of signatories for any e-petition that has been submitted to the Government to date. That is strong evidence that the public want tough action to deal with rioters.
This clause seeks to make sure that that is the case by adding a new ground for possession into the Housing Acts 1985 and 1988 in respect of secure tenants and assured tenants respectively. Under the new ground, landlords will be able to apply for possession of a tenant’s property in England where the tenant or a person living in the tenant’s property has been convicted of an offence committed at the scene of a riot which took place anywhere in the UK.
Following concerns raised in Committee and by the Joint Committee on Human Rights, we gave a commitment to consider the amendments tabled at that stage by my noble friends, Lady Hamwee and Lord Greaves, which proposed that the new ground would apply only where the tenant and not a member of the household has been convicted of a “serious offence”, rather than any offence, as currently drafted.
Recognising the concerns that have been expressed, government Amendments 80A to 80F provide further reassurance that the new ground will apply only to the more serious cases of riotous behaviour. Amendments 80A, 80C, 80D and 80F provide that landlords would be able to seek possession under the provisions of Clause 91 only where the tenant or an adult member of their household has been convicted of an offence at the scene of a riot.
We have retained the application of the ground to the convictions of adult members of the household as we do not believe that adult perpetrators of serious anti-social behaviour or criminal activity should be able to escape consequences for their home simply on the basis that the tenancy is not in their name.
In addition, to address concerns relating to the possibility of minor offences triggering possession under this ground, Amendments 80B and 80D would restrict the application of the new ground to “indictable offences” instead of any offence committed at the scene of a riot as currently drafted. This means that convictions for less serious offences such as common assault and obstructing a police officer in the execution of his duty will not trigger possession under this ground. However, I emphasise our commitment to ensuring that we send a strong signal: if you get involved in a riot, whether it is near your home or not, there may be consequences for your tenancy.
With regard to the concerns raised by the Joint Committee on Human Rights that the ground amounts to a double punishment and may disproportionately affect children, it is important to note that the new ground is discretionary and that the court can grant possession only where it considers it reasonable to do so. This means that the court can take into account the circumstances of the tenant and other family members, including children, when deciding whether to grant possession. I should add that available evidence also indicates that landlords resort to eviction only as a last resort. In addition, these government amendments would provide additional safeguards in the Bill to ensure that whole families are not evicted under the new ground for the actions of a child during a riot. I would reassure the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan— I am pleased to see that she is in her place—and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, who have tabled Amendment 80G to remove Clause 91 from the Bill, that we expect the impact of the provision and the number of evictions, including those of families, to be very small over time. That is especially as I hope that we will not see any future occurrences of the disgraceful looting and rioting across England that we saw in the summer of 2011.
I hope that the House will agree that these government amendments respond positively to the concerns that have been expressed about this provision and that your Lordships will support the retention of Clause 91 in its amended form. I beg to move.
Baroness O'Loan (CB)
My Lords, Clause 91 as originally drafted added a new ground for possession under Schedule 2 of the Housing Act 1985 and Part 2 of Schedule 2 to the Housing Act 1988 so that, as the Minister has said, a landlord might apply for possession where someone living in the property has been convicted of an offence committed at the scene of a riot which had taken place anywhere in the United Kingdom. The Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member, has consistently stated that this clause should be deleted from the Bill. In the first instance the committee stated that it was unnecessary and disproportionate. It was also concerned about the potentially serious implications of this clause for family members and considered that it may disproportionately affect both women and children. The committee said that it amounted to a punishment rather than a genuine means of preventing harm to others.
I wish to set out absolutely the aggravated nature of riot offences. Living in Northern Ireland, I have long experience of the fear and the horror of riots. People who commit criminal offences must be pursued under the criminal law. To allow an offence committed anywhere in the UK, even if the conviction were to be on indictment only, to be grounds for eviction where there is a tenancy, is certainly to impose a second punishment on a limited group of people who do not own their own home and who have committed no offence, since the other members of the household have committed no offence. I should like to thank the Minister for meeting with me in December to discuss this issue, and for giving me the opportunity to articulate again the difficulties with this clause.
I note the amendments that the Government have now tabled and the fact that they make in effect two changes. The clause will apply only where an adult member of the household—someone living in the house—has been convicted of an indictable offence. That is to be welcomed because it limits the effect of the clause. It relieves from the threat of eviction the families of young people who may have fallen into bad company, but who have been dealt with for their criminality under the criminal law. However, that still leaves tenants and their householders subject to a possible double punishment for a crime committed either by a tenant or someone else who lives in the rented property, and no such double punishment can be applied to a private householder. The family of such a household will be put through the stress, fear and expense of fighting an eviction application. It will go on for months, and while they may well win at the end of the day, there will still have been serious disruption and expense and, above all, distress to the family. Can the Minister tell me whether there is a time limit on the use of a conviction as a ground for eviction? If a person was convicted in 2013, could that conviction be used in 2014? If he was convicted 2011 as a result of the London riots, could it be used in 2014?
Clause 91 would create the curious circumstance in which someone convicted of a riot offence in Edinburgh, Glasgow or even Belfast could be evicted in England and Wales but a person convicted in England and Wales could not be evicted in Scotland or Northern Ireland. The Government have offered no justification for this measure, nor is there any necessity for it, even in its amended form. In the Minister’s letter to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the explanation for the Government’s amendments is that, in light of the Lords Committee stage debate, they concluded that it would be appropriate to place further safeguards on the face of the legislation. However, the Minister repeats the Government’s position that “this provision is intended to deter the sort of deplorable ‘riot tourism’ that we witnessed in summer 2011”. The Joint Committee on Human Rights states:
“In our view it is the job of the criminal law, not the civil law, to deter riot-related offences and to administer sanctions when such offences are committed. Nor do we consider the existence of judicial discretion to be a satisfactory answer to our concern about the disproportionate impact of eviction on other members of the household who have not engaged in such behaviour. We maintain our recommendation that clause 91 be deleted from the Bill”.
The justification for the current position under the Housing Act is that those convicted of rioting in their locality pose a threat to their local community and that, in order to protect that community, the person must be removed from it. This justification cannot cover the proposed extension of the ground for eviction—there is no link between the crime and the local area. As the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, a former deputy assistant commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, stated in Committee,
“the provision to order possession of a property when the offence has absolutely nothing to do with protecting neighbours, for example, from anti-social behaviour, is a step too far. It is politically motivated and is not driven by the needs of justice. Therefore, it should be no part of this Bill”.—[Official Report, 2/12/13; col. 62.]
The Government have sought to justify their proposals by stating that the threat of eviction is intended to deter those considering engaging in riot-related behaviour —but that is the purpose of the criminal law.
In Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, who is soon to take his place on the Front Bench, stated that he could not endorse the clause. He did not qualify that in any way:
“The courts have sufficient powers to deal firmly with offenders caught up in a riot … The criminal justice system—some would say ‘for once’—in general responded very well to what occurred”.
He also said:
“Those who committed offences during the riot on that occasion were dealt with speedily and firmly”.
He stated that he did not think it was “necessary or appropriate” to legislate in this manner,
“given all the other powers that exist elsewhere in the Bill”,
and concluded that,
“this clause is a step too far”. —[Official Report, 2/12/13; col. 60.]
In 2011, Wandsworth Council threatened to evict a Liberty client, Maite de la Calva, and her younger daughter, if her son was convicted of a crime committed during the riots in 2011. Her son had been arrested and charged during the disorder. He had moved out of his mother’s property earlier in the year, but she was still served with a notice by Wandsworth Council seeking possession, which stated that she was likely to have breached her tenancy agreement. The authority vowed to apply for a possession order evicting her and her daughter if her son was convicted. This was despite her contribution to the local area over the past three years: she was described as a credit to her housing estate by neighbours and spent her spare time volunteering with a youth charity and working with domestic violence victims. She had committed no crime herself and would not have faced that threat had she lived in a mortgaged house. Liberty represented her in challenging Wandsworth Council’s attempt to punish her and her daughter for her son’s conviction. Eventually the council was persuaded to back down, but not before considerable anxiety and suffering had been inflicted. If the eviction powers set out in the Bill are enacted, even as modified by the present government amendments, there will be many more cases just like this one and it is unlikely that the outcome in all of them will be as positive.
Removing a person and their family from social housing is unlikely to lead to less, rather than more, crime and anti-social behaviour. Dispossession will shift the problem elsewhere, creating new and greater problems for the individuals concerned and their families. Private housing may be unavailable and private sector rents are rising, partly as a consequence of the welfare reform measures. Temporary accommodation does not deal with the issue: it splits up families; it disrupts education and social cohesion; and the end result may well be that alternative accommodation becomes unaffordable for many families, leading to increased homelessness and destitution.
I ask the Minister to consider again the fact that the Joint Committee on Human Rights has consistently said that this clause is neither necessary nor proportionate; that it is not about protecting a local area; that it discriminates against those in public housing; and above all that it will create significant distress to people who have committed no crime.
Baroness O'Loan
Baroness O'Loan
My Lords, I had expected to have the right to respond to the Minister on the previous amendment. I do not think that the relevant measure has been shown to be necessary, proportionate or in the interests of innocent victims. I beg to move. I wish to test the opinion of the House.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Baroness O'Loan Excerpts(11 years, 6 months ago)
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Baroness O'Loan (CB)
Can the noble Baroness explain precisely how judges are supposed to interpret a threat and a feeling of being threatened from the words “nuisance” and “annoyance”? Also the use of the word “threatened” would indicate a much higher threshold.
Baroness Hamwee
I would say because of the context of the Bill, the clear policy underlying it and the evidence that would have to be given. I have heard the exchange about hearsay evidence but a judge has still got to be convinced that it would be just and convenient, and therefore proportionate, as I understand it, to grant an injunction.
EU: Eurojust (EUC Report)
Baroness O'Loan Excerpts(11 years, 8 months ago)
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Baroness O'Loan (CB)
My Lords, I support the noble Baroness, Lady Corston. I have the privilege to serve on the European Union Sub-Committee on Justice, Institutions and Consumer Protection, which is chaired excellently by the noble Baroness.
The Government have made it quite clear that the current legislation on Eurojust represents a,
“positive model of cross-border co-operation”.
The Government have stated that it is their intention to seek to opt back in to the existing legislation on Eurojust following the decision to exercise the 2014 opt-out of 130 EU police and criminal justice measures adopted before the treaty of Lisbon entered into force in 2009.
When the sub-committees were considering the general issue of the opt-out, Eurojust was one of the measures on which there was a high level of consensus in favour. Eurojust provides judicial co-ordination meetings, judicial co-operation agreements with third countries, office facilities, the facilitation of mutual legal assistance agreements, the acceleration and execution of European arrest warrants and the funding of joint investigation teams with the accompanying translation costs. As the Government have recognised, all of these are of considerable value to the United Kingdom. In these circumstances it is very clear why the Government wish to opt back in to the existing arrangements.
The DPP, in evidence, to the committee said that Eurojust costs the UK just £360,000 per annum and costs would be much greater were these arrangements to be the subject of individual bilateral liaison between magistrates in each country. Those of us who were involved in the process of criminal investigation prior to 2002 are aware of how very much longer all these things took prior to the establishment of Eurojust. We know that sometimes things took so long and became so complex that criminals were able to avoid justice. We must also bear it in mind that even if criminals are ultimately apprehended, the ancient maxim that justice delayed is justice denied still applies.
The committee in its 23rd report of the 2003-04 Session, stated that Eurojust was,
“a model of how to make progress in an area where the differences between national jurisdictions are so great that it would be unrealistic to aim for harmonisation. It is also an example of the sort of effective practical co-operation that an EU agency can provide”.
The Government’s concerns have been articulated very clearly by the noble Baroness, Lady Corston. They are threefold: ramifications for fundamental rights; concerns in relation to the governance and management structures of Eurojust; and the nature of the extended powers to be given to national members. The decision is imminent and the sub-committee to which I belong has recommended that we should opt in. The real problem with Eurojust is well recognised. It is the extent to which the new proposal interacts the European Public Prosecutors Office proposal with Eurojust. I understand the reservations in relation to the EPPO. They are shared by a significant number of other states. As we say in our report, the UK will not be alone in opposing the EPPO.
The UK needs to be at the table to participate in these fundamentally important negotiations in the Council. We need to ensure that our voice is heard in these debates, particularly in support of those other members who wish to support less radical change to Eurojust, as the UK does. These will be complex and important arrangements. Ultimately it is likely that the current Eurojust arrangements will change. If we are not part of the negotiations, we will not be able to influence the outcome as effectively as if we were at the table. It is not impossible, as we say in the report, that if the UK fails to take its place at these negotiations, they will proceed. Eurojust will change, and the UK will find itself unable to opt back in to the existing arrangements, leaving us at a significant disadvantage in the fight against crime. The existing Eurojust will disappear, and we will not have brought to bear our very considerable influence on the creation of the new Eurojust. This can only leave the UK at a disadvantage.
As we contemplate the fight against crime and terrorism across borders, we have good cause to ensure that co-operative arrangements are as comprehensive as possible, while still retaining and maintaining our national independence. In Ireland last night, a massive bomb was intercepted by the Irish police. It was destined for the north. It would have caused carnage. We have increasing levels of evidence of more militant views in many communities, with the creation of many murals glorifying what they called the armed struggle. We have to consider the concerns we know exist in Northern Ireland about the possible effects of the current opt-out proposals on the protection of security in these islands. We have also to consider the ramifications of the interdependence between organised crime and terrorism in the context of this proposal. For example, we have two individuals who are subject to TPIMs currently on the run. They are subject to TPIMs because they were regarded by a judge as a threat to national security.
We cannot revert to the times when we were dependent on bilateral arrangements and individual processes took months, if not years. If we opt out of Eurojust under the protocol 36 arrangements and find ourselves unable to opt back in because things have moved on, that may well threaten the coherence of the whole package which the United Kingdom will present to the Commission when it seeks to opt back in to the various measures. European arrest warrants, the other 34 measures and, indeed, the other measures which have been recommended for inclusion in the package are interdependent. The Government stated in their response to the 13th report:
“Europol currently provides support in over 280 operations involving UK law enforcement”.
If we opt in, we can negotiate so as to secure the removal of the powers to direct national law enforcement agencies to initiate investigations or share data. We can influence other states to achieve an outcome acceptable to the UK. We will definitely do so more effectively if we are sitting at the table than if we are on the sidelines watching, seeking ultimately to rejoin a Eurojust on terms for which we have not argued and which ultimately we may even be unable to accept.
We put our whole protocol 36 situation at risk if we do not opt in. Eurojust represents great value to us. We must ensure that we have a voice in the ongoing debates, and I ask the Minister to consider again the decision the Government have made.
Lord Rowlands (Lab)
My Lords, if only I could improve upon the powerful and compelling case that the noble Baronesses, Lady O’Loan and Lady Corston, and the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, have made on our committee’s report. This time last week, we had a consensus on our report on the EPPO. As I understand it, we have a consensus of a rather different kind tonight: a consensus of two Front Benches opposing our report. I find that all the more puzzling given the events of the past week or two.
As the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, said, since we wrote this report, the context has changed. We have seen a very significant and “important”—in inverted commas—rebellion across a number of European Parliaments to the draft proposal on the EPPO. It was our case that if the Government joined in the debate and discussion on Eurojust, they would find enough allies to change and alter that report effectively. Surely the evidence of the past week or two has been that there are such allies and that if one engaged in an active and proactive way on this measure, one would find enough allies to change or transform the report itself. Our case has been strengthened by the events of the past week or two, and therefore I am puzzled if both Front Benches for some reason oppose the conclusions of our report.
We all accept the value of Eurojust. The Government accept the value of Eurojust. They want to opt back in to Eurojust under the opt-in proposals. We all support that opt-in to the system. I certainly share the Government’s concerns about the existing draft proposal. Almost all those concerns are about the interrelationship between it and the proposed draft for the EPPO. If those fall—if, in fact, the Commission is going to have to withdraw or revise its proposal—surely there will be a consequential fallout in the draft Eurojust proposal. Will the Minister bring us up to date on what has happened since last Monday, when there were enough reasoned opinions across Europe to mean that the Commission will have to review it? What has the Commission intimated? It has suggested that it is going to do so, and it accepts and understands the voices of concern. If it does that, does it not also have to review and almost withdraw this proposal because they are totally interlinked? A portion of the Eurojust draft is related to the proposed public prosecutor’s office. Will the Minister tell us whether, if the Commission has to review the EPPO, it will also probably have to undertake some kind of review of this draft?
In this case, we have a compelling case for joining in the negotiation because we now have a good clear view that we could affect those negotiations in a very positive way. As other members of the committee have said, one of the things that swung me in favour of our report—and I was sceptical at the beginning because I understood and appreciated the Government’s concerns—was that we could influence this because we sensed there would be a lot of other supporters. The other reason why I supported it was that I looked down the road and thought that a bizarre situation could happen in which the Government opt in to the existing measure and then find that this measure has been revised and it belongs to an existing measure which down the road may well be of a different kind, and they have opted out of that. I think that would cause a very puzzling and bizarre situation in the relationship between the United Kingdom and the Eurojust system.
There is one thing on which we surely have consensus: we are in favour of Eurojust and we are in favour of the United Kingdom’s participation in it. Therefore, I beg the Minister to tell us what has happened since last Monday and whether the impact of what happened in the past week or two means that the Government should rethink their position on this issue and should at least keep an open mind on the question of opting in, negotiating and influencing what I think is a very important organisation.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Baroness O'Loan Excerpts(11 years, 8 months ago)
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Baroness O'Loan (CB)
My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, on his eloquent and humorous maiden speech. We look forward to hearing much more from him.
I welcome many of the provisions of this legislation, in particular those in relation to forced marriage, dangerous dogs and the additional powers given to the IPCC. In particular, and most importantly, I welcome Clause 123, which provides for access to information—a critical tool for an investigator. I also join with many of the comments that have been made in relation to anti-social behaviour and the deficiencies of the Bill as currently drafted. I also draw attention to the 20 or so recommendations and observations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, to which I belong, in relation to that section of the Bill alone.
I will speak on the issue of compensation for miscarriages of justice. Clause 151 provides that compensation will be payable for a miscarriage of justice,
“if and only if the … newly discovered fact shows beyond reasonable doubt that the person was innocent of the offence”.
The UK has a long and proud history of the presumption of innocence in criminal matters unless guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt. The European Convention on Human Rights, which was drafted largely by United Kingdom representatives, maintains this presumption in Article 6(2) of the Convention. It is one thing to be able to prove that there is reasonable doubt as to the safety of a conviction, and even that will normally take years, during which the person wrongly convicted will serve a prison sentence. The CCRC process and the process of the Court of Appeal do not involve a retrial. The person seeking to overturn a conviction is often in a very lonely place—it is not an easy process. The Minister has told us that Clause 151 is intended by the Government to bring much needed clarity—as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, said, it does. However it is, in fact, a total change in the law. Never previously has the victim of a miscarriage of justice had to prove innocence beyond a reasonable doubt.
As I have said, the business of disproving guilt is not easy. A court may, as the Minister in the other place stated, determine that a person’s conviction is overturned; for example, because DNA evidence comes to light showing that they could not have committed the offence. That may seem a very simple example, but it is not. In many cases, both here and in Northern Ireland, there will be people convicted long before DNA testing became available, where the evidential material, which may well have contained exculpatory DNA evidence, has been destroyed for a variety of reasons. Most commonly, evidence such as clothing was destroyed because blood contamination was regarded as constituting a health risk. That should not happen now, but the cases in which there is a referral to the Court of Appeal by the CCRC are not recent cases, and they are only the most serious ones. People may also be convicted on what turns out to be false expert evidence, as in the cases of parents whose children died suddenly and who were wrongly convicted. If it transpires that the evidence is not reliable, the conviction will be overturned. That will not prove the innocence of the mother or father. There are many other reasons why a person may be incapable of proving their innocence to the standard required by this test. Obviously I cannot give examples of all of them in the time allowed.
If we legislate in the way suggested by the Government, we will create two types of “not guilty”. There will be those who are fortunate enough to be able to present evidence that proves conclusively that they are innocent; they will be entitled to compensation. Others, not so fortunate, will only be able to prove that they should not have been convicted. Since they cannot prove their innocence, while they may assert that they did not commit the offence they will not be able to claim compensation, and it is inevitable that some people will conclude that they are not innocent because they are not innocent beyond all reasonable doubt.
In a number of cases people were convicted on evidence fabricated by police officers. I think, for example, of a schoolboy in his late teens who was convicted of murder on the basis of a confession and other evidence secured as a result of wrongful behaviour by police officers. The boy in question did not commit the murder, but could not prove that and served over a decade in prison before being released. His conviction was overturned, but that evidence, which should never have been presented to the court, does not prove his innocence. It is something completely different to ask the victim of a miscarriage of justice to prove his innocence.
Such victims would effectively have to reinvestigate their own case in order to prove their innocence. In many cases they would not get the right of access to documents, to question witnesses, to get expert evidence checked, or to get access to retired police investigators, who would not assist them. Have the Government considered how such a person is supposed to satisfy that test, which is not the test required by the Court of Appeal?
It has been pointed out that had this clause been law at the time of the cases of the Birmingham Six, the Guildford Four, the Maguire Seven, the Cardiff Three and Judith Ward, they would all have been highly unlikely to meet the test. In criminal law people do not have to prove their innocence; the prosecution has to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. When the state has held that a person was wrongly convicted, years after the event, it is very likely that it will just not be possible to marshal the necessary evidence to prove innocence.
Compensation is given for the wrongful conviction and for the time served in prison. If a court declares a conviction to be unsafe, the person who is released will have to try and rebuild his or her life. They will usually have spent long years in prison. They will have lost their opportunities to be educated, marry, have children, build a life and contribute to society. Above all, they may have lost contact with their family, or their relationships may have broken down to the extent that they are not repairable—and all that because they were wrongly convicted. Now the Government propose to remove the right to compensation from anyone who cannot prove their innocence beyond reasonable doubt. This matter was discussed briefly in the other place, and amendments were tabled that sought to address this. There was some debate, but it was decided in the end to leave the matter to this House. They said,
“leave it to the other place to find the right answer”.—[Official Report, Commons, 15/10/13; col. 610.]
The Minister told us that there are two to four cases a year in which compensation is paid. Can he tell the House whether that number covers England, Wales and Northern Ireland, or whether it is England and Wales only? If it does not cover Northern Ireland, can he give us the Northern Ireland figures? Can he also tell the House how many unsuccessful legal challenges there are each year? I suppose that I am really asking the Government, “Is this really mischief which requires to be remedied through legislative change, or is it something that will damage forever the reputation of law in the United Kingdom?”.
EU: Police and Criminal Justice Measures
Baroness O'Loan Excerpts(11 years, 11 months ago)
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Baroness O'Loan
My Lords, I speak as a member of the sub-committee of the European Union Committee and as one who participated in the inquiry that resulted in the 13th report. I do not speak on behalf of the committee.
It is perhaps desirable not to proceed with undue haste in making a decision on this matter. No decision is required until May 2014. The Government are arguing that they need the additional time for negotiations, but it might be wise to contemplate the fact that, as other noble Lords have said, some of the consequences of the opt-out, if matters proceed as indicated, may be less than favourable for the United Kingdom. If the decision is made, on 1 December 2014 the Court of Justice and the European Commission will have no powers in respect of these matters over the UK, but the pre-Lisbon measures will remain in effect in the other member states. If the decision was made, then until—or perhaps unless—we rejoined we would have no access to a number of processes and facilities that expedite the fight against crime and terrorism.
We would cease to have access, as has been said, to the European arrest warrant. We would cease to have access to Europol, led by Rob Wainwright, who has been described by the Home Secretary as doing a very good job as director. We would lose access to the EU judicial co-operation unit, which costs just £360,000 a year and provides centralised facilities for liaison in The Hague. Instead, we would have to have bilateral arrangements with the judiciary in each member state. We would lose our capacity to be involved in joint investigation teams. The Government told the committee’s inquiry into the EU internal security strategy that they considered these joint investigation teams to be a valuable tool, and the Government supported the Commission’s plan to expand their use.
I could go on and on describing the benefits that we would lose if the Government were to opt out, or even to fail to opt back in within a limited period. The Home Secretary said that the Government are acting on the grounds of principle, policy and pragmatism in making this decision. The EU Committee took extensive evidence, as noble Lords have said, from a wide range of witnesses in the course of the inquiry. Overall, the response was one of massive concern about damage to the UK’s interests. I refer the House to paragraph 157 of the 13th report, which states:
“The Lord Advocate told us that he would have ‘real concerns’ if the UK were to opt out of the EAW and the DPP told us that to do so would result in a poorer deal for victims of crime. ACPO … emphasised the significant percentage of EU nationals from other Member States that were arrested in London each year and suggested that it would be more difficult to return them to their Member State of origin”.
It also suggested that,
“withdrawing from the EAW would be a mistake and could jeopardise justice and public safety … the President of Eurojust told us that it would make it harder for the UK to tackle cross-border crime”.
JUSTICE and Justice Across Borders stated that,
“criminals would exploit any differences that arose between any different extradition arrangements … and others suggested that it could result in the UK becoming a ‘bolt-hole’ or ‘safe haven’ for criminals … organised crime or terrorism”.
The report concludes that the European arrest warrant is the single most important pre-Lisbon measure and that it is inevitable that the extradition process would become more protracted and cumbersome, potentially undermining public safety.
No system is perfect. International co-operation on criminal justice measures will always require amendment to make them work as well as possible. Even the criticisms that have been made of the European arrest warrant relate mainly not to the warrant itself but to the consequences of people being sent to certain countries in terms of long periods of pre-trial detention et cetera.
Withdrawing from protocols or exercising the opt-out will not enable us to have any influence to improve matters in that respect. In his review of the operation of the European arrest warrant in 2011, Sir Scott Baker concluded that it had improved the scheme of surrender between member states and that broadly it operates reasonably well. He made recommendations and the Government committed to work with the Commission and other member states to improve the situation.
At a time when we are fighting international terrorism with all its devastating consequences for individuals, national economies and the general global situation; at a time when international organised crime is growing rapidly and when levels of people trafficking, smuggling and white collar crime represent a significant threat, there can be no logic in withdrawing from existing arrangements that work in the interests of the UK, even if we hope to rejoin on our terms—something which may not be available to us.
In all the evidence we took as a committee, very few witnesses drew our attention to any specific measures that they considered to be detrimental. The committee concluded:
“We therefore consider that there are compelling reasons of national interest for the United Kingdom to remain full participants in most of the measures … As to the remainder we have identified no persuasive reason for the United Kingdom to withdraw from them”.
We need an extradition process. We need to continue to have access to Europol and Interpol—as the noble Lord, Lord Lawson, says—and other national and international intelligence-handling operations so that we can become aware of suspected threats of crime or terrorism, and so that we can act accordingly. We need the benefits of joint investigations with all their logistical support mechanisms. We need to be able to take advantage of these measures. The Government of course recognise this and state that they will opt back in. However, it will not necessarily be as simple as that. As the committee stated in paragraph 223 of its report:
“While in our discussion with the Commission we found no inclination on their part to obstruct or make the process of opting back in difficult, seeking to rejoin particular measures would not necessarily be automatic or straightforward. Either the Commission, or where appropriate, the Council, may seek to impose conditions on such requests”.
The Home Secretary, in evidence to the Committee, accepted that the Commission may make it a requirement that the UK rejoin or opt into a particular measure to preserve the coherence of the totality of the policing and criminal justice measures. The Commission made clear in its evidence that it considers coherence to be a matter of paramount importance.
All this is happening in the context of debate about the current European arrangements and our membership of the European Union. Other noble Lords have spoken quite passionately about that on occasion.
For Northern Ireland and for the UK as a whole, the issue of continued involvement in these measures is critical. There is still a terrorist threat from republicanism in Ireland, north and south. There is also a threat from international terrorism. Today, according to the Government, the situation is that in mainland Britain an international terrorist attack is a strong possibility, and in Northern Ireland a terrorism-related attack is possible but not likely. In Northern Ireland, an international terrorist attack is a strong possibility and a Northern Ireland-related attack is highly likely.
It may be that the Government are relying on the interests of other member states in our participation in these arrangements to force Commission acceptance without undue conditions on the UK’s request to opt back in. I have heard and seen extensive concern being expressed both internationally and within the EU about what the UK is doing and its potential damage not just to our country but to other countries’ interests. However, while the Commission will make the majority of the decisions, the Commission of course comprises commissioners from member states who are required by virtue of their position to act in the interests of the European Union rather than in their national interests. Notwithstanding that, it would be unwise to anticipate that the Commission will simply accede to requests for re-admission. It is surely necessary to ensure that our anti-terrorist, crime prevention and detection operations are as strong as possible.
The biggest number of European arrest warrants to the UK over the period from 2009 to 2011 were from Ireland, the Netherlands and Spain. In Ireland and Spain there are a significant number of terrorist incidents.
Baroness O'Loan
If noble Lords will just bear with me, I am nearly done. Of all surrenders to the United Kingdom, 70% were from those three countries. I am not scaremongering in drawing these matters to your Lordships’ attention. I have lived with terrorism for 36 years. I have worked in many countries seeking to make good the damage from it. The evidence that the committee on which I was privileged to serve received was both compelling and overwhelming. Let the Government take more time to respond and to contemplate the consequences of the proposal. It is never wise to act when one does not have a full understanding of the possible consequences of such action. We do not yet know the consequences of what the Government are now proposing.