Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Friday 12th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hollins (CB)]

My Lords, I would like to comment on this group in response to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has just said.

In its recent briefing for Peers, the Royal College of Psychiatrists gave its view:

“Assessors should be required to take all practicable steps to work with professionals involved in a person’s health and social care, and to talk to a relative, carer or nominated friend, including by accessing medical notes from both primary and secondary care”.


It expressed concern that

“a consideration of suicide protection duties are being bypassed by the Bill in its current form”

due to unmet need not being formally assessed. A previous DoLS is relevant to consideration of current capacity to decide to end one’s life. What would be the mechanism for reliably ensuring information that there has been a DoLS before it gets to the assessors and the panel?

Having mentioned the Royal College of Psychiatrists, I would like to make a short statement. The college has asked me to respond to the allegations about its leadership made by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, on 14 November, our first day in Committee. The president of the college, Dr Lade Smith, wrote to the noble Baroness asking her to withdraw her allegations, as they are inaccurate. But although the noble Baroness was present in the Chamber the following week, no clarification was provided. As a past president myself, I beg leave to set the record straight.

The college’s recommendations on the Bill are, in fact, based on 18 months’ consideration by a cross-college working group involving membership surveys, debate with members on proposals before other jurisdictions, and discussions with colleagues in other jurisdictions where assisted dying is practised. The president is clear that Dr Annabel Price, the appointed college lead for the Bill, has accurately represented its views when giving formal evidence to both Houses. With the Bill before the Lords, the Royal College of Psychiatrists is focusing on how to make it safer for people with mental health needs and learning disability needs, and better aligned with the responsibilities of psychiatrists. I feel that, in the light of the discussion on DoLS, this is an appropriate statement to make.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I have put my name to Amendment 16. I also support Amendments 16A, 114 and 114A because the very general definition in Clause 1 of a terminally ill adult who has the capacity to take their own life does not contain any consideration of those who have been deprived of their liberty under Section 4 of the Mental Capacity Act. It is an unfortunate reality that many of those detained in hospitals or care homes are detained because they lack the capacity to make a decision about their own care or treatment. As the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, said, in such circumstances it is surely axiomatic that there should be careful consideration of cases involving individuals subject to a DoLS.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said, even assessing the capacity of someone with dementia or another neurological condition, for example, can be profoundly difficult. This is not just because of the frequent fluctuation of both capacity and the extent to which any identified capacity enables the making of a particular decision; a medical practitioner or social worker who meets a person for the first time may be misled as to the capacity they actually have. As the Royal College of Psychiatrists noted in its written evidence,

“an assessment of a person’s mental capacity to decide to end their own life is an entirely different and more complex determination requiring a higher level of understanding”

than in other assessments of capacity.

In the 1997 case of Re MB, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said:

“The graver the consequences of the decision, the commensurately greater the level of competence required to take the decision”.


Capacity assessment is not a precise science. The unique context of this Bill makes taking a cautious approach appropriate. It is common sense that there is a likely correlation between incapacity in one area, so extreme that the state must deprive the person of their liberty, and incapacity to decide whether to end one’s own life. People whose incapacity for basic decisions is so severe that they are deprived of their liberty are the most vulnerable members of society.

I want to give your Lordships a brief example. I was aware of a woman in her late 80s who had been assessed and was subject to a DoLS. She objected to it and appealed against it. Intellectually, she was enormously able, possessed of considerable social skills despite her dementia. She was able to persuade those dealing with her appeal that she had capacity despite the very real concerns of her family, who knew the extent of her incapacity. The DoLS was lifted and she went back to her own home. Shortly afterwards, she was found playing golf in the road in her pyjamas at two o’clock in the morning. She was going to the supermarket at 4 am. She was leaving the door unlocked all night for her husband and cooking his dinner every night; he had died some 20 years previously.

That lady was my mother. She certainly would not have understood a suggestion that she should opt for an assisted death. The DoLS was subsequently reinstated. This is not an unusual situation. If the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, rejects these amendments, how does he consider that such vulnerable individuals can be protected from making this final decision, although they may not understand exactly what they are doing?

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)]

My Lords, forgive me. What the noble Baroness is saying is extremely interesting, but the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has already said that he will seek a meeting with the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and all other noble Lords who are interested in this. He is not rejecting the amendments; he is willing to enter into a discussion.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

I thank the noble Baroness for that helpful intervention, but we do not know what the outcome of that meeting will be. I think I have the right to make my remarks.

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to the amendments in this group. I did not table one in my name about a group of people who are also subject to deprivation of liberty safeguards. I am pleased to hear the noble and learned Lord repeat his offer of a meeting, which was made last Friday. I was disappointed not to receive an invitation to a group meeting to discuss the various groups of vulnerable people who may need additional conditions. Had there been such a meeting, I would not be taking up time today or on the later group, where I had offered to withdraw amendments had a meeting taken place.

There is another group of people under deprivation of liberty safeguards who are not under the Mental Capacity Act. These are young people who are under the High Court jurisdiction of deprivation of liberty safeguards—called High Court DoLS. I thank the President of the Family Division for ensuring that there is research available on this group and the Children’s Commissioner, who has visited very many of them. Those young people are so troubled that their liberty needs to be restricted, but they cannot currently be detained under Section 25 of the Children Act in a secure children’s home. That was for a variety of reasons. One was that we ran out of places, but another was that some of them were in such a situation that they could not even bear a communal secure environment like that.

I did not table an amendment also because under the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill these young people will possibly be brought under the statutory jurisdiction of the Children Act, though it would not be all of them. There were 1,280 applications made last year, and around 90% of them were granted, so this is not, as was originally envisaged, a handful of young people. Are any of those young people also ill? Are noble Lords content that at 18 years and one day old they should have assisted suicide raised with them? Are they also happy that if a child has been under mental health treatment but is also physically ill, at 18 years and one day they come under the jurisdiction of this Bill? The same applies to those detained in a young offender institution. Sadly, due to the Private Member’s Bill process, I do not believe that there has been any consultation, a White Paper or pre-legislative scrutiny to flush out the details and data that we need to properly legislate.

I am grateful to the Children’s Commissioner for attending the Select Committee, but I was surprised that the Public Bill Committee in the House of Commons did not hear from her.

In addition to the issue of those who are 18 years old and one day, some of whom are still under the jurisdiction of the Children’s Commissioner until they are 25 and under the jurisdiction of the local authority, it is not wrong to say that there will be enormous societal change that affects children. I would be grateful to know, whether now or in the meeting that the noble and learned Lord has promised, whether he is aware of this group of children and what meetings he has had to establish how many would be affected at 18 years old, how many are in this group and how they can be protected by additional conditions and safeguards.

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[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I tabled Amendment 20 and I have put my name to Amendment 220, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, who is not able to be here today. I am sympathetic to Amendments 21 and 29 and to the process devised by the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, in her Amendments 30B, 265A and 443A.

A huge range of clauses—Clauses 7, 8, 10, 12, 15, 19, 20, 23, 24, 28, 29 and 30—refer to the applicant’s GP practice and the importance of keeping a GP informed. Clause 12(2)(f) includes a provision for the assessing doctor to recommend that the applicant informs their GP practice. These amendments also refer to the very relevant information that may be available from those who are close to the person seeking assisted death.

There is an assumption that the GP knows the patient and that the patient has an ongoing supportive relationship with the UK GP practice. Notwithstanding what the noble Baroness, Lady Gerada, has just said, that is no longer the case for many people. Many patients now see different clinicians on each visit. Locum and temporary staffing arrangements reduce the possibility of a GP being familiar with the patient’s condition or with the context in which they live. Home visits have almost disappeared. People in need of care often have to go to A&E, since doctors no longer visit as they once did. A major theme in UK and international data on GPs is declining continuity of care, particularly where people live in poverty or deprived areas. The Government’s equality impact assessment notes that such people experience “poorer quality healthcare”. They

“have a higher patient to GP ratio … have worse continuity of care”

and

“are more likely to struggle with navigating the healthcare system”.

Amendment 20 in my name would provide that it is not enough to be registered with the GP, but that there must be an established relationship between the GP and the patient. The GP must be able to certify that they have good knowledge of their personal circumstances, having seen the patient at least four times in the year and made at least one home visit in the last 12 months. As I said, the reality today is that many sick and elderly people do not have the relationship they might like with their GP; it is a thing of the past. Moreover, when a person moves into a residential or nursing home, they are often required to change to the GP who attends that facility and who may only have seen them on a few occasions, if at all. A GP who does not know a patient may not have the ability to make the necessary assessment.

The Select Committee heard evidence highlighting the very real inherent difficulties in detecting coercion, pressure and complex capacity issues. Making someone feel that they are a burden does not normally happen by direct coercion but is more likely to occur over a period of time. The National Care Forum stated:

“Our members are concerned that some of the people they support may sadly already see themselves as a burden. This can be financial, or just because they are now reliant on those who once relied on them. The concern is that this makes them vulnerable to deciding for this reason alone, or as a result of exploitation”.


Dr Annabel Price of the Royal College of Psychiatrists said in her evidence that coercion

“is everybody’s business. It is an area that is difficult to rule out confidently”.

It needs to be thought about throughout the process, not just at the scrutiny at the end of the panel. Professor Patel, president of the Royal College of Physicians, said in his evidence:

“Involvement of family within decision-making is important … I feel that the complex decision-making is hard. It has to be shared”.


Amendment 220 would provide a mechanism to allow GPs to consult with those who have a close interest in the applicant’s welfare when there are concerns about safeguarding capacity and undue influence. Such concerns, regrettably, often arise. Family members and close contacts may possess information which could be vital for a robust assessment and which is otherwise unavailable to the assessing medical practitioner.

Professor Katherine Sleeman said that

“complex capacity assessments do conventionally require triangulation, with input and information from the family”.

This amendment would allow access to professional records, including police and local authority records. Medical practitioners may be unaware, for example, of existing domestic abuse situations which have been reported to the police but have not made their way back to the doctor, where you have got a patient or an elderly person.

It should never be the case that the first time that somebody finds out that a family member has been granted a request for assisted dying is when they are asked to go to the mortuary to view the body. Anybody with any experience of the situation in which a person dies by suicide will know the terrible shock and trauma which ensue for surviving family and members. The reality is that, by extending the concept of autonomy to this extent, there can be a terrible impact on the ability to function of those who love the person who has died. Autonomy in this context can cause serious medical problems for those who are left behind. Autonomy, to the extent provided for in the Bill, does not ensure sufficient protection for a vulnerable—

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

Does the noble Baroness accept—because she has been quoting some of the evidence given to the Select Committee of which I was a member—that the committee was not able to hear either from people who were dying or indeed from the families who had been through what she is talking about? That was absent; we lost that. On the particular point she raises about the first time a family may know about it, might she also reflect that the evidence was that most families try to discourage somebody from taking their own life rather than the other way round?

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for her intervention. It is of course the case that the Select Committee was very truncated in its ability to hear evidence. That was a decision of the House and, although we would have preferred to hear evidence from others, it was not possible.

[Lord Markham (Con)]

I just say, if I may, as a member of the Select Committee, that it was decision by the Select Committee not to hear from terminally ill people. It was not to do with the time available; it was to do with the majority of the committee being opposed to hearing from terminally ill people.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

I cannot comment on the deliberations of the committee. I think there are others here who possibly can.

[Baroness Berger (Lab)]

My Lords, for the record, I inform the Committee that there was only one vote taken in the Select Committee. The vote was on whether the committee should receive written evidence; that vote was taken and the committee did not receive written evidence, which is a great shame because we would have heard from so many groups that people are raising in their contributions today. So, for the record, there was only one vote taken. There were many witnesses whom people on all sides wished to hear from. There was a deep regret that we were truncated and had only those three weeks to have those 13 panel sessions. If we had had more time, we would have been able to hear from many other groups. Again, for the record, only one vote was taken, which was not to take written evidence.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her intervention, which is very helpful. All I was trying to say is that we are aware of many situations in which people are subject to coercion and where there are financial and other interests that cause people to be subject to pressure or to think that perhaps they are a burden. The autonomy which currently exists in the Bill in terms of decision-making, where there is no provision for access to police and medical records, does not ensure sufficient protection for a vulnerable individual who is making an application for assisted death. That is why these amendments are important, so that the GP who is faced with dealing with the situation and all those involved can have access to other documents.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I am currently a patient, in a very minor way, at an excellent medical practice where the nurses know me well. There are five GPs; I have met two of them briefly, but they do not really know me. I have huge sympathy with these amendments, but I think this is unrealistic. Over the years that I have been at this excellent practice, I have never got to know a GP, certainly to an extent of more than twice. Since there are five, and I am extremely well looked after, I do not see any problem with it. However, the idea that you should know your GP, or rather that your GP should know you—I just do not think that happens across the country. Going by what the noble Baroness, Lady Gerada, said, that is the reality.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

My Lords, could the noble and learned Baroness possibly accept that there are situations in which patients either cannot get access to GPs or, when they do get access to GPs, have GPs with huge patient loads, which means that they cannot see the patients? While she may be in the privileged position of having five GPs, many doctors’ practices do not have that number, and people quite simply do not get access to the doctor. I am not fabricating anything as I say this, and I ask her to reflect on the fact that it is established in the Government’s equality impact assessment that there are problems with access.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

Yes, I entirely agree. That is the basis of what I am saying. I think it would be admirable if anyone who was seeking assisted dying in fact had the opportunity to be known by the local GP. All I am saying is that, yes, I am lucky, but I do not actually know my GPs. Of course, I accept what the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, says: there are many people who never meet their GPs and never have access. That is why it seems to me that what is required cannot be achieved. That is all I am saying.

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[Lord Winston (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, in fact destroys her own argument, because access to GPs, unfortunately, is still a major problem. In that respect, I greatly congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Gerada, who gave a fantastic maiden speech yesterday explaining the role of the GP and the ideal situation. The fact is, in this Chamber, there will be a number of people who, quite rightly, absolutely deplore or disagree with assisted dying, as they have every right to do.

It is also true that, in my practice many years ago, I saw patients who had requested termination of pregnancy—certainly, in more than one case. However, there is one particular patient who I remember very clearly. Several years after the Abortion Act had been agreed to and had started, I saw a patient who came into the hospital having been refused referral by a GP because he disapproved, as he was entitled to do, of abortion. She did not get a further referral. She went to an illegal practitioner in the East End of London and ended up with infection of the uterus and was in bed for several weeks with septicaemia. She did not die, but her laparotomy required her uterus, tubes and most of her pelvis to be removed. That is the risk. It is always going to be the case that individual GPs have the absolute right to decide how they might handle a particular difficult ethical issue. Of course, the problem here is that these vary from patient to patient; we have to understand that, and simply relying on the GP in this way seems to me to be deeply flawed.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

My Lords, it is very regrettable that the noble Lord had a patient in an abortion situation. We are not, in this group, discussing the doctor’s wishes or otherwise and his views about abortion. I ask the Minister, because I can hear mutterings here, what provision says that you cannot intervene in a debate where you have not been present, perhaps, at the very first moment of the debate? What is the section in the Companion that provides for that?

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, returning to the amendments that we are discussing, I want to commend the sponsors of the Bill in the sense that, when I read the Bill, multiples clauses referred to the applicant’s GP. There is an assumption, however, of an ongoing relationship with that GP. If there is not, we can come back to that. I had assumed that there is an ongoing relationship. The noble Lord, Lord Rook, has raised some of the real challenges to why that might not be realistic.

The problem is that, if there is no assumption of an ongoing relationship but simply a visit to a GP, it seems to me completely meaningless. You go in for a 10-minute meeting with a GP, which is transient and patchy at best, as they are unlikely to be able to make any clinical assessment of great merit. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, referred to the real-life situation of not seeing a GP but how pleasant it was.

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However, to be even-handed, I have a degree of sympathy with the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, who spoke very well to her Amendment 20, but when I read the amendment I thought, “Who on earth is ever going to have access to this?” Home visits are mentioned in a number of amendments. Who has ever had a home visit recently? These are a thing of the past. I know that we are all getting on, but honestly. I am confused, because I want the Bill to embody a sense of the GP being important, but that requires continuity of care.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

I remind the noble Baroness that we are talking about people who are terminally ill, not the general population.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords—

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An impending trial, whether one is bailed or remanded, or the sense of hopelessness a prison sentence can induce are particularly confounding factors when a person receives a diagnosis of terminal illness, in terms of what steps they wish to take. We cannot ignore the extent to which these factors will profoundly compromise their applications for assisted suicide, so barring them from the provisions of this Bill would be compassionate to both them and the alleged or proven victims of their crimes.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I have put my name to Amendments 22 and 24 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, and support the other amendments in this group, which relate to the fact that prisoners, people detained under a hospital order, homeless people and those who are pregnant require special care because of their situations.

Suicidal ideation and depression as a result of incarceration, with limited ability to access outside resources due to imprisonment, are very common among prisoners. One study found that 61% of elderly male prisoners had a mental disorder. Primary care mental health services are still being developed in prisons to provide for conditions such as depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder and learning disabilities. That vulnerability, combined with a terminal illness and probable lack of access to good palliative care, means that their welfare is a special responsibility of the state. Special arrangements must be made to ensure that they do not feel they have no option other than to opt for assisted death.

Suicidal ideation is also very common among the homeless. The noble Lord, Lord Bird, recently spoke eloquently in your Lordships’ House about the problem of poverty, which so often results in homelessness and the hopelessness which accompanies poverty. Solutions to things such as poverty and homelessness should not involve offering people assisted death rather than a home, possibly in sheltered accommodation, in which they may be able to flourish.

The noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, spoke eloquently about pregnancy. I want to add just a couple of things. Pregnancy is not an illness, but pregnant women are at a higher risk of mental illness. The Maternal Mental Health Alliance reported that at least one in five women develops a mental illness during pregnancy or within the first years after having a baby and that maternal death due to mental health problems is increasing and suicide remains the leading cause of death in the first year after birth.

[Baroness Berger (Lab)]

I declare an interest as chair of the Maternal Mental Health Alliance. The figures have been updated; currently, one in four women experiences a mental health condition in the perinatal period, either during pregnancy or in the two years after birth.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her intervention. I also want to raise the risk of domestic abuse, which is much higher during pregnancy. The Maternal Mental Health Alliance says that up to 30% of domestic abuse cases begin during pregnancy.

Ending someone’s life with lethal drugs while they are pregnant raises additional layers of moral, legal and medical concern—for example, consent, the viability of the baby, conflicts of interest, et cetera. Pregnancy causes drugs to be processed differently. The rate of absorption is affected by physiological changes. That could mean a slower or more prolonged death from the approved substances for both mother and child. Women are particularly vulnerable, and the safeguards just do not seem to be in the Bill at present.

The amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, in this group relate also to those up to the age of 25 who have an EHCP, which may be provided to vulnerable children, including those with special educational needs and mental health concerns.

Finally, the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, has told us that young people with complex needs may be at a higher risk of internalising negative societal values about their disabilities. The National Down Syndrome Policy Group states that people with learning disabilities can be highly suggestible and prone to acquiescence bias, agreeing with authority figures to please them.

There may also be diagnostic overshadowing, the risk that a young person’s desire to die might be as a consequence. In this context, a young person with an EHCP, for example, might request assisted dying not because their condition is intolerable but because the social care and support legally promised to them has failed to materialise, making their daily life situation unbearable. That could be misinterpreted by clinicians as a rational choice due to their disability. It is therefore the case that special provisions, such as those identified in these amendments, are necessary to ensure proper support, and that the various vulnerable groups of people do not feel that they have no choice.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I want to speak specifically to Amendment 22, about why prisoners should not be eligible for assisted dying. The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, are also pertinent here.

The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester raised the real and specific safeguard issues from the lack of medical records of prisoners, and I am sure we will hear more about the problems of medical care for prisoners. The terrible terminal diagnosis that one might get as a prisoner would be particularly frightening, I would think, because of the lack of medical care.

That is actually not my concern. Regardless of where one stands on assisted dying in general, I really hope that, when it comes to this Bill, noble Lords will consider the very particular circumstances of those incarcerated by the state. I hope the sponsors of the Bill will still be open to excluding prisoners and keeping them out of the Bill, on the basis, if nothing else, of their lack of autonomy.

I have to confess that I was rather taken aback when I heard Minister Stephen Kinnock in the other place state that excluding prisoners from this Bill would lead to a difference in treatment between prisoners and non-prisoners, an inequality, citing Article 8, private life, and Article 14, discrimination, of the ECHR. He noted that differential treatment would require objective and reasonable justification. It seems a bit shocking to me to have to explain this to a Minister, but my objective and reasonable justification is that, if you are in prison, you do not have the same rights as if you are not in prison. I did not make that up—although I know the Sentencing Bill has gone a bit liberal.

Actually, I think that, you know, you are deprived of your liberty. Many of the arguments made by the advocates of the Bill about autonomy and giving people choice towards the end of life, in particular circumstances —which I completely understand, philosophically and politically—are entirely appropriate for free people. But when you are not free and do not have autonomy, it brings with it a whole new range of ethical dilemmas.

The purpose of prison is, as I have said, to suspend certain rights from people to protect the public, to ensure deterrence and to uphold a sense of justice in society—I could go on. When the state has deprived an individual of so much autonomy, for all the criminal justice reasons we know, offering the option of an assisted death does not increase their autonomy in a meaningful way. It is saying, “Oh, well, we’re giving them choice”—but their real choice would be being able to leave. In other words, we have limited their choices.

Why does this matter? It is because, when the state decides to deprive somebody of their liberty, it is a very serious decision. For me, it is the worst possible punishment you could give: you are limited in being free, which I obviously consider to be very important. Prisoners, inevitably, are depressed: and often they are vulnerable in the first place. That is why they are prone to suicidal ideation.

Those of us who have had the privilege of doing some work with prisoners will know that we spend a lot of time tackling self-harm, with people hating themselves and the circumstances they are in. We do a lot of work on that. I and many others have worked on IPP prisoners, who are, ridiculously unfairly, still in prison indefinitely based on an abolished sentence, often for minor breaches of the law in the past. It is always shocking when you hear of another IPP prisoner who has taken their life. It is particularly horrible, as many noble Lords here have articulated far better than I can, because it is almost like it is on the state’s conscience. That is the reason why coroners make such a fuss about it. Those prisoners should not be there; they are in prison because the state made a mistake with the sentencing regime that it will not resolve and then they take their life. The state is somehow implicated in those suicides and we make a particular point of that.

Those of us who have worked in prisons will also know that suicide prevention is something we take very seriously. It does not matter how heinous the prisoner’s crime is. They could be a child abuser, a rapist or a murderer, but, if there is even a hint that they might commit suicide, there is suicide watch. We do all sorts of suicide prevention. The reason is that, as a humane society, we do not think that people should be allowed to take their own life, if at all possible. We have suicide watch in prison because the state has somebody incarcerated. Therefore, as a humane society, you take seriously not letting them kill themselves: otherwise, you could just say, “Carry on boys, it doesn’t matter”. We do not do that because we think that we have to protect those prisoners in the state’s care.

Right, I will finish. Letting prisoners have access to and be eligible for assisted death would be very close to reckless state abandonment of those prisoners to something very deeply dark. Philosophically, if a penal sentence in Britain ends up with the state effectively putting a prisoner to death via lethal drugs—I do not want to go on, but that is what would have to happen: they would be locked up in a prison, in the state’s care, the state would then make them eligible to ask for assisted dying, with limited autonomy, and would then hand them lethal drugs—that is far too like capital punishment, which I have long opposed and do not approve of. Therefore, even if you do not agree with me on the rest of the Bill being a completely difficult challenge to humanity, which I think it is, I none the less suggest that, if we pass it, we should absolutely exempt prisoners from it.