Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 12th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hollins (CB)]

My Lords, I would like to comment on this group in response to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has just said.

In its recent briefing for Peers, the Royal College of Psychiatrists gave its view:

“Assessors should be required to take all practicable steps to work with professionals involved in a person’s health and social care, and to talk to a relative, carer or nominated friend, including by accessing medical notes from both primary and secondary care”.


It expressed concern that

“a consideration of suicide protection duties are being bypassed by the Bill in its current form”

due to unmet need not being formally assessed. A previous DoLS is relevant to consideration of current capacity to decide to end one’s life. What would be the mechanism for reliably ensuring information that there has been a DoLS before it gets to the assessors and the panel?

Having mentioned the Royal College of Psychiatrists, I would like to make a short statement. The college has asked me to respond to the allegations about its leadership made by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, on 14 November, our first day in Committee. The president of the college, Dr Lade Smith, wrote to the noble Baroness asking her to withdraw her allegations, as they are inaccurate. But although the noble Baroness was present in the Chamber the following week, no clarification was provided. As a past president myself, I beg leave to set the record straight.

The college’s recommendations on the Bill are, in fact, based on 18 months’ consideration by a cross-college working group involving membership surveys, debate with members on proposals before other jurisdictions, and discussions with colleagues in other jurisdictions where assisted dying is practised. The president is clear that Dr Annabel Price, the appointed college lead for the Bill, has accurately represented its views when giving formal evidence to both Houses. With the Bill before the Lords, the Royal College of Psychiatrists is focusing on how to make it safer for people with mental health needs and learning disability needs, and better aligned with the responsibilities of psychiatrists. I feel that, in the light of the discussion on DoLS, this is an appropriate statement to make.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I have put my name to Amendment 16. I also support Amendments 16A, 114 and 114A because the very general definition in Clause 1 of a terminally ill adult who has the capacity to take their own life does not contain any consideration of those who have been deprived of their liberty under Section 4 of the Mental Capacity Act. It is an unfortunate reality that many of those detained in hospitals or care homes are detained because they lack the capacity to make a decision about their own care or treatment. As the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, said, in such circumstances it is surely axiomatic that there should be careful consideration of cases involving individuals subject to a DoLS.

As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said, even assessing the capacity of someone with dementia or another neurological condition, for example, can be profoundly difficult. This is not just because of the frequent fluctuation of both capacity and the extent to which any identified capacity enables the making of a particular decision; a medical practitioner or social worker who meets a person for the first time may be misled as to the capacity they actually have. As the Royal College of Psychiatrists noted in its written evidence,

“an assessment of a person’s mental capacity to decide to end their own life is an entirely different and more complex determination requiring a higher level of understanding”

than in other assessments of capacity.

In the 1997 case of Re MB, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said:

“The graver the consequences of the decision, the commensurately greater the level of competence required to take the decision”.


Capacity assessment is not a precise science. The unique context of this Bill makes taking a cautious approach appropriate. It is common sense that there is a likely correlation between incapacity in one area, so extreme that the state must deprive the person of their liberty, and incapacity to decide whether to end one’s own life. People whose incapacity for basic decisions is so severe that they are deprived of their liberty are the most vulnerable members of society.

I want to give your Lordships a brief example. I was aware of a woman in her late 80s who had been assessed and was subject to a DoLS. She objected to it and appealed against it. Intellectually, she was enormously able, possessed of considerable social skills despite her dementia. She was able to persuade those dealing with her appeal that she had capacity despite the very real concerns of her family, who knew the extent of her incapacity. The DoLS was lifted and she went back to her own home. Shortly afterwards, she was found playing golf in the road in her pyjamas at two o’clock in the morning. She was going to the supermarket at 4 am. She was leaving the door unlocked all night for her husband and cooking his dinner every night; he had died some 20 years previously.

That lady was my mother. She certainly would not have understood a suggestion that she should opt for an assisted death. The DoLS was subsequently reinstated. This is not an unusual situation. If the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, rejects these amendments, how does he consider that such vulnerable individuals can be protected from making this final decision, although they may not understand exactly what they are doing?

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon (Lab)]

My Lords, forgive me. What the noble Baroness is saying is extremely interesting, but the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has already said that he will seek a meeting with the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and all other noble Lords who are interested in this. He is not rejecting the amendments; he is willing to enter into a discussion.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

I thank the noble Baroness for that helpful intervention, but we do not know what the outcome of that meeting will be. I think I have the right to make my remarks.

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to the amendments in this group. I did not table one in my name about a group of people who are also subject to deprivation of liberty safeguards. I am pleased to hear the noble and learned Lord repeat his offer of a meeting, which was made last Friday. I was disappointed not to receive an invitation to a group meeting to discuss the various groups of vulnerable people who may need additional conditions. Had there been such a meeting, I would not be taking up time today or on the later group, where I had offered to withdraw amendments had a meeting taken place.

There is another group of people under deprivation of liberty safeguards who are not under the Mental Capacity Act. These are young people who are under the High Court jurisdiction of deprivation of liberty safeguards—called High Court DoLS. I thank the President of the Family Division for ensuring that there is research available on this group and the Children’s Commissioner, who has visited very many of them. Those young people are so troubled that their liberty needs to be restricted, but they cannot currently be detained under Section 25 of the Children Act in a secure children’s home. That was for a variety of reasons. One was that we ran out of places, but another was that some of them were in such a situation that they could not even bear a communal secure environment like that.

I did not table an amendment also because under the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill these young people will possibly be brought under the statutory jurisdiction of the Children Act, though it would not be all of them. There were 1,280 applications made last year, and around 90% of them were granted, so this is not, as was originally envisaged, a handful of young people. Are any of those young people also ill? Are noble Lords content that at 18 years and one day old they should have assisted suicide raised with them? Are they also happy that if a child has been under mental health treatment but is also physically ill, at 18 years and one day they come under the jurisdiction of this Bill? The same applies to those detained in a young offender institution. Sadly, due to the Private Member’s Bill process, I do not believe that there has been any consultation, a White Paper or pre-legislative scrutiny to flush out the details and data that we need to properly legislate.

I am grateful to the Children’s Commissioner for attending the Select Committee, but I was surprised that the Public Bill Committee in the House of Commons did not hear from her.

In addition to the issue of those who are 18 years old and one day, some of whom are still under the jurisdiction of the Children’s Commissioner until they are 25 and under the jurisdiction of the local authority, it is not wrong to say that there will be enormous societal change that affects children. I would be grateful to know, whether now or in the meeting that the noble and learned Lord has promised, whether he is aware of this group of children and what meetings he has had to establish how many would be affected at 18 years old, how many are in this group and how they can be protected by additional conditions and safeguards.

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[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I tabled Amendment 20 and I have put my name to Amendment 220, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, who is not able to be here today. I am sympathetic to Amendments 21 and 29 and to the process devised by the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, in her Amendments 30B, 265A and 443A.

A huge range of clauses—Clauses 7, 8, 10, 12, 15, 19, 20, 23, 24, 28, 29 and 30—refer to the applicant’s GP practice and the importance of keeping a GP informed. Clause 12(2)(f) includes a provision for the assessing doctor to recommend that the applicant informs their GP practice. These amendments also refer to the very relevant information that may be available from those who are close to the person seeking assisted death.

There is an assumption that the GP knows the patient and that the patient has an ongoing supportive relationship with the UK GP practice. Notwithstanding what the noble Baroness, Lady Gerada, has just said, that is no longer the case for many people. Many patients now see different clinicians on each visit. Locum and temporary staffing arrangements reduce the possibility of a GP being familiar with the patient’s condition or with the context in which they live. Home visits have almost disappeared. People in need of care often have to go to A&E, since doctors no longer visit as they once did. A major theme in UK and international data on GPs is declining continuity of care, particularly where people live in poverty or deprived areas. The Government’s equality impact assessment notes that such people experience “poorer quality healthcare”. They

“have a higher patient to GP ratio … have worse continuity of care”

and

“are more likely to struggle with navigating the healthcare system”.

Amendment 20 in my name would provide that it is not enough to be registered with the GP, but that there must be an established relationship between the GP and the patient. The GP must be able to certify that they have good knowledge of their personal circumstances, having seen the patient at least four times in the year and made at least one home visit in the last 12 months. As I said, the reality today is that many sick and elderly people do not have the relationship they might like with their GP; it is a thing of the past. Moreover, when a person moves into a residential or nursing home, they are often required to change to the GP who attends that facility and who may only have seen them on a few occasions, if at all. A GP who does not know a patient may not have the ability to make the necessary assessment.

The Select Committee heard evidence highlighting the very real inherent difficulties in detecting coercion, pressure and complex capacity issues. Making someone feel that they are a burden does not normally happen by direct coercion but is more likely to occur over a period of time. The National Care Forum stated:

“Our members are concerned that some of the people they support may sadly already see themselves as a burden. This can be financial, or just because they are now reliant on those who once relied on them. The concern is that this makes them vulnerable to deciding for this reason alone, or as a result of exploitation”.


Dr Annabel Price of the Royal College of Psychiatrists said in her evidence that coercion

“is everybody’s business. It is an area that is difficult to rule out confidently”.

It needs to be thought about throughout the process, not just at the scrutiny at the end of the panel. Professor Patel, president of the Royal College of Physicians, said in his evidence:

“Involvement of family within decision-making is important … I feel that the complex decision-making is hard. It has to be shared”.


Amendment 220 would provide a mechanism to allow GPs to consult with those who have a close interest in the applicant’s welfare when there are concerns about safeguarding capacity and undue influence. Such concerns, regrettably, often arise. Family members and close contacts may possess information which could be vital for a robust assessment and which is otherwise unavailable to the assessing medical practitioner.

Professor Katherine Sleeman said that

“complex capacity assessments do conventionally require triangulation, with input and information from the family”.

This amendment would allow access to professional records, including police and local authority records. Medical practitioners may be unaware, for example, of existing domestic abuse situations which have been reported to the police but have not made their way back to the doctor, where you have got a patient or an elderly person.

It should never be the case that the first time that somebody finds out that a family member has been granted a request for assisted dying is when they are asked to go to the mortuary to view the body. Anybody with any experience of the situation in which a person dies by suicide will know the terrible shock and trauma which ensue for surviving family and members. The reality is that, by extending the concept of autonomy to this extent, there can be a terrible impact on the ability to function of those who love the person who has died. Autonomy in this context can cause serious medical problems for those who are left behind. Autonomy, to the extent provided for in the Bill, does not ensure sufficient protection for a vulnerable—

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

Does the noble Baroness accept—because she has been quoting some of the evidence given to the Select Committee of which I was a member—that the committee was not able to hear either from people who were dying or indeed from the families who had been through what she is talking about? That was absent; we lost that. On the particular point she raises about the first time a family may know about it, might she also reflect that the evidence was that most families try to discourage somebody from taking their own life rather than the other way round?

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for her intervention. It is of course the case that the Select Committee was very truncated in its ability to hear evidence. That was a decision of the House and, although we would have preferred to hear evidence from others, it was not possible.

[Lord Markham (Con)]

I just say, if I may, as a member of the Select Committee, that it was decision by the Select Committee not to hear from terminally ill people. It was not to do with the time available; it was to do with the majority of the committee being opposed to hearing from terminally ill people.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

I cannot comment on the deliberations of the committee. I think there are others here who possibly can.

[Baroness Berger (Lab)]

My Lords, for the record, I inform the Committee that there was only one vote taken in the Select Committee. The vote was on whether the committee should receive written evidence; that vote was taken and the committee did not receive written evidence, which is a great shame because we would have heard from so many groups that people are raising in their contributions today. So, for the record, there was only one vote taken. There were many witnesses whom people on all sides wished to hear from. There was a deep regret that we were truncated and had only those three weeks to have those 13 panel sessions. If we had had more time, we would have been able to hear from many other groups. Again, for the record, only one vote was taken, which was not to take written evidence.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her intervention, which is very helpful. All I was trying to say is that we are aware of many situations in which people are subject to coercion and where there are financial and other interests that cause people to be subject to pressure or to think that perhaps they are a burden. The autonomy which currently exists in the Bill in terms of decision-making, where there is no provision for access to police and medical records, does not ensure sufficient protection for a vulnerable individual who is making an application for assisted death. That is why these amendments are important, so that the GP who is faced with dealing with the situation and all those involved can have access to other documents.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I am currently a patient, in a very minor way, at an excellent medical practice where the nurses know me well. There are five GPs; I have met two of them briefly, but they do not really know me. I have huge sympathy with these amendments, but I think this is unrealistic. Over the years that I have been at this excellent practice, I have never got to know a GP, certainly to an extent of more than twice. Since there are five, and I am extremely well looked after, I do not see any problem with it. However, the idea that you should know your GP, or rather that your GP should know you—I just do not think that happens across the country. Going by what the noble Baroness, Lady Gerada, said, that is the reality.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

My Lords, could the noble and learned Baroness possibly accept that there are situations in which patients either cannot get access to GPs or, when they do get access to GPs, have GPs with huge patient loads, which means that they cannot see the patients? While she may be in the privileged position of having five GPs, many doctors’ practices do not have that number, and people quite simply do not get access to the doctor. I am not fabricating anything as I say this, and I ask her to reflect on the fact that it is established in the Government’s equality impact assessment that there are problems with access.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

Yes, I entirely agree. That is the basis of what I am saying. I think it would be admirable if anyone who was seeking assisted dying in fact had the opportunity to be known by the local GP. All I am saying is that, yes, I am lucky, but I do not actually know my GPs. Of course, I accept what the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, says: there are many people who never meet their GPs and never have access. That is why it seems to me that what is required cannot be achieved. That is all I am saying.

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[Lord Winston (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, in fact destroys her own argument, because access to GPs, unfortunately, is still a major problem. In that respect, I greatly congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Gerada, who gave a fantastic maiden speech yesterday explaining the role of the GP and the ideal situation. The fact is, in this Chamber, there will be a number of people who, quite rightly, absolutely deplore or disagree with assisted dying, as they have every right to do.

It is also true that, in my practice many years ago, I saw patients who had requested termination of pregnancy—certainly, in more than one case. However, there is one particular patient who I remember very clearly. Several years after the Abortion Act had been agreed to and had started, I saw a patient who came into the hospital having been refused referral by a GP because he disapproved, as he was entitled to do, of abortion. She did not get a further referral. She went to an illegal practitioner in the East End of London and ended up with infection of the uterus and was in bed for several weeks with septicaemia. She did not die, but her laparotomy required her uterus, tubes and most of her pelvis to be removed. That is the risk. It is always going to be the case that individual GPs have the absolute right to decide how they might handle a particular difficult ethical issue. Of course, the problem here is that these vary from patient to patient; we have to understand that, and simply relying on the GP in this way seems to me to be deeply flawed.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

My Lords, it is very regrettable that the noble Lord had a patient in an abortion situation. We are not, in this group, discussing the doctor’s wishes or otherwise and his views about abortion. I ask the Minister, because I can hear mutterings here, what provision says that you cannot intervene in a debate where you have not been present, perhaps, at the very first moment of the debate? What is the section in the Companion that provides for that?

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, returning to the amendments that we are discussing, I want to commend the sponsors of the Bill in the sense that, when I read the Bill, multiples clauses referred to the applicant’s GP. There is an assumption, however, of an ongoing relationship with that GP. If there is not, we can come back to that. I had assumed that there is an ongoing relationship. The noble Lord, Lord Rook, has raised some of the real challenges to why that might not be realistic.

The problem is that, if there is no assumption of an ongoing relationship but simply a visit to a GP, it seems to me completely meaningless. You go in for a 10-minute meeting with a GP, which is transient and patchy at best, as they are unlikely to be able to make any clinical assessment of great merit. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, referred to the real-life situation of not seeing a GP but how pleasant it was.

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However, to be even-handed, I have a degree of sympathy with the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, who spoke very well to her Amendment 20, but when I read the amendment I thought, “Who on earth is ever going to have access to this?” Home visits are mentioned in a number of amendments. Who has ever had a home visit recently? These are a thing of the past. I know that we are all getting on, but honestly. I am confused, because I want the Bill to embody a sense of the GP being important, but that requires continuity of care.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

I remind the noble Baroness that we are talking about people who are terminally ill, not the general population.

[Baroness Lawlor (Con)]

My Lords—

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An impending trial, whether one is bailed or remanded, or the sense of hopelessness a prison sentence can induce are particularly confounding factors when a person receives a diagnosis of terminal illness, in terms of what steps they wish to take. We cannot ignore the extent to which these factors will profoundly compromise their applications for assisted suicide, so barring them from the provisions of this Bill would be compassionate to both them and the alleged or proven victims of their crimes.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I have put my name to Amendments 22 and 24 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, and support the other amendments in this group, which relate to the fact that prisoners, people detained under a hospital order, homeless people and those who are pregnant require special care because of their situations.

Suicidal ideation and depression as a result of incarceration, with limited ability to access outside resources due to imprisonment, are very common among prisoners. One study found that 61% of elderly male prisoners had a mental disorder. Primary care mental health services are still being developed in prisons to provide for conditions such as depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder and learning disabilities. That vulnerability, combined with a terminal illness and probable lack of access to good palliative care, means that their welfare is a special responsibility of the state. Special arrangements must be made to ensure that they do not feel they have no option other than to opt for assisted death.

Suicidal ideation is also very common among the homeless. The noble Lord, Lord Bird, recently spoke eloquently in your Lordships’ House about the problem of poverty, which so often results in homelessness and the hopelessness which accompanies poverty. Solutions to things such as poverty and homelessness should not involve offering people assisted death rather than a home, possibly in sheltered accommodation, in which they may be able to flourish.

The noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, spoke eloquently about pregnancy. I want to add just a couple of things. Pregnancy is not an illness, but pregnant women are at a higher risk of mental illness. The Maternal Mental Health Alliance reported that at least one in five women develops a mental illness during pregnancy or within the first years after having a baby and that maternal death due to mental health problems is increasing and suicide remains the leading cause of death in the first year after birth.

[Baroness Berger (Lab)]

I declare an interest as chair of the Maternal Mental Health Alliance. The figures have been updated; currently, one in four women experiences a mental health condition in the perinatal period, either during pregnancy or in the two years after birth.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

I thank the noble Baroness for her intervention. I also want to raise the risk of domestic abuse, which is much higher during pregnancy. The Maternal Mental Health Alliance says that up to 30% of domestic abuse cases begin during pregnancy.

Ending someone’s life with lethal drugs while they are pregnant raises additional layers of moral, legal and medical concern—for example, consent, the viability of the baby, conflicts of interest, et cetera. Pregnancy causes drugs to be processed differently. The rate of absorption is affected by physiological changes. That could mean a slower or more prolonged death from the approved substances for both mother and child. Women are particularly vulnerable, and the safeguards just do not seem to be in the Bill at present.

The amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, in this group relate also to those up to the age of 25 who have an EHCP, which may be provided to vulnerable children, including those with special educational needs and mental health concerns.

Finally, the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, has told us that young people with complex needs may be at a higher risk of internalising negative societal values about their disabilities. The National Down Syndrome Policy Group states that people with learning disabilities can be highly suggestible and prone to acquiescence bias, agreeing with authority figures to please them.

There may also be diagnostic overshadowing, the risk that a young person’s desire to die might be as a consequence. In this context, a young person with an EHCP, for example, might request assisted dying not because their condition is intolerable but because the social care and support legally promised to them has failed to materialise, making their daily life situation unbearable. That could be misinterpreted by clinicians as a rational choice due to their disability. It is therefore the case that special provisions, such as those identified in these amendments, are necessary to ensure proper support, and that the various vulnerable groups of people do not feel that they have no choice.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I want to speak specifically to Amendment 22, about why prisoners should not be eligible for assisted dying. The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, are also pertinent here.

The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester raised the real and specific safeguard issues from the lack of medical records of prisoners, and I am sure we will hear more about the problems of medical care for prisoners. The terrible terminal diagnosis that one might get as a prisoner would be particularly frightening, I would think, because of the lack of medical care.

That is actually not my concern. Regardless of where one stands on assisted dying in general, I really hope that, when it comes to this Bill, noble Lords will consider the very particular circumstances of those incarcerated by the state. I hope the sponsors of the Bill will still be open to excluding prisoners and keeping them out of the Bill, on the basis, if nothing else, of their lack of autonomy.

I have to confess that I was rather taken aback when I heard Minister Stephen Kinnock in the other place state that excluding prisoners from this Bill would lead to a difference in treatment between prisoners and non-prisoners, an inequality, citing Article 8, private life, and Article 14, discrimination, of the ECHR. He noted that differential treatment would require objective and reasonable justification. It seems a bit shocking to me to have to explain this to a Minister, but my objective and reasonable justification is that, if you are in prison, you do not have the same rights as if you are not in prison. I did not make that up—although I know the Sentencing Bill has gone a bit liberal.

Actually, I think that, you know, you are deprived of your liberty. Many of the arguments made by the advocates of the Bill about autonomy and giving people choice towards the end of life, in particular circumstances —which I completely understand, philosophically and politically—are entirely appropriate for free people. But when you are not free and do not have autonomy, it brings with it a whole new range of ethical dilemmas.

The purpose of prison is, as I have said, to suspend certain rights from people to protect the public, to ensure deterrence and to uphold a sense of justice in society—I could go on. When the state has deprived an individual of so much autonomy, for all the criminal justice reasons we know, offering the option of an assisted death does not increase their autonomy in a meaningful way. It is saying, “Oh, well, we’re giving them choice”—but their real choice would be being able to leave. In other words, we have limited their choices.

Why does this matter? It is because, when the state decides to deprive somebody of their liberty, it is a very serious decision. For me, it is the worst possible punishment you could give: you are limited in being free, which I obviously consider to be very important. Prisoners, inevitably, are depressed: and often they are vulnerable in the first place. That is why they are prone to suicidal ideation.

Those of us who have had the privilege of doing some work with prisoners will know that we spend a lot of time tackling self-harm, with people hating themselves and the circumstances they are in. We do a lot of work on that. I and many others have worked on IPP prisoners, who are, ridiculously unfairly, still in prison indefinitely based on an abolished sentence, often for minor breaches of the law in the past. It is always shocking when you hear of another IPP prisoner who has taken their life. It is particularly horrible, as many noble Lords here have articulated far better than I can, because it is almost like it is on the state’s conscience. That is the reason why coroners make such a fuss about it. Those prisoners should not be there; they are in prison because the state made a mistake with the sentencing regime that it will not resolve and then they take their life. The state is somehow implicated in those suicides and we make a particular point of that.

Those of us who have worked in prisons will also know that suicide prevention is something we take very seriously. It does not matter how heinous the prisoner’s crime is. They could be a child abuser, a rapist or a murderer, but, if there is even a hint that they might commit suicide, there is suicide watch. We do all sorts of suicide prevention. The reason is that, as a humane society, we do not think that people should be allowed to take their own life, if at all possible. We have suicide watch in prison because the state has somebody incarcerated. Therefore, as a humane society, you take seriously not letting them kill themselves: otherwise, you could just say, “Carry on boys, it doesn’t matter”. We do not do that because we think that we have to protect those prisoners in the state’s care.

Right, I will finish. Letting prisoners have access to and be eligible for assisted death would be very close to reckless state abandonment of those prisoners to something very deeply dark. Philosophically, if a penal sentence in Britain ends up with the state effectively putting a prisoner to death via lethal drugs—I do not want to go on, but that is what would have to happen: they would be locked up in a prison, in the state’s care, the state would then make them eligible to ask for assisted dying, with limited autonomy, and would then hand them lethal drugs—that is far too like capital punishment, which I have long opposed and do not approve of. Therefore, even if you do not agree with me on the rest of the Bill being a completely difficult challenge to humanity, which I think it is, I none the less suggest that, if we pass it, we should absolutely exempt prisoners from it.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 5th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Shinkwin (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak on Amendment 405. It is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, and to echo some of the points she touched on. I clarify that of course the amendment is in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. I do so because, as a disabled person who was on the National Disability Council in the late 1990s developing codes of practice and advising the then Government on the importance of language—a point that the noble Baroness has just mentioned—I fail to see how changing the Bill’s wording from

“must first ensure the provision of adjustments for language and literacy barriers”,

which was the language of the amendment adopted by the other place, to “take all reasonable steps” can do anything other than weaken this Bill.

The noble and learned Lord would have us believe that this is just a drafting change; indeed, he said in his opening remarks that it makes it “clearer”. I contend that this is no drafting change because, yes, it changes the sense of meaning. The amendment would take us backwards because it would fundamentally weaken one of the Bill’s safeguards, such as they are, which was inserted as a result of Jack Abbott’s Committee amendment in the other place, and which the Bill’s sponsor in the other place described as “very sensible”—she was happy to support it.

I have a few questions for the noble and learned Lord that I would be grateful if he could answer in his closing remarks. Is this Committee being asked to believe that today the Bill’s sponsor in the other place is happy for the noble and learned Lord, in effect, to overrule her? Can he confirm in his closing remarks that she and Mr Abbott have been consulted, or is it that, together, the noble and learned Lord and Ms Leadbeater have decided to water down one of the few safeguards in the Bill because, well, it is only the House of Lords so no one is going to notice? The whole point of the Bill is to make it as easy as possible for people to have assisted dying, so let us minimise the constraints.

I began my career at the Royal National Institute for Deaf People during the first Blair Government. It was an exciting time. To the credit of Tony Blair and the noble Lord, Lord Hutton, who was Health Secretary, digital hearing aids were introduced on the NHS. The RNID, when I worked there, was listened to, and it should be now. So could the noble and learned Lord explain why this amendment implicitly ignores the finding made this year by the RNID and SignHealth in their report that some patients did not understand their diagnosis or treatment?

As a disabled person, I thank our Labour colleagues most sincerely. I know that I owe a debt to the Labour Party’s long-standing and noble—in the true sense of the word—commitment to advancing disability rights. However, this amendment underlines an inescapable but painful truth. The Bill makes a mockery of that fine, noble and honourable tradition. It shreds a tradition that deserves to be preserved, not sacrificed in such a profoundly cynical and misleading way as to make out, as the amendment does, that this is somehow only a drafting change.

There is a reason why not one organisation of or for disabled people supports the Bill; they know that disabled people need the Bill like a hole in the head. I marvel that the noble and learned Lord does not seem to realise that the Bill is dangerous enough already without the removal of provisions that would at least acknowledge the obligation to first ensure that communication adjustments were made; for example, for people with learning disabilities or users of British Sign Language.

The last thing that we as a House should be doing is endorsing an attempt to make the Bill an even poorer piece of proposed legislation than it already is. Noble Lords could be forgiven for thinking that that was not possible, but, as the noble and learned Lord’s Amendment 405 clearly states, he is perfectly capable of making his poorly drafted Bill even worse.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

My Lords, could the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, clarify for me the impact of Amendment 290 and whether it deals with matters of coercive control and economic abuse effectively for the purposes of the legislation? I ask this because Amendment 290 would remove

“including coercive control and financial abuse”

from the Bill. The same principle applies to Amendment 366, while Amendment 931 would remove the requirement for members of a panel to receive training on coercive control and financial abuse.

Even taking into account the Domestic Abuse Act, which I will come back to in a moment, there is a difference between coercion and pressure and coercive control and abuse. It is for that reason that I support the comments previously made about, for example, Kim Leadbeater in the Commons being pleased to support mandated training on domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse, and the Health Minister in the Commons Committee noting that the amendment would require training regulations to include

“mandatory training relating to domestic abuse, including coercive control and financial abuse”,—[Official Report, Commons, 18/3/25; col. 1212.]

which clearly would ramp up the requirement.

However, the definition of domestic abuse in Section 1 of the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 refers to behaviour in the context of personal relationships—persons who are connected—and there is a list of the persons who are connected. Section 1(4) of the Act does not cover those who are not personally connected but who may be capable of having enormous influence upon people on behalf of those who are. I think, for example, of financial advisers, lawyers and even doctors, people like that, who may be able to put pressure on people, and we have seen situations in which such pressure has been brought to bear. Does the noble and learned Lord consider that the situations in which pressure may be brought to bear by someone not personally connected should be otherwise provided for?

This group also contains amendments to Clauses 10 and 13, the provisions in relation to the situation in which a doctor is unable or unwilling to act as the independent doctor. There are provisions in Amendments 332, 418 and 419 for a further referral if a doctor is unable or unwilling to continue. His reasons for unwillingness could include ethical concerns or suspicions of undue influence on the patient. Despite the fact that there is a provision that he can seek specialist advice on this issue, there may be a situation in which the doctor will simply withdraw from the process. The single additional referral was approved in the other place to protect the patient, but these amendments would enable doctor shopping to occur. We will come back to that in group 44. Moreover, if a doctor withdraws from completing the process because of suspicions of possible or undue influence, the reason must surely be recorded.

Amendment 405 would remove from the Bill the requirement to have regard to “language and literacy barriers”, replacing it with the new more general requirement to

“take all reasonable steps to ensure … effective communication”.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, explained during the previous debate the extent to which people with a disability have complex needs, which must be satisfied to enable understanding. The inclusion of “all reasonable steps” et cetera introduces a far less specific test, and consideration must be given to setting standards for the level of communication which is required. I have to ask the noble and learned Lord: does this amendment inadvertently disadvantage those with specific learning difficulties and similar vulnerable groups?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

The reason it is covered already is that the Bill says that the training must cover domestic abuse. Domestic abuse is defined by reference to the Domestic Abuse Act 2021. Domestic abuse in the 2021 Act includes coercion, control and economic abuse. That is how there is a mandatory requirement in the Bill for all those things to be covered.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

The definition of economic abuse in the Domestic Abuse Act is limited to actions that will prevent the person getting money or being able to spend money, if I remember correctly. There could well be financial abuse, depriving a person of very large sums of money, while they are still able to get money and spend money, so I think it needs further thought.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I will certainly give it thought, but my reading of the definition of domestic abuse in the Domestic Abuse Act 2021 is that it is an effective means of covering the sort of economic abuse habitually seen between domestic partners. I think that covers it but, because of my respect for the noble Baroness, I will certainly look at whether it needs to be expanded. What the noble Baroness is referring to is a problem in the definition of domestic abuse generally in relation to economic abuse, which I do not think is there and was certainly not the intention of the 2021 Act.

I turn to the other issues. First, on “other than illness”, this is about when one or other of the two doctors withdraws from the process without giving a reason—simply withdrawing from the process. I completely understand what the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is saying, which is that if someone is withdrawing because they think the person is being pressured, that must be recorded somewhere and any other doctors must be able to see it. What we are dealing with here is not that situation. We are simply dealing with a doctor who withdraws and gives no reason. Should the patient have to establish that there is a good reason for the withdrawal, or is it enough that the doctor has withdrawn and is no longer willing to participate? All the amendment does is to say, “If you can’t or won’t go on, you can get another doctor”, which is not a change in sense but makes clear what those provisions are. When I say “those provisions”, I am referring to those that allow for a replacement doctor when one of the other doctors—the originally appointed one—cannot go on.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 21st November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, I am not a lawyer, and it is dangerous to follow the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but I think on this occasion he is mistaken. The fact that this kind of protection is not there until this Bill does not actually mean anything—perhaps it should have been there in any case—but, if we are going to have this protection, it needs to be proper protection.

I say to those who, at least today, live a privileged life that they ought to remember that there are many people in this country who, for the first time, are within touching distance of large sums of money, because the housing situation means that there are many old people who have houses of a value that those families have never seen ever before—grandma’s £200,000. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that, as somebody who was a Member of Parliament for 40 years and works now in a community, that this is a very real fact, and we just have to accept that some people in this House are a long way away from those people. I was brought up in a slum parish by a clergyman. I have spent my life trying to deal with the very people we are talking about. I think these amendments are crucially important, because we are talking about circumstances which we are about to change deeply.

The fact is that the Bill itself changes the way in which we think about old age and infirmity. I desperately want people to know that they are always valuable and always got something to give, even at the end of life. This Bill removes that. If we are going to have it— I hope we will not, but if we are going to—we must make sure that people are protected not just from coercion but from encouragement, which I am afraid is sometimes driven by a sort of misunderstanding of what we can give. I can see people who will say, “You know that your grandson is in some real difficulty. You have a last opportunity to do something worthwhile. If you die now, your house will save his marriage, will save his firm and will look after his future”. That is what will happen. We, who are in happier circumstances, should just remember that we have a deep responsibility for those people.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

My Lords, these amendments seek to prevent and/or identify coercive behaviours and pressure which may fall short of coercion, and situations in which vulnerable people may be encouraged to make what is actually an involuntary decision to end their own life that they would not otherwise have made. There is no definition of coercion or pressure in the Bill, although new offences are created by Clause 34. That is unfortunate.

Arrangements made did not enable the taking of evidence from those with disabilities until the recent Select Committee on the Bill. Liz Carr said in evidence to that committee:

“The absence of our … involvement has led to disability rights organisations making a formal complaint to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities”.


That is very serious. We know that 40% of those who die by assisted dying in Canada have lived with disabilities.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)]

I moved from my position at the front, because there was a presumption that I was the Front-Bench spokesman trying to force something. I apologise; I was not. This House has a free vote, and nobody is whipped. I happened to be sitting on the Front Bench, and I have moved back; I understand the alarm I may have caused by standing up then, but I was not trying to derail the debate. I was just trying to be helpful, because lots of people have spoken, and I respect every single person who is doing so in the House—for and against. Within my own party we have the same difficulties.

It is about evidence. I want to help the House today, on the specific premise of coercion. Sir Max Hill, the former Director of Public Prosecution, said that

“throughout the time that I served as DPP … we did not have the coercion offences created by the Bill, which I suggest would be a significant advance, and nor did we have a legal system in which the investigation was taking place before the death. … The major advantage of the Bill, if I can put it that way, is that … scrutiny will be before death”.—[Official Report, Commons, Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill Committee, 28/1/25; col. 86.]

That comes to one of the points the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, made—that when you are dead, it is too late to find out what has gone on.

In the other place, mandatory specific training on domestic violence, including coercive control and financial abuse, was introduced into the Bill and agreed through an amendment tabled by Jess Asato MP. Participating doctors and members of the multidisciplinary panel will have to undergo specific training in this area, as well as in assessing mental capacity. I believe there are now safeguards in the Bill—I think that was what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, was alluding to.

It seems to me that we in the House think this is the first time this has ever happened, but the fact is that 300 million people across five continents have some form of assisted dying legislation. Not one of those countries has ever repealed it. It is right that we make it the safest and the best, and that the amendments be debated at length.

Noble Lords should forgive the cynicism of those who support the Bill—one Member said last week, causing some humour in the House, that they were sorry they came second to another Member in getting amendments down. This is not a competition; this is about getting the Bill right and fit for purpose.

I find it quite amusing when I see the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Carlile— it is worth the admission fee just to see the interaction. The points from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, were right about trying to come to a conclusion and move forward. It is right that everybody speak, but that we speak to the amendments and try to get to a conclusion.

The noble Lord, Lord Dodds, is right: we should give it time. But we do not have time. We have four Fridays and no more. The Government have said they are not going to give way. If we do not finish the debate on these amendments, which are increasing every day—I believe we are up to 1,500 now—the Bill falls. Somebody—not me but someone else—might say, “Well, it is somebody’s objective that we run out of time; then we can stand here wringing our hands and say that we were just trying to make it the best Bill we could but we ran out of time and are very sorry”. That is not acceptable. Our role here is to ensure that legislation goes back to the other place, fit for purpose and the best we can make it. Somehow, we have to distil these amendments into something understandable.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

I do not want to interrupt the noble Lord for very long. I just wanted to ask him this: is he aware that this House has the right to reject this Bill should it choose to do so? It is a Private Member’s Bill, and there are no conventions that apply in that situation. It is important that the House fulfils its scrutiny role. Another Bill could be brought forward that might be very different, but this is the Bill we are asked to debate, and we will debate it as best we can to improve it as best we can.

[Lord Goddard of Stockport (LD)]

And if we run out of time at the end of that, the Bill falls. Someone will say, “it is not our fault”, but it is our fault.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

I have a very quick question. I cannot find in the Bill the powers that would allow the doctors to carry out the investigation to which the noble and learned Lord has repeatedly referred. If people do not co-operate, that is it.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

With the greatest respect, the noble Baroness has missed the point. If, for example, a person says to the doctor, “I’m not telling you things”, the doctor can never be satisfied. That is the protection.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Committee stage
Friday 14th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I declare my registered interest as a trustee of St John & St Elizabeth Hospital in London.

The first clause sets the tone for the rest of the Bill. It has so many deficiencies and such inherent danger that it has rendered necessary the tabling of so many amendments. Multiple amendments were, of course, tabled in Committee in the other place, but they were not permitted to be debated or voted on. Our duty is therefore to scrutinise the Bill, not to meet arbitrary timetables and a limited number of Committee days. We have to do it properly, because on this work that we do rest questions of life and death.

Clause 1 deals with the “who”; who can decide to end their life with medical support or to be assisted to end their own life when they cannot do it themselves. The definition of “who” is simple and sparse. It demands only that someone has capacity, has reached the age of 18, is ordinarily resident here and is registered with a GP. Clause 1 also deals with what is required—the process for determining. It requires that any decision made by a person who fits the definition in Clause 1 is made by someone with

“a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life, and … has made the decision … voluntarily”,

and who is not the product of coercion or pressure. We will come to that, but it is not enough.

The decision to end one’s own life is the most profound decision that one can make. One might argue that some decisions are not as immediately serious. If, in a fit of despair or loss of hope, I decide to refuse treatment, I might still change my mind. Similarly, if I stop eating, I may choose to reverse that decision. If I decide to end my life, there is no coming back and no reconsideration, and that is why it is such an important matter.

I think the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred to advanced directives in these provisions, by which people can declare their future care, but the decision to refuse treatment and go for a natural death is not a proactive decision to end life. There is no precedent for the Mental Capacity Act being used for a decision to end life.

[Baroness Murphy (CB)]

I would like to briefly intervene, because every day of the week there are hundreds of decisions made in the NHS and independent care about life and death. I will give a very brief example. My brother has had renal failure for 40 years. He has been brilliantly looked after by Guy’s Hospital, and, after the failure of the last transplant, he has been on dialysis for the last five years. It has become more and more wearing and disabling for him, and he has decided that, by Christmas, he would like to make the final decision, with the help and the support that he is getting from the Guy’s team, to end his life.

He is supported in that by his wife, brother, sister and children. We have supported him to make his own decision. It is a life and death decision that he will be supported through. That is the way it happens, day in, day out, in the health service. It is a nonsense to say that life and death decisions are not made. Furthermore, what test will they use? They will use the Mental Capacity Act.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness has told us a very sad story about her brother, but it really is not on the issue that I am speaking of today. It is, of course, the case that decisions about life and death are made. What I am saying is that, in this case, the decision is to ask the state to enable the person to administer that, and for the state to bring all the forces and resources available to do it. That is what we are debating today: does the Bill provide a situation in which “capacity” is the correct term to use in this clause?

I support Amendment 2. The use of the word “capacity” is undoubtedly provided for in the Mental Capacity Act. This Bill says that

“references to a person having capacity are to be read in accordance with the Mental Capacity Act”,

which is very helpful. The Mental Capacity Act was not passed to deal with the decision to end one’s own life, but rather it was formulated with the basic assumption that a person has capacity. In November 2021, the Supreme Court said in A Local Authority v JB:

“‘A person must be assumed to have capacity unless it is established that he lacks capacity’”.


It continued:

“This principle requires all dealings with persons who have an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain to be based on the premise that every individual is competent until the contrary is proved. … Competence is decision-specific so that capacity is judged in relation to the particular decision, transaction or activity involved. P may be capable of making some decisions, but not others”.


Therefore, there are circumstances in which capacity cannot be assumed and a person may not be capable of understanding, to the necessary extent, the information that should underpin any decision-making, or of analysing the consequences of that information or of making a decision in their own best interests. When these conditions are not fulfilled, the Mental Capacity Act requires, in particular circumstances, that a decision be made by a third party, but always in the best interests of the person. As the Royal College of Psychiatrists told us in evidence,

“an assessment of a person’s mental capacity to decide to end their own life is an entirely different and more complex determination requiring a higher level of understanding”

than assessing capacity for treatment decisions.

We have received very helpful evidence from Professor Gareth Owen, Professor Alex Ruck Keene, and Professor Katherine Sleeman of the Complex Life and Death Decisions group at King’s College London. They have stated quite clearly that

“the MCA 2005 was not designed to be a universal framework for determining capacity.  It is primarily a workaround for the inability of a person to give consent to actions required to secure their health and social care needs. In the MCA 2005, the principles applying to and the test for capacity apply in a context where a decision can be taken on a ‘best interests’ basis for the person if they lack capacity”.

In the context of the Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill, they state that,

“no such best interests decision could ever be made”.

Capacity is not a constant state. It may fluctuate depending on a variety of circumstances, including some illnesses, disabilities and the side-effects of medication. A person can have capacity in relation to one decision and not another. A person may have capacity at one time, but not another. It is an enormously complex issue. When the decision in question is the decision to end one’s own life, capacity to make that decision requires very significant analysis in each case at the time in question.

That is the reason why “capacity” is not an adequate word to deal with the situation in which a person is coming to make a clear, settled, and informed decision. “Capacity” cannot be the test. “Ability” is a wider test, and there will be opportunity for the Committee to consider what that might look like as we go through future groups.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, this issue was well discussed in the Select Committee, and I want to refer to Professor Sir Chris Whitty, who I think knows a little bit about this. I want also to respond to and endorse the words of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, because she talked about concentrating on the interests of the person concerned. They were not exactly her words, but she was saying how important that was. We are talking here about someone who is dying. They are in the last months of their lives and, under the Bill, they must have capacity throughout the stage for which this legislation will provide. In other words, at each stage, they must have capacity. Professor Sir Chris Whitty, who knows a lot about this, spoke on it—it is on page 153 of the committee’s report, if anyone would like to look. He said:

“There is plenty of evidence, and it goes with common sense, that, when people use an existing system that they have used for many years, that they are used to and that has been tested in the courts, they are far more likely to be able to follow a reproducible and sensible pattern of making decisions than if they are faced with a completely new approach which they have not used previously and in which there may well be legal ambiguities the courts have not yet adjudicated on”.


If we want this Bill to work, as I assume the House of Commons did when it sent it to us, and as I think a majority of this House does, we must give to doctors and everyone else a form of words that they already understand, they can use and, above all, what is in the best interests of the patient in front of them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Andrews (Lab)]

My Lords, at the heart of this debate is the question of safety. It is very impressive to hear all the experience around the House and I know that people shared my experience when we took the Mental Capacity Act through the House in 2005. That Act had been years in the making. It had most profound and serious consideration in this House and, most unusually, it then had post-legislative scrutiny, where we went into every aspect of the Act. The noble Baroness, Lady Browning, is quite right; there were many concerns raised about the practice and the absence of proper training, but no one, to my knowledge, challenged the definition of “mental capacity”, recognising the huge complexity of the term, the different circumstances in which it is implemented and people’s responses to it.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said that we have a framework. Safety, I think, relies on and is expressed in the 20 years of practice in the way the Mental Capacity Act has been implemented and has benefitted so many. The assumption that there is mental capacity was in itself a huge and very important statement of a positive right in the law. The Bill before us is another statement of a positive right in the law, where there has not been one, and where so many people are desperate for us to find a route through this urgently.

We have the experience of that Act, the experience and expertise that this House put into reviewing that Act and confirming it with the recommended improvements, and the way the Act is understood—as my noble friend has said, not least by Chris Whitty—as well as its unknown interpretations. We have just heard about the complexity of defining “ability”. We already know of the huge, unframed and unknown complexity of creating another concept in law in the context of a Bill which, itself, has to be so carefully understood, implemented and communicated. We have to stick to what we know, even though it is still a work in progress, because it can still be improved. I hope it will be improved, in the course of this Bill. But it will be immensely dangerous, unless I hear a completely conclusive explanation as to why “ability” is better, if we were to depart from “capacity”.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, under the Mental Capacity Act, the decision is not made by one individual; the Mental Capacity Act provides for decision-making, which includes the experiences of families et cetera. It is a profound process. This is not a profound process; it provides for a doctor to make a decision about whether a person has capacity and a second doctor to sign it off. It is not the same thing at all.

I attended a meeting, as did the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, during which a doctor told a story about a patient who had signed up for assisted suicide. When the time came, he took a sip of the medicine and said, “I’m not drinking this”—upon which his family told him, “You decided you would die this day; you must do it”. He would not drink it. It took him seven days to die.

[Baroness Andrews (Lab)]

The noble Baroness is quite right, and it is a very important part of mental capacity decisions that the families are involved, supportive and completely understand the implications of what it means to have either incomplete capacity or capacity that varies from time to time. There is no reason— I will leave my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer to answer this point—why this should not be a better Bill, and maybe it can be better if we address these particular questions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

I thank the noble Lord for that point. As I said at the start, the Government remain neutral and will not be providing government time for this Bill. Obviously, we will look at things when we get to the end of our four days in Committee. I will then work with the usual channels to see what other time can be made available from non-government time, but we will have to see whether we will move on over the next few days.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

I say to the Minister that we are talking about four days. The general public know that a sitting Friday lasts from 10 am to 3 pm. People have made arrangements accordingly, and there are reasons of faith and things such as that which require that we respect that ending at 3 pm. On a normal day, the House would sit for up to 10 or 12 hours, so four days is just not enough.

Telemedical Abortions

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Wednesday 12th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Baroness O'Loan]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of recent proposals to extend access to telemedical abortions, and how they will ensure women’s safety and informed consent in the absence of in-person medical consultation.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Baroness Merron) (Lab)]

Before I respond, I join the Lord Speaker—I am sure on behalf of the whole House—in extending our condolences sincerely to the late noble Baroness’s friends, family and loved ones. We will miss her greatly.

The Government have no plans to extend access to telemedical abortions. As with other matters of conscience, abortion is an issue on which the Government take a neutral stance. It is for Parliament to decide. The safety of women accessing abortion services is of paramount importance. All providers are required to have effective arrangements in place to ensure women’s safety and to obtain informed consent.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, before I ask my supplementary, I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Newlove, who was so brave and effective in all she did in this House and in her work for victims after the murder of her beloved husband, Garry. Helen had such compassion and courage, and she really was such a lovely person that she will be sorely missed, not only by her family, to whom I am sure we all send great sympathy, but by so many of us in this House and in the world beyond. We were indeed blessed by her presence among us.

I thank the Minister for her reply. It is not possible on the telephone to ensure a woman’s privacy, to ensure that she is not being coerced, or to verify that the woman seeking the medication is actually the person who will take it, particularly in cases involving domestic abuse, child abuse and trafficking. Government stats show that, since 2020, 54,000 people have been admitted to hospital in England for complications from abortion pills. Last year alone, some 12,000—over 6% of women taking such medication—required hospital treatment. To safeguard women and girls, will the Minister take action to restore the requirement for face-to-face consultations? Will she also assure the House that there will be no extension of the time limits for access to medical abortions?

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, the evidence base for telemedical abortion is sound. It has been thoroughly evaluated and it is recommended as safe by the World Health Organization, the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists, and NICE’s evidence-based guidelines. There are no plans to do what the noble Baroness has requested, and I have to say that I do not recognise the statistics she raised, although I would be interested to hear more about them. But I assure your Lordships’ House that telemedical abortion is and must be carried out in line with clinical guidelines published by the royal college.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

2nd reading
Friday 19th September 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

I thank the noble and learned Lord for yielding. I simply wanted to say that a number of Members of the other place have said that the Bill did not receive proper scrutiny in the other place. They have also said that they expected that it would receive scrutiny in this place because that is what we do. That is profoundly important, and I do not think that what the noble and learned Lord just said is actually correct. I would also say that there were a number of amendments tabled and a number of MPs who wanted to speak who were not permitted to do so. That is reflective of the fact that the Bill did not receive proper scrutiny in the other place.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her intervention. I have laid before the House the facts. I recognise that some Members of Parliament say that the Bill was not given proper scrutiny. I wonder if those were Members of Parliament who did not agree with the conclusion—I do not know. I have laid before your Lordships the time that was spent and the fact that it got more scrutiny than government Bills.

The essence of this Bill is that those who are terminally ill—and that means that they have a diagnosis that they will die within the next six months—should have the option, subject to safeguards, to be assisted to take their own life. One of the features of this debate was the personal experience that so many people have had of how, had that option been available, it would have ended terrible suffering. That suffering is not often about the pain but about the lack of dignity and the profound desire to keep control, because that is what people want.

I believe, from my own experience and from talking to so many people, that having that option is important. The points that have been made against it, which I have listened to incredibly carefully, are, in essence, not that people should not have that choice but that it brings dangers with it. The dangers are, first, that people will be overpersuaded and, secondly, that it will affect society in other ways.

On the idea that people will be overpersuaded, the Bill provides for the following: first, a conversation with the doctor in which all the options, including the palliative care options, are laid out; secondly, that a doctor decides that it is a free choice; thirdly, that a second doctor decides that it is a free choice; and, fourthly, that a panel, consisting of a senior judge or a King’s Counsel, a psychiatrist and a social worker, concludes that the person is not being coerced, that they are capable of making the decision and that it is their free choice. As it happens, that is probably the most safeguarded procedure in the whole of our healthcare system. It is certainly the most safeguarded process when compared with terminal illness Acts in other countries in the world.

I profoundly believe that people should have this choice—a profound belief that is based not on either my spirituality or my lack of spirituality, but on looking at the evidence from other countries that this will not lead to people being overpersuaded. I have in mind those countries that already have a terminal illness Act. The one that has been in force for longest is the one in Oregon, but there are many other states in the United States of America that have terminal illness Acts that have been in force for 20 years and more. They do not have those safeguards. They do have annual reports and record-keeping of the highest sort about assisted death. They show no evidence of the coercion that some noble Lords referred to in this debate.

I would have expected that, if there were real evidence of that, somebody in the course of the debate would have referred to a case from one of those countries where there is a terminal illness Act showing that there was coercion. There was none. I am convinced, first, that the Bill has had proper scrutiny in the other place and, secondly, that there is no real danger in relation to coercion. Thirdly, I completely accept the point made by noble Lords who said in this debate that they wanted more palliative care—I want more palliative care, and we should do everything we can to promote it. However, as so many people said, it is not either/or—it is both.

Some 75% of people in Victoria, Australia, who have had an assisted death came from palliative care, and 92% in Oregon came from palliative care. The Select Committee in the Commons to which I referred, which reported in 2024, said that palliative care in many jurisdictions went up in terms of its resources. In answer to the question that was raised about what the effect will be on palliative care: on the basis of other jurisdictions, it will get better. In fact, the debate here has provoked the Government to spend more money on palliative care.

Many noble Lords have talked about language. I take no point about language. I simply say this. For over 10 years of having been engaged in this debate, I have found that, for people who are terminally ill and want an assisted death, nothing upsets them more than saying that that is suicide. They hate that because of the impact it has on those they leave behind. What they feel is that they are dying anyway, and what they want is some degree of control over when and how it will happen.

I turn briefly to what happens next. I very much welcome my noble friend Lady Berger’s Motion to set up a Select Committee that can hear evidence. I very much welcome that it is time-limited, because, as my noble friend and I indicated in the letter we sent to every Peer, it allows for the Bill to go through all its phases after 7 November. I will therefore support my noble friend’s Motion to set up a Select Committee.

We have a job of work to do. I agree with everybody that, plainly, this House must give the Bill a Second Reading. We must listen to the evidence that my noble friend Lady Berger’s Select Committee will supply, and then we must do what we do so well, which is scrutinise and amend the Bill as necessary, and then send it back to the other place for a decision.

I have heard some noble Lords say, “Oh well, we can say no to this Bill”. Ultimately, on an issue such as this in our system, somebody has to decide. It is not the electorate because it is never in anybody’s manifesto, with the exception of the Greens. Therefore, Parliament has to decide. Ultimately, in our system, that means it will have to be those who are elected—not those who are unelected—who make that decision.

I end by expressing my profound gratitude to the House for the attention and quality of the debate it gave to the Bill. I commend this Bill to the House.

Health and Care Bill

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Report stage
Wednesday 16th March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Brown of Cambridge (CB)]

My Lords, at this very late hour, I just rise to say that I hope your Lordships will not confuse individual anecdotes, however moving, with the very extensive scientific evidence base quoted by the noble Baronesses, Lady Sugg and Lady Watkins.

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

My Lords, what is proposed in this amendment is a fundamental change in the law. What we must look at is, I think, fundamentally for each woman, what actually happens in each situation, and what care is provided for the woman in that situation.

I believe that the Government were right to say that this provision would come to an end and that it is not necessarily safe. There are major uncertainties for many women when they conceive. They do not always know when their last period was, as noble Lords have said. But it is not just that. They do not always know the nature of their own medical health and the consequences of taking the telemedical abortion pills.

In that period after 2020 alone, 10,000 women needed hospital treatment for the complications arising from telemedical abortions. It is not an anecdote but a scientific fact that losing a baby, whether by miscarriage or by abortion, is a very bloody and, on occasion, very painful business, which gives rise to all sorts of problems and complications.

Medical Abortion Pills

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Thursday 10th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kamall (Con)]

As I am sure noble Lords will acknowledge, this is a very sensitive area. Initially, it was meant to be a temporary-only service. If we do decide to respect its temporariness, an extension will probably be made to ensure that the clinics and other medical services have time to adapt before returning to the position before the pandemic.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, is the Minister aware of a recent study, based on FOI requests to NHS trusts, which revealed that in 2020 more than 10,000 women who took at least one abortion pill at home, provided by the NHS, needed hospital treatment for side-effects? That is equivalent to more than one in 17 women, or 20 women a day, needing hospital treatment. Does the Minister agree that such reports indicate a serious and disturbing lack of understanding by its advocates of the dangers of the telemedical abortion policy?

[Lord Kamall (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving the other side of the debate; it shows what a difficult subject this is. Sometimes people dig up the wider debate, but I think we have to be very careful and focus on the issue. This was a service offered to women, and the initial consultation was in person, but we made temporary provision, rightly, during the pandemic to ensure that women were treated with dignity, while appreciating that it had to be done at distance. We have looked at whether this should continue to be temporary or become permanent, and we are still weighing up this difficult decision. I think the debate today shows that there are a number of views, and it is not as simple as either side proposes.

Health and Care Bill

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 7th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness O’Loan (CB)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Stevens of Birmingham, on his excellent maiden speech. I think, too, that this is an appropriate time to pay tribute to those staff in hospitals, care homes and the community who have laboured so hard over the past two years. However, routine medical care did not happen. Elective surgeries were cancelled and treatment for the most serious conditions and illnesses was limited or not delivered, and now we have a major problem. The problem is actually worse in Northern Ireland, where people routinely wait five years for necessary treatment. Across the UK, the frustration of doctors and other medical practitioners at their inability to provide essential services because of staff shortages—resulting in part from the Covid emergency, but not just from Covid—is well-known.

I first served in 1996 on one of those health boards to which the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, referred. Then people remained in hospital because they could not be discharged to their own homes with proper care packages or to residential and nursing accommodation. Some 25 years later, it is still a problem. For 25 years the issue has been discussed, papers written, committees formed, strategies devised—and the problem has got much worse.

The compulsory immediate Covid vaccination of staff, low levels of salary for the intense and difficult work of caring for those with reduced mobility, dementia and serious ill health, and a lack of support have resulted in a further loss of staff from the care sector. Care of this kind is inevitably resource-intensive. It is not just mechanistic; it requires a compassion and humanity that very often simply make it possible for people to settle in places where they would rather not be but must be. Will the Government ensure that there is a change of philosophy that will result in a greater respect for and appreciation of those who care in such circumstances, consistent with our proudly-proclaimed Great British values?

The repeal of Section 75 of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 is welcome. The new processes, which are still being developed, must enable proper procurement and remove unnecessary bureaucracy but ensure that contracts are awarded with proper scrutiny and that there is consideration of the impact of individual contract awards on the provision of services generally. Can the Government give an assurance that accountability and transparency really will result from the passing of this Bill?

There is also a need to ensure that the creeping privatisation of the NHS will not result in increased costs, reduced equality of access to services, and longer waiting lists. The public sector NHS trusts and NHS foundation trusts must be the default provider of NHS services.

The potential conflicts of interest for those such as employees of private healthcare providers as members of ICBs has been referred to repeatedly. They will be responsible for the commissioning of NHS services. I can see the benefit of private sector experience, but government must ensure proper accountability and there must be a mechanism for regulating and identifying conflicts of interest when they emerge.

Finally, the proposed level of delegation of power to the Secretary of State over operational clinical matters is quite simply unacceptable.

Medicines and Medical Devices Bill

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 2nd September 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness O’Loan (CB) [V]]

My Lords, I would like to thank the noble Baroness, Lady Cumberlege, for her excellent work on the report that she has presented to the House. I would like to support her recommendations, and most particularly her recommendation for a patient safety commissioner.

This is an important Bill, and there is an opportunity presented by it to improve the regulation of human organ harvesting across the world. Organ transplantation is one field of medicine that offers great hope to the recipient. Organs are taken from deceased donors in particular circumstances and for years living donations have been possible. A person can donate a kidney, part of a liver and so on, and live perfectly well afterwards. I have seen it. It can make the difference between life and death. It is a rapidly growing field of medicine in which demand exceeds supply.

Here in the UK, we have stringent regulation of the process of organ donation to ensure that those who donate are protected and that donation is only allowed from those who are fit and are willing to donate without any payment but to help someone else. That is how it should be and at its best this is a wonderful development. Similarly, organ transplantation after death can, in the right circumstances, bring untold blessing to those who receive an organ.

However, the very fact that demand for organs for transplant exceeds supply means that there is a market in organ harvesting, both from the living and the dead. For decades, people have been forced through poverty to sell their own organs. This is unethical and wrong. There should be no support for such practices, and we must ensure control over any contribution made by British companies that enable such activity.

We know, too, that there is transplant tourism, where people travel to countries where they may be able to get a transplant, in some cases with few questions asked about where the organ donated to be transplanted came from. We know, too, that organs can be shipped and transplanted into recipients across the world without proper procedures. There continues to be a major problem in the lack of global control over organ harvesting. There has been a reference to the work of the China Tribunal and to reports of a state-run programme of forced organ harvesting in China, the organised butchery of living people to sell body parts, which the China Tribunal compared to the

“worst atrocities committed in conflicts of the 20th century.”

We know that Uighurs, Falun Gong practitioners and others are being killed and subjected to forced organ harvesting.

When an organ is taken, whether from a living or a dead body, it needs to be preserved and transported to its destination. Just as we now require that imported products, whether they be clothes or anything else, should be manufactured in ethical conditions, we need to ask ourselves whether British manufacturers are selling to China the devices, medicines and technology which will enable China to sell organs which have been harvested from people in China’s detention camps or otherwise wrongly obtained. There could be many spin-offs from such activity, including the use of such organs—that can be imported here without any evidence of consent or traceability—for medical research, a market in immunosuppressant drugs for the recipient, and a market in harvested organs which might even be imported and used here in the absence of full regulation.

China is not self-sufficient; it is highly reliant on the West for the equipment and medicines which it needs to help its organ transplant and harvesting industry. The extent of British engagement is not immediately accessible in the context of the Chinese organ transplantation process. The report The Economics of Organ Harvesting in China indicates that there are British companies with interests in this area—in research and in producing and selling organ-preservation solutions to China.

It is right to support and develop ethical, regulated organ transplantation. It is profoundly important that this Bill provides for proper regulation. We can provide regulation to prevent companies being empowered and enriched by the mass crimes that may be facilitated elsewhere. This will show the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party that the balance between human rights and commerce will change.

We need to think very carefully about how this Bill will proceed, so that it does that which it seeks to do and protects the health and safety of those who may be forced organ donors.