Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]
Baroness Noakes ExcerptsMonday 6th July 2026
(3 weeks, 3 days ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL] 2026-27 View all Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL] 2026-27 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 5-V(b) Amendments for Grand Committee (Supplementary to the Fifth Marshalled List) - (6 Jul 2026)
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I will just comment briefly. I completely agree with the notion that wholesale markets and retail markets should be dealt with separately for the reasons that have been given. I am less than clear that a structural solution, such as the one proposed by my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, is the right one. I think that the problem is deeper; it lies in the construction of FSMA because the FCA is given a consumer protection objective that makes no differentiation between wholesale and retail markets . The meaning of “consumer” is generic and there is no understanding that there are radically different markets for retail and wholesale participants. All that means that the burden of treating these markets differently falls on the applicability of the proportionality principle in Section 3B, which we have discussed many times and is due to be downgraded under the current proposals. I do not know what the answer is, but I suspect that, in legislative terms, it is a deeper answer than simply setting up a separate division within the FCA because the construction of FSMA simply does not accommodate easily the fact that there are two quite different types of market.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friends Lord Hunt and Lord Ashcombe for bringing forward Amendments 142A and 142C. We have heard from industry that there is often insufficient clarity around whether retail or wholesale regulatory standards apply in particular cases. That lack of clarity matters because it means that firms can find themselves applying regulatory standards, processes and levels of prudence that go above and beyond what is required simply because they are concerned that the boundary is not clear. That is why the proposals from my noble friends Lord Ashcombe and Lord Hunt of Wirral for a clearer statutory distinction are important. Any threshold would, of course, need to be carefully considered, but the principle is right. Firms should know which rules apply to which clients. Regulators should avoid applying retail-style requirements to wholesale clients unless that is genuinely proportionate.
I also welcome the broader point behind Amendment 142A, which would create a dedicated wholesale markets and firms division within the FCA. The case for that amendment in a highly competitive global industry, as my noble friend Lord Hunt explained, is that wholesale markets require specialist expertise and a regulatory culture that understands institutional, professional and capital markets activity. If the FCA is regulating retail consumer markets, with lots of SMEs, and complex wholesale markets at the same time, it must have the internal structure and expertise to apply the right approach to each. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, a member of the Lords committee, rightly suggested that consumer preference has become a problem mindset in the wholesale area. My noble friend Lady Noakes explained that that followed from the way that FSMA was set up. Interestingly, the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, cited MAS in Singapore, where regulation is split by target market. Another member of the committee, the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, rightly called for proportionality, which was endorsed by my noble friend Lord Holmes. This is complicated, but it is important that we look at these amendments seriously.
Amendments 165 and 173 are in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Altrincham. These raise the related but distinct question of whether the FCA is operationally ready to take on the significant new functions being handed to it under the Bill. This is a matter for the FCA, as it is an independent regulator, but the fact is that some do not trust it, including those in the payments and consumer credit industries who will be new or largely new to its fiat.
We need a plan to show what will happen and when in all cases where the regulator is taking over responsibilities from elsewhere—which, on reflection, I should have added to our amendment. We also need to know how many staff the FCA plans to add and the accommodation arrangements. The industry pays for our regulators, and the latter should spend every pound as carefully as if it were their own. In time, we would hope to see some economies of scale as the proposed changes drive efficiency. The Explanatory Notes for the Bill explain that because the FCA will take over AML supervision of legal service providers, accountants and trust company service providers, it will need significant preparatory work, including the hiring and training of staff and establishing necessary IT infrastructure. We need more clarity on that point, and particularly on ensuring service standards and value for money.
The point behind Amendment 165 is simple: before significant new FCA functions are commenced, a report would look at FCA staffing and resourcing; systems capability; the impact on authorisation, supervision and enforcement timeliness; the effect on service standards for firms and consumers; and any mitigation measures considered necessary by the Treasury and the FCA. That would have the benefit of allowing Parliament and its committees to examine the plans.
One example that has been raised with us is the movement of the Payment Systems Regulator into the FCA. Firms have told us that there is very limited clarity about the timeline for that transition, the operational arrangements, the treatment of existing PSR work, the continuity of functions and how the FCA will absorb these responsibilities without disruption. They do not see that as a satisfactory position.
I thank my noble friend Lady Lawlor for her support and for her amendment to my amendment. It makes a valuable point about the importance of training staff to ensure a smooth transition, and I very much agree with this from my experience in business and in government.
I look forward to hearing from the Minister, first, on how we can better avoid duplication and the excess caution that is sometimes caused by the existing overlap between retail and wholesale at the FCA, and, secondly, on his view on how Parliament and stakeholders can best scrutinise plans for the handover of new areas of responsibility to the FCA.
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
I am actually speaking to the FCA next week, so I will get some clarity on that and feed back to the Committee.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
The Minister referred to the four workstreams that the Chancellor set up last year. Can he say when firms might feel any difference?
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
I will come back on that after getting clarification on when those will come into effect.
Baroness Noakes
“Offices for regulatory evaluation(1) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is amended as follows.(2) After section 1RB (requirements in connection with public consultations), insert—“FCA Office for Regulatory Evaluation
1RC FCA Office for Regulatory Evaluation(1) The FCA must establish and maintain an office for regulatory evaluation, to be known as the FCA Office for Regulatory Evaluation (“the Office”), to provide independent evaluation of the FCA’s regulatory actions.(2) The FCA must appoint a person as Director of the Office who will be responsible for the activities of the Office.(3) Treasury approval is required for the appointment or dismissal of the Director.(4) The FCA must provide the resources that are required by the Director to carry out the evaluation of the FCA’s regulatory actions.(5) The Director must draw up a statement of policy of how the evaluation of the FCA’s regulatory actions will be carried out. (6) The Director must report to the governing body of the FCA at least every six months on the work of the Office and the report must be—(a) published,(b) sent to the Treasury, and(c) sent to the Committees of Parliament referred to in paragraph 28(7) of Schedule 1ZA (the Financial Conduct Authority).(7) The Director must report to the chair of the FCA and be independent of the FCA’s board of directors and its executive management.(8) The chair of the FCA will be responsible for the remuneration of the Director and for settling any disputes about the resources allocated by the FCA to the work of the Office.(9) “Regulatory actions” means any actions carried out by the FCA in discharging its general functions under section 1B and supervision, monitoring and enforcement under section 1L.”(3) After section 2NB (requirements in connection with public consultations), insert—“Bank of England Office for Regulatory Evaluation
2NC Bank of England Office for Regulatory Evaluation(1) The Bank of England must establish and maintain an office for regulatory evaluation, to be known as the Bank of England Office for Regulatory Evaluation (“the Office”), to provide independent evaluation of the regulatory actions of the PRA and the Bank of England in respect of its financial market infrastructure (FMI) functions.(2) The Bank of England must appoint a person as Director of the Office who will be responsible for the activities of the Office.(3) Treasury approval is required for the appointment or dismissal of the Director.(4) The Bank of England must provide the resources that are required by the Director to carry out the evaluation of the regulatory actions of the PRA and the Bank of England in respect of its FMI functions.(5) The Director must draw up a statement of policy of how the evaluation of regulatory actions will be carried out.(6) The Director must report to the court of directors at least every six months on the work of the Office and the report must be—(a) published,(b) sent to the Treasury, and(c) sent to the Committees of Parliament referred to in paragraph 36(7) of Schedule 1ZB (the Prudential Regulation Authority).(7) The Director must report to the chair of the court of directors and be independent of the court of directors, the Prudential Regulation Committee, the Financial Markets Infrastructure Committee and the executive management associated with those Committees.(8) The chair of the court of directors will be responsible for the remuneration of the Director and for settling any disputes about the resources allocated by the Bank of England to the work of the Office.(9) “Regulatory actions” means any actions carried out by—(a) the PRA in discharging its functions under section 2AB and supervision of PRA-authorised persons under section 2K, and(b) the Bank of England in respect of its FMI functions under section 30D of the Bank of England Act 1998.””
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and my noble friend Lord Bridges of Headley for adding their names to this amendment.
Last week, we debated the need for more extensive regulatory evaluation in order to hold the regulators to account effectively. The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, suggested a Treasury-convened panel to undertake periodic independent reviews, and my noble friend Lord Bridges of Headley suggested an office of regulatory evaluation, which would assess the regulators’ performance in discharging their duties and meeting the regulatory principles. These would not replace the parliamentary committees in each House but would complement them by providing more in-depth and comprehensive analysis, which could then be built on within the framework of parliamentary accountability. My Amendment 142F would be another way of increasing the amount of the evaluation of the regulators.
I remind the Committee of the background. The volume of regulatory activity has grown significantly in recent years, as the matters that used to be dealt with in the EU have been added to the FSMA model. In addition, innovation is presenting major new challenges, which has the effect of increasing regulator activity.
The ability of Parliament to hold regulators to account was already under strain. For example, the Financial Services Regulation Committee of your Lordships’ House recently undertook a major piece of work on stablecoins, but it would not have been realistic to attempt to encompass all developments in digital assets. We cannot cover everything that we think should be covered.
The Bill is adding to that workload by adding the huge area of consumer credit to the FCA’s responsibilities, all of which will need to be implemented by way of new FCA rules. This will involve very significant issues: the balance between consumer protections; the supply of credit; and the efficiency of credit providers. I do not know how all that will be scrutinised effectively.
Instead of looking to solutions that are external to the regulators, which is what we discussed last week, Amendment 142F proposes that each of the regulators sets up an internal but independent office for regulatory evaluation. Apart from safeguarding the independence of the office and mandating regular reporting, the amendment is deliberately not prescriptive beyond that, leaving it to the new offices to work out how to carry out their work.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this short debate. I know that it is, in part, a repeat of debates we have held already in Committee, but it is bringing together such an important issue, which is the strength of the accountability mechanisms for the regulators. The Minister outlined the things that exist at the moment. I think I explained that the Independent Evaluation Office in the Bank does not do very much, although what it does is actually very interesting: its report on the secondary competitiveness and growth objective was a good piece of work.
Within the FCA there is no visibility, so anybody involved in external accountability of the FCA would know none of it, with the possible exception of the National Audit Office reports. The National Audit Office, as noble Lords know, will do those value-for-money reviews only very infrequently, and I am not sure that the one the Minister referred to would have had any impact on the work of the Financial Services Regulation Committee had we taken it into account.
I will not labour the points now, because obviously we are going to have more substantial discussions this week in the Financial Services and Regulation Committee, and of course I am sure there will be discussions when we get to Report, and I look forward to any other discussions that we have before we get to Report in the autumn. With that, I beg leave to withdraw.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)
I put on the record that parliamentary counsel has advised that this amendment and all the other government amendments in this group are all technical amendments. If the noble Baroness’s objection is based on the fact that she believes that an all-Peers letter should have been sent for a handful of technical amendments, then that is not normally the case. However, if she wants to object, we will not move them.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
The Minister and I had a meeting on this last week, so I am surprised that he is raising the issue today. I notified on Friday that I would be continuing the line that I had taken on the first Committee day.
Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)
Can I just ask the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, on that basis—parliamentary counsel has advised that these are technical amendments, and therefore that Peers’ letters do not need to be sent out—does she not agree with the parliamentary counsel?
Baroness Noakes
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Treasury to consult the regulators about regulations which designate countries or territories for recognition.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, in moving this amendment, I will speak also to Amendment 153 and the Clause 37 stand part notice.
I am instinctively suspicious of Clause 37 because I think that the best people to judge whether overseas financial services firms should be able to operate in the UK, and to determine the terms on which they operate, are the regulators. The Bill hands major judgments to the Treasury, which means that they are likely, at least in part, to be political judgments. Although new Section 408A requires the Treasury to have regard to various things, that list is not exclusive, so there is nothing to stop the Treasury taking into account factors other than those listed in new subsection (2). Decisions could be made, for example, in pursuit of foreign policy aims against a wider background of international relations in relation to the EU reset. Financial services could also be traded away in the context of international trade agreements. Even if the Treasury sticks with the list of “have regards” in new subsection (2), that subsection has no hierarchy of criteria. Financial stability is on a par with international competitiveness and growth.
This is in stark contrast to the regulators, where international competitiveness, growth and competition are secondary objectives that cannot override their core objectives. I fully support the Government’s quest for economic growth and the pursuit of international trade agreements but, under new Section 408A, the Treasury could set aside any concerns about the integrity and stability of the UK’s financial system because it favours facilitating international competitiveness and growth. Is this really what the Government are trying to enable?
We know that some countries, such as China, seem to have technical compliance with many international financial services standards although, in practice, the degree of state control and the weakness of local regulators leave a lot of questions to be answered about the organisations in their financial services sectors. We know that the Treasury wants more trade with China. Will it let Chinese financial services firms freely into the UK in order to facilitate that? How will the Treasury ensure that it gets a good deal for British financial services firms? Some countries, such as India, give the appearance of allowing foreign firms to operate in them. However, in practice, India places many hurdles in their way, and many organisations give up the struggle after a while. Does the Treasury really have the granular understanding of what is happening in these countries?
My own view is that it would be dangerous to let the Treasury loose on this area, and that the independent financial services regulators are the best people to determine who can operate in the UK and on what terms. This is why I oppose Clause 37 standing part of the Bill. However, I have heard from some in the City that they welcome this new overseas recognition regime, because the regulators do not prioritise negotiations with their foreign counterparts and there is little faith that they ever will. That has a ring of truth to it. The FCA has far too many other things to do, and the Bank and the PRA are exceedingly cautious. For that reason, I have tabled Amendments 152 and 153 in order to emphasise the important role that the regulator should have in the process.
Amendment 152 would add a requirement for the Treasury to consult the regulators when it uses the power under Section 408B. As currently drafted, the Treasury has to consult the regulators only if it exercises the power to recognise overseas firms to operate in the UK under Section 408A. The Treasury does not have to consult the regulators if it uses the Section 408B power to recognise overseas territories. My amendment poses the question: why not? The regulators are likely to know more about financial services and regulation in the overseas countries than the Treasury.
Amendment 153 is aimed at improving the information given to Parliament when the Treasury brings forward regulations to use these new powers. It would require the Treasury to publish any information or advice received from the regulators in connection with the use of the powers. As I mentioned, the Bill requires the Treasury to consult the regulators on only one of the two powers, but then the Treasury could completely ignore the information or advice that it receives from the regulators and Parliament would be none the wiser. This should be more transparent. The Treasury must be prepared to say why it has ignored or overridden the advice that is received, if that is indeed the case. It must therefore be prepared to share any relevant information with Parliament.
We all know that secondary legislation processes give Parliament no effective power over the Executive. That does not mean, however, that Parliament can be ignored. I believe it is necessary to force a bit of daylight into the process and not tolerate the suppression of relevant information from Parliament. Consistent with the stance I have taken throughout this Committee, if the Minister wishes to move his Amendment 154, I shall call, “Not content”. I think even the noble Lord, Lord Wilson, will accept that this amendment is not a small technical amendment.
I had hoped that the Treasury would have organised an all-Peers letter by now. It has had two weeks to do so since I first raised the issue. I was informed on Friday that the Government think it is okay just to write to the Front Benches on some government amendments. Since I was the only Peer who had tabled amendments in relation to Clause 37, I believe it was, at a minimum, discourteous not to have written to me at the same time.
I do, however, stick to my broader point that the whole House should be informed. The scrutiny of Bills is not something that belongs in a cosy club of Front-Benchers. Someone needs to stand up for Back-Benchers and that is what I am doing in this Bill. I beg to move.
Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)
My Lords, I will be very brief. I am sympathetic to ensuring that the overseas recognition regulations are as pragmatic and seamless as they can be to enable easier international competition. But I have quite a lot of sympathy with the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, about giving these powers exclusively to the Treasury.
I want to ask one question of the Minister. New Section 408A(2) sets out a list of areas that
“the Treasury must have regard to the importance of”
when making regulations. As an aside, that is quite odd wording; normally it is “have regard to”. I am still not sure I understand what difference
“must have regard to the importance of”
makes to the meaning. Maybe the Minister might explain that. New Section 408(1) does something similar but in a slightly different way. It seems that one area is missing from the lists of “have regards”: the question of economic crime, particularly anti-money laundering and the transparency of ownership in the relevant jurisdictions. Can the Minister say whether he agrees that those are important and explain why they might be missing from the list?
I will just finish with something I should have said earlier today, given that I think we are finishing early and the Minister is going to get some of his evening back: I wish him a happy birthday.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
Before I decide what to do with my amendment, I ask the Minister—because I may not have been paying attention—whether he explained why there is a requirement to consult the regulators for powers under new Section 408A but not under new Section 408B.
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
Again, I will write to the noble Baroness to clarify that.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
The Minister is stacking up rather a lot of letters that need to be written.
I thank all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. It raises important issues. The Minister said, in relation to consultation, that the Treasury would summarise the evidence. That is not the same as being transparent about the advice from regulators. Although I am quite happy for the Treasury to summarise most other evidence on any consultation it undertakes, I think the regulators are a special case here. However, I will read Hansard and consider what, if anything, I will do with this topic before Report. Before sitting down, I too add my birthday wishes to the Minister. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]
Baroness Noakes ExcerptsWednesday 1st July 2026
(4 weeks, 1 day ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL] 2026-27 View all Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL] 2026-27 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 5-IV(b) Amendment for Grand Committee (Supplementary to the Fourth Marshalled List) - (1 Jul 2026)
The Minister of State, Department for Business and Trade and HM Treasury (Lord Stockwood) (Lab)
My Lords, the Government share the views of many in this debate, particularly on the importance of ensuring that the secondary growth and competitiveness objectives are comprehensively embedded in the work of the regulators. That is why the Bill legislates to extend the requirement for the regulators to produce annual reports on their actions to advance competitiveness and growth objectives.
Amendment 99 would amend the secondary objective so that when carrying it out the regulators would need only to consider international standards, rather than to align with them. I recognise the desire to ensure that there are no unnecessary constraints on the secondary objective. However, the Government cannot accept this amendment. Aligning with international standards is central to the Government’s approach to supporting the international competitiveness of the UK as a global financial centre. These international standards underpin global financial resilience and support international trade. Stability, predictability and high regulatory standards are the cornerstone of the UK’s reputation as a global financial centre. Weakening the requirement to align would risk undermining the attractiveness of the UK as a place to do business.
However, it is worth noting that the UK is no passive recipient of international standards: we help to shape them. The Governor of the Bank of England is the current chair of the Financial Stability Board, and the UK authorities play leading roles in international bodies. I reassure noble Lords that international standards generally operate on a comply-or-explain basis. No standard trumps the objectives of the FCA or the PRA. Where it is right for the UK to go further, or where the nuances of our market require a different approach, the FCA and the PRA retain full flexibility to do so.
Amendments 100 and 101 would require the growth and competitiveness reports to be laid in Parliament and would prescribe their contents. These amendments clearly demonstrate the importance this House places on the growth and competitiveness reports. The Government absolutely agree about that. Since they were introduced in FSMA 2023, their value to stakeholders in Parliament and industry has been clearly demonstrated, which is why the Bill extends the original temporary requirement and will require the regulators to keep producing the reports on an annual basis. However, these amendments are not necessary: they are overly prescriptive and overlap with existing reporting mechanisms. For example, the regulators already provide ample public reporting on their authorisation metrics, which are published regularly and allow for year-on-year comparisons, and they already publish metrics along with their competitiveness and growth reports.
Amendment 102 would give the Bank of England a secondary objective to facilitate international competitiveness and growth in its regulation of central counterparties and central securities depositories. The Government recognise the importance of a dynamic and competitive UK clearing and settlement market. However, CCPs and CSDs have a unique role in managing risk at the centre of global financial markets and the value they provide is based on reliability and sound risk management. The UK’s success as a global centre for financial market infrastructure depends on its reputation for resilience, and regulation must reflect the roles of CCPs and CSDs as critical, globally shared infrastructure. The Government therefore do not believe that it would be appropriate for the regulatory framework for these firms to focus on international competitiveness or growth in the same way as other firms, or that the secondary objective for the Bank to facilitate innovation is the right one. However, the Chancellor made it clear in her remit letter to the Bank last year that it should consider how it can best support the Government’s growth mission when pursuing its objectives.
Lastly, Amendment 104A seeks to introduce new secondary objectives for the Bank of England in relation to payment systems. I am grateful to the noble Lord for raising this issue. The Government recognise that, where appropriate, secondary objectives can help the regulator to advance its primary objective in a balanced way. Payment systems are critical economic infrastructure and the Government agree that, alongside security and resilience, regulation in this area should support competition, innovation and growth.
However, the Government consider that the Bill already provides a framework that supports the aims of the amendment. Following the FCA taking on the responsibilities of payment systems regulations, it will retain the substance of the PSR’s objectives. This means that it will be responsible for promoting competition and innovation in payment systems and for protecting the interests of service users. The Bill also applies the FCA’s secondary competitive and growth objective to its general payment system functions and it includes provision to ensure that the Bank and the FCA co-ordinate effectively. I therefore ask the noble Baroness not to press her amendment.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken today and the previous day. These amendments all relate to the secondary competitive and growth objective. I think that we share the same desire to have an effective secondary competitive and growth objective, which my lead amendment, in particular, was designed to ensure. The Minister says that the regulators have flexibility to do what is right, whatever the international standards. I do not think that that is captured by forcing alignment with standards, but I will think again about that before Report. I was also disappointed by the Minister’s other replies, because it seems that the Government are not taking opportunities to ram home the importance of growth and competitiveness, which is something that we fully support. I will withdraw my amendment now and consider what I shall bring back on Report.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I have Amendment 118 in this group. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, noted, it is aimed at the same target as her Amendment 117. Both of us are focusing on the regulators needing to have some specific and serious concerns about regulatory breaches before triggering a Section 166 review. I have had some experience of being on the receiving end of Section 166 notices from my time on the board of a major bank. They are genuinely very burdensome: they cost a lot of money, and they divert a huge amount of staff resources and, more importantly, senior management time. They are not something to be undertaken lightly.
The consulting firms absolutely love them. The fees are set by the regulator, so they do not have to do anything awful, such as negotiating with a client around the fees. They often have some perverse incentives, and quite often are structured as phase 1 and phase 2. Phase 1 is where you see whether there is a bit of a problem, then you move on to phase 2. Phase 2 is where the real money usually is, so the consultants leave no stone unturned in their efforts to trigger phase 2, and they can end up creating more work than might perhaps have been needed. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, I am not saying that Section 166 reviews should not exist, but the use of them should probably revert to the use that existed before. That is why it is important to put a higher hurdle than is currently in the statute for the use of Section 166, so that the burdens are imposed only when there is genuine cause.
Lord Altrincham (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and my noble friend Lady Noakes for bringing forward these amendments. I declare my interest as a director of South Molton Street Capital, which is regulated by the FCA.
The amendments in this group focus principally on Sections 165 and 166 of FSMA. It is worth recalling that the very expression “Section 166” has become part of the language of financial regulation. When the history of financial regulation is written, it will be the most famous item of regulation for this period. It is part of the common language, because there are dozens and dozens of these regulatory interventions.
Section 166 gives the regulators the power to require a firm to appoint or to pay for a skilled person—often a very expensive law firm—to produce a report on specified matters. These reviews can be burdensome, expensive and disruptive for the firms concerned. The concern we have heard from industry is that Section 166 notices have become more and more common in recent years. They were, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, pointed out, initially quite scarce and quite important—and quite quiet, incidentally. Now, they are talked about all the time, because they are as common as anything. The serious issue is that they can, in effect, be used by the regulator as a demonstration of the exercise of its supervisory function.
These notices are supposedly for an inquiry, but they look quite threatening: they can be written in bold and in caps and in different sized fonts. They arrive at the firm with a variety of different names—often the firm has not actually heard of the regulator—and the tone of the notices can be unintentionally discourteous. This, of course, touches on other amendments which reference the right profile for the UK in regulating international firms that may operate in this country.
A Section 166 review is not cost-free regulation; it can require substantial external expenditure, internal management time, legal advice, data gathering, citizens’ work and follow-on remediation. The direct cost of the skilled person report may be only one part of the total burden. This means that there is inevitably a presumption of guilt in these inquiries, without a balanced challenge to which the firm can fully respond. We must bear in mind that firms often do not even know what the inquiry is looking for, so the ability to seek legal protection or a balance in the inquiry is made impossible by this approach to regulation.
In the general insurance and protection sector, an FOI-based report suggested that firms paid around £2.7 million for FCA-mandated Section 166 reviews in the year to 31 March 2024. It noted that internal costs and remediation costs can exceed the external review cost itself. That illustrates the point clearly that the financial and operational impact on firms can be significant. There is also the problem that some firms are not clear on why they are being subject to Section 166 in the first place. The regulator may go on a “fishing trip”, as described by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, which really is a good expression for how these inquiries proceed—to find fault without disclosing precisely what they are looking for.
That is why these powers need guardrails. As my noble Friend Lady Noakes has argued, Section 166 notices should be reserved for serious circumstances. They should not become a routine supervisory practice; they should not be used where the same information could reasonably be obtained through less burdensome means; and they should not be imposed without proper consideration of proportionality.
Amendment 117, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, would require the regulator to be satisfied that there is a material risk of serious detriment to regulatory outcomes, and that using a skilled person report is a proportionate response. It would require the regulator to consider the scale and nature of the suspected issue, the burden on the firm and whether the matter could reasonably be addressed through existing supervisory tools.
That seems to be a sensible framework, as does that set out in Amendment 118, in the name of my noble friend Lady Noakes. It would restrict Section 166 reports to circumstances where the regulator considers that there is likely to have been a significant contravention of a relevant requirement, and where the information or documents could not reasonably be obtained without the report. These amendments speak to the same underlying principle: Section 166 should be an exceptional tool for serious cases, not a default mechanism.
I welcome Amendment 123, in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Bowles and Lady Altmann, which deals with Section 165 information-gathering powers and seeks to set sensible thresholds on access to information. If a regulator asks a firm for information or documents, it should be able to explain why that material is reasonably necessary, why the request is proportionate and why the information cannot be obtained from another source. Requests should not be duplicative and they should not be broader than necessary. Firms should not be left trying to satisfy vague or excessive demands without a clear understanding of the purpose behind them. That is a basic principle of good regulation, and it particularly matters for smaller firms.
The broader issue here is one we have returned to throughout the Committee: regulatory power must be matched by accountability and proportionality. The FCA and the PRA have significant supervisory tools at their disposal. Where those tools impose real costs on firms, there must be proper discipline in their use. These amendments raise important questions about the balance between effective supervision and regulatory burden. We will listen carefully to what the Minister has to say in response.
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baronesses for these amendments, and I have listened carefully to the points made today. The principle of ensuring that the regulators take a proportionate approach to their work—in the case of these amendments, to skilled person reviews and regulatory information collecting—is one that the Government strongly agree with. We have previously debated that principle and how it applies more broadly to the work of the financial services regulators.
Amendments 117 and 118 relate to skilled person reviews under Section 166 of FSMA. It is an important supervisory tool, and the Government agree that it should be deployed proportionately. However, the Government are not persuaded that there is an issue here that requires us to further constrain the regulators’ ability to require these reviews when they consider it appropriate to effectively safeguard the markets and consumers. The regulators have existing procedures to ensure proportionality when considering whether to initiate a skilled person review. The FCA handbook sets out that it will first consider the circumstances of the firm, the costs involved and the availability of other supervisory tools to tackle the issue. The PRA has similar processes in place.
Layering additional statutory requirements on top of this risks creating burdensome delays over supervisory decisions. Skilled person reviews are often used precisely in circumstances where the regulator needs independent expert analysis. For example, requiring the regulator to satisfy a threshold test before commissioning a review could limit the regulator’s ability to direct a skilled person to investigate a potential consumer harm and implement a mitigation strategy.
The data does not suggest that the use of skilled person reviews has grown over time. I reassure noble Lords that the FCA’s use of them has been broadly consistent over the past 10 years, with an average of 48.5 commissioned a year. However, in 2025-26, only 31 were commissioned, down from a high of 83 in 2023-24. This increase reflected the FCA’s strengthened oversight in key areas, including financial crime and appointed representatives and, despite the increase in volume, overall costs to firms remained flat.
Amendment 117 would create statutory disclosure requirements relating to Section 166 skilled person reviews. The FCA and the PRA already provide transparency by publishing data on the reviews they have commissioned in their annual reports.
Amendment 123 seeks to raise the bar for regulators requesting information for the firms they oversee. The Government recognise the impact that regulation and supervision can have on firms, and agree that regulators’ supervisory activities, including information requests, must not create disproportionate burdens on firms. That is why the Government have committed to cutting the administrative burden of regulation by 25% by the end of this Parliament. The financial services regulators are activity contributing to this agenda. For example, the PRA is deleting redundant and duplicative data collections—its future banking data programme has reduced costs to firms by around £26 million annually so far—and the FCA has stripped out data requests for 36,000 firms. All this has been done without detracting from consumer protections or systemwide resilience.
Through the Bill, the Government are taking action to reduce the burden of regulation on businesses. This includes reforms to the senior managers and certification regime, which will enable the regulators to reduce the regulatory burden of the regime by 50% while maintaining its strong and effective framework for individual accountability. Imposing prescriptive statutory requirements on how the regulators gather information risks undermining effective supervision, which might bring serious risks. Regulators must be able to respond quickly to emerging risks, and sometimes that means requesting information in ways that cannot be neatly anticipated by legislation.
The Government agree that proportionality is hugely important, that unnecessary burdens should be avoided and that the regulators must be held properly to account for how they exercise the significant powers given to them by Parliament. But there is no evidence that these amendments are needed to ensure proportionality. They would risk constraining the regulators’ ability to do their jobs effectively, which would introduce risks into our financial system. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
The Minister made great play of the importance of proportionality, on which I think there would be considerable agreement. The Bill removes the requirements to have regard to the regulatory principles, including, importantly, the proportionality paragraphs, for anything other than the five-year plan. It is therefore incumbent on the Government to look at all other areas of the Bill to ensure that proportionality, where it is needed, is correctly referenced in the Bill. By taking it away at the outset from the requirement to have regard in areas other than the five-year plan, the Government are leaving the Bill wide open to the non-proportional use of powers by the regulator. This area has not been fully developed by the Government in their thinking on this.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
My Lords, I thank all those who have spoken in this debate, in particular the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, for her last intervention; I presume that the Minister had finished speaking. Perhaps we need 200 amendments on Report saying, “This has to be done proportionately”. That is literally where we are. Anybody who has been near a Section 166 review will know that an awful lot about it seems awfully unfair. For instance, the regulator may not have its own expertise, so it makes you pay to hire it in. Some of these things should be done under the regulators’ ordinary duties. This needs to be looked at and, as the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham, said, some kind of proper discipline must be put around it. That is what we are asking for.
I am glad to hear that there is a target of cutting the administrative burden by 25%. We will see how that goes, but I do not think that everything can be left as open as it is now, which is the much-repeated message that we have been delivering. For now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Noakes
“Cost benefit panels(1) The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is amended as follows.(2) In subsection (4) of section 138IA, insert after paragraph (a)— “(aa) keep under review the cumulative impact of rules issued by the FCA including those covered by subsection (3); and”(3) In subsection (4) of section 138JA insert after paragraph (a)—“(aa) keep under review the cumulative impact of rules issued by the PRA including those covered by subsection (3); and”(4) In subsection (5) of section 139A, omit “(e)”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment allows the Cost Benefit Panels of the FCA and the PRA to keep the cumulative impact of regulation, including those rules which are not consulted on, under review. It also requires the FCA to prepare cost benefit analysis for guidance and for the Cost Benefit Panel to review it.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for adding his name. Unfortunately, he is not able to be in Committee today. The amendments in this group concern cost benefit panels, which were created by the 2023 Act to underpin the existing FSMA requirement for cost-benefit analysis to be undertaken and published when rules are consulted on by the PRA and the FCA. The panels were created a little under two years ago and they are doing good work, as their annual reports show. The Financial Services Regulation Committee had a private briefing session with the chairs of the two panels, and we were impressed by the progress that they have made.
My amendment has two elements. The first requires the panels to keep under review the cumulative impact of rules, including those for which a cost-benefit analysis was not required because the impact was expected to be less than the £10 million threshold used by both regulators in their cost-benefit analysis policy statements. Keeping track of the cumulative burden of regulation was a recommendation of the Financial Services Regulation Committee in its Growing Pains report on the secondary competitiveness and growth objective. It was also one of the provisional recommendations of the FCA’s panel in its first report for the period to the end of March 2025. The 2025-26 report is not out until next week, but I would be surprised if it did not feature again.
Ideally, FSMA should be changed so that the existing statutory requirement on the regulators, which is confined to cost-benefit analysis on the proposed new rules, is widened so that it will be the responsibility of the FCA and the PRA to keep the cumulative burden on regulatory activity under review. I have taken the slightly easier drafting route in my amendments by putting a narrower requirement for the role of the panels.
The second element of my amendment concerns guidance by the FCA, which was covered last time in Committee, and the PRA. I confess that proposed new subsection (4) of my amendment captures only one part of what I was trying to achieve. I realised that when I was preparing my speaking notes, but it was too late to do anything about it, so I will speak to what I intended to cover in my amendment rather than what it does cover. This is Committee, after all.
At present, the FCA and the PRA are required to issue guidance under Sections 1K and 3I of FSMA and the FCA has power to issue guidance under Section 139A. If the FCA issues guidance under Section 139A, it has to be consulted on, but no cost-benefit analysis is required to be done or published. Proposed new subsection (4) of my proposed new clause in Amendment 119 seeks to require cost-benefit analysis for Section 139A guidance. I intended, but failed, to require cost-benefit analysis for all guidance issued by both regulators—that is a difference not reflected in the amendments.
I am well aware of the Government’s plan in Clause 18 to remove all the guidance obligations from the regulators, as well as the requirement for consultation on the FSA’s guidance under Section 139A. This part of my amendment is predicated on the Government realising the folly of their ways in Clause 18 for the purposes of today’s debate.
One of the findings of the FCA’s cost-benefit panel last year was the minimalist approach taken to cost-benefit analyses by the FCA: they are undertaken only when required by statute rather than being seen as good regulatory practice underpinning the detailed actions of regulation. The Financial Services Regulation Committee, as part of our inquiry into the FCA’s naming and shaming provisions, which had a potentially very significant impact on certain firms, called for a cost-benefit analysis. However, the FCA refused, saying that it was not required to do it by law. Therefore, I believe that attaching cost-benefit analysis to pretty much everything that the regulators do is necessary. Guidance would have been a good start, but the changes required are even broader than I have tried to achieve in my amendment.
My noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe’s Amendment 132 seeks to widen the work of the CBA panels, and I look forward to hearing what my noble friends on the Front Bench have to say on that. With that, I beg to move.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow my noble friend Lady Noakes. I congratulate her on her purposive, rather than literal, interpretation of her amendment. I support her amendment and everything she said, as well as the other amendments in this group. I will speak to my Amendment 129.
Many noble Lords here today were in the Grand Committee debates for the then FSM Bill 2023. As my noble friend Lady Noakes rightly identified, the CBA panels have done very good work in their first couple of years of existence. My Amendment 129 seeks to give them further clarity to assist them in doing that good work, to ensure that they have the materials they need to do it, and to bring an additional element around public awareness of the panels’ work. That speaks to greater transparency, awareness and engagement, which can help not only the work of the CBA panels but the wider work of the regulators themselves. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
Can the Minister explain what the FCA and the PRA are doing about cumulative burden? Are they focusing on the cumulative burdens of the rules that they have assessed using a cost-benefit analysis, or is it for all of their activities? It is my understanding that they are both pretty clear that they will use cost-benefit analysis in the way the statute has prescribed—that is, they use materiality thresholds, so quite a lot of them are not required at all to be looked at—so the whole range of their activities, which covers anything that is not rule-making, does not get assessed for cost-benefit at all. Can I be clear on what the Minister thinks the regulators are doing?
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
I will have to write to the noble Baroness, because that is a very detailed question.
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
We are trying to be balanced and proportionate here. I recognise that these are important issues but, at the same time, it is about ensuring that the regulator has the flexibility to make those decisions. We are definitely making inroads on this, although I imagine that there is a lot more discussion to be had between now and Report. I want to make sure that I give the noble Baroness the right response.
Amendment 132 seeks to extend the CBA obligations to general guidance and supervisory practices—I take that to mean all guidance. The Government recognise the concern that regulatory burdens can be imposed on firms through guidance and supervisory practice, as well as through formal rules. Where guidance is about rules that have already been made, in most cases the underlying policy would have already been subject to CBA through the rule-making process, so requiring CBA for such guidance would be duplicative. In these cases, the guidance is to help firms understand what the rules require and how they operate. Where guidance may result in significant costs being incurred, the Government note and welcome the regulators’ work to voluntarily prepare CBA for guidance—for example, the FCA’s guidance on fair treatment for vulnerable customers.
Most guidance issued by the regulators does not impose material incremental costs on firms. Obligating the regulators to undertake CBA on guidance would impose heavyweight analysis where it is least meaningful. It would introduce delays for guidance being issued, undermining the regulators’ ability to respond quickly to market developments, risks or firm failures.
The CBA panels are a hugely valuable and still-developing part of our regulatory architecture. The right approach is to allow them to mature and to hold regulators publicly accountable for how they respond to input from the panels, rather than embedding a detailed operational rulebook in primary legislation that will be inflexible in the face of ever-evolving circumstances. I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his reply, but I do not think that it dealt comprehensively with the nature of the problem. I do not think that any of our amendments deal comprehensively with the nature of the problem, actually, because the answer is not loading on extra things for the CBA panels to do; it is about looking again at the obligations of the regulators. That is not what we have put down in these amendments, although we have had a debate on the issue.
I was pleased to hear the Minister say that he was prepared to have discussions between now and Report. This is an area where a number of us would like to get together with the Minister to try to work out how we can make some improvements, because the law as it stands is narrowly drawn. I do not think we can assume that the regulators will voluntarily expand that into the areas that some of us think should be covered, so it is right that we look at the legal provisions—but perhaps not necessarily the ones covered by these amendments. With that, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I have added my name to my noble friend Lord Bridges of Headley’s amendments creating OFRA. I also support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, which would use a panel to look at how the regulators are performing. The key thing is that we need more external heavyweight oversight of what the regulators are doing. As noble Lords have identified throughout this Committee, accountability is the key issue that we are focusing on, in particular because of the way in which the Bill weakens the current accountability constructs.
My noble friend Lord Bridges referred to the previous time that we were debating the same amendments, when we were sitting on the other side of the Room—I remember it very well. At that time, as my noble friend knows, I did not support his amendments because I was dead set on trying to get either a House of Lords Select Committee or a Joint Committee of both Houses involved. The original version of what is now FSMA 2023 had the involvement of only the Treasury Select Committee in the other place and we were clear that this House had far more expertise in financial services, and that it was important to leverage that either through the use of a dedicated Select Committee in your Lordships’ House or a Joint Committee. There was no appetite for a Joint Committee from the other place. We ended up with a committee, but it took an amendment to the then Bill in 2023, on which I focused all my effort last time. Also, as I said to my noble friend at the time, I did not think that we needed yet another unaccountable public body.
The Financial Services Regulation Committee has been in operation for about two and a half years, and I am now clear that the scale of the task is very large and very hard to execute without the kind of independent analysis that we would get from having something such as OFRA or a panel to assist in the task. It is just too big a task for one Select Committee in your Lordships’ House to handle. We meet weekly, as is customary for all Select Committees, but we have limited staff resources, in common with all other Select Committees of your Lordships’ House. We do pretty good work on that basis, but we cannot cover the whole area, nor can we look at as many things as we would like; we have to be selective about what we look at. We cannot take a comprehensive look at the accountability of the regulators; that is the missing piece now. We need something that is resourced and able to look at it in the round.
I support all the amendments in this group because anything would be a big improvement on what we have to date. I bring good news for the Minister: I have, today, tabled another idea for improving accountability, based on discussions with some people in the industry, which some Members of the Committee already know about. I tabled that this afternoon so I hope that we will be able to debate that on Monday.
The only point I am trying to make is that we are looking for options to improve accountability, which was already under pressure, but we now have huge new consumer credit legislation coming in that will mean lots of regulations and rules being issued over the next couple of years. There is quite a big task coming down the line, and we have to do something about it in the Bill.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendments 133 and 135, in the name of my noble friend Lord Bridges, and I shall say a few words about them. I have also tabled Amendment 135A, which amends Amendment 135.
Two of the questions raised by the Bill are how will the regulators operate, make, impose and judge the rules and how will Parliament’s proper role in the legislative process be ensured? In some cases, not only do we not know what we are supposed to be legislating on, as the Committee has discussed, but we do not know the basis on which the regulators will, in practice, be held to account. Indeed, as matters stand, the arrangements and the deployment of powers is not known, or not entirely, in many cases.
The amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Bridges and supported by my noble friend Lady Noakes and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, to which I have added my name, would establish an office for financial regulatory accountability, which would have the specific duty of examining and reporting on the performance of the FCA and the PRA and how they perform on specific measures, would provide some of the essential answers. The office would assess how far the regulators meet their statutory objectives and principles under FSMA 2000 and, importantly, the effect of specific pieces of regulation. We need to know the impact of these regulations on the domestic development of the financial services and the market, as well as the impact internationally, and we need to know the costs and burdens of compliance. Amendment 135 contains very specific duties, and I think they have been very well thought out. I hope the Minister will take them into account and consider why we need this office, which will be independent of the process of regulation. It will be independent of Parliament, not just of the regulators, and it will help Parliament to do what it ought to do as the legislature.
My Amendment 135A would include in these independent reports examples of how the rules have been implemented and applied to different firms, including similar firms doing the same kind of activity, because we do not have an independent analysis of those rules and regulations, the process or the compliance. Very often, small businesses are at sea; they cannot look to Parliament because we do not have the basis for assessing them, they cannot look to our reports, and they cannot necessarily look to the regulators. They tell me about this and quite often explain that they are not sure. They want to take a step to grow their business, perhaps to develop some new instrument or to expand their market, but they are not quite sure how the regulators will treat it. They have no example of how these things have been seen in the past or of how the rules have been applied.
Requiring an independent office for financial regulatory accountability to provide some examples will help not only Parliament but businesses in being competitive and growing their businesses. They will see the precedents and be able to predict much more easily how the system operates. It is not an expensive way in which to make judgments. They do not have to get in expensive consultants or do little trials here and there and pilots. They would give security in knowing where the boundaries are set and judged and whether they are consistent with the opportunities they need to seize if they are to make their businesses grow.
Above all, such an office reporting and assessing these duties would encourage the regulators to be consistent and predictable and to focus on their statutory objects. As the Bill aims to focus on the competitiveness and growth objective—we have talked a lot about reporting requirements and the overall strategic plan—there is a problematic lack of transparency and accountability by the regulators, other than to the Treasury, and that relationship sometimes seems a little too cosy.
The amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Bridges would promote an affective mechanism to ensure that we have objective, transparent and impartial evidence externally provided by an independent body. I support them for that reason but add my small amendment so we have greater transparency in how they are applied.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
I think that the Committee would like to hear from the noble Baroness.
Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)
As I said at the start of this session, when it comes to withdrawing an amendment, noble Lords need to be brief. We do not want them to rehash the whole debate. They have to be respectful to the Committee because we have other amendments to discuss.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
We are a self-regulating House, and this is such an important area that I would like to hear the end of the noble Baroness’s remarks.
Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)
The noble Baroness is absolutely right that this is a self-regulating House, but the other side of the coin is self-discipline.
Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]
Baroness Noakes ExcerptsMonday 29th June 2026
(1 month ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL] 2026-27 View all Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL] 2026-27 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 5-III(a) Amendments for Grand Committee (Supplementary to the Third Marshalled List) - (29 Jun 2026)
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I have Amendments 83, 84, 85 and 86 in this group, and I thank my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for adding her name to the first three of them. We are continuing our examination of the role of the regulatory principles, which we debated to some extent on previous Committee days. To recap, Clause 17 proposes to downgrade the regulatory principles in Section 3B of FSMA so that instead of guiding the everyday work of the regulators, they will now feature in only an element of the regulators’ new five-year plans. Some of us have tried, but so far failed, to convince the Minister that this represents a constitutional assault on the effectiveness of your Lordships’ Financial Services and Regulation Committee. I am pleased that a meeting has now been arranged for the committee to discuss this in more detail with the Minister, together with the Financial Secretary, and I hope we can make some progress there.
On the previous day in Committee, I moved an amendment which called for the Treasury to undertake a review of the regulatory principles, because they are a mixture of important things concerning how regulations should be conducted, some duplicated areas and some special interest items. The Government resisted my amendment, with the Minister saying that they had already reviewed them and found them to be fine, which was a completely bizarre judgment.
My Amendments 83, 84 and 85 take a different approach. If Clause 17 is to remain in its present form—that is to say, downgrading the Section 3B principles to abstracts, to be wordsmithed into five-year plans—it is important to rescue the most important element of them: proportionality. Amendment 83 places the proportionality principle, using the rather wordy parent formulation in Section 3B(1)(b), into Section 1B of FSMA, which is about how the FCA should discharge its general functions. This achieves for proportionality the effect of ensuring that when the FCA draws up rules or guidance or does anything else, it will conform to the proportionality principle. That would allow the rest of Section 3B to head into strategic oblivion, but it would preserve proportionality as a matter that should guide the FCA’s work on a daily basis—for example, when drawing up rules or guidance. That, in turn, would allow the Financial Services Regulation Committee to focus on whether the FCA is indeed reflecting the principle of proportionality in its rules. Amendment 84 seeks to do much the same for the PRA. Lastly, Amendment 85 removes proportionality from Section 3B to avoid yet more duplication cluttering up FSMA.
The Financial Services and Regulation Committee received a lot of evidence for its first inquiry into the secondary competitiveness and growth objective. One of the enduring themes was that neither regulator lived out the requirement for proportionality. For example, the confidential round table that we held with mid-market and specialist banks, which are very diverse and very different from the big banks, reported that regulations are substantially similar for all sizes of banks. The confidential round table with insurers and reinsurers found that there were disproportionate responses to consumer issues, failing to differentiate between different business models or different types of firms.
As an aside, the committee had to hold these round tables on a confidential basis because of a widespread fear of regulatory repercussions if attendees articulated views that did not reflect well on the regulators. This is a serious cultural issue that cannot be dealt with directly in this Bill, but it underlines the need for parliamentary accountability mechanisms to be made stronger rather than weaker. We should make these mechanisms as effective as we possibly can.
As well as finding disproportionate regulations and supervision, the committee’s report also highlighted how thresholds, which can aid proportionality, were often used in a way that in practice impacted the willingness and ability of financial services businesses to grow. The proportionality is a very big ongoing issue in financial services regulation and has real-world consequences.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has tabled similar amendments to mine, which also include the regulatory principle currently found in Section 3B(1)(f). My own view is that paragraph (f) is a restatement of proportionality from a different angle. I agree that the things in it are important, but I hope that we can work to get some kind of streamlined definition of proportionality that incorporates both strands.
My other amendment in this group is Amendment 86, which seeks to import the regulatory principles of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006 into the regulatory principles in FSMA. I did this in response to a statement in the Explanatory Notes that the Government intended to use secondary legislation to take the financial regulators out of the ambit of the 2006 Act, which I regard as a bad decision.
It is true that some elements of the very succinct expression of regulatory principles set out in the 2006 Act are already found in Section 3B, but not all of them. The 2006 Act requires all regulators to carry out their regulatory activities
“in a way which is transparent, accountable, proportionate and consistent”.
It also says that regulated activities should be taken only for
“cases in which action is needed”.
This goes beyond Section 3B in requiring accountability and consistency, and I cannot find anywhere in FSMA that says that the FCA and the PRA should regulate only when action is needed.
I cannot think that it is right to dilute the FCA’s and the PRA’s regulatory obligations. They are probably the most important regulators in the land; to let them off the regulatory principles in the 2006 Act is just plain wrong. Since Parliament is, in effect, powerless against secondary legislation, the only way to ensure that the FCA and the PRA remain subject to the 2006 Act principles is to hard-wire them into FSMA, which is what Amendment 86 seeks to do. It may well then be downgraded if the Government have their way on the regulatory principles and Clause 17, but it will not disappear completely from the requirements to which the FCA and the PRA will, in some measure, have to have regard.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
My Lords, before turning directly to proportionality, I will touch briefly on sustainable growth, because its meaning has drifted over time. Sustainable growth was not part of FSMA 2000. It was introduced later, in the post-crisis reforms, as a macroeconomic guardrail. Its purpose was to ensure that regulators did not focus solely on narrow consumer protection or market integrity but had regard to the wider economy. It was intended to counteract over-regulation, pro-cyclical rule-making and, in effect, to avoid killing the golden goose of financial services. It was, in fact, a pro-growth statement. Later, maybe since 2018-19, sustainability has expanded in understanding to include environmental concerns, although, of course, they now have their own place and, as debated earlier, will maybe have some further places in legislation.
I do not want the original macroeconomic point to be lost. It was designed as a counterpart to proportionality, a reminder that regulation must support durable long-term economic stability, not contribute to boom-and-bust cycles. In that sense, both proportionality and macroeconomic sustainable growth sit in the same family of “have regards”. They are deregulatory principles intended to prevent unnecessary burden and to ensure that regulation does not itself become a source of economic harm. Of course, climate change has macroeconomic effects, but they are of a different character and should not obscure the original boom-and-bust prevention purpose of this duty.
I turn to proportionality and Amendments 83 to 84A. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, on Amendments 83 and 84, which would restore the proportionality duties to the regulators’ general functions, and Amendment 86, which would import the principles of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act into FSMA. These are thoughtful and constructive amendments, which would save something, but there is a great deal they cannot save—we will discuss that later. In particular, they do not save the second proportionality duty: the duty to have regard to the nature and objectives of businesses carried on by different persons. That is the proportionality principle that protects smaller firms, sole traders, mutuals, benefit companies and individuals. It is not just about cost-benefit or even size; it is about recognising that different types of firms have different objectives and experience regulation differently. To some extent, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, said, this should all be understood within proportionality, but if we leave it out when it is still separately listed in the current regulatory principles, even when they are largely disregarded, that might lead to the wrong conclusions.
That is why I tabled Amendments 83A and 84A, which build on the formulation of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and would restore the smaller and different business protections. As has been explained, these would be inserted into clauses that relate to the discharging of the regulators’ general functions so that they restore these duties to the operational level of rules and supervision. But this limb of proportionality does more than protect smaller firms; it may also protect firms whose objectives legitimately involve taking more risk in the interests of growth and innovation. Parliament’s role is not to eliminate risk but to ensure that it is understood, calibrated and supervised fairly. That is why this proportionality duty matters: it is one of the few operational tools that give Parliament visibility into how regulators weigh those differences in practice.
However, even with these amendments, we still would not save the principle of sustainable growth—growth that is durable, predictable and not a flash in the pan. As I have explained, that was a partner “have regard” to proportionality. I hope that during these proceedings I can persuade noble Lords and the Minister that sustainable growth should also be included. It chimes with competitiveness and growth, but it, too, needs to have a place in the real business part of these clauses, in the general functions. To echo my earlier comment, macroeconomic sustainable growth belongs alongside proportionality, as part of the deregulatory family of “have regards”.
These duties were originally conceived as guardrails to ensure that regulation supports the economy rather than constrains it. That operational balance is worth preserving. All the “have regard” duties were carefully designed and each has a purpose, and some of the others work together, as I have explained.
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
My Lords, this will be the first of many groups where we discuss the frameworks that the regulators operate under, so I will say a few words about that framework before turning to the amendments.
Many of these amendments, and those in other groups we will take today, focus on the regulators and their accountability to Parliament. Parliament has enshrined the principle of regulatory independence into primary legislation through the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which obviously everyone in the Room knows as FSMA. The Government continue to believe that this model best serves the UK’s long-term interests by delivering effective regulation, informed by evidence and free of political interference. It is absolutely right that financial services markets, firms and activities are overseen by operationally independent, expert regulators. The FSMA model sets out clear roles and responsibilities for Parliament, the Government and the regulators. Parliament sets the objectives for the regulators and holds them to account for how they further those objectives when discharging the statutory functions that Parliament has given them.
The Government and Parliament must be able to scrutinise the work of the regulators to evaluate how effective they are and the impact that their rules are having. It is important that the regulators remain independent and accountable for their actions. The regulators are directly accountability to Parliament, and there are a range of mechanisms within FSMA to support that accountability and allow Parliament to effectively scrutinise the regulators.
A critical part of regulatory independence is the idea that the regulators listen to legitimate criticism and scrutiny—and the regulators do listen. For example, the FCA decided not to progress some changes to its proposed enforcement policy following scrutiny from the House of Lords Financial Services Regulation Committee. However, it is clear from the debate today and from outside the Room that there is room for improvement.
On the recent publication by the Financial Services Regulation Committee, chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, I recognise the important work of that committee in its Growing Pains report and share its ambition to see a regulatory culture that is more proportionate, more responsive and more supportive of growth. The committee’s recommendations were directed principally at how regulators exercise their functions rather than at the statutory framework itself. The Bill provides greater legal clarity and certainty but it remains for regulators, through their leadership, judgment and accountability to Parliament, to deliver the cultural change that the committee rightly called for.
On the amendments in this group, Amendments 81, 83, 83A, 84, 84A and 85 each seek to address various aspects related to the principle of proportionality. I recognise the concerns and strength of feeling that I have heard today and I agree that the principle of proportionality is extremely important and must remain central within the regulatory framework.
The Bill’s approach is not to remove proportionality from meaningful consideration. Instead, the reforms will require the regulators to have regard to proportionality in the development of their long-term strategies, ensuring that they are applied in a more coherent and visible way at the strategic level. This would mean that, for example, rather than considering if an individual proposal is proportionate, the regulators will be required to set out clearly how they have considered whether their strategy and workplan as a whole results in burdens on firms that are proportionate to the outcomes they achieve. This change will support more meaningful scrutiny of how the regulators are considering and responding to the regulatory principles, and will support greater overall scrutiny of the regulators’ work.
Amending the framework to prescribe in detail how the regulators must recognise differences in the size, nature and objectives of the firms it regulates goes far beyond the current framework and risks adding unnecessary complexity to the framework. It is for these reasons that the Government cannot accept these amendments.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
I am afraid the noble Lord is going to be assailed from all sides. I was glad to hear the Minister refer to the work that the committee did in relation to the enforcement proposals, otherwise known as naming and shaming. Is he aware that if the proposals in Clause 17 go through, we will be unable to interrogate the FCA, in this case, on the proportionality of particular examples of what they are doing, in this case to change the enforcement rules? Proportionality there related very specifically to a set of proposals. For example, those proposals, which were to name people much earlier in the enforcement process, could have had the effect of wrecking the businesses of very small players in the financial services market. That is something that we were very keen to draw the attention to.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
To return to the question of the 2006 Act, the Minister said that FSMA’s regulatory principles have been specially crafted for financial services. They have, over a period of time; they have changed rather a lot since they were first put into FSMA. However, when the 2006 Act was passed, there was a specific decision, by the Government, to include the FSA within its scope. They were all brought within scope by secondary legislation, just as the Government now propose to take them out by secondary legislation. Why do the Government take a different view from the Labour Government in 2006—who decided that those regulatory principles have, as I have explained, some important additional elements to those within Section 3B—and think that those additional principles are not now relevant?
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
It goes without saying that there are many things on which I do not agree with the Labour Government of 2006, but we will leave that for another day. We believe that this is already covered. I do not want to allow the noble Baroness’s expertise to be undermined by my relative inexpertise, so let me come back in writing on that. The advice I am getting is that we believe that it is already covered, but let me come back in writing before our meeting next week.
Lord Bridges of Headley (Con)
My Lords, I will speak very briefly on this. I declare my interests as employee adviser to Banco Santander in Madrid and a shareholder in Santander. I also apologise to noble Lords, as I was unable to speak at Second Reading.
I will follow on from the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell. I think he and I may disagree on certain aspects of the regulatory and supervisory approach, but I fundamentally agree with every single syllable he has just said. I am very queasy about aspects of the Bill. Many of us spent some time in this Room several years ago trying to ensure that we can hold to account in Parliament, both in this House and the other place, the regulators and supervisors, who hold immense power. That was absolutely right. We put in place a number of measures, including the establishment of the new committee, so ably chaired by my noble friend Lady Noakes, to enable us to do that—just one measure. This clause goes very much in the wrong direction.
I read the letter, for which I am very grateful, from the noble Lord, Lord Stockwood, and I have to say that I am somewhat perplexed by it. My wife says that I have a very little brain, so I very much look forward to the noble Lord telling me that I am wrong—I am very used to it. Let me try to understand what it is saying.
It starts by saying—or, rather, several paragraphs in it says:
“Considering separate rules in isolation is not effective for assessing the cumulative effect of the regulators’ actions—both the benefits in terms of advancing their objectives, and the costs to affected businesses”.
It goes on to say, as noble Lords will no doubt have read, that the publication of the overall long-term strategy will somehow address this. It also says:
“Clause 16 is intended to address this feedback”
from the sector—I am not sure from whom—
“and improve transparency around the regulators’ long-term direction and focus”.
I am very happy to have a long-term strategy but we absolutely need to be able to call to account actions that the regulators take, case by case.
I have read the Explanatory Notes, which say that the long-term strategy will be once every five years. I see that as entirely insufficient. Furthermore, in paragraph 170, the Explanatory Notes go on to say:
“The Government expects that the strategies will be high level and focus on the FCA’s and PRA’s top priorities and the outcomes they aim to achieve over that time”.
I do not see this as anything like the accountability that we were looking for when we introduced the measures in the last Bill, now an Act, and in the new committee. As far as I can see, it is not the case that the Government dispute the need for this case-by-case analysis, for they say this three paragraphs down in the same letter that I quoted earlier:
“There appears to be broad agreement that, in some areas, regulatory requirements on firms have become overly prescriptive, in some cases duplicative, and that this results in high costs for firms, and means that they spend a large proportion of their time and resources focusing on regulatory requirements”.
I agree wholeheartedly. We need, therefore, to address these points case by case.
All these points tie up. We cannot see the regulatory oversight of this House and the other House diluted in the ways that these clauses do when you put them together. I therefore agree entirely with the noble Lord and those who back these two amendments. I will later press for other measures to tighten, not weaken, regulatory accountability.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I will be brief because much of what needs to be said on this topic has already been said. I will not detain the Committee for long but, as I have added my name to the clause stand part notice, I thought that it was worth me reiterating my strong opposition to Clause 17.
Picking up on what the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, spoke about, in our debate on the first group, the Minister reiterated that the Government think that the FSMA model is the correct model. I do not think that any of us is seriously disputing that as a broad proposition. What we are focusing on is the detail of how the FSMA model can continue to work. When we left the EU, the huge amount of EU law that became assimilated law changed the name of the game around how financial services regulation is lived out in this country.
As we have heard, the 2023 Act tried to deal with that in part by increasing parliamentary accountability through the committees of each House, including the requirement for individual rules proposed by the PRA or the FCA to be accompanied by explanations of how the regulatory principles had been applied. I do not think that any of us clearly understood the scale of the problem back in 2022, when we were considering the Bill, but we thought that these were sensible moves in the right direction. The only thing that has changed is that, now, the Government are coming along and putting even more into the FCA by way of the consumer credit legislation, which is a good idea.
But this has seriously undermined what was still work in progress on how effective parliamentary accountability could be worked. There were never any discussions with either committee of the Houses of Parliament about how the arrangements for accountability following the 2023 Act worked. We suddenly got this decision by the Government to cut away the legs of the committee through its inability to engage with the individual regulations. It is clearly the case that looking at a five-year strategy will never replace the work that needs to be done at a granular level on some of the proposed regulations that come from the regulators. That is the time for interventions—not by looking back at whether actions have complied with a strategy.
We should use this Bill to refine the FSMA model, to make it workable for the scale of the task that is being given by Parliament to the regulators and to make sure that the strength of the accountability mechanisms matches the scale of that activity. That is all that we are trying to do. The direction of this Bill is the wrong direction.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
I shall make a brief comment on why Parliament has not offered any guidance on risk metric. The committee was well aware that the FCA sought to get clarity about the risk appetite that it was taking. The PRA had not made that request; it regards it as its responsibility to judge the balance of risk. There is no unanimity in the regulator community on this, but we reported the issues as we found them in one of our reports.
The noble Baroness asks why Parliament has not given its answer. The straightforward answer is that the Government have not brought forward anything. Parliament gives an answer only when it approves something that the Government bring forward. When we asked the Financial Secretary to the Treasury whether she intended to operationalise the giving of a more specific risk appetite to the FCA, she said pretty clearly that she thought that the Government would not do that.
If the Government do not bring forward something for Parliament to approve, it is not going to happen. Parliament does not act in the way that the noble Baroness seemed to think that we would act, which is that a committee would somehow produce an answer on risk appetite. The committee can comment on the issue of risk appetite and has done so, but it is fundamentally for the Government to take any action that is to change the way in which the risk appetite is specified for any regulator.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, this is an important clause, and I understand why noble Lords wish to probe the Government’s approach to Clause 17. It is always right that we scrutinise carefully any change to the statutory framework governing our financial regulators, and the sponsors have set out their case well. I note that they were introduced into the 2023 Act for good reason: to try to ensure that financial regulation in the UK is proportionate, accountable, flexible and aligned with economic and market objectives.
As I said earlier, I am glad that a meeting with the Financial Services Regulation Committee will take place next week. Certainly, I would like to get to the bottom of whether the change neuters the committee, as has been suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, and my noble friend Lady Noakes; indeed, I think that committee was unanimous that there was a problem. I thought it was interesting that my noble friend Lord Bridges echoed concerns that key, case-by-case analysis by the committee would disappear, and that the noble Baroness, Lady Donaghy, expressed concern about the way that her questions about cost-benefit analysis had been answered, presumably under the existing system.
These are all very legitimate questions, but there are other considerations—the noble Baroness, Lady Bi, touched on some of them. Our position is that we do not want to perpetuate overburdensome regulation. In discussions with industry, we have heard repeatedly that the regulatory principles in Section 3B of the 2000 Act can themselves lead to tick-box exercises. That is particularly true where the principles require regulators to consider wider public policy objectives, which may have only a very indirect connection with the firms being regulated or the activities in question. For example, Section 3B(1)(c) includes
“the need to contribute towards achieving compliance by the Secretary of State with section 1 of the Climate Change Act”—
the net-zero target—
“and … the Environment Act 2021 (environmental targets) where each regulator considers the exercise of its functions to be relevant to the making of such a contribution”.
My own experience of serving on a challenger bank’s board is that there is already a lot of climate-related activity required by the regulators that creeps into many aspects of governance. It is generally costly and sometimes of little worth. That was before the regulatory principles were added. That reflects, harking back to our earlier conversation, the extensive net-zero regulations that exist, the remit letters and the sustainability reporting network, all of which were cited earlier. Therefore, the real question is whether financial regulation is the right vehicle through which to pursue such goals and whether embedding such considerations produces better regulation or simply more process, as we suspect.
The Bill is meant to be deregulatory, and it is meant to simplify the regulatory environment and to support growth and competitiveness. I think the Government may be genuinely reducing a burden that has been identified by industry. We should be careful before assuming that every principle must remain in place. For me, the real tests are about what improvements are coming about here. I am interested in the detail. Does it make the FCA or the PRA more effective? Does it protect consumers? Does it support financial stability? Does it help growth? Alternatively, does it simply create another layer of process, the cost of which falls on firms?
I would be grateful if the Minister could explain more clearly the Government’s rationale for Clause 17. What burdens have been identified and what will the impact be of the changes proposed here? What evidence have the Government received from industry and regulators about the operation of the current Section 3B principles? How will the Government ensure that removing or amending such principles reduces unnecessary burdens, without weakening the core protections that consumers and markets expect?
As the Official Opposition, we are, in essence, in listening mode on this quite radical proposal. We would like to understand whether the “whereases” that are being partially abolished are a burden on only the regulators or whether that feeds through to industry and consumer protection—and, if so, how. I believe that, sometimes, a clearer, simpler and more focused framework is more effective. If Clause 17 helps move us in that direction, it may be needed in the Bill, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bi, suggested. However, it also seems very important to work out how the two parliamentary committees will exercise proper oversight going forward in a post-Brexit regulatory environment, and to ensure that any regulatory resistance, which we have been hearing about this evening, is minimised.
Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)
In a way, it is a pity that I tabled this amendment, because it would probably be a whole lot more informative for us to go straight on to Clause 18. However, Amendment 88 would introduce a new mechanism that was suggested to me: a formal Treasury statement of concern. The idea is that it would fill a gap that has always existed—one that becomes all the more glaring alongside the opacity created by the Bill.
The FSMA 2000 settlement imagined a world in which Ministers were hands off and regulators were left to get on with it. That world has long gone. The Government are now highly interventionist in the name of growth. More generally, they signal priorities, express expectations and raise concerns, but almost all of that happens privately or through speeches and press releases that are approximate and not subject to parliamentary scrutiny.
My amendment would formally put the record straight. If the Treasury considers that
“rules or guidance … are inconsistent with primary legislation or statutory objectives, the Treasury may publish a statement of concern”
and the regulators must respond publicly within 60 days. That is all. It is not a direction, and it is not interference; it is a constitutional signalling mechanism. It would simply show that the Government have taken action on a concern, which otherwise might be unknown. The Government may say that they do not wish for such a mechanism—they do not have to use it—but legislation is not written for the preferences of a particular Minister at a particular moment in time; it is written for the system. The truth is that the Government already intervene with regulators, only informally, privately and without transparency. Why not have a formal system as part of escalation or as a pre-legislative tool?
There is also a practical point. Parliamentary time is limited, and correcting regulatory inconsistencies through statutory instruments can take months, if it happens at all. A statement of concern is a stage earlier. It would allow the Treasury to flag a potential inconsistency without immediately reaching for legislation. It would also allow the regulators to respond and, where appropriate, adjust course. It could also help resolve issues that arise when different things are said or interpreted differently in different places.
In that sense, this mechanism’s greatest strength may lie in its quiet deterrent effect: it would rarely need to be used because its existence would encourage early correction and avoid the need for statutory intervention later. A statement of concern provides exactly that. It would allow the elected arm of government to say transparently, on the record, “We see a potential inconsistency. We are not directing you, but we expect a reasoned response, and we think that this needs to be done publicly”. It would also have the benefit to the Government of them showing formally that they have taken a concern forward.
As I say, this was proposed to me, and I think that there is a point to it. There is a missing link. The Treasury often says that it does not interfere, but there has been an awful lot of correspondence and hugger-mugger between regulators and the Treasury recently in order to come forward with the growth strategy. This is a missing link. The power of Parliament has been eroded. I did not recognise a lot of the things that the noble Baroness, Lady Bi, said about how the system works. There is a missing link in terms of what the Treasury is able to do. I beg to move.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of Amendment 88 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. It would be a useful addition to FSMA to have a specific power for the Treasury to issue a statement of concern; I particularly like the fact that it could be used without the full parliamentary process of regulations. As the noble Baroness may recall, when we debated the then Bill in 2023, the Treasury took a power to tell regulators to make rules. However, that power has to be exercised via regulation, so it needs to go through the whole statutory instrument procedure. It has not yet been used, as far as I am aware, but it is a useful backstop that the Treasury has if it wants to direct the work of the regulators, which is a perfectly reasonable thing for it to do in certain important areas.
The existence of the Treasury’s ability to issue a statement of concern would be particularly useful when interested parties were trying to get a point about things that were not working heard by the regulators. The ability to engage the Treasury in that would be very helpful, although I am sure that it would be used more as a background factor in the relationship than as an active part of the Treasury’s relationship with the regulators. I applaud the noble Baroness on her ingenuity in bringing this amendment forward.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, for bringing forward these amendments. They raise two very salient points about the accountability of the financial regulators and the mechanisms by which Parliament, the Treasury and the public can scrutinise how those regulators use their powers.
One of the core functions of the Bill is to increase the power and scope of the remit of the regulators, in particular the FCA. Across the Bill, more responsibility is being transferred, more detail is being left to rules and more of the practical operation of the regime will depend on regulatory judgment, rather than primary legislation. My concern is that although the Bill increases the power of the regulators, it does not always provide a corresponding increase in oversight or scrutiny of them; as an ex-Treasury Minister, I am slightly surprised that the Treasury is entirely happy with that.
To me, Amendment 88 seems a sensible and proportionate form of challenge. It would create a formal and transparent way for the Treasury to say that, in effect, a regulator may have gone beyond what Parliament intended or may have acted in a way that is not consistent with its statutory remit. This matters because the Treasury is directly accountable to Parliament in a way that independent regulators are not. If regulators are to exercise substantial powers delegated by Parliament, there must be some meaningful mechanism by which Ministers can challenge, explain and account for how these powers are being used. We will come back to this point again at a later stage in Committee; my noble friend Lord Bridges has tabled an amendment that speaks to this same broad issue.
The underlying point is simple: if regulators are powerful, they must also be accountable. How best to achieve this should be a key objective of our scrutiny in Committee and on Report. I would be grateful, therefore, if the Minister could set out the Government’s position on this wider issue. He wrote to us shortly before Committee—a little too shortly before Committee; I say that politely—but I am not sure whether what he sent us, including the Treasury memorandum, answers our outstanding questions. So do the Government accept that the Bill increases the powers and responsibilities of the FCA and PRA? If so, do they accept that stronger oversight mechanisms are called for? What formal routes currently exist for the Treasury to raise concerns about regulator rules or guidance that may not reflect Parliament’s intention?
Also, what is the Government’s objection, if any, to periodic independent reviews of regulator performance and burden? As a former Minister, I found that, although such requirements were unpopular with the department at the time they were put into law, they proved useful in helping me keep on top of the responsible regulators and their policies.
I very much hope that the Minister will engage constructively with the problem, answer my questions, on both the previous group and this group, and appraise in a constructive spirit the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles. Above all, we need reassurance that the Government recognise the importance of scrutiny, transparency and trust in the regulatory system.
Baroness Noakes
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, together with another in the name of Baroness Noakes, ensures that the FCA and the PRA continue to give guidance about how they intend to advance their objectives.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, we now come on to a bit of a ragbag group of amendments, which I should probably have split into more than one group. In moving Amendment 89, I shall also speak to Amendments 92, 93, 94, 96 and 98.
I will start with the FCA’s guidance. At present, the FCA has a power under Section 139A of FSMA to give guidance on, for example, the operation of specific parts of FSMA or its rules. Section 1K says that the guidance must—that is, must—
“include guidance about how it intends to advance its operational objectives … in relation to different categories of authorised person or regulated activity”,
and, inter alia, it has to consult on that guidance. What does this Bill do? Predictably, it eviscerates the provisions. Clause 18(2) removes Section 1K from FSMA, and Clause 18(8) takes all the substance out of Section 139A. This is part of the insidious pattern of this Bill, removing information that regulated persons might find useful—removing guidance about how a regulator would advance its objectives—and removing the requirement to consult on what is left of Section 139A. This is a Bill solely for the regulators’ convenience, regardless of the needs of those subject to regulation. Similarly, Section 2L of FSMA currently requires the PRA to consult those it regulates about how its general policies and practices are consistent with its general duties, and Clause 18(3) removes this. My Amendments 89 and 92 would remove these retrograde provisions from the Bill.
Amendments 96 and 98 are rather different. They concern statutory references to the Financial Services Regulation Committee, and I thank my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, for adding their names. The current FSMA wording about parliamentary committees derives from the 2023 Act, which, as initially drafted, referenced only the Treasury Select Committee in the other place, but that was amended during the passage of the Act to encompass any committee of your Lordships’ House set up to deal with financial services regulation or indeed any Joint Committee of both Houses. Following the passing of the Act, your Lordships’ House decided to set up the Financial Services Regulation Committee, to which I, like others, have referred several times in this Committee. Amendments 96 and 98 merely amend the 2023 wording inserted into FSMA to reflect the fact that your Lordships’ House now has a specific committee which should be referred to in legislation.
When the Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Act was passed last year, we managed to get it amended to incorporate a specific reference to the Financial Services Regulation Committee, and I am a bit disappointed that the Treasury, which agreed to those amendments last year, has already forgotten that the FSMA wording is out of date and needs to be amended. I therefore hope that Amendments 96 and 98 are non-controversial and that the Government will accept them. I should explain for those noble Lords who did not take part in the passage of the Bank Resolution (Recapitalisation) Act that the references in the amendments to the Chairman of Committees are in fact references to the Deputy Lord Speaker—when that role was created, it encompassed the function of the Chairman of Committees, but that nomenclature remains in statute. That is the Committee’s fun fact of the day.
My remaining two amendments in this group, Amendments 93 and 94, are pretty arcane for those who have not audited a bank or sat on a bank or insurer’s board. For my sins, I have done both. Following the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, FSMA was amended to require meetings at least annually between the regulators and the auditors of PRA-regulated persons. This was definitely overkill, and I am pleased that the Government have decided to delete most of Section 339B of FSMA, through Clause 18(11). They have, however, retained the requirement for the PRA to do those meetings, even if it no longer has to report on them; my Amendment 93 would remove Section 339B in its entirety. This does not mean that the PRA will never meet the auditors of the bodies it regulates: it used to meet the auditors before Clause 339B was enacted in 2013 and can continue to do so if the clause is eliminated, but it would remove the obligation on the PRA to do so. Clause 339B has in fact spawned a small industry of the PRA thinking up questions to ask the auditors to report on. The auditors then go away and write a report, usually asking their client to produce a lot of information first, and then the auditors ask the client for a fat fee. It is not value-added activity. We should leave meeting auditors to the regulator’s discretion.
In a similar vein, my Amendment 94 would amend Section 340 of FSMA, which requires the PRA to make rules about auditor co-operation. It has a similar provision for the FCA, but that merely empowers the FCA to do so. My amendment is unlike most “may”/“must” amendments in your Lordships’ House. We normally seek to replace “may” with “must”. My Amendment 94 does the reverse, so that the PRA “may” make rules if it chooses to do so, and hence aligns with the FCA by giving discretion to the PRA, which is also what my Amendment 93 aims to do. I beg to move.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Wilson of Sedgefield) (Lab)
My Lords, before we continue the debate, we have started group 6 and we have one more complete group to do. We are going to finish at 8.45 pm and I would hate to think that we would finish mid-group, but I am in your Lordships’ hands as to whether we do that.
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
My Lords, I begin by explaining the Government’s purpose behind Clause 18 and why it should stand part of the Bill. Over time many reporting and procedural requirements have been placed on the FCA and the PRA, increasing burdens, introducing duplication and in some cases complicating oversight, scrutiny and accountability. There is broad agreement that this dynamic is true for firms subject to regulation. I ask noble Lords to reflect on whether it might also be true for the regulators and on whether that is slowing them down and ultimately having a negative impact on firms and consumers.
These burdens are not without consequences. The regulators must follow the letter of these requirements, diverting time and resources away from other work. Ultimately the cost of that work is passed on to firms through the levy they pay and through their engagement with the asks of the regulator. The Government’s view is that there is scope to rationalise parts of this approach to enhance the effect of scrutiny and to help regulators become more agile and ultimately better support innovation and growth.
The Government sought feedback on which regulator publications stakeholders found most useful and then worked closely with the regulators to consider this feedback and further assess the range of requirements placed on them. Feedback to the regulatory environment consultation indicated very low engagement with certain types of regulator publications, and the regulators’ data confirms this. In recent years, the FCA and the PRA consulted on several proposals to which they received zero responses, although I accept that not all publications are created equal.
I have listened carefully to the concerns raised, particularly the argument that these provisions remove practical tools that help Parliament and stakeholders understand what the regulators are doing and why. I recognise that concern, and that is why the Government have approached this area carefully. Clause 18 is carefully targeted and relatively modest. The Government are retaining the vast majority of the existing transparency and reporting framework. Clause 18 is focused on removing a small number of requirements where the burden of complying is disproportionate to their value. These changes do not prevent the regulators undertaking any of these activities where they judge it useful to do so. Instead, they give the regulators greater flexibility to focus on delivering their strategic priorities.
This clause must also be read in the context of the wider framework. The Bill introduces new long-term strategies, maintains the requirement for regulators to respond annually to Treasury recommendation letters and provides for an additional annual report on how the FCA and the PRA have complied with their competitiveness and growth objectives. Taken together with the existing framework in FSMA, these measures are intended to strengthen overall transparency, not weaken it.
I turn to the amendments, starting with Amendment 89—
Baroness Noakes (Con)
Before the Minister moves on, can I just press him on the evidence of stakeholders that has been relied upon to sweep away so much stuff in Clause 18? Did the stakeholders specifically say they were not interested in guidance that was issued by the regulators or in the consultation on that guidance?
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
Unfortunately, the precise question was not asked in the consultation.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
So on what basis are the Government making the decision to remove the requirement under FSMA to issue the guidance, and obviously, therefore, to consult on it?
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
I will have to come back to the noble Baroness. The broader requirement is that we are trying to streamline the process to take the regulatory burdens away. We recognise that we need to give a precise answer on that.
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
I think there is a broad principle: we are trying to give the FCA the power to make those small changes in both directions.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
Where does that power begin and end? I can understand it when we are talking about hundreds of pounds; I am not sure I understand how much flexibility is now being given to the regulators to do things. We can probably recognise, at one end of the spectrum, something that is very significant, but who is the arbiter of what is so unimportant that it does not have to be consulted on? The regulator. Are the regulators the right people to make that decision? No, they are not, because they are not the people affected by the change.
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
Our overarching principle is that we are trying to show trust in the regulators while recognising the significant feedback from the debate today. We are hoping that minor changes will be in their gift and their expertise.
I will come back to my notes here. The measure is about giving the regulators the flexibility to gather industry input in more efficient ways. It is not about bypassing industry, but rather about recognising that the industry’s time is valuable and should be focused on engaging with consultations that genuinely have impact. Other channels, such as round tables with firms, supervisor interactions, meeting with trade bodies and engagement with statutory panels, can provide a more efficient route to understand industry’s issues on what are minor or technical changes. The Government’s view is that retaining these specific requirements in all cases would preserve unnecessary process, even where it adds little value in practice, and that the Bill preserves consultation requirements in most cases and where there is genuine value for the sector, as well as regulatory oversight.
Amendments 93 and 94 seek to remove all requirements on the PRA to meet the auditors or PRA-authorised persons. As the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, noted, the Bill removes the requirement for the FCA to meet at least once a year with the auditor of any PRA-authorised firm that has been designated as important to the stability of the UK financial system. Requiring both the FCA and the PRA to meet PRA-authorised firms is duplicative and unnecessarily burdensome in terms of the effective use of resources. However, the Government’s view is that removing all requirements around engaging this important group of auditors would go too far. It is vital that the PRA continues to engage with these auditors and plan for meetings to take place at least annually, to ensure that the PRA can secure the valuable insights into the health of systemically important, regulated firms that auditors can provide. It is for this reason that the Government cannot accept these amendments.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. Clause 18, guidance, consultation and whether regulators can be trusted is unfinished business as far as this Committee is concerned. I look forward to getting the answers on questions that have been put, but my instinct is that the Government’s approach is going too far in favour of letting the regulators determine what their interactions will be with the regulated community. On the one hand, there are independent regulators which need forms of oversight, and this Bill is just chipping away all the time at those points at which there can be some interaction between those charged with the oversight of them. By constantly removing these points at which there can be some intervention, we end up with a weaker situation overall. I will need to think very carefully about what we do about Clause 18 in general when we get to Report. I think it is part of the issues that we have been developing. Clauses 16, 17 and 18 are all part of one picture that we need a more satisfactory answer to.
Turning to the auditors. I was not trying to stop auditor meetings—
Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)
I mentioned at the beginning of this afternoon that when an amendment is being pressed, noble Lords have to be short. The withdrawal of amendments is starting to take longer and longer, which eats into the time for the other groups.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
I hear what the noble Lord has said. I think it is important that we have the opportunity to comment before withdrawing amendments. It is not simply a case of getting up and saying, “I withdraw”.
Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)
I just say to the noble Baroness that it is clear in paragraph 8.82 of the Companion that noble Lords should
“be brief and need not respond to all the points made during the debate”.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I had no intention of responding to all points made in the debate. There are a number of different amendments in this group. They could have been degrouped into four or five separate groups, and we could have had a short winding-up on each one of them. We have effectively four groups here, so we are going to be talking about all of them.
On auditors, I was not trying to suggest that auditor meetings should not take place: of course, there is value in those meetings, which have taken place for decades. They were not invented when FSMA was being drafted; they were already part of the thing. The amendments are not that important; I was simply trying to give the PRA the same flexibility that the FCA has.
On the nomenclature in the Act and the Financial Services Regulation Committee, I give notice that I will return to that matter in Committee. My committee will think that it is important that, now that it exists, it is reflected in statute. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Noakes
“FCA and PRA secondary competitiveness and growth objectivesThe Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 is amended as follows—(a) in section 1EB (competitiveness and growth objective) for “aligning with” substitute “consideration of”;(b) in section 2H (secondary objectives and duty to have regard to regulatory principles) for “aligning with” substitute “consideration of”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment modifies the secondary competitiveness and growth objectives of the FCA and the PRA by requiring international standards to be considered rather than aligned with.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I will speak also to Amendments 100 and 102 in this group. I thank my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for adding her name to Amendments 99 and 102, and I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, for adding his name to Amendments 99 and 100. My noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral is unable to be with us today, as he is on our Front Bench in the Chamber dealing with the Steel Industry (Nationalisation) Bill, so I shall also speak briefly to his Amendment 101.
Amendment 99 concerns the secondary competitiveness and growth objective, which applies to both the FCA and the PRA. When it was introduced in the 2023 Act, it was no secret that the regulators were less than enthusiastic. Our regulators have always been heavily involved with the international financial institution community. They often act as chairmen, as is currently the case with the Governor of the Bank of England and the Financial Stability Board. They are members of as many committees as they can get on, and they are completely embedded in the international standards infrastructure. It was unsurprising, therefore, when they managed to convince the Treasury that it should make the secondary competitive and growth objective subject to alignment with international standards.
During the passage of the 2023 Act, I tried to get this watered down, because I had a real concern that the PRA and the FCA would hide behind international standards when making rules, in a way that does not optimise UK competitiveness and growth. International standards are a good thing, but only if all the major countries implement them. In fact, there is a history of patchy adoption—not least by the United States of America, which is, of course, one of our main competitors in financial services. Unfortunately, the Treasury supported the regulators and kept alignment in the 2023 Act.
I return to this theme with Amendment 99, which would change the words of the competitiveness and growth objective so that the regulators must consider international standards only, rather than automatically aligning with them. We have had three years of experience of the operation of the Act. It is time, I believe, that we made growth and competitiveness an unambiguous part of the regulators’ objectives.
In the past three years, we have seen the continuation of US exceptionalism. It has not implemented Basel III, and we have to remember that it never implemented Basel II. To be fair to the PRA, it has found reasons to follow what other countries are doing to delay certain aspects of Basel III and has performed contortions to justify implementing other aspects in a way that does not fully hit smaller UK banks, but the fact is that other countries are implementing Basel III in ways that suit them, and it would be more honest if our own regulators were given that freedom.
Another problem area in bank capital is the requirement to hold MREL, the minimum requirement for eligible liabilities. This started as a European requirement that went way beyond the international rules for total loss-absorbing capital for global systemically important banks. The UK has just three G-SIBs out of 29. Unfortunately, the UK sets MREL for many more banks than three. This is not set by the PRA, which might have a problem justifying it by reference to international standards, because the international standards are clearly less than the European model which we are sticking to. It is in fact set by the Bank of England, which does not have a competitiveness and growth objective. This shows what happens when regulation is detached from the interests of the UK economy.
I turn to the FCA. When the Financial Services Regulation Committee looked at stablecoins, we asked the FCA about its work on stablecoins aligning with the secondary competitiveness and growth objective. The director of payments and digital assets at the FCA was keen to tell us what the FCA did on committees at IOSCO, how it helped to draft the FSB’s paper on stablecoins and how it brought together regulators and standard-setting bodies in London. Although the executive director for payments said that the FCA was trying to find solutions right for the UK, it is clear that the instincts of the regulators’ staff is to look to international standards bodies rather than to think about what is best for UK competitiveness and growth. I do not think that the secondary objective’s potential will be maximised while the comfort blanket of international standards is reinforced by the FSMA requirement to align with them.
Amendment 100 is much more straightforward and I hope that it is uncontentious. I fully support Clause 20’s requirement for the regulators to report annually on the secondary objective. The two initial reports required by the 2023 Act make it clear that the competitiveness and growth objective is not a finite event but a continuing challenge. This was also one of the key findings of the first report by the Financial Services Regulation Committee. My amendment would merely require the Treasury to lay the annual reports before Parliament. It is customary to lay key accountability documents before Parliament. If this is not a key accountability document, I do not know what is. I hope that the Minister can accept this amendment.
I was going to go on to Amendment 101 in the name of my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral, in anticipation of his absence, but I see that he is with us, so I will not speak to his amendment but will conclude with my final amendment in this group, Amendment 102.
Lord Wilson of Sedgefield (Lab)
I am afraid that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, was not here at the start as he came into the Room two minutes late, so the noble Baroness may go ahead.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
I thank the noble Lord for telling me about my noble friend’s disqualification from speaking; I will now speak to his Amendment 101. I find that it would be a useful addition to Clause 20, by imposing some modest requirements such as making the reports comparable with previous reports and covering things such as the cumulative cost of regulation and an explanation of how proportionality has been applied, including for SMEs. I do not think that any part of this amendment should be controversial, and I hope that the Minister will be able to accept it.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My last amendment in this group, Amendment 102, is also about the secondary competitiveness and growth objective, but, this time, for the Financial Market Infrastructure Committee of the Bank of England. The FMIC was set up with a secondary innovation objective, and there is clearly a link between innovation and growth and competitiveness—but they are not synonymous. I am not sure why the FMIC was set up with innovation objectives rather than full competitiveness and growth objectives, and I do not recall a substantive debate on that during the passage of the 2023 Act.
Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]
Baroness Noakes ExcerptsWednesday 24th June 2026
(1 month ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL] 2026-27 View all Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL] 2026-27 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 5-II(Rev)(a) Amendment for Grand Committee (Supplementary to the Revised Second Marshalled List) - (24 Jun 2026)
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
My Lords, the purpose of the government amendments in this group is to ensure that the relevant provisions of the Bill operate clearly, consistently and in line with the Government’s original policy intent. They are technical and corrective in nature and do not change the underlying policy of the Bill. However, it is important that noble Lords understand the purpose of the amendments so that they can agree that they are minor and technical, so I will explain them briefly.
Amendments 56, 60 and 63 make minor, technical corrections to Schedule 2, which, taken with Clause 13, abolishes the Payment Systems Regulator and gives broadly equivalent functions to the FCA. Amendment 56 removes a duplicative provision from new Section 131Z9 to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 that is already covered by new Section 131Z19. Amendment 60 corrects a cross-reference so that the Bill refers to the correct FCA payment system powers when setting out how the Competition and Markets Authority is to determine an appeal.
Amendments 61, 62 and 63 ensure that references to the chair of the PSR, which will be obsolete after the PSR is abolished, are deleted in the correct places in Schedule 1ZA to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, which concerns the FCA’s constitution and governance.
Amendments 143 to 145 are also minor and technical amendments. Amendment 143 and 144 ensure that Section 66A of FSMA is amended in a coherent and orderly way, regardless of whether the amendments to that section made by Clause 27 are commenced first or the amendments to that section made by Clause 36 are commenced first. Amendment 145 amends subsection (4) of new Section 55AA, inserted by Clause 29(3), to ensure that the language used there is consistent with the language used elsewhere in FSMA. The amendment simply replaces the words “is in force” with “has effect”. These amendments do not change the policy or legal effect of the affected clauses. They are drafting amendments for the purposes of coherence and consistency only.
I now turn to Amendments 147 to 150, to Clause 33. Clause 33 allows firms to apply for senior approval, subject to conditions or a limited period; they are known as permitted conditional applications. This helps support a more flexible approvals process. Amendments 147 to 150 are technical amendments that fix an error in the original drafting and will ensure that the framework operates as intended. Without these amendments, there is a risk that decisions will not be properly formalised and that the period for determining applications will not be applied consistently.
Amendments 147 and 149 provide that the period for determining permitted conditional applications is the same as for other senior manager applications. Amendments 148 and 150 provide that regulators must give written notice when they approve a permitted conditional application. Taken together, these amendments will ensure that the statutory framework works clearly and consistently in practice.
In summary, this group of government amendments makes technical corrections to ensure that the Bill works as intended. I hope that noble Lords will join me in supporting them.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I have given the Minister notice that I intend to object to these amendments, so if he presses them, I will object and therefore they will not pass. It has been the custom of our House that when the Government table amendments to Bills, they notify all Members of the House—because the Government cannot determine which Peers might be interested in which amendments—and explain the amendments. It may well be that some of these amendments are technical and mean simply the correction of errors, but Members of your Lordships’ House should have the opportunity to consider them properly.
I became aware of this only late last week, when I suddenly realised that several government amendments had been put down—these and others—and that I had had no letter. I do not believe that anybody else has had a letter. Because of that, we ought to maintain the customary practices of your Lordships’ House. As I said, I will object to these amendments if they are put.
Lord Ashcombe (Con)
My Lords, unfortunately, I was unable to speak at Second Reading—like the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, as he mentioned on Monday—but I am delighted to be back in time to speak in Committee. I declare my interest as an employee of Marsh, an FCA-regulated firm.
The amendment in my name in this group, Amendments 69B and 73A, propose that our financial regulators move from a five-year to a three-year strategic planning cycle. At its heart, this is a straightforward proposition: regulators must keep pace with the world they regulate. In financial services, the rate of change has accelerated to such an extent that a five-year strategy can quickly become outdated. When the FCA and the PRA last set their strategies, few could have anticipated the speed and scale of the developments that followed. The volatility seen in digital assets, the rapid emergence of artificial intelligence in financial decision-making, the growing importance of cyber resilience to financial stability and the impact of geopolitical tensions on global markets have all evolved far more quickly than expected. Yet regulators remain bound by frameworks conceived for a very different environment.
A three-year cycle offers a more realistic and proportionate approach. It is not an arbitrary shift. It better reflects the pace of change in financial services, aligns more closely with the Treasury’s spending review cycle and mirrors the planning horizons adopted by many firms. It also corresponds more closely to the time it takes for innovation to move from novelty to something requiring clear regulatory oversight. Some may argue that a five-year cycle provides greater stability, but stability should not be confused with rigidity. A strategy that is clearly out of date does not offer certainty; it risks losing credibility. True stability lies in a framework that is regularly reviewed and refreshed, so that it remains relevant and dependable. Nor would a shorter cycle create unnecessary disruption. It would not require regulators to constantly change direction; rather, it would ensure that their strategies are revisited at appropriate intervals and updated where necessary. That strikes the right balance between continuity and responsiveness.
There is a practical consideration. Industry participants have consistently highlighted that five-year strategies can be overtaken by events well before their conclusion, making it harder for firms to plan with confidence. In reality, regulators have already had to adapt to unforeseen shocks—whether economic, geopolitical or technological —outside the normal review cycle. For that reason, this is not a radical proposal but a pragmatic one.
It is important that financial regulation does not rely on a planning horizon that no longer reflects the realities of the market. The FCA and the PRA are strong institutions, but even the most capable regulators cannot be expected to operate effectively within five-year strategies in a period of such rapid change. A three-year cycle is a measured reform. It would help to ensure that regulation remains responsive, credible and accountable, while fully respecting the independence of our regulators.
These are probing amendments. As such, can the Minister say why the Government chose to fix five-year periods for strategy reviews? I believe that is too long, so I look forward to hearing his thoughts on that. I also support the amendments in the names of my noble friend Lady Noakes and the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted. I beg to move.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 70, 71, 73, 74 and 76 in my name. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, for adding his name to Amendments 70, 73 and 76.
At first sight, Clause 16 looks like a bit of “motherhood and apple pie” legislation. After all, what is not to like about five-year strategies, which are what most businesses do in the UK and internationally? A closer look at Clause 16, however, reveals a bit of a mess. The position we have at the moment is that the PRA is required to determine a strategy, and it does this by way of annual business plans. There is no requirement in statute for the FCA to do anything but it has routinely issued annual plans; last year, it issued a five-year strategy as well. So this is clearly a slightly messy area, and the Government are right to try to tidy it up.
I fear, however, that the solution in Clause 16 will make things worse. First, the requirement for a strategy seems to be a static one, requiring a five-year strategy to be set and then replaced when the five years have nearly run out. The subsections of new Sections 1JZA and 2E, to be inserted by Clause 16, envisage that the strategies can be revised or replaced, but it is unclear what the trigger for that is other than when the Treasury issues new recommendations in a remit letter. In the business world, strategies are kept under review and are often revisited annually—certainly more often than every five years. I believe that Clause 16 needs a positive requirement for the regulators to keep their strategies under review, if only to confirm their continuing validity. My noble friend Lord Ashcombe’s Amendments 64A and 73A would partly get round the problem by shortening the period, but they still envisage a static strategy; it would be three years and then, at two years and nine months, you would do another one, which is not a satisfactory approach to drawing up strategies.
The Explanatory Notes explain that these strategies are expected to be
“high level and focus on the FCA’s and PRA’s top priorities”.
That is fine, but it is not very useful for the regulated firms that want to know how the regulators’ actions will affect them in practice. If these five-year plans are anything like the FCA’s five-year strategy—all 20 pages of it are full of drawings, photographs and big letters—firms will be very disappointed. The FCA’s four priorities of being a smarter regulator, fighting financial crimes, supporting growth and helping consumers are so high level that they mean nothing to regulated firms.
At the moment, both regulators annually set out the detail of what they plan to do for the following year. Can the Minister say whether this will continue once the Bill becomes law? There will be no requirement in law for either the FCA or the PRA as a consequence of the Bill, and, given the lightweight content of the FCA’s five-year plan and the Government’s intentions for only high-level strategies, it would be a serious error if the regulators were not required to publish their detailed annual plans as well.
These are deficiencies in Clause 16 but they are not covered by specific amendments, mainly because, when I drew up my amendments, I was working on the naive premise that asking for a five-year strategy was a sound, if unexciting, proposition. As I have explained, I now see that as flawed in many ways. For this reason, I fully support the Clause 16 stand part notice in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles; I am sorry that I did not have time to add my name to it.
On the amendments that I have tabled, I will start with Amendment 70, which requires the FCA’s strategic priorities to include its secondary competitiveness and growth objective. The equivalent provision for the PRA in new Section 2E, inserted by Clause 16, says that the strategic priorities of the PRA include secondary objectives, whereas the drafting of new Clause 1JZA for the FCA does not extend to the secondary objectives. The Minister has helpfully written to me today to say that the Government sort of accept that but that they will work up their own amendment. I thank him for that and I look forward to seeing the text of that ahead of Report.
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
I think this is part of a broader discussion. I am informed that this takes into account existing practices for how the reviews and overviews take place. Unless we decide, in the following debates, that we need an amendment to provide parliamentary overview, this will apply to the current regulatory framework as the oversight currently exists.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
I may be being a bit dumb, but I did not understand that at all.
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
I do not want to get confused about this. My understanding is that this is already existing practice, but I will take this away and write to the noble Baronesses just to confirm that this is exactly correct. We are trying not to defer from the practice as it exists today, but I will write to clarify that.
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
We will have to come back to these points at a later date. This is a broader conversation on oversight, and points have been made on this subject outside the Room. I hope noble Lords will allow me to come back to these points, as I think this will come up in further debates both during and after Committee.
Turning to Amendments 72 and 75, the Government agree that regulation should be proportionate and support the objectives behind these amendments. Indeed, the Bill forms part of the Government’s broader effort to reduce the burden of regulation on businesses, ensuring that the UK has a regulatory environment that supports growth while maintaining high standards. The Government have made a commitment to cutting the administrative burden of regulation by 25% by the end of this Parliament. The financial services regulators are actively contributing to this agenda. For example, the PRA is implementing new insurance reporting requirements that will cut paperwork by one-third, contributing to savings for firms of £66 million per year, and the FCA has proposed removing some transaction reporting that would save firms over £100 million per year.
However, the Government do not think it would be appropriate to impose a requirement that every long-term strategy must include a full review of all regulations and a plan for eliminating them. A universal rule review exercise each time a strategy is prepared or revised would not be proportionate and would reduce the regulator’s capacity to focus on other priorities. There are existing requirements in FSMA which require the regulators to keep their rules under review and to publish statements on policy and on their approaches to reviewing the rules. The Government consider that this is a proportionate approach.
Amendments 71 and 74 seek to require the FCA and the PRA, when preparing and revising their long-term strategies, to consult persons they consider would be affected, including those they regulate. I understand the intention behind these amendments. If the regulators are to produce long-term strategies that are meaningful and credible, it is clearly important that they are informed by engagement with those who are affected by them. The Government have a clear expectation that the regulator’s strategies will be informed by that engagement.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
Can the Minister explain why that is not included in the Bill? The Government expect them to engage with the industry. One would normally write consultation expectations into legislation. That is the normal practice. Why was it not done in this case?
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
Again, we will have to come back to that point. One of the things we are trying to consider is how we do not overburden by creating more regulation, but we will have to review that point and come back to the noble Baroness.
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
That is correct.
Amendments 71 and 74 seek to require the FCA and the PRA, when preparing or revising their long-term strategies, to consult persons they consider would be affected, including those they regulate. The Government have a clear expectation that the regulators’ strategies will be informed by engagement with industry, consumer representatives and other stakeholders. However, adding a statutory consultation requirement could lead to long delays between a new Government setting direction through a recommendation letter and the regulators putting a strategy in place.
The noble Baronesses, Lady Kramer and Lady Noakes, asked how the Government’s remit will work under the new system. The FCA and the PRA will now be required to have regard to their remit letters when producing or updating long-term strategies. The regulators will continue to be required to respond annually to remit letters, setting out the actions to which they will respond. The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, asked about non-executive directors; I will write to her on that as I do not have the answer to hand.
The accountability of the financial services regulators is clearly an important matter of huge interest to the Committee. I have heard a range of views today on exactly what this should look like, and we will continue to debate this issue in relation to subsequent clauses. However, regardless of views on the wider matters of transparency and accountability, I am confident that the majority will agree that long-term strategies will add to our understanding of the regulators’ strategic priorities and approach, which must be a good thing. I therefore ask that Clause 16 stands part of the Bill.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
I have some questions for the Minister. Does he believe that the FCA’s five-year plan provides a model for what the Government have in mind for compliance with Clause 16, if it becomes law? I will start with that question.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
Does the Minister believe that the FCA’s five-year plan, which started last year, is the model on which Clause 16 has been based? Is the Minister expecting that sort of document to be produced in response to Clause 16?
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
What the clause is trying to represent is that this is the starting point. There is definitely work to do and it needs to be improved.
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
What we have set out in answer to that question is that there is clearly a need for greater transparency and thinking about what the five-year plan looks like. In terms of the interaction with the Treasury, the hope is that we can get it into a position where it has greater clarity and certainty about long-term planning. It will be an emergent process, to ensure that it is improved on.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
I put it to the Minister that this clause has no specificity around it: no ability for the Treasury to agree the format or content of a five-year plan; no requirement for consultation; and no requirement for the involvement of parliamentary committees. We are being asked to give a blank check with these rather vague requirements. There are words in the Explanatory Notes about the Government expecting these to be “high level”, which is why I asked for the Minister’s reflections on what is clearly a very high-level document from the FCA. I am not getting any sense of what is likely to come out as a response to that.
Linked to that is my second question. I asked earlier what the Minister’s response would be to the question of whether annual plans were required. At the moment, both regulators produce annual plans for what they will do in the year, which provide a very rich source of information for the regulated community on what they can expect. If we are to have those levels of detail, it may not matter at all if an airy-fairy five-year strategy document is produced, full of drawings, pictures and stuff like that. If, however, we will not have anything else, and if the Bill takes out the one existing requirement on the PRA to produce annual plans, then we have a problem.
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
I can clarify that an annual plan is required and will still be required. Let me write to the noble Baroness to confirm that.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
Can I conclude my remarks with a plea to the Minister? He has taken away a number of issues arising from this debate, on which he will be writing one big letter or several medium-sized ones. It is normal, when something as contentious as this arises, for all Members of the Committee to be copied in on any such letters, not simply the one noble Lord who raised a specific query.
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
The sense is that it creates an administrative burden. We are trying to cut down on regulation as part of trying to accelerate growth, and we believe that that is the right balance.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
Do we not want to reduce regulation on regulated firms, rather than regulators?
Baroness Noakes
“Review of regulatory principles(1) Within 12 months of this Act coming into force, the Treasury must carry out a review of the regulatory principles in section 3B(1) of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.(2) The review must in particular consider whether—(a) the regulatory principles duplicate other requirements in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 or elsewhere, or(b) are no longer required.(3) The review may make recommendations as to whether section 3B(1) needs to be amended or whether there are other mechanisms which can achieve the same result.(4) The review must be laid before each House of Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment calls for a review of the regulatory principles in section 3B(1) of FSMA.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 77 calls for a review of the regulatory principles in Section 3B of FSMA 2000. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for adding his name to it. My amendment calls for the Treasury to review the regulatory principles and, in particular, identify those that are duplicated or no longer required. As we have already discussed in outline and will discuss further in a later group next week, FSMA currently requires the FCA and PRA to have regard to the regulatory principles in their general functions, but Clause 17 downgrades this by confining them to the new five-year strategy documents.
When your Lordships’ Financial Services Regulation Committee reported last year on the secondary competitiveness and growth objectives for the PRA and the FCA, it took eight pages of our report to describe the web of objectives, principles and “have regards” that the regulators have to live with. In fact, the eight pages covered only some of the “have regards”. The FCA told us that it had around 80 “have regards”, on top of the Chancellor’s remit letters and the regulatory principles themselves. The PRA said that its number was 25. My Amendment 77 should probably have required a review of all the “have regards”, and if I bring it back on Report I may well extend it to that.
In Committee, my amendment is focused on the regulatory principles, because, via Clause 17, these have become a contentious part of the Bill. There are currently eight regulatory principles in Section 3B, plus a vestigial reference to a ninth, and they include some very significant ones, such as proportionality, which we will also be discussing later in Committee. There were seven in the first iteration of FSMA, but they have been changed many times over the years and only three of the current principles directly read across to the original list—namely, efficiency and economy, proportionality and consumer responsibility—which suggests that not all the Section 3B principles are enduring in nature. We should expect the regulatory principles to represent the essential elements of how regulation should operate in practice and have some form of enduring quality. It is relatively clear that Section 3B of FSMA does not meet that test.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for taking part in this brief debate on what is, I think, an important area.
The Minister said that the Government have already reviewed the regulatory principles and found them to be absolutely fine. I find that quite remarkable, given that they clearly duplicate other requirements and that some are, frankly, almost incomprehensible; they have grown up over the years in various ways. As the Minister knows, the burden on my remarks was on the proliferation of have regards and not just the regulatory principles, which we will be debating in the context of the Government’s clear desire to downgrade the way in which they operate and to reduce the ability of Parliament to hold the regulators to account. We will return to that issue.
This is an important area for the Government to look at again. They say that they have reviewed all the have regards—there are many of them throughout FSMA—but I cannot believe that they have concluded that no change to the legislation is required. It beggars belief, because the have regards clearly overlap in some areas and are restated in others. I continue to believe that a proper review should be undertaken. I will remind myself of what the Government’s so-called review has already found, because I am not sure that I remember the details of it at the moment—I will check up on it between now and Report—but, as I indicated earlier, I may well return to this theme on Report, if not with this specific amendment. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, was kind enough to refer to the committee I chair. I will offer a few comments on this area.
First, in line with what I said on the previous group of amendments, I do not believe that this is a regulatory principle in any real sense. It is certainly not one directed just at the PRA and the FCA; for example, the system-wide exploratory scenario, which the noble Baroness referred to, is being undertaken by the financial stability arm of the Bank. She referred to Sarah Breeden—that is her area, and she is not in the PRA or the FCA.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, read out some headlines from the Financial Times. She is right that there is a lot of noise around private credit. It is all based in the United States at the moment. It is often said that what starts in America comes to the UK, but there are a lot of differences between what has happened in the US, including what has gone seriously wrong, and what has happened here. It is encouraging that the Bank of England has taken the initiative to carry out the system-wide exploratory stress scenario—it is the only central bank in the world to do so.
There was criticism that this was voluntary, and that is because the players in the private credit market are not regulated organisations and so they have no obligation under existing law to provide information. However, it is my understanding that the degree of involvement of the organisations taking part that are not directly regulated by the PRA or the FCA—or are not involved in the activities we are discussing—has been satisfactory.
One thing I considered tabling for this Committee was the question of whether the Bank of England has sufficient powers to get the information from the non-regulated sector if it needed to do so. I would be grateful if the Minister could reflect on that question. All the time the information is being adequately obtained voluntarily, I do not see any need to legislate for it; I am just not aware of whether there is a backstop power, and I ran out of brain power for drafting an amendment to find out about that. I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving me a cue to raise this issue.
A lot of issues arise in relation to the impact of private credit on the existing regulated organisations—banks and insurance companies—but it is also fair to say that, although there is not complete transparency on what the second-order impact would be if there was a stress in this situation, there is a lot of awareness and supervisory engagement with the key players, as was explained to us during the conduct of the inquiry that my committee undertook. The committee did not find such a scary situation as has been portrayed by other Members of the Committee this afternoon.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, here I am again with another issue that I want to raise. It does not necessarily look like it, but this is another constitutional amendment. Digital money and stablecoin are coming. As I have said in the House before, I am not King Cnut but I am concerned that both the industry and the regulators treat stablecoin as merely a change in plumbing in the payments system. I understand the desire for the UK to be an attractive place for stablecoin companies and the need to build a substantial sterling stablecoin sector. What concerns me is that, at scale, it has huge consequences for the taxpayer to carry the liabilities, and it determines who has their hands on the levers of economic power. I will not pursue that last issue; it would take about 10 minutes and the Committee is beyond coping with that.
In October, the FCA will publish regulations for the non-systemic stablecoin players but, on Monday, the Bank of England launched its policy statement and draft rules for systemic stablecoin. The document is clearly a loosening of rules previously under discussion, but my attention was grabbed by the Bank’s confirmation that it will introduce a central bank liquidity facility for systemic stablecoin. In other words, if there is a run on stablecoin, the taxpayer is on the hook. It is true that liquidity facilities are offered to the banks but to extend this to stablecoin is a major decision. I am not saying that it is right or wrong, but a decision on this scale, with the liabilities that are consequent, is above the pay grade of the regulator. This should be a decision in which Parliament is fully engaged. I beg to move.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, the Financial Services Regulation Committee has also been looking at stablecoin, so I have a few words to say on the topic.
I go back to my earlier point: this is not a regulatory principle that can be applied by the FCA and the PRA. It has very little to do with them, as it is the financial stability part of the Bank of England that has issued the policy. The backstop is just one part of the arrangements, as the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, will be aware. A very significant part of the assets of stablecoin issuers also need to be held in unremunerated form at the Bank of England—30%, which is a significant amount of money. If the noble Baroness is worried about the cost to the taxpayer, she might also reflect on the gain to the taxpayer for all the time that there is not a crisis because the Bank of England has access to free money, which is part of the whole deal.
The stablecoin package needs to be looked at as a whole, rather than one small part of it being picked out. The noble Baroness may still disagree with it, but it is a calibrated package which balances the risks, including keeping one-to-one asset backing, which will also go a long way to allaying her concerns.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that digital assets are a serious issue and that they deserve proper scrutiny. We come at it from a slightly different perspective. I note the point made by my noble friend Lady Noakes that this is not a matter for regulatory principles.
This week, as we have heard, the Bank of England published its final policy statement and draft code of practice for sterling-denominated systemic stablecoins. This may go some way to supporting institutional scale-up, but we are concerned by the general reaction, which has been that the fundamentals have not changed and that the prevailing regime we are left with could still leave UK issuers less attractive internationally.
We are very grateful for the work of the Financial Services Regulation Committee, under my noble friend Lady Noakes, with the help of her very distinguished committee. Yet again, it features in almost every part of this Bill. Its report, Stablecoins: Waiting for Regulation, makes it clear that the UK, in its view, is lagging behind the US and EU on stablecoin regulation. Stablecoins and other forms of digital money are no longer simply niche products or theoretical innovations; they have the potential to become part of the wider payments and financial infrastructure.
The danger now is that we risk creating, or at least allowing to persist, a regulatory grey zone. Firms need clarity on the duties, expectations and requirements that they will have to meet. That is why we are calling for a much clearer digital asset strategy from the Government. We need Ministers to take a position of leadership in this area. It is not enough to simply respond to developments as they arise in different parts of the digital stratosphere. We have tabled amendments alongside the noble Lord, Lord Ranger, who is somewhat expert in this area and is not here today, to probe the Government on the wider question of digital assets and digital finance strategy. We will come to those amendments in a later group. I do not want to pre-empt that debate now—not at this late hour, with so few people in Committee on such a hot day.
This amendment touches on the same underlying point: that the Government need to provide clarity and certainty. They need to provide leadership, whatever that is. I would be grateful if the Minister can briefly explain the Government’s position on stablecoins, and— in response to the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has rightly raised—explain how stablecoins will help growth and competitiveness.
Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]
Baroness Noakes ExcerptsMonday 22nd June 2026
(1 month, 1 week ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Full debate Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL] 2026-27 View all Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL] 2026-27 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 5-I(b) Amendments for Grand Committee (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (22 Jun 2026)
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, it is a pleasure to open our deliberations on the Financial Services and Markets Bill. I thank the Minister for his constructive engagement so far and I thank noble Lords across the House who have shared their initial views with us. These conversations have been very helpful and have underscored a shared objective: to improve financial services regulation in a way that promotes growth, attracts investment and supports innovation. Although there are differences between us, we all agree on the importance of the financial services industry across the United Kingdom: the contribution it makes to GDP, the 2.5 million jobs it supports and the £110 billion in tax it pays.
However, I think this first group of amendments will challenge the Minister on a very important issue that we will want to address at several points throughout Committee: oversight and parliamentary scrutiny. We have approached this with slightly different amendments, but I believe that the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, shares the concern, which also applies to her amendments in group 2.
Clause 1 is short, but it is the gateway provision that introduces Schedule 1. It provides for the repeal and recasting of significant parts of the remaining Consumer Credit Act framework into FCA rules. The reasoning behind this desire for reform, as we said at Second Reading, is broadly understandable. The Treasury’s policy statement on CCA reform says that the current framework is increasingly out of date because it was designed for a paper-based credit market and now sits awkwardly alongside modern regulation. The Government say that the aim is to create a more “agile and proportionate” regime, and we do not disagree with that assessment. Certainly, that is the feedback we have been getting in our discussions with stakeholders.
However, identifying the right problem does not necessarily mean that the Government have chosen the right solution. Their approach has two serious consequences. First, Parliament will lose control and oversight of the core consumer protections currently contained in the CCA. Secondly, we are being asked to approve the repeal of these protections without being able to scrutinise the regime that will replace them. This sets a deeply concerning precedent. The purpose of your Lordships’ House is to scrutinise legislation, challenge the Government, ask questions and ensure that the law is workable, proportionate and effective. Yet there is nothing for us to scrutinise. The Government are dismantling the existing regime without showing Parliament what will take its place.
Both Houses contain a wealth of expertise—much of it is here today—including Members with extensive industry experience, who can identify unintended consequences and suggest more effective solutions. As we have frequently made clear, we want to work constructively with the Government on this Bill, but asking Parliament to surrender its powers to a regulator before it can examine the replacement regime is not meaningful scrutiny and it is not an approach that we can support.
Consumer credit in particular matters because it is woven into the everyday financial lives of millions of people. It allows households to spread the cost of major purchases, manage short-term cash-flow pressures and access funds when they are needed, all of which supports wider economic participation but needs to be done carefully and responsibly. This is a very important area and, as with the other parts of the Bill that delegate power, the Minister must take this opportunity to answer some key questions.
First, which core consumer rights and remedies do the Government intend to keep in primary legislation? By what principle have they decided which protections may safely be moved into the FCA rules? Secondly, when will Parliament be able to see the FCA’s replacement rules in draft? Will these rules be finalised before any repeal of the existing statutory protections is commenced? What transitional arrangements have the Government found? Thirdly, how do the Government intend Parliament to scrutinise future changes once the substance of consumer credit protection sits in the FCA rule book, rather than in statute? Finally, what assessment have the Government made of the effect of these reforms on smaller lenders, brokers and intermediaries, as well as on the availability of credit and related services more broadly? What effect is uncertainty on this point around the future regulatory regime having on economic activity and how much is that costing?
My amendment seeks to re-establish a basic constitutional principle that is being threatened by the Government’s approach in this part of the Bill. Parliament should not be asked to repeal important statutory protections before it knows what will replace them, how the new regime will operate and how it will be held to account. Modernisation and agility are worthwhile objectives, but they cannot justify Parliament legislating in the dark. Before Parliament agrees to transfer such significant powers, the Minister must show us not only that the destination is right but that the safeguards, accountability and route for getting there are right as well. I look forward to the Minister’s response and I beg to move.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, as this is my first contribution in Committee, I declare my interests as recorded in the register, in particular that I hold listed shares in financial services companies and technology companies that may be affected by the Bill or amendments tabled to it.
I am going to use the opportunity of this first group of amendments to raise the issue of the accountability of the financial services regulators, which, as we have heard, are being given significant regulatory powers. This theme certainly applies to Clause 1 and Schedule 1, because of the vast new powers in relation to consumer credit being given to the FCA, but the theme is pervasive and we will debate it several times in Committee.
I should start by saying that I agree that consumer credit legislation needs a massive overhaul. The current legislation focuses on paperwork and processes. It was written in a pre-digital age and does not have a sophisticated approach to consumers—for example, it does not have the concept of a vulnerable customer. It is crying out for change. Indeed, when we scrutinised the Financial Services and Markets Bill in 2023, I tabled an amendment to give the Treasury significant powers to rewrite the legislation, including the ability to delegate to the FCA. My noble friend Lady Penn, who was the Treasury Minister at the time, convinced me that this was a step too far because of the many significant consultations that were needed. In withdrawing my amendment, I suggested that the extensive consultations sounded to me like an excuse for not making any progress. I am, therefore, supportive of the Government using this Bill as a vehicle to make some progress, although I regret that they still have not completed the task.
That support is qualified by issues that have become apparent since the 2023 Act was passed. At that time, I was a supporter of the FSMA model, which allowed Parliament to determine the overall principles of financial services regulation and left the detail to the regulators. Instead of challenging the huge burden being put on the FSMA model by the 2023 Act, which made provision for the repeal and replacement of retained EU law, a number of us focused on the accountability of the regulators. This was an error. I now believe that we failed to understand fully what that meant for democratic oversight of what the regulators do with the powers that they acquire. We also failed to appreciate the scale of the task of holding the regulators to account.
The FSMA model was set up by FSMA 2000 in an era when the most significant financial services regulation was set by the EU and either applied directly or incorporated by our own legislation. In either event, there was significant oversight through the processes of the European Parliament, particularly ECON, which was chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted. In addition, both Houses of Parliament had committees dedicated to oversight of the regulatory outpourings of the EU, and, in the case of your Lordships’ House, we had a Sub-Committee of the EU Select Committee dedicated to financial services.
The FSMA model was not designed to do the heavy lifting that it is now being asked to do, first via the 2023 Act and now via this Bill for consumer credit legislation. I do not advocate scrapping that model but I believe the time is right for re-examining Parliament’s oversight and the accountability of the regulators. The 2023 Bill initially provided for some additional oversight by the Treasury Select Committee in the other place but was amended during its passage to add what is now the Financial Services Regulation Committee of your Lordships’ House. I am a member of that committee, along with several other noble Lords present today, and I currently chair it.
These arrangements were designed to increase the accountability of the regulator, but I have to tell the Committee there remains a significant accountability deficit. Of more importance, committees of Parliament cannot and should not replace democratic oversight of the judgments made by the regulators. That is particularly important when we come to consumer credit law. The arrangement envisaged in the Bill passes to the FSA almost total responsibility for judging the complex balance between consumer protection and the need for innovation and competition in the market. Quite simply, that is not the right answer and Parliament needs more involvement.
The noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has some amendments to Schedule 1 that we will be debating in the next group, and I believe they are designed to alter the balance between Parliament and the regulators. I look forward to that debate, but that measure alone would not be enough because any reasonable approach to modernising consumer credit legislation will still involve significant delegations to the regulators. That is why we need to use the Bill to revisit the mechanisms for the accountability of the regulators.
At a later stage in our Committee, we will be reaching some important amendments designed to tackle that: the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, has a provision requiring a periodic independent review of the regulators, and my noble friend Lord Bridges of Headley has some amendments dealing with an office of financial regulatory accountability.
These issues of democratic oversight and regulatory accountability are unfinished business, and we must use the opportunity of the Bill to strengthen both and not sleepwalk into a situation where the regulators govern us rather than the other way around. We will be debating the accountability of the regulators again when we get to Clauses 16 and 17, when we reach the accountability amendments that I have just referenced.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I disagree with what my noble friend Lord Blackwell has just said. He has fallen into the trap of believing that an accountability process can be effective within Parliament. The experience that I and my committee have had is that there are limits to what can be achieved in terms of parliamentary accountability. That is one of the reasons why there are other amendments later in this Bill to find other mechanisms for improving accountability.
It is important to differentiate between those areas where Parliament has a right to be democratically involved in the decisions and those areas that can safely be left to the regulators to carry out the detail and to be held accountable for that. It is the balance that we are concerned about. I would probably end up with a different decision on whether certain of the protections in the existing legislation need to be retained as well as on improving the way in which the legislation works by updating it to a modern digital age. There is genuinely a case for looking again at whether the sanctions that exist in the consumer credit legislation are right for today’s world. I believe that some of them are too severe or can be disproportionate to the issues that are involved in practice—for example, minor breaches in relation to enforcement notices.
I would not necessarily end up with the view that what is currently in the legislation must be preserved for all time, but I think that Parliament needs an involvement in some of those key decisions about the parameters of where liability exists and what sort of sanctions can be applied. That is why I think that we must constantly differentiate between democratic oversight and parliamentary accountability. They are complementary but different things.
Lord Carlile of Berriew (CB)
My Lords, I speak with diffidence on this matter, as I am not an expert on consumer credit. I have been involved in many cases over the years when consumers have been dissatisfied with the consumer credit arrangements that they have undertaken and have felt that there was a serious breach of contract. I am concerned that we are suggesting here that parliamentary process is the answer to many consumer credit complaints, even though parliamentary process is just about the least living instrument in our possession. It seems that the purpose of Clause 1 and Schedule 1 is to ensure that what is created is a living instrument that will modernise the consumer credit framework—not weaken consumer protection—and will become more effective because it sits in FCA rules rather than in primary legislation. It has been suggested that FCA rules are not subject to the courts, but there is already an elaborate system in place in the FCA rules.
In this debate so far, no one has mentioned the Consumer Duty, an extremely detailed document that has been in existence for three and a half years and that has, in my view, served the FCA well. If you look at the comments from law firms, which one can find all over the internet, the result is that there has been a much more informal resolution of difficulties than relying on the old system before the Consumer Duty was created. Therefore, I believe that FCA rules are part of a living instrument: they are binding, enforceable and subject to consultation and scrutiny. At the end of the day, if someone breaks the law, they are of course subject to the courts as well. That goes without saying and to suggest the contrary would be nonsense.
Baroness Noakes
“(1A) Before making regulations under this section the Treasury must consult persons which provide banking services and such other persons as the Treasury consider may be affected by the regulations.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Treasury to consult banks and others who might be affected by regulations on access to banking services.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 18, I will also speak to my Amendments 19, 20 and 25 in this group; I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for adding his name to them.
We now move on to Clause 3, which gives a very wide power for the Treasury to make pretty well any provision it feels like about providing access to banking services. It is a fact of life that major banks in the UK have been reducing their branch footprints for several years, in response to the massive shift from in-person banking to online and mobile banking. Branch visits have fallen by more than 90% since the 1980s, and debit cards overtook cash transactions in the 2010s. In 2024, only 9% of transactions were made in cash, while 93% of adults used online or mobile banking. At the same time, the activity that banks could conduct safely via branches diminished. Some might think nostalgically of the era of autonomous bank managers making lending decisions and offering investment advice, but those days have been largely risk-managed out of retail banking.
Noble Lords will be aware that the 2023 Act gave the FCA powers to protect access to cash services. I did not think that those powers were necessary, because I could see that cash was definitely on its way out, but I accept that banks have to continue to provide cash until cash-only users drop to an insignificant number. The banks have agreements with the Post Office and have voluntarily signed up to the provision of 350 joint banking hubs that provide not only cash services but, to a more limited extent, the services of community bankers.
I know that some consumer lobby groups have had statutory protections for more than cash services in their sights for some time, but it is far from clear whether more needs to be done beyond the banking hubs, which are still being rolled out. I have never seen a clear exposition of what services are missing, so I have no idea whether they are realistic in terms of continuing provision, hence I am unconvinced about the case for either statutory intervention or further regulatory powers.
The case may be made when the review being undertaken by Mr Richard Lloyd reports, but that is the time for the Government and Parliament to decide whether a statutory remedy is necessary. Frankly, it is bizarre that the Government set up the Lloyd review in the very month when they announced in the King’s Speech that they intended to legislate. Normally, we consider matters then determine whether legislation is necessary, but not in this case. Even if Mr Lloyd’s review finds that further banking services are needed, that does not inevitably lead to the need for further laws. The banking hub arrangements that I referred to are not in existence as a result of the 2023 Act, as the banks had already started to set them up. The banks are generally well aware that they are an essential part of the fabric of our society and that responsibilities go with that.
I turn to my amendments. Amendments 18 and 19 are straightforward. Amendment 18 says that the Treasury would have to consult the banks and anyone else who might be affected before making regulations. I am quite sure that Mr Lloyd will be diligent in discussing the issue of banking service provision with the banks during his review, but that is no substitute for the Treasury itself being required to consult the banks before any regulations are made. Whatever Mr Lloyd’s review concludes, it is the Treasury in the first instance that needs to decide what, if any, burdens to impose on banks, hence it is absolutely necessary that they are consulted. Amendment 19 would require the Treasury to be satisfied that the banking services which might be covered by regulations would not be provided voluntarily. There is no need to create regulatory burdens where the desired outcomes can be achieved by other means.
As I have already said, retail banks are aware of their societal responsibilities; they will also be aware of the Treasury’s power under Clause 3 to require them to do things. Hence it is highly likely that, if Mr Lloyd comes up with reasonable recommendations, there will be a voluntary agreement. That would in effect leave the power in Clause 3 to make regulations in place to make less than reasonable recommendations into law, which is particularly why Amendment 18, which requires consultation, would be essential.
My other amendments in this group, Amendments 20 and 25, are intended to ensure that any use of the regulation-making power in Clause 3 is rooted in the findings of independent reviews. At present, the regulation-making power is unlimited and its only restriction is to have regard to the findings of the Lloyd review. It does not even have to follow the findings of the Lloyd review. That review might make recommendations which the Treasury does not wish to pursue at this time. Amendment 25 would ensure that if the Treasury wished to resuscitate such recommendations at a later date, or indeed to pursue other approaches to the provision of banking services, then it would have to have another independent review to validate the necessity for using the power.
Amendment 24 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, would tie the use of the Clause 3 power to the Lloyd review. I see the rationale for that, but I wonder whether her amendment might ossify the concept of banking service provision into mid-2026. I am sure that the need for in-person banking services will carry on changing long after Mr Lloyd has submitted his report.
I predict that we will end up with only a very small number of bank customers who actually need in-person services. The last thing that we want to do is to make the banks carry on providing them if those services are not generally needed, because the costs would be borne not by the banks but by all bank customers, so we would be shifting burdens from one small set of consumers to another.
The noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, has tabled a Clause 3 stand part notice, with which I have very much sympathy. The Government have stated in the Explanatory Notes, and the Minister repeated at the Dispatch Box at Second Reading, that the Government intend to narrow the power during the Bill’s passage. My own view is that it is unacceptable for the power to leave your Lordships’ House in its current wide form. The Government must narrow the power while we are scrutinising it in your Lordships’ House, since it is unacceptably wide as it stands. I beg to move.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, the Minister said that they may need the power to change financial services legislation. Since financial services legislation is in the hands of the Treasury, I think we are entitled to a slightly more specific explanation of how the power might be used to change primary legislation. Can he be more specific about which bits of financial services legislation the Treasury will likely use the power for?
Lord Stockwood (Lab)
With all these examples, I will have to come back in some detail at a later stage. The idea of narrowing the powers means that we can take into consideration the conversation and debate, while acknowledging that there will be some work to do in the intervening period. We believe we have the time to do that before the Lloyd review comes into play, allowing us to make the amendments necessary.
On Amendment 18, from the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, I reassure noble Lords that the Treasury engages very regularly with the retail banking sector as part of its policy-making process. In addition to the Treasury’s ongoing regular engagement, the Access to Banking Services review will engage closely with as wide a range of stakeholders as possible, including the industry, consumers, local authorities, small and medium-sized businesses, and trade bodies. Furthermore, if regulations are made under this power to confer functions on the FCA, the Government would expect the regulator to follow its usual processes and to fulfil its statutory duty to consult before it imposes any new requirements.
Amendment 21, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, contains a similar requirement for the Treasury to consult before making any regulations. It would require the Treasury to have regard to other sources of evidence, including the burdens that any regulations would place on banks, and for the Treasury to publish a statement alongside any draft regulation summarising its consideration of the evidence. The review will consider these sources of evidence, and, in considering the review’s recommendations, the Treasury will naturally take into account the impacts on banks and other relevant businesses. If the Treasury brings forward regulations under this clause, it will publish an impact assessment that will consider the impact on firms, as well as the proportionality of regulation.
Similarly, Amendment 23—in the name of my noble friend Lord Sikka and spoken to by my noble friend Lord Davies of Brixton—would require the Treasury to have regard to the need for local banking services when making regulations under Clause 3. I reassure my noble friends that the review will consider the need for in-person banking services and the impact on any specific cohorts or demographics. Funding will be considered once the review has identified the scale and nature of the consumer detriment and once the Government have considered how to respond.
Likewise, Amendment 22, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler of Enfield, seeks to require the Treasury to have regard to several matters relating to the existing provision of banking services, including through banking hubs and the Post Office. The review will consider these sources of evidence when forming its recommendations. On her specific point on the time between bank branch closures and the opening of a banking hub, I reassure her that, if a banking hub is recommended, FCA rules already require banks not to close existing cash-access services, such as branches, until the recommended solution is in place.
Amendments 20 and 25 would require the Treasury to commission further independent reviews if it wishes to make subsequent regulations after first exercising the power in this clause. There is an existing requirement in Clause 3 for the Treasury to have regard to the recommendations of the current review when making regulations. The review was commissioned to bring together proactively the evidence from across the UK and to look at the trajectory for access to in-person banking services, not just the position as it currently stands. If the Government consider it necessary to make further provision in future, they would envisage this to follow the usual process of consultation and impact assessment, beginning from the baseline of evidence provided by the ongoing review. Further wide-ranging independent reviews are likely to be disproportionate.
Amendment 24, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, is similar: it would limit the power to be used only to implement matters arising directly from the independent Access to Banking Services review. As I have made clear, the Government’s intention is for the power to be used to implement the recommendations of the review. However, it is important that the power is not limited solely for this purpose, in case further relevant evidence outside the scope of the review comes to light as Ministers consider the review’s recommendations. The Government should be able to consider all relevant evidence, not just the review itself, before making any regulations.
Amendment 19 would require the power to be used to make regulations only if the relevant banking services would not be provided on a voluntary basis. The Treasury welcomes action taken by industry to support customers and welcomes the voluntary commitments, such as services provided in banking hubs, that the industry has taken forward. The Treasury will consider relevant information in determining any regulations to take forward following this Bill, including any relevant voluntary arrangements already in place.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who took part in this debate. A number of noble Lords expressed their views on what kinds of services should be made available, but we have the Lloyd review and we now await its outcome. That may or may not answer questions to all noble Lords’ satisfaction, but at least we will have a starting point.
That brings me to one of the key issues that arise from our debate: sequencing. It is normal to identify a problem, then decide whether legislation is required to deal with it, and then legislate. That has been how we have done business through Parliament for time immemorial. Not just in this case but in other cases as well, the Government are starting to flip that on its head: “Let’s take some powers. Then let’s see if we’ve got a problem and then see if we can use the powers to solve the problem”. That is not responsible legislation.
The Minister acknowledged the breadth of the powers but he has failed to articulate in a way that will satisfy the Committee the reasons or the rationale for having such a broad power. He referred to the DPRRC report, which gave a clear finding. The Minister will find that the House will generally take a lot of persuading not to follow such an explicit finding of the Delegated Powers Committee.
This will not rest here; the Minister will be aware of that. This power is being taken at the wrong time, without sufficient evidence or definition. In consequence of it being taken at the wrong time and without any evidence, it is being drafted in a way that is deeply offensive constitutionally. The only thing I need to say in closing is that we will return to this on Report. I beg leave to withdraw.
The Lord Bishop of Manchester
My Lords, I support Amendment 28, to which I have added my name. As we have heard, the amendment would require the FCA to establish a framework assessing banks’ and building societies’ provision of affordable credit. I spoke at some length at Second Reading on the importance of equal access to credit. I welcome what is already in the Bill, as I did then, but we can and should do more.
We are witnessing a crisis of deepening economic inequality in this country. For the most vulnerable communities, it is worsened by a lack of choice. Struggling to meet their most basic day-to-day needs, long-term financial planning is not an option for many families today. Daily life is a battle to put food on the table and to keep the house warm in winter, though perhaps not today. It is often the most impoverished who are forced to accept riskier loans, to turn to loan sharks—many of those operate in my diocese of Manchester—or to enter credit agreements that they are unable to pay back. In doing so, they find that they are paying a poverty premium, which then exacerbates and ratchets the problem round and round, deepening the financial injustice.
As I said earlier, I am trying to be more overtly religious in my speeches on the Bill today, so I assure the Committee that this is not merely a modern phenomenon. I could point to specific places in the Hebrew and Christian scriptures where specific rules are set out to ban the most egregious practices around unfair credit arrangements—things like extortionate interest charges, or the taking of essential items like protective clothing or workers’ tools as a pledge for credit.
Yet the alternative to unfair credit cannot be no credit but instead must be fair and affordable credit. Across the country, in churches, food banks and charitable organisations, the impact of financial exclusion on human dignity—another important Biblical concept—and well-being is being made apparent. We also see how certain communities are at a particular disadvantage: this includes if you are a migrant without a long-standing credit history, or an adult with little financial literacy, unable to navigate complex financial systems on your own, or a family experiencing living pay cheque to pay cheque—and about 10 years ago we passed the point at which most families in poverty began to be working families, rather than families in which no person is in work. The services that community institutions provide to such communities are essential but are not enough. In order to truly flourish, individuals and households facing financial insecurity need access to credit which gives them choice and independence and creates opportunities for them to become full participants in economic life.
One thing I learned when I worked on responsible investment for the Church of England’s national investment bodies was the phrase “social licence to operate”. That is an important part of this conversation today, though I have not heard it mentioned yet. The banks—not only those which were bailed out so expensively to the taxpayer less than 20 years ago—are required to operate not simply as best turns a profit, but as fits the needs for the society in which they are working. That requires a willingness to provide social goods, not merely the most profitable products to the most eligible customers.
What is set out in Amendment 28 will not only enable us to measure where affordable credit is and is not reaching people but will lay the foundation to make targeted improvements. I am told that the banks already have much of that data and that it is simply a question of making it more available by providing and publishing it. With a clearer understanding of the barriers that minoritised communities face, we can work beyond this Bill toward financial policy which tackles financial exclusion at its very root, creates new opportunities for families in debt, and promotes economic growth on a wider scale.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I support what my noble friend Lord Massey said earlier on these amendments, and in particular on Amendment 28.
When people talk about affordable credit, what they mean is subsidised credit, because the terms on which financial institutions are prepared to advance money to the kinds of individuals and organisations which have been referenced so far are always provided on a risk-adjusted basis. That reflects the likelihood of default and the amount of loss given a default, which drives pricing and causes people to say that they cannot afford the prices at which a product is advanced to them. We must be clear on this: we are saying that some groups in society need to have access to credit at below a risk-adjusted rate. A fairly simple question is whether we think we should impose on banks the requirement to subsidise one way or another—whether through the vehicle of community finance organisations or directly by charging lower non-risk-adjusted rates to certain groups. My answer is that it should not be; the banks already have quite considerable costs imposed on them, such as the banking hubs which we discussed earlier and which would not be set up for pure economic reasons, or the provision of basic bank accounts. There must be a point at which we stop saying that the banks can just provide more things to groups of people who could not otherwise afford access to them, so I am very much opposed to Amendments 28 and 29, which are an unreasonable imposition.
On Amendment 30, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, I am very unclear as to how she sees her amendment relating to the consumer duty, which has been in existence only for a couple of years, and the full effect of which we have not yet seen. I assume the noble Baroness is trying to set up an actionable right for consumers, although she is not explicit in saying that. I think that would be taking regulation one step too far. We already have the complicated arrangements of the FCA overseeing consumer requirements with its enforcement powers to set up a parallel ability of giving individual consumers rights of action under a rather ill-defined fiduciary duty, and this amendment would be an unwise addition to the regulatory landscape.
Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]
Baroness Noakes ExcerptsMonday 8th June 2026
(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL] 2026-27 View all Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL] 2026-27 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I declare my interests in that I hold shares in a number of listed financial services companies. It is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, who is one of the select group of noble Lords who regularly take part in the scrutiny of financial services legislation. I welcome the Minister to our club.
There is much in this Bill which is good. I welcome clauses dealing with the SMCR regime, how the FOS works and the transformer and insurance vehicles. In addition, the changes to ring-fencing are positive, but they do not go far enough to roll back this burdensome regime which cost billions to implement and run and is so flawed that not a single other country has adopted it.
There are, however, several areas of the Bill which I shall be looking to improve in Committee. I will focus my remarks today on just one area: Clause 17. Currently, the PRA and the FCA must have regard to the regulatory principles in Section 3B of FSMA in everything that they do. Clause 17 downgrades this, so that the principles are rendered impotent. If Clause 17 becomes law, the regulators will merely have to talk about the principles in the new five-year strategies that are required by Clause 16.
The regulatory principles were certainly due an overhaul. However, neutering them is a shockingly bad decision by the Government. It is not surprising that many in the financial services sector have criticised it. I will frame my remarks around the regulatory principle of proportionality, though what I say also applies to other elements of the principles. Proportionality requires burdens imposed to be proportionate to the benefits that are expected to result. This manifestly should be uppermost in the mind of the FCA and the PRA when they are designing new regulatory burdens or updating existing ones. The lack of proportionality in how the regulators currently operate is one of the key criticisms made by financial services firms. I do not doubt that the proportionality principle is relevant when the regulators develop their long-term strategies. Strategies, however, tend to be high-level abstractions; they are not blueprints for how regulation works in practice. It is the detail of the rules and guidance, rather than strategic statements, that determines how regulation impacts the financial services sector.
The effect of Clause 17 is that the regulators no longer must consider how the detailed rules and guidance work in practice for the various firms that they regulate from a proportionality perspective. The regulators will be entitled to ignore representations about proportionality made during consultations. This downgrading not only directly affects how firms can engage with the regulators when rules or guidance are developed but impacts the accountability of the regulators, which is already problematic.
The regulators like to say that they are accountable both to the Treasury and Parliament. I have not yet found an example of how the Treasury has held the regulators to account. Focusing on strategic plans will not be enough. The regulators are masters of the art of wordsmithing documents to make them attack-proof. Parliamentary Select Committees try to grapple with holding the regulators to account, but it is an uphill battle—and this Bill makes that battle harder. The root of the problem is the FSMA model. As the noble Lord, Lord Burns, explained, under this model Parliament decides the principles of regulation and the regulators are left to get on with the detail of regulation. That worked well while we were in the EU. The quasi-democratic processes of the EU Parliament—in which the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles of Berkhamsted, played such a central role—meant that there was significant oversight of new directives and regulations.
Post Brexit, the previous Government decided to continue with the FSMA model when the huge body of retained EU law was repealed and replaced, so massive areas are now wholly delegated to the regulators. That is what the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 enabled. It exposed a large accountability deficit. In partial mitigation, the 2023 Act ensured that the regulators’ consultations had to be sent to the Select Committees of each House of Parliament. That Act also paved the way for the creation of the Financial Services Regulation Committee in your Lordships’ House, which I currently chair.
Clause 17 not only excuses the regulators from having regard to the regulatory principles but repeals the need for the regulators to explain to the parliamentary committees how the regulatory principles apply to their draft regulations. This is a naked attempt to neutralise the work of the Select Committees of Parliament in holding the regulators to account. The FSMA model is a bureaucrats’ and politicians’ dream come true. The Treasury can always point to the regulators if something goes wrong—and the regulators are largely unaccountable. We must use this Bill to make the accountability of the regulators stronger and not, as it currently is, weaker. There will be much to discuss in Committee.
Employment Rights Bill
Baroness Noakes ExcerptsWednesday 3rd September 2025
(10 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Employment Rights Act 2025 View all Employment Rights Act 2025 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 129 Running list of amendments - 28 August 2025 - (28 Aug 2025)
Lord Balfe (Con)
My Lords, I will probably not find a lot of favour on this side with what I am about to say. I remind the House that I am the honorary president of BALPA, the pilots’ union, a union that does not go on strike and does not regard militant industrial action as an achievement. A dispute that leads to a loss of work for our employees is a failure, not a success. I also remind the House that 30% of trade union members vote for the Conservative Party. People might say, “Well, there’s something wrong with them”, but I do not think that there is. The truth of the matter is that there is very little politics in trade unionism. Through several years, I have sat on the executive of BALPA, and we just do not discuss politics. Occasionally, things come up where we have to comply with some regulation or other and there may be a discussion, but the discussion is probably about the cost of complying. One of the things that I have noticed is the huge growth in legal fees that the union is dishing out. We are the nearest that the legal profession has got to a recruiting agency. We always seem to be paying KCs a lot of money to get us round the law. I am not aware that our union has ever broken the law.
I hope that we will move forward and regard this Bill as the starting point of a consensual approach to industrial relations. We are all basically on the same side. I mentioned that 30% of trade unionists vote Conservative. In the pilots’ union, it is over 50%. They are not impressed with this “Punch and Judy” approach to trade union legislation in recent years.
I appeal to all the House, the Government and the Opposition to work to get a consensual basis for trade unionism. I look across and I see my friend Brendan, the noble Lord, Lord Barber, who did enormously good work at ACAS, and that is the sort of organisation that we need. It attempts to smooth out the problems that we have in industry. At the end of the day—yes, I am going to wind up—our employees want a wage and our employers want a successful business. We recognise that. This should help to build that up, and I certainly hope that it will. I wish the Bill well.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, we have certainly improved the Bill during its passage, but it remains a very bad Bill. It is bad for business, which means it is bad for the economy, and it is just terrible for people who want jobs.
It is also a dreadful time to be making such significant changes. The economy is stressed. The Bank of England has failed to tame inflation, and we now have the highest rate in the G7. Speculation abounds about how big the black hole is in the Chancellor’s Budget preparations. Bond markets can see that our economy is in trouble and they have hiked gilt yields to levels not seen since 1998. Sterling is on the slide. It feels like the 1970s all over again.
Businesses are still reeling from the impact of the national insurance increases on top of the significant increases in minimum wage rates. This is already taking its toll. The Resolution Foundation said last month that it reckons the unemployment rate will have increased to 5% this month.
Almost all the employment data are negative. Payroll numbers are down, job vacancies are down, the PMI employment index is down and economic inactivity is up. Against that background, creating new employment rights and going back to 1960s trade union legislation is not far short of suicidal for the economy.
The Government say the Bill will cost £5 billion, adding to employment costs. Most of that will fall on the SME sector. That is bad enough, but the bigger problem is that the Bill will work against economic growth. Instead of job creation, we will have more job destruction.
In the other place, the Government have an opportunity to accept the modest changes that your Lordships’ House has made to the Bill. Those changes are moderate and will not remove all the Bill’s harmful effects, but I hope that the Government will at least take this opportunity to modify the impact of the Bill.
Employment Rights Bill
Baroness Noakes ExcerptsMonday 14th July 2025
(1 year ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Employment Rights Act 2025 View all Employment Rights Act 2025 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 113-I(a) Amendments for Report (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (11 Jul 2025)
Lord Ashcombe (Con)
My Lords, this first group of amendments, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, and my noble friends Lord Sharpe of Epsom and Lord Hunt of Wirral, is significant and I am pleased to support it. I declare my interest as an employee of Marsh Ltd, a large insurance broker. Noble Lords might think that this will therefore not have much effect on me. They would be right, but I have other views.
Many individuals, for a wide variety of reasons, do not wish to have a permanent contract with guaranteed hours. While the Government might like to think that everyone wants guaranteed work, that is simply not the case. Flexibility for employees who desire zero-hours contracts is surely what everybody wants. In my experience, happy employees inevitably are more productive than those who are not. This goes directly to the heart of what the Government are trying to achieve—growth.
At the same time, many others would welcome the certainty and stability of fixed-hours contracts. It is essential, therefore, that we provide clarity in this legislation where ambiguity might otherwise lead to dispute or, worse still, legal action. That is why I welcome Amendment 2, which introduces a clear definition of a threshold below which it is not reasonable for an employee to request a guaranteed-hours contract. Setting this threshold at eight hours a week—essentially a day’s work—offers helpful clarity. It strikes a sensible balance between flexibility and fairness.
On Amendments 3 to 5, there also needs to be fairness in any arrangement, otherwise it will not stand the test of time. Therefore, it is entirely reasonable to allow a reference period during which both parties can assess the suitability of the arrangement before any request for a fixed-hours contract is made. This period of mutual assessment is not only practical but necessary. Mistakes can be made on both sides, and both employer and employee should have the opportunity to part ways without undue burden if the relationship is not the right fit. The 26-week period proposed in these amendments is an appropriate length of time for such assessments to take place.
As mentioned before, unhappy or mismatched employment arrangements serve no one. They can harm the individual’s well-being and morale and, in time, may undermine the company’s productivity, particularly for smaller businesses, where every member of staff has a significant impact—the smaller the company, the bigger the impact. We must remember, as we were reminded in Committee, that small businesses make up the majority of the companies in this country, unlike those I work for. For these reasons, I support the inclusion of a minimum number of hours’ work per week for a clearly defined reference period before the employee may request a guaranteed contract. I believe these amendments strike a fair and practical balance that will benefit both employers and employees.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, in this group I have Amendments 9 and 22, both of which seek to amend government amendments in identical ways. I shall speak to Amendment 9, which seeks to amend government Amendment 8, but my remarks apply equally to Amendment 22, which seeks to amend government Amendment 21. Before doing so, I offer my support to the other non-government amendments in this group; other noble Lords have already spoken well in favour of them.
My Amendment 9 is based on the premise that the Government should be trying to balance employee rights with the need of businesses to be successful and to grow. The Government want to end what they call “one-sided flexibility” but that would not be a good thing if the outcome was to destroy the labour market flexibility which is the hallmark of the UK’s international competitiveness and has been a major contributor to the country’s overall economic resilience.
Government Amendment 8 amends the provisions of Clause 1 which would have allowed the Secretary of State to create exemptions from the duty to offer guaranteed hours on a very broad basis. That power was a glimmer of light in a part of the Bill that was otherwise quite dark, especially for those employers whose businesses could be harmed by the new duty. It is clear that the Government wanted to use that new power very sparingly but it was drafted in a broad way and would therefore have offered the Government an elegant solution if they discovered that certain types of businesses simply could not stay in business if the duty applied to them.
Unfortunately, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee of your Lordships’ House, for which I generally have a high degree of respect, declared that this power was “inappropriately broad”. I suspect that if the DPRRC had attended some of the debates on the Bill earlier in its passage, it would not have been quite so quick to damn this power. Even more unfortunately, the Government have chosen to respond to the DPRRC’s recommendation by making the power virtually useless.
My little glimmer of light has been virtually extinguished by the Government’s Amendment 8. This now requires that when the Government try to use the regulations to create exemptions, they have to take account of two things. The first is the benefits of workers receiving a guaranteed-hours offer. I would have absolutely no problem with that if it were balanced by an equivalent need to avoid having adverse effects on employers, but Amendment 8 goes further and says that the needs of the employers concerned can be taken account of only if they are dealing with “exceptional circumstances”. I do not know what “exceptional circumstances” means but it is probably something like a pandemic; it would not deal with those businesses which face fluctuating demand patterns as part of their natural business model. Unpredictable work demands are therefore difficult to see as exceptional circumstances.
When we debated this clause in Committee, my noble friend Lady Verma, who is not in her place, talked about the need for employers providing domiciliary or home care to be responsive to the actual fact pattern of demand for care. I suspect that would not count as exceptional, even though it is an intrinsic part of the business model of those who provide home care; nor would it, I suspect, apply to any of those businesses that are affected in any way by seasonal demand patterns, as has already been mentioned. Therefore, the ordinary everyday needs of businesses will be ignored if Amendment 8 is accepted without amendment. In practical terms, all the Secretary of State can take account of is the benefits to workers of receiving a guaranteed-hours offer.
Therefore, my Amendment 9 removes the constraint of needing to satisfy the exceptional circumstances limb; the Secretary of State would simply be having regard to, on the one hand, the benefits for employees and, on the other, the adverse effects on employers. I hope in that way a proper balance would be achieved in the Bill and that the Government will be prepared to rethink their Amendments 8 and 21.
Lord Wolfson of Aspley Guise (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 2 stands in my name. I declare my interest as a shareholder and the chief executive of Next plc, a job I have held for 24 years. I should add that Next employs nearly 50,000 people in the UK, of whom around 20,000 are part-time.
I hasten to add that the company I work for does not use, and never has used, zero-hours contracts. I am not in favour of them. As the noble Lord, Lord Barber, said at Second Reading, eliminating bad employment practices serves the interests of good employers. He was right. As I said in Committee, I support the Government’s aim of eliminating the unfair practices associated with zero-hours contracts. The problem with this section of the Bill is not the tight regulation of zero-hours contracts; nor is it the understandable intention to extend those protections to low-hours contracts, preventing employers from circumnavigating zero-hours provisions by offering token contracts. The problem is the failure to define what low-hours contracts are for the purposes of the Bill or give any hint as to what that limit might be.
Amendment 2 aims to address this problem by placing a reasonable cap on the discretion of the Secretary of State to define what low-hours contracts should be at eight hours a week. This is important because it materially changes the nature and scope of the Bill; if this number is set too high, the provision will profoundly change the working arrangements of 8.5 million part-time workers in the UK.
I can assume only, having read through the provisions of the Bill, that the Government have not really understood the near impossibility of managing the process they are proposing if it extends to millions of people. Employers will have to track their low-hours employees’ extra hours every day of the year, and at the end of every employee’s individual reference period, businesses must offer those employees a new permanent contract. These hours will have to be offered in a compliant way, with no hint as to how you comply with the Bill itself. They will have to be offered the hours regardless of whether those hours are actually needed.
This process creates two problems. The first is the problem of complexity of implementation, and the second is that businesses, if they comply with the Bill, risk being chronically overstaffed. To start with complexity, I estimate that in the company I work for, it will take us at least a year and several million pounds of systems development to develop a system to adequately cope with the implementation of the Bill. I work for a company that has more than 1,600 systems and software professionals. Small businesses will find this process almost impossible to manage. I would be very grateful if the Minister could share any details as to the cost and scope of work that will be required to be undertaken by councils, hospital trusts and other public sector employers for the purposes of developing these systems.
The second problem is that, even if an employer successfully implements a system, they will have to offer contracts regardless of whether there is any work for those people going forward. Your Lordships will not be surprised to hear that restaurants, shops and pubs simply cannot afford to have the same number of people working in their establishments in February as they have in December. Nor can we take the risk that the extra hours required to cover many different seasonal peaks and sale events become permanent costs for the rest of the year.
The complexity of implementation, along with the risk that businesses leave themselves overstaffed, will mean only one thing, and it is very important that the Government understand this: businesses simply will not be able to offer additional hours to workers on low-hours contracts. Instead, they will be forced to employ temporary staff to cover those peaks, depriving loyal and skilled employees of income at times when they need it. Whose interest does this serve? Neither business nor employees, and certainly not a Government that I believe are genuinely interested in promoting growth.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I support Amendment 28, which has been so well moved by my noble friend Lord Hunt of Wirral. My main problem with the statutory sick pay clauses in this Bill is that the Government are proceeding without a reliable evidence base. The Government do not collect data on sick leave taken by employees. Instead, they have relied on some modelling by the Department for Work and Pensions, and that modelling in turn rests on some surveys that are carried out by the DWP. Those surveys have some problems, which the DWP itself owns up to, in terms of statistical quality. The Office for National Statistics also published some data on sickness absence. These data are labelled “statistics in the course of development”, and we all know that the ONS currently has major problems with its labour market statistics.
Nevertheless, the Government have used these data and made some challengeable assumptions of their own, such as that there will be no increase in sickness days taken off if the changes in Clauses 10 to 14 go ahead. They have come up with an additional cost to business of £420 million, which they then calculate as £15 per employee. I do not think that £15 passes the common-sense test. It implies that employers will bear the cost of not much more than an extra half a day of statutory sick pay at the rate that is specified in the Bill.
Part of the problem is that the Government’s calculations average those costs over 24 million employees, which is roughly the size of the whole private sector workforce. Within that, nearly a half of employees are employed in large businesses, many of which have their own sick pay arrangements and do not rely on the statutory sick pay arrangements that my local friend Lord Hunt outlined. I tried to find the complete set of costs for small and micro businesses. It looks as if the costs for the smaller end of the scale of businesses are roughly double the amount per employee, but it is very difficult to tie it down, because the dataset is incomplete—certainly the one that is available in public. As my noble friend has already pointed out, the Government’s own assessment has owned up to the fact that these costs will disproportionately bear on small and micro businesses.
Even if we double the £15 per employee to £30, I am not sure that even that is a realistic estimate of the costs that will fall on individual businesses, because it amounts to just a bit over a day of statutory sick pay at the new rate in the Bill. That does not seem to me to make any sense at all. The Government should have done proper studies of current sickness patterns and costs for the various businesses that are affected by these clauses before going ahead. In particular, I believe that the costs to small and micro businesses should have been evaluated before the clauses were proceeded with. The only thing that we know for sure about these clauses is that the impact on small and micro businesses will be disproportionately large.
However, I recognise that the Government would probably have gone ahead with these provisions even if they had gold-standard data and analysis, and even if that analysis showed that the cost was 10 times the amount that the Government currently estimate. That is the reason I support my noble friend’s Amendment 28, with a one-day waiting period and a qualifying threshold of two days, which would go some way towards reducing the impact on smaller firms. Survey data shows that nearly 60% of sickness absences are for one or two days. The small change that my noble friend’s amendment seeks could have a major impact on businesses and the bureaucratic burdens that they would have to bear.
I support Amendment 30, which would reintroduce a statutory sick pay scheme. I would have confined it to small and micro businesses, because that is where the greatest harm is, but, in this uncertain economic environment, with costs being piled on businesses in all directions, businesses deserve protection from the Government’s policies. For that reason, I support Amendment 30.
Baroness Coffey (Con)
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 30, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Goddard of Stockport, which builds on something that I raised in Committee. I have been asked to do a statement for the Covid inquiry regarding the economic response and so have been going through a variety of notes from five years ago. One of the most successful things that we did then was to support employers in the deployment of statutory sick pay by ensuring that people could stay at home and not be spreading coronavirus at work.
For me, that reinforced something that made sense for the country as a whole and its public health and was fair. It was fair to businesses that, while the country was being asked to do something and they were being asked to do something as employers, the Government helped with the cost.
Part of this entire debate is the fair work agency and it being fairer for employees—and apparently it will be fairer for employers, around productivity. I do not want to repeat all that I have said on this but I recall that, when there used to be a rebate, it was recognised that this was the bare minimum, with many employers paying a lot more than the statutory sick pay rate. It was about co-working and recognising that, as a mature country, we believe that people should continue to be paid when they are off ill, and that the Government have an interest in that too. That is why I was particularly keen to sign Amendment 30, although I am conscious that some of its finer details could be worked out further.
Amendment 28 was tabled by my noble friends on the Front Bench. Of the variety of changes that are happening through this Bill—many of which, I remind the House, could have been done through statutory instruments—statutory sick pay from day 1 has come up time and again with most of the employers that I have met or heard from. The impact is genuinely worrying, particularly for people in the hospitality sector, the retail sector and so on. Going straight to day 1 is a step too far backwards. That is why I am supporting my friends on the Front Bench.
Employment Rights Bill
Baroness Noakes ExcerptsWednesday 18th June 2025
(1 year, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Employment Rights Act 2025 View all Employment Rights Act 2025 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 81-X(a) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Tenth Marshalled List) - (17 Jun 2025)
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Leong) (Lab)
My Lords, here we go again on impact assessment. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, will forgive me if some of my notes repeat what was said in previous debates, but I will answer some of the points here. First, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Sharpe, Lord Hunt and Lord Goddard, for their amendments relating to impact assessment.
I refer to the point by the noble Lord, Lord Goddard, about what the Government are doing concerning SMEs. I have just recently been appointed as the spokesperson for the Department for Business and Trade, and my priority is to have regular communications with micro-businesses and small businesses. That is what I will be focusing on. Today, we appointed the Small Business Commissioner, who will start work very shortly in tackling late payments and some of the abuses that small businesses experience from big companies not paying them on time. We will be publishing a small business strategy very soon, and our industrial and trade strategy very soon as well, hopefully sometime next week or thereabouts. We are doing a lot—not only myself but the Secretary of State, my noble friend Lady Jones and all the Ministers in the department. We have regular contact right across the business community.
We have had extensive debate already on impact assessments related to this Bill. My commitment in an earlier debate to meet noble Lords to further discuss the impact assessments still stands. The Government have already published a comprehensive set of impact assessments based on the best available evidence on the workers likely to be affected by these measures. This includes an assessment on the economic impacts of the Bill, including on workers, businesses, sectors and regions. This package shows that there are clear, evidence-based benefits from tackling issues holding back the UK labour market. This analysis is based on the best available evidence and consultation with external experts and stakeholders, including academics and think tanks. Further analysis will be forthcoming, both in the form of an enactment impact assessment when the Bill secures Royal Assent and when we consult on proposed regulations to meet the Better Regulation requirements.
Before I conclude, I share with noble Lords some really startling statistics. We already know that healthier and happier workers are more productive workers. The Health and Safety Executive estimates that stress, depression or anxiety accounted for something like 17.1 million working days lost in 2022-23, which is equivalent to a loss of something close to £5.3 billion in output per year. In addition, close to 2 million employees report feeling anxious about hours worked or shifts changing unexpectedly. By increasing the job security of these workers, the Bill would have well-being benefits worth billions of pounds a year. The Bill will therefore create a healthier and happier workforce, which is not only the right thing to do but will help businesses by making the workers more productive as well as resulting in lower treatment costs for the NHS.
Earlier, the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, asked me what we have done to support growth since getting elected. I am proud to share with the noble Lord that, since the election, 500,000 more people are in work. In recent weeks, we have had the strategic defence review with some 30,000 new jobs building submarines created, and the announcement of the Sizewell C project, which will create some 10,000 new jobs. So, we are creating new jobs.
In addition, we have people who are investing in this country and who have confidence in this Government. Jamie Dimon, who has run one of the largest US banks, JPMorgan Chase, for two decades, told the Financial Times:
“I’ve always been a believer in the UK’s inherent strengths as a place to do business and there’s much to like about the new government’s pro-growth agenda”.
Further, a couple of weeks ago, Jon Gray, president of Blackstone, one of the largest private equity companies in the world, which has invested close to £100 billion in the UK and employs some 50,000 people, told the Times:
“I would give the UK government a lot of credit for embracing business”.
This is not what the Government are saying, but what people with money who are investing in this country are saying to us. Further, every single day, £200 million is being invested in tech companies in this country. I do not call that a small sum, I call it confidence in the UK Government and what we are doing for business.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I listened very carefully to that wonderfully rosy picture of the UK economy. Can the Minister reconcile that with the most recent employment statistics, which show a decrease in payrolled employment and an increase in unemployment? That does not reconcile with what he is trying to convince us is the case.
Lord Leong (Lab)
I thank the noble Baroness for that. Figures go up and down every month but let us look at it in the longer term. We are creating new jobs and that is what is really important. In conclusion, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, to withdraw his amendment.
Baroness Noakes
“Employment Law Advisory Committee(1) There shall be a committee, to be known as the Employment Law Advisory Committee (in this Act referred to as “the Committee”), for the purposes of—(a) giving advice and assistance to the Secretary of State in connection with the Secretary of State’s functions under this Act and any other relevant labour market legislation, and(b) performing such other duties as may be assigned to the Committee under any enactment.(2) The Committee shall consist of no more than 10 members appointed by the Secretary of State and include equal numbers of each of the following—(a) persons appearing to the Secretary of State to represent the interests of workers,(b) persons appearing to the Secretary of State to represent the interests of employers, and(c) persons who have relevant expertise but who do not fall within paragraph (a) or (b).(3) The Chairman of the Committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of State from one of the persons falling within subsection (2)(b).(4) The Secretary of State may by regulations set out matters relevant to the constitution and operation of the Committee.” Member's explanatory statement
This amendment sets up a Committee to advise the Secretary of State on regulations made under this Act and other labour market legislation. It is intended to be similar to the Social Security Advisory Committee which advises the Secretary of State in relation to social security regulations.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
As noble Lords know, this is the final group of amendments, and I must say that I am very flattered that so many noble Lords on the Benches opposite have stayed to hear it.
The inspiration for these amendments is the Social Security Advisory Committee, which has been in existence for over 40 years and has established itself as an impartial and expert committee in the highly complex area surrounding our benefits system. Much of the benefits legislation is set out in secondary legislation.
It is an area marked by highly complex law, which has very important real-world effects for the people affected by the secondary legislation. If the Department of Social Security gets it wrong, people can suffer genuine detriment. The SSAC has been an important underpinning to the parliamentary approval of complex social security secondary legislation, and it gives parliamentary accountability some real substance. Parliamentary accountability is the key driver of these two amendments.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, for her Amendments 299 and 300. The Government have already committed to consulting on the detail of implementation and have already undertaken extensive engagement with employers, businesses and workers’ representatives, trade unions and experts. We will continue with this approach as we develop our secondary legislation.
There are some specific instances, such as in the enforcement space, where we are proposing setting up an expert group. Upgrading the enforcement of workers’ rights is an important and complex task, where it is right to draw on expertise from businesses, workers and independent representatives.
That is why the Bill requires the Secretary of State to establish an advisory board. It will play a critical role in providing advice and insight to the Secretary of State on their enforcement function under Part 5 of the Bill, which they will in practice deliver through the fair work agency. This is a proportionate and necessary step to help ensure the agency’s effectiveness. But this is not required across the Bill and wider labour market legislation as a whole. The committee proposed by the noble Baroness would be a repetition of the planned engagement and consultation on the Bill. We have already engaged with more than 190 different stakeholder organisations on our Plan to Make Work Pay, including employers of all sizes, from SMEs to large corporations, trade unions and representative organisations representing thousands of businesses and millions of workers.
We have held round-table discussions focused on particular topics, such as zero-hours contracts, and with particular groups, such as leaders of small businesses or retailers. As a Government, we are committed to engaging closely on our plans, and we will continue to do so. This engagement will continue throughout implementation, including as we develop regulations under the Bill.
On parliamentary scrutiny, the Select Committees will of course scrutinise the government proposals and reforms as they are rolled out. The Economic Affairs Committee had an inquiry on the labour market, and the noble Baroness was herself a member of that committee, so we know that there are already bodies in the parliamentary network that can be used to provide that scrutiny. On the basis of our proposed consultation and the parliamentary scrutiny available, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her Amendment 299.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I will not detain the Committee for long. With the exception of the expert group, which I was not aware of, I could have written the Minister’s speaking notes myself. They ran along the lines of, “Blah, blah, blah, consultation; blah, blah, blah, Select Committees” and, basically, “We know best”.
My amendment was a genuine attempt to try to enhance the process of parliamentary scrutiny. As I am sure the Minister is aware, Select Committees are simply not set up to deal with the detail of secondary legislation; they are set up to do some things very well—usually broader-ranging topics such as those undertaken by the Economic Affairs Committee of your Lordships’ House—but they never attempt to look at secondary legislation. I can see a lot of secondary legislation coming down the line and the need for a better process and greater information to help Parliament in its job on that.
I am not surprised by the Minister’s response. Before we get to Report, I will consider again what to do with my ideas, which I had hoped would be constructive contributions to the Government’s Bill. I beg leave to withdraw.
Employment Rights Bill
Baroness Noakes ExcerptsWednesday 18th June 2025
(1 year, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Employment Rights Act 2025 View all Employment Rights Act 2025 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 81-X(a) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Tenth Marshalled List) - (17 Jun 2025)
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, in this group of amendments, I have the stand part notice for Clause 114. I support the several amendments in this group in the name of my noble friend Lady Coffey, many of which are probing amendments to try to find out more about this clause. I could find no clear rationale that the Government have given for Clause 114, in the sense of providing a rationale for the state—that is to say, taxpayers—funding the legal and other costs of civil proceedings in employment matters cases.
The scope of Clause 114 is huge. Not only does it cover the whole of employment, trade union and labour relations law, but the intended recipients seem to be unlimited. My noble friend Lady Coffey referred to the use of “person”. Subsection (1) refers to
“a person who is or may become party to civil proceedings”,
which covers a huge number of persons, and there does not seem to be any clear target for this clause. Of course, as we have heard, the funding can also extend to litigation involving non-employment matters, which seems extraordinary to me. All of this adds up to Clause 114 being very wide.
We already have in the UK a system for providing support for people in legal cases. It is called legal aid. It costs the taxpayer around £2 billion a year, nearly half of which is for civil litigation. That already has rules for employment tribunal support, where there is no funding for legal representation but there may be funding for advice on preparing cases. Successive Governments have had to make hard choices about what will be funded by legal aid in order to keep the cost of it within reasonable bounds for taxpayers as a whole but, now, with Clause 114, the business department is going to undermine that completely by taking powers to fund legal cases completely outside of the structures and limits that have been created for the legal aid system. The Government are again showing that they are, at heart, a two-tier Government, with unlimited legal aid by the backdoor for some favoured employment cases but tough eligibility criteria and financial limits for everybody else.
I now turn to the costings, which my noble friend Lady Coffey mentioned briefly. I could not find out what Clause 114 is going to cost. There is a limited amount of information in the paperwork that surrounds the Bill on the estimate of the overall costs for the fair work agency but, as far as I could find, there is no reference to how much the implementation of this proposal to fund legal costs will be within that totality. So my question to the Minister is really quite simple: what are the Government’s estimates of what Clause 114 will cost?
Going beyond that into the underlying assumptions, how many cases do the Government expect to bankroll every year? Will the Government support only cases with a better than average chance of success, or will they also fund no-hopers? What is the average cost of the cases that they think they will fund using the powers under Clause 114? What are their assumptions about cost recovery? I would have expected to find all these things analysed in detail somewhere in the papers, but I could not find anything. I hope the Minister will be able to answer these specific questions, and maybe also explain the lack of analysis in the documentation that the Government have prepared surrounding the Bill so far.
As I said earlier, I support my noble friend Lady Coffey’s amendments in this group, and I will listen carefully to what the Minister says in response to those amendments and, indeed, on Clause 114 standing part overall. My view is that, in the absence of good justification and a good understanding of the costs of Clause 114, it should not stand part of the Bill.
Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)
My Lords, I commend my noble friends’ excellent speeches on this clause. I press the Minister on what the Explanatory Notes say about subsection (4), because we have talked about the concept of persons and what that actually means. My noble friend spoke earlier about ministerial powers and the lack of information on costs, which should have been in a proper and more detailed impact assessment but is not. It is not in any supporting material, including the Labour Party manifesto for the general election. Presumably, the Minister will say that such information about the form and function of the clause will be developed in secondary legislation.
The sentence in the Explanatory Notes about subsection (4) is extraordinary, because it touches on what is potentially ultra vires and will certainly, I think, be subject to litigation or judicial review. Given that this is an Employment Rights Bill about labour relations and employment, it says:
“Subsection (4) makes provision for situations where proceedings relate partly to employment or trade union law … and partly to other matters”.
I just do not understand what those other matters can be. This is an employment law Bill. It is about labour relations and the relationships between employers, trade unions and a workforce. What other matters are within the bailiwick of Clause 114? I think we need to press the Minister on that, because we are being invited to give a blank cheque with taxpayers’ money to something that is very opaque, we do not understand, is not costed and is not detailed. On that basis, the Minister should address those specific issues.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I am more than happy to. The noble Lord, Lord Hunt, anticipates the comments that I was just about to come to—but we can address the point now. The noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, focused on this as well. This is not expanding legal aid. The power is intended to give the fair work agency a discretion to provide support in employment-related cases. It is not an alternative to legal aid and it will be used in specific cases. The Government will set out how and when the fair work agency will exercise its power in due course and will discuss this with a range of stakeholders. I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, we have regular conversations with the Ministry of Justice, including on the Bill’s implementation.
I return to what I was saying about the importance of ensuring that the power of legal advice is appropriately bounded. It cannot be used to fund dispute resolution facilities delivered through other routes. Importantly, the clause protects the integrity of the courts and tribunals by confirming that nothing in the clause overrides existing restrictions on representation imposed by legislation or judicial practice. This clause complements the fair work agency’s wider role in promoting access to justice and fair treatment in the workplace. It provides a vital lever for supporting individuals who might otherwise face legal barriers alone or for ensuring compliance with relevant law, and it delivers our manifesto commitment on which Members in the other House were elected.
The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, asked about the costs. These will be set out in due course and will be discussed with a range of stakeholders, particularly employers, trade unions and employees.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
That was a rather surprising statement. Is the Minister saying that these costs are not included in the estimates that have already been given for the costs of the fair work agency, which were included in the various documents surrounding the Bill? He has just implied that it will be done later. It is rather extraordinary to produce a clause in a Bill without having a costing for it. Can I press him again on what the costs are, whether they are included in the existing estimates of costs for the fair work agency and, if not, when they will actually be made clear?
Lord Katz (Lab)
I thank the noble Baroness for that intervention. The costs are not factored in. As I said, they will be set out in due course, following discussions with a range of stakeholders. I hope that this has persuaded the noble Baroness that Clause 114 should stand part of the Bill.
I turn finally to the amendments on recovering costs for legal assistance. Regarding Amendment 272J, if an individual has received free legal assistance from the fair work agency, any cost award should be returned to where that assistance came from. To be clear, a cost award is separate from any other awards a tribunal may make in favour of an individual. This amendment will prevent the fair work agency recovering costs and could lead to situations whereby individuals receiving legal assistance could receive money for costs they had not incurred. I hope noble Lords will agree that this is completely unreasonable.
On Amendments 272K and 272L, removing the ability to provide for the appointment and expenditure incurred is unreasonable and could lead to uncertainty about what expenditure of the Secretary of State is recoverable. In addition, while Amendment 272L looks consequential to Amendment 272K, it would actually remove the requirement for regulations under Clause 115(5) to be subject to any parliamentary procedure. I am sure that this is not the intention of the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey. Needless to say, we oppose removing requirements of parliamentary procedures in this way.
In response to noble Baroness’s question on why the regulation for Clause 115(5) is negative, this follows precedent from the Equality Act. I indeed note and point out to the noble Baroness that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has raised no concerns with the Government about this power.
The legal assistance powers within the Bill are necessary to deliver our manifesto commitment to strengthen enforcement and improve outcomes for workers through a fairer, more acceptable system. These amendments would hamper that goal and might even unintentionally limit access to justice. The current drafting has been carefully considered. It is both deliberate and necessary. I therefore ask the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, to withdraw Amendment 272BA.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
In the case of the noble Lord’s response to this group of amendments, and the response to the previous group of amendments by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, the Ministers have claimed that these clauses are covered by manifesto commitments. The Labour Party manifesto is not something I carry around in my handbag, but, from memory, I do not think it covered these particular clauses. What makes me so sure that this is the case is that these two clauses were introduced in the other place on Report. They were not part of the original Bill that was introduced. That means, inter alia, that they received no substantive examination or discussion whatever in the other place. More importantly, this suggests to me that they were not a part of the original package that can claim manifesto support. I think we will want to examine that extremely carefully. If the Minister has a response now, with a chapter and verse in the manifesto, I will be happy to look it up afterwards, but I think we find unconvincing this part of the Government’s defence of these clauses.
Lord Katz (Lab)
I do not have chapter and verse but a page number. Noble Lords can find it on page 16 of the Labour’s Plan to Make Work Pay document, which was part of our manifesto.