Armed Forces

Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer Excerpts

Thursday 7th September 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer (LD)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Soames of Fletching, on securing this debate and on his introduction to it. He may have watched recently, as I did, the film “Oppenheimer”. It reminded me of colleagues we have lost—Lord Ramsbotham and Lord Bramall, who, with all their military experience, were staunch advocates of holding the Government to account over their nuclear weapons policy as part of defence. So far in this debate, with the exception of the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, no mention has been made of our nuclear programme.

Last month, Aidan Liddle, the UK ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, gave a statement during the preparatory session for the 10th Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. He said:

“The threat of nuclear proliferation persists. We, as States Parties to the NPT, must work to reduce this threat by strengthening the non-proliferation architecture, combating programmes of concern and building trust between regional neighbours”.


So far so good. He gave an extensive commentary on Iran but failed to mention that Israel has a nuclear arsenal, and nor did he mention that India, Pakistan and North Korea have not signed up to the NPT. We are signing a trade agreement with India; we should remind it that signing the NPT is essential.

Currently, nuclear weapons states, including the UK, are engaged in a new modernisation and expansion of their nuclear programmes, in contravention of Article 6 of the NPT. Furthermore, the Trident programme should make all those concerned with our Armed Forces deeply worried; it certainly worries me. The choice of spend is increasingly stark. The MoD paper Defence’s Response to a More Contested and Volatile World talks of recapitalisation of the nuclear defence strategy, but there remains a trilemma: a choice between increasing the overall MoD budget at the expense of other departments, reducing the spend on conventional weapons and forces or reducing spending on the Trident programme.

That trilemma may have led the Government to conclude that they will welcome the return of US nuclear weapons to UK soil. The American airbase at Lakenheath has seen a lot of activity, which many expert commentators say foreshadows US nuclear weapons being based there. If so, we face the build-up of nuclear arms in Europe. Russia has already escalated matters by using Belarus to extend its nuclear base. These developments mean we will again be a moment away from the nuclear nightmare that hung over us throughout the 1970s and 1980s.

I know that to expect progress on disarmament at this time, given the situation with Russia, would be naive. However, there is still much that can be improved, so I conclude with some questions for the Minister. What would she regard as a successful outcome from the next NPT round? What aspects will the UK Government especially prioritise? Will Parliament be asked to approve the hosting of US nuclear weapons in the British Isles?

Integrated Review: Defence Command Paper

Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The review means that we have recognised the pace of change to both the intensity and the character of the threat. The noble Lord is aware that it is now in a multidimensional form with which we were not familiar 10, 15 or even five years ago. It requires us to respond with resilience and flexibility, not rigidity. That is why it is no longer appropriate to measure effectiveness by mass. We need to measure the skills and talents that we have, the swiftness of response, the professionalism of our training, the equipment and the technology. That is the sensible and intelligent way to respond to the new character of the threat.

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer (LD) [V]]

Can the Minister explain the logic of increasing our reliance on nuclear weapons and decreasing our conventional forces given that this increases the danger of nuclear proliferation, and can she say how a 40% increase in our nuclear capacity is compliant with Article 6 of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

I have already indicated to your Lordships why we consider maintenance of a credible minimum nuclear deterrent to be absolutely essential, and it is our judgment that the increase in warheads is essential to underpin that. That is not escalating nuclear weaponry but simply ensuring that the deterrent as it currently exists is adequately supported and capable of doing the deterrent job which it is there to do. We are satisfied that we are compliant with the non-proliferation treaty; of the stated nuclear stockpile nations, we have the lowest stockpile.

Nuclear Weapons

Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer Excerpts

Wednesday 25th November 2020 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government, further to the ratification by 50 countries of the United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, what plans they have to review their policies towards nuclear weapons.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Baroness Goldie) (Con)]

My Lords, Her Majesty’s Government keep their nuclear deterrents policy and posture under continual review, taking into consideration their commitments to maintaining the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent for as long as the global security situation demands, and to the long-term goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply. There is common ground with the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons because that is the shorter term goal, too. However, with the collapse of so many non-proliferation treaties and the failure of the 2015 round of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty to reach a consensus, is the Minister confident that the next round of the non-proliferation treaty, which must take place before April, will reach some consensus as a way forward? The 122 countries that signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons are desperate that nuclear weapons states are not making sufficient efforts to fulfil their obligations under pillar 3. What dialogues have the Government had to date on achieving a consensus and success at the next round of the NPT?

[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

The Government remain constantly engaged. There is probably a fundamental difference of philosophy between an attitude towards a non-proliferation treaty and an attitude towards a prohibition treaty. Certainly, the Government believe that the non-proliferation treaty has been successful because it is built on foundations of consensus and delivers tangible benefits for all its signatories. It continues to make a significant contribution to international security and stability, and that is what this Government want to promote and support.

Trident

Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer Excerpts

Thursday 25th October 2018 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether they will reassess their plans in relation to Trident in the light of the report by the British American Security Information Council, Blowing up the Budget: the cost risk of Trident to UK defence, published on 25 September.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, Her Majesty’s Government remain committed to maintaining a minimum credible nuclear deterrent and continuing with the programme for our new ballistic missile submarines. The first responsibility of government is the protection and defence of the United Kingdom and its citizens. Economic pressure is not sufficient rationale for taking long-term risks with our national security far into the future. Like any organisation, the Ministry of Defence assigns funds to those activities which are the highest priority.

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer (LD)]

I thank the Minister for his reply. I am sure he is as worried as many of his colleagues by the Public Accounts Committee report which found that the nuclear deterrent is an enterprise that is already unaffordable. If this spend were making the UK, Europe and the world safer, it might be worthwhile—but it is quite clear that halting a renewed nuclear arms race, binding treaties and multilateral disarmament are the only ways to achieve that safer world. Given that the UK boycotted the UN talks and the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, can the Minister tell the House just how the Government intend to set an example, as a nuclear weapon state, in making a success of the forthcoming round of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, and what steps they have already taken to ensure that positive progress towards disarmament will be achieved?

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the unpredictable security environment we face today demands, in the very firm view of the Government, the maintenance of our nuclear deterrent for the foreseeable future. However, the Government are committed to a world without nuclear weapons, and we firmly believe that the best way to achieve that goal is through gradual, multilateral disarmament, negotiated using a step-by-step approach within the framework of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. We have tried over the years to lead by example. Our nuclear warhead stock has been much reduced, as the noble Baroness is aware, and we will do our best to discuss and negotiate, with our partners, the best way to proceed from this point.

Multilateral Disarmament

Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer Excerpts

Monday 28th November 2016 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government whether they intend to oppose the proposed United Nations resolution on taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament; and, if so, what alternative measures they consider could lead to progress being made on multilateral disarmament negotiations.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Earl Howe) (Con)]

My Lords, the UK voted against this resolution on 27 October as we do not believe that the negotiations it mandates will lead to progress on global nuclear disarmament. We are committed to a world without nuclear weapons, in line with our obligations under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, but the best way to achieve this goal is through gradual multilateral disarmament, negotiated using a step-by-step approach and within existing international frameworks.

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer (LD)]

My Lords, I welcome the Minister reiterating this country’s commitment to multilateral disarmament, but does he share the frustration of the UN Secretary-General, who said that:

“The UN disarmament machinery is locked in chronic stalemate”?

Although, as the Minister says, Article VI of the NPT is supposed to ensure progress, in fact some nuclear weapons states such as India, Israel and Pakistan have not even signed the treaty while others, including the UK, US, Russia and France, oppose the current resolution the Minister is talking about—and all this is happening at a time when the world as a whole is going to spend $1 trillion on the modernisation of nuclear weapons. How will it be possible to open the dialogue that would lead to what the Minister asserts we hope will happen?

[Earl Howe]

The noble Baroness points to a number of obstacles which I do not for a moment wish to dispute. But in the end the only way to achieve global nuclear disarmament is by creating the conditions whereby nuclear weapons are no longer necessary, and the precursor to that has to be achieving consensus among and between nuclear states. We remain determined to continue to work with partners across the international community to make progress on multilateral disarmament, and that in turn depends on building trust and confidence between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states. The United Kingdom has been at the forefront of a number of initiatives to achieve that.

Queen’s Speech

Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer Excerpts

Monday 23rd May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer (LD)]

My Lords, I would like to make a powerful speech in favour of remain but we have heard lots of such powerful speeches, and I agree with them. Straight after the referendum there is likely to be a vote on the other matter the gracious Speech referred to: the securing of the future of the British nuclear deterrent. I will therefore make a few comments on that and pose a few questions, because many questions need to be asked before we get to that point of a vote in the other place.

There are economic, practical, moral and legal aspects to the decision to renew the deterrent. The economic estimates of the cost vary widely but they always climb upwards very steeply. The independent Trident Commission estimated in 2014 a lifetime cost of around £100 billion. About six months after that, the Foreign Affairs Committee chair Crispin Blunt estimated a cost of £167 billion, and the figure of £205 billion was very recently reported, so it seems to go up by about £50 billion every six months. Therefore, cost is a big concern, but certainly by no means the only one.

Questions must urgently be asked about whether Trident will already be past its sell-by date technologically before it is put into service. Could the UK be investing in a technology that will shortly be rendered useless by technological advances? Many well-informed people think so. I know that older decision-makers find it hard to imagine the speed with which technological changes happen. Some 25 years ago we had no idea of what cyberwarfare meant or what it would mean to an internet-connected world. My worry is that Trident will be to the UK what Hannibal’s elephants were to him: seemingly fearsome, massive and invulnerable, but easily defeated as the Romans crept round behind them and hamstrung them. The likelihood is that the ability of autonomous underwater submarines and associated detection will develop as fast over the next 20 years as it has in the last 20. If so, the Trident-carrying Vanguard submarines will not be so invisible in the depths of the ocean. What if the very fast developing cyberthreat means that such a nuclear weapons system is a bigger threat than a reassurance?

Then there is the moral case. The pressing case for nuclear disarmament is as strong as ever, but memories of the horrendous nightmare of the reality of a nuclear attack have faded. It is therefore significant that this week, President Obama will visit Hiroshima. The reality of what we mean by nuclear warfare must be remembered and understood. I hope the new Mayor of London, Sadiq Khan, will join the almost 7,000 other Mayors for Peace who find targeting of cities, even as a so-called deterrence strategy, totally unacceptable. Moral arguments have been made powerfully by spiritual leaders. The former Archbishop of Canterbury, the noble and right reverend Lord Williams of Oystermouth, said that the weapons were “intrinsically indiscriminate”, and Pope Francis has called for the full application of the non-proliferation treaty. That leads me to the next point, the legal aspect.

Would the renewal of Trident be in violation of the UK’s commitments under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons? The ongoing Marshall Islands case in the International Court of Justice in The Hague began this year. The Marshall Islands argues that nuclear weapons states have failed to carry out good-faith negotiations towards nuclear disarmament. It is not enough just to talk about nuclear disarmament or submit well-meaning Motions to the UN Conference on Disarmament if you are renewing and modernising your nuclear arsenal at the same time. The Marshall Islands case may well just be the start of non-nuclear powers using legal recourse to address these weapons of mass destruction.

The vote in the Commons this year will set a posture for the UK for the next 50 years. We need clear thinking and long and loud debate before it happens. The noble Lord, Lord West, called that a political football. I call it a very necessary debate, and I am glad that Jeremy Corbyn has raised the level of that debate, because before he mentioned it, it was virtually invisible.

As I conclude, I ask the House to spare a thought for Israeli nuclear whistleblower Mordechai Vanunu, who last Sunday was charged with violating the terms of his release, more than a decade after he completed an 18-year jail term, and all for telling the truth.

Defence Reform Bill

Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer Excerpts

Monday 24th March 2014 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer]

1: After Clause 8, insert the following new Clause—
“Procurement of communications systems or servicesAdditional arrangements relating to procurement of communications systems or services
(1) To the extent that communications systems or services are procured for defence or related purposes under this Part (whether by the Secretary of State, Scottish Ministers or officers of other states resident in the United Kingdom) and those systems or services are used or proposed to be used for the purpose of interception of communications or processing of intercepted communications, it shall be the duty of the Interception Commissioner to report on the use or proposed use of those services or systems for any activity which may be subject to the provisions of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.
(2) In section 57 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (interception of communications commissioner), at the end of subsection (2) insert “; and
(e) the transmission of data through the jurisdiction and processing of data by means of any communication systems or services procured under Part 1 of the Defence Reform Act 2014 in the United Kingdom for defence (whether or not of the United Kingdom) or related purposes which has been obtained by interception, whether by—(i) the Secretary of State or Scottish Ministers; or(ii) officers of other states acting within the jurisdiction.””

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer (LD)]

My Lords, I will take just a moment to remind Members of the problem that I am trying to address with this amendment—that is, that the ability to intercept communications has leapt ahead of the regulations governing them. However, that is a very broad area and I think it is generally accepted that the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act needs a thorough overhaul. This amendment addresses just the update to governance that is needed in the area of defence procurement—the subject of this part of the Bill.

The capacity and scale of interceptions from the RAF bases used by our allies, the Americans, under the Visiting Forces Act means that Parliament must put something in place to be confident of a statutory basis for these interceptions. However, I emphasise that in no way should the amendment be seen as undermining of our relationship with our NATO allies or of the intelligence agencies—quite the reverse. It seeks to increase confidence among UK citizens that we are in compliance with international law and have a national legislative framework that respects citizens’ right to privacy while keeping abreast of threats and technological developments.

I raised this issue in Committee and, in tabling this more focused amendment, I have taken account of the Minister’s comments at that stage. Since Committee, both the Deputy Prime Minister and the shadow Home Secretary have made speeches highlighting the need to act quickly and decisively with regard to governance of the intelligence agencies and interception.

I welcome particularly my right honourable friend Nick Clegg’s announcement that the Royal United Services Institute—RUSI—has agreed to establish an expert panel to review the use of internet data for surveillance purposes. That panel will consist of a group of experts drawn from the worlds of intelligence, technology, civil liberties and the law, and it will be chaired by Professor Michael Clarke, the director-general of RUSI. The panel will look at the principles that ought to govern our use of surveillance, examine current practice and make recommendations for reform and, where necessary, new legislation. I am sure that the review will spend some time looking at the whole legislative framework.

This amendment does no more than try to plug a gap in the mean time in respect of how data are obtained from UK citizens and how they may be shared, stored and used. The DPM went to the heart of the matter in his speech to RUSI when he said:

“it is in all our interests to ensure that we can enforce the law in the online world in the same way we enforce the law in the offline world, targeting terrorist and criminal networks and preventing attacks from taking place, precisely to safeguard the free and open society that we want”.

Yet would our laws even apply as things stand? The facts about what is intercepted and stored by, for example, the NSA as opposed to GCHQ, are a matter of conjecture to most of us, certainly to me. No doubt many interceptions are joint operations, but just how do Ministers know which are which and what is going on? It is so that Ministers are precisely aware of what is being planned that I propose in this amendment a reporting obligation relating to the procurement of communications systems or services in the area of defence.

The amendment seeks to extend the existing reporting obligations of the Interception of Communications Commissioner to report on the use of all communications systems and services procured for defence purposes. This expressly includes systems used on US bases by officers of states who are in the United Kingdom. The proposal involves extending the remit of the ICC, as I have suggested in subsection (2) in the amendment. In doing this, I sought to take into account the Minister’s careful response to the more extensive series of amendments tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Hodgson and Lord Dubs, the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, and me in Committee. In particular, I accept the argument of my noble friend Lord Astor that an entirely new scrutiny group might not be necessary, with the caveat that we must therefore build on existing mechanisms to fill the gaps in regulation and monitoring of all communications systems in the UK. This modest amendment seeks to address those different points on which my noble friend Lord Astor, through absolutely no fault of his own, given existing regulation and the remit of the Bill, was unable to reassure us.

We were informed by the Minister when this issue was last debated in Committee that,

“under the Visiting Forces Act visiting forces are subject to UK law”.

In response to an earlier version of this amendment, which also sought to provide oversight by the Interception of Communications Commissioner of the activities undertaken at US bases on UK soil, my noble friend Lord Astor added that, if the visiting forces,

“ever wanted to undertake interception activities that engage the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act—RIPA—a proper authorisation must be obtained. All such authorisations are already overseen by the Interception of Communications Commissioner, and he reports annually to Parliament and the Prime Minister on the exercise of those powers”.—[Official Report, 5/2/14; col. GC 118.]

This reply puzzled me somewhat; perhaps I misunderstood it. I thought that US bodies or officers were not actually listed as those authorised under RIPA to apply for interception activity. With this in mind, I would be very grateful if my noble friend Lord Astor could explain whether and how such authorisations have been made. In addition, the reported scale of the interceptions would make the granting of such a volume of authorisations almost impossible.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer]

My Lords, first, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for his thoughtful, thought-provoking and informative reply, from which I hope to have gained a lot more food for thought. Between us, we have managed to move the debate on this afternoon. I very much thank him for taking the time and effort to analyse the issues that we are looking it. I also thank my noble friend Lord Palmer of Childs Hill for his support because this matter really goes to the heart of that balance of which I spoke, between security and privacy.

I also warmly thank my noble friend the Minister. I realise that his reply labours under the difficulty of the amount that he is not able to say. He has given, as far as he is able to, some of the assurances that I was seeking. The difficulty is that there is so much that we cannot possibly know that it is very hard to imagine that we will ever be able to legislate adequately for the technological advances that have been made. That is the challenge before us because at some stage we are going to have to update RIPA, and even where it crosses into areas of defence it will have to be within a legislative framework.

The Minister made one particularly useful and interesting comment that I picked up on. That is the fact that some of this falls under the jurisdiction of the Home Office and some under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence. Again, when we come to legislate that is a real issue because its effect is to leave a bit of a hole in the middle down which things can disappear. Also, had we had something about procurement and expanding defence capability back in about 1990, then what was going on and being built at Menwith Hill might have created a bit more of a stir about what was being procured there and for what purposes. There was some debate that it was for missile defence; I am sure that some of it is but some of it is for other purposes. The Intelligence and Security Committee may be aware of those purposes but of course many of them are poachers turned gamekeepers, which poses another challenge.

In concluding, I pay tribute to the Campaign for the Accountability of American Bases, which is based up near Menwith Hill. This is about accountability. It is not asking American bases to go home but saying that they should be accountable to the UK. Without that campaign, some of these issues would be much harder to keep our eye on from Westminster. However, I thank noble Lords for giving us the time during this important Bill and, in the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

Defence Reform Bill

Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer Excerpts

Wednesday 5th February 2014 Grand Committee

This amendment is a small beginning. If we want to agree on the terminology—which will certainly not be easy—the view of the APPG is that “unmanned aerial system” is a preferable term to “remotely piloted aircraft system” because that definition fails to take into account the fact that these devices might not be remotely piloted, and that they might not be piloted at all. This amendment could mark the start of a process of building up the corpus of law and regulation, governance and supervision that we are going to need in future. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak briefly to these amendments, to which I have added my name, because I want to spend more time on Amendments 14 to 16. What the two groups of amendments have in common is the need for accountability so that military activity or surveillance conducted from UK soil follows a legislative framework and a line of accountability through our Secretaries of State and parliamentary scrutiny committees. Such accountability is entirely lacking at the moment. I am glad that the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, set out so clearly the issues involved in this group of amendments, which I hope will allow me to spend a little more time on surveillance issues and the RIPA legislation lacuna that I want to talk about later.

[Lord Dubs (Lab)]

My Lords, I want briefly to add my support for these amendments and to make one point. When the visiting forces legislation and other legislation governing the use by the United States of airbases in Britain was enacted, the technology was at a very simple stage. We did not have sophisticated techniques such as drones; we did not have any of these things. The legislation was designed for a different age when things were very simple. Because they have changed so much there is a need to look again at the way in which these bases operate. That is my simple proposition.

I understand that, when questioned on this point, the Minister said:

“There is no requirement for an additional agreement regarding the use of RAF Croughton by the United States visiting forces … The Department has no plans to review this arrangement nor review the activities undertaken by the US at the base”.

The US has been a great ally of ours. We were delighted when its forces came here and we welcomed them. Their airbases in Britain helped defend us in the war and we must not forget that, but things have moved on. The problem is that activities that were fully understandable to us, and we were happy about, when these bases were first established may now be considered in a different light. We are at least entitled to have a better understanding of what goes on there and to be assured that the uses to which the bases are put are compatible with our system, our laws and our approach to using some of these very dangerous weapons.

We need to look again at this issue. I am not saying that we should close down American bases. I share the view of the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, on drones: they have their good points and they have their bad points. However, we need to be careful before we allow even the friendliest of our allies to use bases for purposes about which we do not know enough and certainly have unease.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Astor of Hever]

My Lords—

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer]

I apologise to the Minister, but I am afraid that there is a lot more to say on these amendments before he comes to reply.

I want to address two issues in these amendments in particular. First, the technology has advanced much faster than the legislation designed to regulate its application. In this case, I am not talking about drones but about interception capabilities. Secondly, a lot of the technology appears to be applied by American forces who operate from UK soil but for whom the force of UK law does not seem to apply. For both those reasons, I suggest that the legislative framework is in urgent need of amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Robertson of Port Ellen (Lab)]

The said Mr Norman Baker is now a Minister at the Home Office. Has the noble Baroness any indication that he has perhaps pursued these matters and some of the other eccentric matters that he was interested in before he became one of Her Majesty’s Ministers?

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer]

I do not know why the noble Lord finds it an eccentric matter, but I have not discussed this with Mr Baker before speaking today or, indeed, at any time. I am simply quoting the Hansard entry from those years as an example of one of the parliamentarians. I could give many others, but I do not want to take the time of the Committee. They are certainly not eccentric.

[Lord Robertson of Port Ellen]

I should clarify for the noble Baroness that I was referring to Mr Baker’s other eccentric issues. This one might not be classified as that at the moment.

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer]

I do not think we are discussing the other issues at this moment, so I shall return to the matter of the debate. The fact is that Parliament has time and again raised this issue. Indeed the Defence Select Committee in another place also raised it. In October 2004, a number of changes of use at Menwith Hill were put through as Written Statements prompting the Defence Select Committee to tell the then Secretary of State, Geoff Hoon, that:

“Despite the Secretary of State’s unequivocal statement that he wanted the decision to be informed by public and parliamentary discussion, he has acted in a way that has effectively curtailed such discussions”.

It went on to recommend full parliamentary debate of the proposals. There were none. In January 2008, my noble friend Lord Wallace of Saltaire spoke about how much Menwith Hill remains subject to British control and said that he was,

“extremely unhappy about the extent to which it remains effectively under British sovereignty”.—[Official Report, 10/1/09; col. 987.]

There is a long history of Parliament being left in ignorance on this issue. I do not know the reason for that. Was it because Secretaries of State did not know what was going on there or chose not to let Parliament know? However, the fact remains that the legislative framework applies to UK operators and all communications between the UK and abroad. We now have the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, which was brought in to cover some of these advances in technology. It will not come as a surprise to Members of the Committee that, under the framework, authority and warrants must be given if anything is to be done that would interfere effectively with the private lives of UK citizens. We need to know that what happens on UK soil, whether it is done on American bases or by people in the UK, is covered in the same way. That is the point of these amendments. In Amendment 15, we would give responsibility to an individual to ensure a reporting mechanism. My noble friend Lord Hodgson already referred to what an unenviable position that might be.

We have a heavy responsibility here to make sure that the very unsatisfactory state that has continued for decades comes to an end. In last week’s State of the Union address, President Obama promised to work with the US Congress to reform surveillance programmes. All we suggest in these amendments is that we in the UK Parliament play our part in making surveillance accountable. I fully accept the need for a security programme but of course I am equally concerned about where the lines are drawn and whether GCHQ overstepped its remit. At least I am assured that GCHQ has a line of accountability to the Government and our Ministers, and appears before committees of Parliament. In the case of the visiting forces, that is something we can remedy by amending the Bill as we suggest. I strongly feel that that needs to happen.

To conclude, when in 1994 Bob Cryer brought up the worry about these developments at Menwith Hill, the then Minister, Mr Hanley, said that,

“what he peddles is ill-informed, second-hand fantasy based on prejudice against our allies which in itself is not in the national interest. His colourful language may well make good sound bites, but it is pathetic in its paranoia”.—[Official Report, Commons, 25/3/94; col. 616.]

Since then, Mr Cryer’s worries have proved to be absolutely sound. It is our duty today to put in place very belatedly these amendments that would ensure full accountability.

[Baroness Stern]

My Lords, it is a privilege to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Miller, who has been so determined in pursuing this over a long period. I shall try to be brief. I will begin by bringing to the attention of the Committee a very short passage from the Ministry of Defence Joint Doctrine Note. It quotes General Robert E Lee:

“It is well that war is so terrible—otherwise we would grow too fond of it”.

That seems a very well chosen quotation in light of the development of war that is remote, unpiloted and rather like a video game.

These amendments take us into the area of ensuring lawfulness through requiring reporting on the activities of contractors and visiting forces. We aim by raising this matter to ensure that there is a debate on the existing scrutiny arrangements and the need to update them in the light of the widespread use of unmanned aircraft systems and future developments. I am grateful to the Minister for cleaning up my language; I will now say at all times “unmanned aircraft systems”, and I can see he is happy with me because he is smiling. It is not to suggest for one moment that what our Armed Forces are doing is unlawful. I am sure that it is not, and I am sure that the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, was right about having his lawyer with him all the time. I do not doubt any of that for a moment.

The doctrine note that I have just mentioned deals with matters of lawfulness, ethics and humanitarian law in chapter 5. The note begins by saying:

“Signatories to the Geneva treaties are required to review all new weapons, methods and means of warfare to determine their compliance with applicable law”.

I am sure that the Ministry of Defence has done this in respect of unmanned aircraft systems, and I would be grateful to have from the Minister an indication of how and when that was done and where Members of Parliament have access to reading about such a review.

The note also says:

“There are elements of the LOAC”—

the law on armed conflict—

“that have specific consequences for unmanned aircraft, as compliance will become increasingly challenging as systems become more automated”.

I was very interested and glad to hear the Minister say that we are not going to become more automated and use unmanned systems without human agency. I am sure that many noble Lords here today will be glad to see that on the record.

I take this opportunity to congratulate the Minister and his department on the doctrine note, which is admirable in its clarity, its adherence to international law and the thoughtful way in which it raises the implications of these technologies for war in future and the impact on our humanity and value systems. I assume that the document has been shared with our American partners.

In June 2013, I asked the Government a Written Question on,

“what assurances they have received from the United States that it will not conduct activities from United States bases in the United Kingdom that violate international law”.

In reply, the Minister said:

“The use of bases in the UK by the United States visiting force remains subject to long-established agreements and procedures which ensure that the UK Government are fully satisfied as to the propriety of any US activity undertaken”.—[Official Report, 12/6/13; col. WA245.]

Will the Minister indicate what the long-established agreements are—I imagine that they are in the public domain and we know what they are—and the procedures? Can he tell the Committee whether he is satisfied that these “long-established agreements and procedures” are up to date and capable of dealing with the developments that we are discussing today?

The noble Baroness, Lady Miller, set out very cogently the concerns about why we need such arrangements—the forms of monitoring and oversight such as those proposed in the amendments. Bodies to ensure that the law is being followed are a normal part of our public administration. The IPCC scrutinises the police and Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Prisons inspects the prisons, just as the Care Quality Commission inspects hospitals, and so on. The area of defence weaponry and its uses is also subject to law—domestic, international and humanitarian. Machinery to ensure that the law is adhered to can bring great benefits in informing the public, counteracting ill informed speculation and strengthening the hand of all those in the system who want to operate within the law but may find themselves in a culture where there is no pressure to do so because there is no scrutiny and no chance of a comeback. I hope that this debate marks the beginning of a wider discussion of these important questions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Roper]

The noble Lord is obviously right about that. I was really treating the somewhat narrower point on the earlier amendment which we had been considering rather than the wider range of activities which could take place and which was very much discussed when we were looking at the question of extraordinary rendition.

I only replied en passant to the second point which my noble friend Lord Hodgson made. I mentioned that, although we have had a very clear assurance about nothing being done from the United Kingdom, unfortunately, the Minister was unable to cover the second issue which he raised.

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer]

I apologise to the Minister but, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, does not appear to be going to give an opinion, I would like to ask him a question. His Government were farsighted enough to bring in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act—and obviously they were concerned that the legislative framework kept up with technology. Does he support, in principle, the idea behind our Amendment 15 that its reach should be extended to cover visiting forces? In his opinion, is that something that we should aim to do?

[Lord Rosser]

It was not my intention to intervene in this debate since it seemed to be going on to rather wider issues than strictly covered in the amendment. For that reason, I am not going to go through the specific wording of the amendment and respond to the particular points in it as to where we stand because clearly the issues being raised in this debate go way beyond the amendment and, in my opinion, way beyond the provisions of this Bill.

Defence Capabilities: EUC Report

Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer Excerpts

Wednesday 24th October 2012 Grand Committee

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer]

My Lords, I found this report extremely interesting, and I congratulate my noble friend and his committee on it. Given that defence expenditure in the UK, as the report graphically shows, is 2.56% of GDP, this report should concern us all as parliamentarians. The fact that that percentage actually grew between 2010 and 2011, when expenditure on pretty much everything else went down due to the austerity Budget, is an enormous incentive for us to look to our friends and neighbours for areas where we can share capabilities and save an awful lot of money.

However, I was surprised to find almost no mention of the nuclear capability and no discussion of it. There are some tangential references at the beginning explaining how threats have changed from the old Cold War scenario to threats involving food security, water issues and terrorism. Noble Lords have spoken of a two-tier Europe, and almost nothing is more two-tier than the two countries that belong to the P5—the UK and France—and the rest. So I do not think that it is just about the money, although phasing out the Trident system would save something like £83 billion, according to the Trident Commission which is co-chaired by Sir Malcolm Rifkind, the noble Lord, Lord Browne, and Sir Menzies Campbell; and the French would surely make similar savings. So that is economically interesting. However, I am puzzled as to why the report does not discuss whether two of the biggest European spenders on nuclear issues—France and the UK—would have a very different commitment to the EDA if, for example, they did not have that level of spend on things nuclear. It is the psychology of having two nuclear states and then the rest.

I accept that a lot of expertise is gathered around the table and that noble Lords may well put me right on this issue and say that it is not a question. However, I believe the public will continue to question it and the debate about whether we should continue with our so-called independent nuclear deterrent is already alive here politically.

In France, the force de frappe is perhaps less discussed at the moment, although Michel Rocard, the former Prime Minister, suggested that France should abandon its independent deterrent, saying that the money spent on maintaining it serves absolutely no purpose. The traditional French view was probably more fairly put recently by Josselin de Rohan, chair of the Senate foreign affairs, defence and armed forces committee, when he laid out all the reasons why France would continue to maintain a nuclear capability: essentially the nuclearisation of the Middle East and the nuclear capability in Pakistan, India and China, so I accept that scrapping the French force de frappe is not an immediate prospect. However, we need to consider where this fits in to a commitment to a different sort of European defence force. While we are thinking about things nuclear, there is the question of whether an independent deterrent can be independent when it depends not on the European Galileo system but on the American satellite system.

Finally, there is another gap in this otherwise constructive and useful report. It is European deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. In several European countries, this deployment is seen as very undesirable. As long ago as 2004, the Science and Technology Commission of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly advised NATO to come up,

“with a proposal on a phased and verifiable withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe”,

as they,

“do not substantially add to the security of Europe”.

States hosting such weapons need to keep their fleets of fighter bombers up to date, which is another cost that is unlikely to be borne in the present times of austerity and which the public may not see as justifiable. Indeed in a Dutch March 2011 survey, 14 NATO states supported the withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons, 10 would accept withdrawal and only three opposed it. These issues about the future of the nuclear weapons in Europe are perhaps ones that the EU committee intends to address in a separate paper, complementary to this one. I certainly hope so.

Armed Forces Bill

Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer Excerpts

Wednesday 6th July 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer]

My Lords, I shall confine my remarks to Clause 25, which is concerned with claims against visiting forces. The role of visiting forces in the UK is defined under the Visiting Forces Act 1952. We in Parliament have very little opportunity to explore and scrutinise the relationship between UK citizens and visiting forces. When questions are asked, they are usually batted back to the questioner with, “We don’t answer questions on matters of security”. There are many interfaces between UK citizens and visiting forces, whether for matters of trespass because the force bases sometimes cross footpaths that have been diverted, or because of protest at those bases. Therefore, it is important that we get any change to this legislation right.

The change proposed in the Bill is quite small on the face of it. At the moment, should a claim be made, the UK Government can handle and settle it, but it is still the visiting force’s responsibility to defend it. My question for the Minister is: why, and for whose benefit, is this change being made? There may well be a very good reason for it. However, when I looked at the Explanatory Notes to discover a little more, the change was explained in paragraph 108 as being made because it was very difficult for the sending state, which would find “itself in unfamiliar proceedings” as the defendant. I find it hard to believe that the USA would have great difficulty in finding a lawyer who could not cope with the unfamiliar proceedings in the UK to defend a case.

This is not a small problem. I am sure that noble Lords are aware of the scale of visiting forces. I could mention, for example, National Security Agency Menwith Hill, better known as USAF Menwith Hill, the scale and importance of which will grow later this year as some of its new facilities are implemented. There is also RAF Fylingdales, USAF Lakenheath, USAF Mildenhall, USAF Croughton, JAC Molesworth, USAF Fairford, USAF Alconbury, the deep space tracking facility at Feltwell and USAF Welford. At all of those bases, the US commander is in charge and the base has a shop, medical facilities and housing; it is a little bit of the USA in the UK. As the USA is our special ally, we have worked very hard over the years to build on that relationship and make sure that we have a very good understanding. However, we in Parliament do not know the basis of that understanding. A lot has changed since the 1950s.

Therefore, I am concerned about whether these changes are being made for the benefit of UK citizens. Will they make matters fairer and easier? I should be very grateful if the Minister could answer any of these questions today. Is this change to the legislation for the benefit of UK citizens, or for the benefit of the visiting forces? As parliamentarians, we want to see that legislation being for the benefit of UK citizens.