(2 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I should just say that it is not my role to make friends among my colleagues in the legal profession; it is to try to get the right result out of the Bill.
I have just one observation on the previous group. It is interesting to note that the Government have some wonderful ways of resisting amendments. They say that it would be inconsistent with the Bill, but they are perfectly capable of passing amendments of their own which are not fully consistent, because that is what exceptions are—they are there because there would otherwise be an injustice.
The site providers are making and have made a very strong case that they need better protection against abuse by operators. Throughout this Bill, we are of course very mindful of the balance between site providers and operators. The Government believe that the provisions of the Bill are putting this in order, but many of us believe that they are putting it in disorder as a result. The Protect and Connect campaign has come up a number of times already during the course of debates on the Bill. It surveyed 116 site owners that host mobile telecoms masts and found that 23% have suffered damage to their property; 35% have had their sites upgraded without permission; 46% have found telecoms companies on their land without warning; and 50% have been threatened with legal action. That does not sound like very good behaviour on the part of the operators. In this context, Clause 68, on the alternative dispute resolution, is of great importance. It sets out the process by which an operator can request rights to land from an occupier, which will now include information about alternative dispute resolution.
The clause however requires operators only to “consider” the use of ADR for resolving disputes with site owners where “reasonably practicable”. It also permits courts to take an operator’s “unreasonable” refusal to consider ADR into consideration when deciding on remedies during a dispute. The ADR process that the Government are providing is therefore non-binding. Telecoms companies need only show that they have considered it in order to avoid costs.
To address this point, the Government should make ADR compulsory for any dispute and issue guidance about reasonable terms. Properly enforced, it would reduce the operators’ reliance on litigation through the courts and encourage better behaviour by both parties. It is important that there is greater onus on the operators to make use of this process, because the terms of the code are so heavily weighted in their favour and their ability to use the courts in general is far greater, befitting their corporate size compared to the average site owner. Given the potential benefits for both parties and the wider public interest, it is difficult to see the case for this process remaining purely advisory.
As regards Ofcom’s guidance, Ofcom has long provided guidance on the ECC, but to date it has not provided any real support for site owners experiencing problems. Amendment 39 is intended to force operators to give greater weight to Ofcom’s code of practice, which it is currently obliged to prepare under paragraph 103(1) of the ECC. Tribunals would be obliged to take into account an operator’s compliance, or lack thereof, when making costs awards. The purpose of this is to render Ofcom’s code of practice meaningful, rather than just optional guidance that is all too easily disregarded.
Amendments 40, 41 and 42 aim to address the issue of non-compliance with Ofcom’s code of practice. It is right that operators are held to standards in how they treat site providers, including measures such as the provision of information or the conduct of negotiations. However, there is a significant body of evidence that, despite the code of practice, site providers are not being treated fairly or with respect by the operators from whom they rent their land. The solution to the problem of non-compliance with the code of practice is to strengthen these measures, yet Ofcom has failed to invest adequately in this area and the Government have spent too long asking the industry to solve its own problems through stakeholder workshops, rather than showing direct leadership. These amendments will collectively place obligations on both operators and site providers. The intention here is not to place an asymmetrical set of requirements on either party in these negotiations or to these agreements.
Amendment 40 would create an obligation to follow the code of practice. It would create a maximum financial penalty for non-compliance of £1 million and require Ofcom to have regard to prior history of non-compliance when assessing the size of any penalty imposed. This amendment would provide a strong incentive for adherence to the code of practice. Moreover, it would require a previous history of poor behaviour to be taken into account. This means that operators or site providers would not be able to disregard the code of practice just because they think they can pay the fine, and poor behaviour would have increasingly impactful consequences. Amendment 42 requires that Ofcom include in its code of practice guidelines on when operators must pay compensation to those affected by a failure by the operator to adhere to the code of practice.
If the Government are serious about promoting consensus-based agreements and getting this market working again, having clear and enforceable guidance on the standards expected by the parties is essential. This is what these amendments try to achieve. I very much hope that the Minister will take all the amendments and their intention on board.
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 36, 37, 38 and 39, and the proposal that Clauses 68 and 69 do not stand part of the Bill. I am delighted to have the support of the noble Earl, Lord Devon.
I am slightly stung by something my noble friend the Minister said earlier: that perhaps we are all paying too much heed to lobbyists. I think my noble friend knows me well enough now to know that I am of particular independence of mind. However, when an allegation is made by those seeking to brief us on the Bill that the Bill has swung too heavily against the interests of the landowners—of which I am not one; I have no particular interest in this other than as a consumer, as I said—and too heavily in favour of the operators and networks, that is something that I think he would expect us to explore. It is something we are encouraged to do when we are introduced. The Reading Clerk reads out that we are given a seat, place and voice in the councils, assemblies and Parliaments to enable us so to do. I take those responsibilities very seriously indeed.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I congratulate my noble friend and the Government on introducing the regulatory sandbox.
My Lords, as chairman of the Proof of Age Standards Scheme board, I join the noble Baroness, Lady Kidron, in congratulating the Government on the work they are doing in this area. Can the Minister give us an update on the sandbox trial of technologies and an idea of when those trials might reach a conclusion, so that they can be rolled out? This is something that, for proof of age for buying alcohol and children’s online activities, will be an immensely positive step forward and one that is very welcome.
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I start with an apology to the Minister. Amendment 26 in the previous group was a rogue and should have been deleted, because Amendment 27, introduced so well by the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, superseded it. The PBO produced a much better format, so Amendment 26 was left like an orphan in a previous group, but it has been extremely helpful in getting a foretaste of the Minister’s arguments in this group, so I apologise to him, but there is nothing like hearing a good argument twice, and no doubt we will be all that wiser for it.
As the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, has introduced the amendments so well, he has made it clear that they are intended to do two things: to ensure that qualifying assets are only assets used in connection with activities carried on in the UK, but not the supply of goods or services to persons in the UK; and, secondly, to prevent “in connection with” being interpreted in a way that treats all assets within the relevant supply chain as being within scope, even if owned and controlled by unconnected third parties, which may have no visibility of the activities of businesses further down the supply chain.
As drafted, the territorial scope of the Government’s call-in power is extremely broad, extending to non-UK entities that supply goods or services to persons in the UK, and assets situated outside the UK that are used in connection with activities carried on in the UK or the supply of goods or services to persons in the UK. This extraterritorial application is out of line with the approach taken in most other foreign investment regimes, which focus only on acquisitions of corporate entities registered in the relevant jurisdiction. It is also unnecessary. There are a number of other more appropriate ways to protect against a threat to the UK’s national security in connection with a transaction involving a non-UK registered company or assets that are not located in the UK, such as export/import controls, the network and information systems regime for critical infrastructure and other licensing requirements relating specifically to national security. From a practical perspective, it may also be difficult in many cases for an acquirer to analyse fully all aspects of the supply chain in order to self-assess the risk of a particular transaction being called in for review.
Furthermore, referring to supplies of goods or services captures all aspects of the supply chain, however minor. It is difficult for an acquirer of a business fully to analyse the supply chain, and including this as part of a mandatory regime with criminal sanctions is disproportionate. The proposed requirement for control by the person exercising the relevant activities is necessary to prevent “in connection with” being interpreted in a way that treats all assets in the relevant supply chain as being in scope, even if owned and controlled by unconnected third parties that may have no visibility of the activities of businesses further down the supply chain.
There are other more appropriate ways to protect against a threat to the UK’s national security in connection with a transaction involving a non-UK registered company or assets that are not located in the UK. As I said, most other foreign investment regimes have managed to crack that issue. I very much hope that the Government will think again.
My Lords, I am delighted to support this small group of amendments. I will speak in particular to Amendment 21 for the reasons my noble friend Lord Hodgson so eloquently and effectively set out.
I am very well aware of the concerns raised by the Law Society of England, as set out by my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Clement Jones, as to the extraterritorial aspects of the application of Clause 7(3) as drafted. It raises a number of practical problems as to how it will be applied. In the view of the Law Society of England, it is potentially inappropriate in its wording.
I am grateful to my noble friend for stepping up to the plate and tabling these amendments. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will look favourably on them, the reason being that, in the definition of qualifying entities and assets currently given under Clause 7(3), an overseas entity is a qualifying entity if, among other things, it “carries on activities” in the UK. The Law Society would very much like to see further guidance on the meaning of this term, as is the case under the Bribery Act and the Modern Slavery Act. It begs the question as to why the Government have not felt able or willing to bring forward such a definition as part of the Bill. My noble friend must understand that it will be up to the practitioners to apply this wording. The courts could have to interpret it as well.
Clause 7(3)(b) also provides that an overseas entity that
“supplies goods or services to persons in the United Kingdom”
would be a qualifying entity. For reasons of international comity, other major jurisdictions do not apply their national security laws to investments in foreign entities. In accordance with this, I support the Law Society’s conclusion that the Bill should treat only overseas entities that carry on activities in the UK as qualifying entities, rather than including entities that simply export to the UK.
In my view, Clause 7(3)(b) should be removed entirely or the wording proposed by my noble friend Lord Hodgson, which I prefer, adopted. I find the Bill unacceptable as it currently stands. I hope my noble friend the Minister will understand that we are not the ones who will have to apply this. Practitioners have raised these concerns with us for very legitimate reasons.
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise to speak to the health data aspects of Amendment 11, which has been mentioned and was so well introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, and the noble Lord, Lord Freyberg. I would add to the point of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton: I join her in deploring the fact that we are debating this group of amendments, which are so important in this area, impacting on the NHS, at this late hour.
NHS data is a precious commodity, especially given the many transactions between technology, telecoms and pharma companies concerned with NHS data. In a recent report, EY estimated that the value of NHS data could be around £10 billion a year in the benefit delivered. The Department of Health and Social Care is preparing to publish its national health and care data strategy in the new year, in which it is expected to prioritise the
“safe, effective and ethical use of data-driven technologies, such as artificial intelligence, to deliver fairer health outcomes.”
Health professionals have strongly argued that free trade deals risk compromising the safe storage and processing of NHS data.
Through this amendment, the objective is to ensure that the NHS—not US big tech companies and drug giants—reaps the benefit of all this data. This is especially important given what the Ada Lovelace Institute called in its report—The Data Will See You Now—the “datafication” of health, which, it says, has profound consequences for who can access data about health, on how we practically and legally define health data and on our relationship with our own well-being and the healthcare system. Health information can now be inferred from non-health data, and data about health can be used for purposes beyond healthcare. So harnessing the value of healthcare data must be allied with ensuring that adequate protections are put in place in trade agreements if that value is not to be given or traded away.
There is also the need for data adequacy to ensure that personal data transfers to third countries outside the EU are protected in line with the principles of the GDPR. Watering down the UK’s data protection legislation will only reduce the chances of receiving an adequacy decision. There is also a concern that the proposed National Data Strategy will lead to the weakening of data protection legislation, just as it becomes ever more necessary for securing citizens’ rights. There should, however, be no conflict between good data governance, economic growth and better government through the effective use of data.
The section of the final impact assessment of the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement—CEPA—between the UK and Japan on digital trade provisions says that the agreement contains:
“Commitments to uphold world-leading standards of protection for individuals’ personal data, in line with the UK’s Data Protection Act 2018, when data is being transferred across borders. This ensures that both consumer and business data can flow across borders in a safe and secure manner.”
The Department for International Trade, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Freyberg, issued a document headed “UK-JP CEPA—a good deal for data protection”. However, the agreement has Article 8.3, which appears to provide a general exception for data flows, where this is
“necessary to protect public security or public morals or to maintain public order”
or
“to protect human, animal or plant life or health”.
The question has been raised of whether this will override data protections and what its impact will be on access to source codes and algorithms. There is also the question of the combined effect of Article 8.84, on the free flow of data, which provides that:
“A Party shall not prohibit or restrict the cross-border transfer of information by electronic means, including personal information, when this activity is for the conduct of the business of a covered person.”
Article 8.80, on personal information protection, says:
“Recognising that the Parties may take different legal approaches to protecting personal information, each Party should encourage the development of mechanisms to promote compatibility between these different regimes.”
It is all very well making reassuring noises, but what public legal analysis of the language in the relevant articles—and how advocacy will be permitted despite this—are the Government going to provide? Why, for instance, are these articles included, which the EU for its part will not sign up to? Unless the Government do this, there will be zero trust in future trade deals, especially regarding the US.
To date, there have been shortcomings in the sharing of data between various parts of the health service, care sector and Civil Service. The development of the Covid-19 app and the way the Government have procured contracts with the private sector for data management have not improved public trust in their approach to data use. There is also the danger that the UK will fall behind Europe and the rest of the world unless it takes back control of its data and begins to invest in its own cloud capabilities. Specifically, we need to ensure genuine sovereignty of NHS data and that it is monetised in a safe way, focused on benefiting the NHS and our citizens.
With a new national data strategy in the offing, the Government can maximise the opportunities afforded by the collection of data and position the UK as a leader in data capability and protection. As Future Care Capital says in its briefing on the Bill:
“Any proceeds from data collaborations that the Government agrees to, integral to any ‘replacement’ or ‘new’ trade deals, should be ring-fenced for reinvestment in the health and care system, pursuant with FCC’s long-standing call to establish a Sovereign Health Fund.”
This is an extremely attractive concept. Retaining control over our publicly generated data, particularly health data, for planning, research and innovation is vital if the UK is to maintain its position as a leading life science economy and innovator. That is why, as part of the new trade legislation being put in place, clear safeguards are needed to ensure that in trade deals, our publicly held data is safe from exploitation, except as determined by our own Government’s democratically taken decisions.
My Lords, I refer to my entry in the register. This is a particularly important group of amendments, on health and the protection of data. I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Thornton and Lady Sheehan, and the noble Lord, Lord Freyberg, for introducing them.
I will limit my remarks to the specific issue of data, which will be relevant to the recently reached super-agreement with Japan. It was discussed as recently as last week, when my noble friend Lord Grimstone spoke about the importance—I agree with him—of a greater exchange of data flows, particularly from that agreement. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Freyberg, said, it is extremely important, as set out in Amendment 11, to protect this data. I will give one example. The Government have been heavily dependent on vaccine trials for the three vaccines that are coming out. Would people readily submit to such trials and completing confidential surveys if there was any doubt that the data they submit would be treated confidentially?
If my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie is not minded to support this amendment, will the Government table their own amendment to ensure the greater protection of data processing services?