Power of Attorney
Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall Excerpts(2 years, 10 months ago)
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Baroness Finlay of Llandaff (CB)
My Lords, the Office of the Public Guardian has changed its processes so that it writes to donors at their home address to inform them that an LPA is being applied for, but in the consultation on modernising the LPA do the Government anticipate that they will need to bring forward new legislation to strengthen the powers of the Office of the Public Guardian to strike out people who hold an LPA who abuse those powers, as outlined in the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer?
Lord Morrow (DUP)
In Northern Ireland, the Commissioner for Older People can speak on behalf of older victims of economic abuse. The same role exists in Wales, and the Scottish Government have in place a Minister for Equalities and Older People. Can the Minister identify an equivalent here in England, so we can bring these parties all together?
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, I agree with everything the noble Lord outlined, and I can assure the House that a paper means of setting up these mechanisms will continue, even after digitisation.
Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall (Lab)
My Lords—I am looking around carefully to make sure it really is my turn—I wonder if the Minister would agree with me that, while we have to be very concerned about the incidents of fraud and the misuse that has just been revealed in the questions he has been asked so far, there is none the less great virtue in lasting powers of attorney. They are very important ways in which all of us can protect ourselves against the things that may happen to us in the future. People should be encouraged to make lasting power of attorney arrangements early enough, while they still have capacity to understand fully what they are committing to, and to inform the people who will be their attorneys how they wish their wishes to be carried out. Would he agree they are not yet encouraged enough?
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
I do agree with the noble Baroness, and I can advise her that even very recently OPG carried out engagement with specific groups in society identified as being less likely to avail themselves of the protections offered by LPAs—specifically, people from socioeconomic groups and within ethnic minorities who have been identified as less likely to take up these protections, which, I agree with the noble Baroness, are of enormous importance for the whole of society.
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill
Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall ExcerptsWednesday 3rd March 2021
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 View all Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2019-21 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 169-I Marshalled list for Report - (26 Feb 2021)
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
I have received a request from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, to ask a short question of the Minister.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
My Lords, on that last point, I take it that the post-legislative scrutiny referred to is separate from the review of polygraph testing after three years, to which the Minister referred. On that, while I take his point about parliamentary scrutiny of regulations, codes of practice may not be statutory and therefore not subject to that sort of scrutiny. Might the Minister take back the suggestion that, following the very helpful sessions that the MoJ arranged during the course of the Bill on a number of matters, for which we were very grateful, Ministers might consider communicating with—and possibly even consulting—noble Lords in framing the review in three or so years’ time? I do not expect him to make a commitment now, but I would like to put that idea in his and his colleagues’ heads.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
My Lords, we now come to the group beginning with Amendment 14. Anyone wishing to press this or any other amendment in the group to a Division should make that clear in debate.
Clause 34: TPIMs: condition as to involvement in terrorism-related activity
Amendment 14
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
My Lords, we come now to the group beginning with Amendment 19. Anyone wishing to press this or any other amendment in this group to a Division should make that clear in debate.
Clause 38: TPIMs: polygraph measure
Amendment 19
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, is not available, so I call the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee.
Baroness Hamwee (LD) [V]
Our views are very close, but we have not actually changed personalities yet. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, asked some extremely pertinent questions as the basis for an assessment of whether it was appropriate for the clause to remain in the Bill. It is a great shame that we have not had the answers to that list of questions; I do not think any could have come as a surprise.
May I pursue one point? Because there is a regulation-making power in new paragraph 10ZA, it is not necessary to have a reference to a code of practice. I have sat through many debates when we have been told that codes of practice are so useful because they are flexible; they can be tweaked without having to go through the legislative process. I have to say that I am quite surprised by that answer. I do not know whether we are being told that the rules that apply under the Offender Management Act in other situations when polygraph sessions are used are the rules that will apply. It is my fault; I got slightly lost during that part of the debate. It may be my perception only but, as I heard the answers, there seemed to be a lot of repetition of what is in the Bill, not answers to concerns which underlie the amendments.
When we get to it, depending on who the broadcasters go to, one of us will move Amendment 21. For now, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 19.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
We come to the group consisting of Amendment 23. Anyone wishing to press this amendment to a Division should make that clear in the debate.
Clause 44: Persons vulnerable to being drawn into terrorism: timing of independent review
Amendment 23
European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (Relevant Court) (Retained EU Case Law) Regulations 2020
Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall Excerpts(4 years ago)
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Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con) [V]
My Lords, it was of great interest to me to listen to my noble and learned friend explain so clearly the origin and scope of this instrument. As the noble Lord, Lord Beith, said, the House of Lords was very interested in this particular provision when it came forward in this year’s withdrawal Bill. The Prime Minister had apparently said during the election that every court would be able to entertain this question of whether a decision of the European Court which was part of the retained case law should be departed from.
This House noticed that the provision in the Bill did not contain any machinery for taking a case from, for example, the magistrates’ court to a court that could decide the issue. In the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Beith, referred to—which I proposed—there was a provision for a method of doing that, so that the Prime Minister’s wish, or answer, that all courts would be able to do it would be met by, for example, the magistrates’ court referring the matter in the way that I had proposed to the Supreme Court or whichever court might then be able to deal with it.
That amendment was, as the noble Lord, Lord Beith, said, passed by a substantial majority in this House but, because of the rush to get the withdrawal Act approved, it was decided to not give effect to it in the House of Commons. There is, therefore, no method in place for reaching from, for example, the magistrates’ court in England to the Court of Appeal. I raised this point with my right honourable friend the Lord Chancellor when he sent me a copy of the instrument. The truth is that there is no way of doing that effectively.
This leaves me with a question which I would be glad if my noble and learned friend could answer. If a point is to be raised about the validity of a judgment of the European Court that is part of the reserved EU case law and it needs to be dealt with in a case coming forward in the magistrates’ court, would the magistrates’ court be allowed to consider that case at all, or is there some provision in the jurisdiction of the other courts to allow a case that would normally be within the magistrates’ court’s jurisdiction to be referred instead to another court that is not of the same level but which is able to deal with this particular problem? It was suggested to me that there are various methods of going from the lower courts to the higher court, but I am not aware—I would be glad if my noble and learned friend could make me aware—of whether there is a mechanism to get, for example, from the magistrates’ court in England to the Court of Appeal. If not, it means that the Prime Minister’s answer to the question at the election may not be open for a result at the moment unless and until primary legislation can be introduced in order to make such arrangements. I would have thought that such arrangements could possibly be made using the rule powers of the various rule-making committees, but I am not sure whether that it so. Anyway, I am glad to raise it in order that my noble and learned friend is able to deal with it.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
My Lords, I think a Division is about to be called and I therefore recommend that we do not call the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, until after the Division in order not to have to interrupt him. Is the noble Lord content to wait until the Division has been completed?
Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (Remedial) Order 2020
Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall Excerpts(4 years, 3 months ago)
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Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I have to declare a personal interest because I have cohabited with somebody for more than 20 years, but I hope never to be eligible to claim this award. I do my best in this House to say “Well done” to the Government when I think they have got something right. It does not happen very often, but when I see something is improving legislation, then I say “Congratulations”, but this statutory instrument is tiny, the bare minimum to address the human rights breach which was identified by the Court of Appeal in the case of Smith. Worse still is the fact that it has taken the Government three whole years to bring these changes to Parliament. That is a three-year gap in which bereaved couples facing a discriminatory system have been left without compensation following the death of their loved ones.
The simple truth is that the Fatal Accidents Act is not fit for the 21st century. It became law more than 40 years ago in 1976, which was a different era of relationships and family values. Today’s remedial order is nothing but a sticking plaster to cover one issue raised by the courts. The Act still refers to and makes a distinction between legitimate and “illegitimate” children. Such wording was probably all right in the 1970s, but even the most senior politicians might be so-called illegitimate children. Nobody mentions that anymore because it is just not relevant. It is the same with the issue we are dealing with today. Statutes should not enforce archaic and, frankly, offensive language and the Government have to amend this. It is true that it needs primary legislation. When we have a quiet spell next year, I hope the Government will bring something back to fix this messy situation.
While I am talking about that, the word “accidents” is no longer valid when we talk about car crashes or traffic incidents. The Metropolitan Police does not use the word “accident” anymore. The whole road safety world abhors it because “accident” presupposes the cause of a collision. It presupposes that it was, “Oops! I shouldn’t have done than”, but there is almost always a real cause, whether it is drugs, drink or inattention. There is a cause, so the word “accident” has to go.
Other issues persist. Why do there have to be two years of cohabitation? What happens if somebody has lived with another person for 729 days, one day short of the two years? A relationship in which people have lived separately for 20 years is just as valuable, and more so, than a relationship in which people have lived together for two years. The Government are saying that a 20-year relationship lived apart is worth £0 on death. As other noble Lords have said, financial compensation is always going to be a crude measure for bereavement and will never come anywhere close to solving the hurt and healing the wounds. This order will ensure that a great many deserving people will get absolutely nothing.
The noble Lords, Lord Hain and Lord Thomas, have suggested that we go forward with the idea recommended by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and supported by the Association of Personal Injury Lawyers: the Government could open a public consultation on how to reform this clunky and flawed area of law. They could consult on whether something like the Scottish system of allowing courts the discretion to determine who should receive how much would work. Will the Minister take this away and raise it with her department?
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
My Lords, the next speaker would have been the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, but he has not been able to join the debate, so I call the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton.
Prisoners (Disclosure of Information About Victims) Bill
Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall ExcerptsWednesday 20th May 2020
(4 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Prisoners (Disclosure of Information About Victims) Act 2020 View all Prisoners (Disclosure of Information About Victims) Act 2020 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 102-I Marshalled list for Virtual Committee - (15 May 2020)
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, have indicated that they wish to speak after the Minister. I call the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford.
Lord Thomas of Gresford
My Lords, I am very grateful to the Minister for his reply, but I think it is necessary to distinguish where there has been a plea of guilty and where there has been a plea of not guilty in a trial. Very often, when a person pleads guilty, he will, with the assistance of his legal team, put together a basis of plea, which is handed to the prosecution for consideration. If it accepts the basis of plea, there is no problem but, if there is an issue, a Newton hearing will be held to determine whether the prosecution which refuses to accept the basis of plea is correct or whether the defendant who is pleading guilty is correct. The judge will sentence accordingly.
That is one situation. Another is after a trial, when there has been a finding of guilt. Let us take a circumstance where a group of people have attacked an individual and one of the group says, “I didn’t take part”—indeed, I remember a case where precisely that happened; the defence was, “I was trying to discourage them so they’d go away”—but, at the end of the trial, the defendant is found guilty. At that point, the judge says, “I will sentence you on the basis that you are withholding information as to where the body was buried.” The defendant could then say, “I’ve been found guilty, but the others took the body away and I want to be heard on that, because I don’t know where they went and where the body was ultimately buried. You cannot sentence me on the basis of the facts the jury has found—that I was a party to a killing—when I don’t know where the body went.” That situation does not involve mental incapacity at all and such a situation should be investigated at the time and not 15 or 20 years later by the Parole Board doing its best, unassisted by medical evidence because it would not arise. It seems to me that issues of that nature should be determined prior to sentencing for the actual offence, whether there is a plea of guilty or a finding of guilt. That should involve a hearing of the sort that I have proposed.
Obviously, my amendment does not require the Parole Board to order a hearing. As the Minister anticipated, my purpose is to encourage the holding of Newton hearings where necessary. I do not believe that they are quite as rare or unusual as he suggests. In this particular instance, with proper directions being given generally to judges to hold Newton hearings where appropriate, they would be useful and helpful to the board’s ultimate determination. They would be of great significance concerning culpability.
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
My Lords, due to the necessity of a few short adjournments earlier this afternoon, I suggest that we continue without any further adjournments this evening.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
My Lords, we now move on to the group consisting of Amendment 19. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. It would be helpful if anyone intending to say “Not content” if the question is put could make that clear in the debate. It takes unanimity to amend the Bill in this Committee. The Committee cannot divide.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
Lord Naseby. No? I am not getting a response from the noble Lord, Lord Naseby. If I do not hear any more, I shall move on to the noble Lord, Lord German.
Lord German (LD)
My Lords, this amendment, tabled by my noble friend Lady Barker, puts victims right at the centre of the parole functions. The amendment has two major functions: to ensure that victims are contacted, and to provide victims with information about the Parole Board’s hearing of the case of the prisoner’s parole. Much more needs to be done to support victims. The issue of strengthening the victims contact scheme as a whole is important and, while associated with the Bill, is beyond the scope of it. I look forward to the Minister telling us when his root-and-branch review of the Parole Board will take place. “In the fullness of time” was the response we got at Second Reading, and I think we ought to know when full time will be up.
However, there are matters in the Bill that relate to the Parole Board’s functions and to the work it has to do for victims. There are considerations that affect the way the board should engage with victims. First, cannot the system be modernised so that victims’ views can be taken by video link, rather than having to travel in person to the prison where the perpetrator is located? This process can in itself add to the anguish felt by victims who have struggled to come to terms with the grief they have suffered. Sentencing and conviction is just the start of justice for victims. The parole process can easily add to a victim’s pain, and it is essential that everything be done to minimise the trauma this can cause, amplified by the heinous crimes committed, which are the subject of the Bill.
The amendment requires that victims should be contacted as of right. Too often we have heard cases where victims have just not known what is going to happen, and suddenly they find that the perpetrator is released into the community, they have no idea what the conditions were, and they have simply to face up to the fright and misery of that happening. It has to be at their choice that they actually receive the information about the Parole Board’s operations; they have to be given the option to do that. That means we must have an opting out of receiving information: in other words, it is the duty of the Parole Board to give information to victims—to do everything it possibly can to give them that information—and it is the victims’ choice whether they receive that information. Of course, that means that, over time, we would expect some people to say, right at the beginning, “I do not want to hear any more; I do not want to have any more information”. But at this particular point, at the point of possible release into the community, there has to be that option, and contact has to be made as of right.
We know of too many examples of victims finding out the result of the parole process only from media reports, as the noble Baroness just said, from social media or, worst of all—can you imagine?—from reporters calling victims to ask for their comments on the release of the perpetrator. Thus far the service has adopted much more of an opting-in approach to receiving information than an opting-out approach, which I think is crucial in making sure that victims have their rights upheld. For example, I am sure Members will recall the case of Worboys being debated in your Lordships’ House last year, when this matter came to a very important head. Within the narrow scope of the Bill, which leads to only a relatively small number of cases being considered, I do not think this obligation on the Parole Board will place a large administrative burden on its workings. But these Parole Board cases are of great significance to victims, and victims have a right to know what is happening and to have their say should they desire to. They need a consistent infrastructure for exercising these rights. This amendment enables victims to opt out of knowing about and participating in the parole process, but the default position is that they will always be given that opportunity.
With modern technology, keeping in contact with victims is so much easier. Tracing victims if they change their address, telephone number or email will be much simpler and quicker. Governments have databases which can make it much easier to locate people whose contact details have been mislaid. There should be an obligation, therefore, on the Parole Board to maintain the contact details of victims, so that when this time comes, as in the Bill it will do, it is obliged to make sure that the victims understand and know their rights, and that they have a right not to hear anything and to opt out of the information if they so desire. That is what this important amendment would do: give rights to victims that are recorded as being consistent, and which are so important to people who are suffering such misery.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions to the debate on the amendment, and I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, for her submissions on it. In the context of the Bill, we are dealing with particularly disturbing forms of crime and particularly disturbing consequences. However, we must have regard to all victims of crime, not just of these crimes, in determining the appropriate step to take in order properly to take account of their views, interests and concerns.
Processes are already in place, by virtue of the Parole Board rules, the victims’ code and the Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004, that address the issues referred to in the amendment. Both the National Probation Service and the Parole Board communicate information to victims, and where a family member is affected by an offender’s action, they too, of course, will be victims and will be contacted. Where a victim wishes to receive information, this will be provided by their victim liaison officer. Victims can receive information regarding the date of a parole hearing and the outcome of a review. Indeed, they may request a summary of a Parole Board decision and can also provide a victim personal statement to the Parole Board to explain the impact of the crime upon them. They have the right to request that certain tailored licence conditions be applied.
Victims are also informed of the avenues for making a request for reconsideration of a decision. Such reconsideration will be carried out by the Secretary of State. Following a request for reconsideration, they will receive reasons why their request was or was not successful. Thereafter, a victim liaison officer will provide information regarding judicial review, if that is requested.
In recent times—I note the reference to the Worboys case—the National Probation Service has improved the way in which it communicates with victims, such as using email or telephone as opposed to letters, while being mindful of the victim’s preferred method of contact. We have also tightened processes to ensure that victims are informed of developments, such as being notified of the date of oral hearings, in a timely manner. We have expanded the criteria for victims who are eligible for contact under the National Probation Service Victim Contact Scheme. We are trialling a new process whereby all eligible victims are referred directly to probation to reduce the risk that they are not offered use of the victim contact scheme directly. Therefore, we have taken steps to improve the system. However, the Parole Board is an independent body and it requires a degree of flexibility in how it operates. To impose these statutory obligations on the Parole Board, and the Parole Board alone, would, I suggest, be going too far.
I hear what is said about the idea of an opt-out rather than an opt-in scheme for victims and what is said about the need to improve the involvement of victims, particularly those in the present category. I will be happy to discuss that at a meeting, as suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, before the next stage of the Bill. However, I also note that there is a proposal for a review of the Parole Board. I cannot give a precise date for that review but, again, I will be happy to take that up in discussions with the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy. At this stage, however, I invite the noble Baroness, Lady Barker, to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
My Lords, no noble Lords have indicated a wish to speak after the Minister, so I now call the noble Baroness, Lady Barker.
Baroness Barker
I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in the debate on this amendment. It would have been easy to dismiss this as a minor procedural matter, but I have long held the view that when people have frustrations about the criminal justice system or indeed the workings of the Home Office, as many of those arise from the way in which the system works and the procedures that are adopted as from the decisions of substance that are made. Our criminal justice system can be extremely difficult to work with at a basic administrative level.
I particularly welcomed the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of Cradley, for our proposal that there should be an opt-out rather than an opt-in scheme. It is high time that we moved to that, and I do not think that it would necessarily put any undue obligations or administrative burdens on the probation service or the Parole Board. My noble friend Lord German spoke about the increased use of technology, which will be life in the new world for everybody. I think that it can be done in ways that minimise trauma to victims, maximise inclusion and make life administratively easier for those who are responsible for implementing it.
I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, recognised that there is cross-party support. I, too, think that it is a matter that could be looked at in the near future. I do not think that it has to wait for the full, wider review of the Parole Board. I very much welcome the Minister’s offer of a meeting. I hope that he might consider including in that some of the victims’ representatives, for whom this is not theoretical but a crucially important matter in their lives. We all wish to see this Bill make the statute book. Therefore, at this point, as the Minister predicted, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
My Lords, I am getting a little background disturbance. I am not sure whether it is intended to get my attention, but I shall proceed on the basis that it is not. That concludes the Virtual Committee’s proceedings on the Bill. The Virtual Proceeding will now adjourn until a convenient point after 6.30 pm.
Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]
Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall ExcerptsWednesday 13th May 2020
(4 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020 View all Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 101-I Marshalled list for Virtual Committee - (7 May 2020)
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to the debate. I shall of course speak to each of the amendments, Amendments 1, 4 and 5. When taken together, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, observed, they have the effect of restricting the power to implement international private law agreements contained in Clause 2 in the 2007 Lugano Convention. But they not only limit the power of the United Kingdom to implement private international law agreements in this way, they also restrict our ability to mirror any such arrangements as between the United Kingdom’s different legal jurisdictions, and indeed as between the United Kingdom and the Crown dependencies and overseas territories.
Of course we accept, as we have previously, that the most pressing need for the power is in relation to the Lugano convention itself. Our application to rejoin the convention as an independent contracting party was made on 8 April—
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
We appear to have lost the noble and learned Lord the Minister. Is he still with us?
Lord Keen of Elie
I think that I am coming back. I apologise, but something happened on the computer.
We have made the application and it is hoped that, subject to agreement, we will be able to rejoin the Lugano convention from the end of the transition period.
I will pause to notice some of the observations made by my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, with reference to Brussels Ia and IIa restated. My noble friend asked in a number of ways what steps we are taking with regard to what she termed the Brussels convention and what progress is being made on that matter. I think we have to remind ourselves that Brussels Ia and IIa do not form an international convention; they are internal instruments of the EU to which you may be a party only if you are a member of the EU. We of course have the transition period during which we enjoy the benefits of Brussels Ia and IIa until the end of the year, but there is no basis on which we can be members of Brussels, as was suggested, after the end of the transition period. That is why we are concerned to apply for membership of Lugano.
With regard to a number of the observations made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, of course I readily acknowledge that Lugano is not as well developed in a number of respects as the Brussels Ia and IIa restated provisions. We are well aware of that. We would hope to advance Lugano once we are a member, but we have to acknowledge that it is not on a par with Brussels Ia and IIa.
However, Lugano is not the only potential use of the power in Clause 2. For instance, Amendment 1 would prevent us joining two other private international law agreements on which the Government are currently considering their position. They are the Singapore convention on mediation and the Hague judgments convention of 2019. I will return to the latter in a moment because it has been mentioned before.
With regard to the Singapore convention, I have shared with noble Lords a copy of an exemplar statutory instrument to demonstrate the sorts of agreements that we may wish to implement under the Clause 2 power. While the final decision on joining that convention is still to be taken, I invite noble Lords to look at that exemplar statutory instrument when considering the ways this power might be used. The instrument contains what are, essentially, technical implementing regulations for a treaty agreed at the level of international law. The choice for this House and the other place at the point of implementation is about not the specific provisions of an agreement, but whether to approve the United Kingdom’s implementation of the whole agreement in domestic law.
Beyond those two examples of private international law agreements which already exist, and which the UK is considering joining, we are actively engaged in work through the Hague conference to develop rules on jurisdiction in international civil and commercial cases. The global arena of private international law is constantly developing. We have been active in it in the past, and hope and intend to take a leading role in the future.
Restricting the scope of the Clause 2 power in the way envisaged by this amendment would, I suggest, prevent the United Kingdom implementing any future agreements in a timely manner. That would in turn delay the benefit of those agreements to citizens and businesses. I regard that as an unsatisfactory position, given that in many cases there is considerable advantage to be gained from such international co-operation in the area of private international law. It would also mean that primary legislation will be needed to insert into a schedule to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 the text of the United Kingdom’s declarations and reservations in relation to the 2005 Hague Convention and the 2007 Hague Convention, in the absence of which the terms of the United Kingdom’s accession to those agreements will be far less accessible to users.
I also point out that it will mean that the definition of “relevant international agreement”, as used in subsections (2) and (3), and presently defined in subsection (7) by cross-reference back to subsection (1), will be unclear. That term is also used in Schedule 6 and defined by cross-reference back to Clause 2. In addition, the way that Amendment 1 has been drafted would not in practice allow us to make implementing regulations in advance of becoming a contracting party but only after joining. In that respect, I venture that it is defectively drafted because, essentially, one has to take these things in a particular order.
I turn to Amendment 4. As drafted, Clause 2(2) allows the terms of an international agreement, subject to suitable modifications, to be applied between United Kingdom jurisdictions: for example, between England and Scotland. Amendment 4 seeks to restrict this power to allow for only the Lugano convention to be applied in this way. International agreements on private international law would not ordinarily apply between the United Kingdom’s three jurisdictions because such agreements apply only between contracting parties and it is the United Kingdom Government, not their separate jurisdictions, who join international agreements. Although the relationship between the different parts of the union are perhaps far deeper than they are between foreign jurisdictions and ourselves, it often means that the rules between different UK jurisdictions need to be detailed and bespoke. Applying the same rules between United Kingdom jurisdictions that we apply with foreign jurisdictions will, not invariably but very often, be desirable. For example, it could reduce the number of sets of rules that courts need to apply in cases raising cross-border issues, making them more efficient and easier for courts, lawyers and litigants to understand. It would also mean that intra-UK private international law rules are at least as effective and up to date as the rules applied between the United Kingdom and foreign jurisdictions. Clause 2(2) allows for such keeping pace but would be exercised only if the relevant jurisdictions agree that it is beneficial to do so.
These sorts of arrangements are not without precedent. All three UK jurisdictions already apply rules that mirror the EU Brussels 1A regulation on jurisdiction for cross-border cases and much of the EU maintenance regulation as between themselves. The fact that, thanks to Schedule 4 to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, a modified version of the Brussels 1A rules is applied to cases between Scotland, Northern Ireland and England and Wales means that there might be limited prima facie rationale for suggesting that we replace this with the application of the rules under the Lugano convention. The rules are already substantially similar.
However, in addition, the amendment that I referred to has an altogether more significant deficiency. By limiting the intra-UK application of private international law agreements to the Lugano convention, the amendment may well result in the perverse situation in which the intra-UK rules are out of step, out of date and less effective than those governing the relationship between all three of these jurisdictions and a foreign jurisdiction. If the amendment were accepted, separate primary legislation would be needed to achieve this, potentially resulting in the intra-UK rules being less effective and less comprehensive than the rules that we apply with foreign jurisdictions until such primary legislation was passed.
Perhaps I may give an example. If the United Kingdom decided in future to join a new private international law agreement dealing with cross-border cases regarding children, the inability to implement that agreement between the UK’s jurisdictions at the same time as implementing an agreement between the UK and foreign jurisdictions could lead to families finding it more difficult to resolve disputes where parents live in, say, Northern Ireland and England than where one parent lives in the United Kingdom and the other in a foreign country. That would be a very strange outcome.
Amendment 5 has an effect similar to that of Amendment 4 in that it seeks to restrict the ability, under the Clause 2 power, for the United Kingdom to enter into arrangements with the Crown dependencies and overseas territories that mirror, subject to suitable modifications, the provisions of a private international law agreement to which the United Kingdom is a party. As I explained in relation to Amendment 4, the UK Government are the contracting party to international agreements on private international law. As such, these agreements would not ordinarily apply as between the United Kingdom and one of the Crown dependencies or overseas territories.
However, as with the relationships between the different legal jurisdictions of the UK, applying the same rules between the UK and the Crown dependencies and overseas territories that we apply with foreign jurisdictions will sometimes be desirable. It can ensure that the relationships between the various members of the wider UK family can be at least as effective and up to date as those applied between the United Kingdom and foreign jurisdictions. Clause 2(3), as presently drafted, allows for such keeping pace but only if the relevant territorial Government agree that it is beneficial to do so.
I submit that this builds on a significant body of precedent. Both the Administration of Justice Act 1920 and the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 enable the Government, via Order in Council, to recognise and enforce civil and commercial judgments from the Crown dependencies and overseas territories where reciprocal arrangements have been entered into with them. Furthermore, Section 39 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 enables the Government, by Order in Council, to apply a modified version of the Brussels 1968 convention between the United Kingdom and a Crown dependency or overseas territory. Indeed, an order was made in respect of Gibraltar in 1997 to do exactly that: applying a modified version of this convention to relations between the UK and Gibraltar—an arrangement that sustains to this day.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
My Lords, the following noble Lords indicated a wish to speak after the Minister: the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames. I shall call them in that order and ask the Minister to respond to each of them in turn.
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab Co-op)
I had not intended to intervene at this stage. However, since this, is or ought to be, very similar to Committee if we were sitting in the Chamber, I hope that Members will understand why I do so. It is not to deal with questions that the Minister raised about Crown dependencies and overseas territories—although he answered the question that I had intended to ask later on, on other amendments, so that will shorten the debate later—nor indeed about the different jurisdictions within the United Kingdom. Again, that will be dealt with in subsequent amendments and I can come back to that during that debate.
I want to say two things. First, I agree totally with what my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer said; that will surprise neither him nor the Minister. Secondly, the noble Lords, Lord Adonis and Lord Pannick, made important points, which the Minister just touched on. As the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, said, we should note the significance of this being the first Committee stage of a Bill that we have held virtually. It is very important that we see that it operates properly.
As it happens, two members of the Procedure Committee are in this debate: the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, and me. At the committee’s last meeting, we asked for a report on the workings of this Committee stage—that is, how it will proceed. At its next meeting, the committee will discuss the procedure for virtual voting. If my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer hopes to divide the House on Report, as he indicated—I hope that he will—that cannot be done without virtual voting. It would be improper and unconstitutional for that to take place. My noble friend Lord Adonis should be reassured by that.
Finally, I hope that the Minister will treat this Committee stage just as he treats Committee stages on the Floor of the House—that is, take account of what has been said, be prepared for a challenge on these issues on Report and bear all this is mind before bringing the Bill in its present form back on Report. I hope he takes note of that.
Lord Keen of Elie
I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, for his further observations. I simply notice this: for the last 20 years, Parliament has had no oversight of the drawing down of these obligations into domestic law because it has been an EU competence. That has not led to any dramatic constitutional issue, as far as I am aware.
In the meantime, however, we have introduced CRaG, which means that the entering into a treaty at the level of international law is now subject to scrutiny by Parliament. After that scrutiny, the Executive can enter into the relevant treaty. Then, when it is drawn down into domestic law, the affirmative statutory instrument procedure ensures that both Houses of Parliament have an opportunity to scrutinise and debate this. There is no difficulty about that; it is the outcome that matters.
However, I notice the noble and learned Lord’s observation that there is little that can be done by way of amendment at that stage. That is why we would suggest that the affirmative procedure was a perfectly adequate mechanism, as distinct from primary legislation.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
My Lords, before I call the noble Lord, Lord Marks, I should say that the noble Lords, Lord Adonis and Lord Pannick, have indicated their wish to speak after the Minister. I shall call them in that order after the contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for what I understand are, again, probing amendments. As I perhaps explained, the Crown dependencies and overseas territories have a constitutional relationship with the United Kingdom whereby the United Kingdom is responsible for their foreign relations. This means that the Crown dependencies and overseas territories do not generally themselves join international agreements, including agreements in the area of private international law, which we are concerned with here. Instead, an agreement that applies in the United Kingdom can usually be extended to apply also in a Crown dependency or overseas territory. We work with those Crown dependencies and overseas territories to determine where and when they would wish to have a private international law agreement apply between them and other contracting parties. The scope of the United Kingdom’s ratification of that agreement is then extended to them. This means that multilateral agreements extended to the Crown dependencies and overseas territories apply only between those jurisdictions on the one hand and the other contracting parties on the other, but not between the Crown dependencies and overseas territories and the UK. To apply the agreement with the UK, there needs to be a separate mirroring arrangement, as it is sometimes termed. I referred to that in responding to earlier amendments.
The general power within Clause 2(3) allows the United Kingdom to maintain and develop a private international law framework with the Crown dependencies and overseas territories as well as with foreign partners. That is the intent here.
The noble Lord asked about consultation. There was consultation, not with the governors of the Crown dependencies and overseas territories, but with each attorney-general and their officials. My understanding is that they were entirely content with the way in which these provisions are extended to the benefit of the Crown dependencies and overseas territories.
The noble Lord raised the question of entrustment. It does not directly arise in this context, but entrustment is where the United Kingdom essentially consents to a Crown dependency, for example, entering into an agreement at the level of international law. That can sometimes happen where, for example, a Crown dependency wants a reciprocal agreement with a foreign partner.
The behaviour of the overseas territories is monitored by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and there are instances in which, for the purposes of good governance, the United Kingdom will intervene in the affairs of an overseas territory. The noble Lord himself gave an example in respect of the Turks and Caicos Islands where that has been done.
As regards the choice of court or arbitration that the noble Lord referred to, in so far as I understand his point, I would respond that it is up to parties to a private contract to determine how their disputes, if any, will be resolved. For that purpose, the parties can choose a law or legal system to apply to their private contract and the jurisdiction in which their disputes will be resolved. That is an issue that arises only in the context of their private contract and in the context of what we are dealing with here, which is private international law. At the level of private international law, we are concerned with the way in which other jurisdictions respect that law, respect the choice of jurisdiction and, indeed, then respect the judgment of that jurisdiction when it comes to enforcement.
I hope that answers the points raised by the noble Lord. I thank him for the probing amendments, but I invite him to withdraw Amendment 14.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
My Lords, I am not aware that any other noble Lords have expressed a wish to speak after the Minister, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock.
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
My Lords, I am really very grateful to the Minister for a helpful reply; he has dealt with each of the points that I raised very properly and helpfully. This is an issue that I feel strongly about generally and will need to pursue in another context in the light of that. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. It would be helpful if anyone intending to say “Not content” when the question is put made that clear during debate. It takes unanimity to amend the Bill in this Committee; this Committee cannot divide.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
My Lords, I believe that Clause 2 should not stand part of the Bill. We have discussed these matters at considerable length today. I simply make the point that it will be constitutionally unprecedented if we end up in a situation where the Government have complete power in relation to private international law agreements in the future, not only to implement the changes to domestic law that are required by secondary legislation but to make regulations that relate to those agreements or connect with them, which goes very much wider than the terms of the agreement itself.
We have discussed considerably today the justification for this unprecedented power and it has been demonstrated —mainly on the question about timely implementation—not to withstand any degree of examination. I feel strongly that the House should reject Clause 2; we cannot do it in this Committee but, when the time comes, we should vote to remove it from the Bill. I think it is a separate debate as to whether there should be a special power in relation to Lugano, but this provision gives unlimited power for an unlimited time to introduce the consequences of international agreements into our domestic law with no primary legislation.
One final point, which has been made by the Constitution Committee, is that the consequence of doing this by secondary legislation is that it can be challenged in the courts and set aside by the courts on the grounds of judicial review. So not only is it constitutionally inappropriate, not only will it damage the quality of our private international law, but it will lead to legal uncertainty. Actions will be brought in court but set aside. I will invite the House on Report not to allow this provision to stand part. There is unanimity in this Committee with the exception—the plucky exception—of the Minister in that respect.
Lord Judge (CB)
During the rehearsal for this afternoon, I was asked to say my piece, and I used two words. I said, “Henry VIII”. Just in case it was not apparent to anybody who heard me say that,I was trying to convey, as I did on 17 March, when the rather claustrophobic shades of the pandemic were closing in on us, that the Bill unnecessarily invests excessive power in the Executive and does so by secondary—
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
My Lords, the Committee is having some problem in hearing the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and I wonder whether his connection is stable.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
Perhaps start again, or perhaps go at least two sentences back.
Lord Judge
I will try again. On Henry VIII, I was trying to convey that the Bill unnecessarily invests excessive powers—
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
Lord Judge, I am afraid that there is a problem with your connection. I suggest that we move to the next speaker and hope to come back to the noble and learned Lord at the end of the list, by which I hope his connection will be better. If that is acceptable, I ask the broadcasters to please unmute the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith.
Lord Goldsmith (Lab)
My Lords, I was looking forward to hearing the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and saying that I agree entirely with what he said. I still imagine that I will agree with him, even if he has to come in a little later in the debate.
I start by declaring two interests. The first is as a practising lawyer whose practice includes international, commercial and public law cases, so some of the things discussed today affect the practice that I carry on. The second, and more important for present purposes, is that I am the recently appointed chairman of your Lordships’ EU Sub-Committee on International Agreements. It is in that capacity that I put my name forward to speak today.
My focus is on Clause 2. I have not spoken in any of the other debates that have taken place but, for all the reasons powerfully advanced by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton, my noble friend Lady Taylor of Bolton and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick —and in the future, no doubt, by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge—I see this as a very unusual and constitutionally unprecedented thing. I could not improve on the speeches made already, including those of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, in an earlier debate, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich.
However, I want to deal with one aspect in my capacity as chairman of the EU International Agreements Sub-Committee. It has authorised me to write to my noble friend Lady Taylor expressing its agreement with the conclusion that the Constitution Committee had reached in its report and concurring with its opinion that the clause, if it goes through, would reduce parliamentary scrutiny of international agreements inappropriately.
It is not an answer, as my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer has rightly said, to say that this is dealing purely with technical things. I know from experience that, although they may be technical, they are matters of great moment and matters of great importance both to the people who are making agreements and to this country. It is common for lawyers to be asked to advise which law should be put into an agreement or which law should govern any disputes that have to be dealt with, and the Bill would affect that.
As I understand it, two principal answers have been given about why the Government say this is appropriate. One is that all agreements will have been subject to parliamentary scrutiny, and that is the bit on which I particularly want to focus. The problem with that is that, as the Constitution Committee said,
“current mechanisms available to Parliament to scrutinise treaties through CRAG are limited and flawed”.
That is particularly so because of the gaps in the CRaG coverage—some of them have been mentioned today, such as model law—and the timing of CRaG means that an agreement will have been concluded by the time, strictly speaking, that the CRaG processes come into effect.
I shall quote one paragraph, paragraph 19, from the Constitution Committee’s report on CRaG, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Treaties. Professor David Howarth from the University of Cambridge observed:
“From the Whitehall point of view, everything is perfect. The whole process is under the control of Ministers. Parliament does not really get a look-in until after signature and, even after signature, the CRAG processes are very difficult for anyone to operate, especially in the Commons where the Government controls the agenda.”
That is the problem with CRaG.
The committee which I am honoured to chair may be an important part of the response to that lack of scrutinising ability. We are only in the foothills of our work, and we do not yet know how well this will work. Quite a lot will depend on how the Government engage with us and with Parliament more generally. I hope that they will wholeheartedly engage not only once an agreement has been concluded but at earlier stages. I know there is some disappointment already that, for example, the amendments made by this House to the previous Trade Bill have not found a place in the current incarnation of the Trade Bill.
Some assurances have been given in the context of the conclusion of trade agreements. Dr Fox made some important statements about the consultation and engagement that will take place. In its paper Public Consultation on Trade Negotiations with the United States, the DIT repeated the assurances that it gave. For example, paragraph 39 of that report repeats commitments made in its earlier paper, including,
“confirmation that at the start of negotiations, the Government will publish its Outline Approach, which will include our negotiating objectives, and an accompanying Scoping Assessment, setting out the potential economic impacts of any agreement.”
The second argument perhaps put forward is that the issue will be only yes or no and therefore the affirmative procedure, as proposed in the Bill, will be enough. I am not persuaded by that argument. It will often not be a question of yes or no. For example, there are treaties which contain options for the member states, such as powers to derogate from particular provisions. Under this binary approach to approval or engagement by Parliament, how will those treaties be considered? Or there may be methods of implementation which are available under the agreement. But more fundamental is the fact that if there is a power to amend that could strengthen the hand of the Government in negotiations, and there is some evidence that in some countries where scrutiny is not limited to yes or no, that is the case.
It seems inevitable that unless the Government drop this, as many noble Lords are urging them to do, this will come back on Report. If in doing so, the Government intend to rely upon the argument about the effect of parliamentary scrutiny under CRaG, they will need to give a very clear explanation of how they will engage with Parliament and the EU International Agreements Sub-Committee so that we can see the reality of what parliamentary scrutiny of the negotiation and conclusion of agreements will be. I look forward to those explanations being given, and in the meantime I support the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
: My Lords, I am hoping to call the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, in a second, but, before doing so, I should say that after the noble and learned Lord I intend to call the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, whose contribution we were not able to hear earlier. I understand that his connection is now properly established. I call the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon. Is he with us? I think we must assume that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, will not be joining us at this time. Is the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, available?
Lord Judge
Good. Do you mind if I ask whether you heard anything that I said when I started last time?
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
In the interest of making sure that everybody hears everything that the noble and learned Lord has to say, perhaps I may suggest that he starts again from the top. I think that would be preferable to trying to start in the middle.
Lord Judge
I thank the Deputy Chairman very much. I apologise to those who have already heard me say this but, when I was tested at the rehearsal to make sure that my machine was working and I was well plugged in, my only response was “Henry VIII”. It was a wonderfully short speech. Effectively, it said what I wanted to say. However, just in case anybody does not know what I meant, I was intending to convey my view of the Bill, as I did on 17 March at Second Reading, when the awful, claustrophobic shades of the pandemic were closing in on us. Having listened to the debate and read the report of the Constitution Committee, I summarised my view of the Bill by saying that it unnecessarily vests excessive power in the Executive by means of secondary, not primary, legislation. It is a very simple principle and it is wrong. At the time, I submitted to the House in what I hope was my characteristic way—understated—that it was not exactly regulation-light.
The result of reading the report and listening to today’s debate—I do not wish to add to the many wonderful contributions that have been made—is that I can be less circumspect this time: this Bill is now heavy. It is overweight with regulation.
Why can we not be realistic about what the affirmative process actually does? It is not a means of controlling the Government. When, in 2015, a go was had at trying to stop a Conservative Government using Labour Government legislation to achieve £4.5 billion-worth of change to fiscal issues, it was apparently regarded as a constitutional outrage. That is us. As far as the Commons is concerned, unless something has happened very recently, it is 1979 since it rejected an affirmative resolution. That suggests that if we are honest with ourselves, the affirmative resolution process, even the super-affirmative, is not nearly as good as every Government of any colour always says it is supposed to be.
The fact of the matter, although I cannot identify a particular Henry VIII clause here save and except the usual ones about amending and getting rid of primary legislation, is that, from his underworld, Henry VIII has hacked into departmental computers. Alternatively, he has been inserted—resurrected and put into departmental computers. We must be very careful about attaching so much weight to the use of secondary legislation that might affect individuals’, companies’ and organisations’ rights. That is really all I want to say at this stage. I will say something about the regulations relating to the creation of criminal offences, but I support the concerns that have been expressed all round. Thank you very much for helping me to get that through, Deputy Chairman.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, for some years I had the privilege of serving on the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee under the chairmanship of my noble friend Lady Thomas of Winchester. That committee has increasingly come to stand as a crucial protector of the role of Parliament, alongside the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, whom I was delighted we were able to hear. The committee has acted in attempting to limit the Executive improperly taking powers for government Ministers to change the law by delegated legislation in significant ways and ways for which delegated legislation has never in the past been deemed appropriate.
The committee usually expresses itself, or certainly has until recent years, in circumspect terms and the Government have traditionally accepted its recommendations. The committee has left it to the House to implement its recommendations if the Government do not agree to do so. The clarity and decisiveness of the recommendation in paragraph 15 of the committee’s report on this occasion is anything but circumspect. The conclusion speaks for itself:
“We are of the view that clause 2 represents an inappropriate delegation of power and we recommend that it should be removed from the face of the Bill.”
The committee is forcefully supported by the report of the Constitution Committee, chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, from whom we have heard, and includes the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, from whom we have also heard. Paragraph 19 of that report contains the kernel of its conclusion:
“We are not persuaded by the arguments the Government has made in support of this power. If the balance between the executive and Parliament is to be altered in respect of international agreements, it should be in favour of greater parliamentary scrutiny and not more executive power.”
Another important point made by the Constitution Committee, mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, is that delegated legislation is amenable to judicial review so that future regulations implementing international treaties could be the subject of challenge. It is entirely right that delegated legislation, which involves an exercise of executive power of itself, should be capable of being challenged as unlawful.
However, it would be a highly undesirable consequence of the Bill if, when enacted, the lawfulness of conventions entered into by the United Kingdom Government as a matter of our domestic law could not be guaranteed to our international convention partners until such challenges were determined.
I also agree with the point made by the Constitution Committee, my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, that the CraG procedure is at present inadequate and ineffective as an instrument of parliamentary scrutiny.
In the light of all that, can the Minister say whether, given the Constitution Committee’s report published on 4 May, he is prepared to go away and reconsider his extremely negative response, dated 17 April, to the Delegated Powers Committee’s report? I ask, because if these important committees of your Lordships’ House are going to be routinely ignored by government, parliamentary democracy is entering treacherous territory, in which the conventional boundaries between executive power and parliamentary sovereignty are roughly and unceremoniously shifted by the failure of government to adhere to well-established, valuable and principled conventions.
The central point is this. As it stands, the Bill involves moving a whole area of legislation—that of implementing private international law treaties in domestic law—from Parliament to the Executive. That is a dangerous extension and an unwelcome trend—noted by the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor—in our constitutional arrangements from parliamentary democracy to government by an overmighty Executive. If it is private international law agreements this year, what might follow next year? This House has rightly sought to resist the trend, which is dangerous and must be stopped. As parliamentarians, and respecting the traditional role of this House as a guardian of the constitution, we have a responsibility to stop it.
Crime: Support for Children and Young People
Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall Excerpts(4 years, 10 months ago)
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Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall (Lab)
My Lords, in reply to the noble Baroness, Lady Uddin, the noble and learned Lord referred to the rights of victims to access certain kinds of support. If I may respectfully say so, he did not say how that access will be delivered. I think the noble Baroness was asking about capacity in the system and the training and adequacy of the people delivering the help. Can he assure us that there is capacity and that it is of a sufficiently high standard?
Lord Keen of Elie
Certainly, I have no reason to doubt that the specialist support services to which I referred are fully available for those who require them.
Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Bill
Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall ExcerptsWednesday 17th July 2019
(5 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord True
The noble Lord also said other things, which the Hansard writers will record, including his saying that somehow a power was being conferred on Mr Johnson to do something that Mr Johnson has never said he would do, which is to advise the monarch to prorogue. That has been an inherent right of the Prime Minister and of the Crown for generations. It is an absurd statement, I am afraid, by my noble friend.
The first reason that these amendments should be resisted is, of course, one that I share but most of your Lordships will not: they are clearly designed to frustrate one route to Brexit on 31 October. That is freely admitted by all concerned. I can see that that is not a clinching argument with many of your Lordships, and, if we have learned anything in this House, it is that there is a dialogue of the deaf in this place between the remainer majority who wish to stop at nothing to prevent Brexit and those of us in the minority who believe that the vote of the public should be respected.
I fear that your Lordships’ House is getting itself into a worse and worse place in resisting Brexit. The very future of your Lordships’ House is now in play. That was made clear, not by me, but in the recent campaign for the European elections. I think these amendments take us to the outer fringe of where an unelected House should go.
The second strand of why I think they should be rejected is this canard of “constitutional outrage”, et cetera. This is an Aunt Sally. Mr Johnson—its target—has never said that he would use Prorogation to secure Brexit on 31 October. This danger, this threat, this crisis, this calamity, this catastrophe, this outrage—it is all got up by the remainers.
Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall (Lab)
What the noble Lord says is clearly true, and I do not dispute it. However, Mr Johnson has been invited on a number of occasions to say specifically, in terms, that he would not use that device, and he has declined to do so. Would the noble Lord agree that that is the case?
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
My Lords, I should tell the House that if Amendment 11 is agreed, I cannot call Amendment 11B by reason of pre-emption.
Amendment 11A (to Amendment 11)
Northern Ireland (Executive Formation) Bill
Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall ExcerptsMonday 15th July 2019
(5 years, 5 months ago)
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Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
I am most grateful to the noble Baroness for the support she has given to what the majority of people in this country wanted to see happen, but I point her to the opinion polls, which show that hers is a minority view. Most people in our country now want this matter finished, so that we can get on with attending to the biggest issues we face—whether social care, education, taxation or anything else—and that is what we should be getting on with.
I make one last point, which arises from what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said when he wrongly implied that my noble friend was attacking a particular individual; he mentioned Gina Miller. I pay tribute to Gina Miller; she has done a brilliant job. Had it not been for Gina Miller, we would not have been forced into passing the legislation that, by law, requires us to leave on 31 October. I say to the noble Lord moving this amendment: beware of Gina Miller and the law of unintended consequences. By seeking to frustrate the wishes of the people, you will put the reputation of Parliament and the standing of this House in jeopardy.
Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall (Lab)
My Lords, before the noble Lord resumes his seat—I see he already has—could he just explain why, if the matter is as straightforward as he puts it to us, it has been so difficult for his right honourable friend Mr Boris Johnson to make it clear that it does not require prorogation to achieve the outcome he is looking for—that we leave the European Union on 31 October? So far Mr Johnson has refused to make that clear. Can the noble Lord suggest why that might be?
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
Yes. I voted for Mr Johnson —I look forward to him becoming Prime Minister—because he seems to understand that the first rule of negotiation is not to make any concessions in advance of carrying out the negotiation. It is a foolish person who asks, “Will you make this or that concession?” and agrees to it along the way.
The very fact that this amendment is before us indicates that he is up against a Parliament in which some three to one in the House of Commons wish to reverse—or certainly voted against—the decision of the British people. I believe he will go into these negotiations from a position of strength, whereas I regret to say that his predecessor went in offering money before there was anything in return. The withdrawal agreement is an agreement to have a further negotiation about a whole range of things, including fishing, trade and other matters. We will be in good hands with Mr Johnson if he becomes leader of the Conservative Party. His approach to negotiations is entirely correct.
Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall
My Lords, with great respect to the noble Lord, I do not think he has answered my question. In the light of what he has just said, does he believe that the use of Prorogation to bring this matter to a close is part of the incoming Prime Minister’s armoury and should therefore be retained in that position? If he believes that, does he think the use of Prorogation in such circumstances appropriate?
Lord Forsyth of Drumlean
I recall hearing complaints not so long ago from the Front Bench of the noble Baroness that this Parliament should have been prorogued earlier because not enough opposition days were being provided and it had gone on too long. When Parliament should be prorogued is a matter for the Executive of the day. This amendment and debate are a distraction from the main issue we should be concerned about; in the case of this Bill, Northern Ireland and our Brexit negotiations, putting in place the necessary preparations—
Brexit: Attorney-General’s Advice
Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall Excerpts(6 years ago)
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Lord Keen of Elie
I do not believe that it is being left at all. It is a question of timing and the availability of the Attorney-General to provide any report and to address the House on Monday regarding these issues. Again, I emphasise the prematurity of the present questions. If noble Lords have an issue arising in the light of the Statement clearly we will respond to that.
Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall (Lab)
My Lords, I fully respect the position the Minister is in, but he is not being asked to divulge anything about the content of the Statement that might be put before the House of Commons on Monday. He was asked, for example in the question from the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, about the intention behind that Statement. If he is not able to say that it is his right honourable friend the Attorney-General’s intention to meet the requirement of the Motion passed in the House of Commons, that is quite a serious matter.
Lord Keen of Elie
I quite understand the noble Baroness’s observations, but let me be clear that my right honourable and learned friend the Attorney-General is aware of the Motion made in the House of Commons and will be conscious of it when he comes to address that House.