Nationality and Borders Bill
Baroness Ludford ExcerptsTuesday 8th February 2022
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Nationality and Borders Act 2022 View all Nationality and Borders Act 2022 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 82-V Fifth marshalled list for Committee - (8 Feb 2022)
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
I was going to come to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser. Let me just say a sentence about it now: the UNHCR is not the interpretive body of the refugee convention. Each state under the convention is there to interpret its obligations, in accordance with the Vienna convention. That is the system which the state parties have set up. When we have a phrase—we will get to one a little later—such as “serious non-political crime”, the state parties have to interpret it. We will get to an example in the next group—this is a little cliffhanger—of where different countries have approached the question differently. There is nothing wrong with that, provided that they are all acting in accordance with the Vienna convention in good faith in seeking to interpret their obligations.
Respectfully, I think that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, essentially accepted that basic proposition under the Vienna convention, and he was obviously right to do so. He sought characteristically carefully—if I might say so—to seek disclosure of the legal advice on which the Government are relying, while recognising the conventions which apply to that. I listened carefully to what he said. I will read Hansard to see whether there is anything more I can say in writing to him; I do not want to rush from the Dispatch Box. There may or may not be anything more I can say, but I will read that point carefully. I think he recognised that there are conventions in this area which do apply.
However, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, that it is not a question of having to agree with all the other signatories. This is not about amending the refugee convention; it is about interpreting it. That is a very different thing. If you want to amend a contract, you need the other party’s agreement, but interpreting a convention is for each state party.
I will say a few words about the substantive clauses, although I think it is fair to say that those were not really the Committee’s focus. Clause 29 sets out how key terms which are defined in the following clauses will be applied; they are the key components of the refugee convention. Clause 29 also revokes the Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006. Those are the regulations through which we transposed our obligations under the EU qualification directive 2004. Because we are out of the EU, we need to do that in a different way.
However, we will continue to grant humanitarian protection to eligible individuals who cannot be removed from the UK to their country of origin if their removal would breach the UK’s obligations under Articles 2 or 3 of the ECHR. It is important to clarify—I am sure Members of the Committee know this—that these are not individuals protected under the refugee convention. However, we will make further changes to align the entitlements of permission to stay granted on the basis of humanitarian protection to that provided to group 2 refugees.
In response to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, we believe that Clause 33 provides a system of effective protection from persecution. Clause 34 deals with relocation, but I do not think any noble Lords spoke to it directly, so I will just refer to it and move on.
On Clause 35, of course we have a proud history of providing protection to those who need it, but that should not apply to those who commit serious crimes, putting the communities that host them at risk and endangering national security. We believe we are right to define and legislate in this area. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, that that is a good example of serious non-political crime. That is a phrase in the refugee convention, but it is not further defined in it. Each state has to look at it and define it, in accordance—always—with the Vienna convention.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
The Minister keeps saying that each state will define the refugee convention, and he alluded to the EU qualification directive; there is also the procedures directive. I declare an interest, as I worked on both directives as an MEP. Of course, that was an attempt not for each state in the EU to do its own thing but to have a collective set of laws which interpreted the refugee convention in detail and, as far as I know, complied with it. That prevented each country doing its own thing in a potentially destructive way.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
I have an associated point, to save the Minister bobbing up and down too much. I entirely take the point about non-political crime. I just wanted to make it clear that I was referring only to that bit of the Bill when I mentioned the case. I was not suggesting that it was the prompt for the whole of this part. But can the Minister explain more about the impact of our leaving the EU? Does that give us a legal opportunity, or is this happening because it is a convenient political point in the calendar, as it were?
Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 105 in my name and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, who cannot be here tonight, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, to whom I am grateful. I also thank Women for Refugee Women and ILPA for all their work on this amendment.
The amendment would remove the narrow restrictive and requirement in Clause 32 that, in order to qualify under the “particular social group” grounds of persecution for recognition as a refugee under the convention, two conditions must be met. The amendment would replace this with an either/or condition. As I will explain, this would be in line with international standards and UK case law.
This is a small amendment, but it is significant, as the UNHCR has made clear. The UNHCR explains that Clause 32 is one of a
“series of changes that would make it more difficult for refugees who are admitted to the UK to be recognised as such.”
The case for the amendment is, in effect, set out in its detailed legal observations, which have been invaluable to our scrutiny of the Bill. The UNHCR warns that narrowing the definition of “particular social group” in the way that the clause does
“could exclude some refugees from the protection to which they are entitled … In the UK and other jurisdictions, the particular social group ground has proved critical in the protection of those with claims based on gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, status as former victims of trafficking, disability or mental-ill health, family and age.”
This view is endorsed by the Bingham Centre, which warns:
“The result will inevitably be to refuse protection to people who, as a matter of international law, are refugees.”
It picks out this clause as one of a number that are particularly troubling to it from a rule of law perspective.
The UNHCR explains the origins of the two conditions and why it has recommended that they should be treated as alternative, rather than cumulative, tests. The argument was endorsed by the late Lord Bingham, acting in his judicial capacity, when he ruled that the cumulative approach taken in Clause 32 was wrong because
“it propounds a test more stringent than is warranted by international authority.”
Thus this approach, the UNHCR points out, has been affirmed in the UK courts over an EU interpretation. I cannot resist observing that it is rather odd that a Government committed to taking back control from the EU is so keen to apply an EU interpretation that has been rejected by the British courts. Indeed, on the previous group, the Minister said that our starting point should be that we had left the EU, so could he perhaps explain why that does not apply to this clause?
In their briefing, Women for Refugee Women—WRW —and ILPA include an example, taken from Garden Court Chambers barristers, of what this might mean:
“a trafficked woman would need to show not only that her status as a trafficked woman is an innate characteristic”—
one shared with other members of a group—
“but also that trafficked women as a group are perceived as having a distinct identity in her country of origin. The latter is of course much more difficult to establish than the former because this is judged by the perceptions of the society in her country, and it can be very challenging to find objective evidence on women as a distinct group.”
WFW and ILPA also point out that there was “no pre-legislative consultation” on this clause because it was not included in the New Plan for Immigration. Can the Minister explain why this is the case? Moreover, the equality impact assessment on the Bill, which has been described as “superficial and inadequate” by barristers at Garden Court Chambers, fails adequately to assess the impact of the change on groups in vulnerable circumstances.
As I have already noted, the UNHCR has warned of the likely implications for a wide range of such groups. I particularly draw attention to how this clause is likely to have an adverse impact on women fleeing gender-based persecution—a group that the Government claim to care about. As I made clear on an earlier amendment, it is one of a number of such clauses that have to be viewed in the context of the failings that already exist. According to WRW and ILPA,
“Over the years, there has been substantial research on the failures of the Home Office in delivering a fair asylum process, and on the reasons why many women who flee gender-based persecution may be wrongly denied protection.”
Most recently, as I noted last week and gave the Minister some weekend reading on, the British Red Cross has published research that details experiences that
“highlight the distrust and disbelief women can face when discussing traumatic experiences of violence”,
especially, but not only, when interviewed by men. One survivor’s words are recounted:
“you feel so low and you feel so degraded and you’ve been violated and you were [telling] your story, you were expecting to be heard and to have someone who shows you some form of sympathy.”
In the Commons Public Bill Committee, the Government justified their position by asserting that the new clause was necessary to bring certainty to an area bedevilled by conflicting authority. But ILPA and WFW give that argument short shrift, pointing out:
“There is no conflicting authority: the UNHCR and the senior UK courts have a clear and constant interpretation. It is the Government that seeks to depart from this shared interpretation of the Refugee Convention, and it does so without warrant or proper justification.”
So can the Minister provide a more convincing justification today of a clause that, in the words of Women for Refugee Women and ILPA
“reverses case law of senior UK courts, contravenes UNHCR standards, and reinstates an erroneous EU law standard”?
If not, will he agree to this amendment?
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, all of these clauses seek to restrict access to the protection of the refugee convention. I will speak to Amendments 103 and 104 to Clause 31 and Amendment 111 to Clause 37, which are all in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and which I have co-signed. However, I share the view of my noble friend Lady Hamwee and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, that all of these clauses should in fact be removed.
The problem with Clause 31 is that it changes the standard of proof for the test of whether a person is a refugee. It creates two limbs of the test and changes the bar from “reasonable likelihood” to
“on the balance of probabilities”.
Although the refugee convention does not prescribe the standard of proof, UNHCR’s handbook says:
“The requirement of evidence should … not be too strictly applied in view of the difficulty of proof inherent in the special situation in which an applicant for refugee status finds himself.”
So, for 20 years, the UK courts, including the Supreme Court, have applied a “reasonable likelihood” standard of proof in a composite and holistic manner.
Clause 31 overturns this established interpretation of the law by dividing the overall test into a series of sub-questions and applying different standards of proof to different limbs of questioning, to require the person to prove on a balance of probabilities that they fear persecution and the decision-maker to revert to a test of reasonable likelihood in assessing whether the person would face persecution and lack state protection. It is quite a mishmash, and a complex and confusing one—not least for already burdened caseworkers. As we have heard so frequently in this Committee, if the Government really want to fix a broken asylum system, why are they making everything more complex and building in delay?
As the Bingham Centre points out, Clause 31
“allows for rejection of a person as a refugee because they failed one of the steps”
imposing that higher hurdle,
“whereas if the test was taken in its totality, the person may have been accepted as a refugee.”
The process may well lead to exclusion from sheer error because of all these complex, different bits of the test. Either the JCHR Amendments 103 and 104 should be accepted, or Clause 31 should be deleted.
On Amendment 111 to Clause 37, as the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, has said, we object to the lowering of the threshold for regarding a crime as particularly serious such that a person can be expelled. It is designed to—and will—exclude many more people from the protection of the refugee convention. Not only is the threshold sentence reduced from two years to 12 months but it changes the rebuttable presumption of “particularly serious” into an unchallengeable assertion.
This is disproportionate; a blanket exclusion is incompatible with the refugee convention, which envisages a crime that is a major threat and expulsion as a last resort. Bear in mind that the Bill seeks to impose a four-year sentence for the mere act of arriving in the UK without permission, which most refugees have to do. That gives you a measure of the lack of proportion in what is supposed to be a serious crime under the remit of the Bill; I am not validating or endorsing any crime, but under the refugee convention it has to be “particularly serious”, and the Government are departing from that.
Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)
My Lords, I confine my brief comments on this group to Clauses 31 and 32, both of which have been touched on, respectively, by the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Lister.
Clause 31 is peculiarly objectionable. As has been described, it divides up what should be a single, holistic question into a series of sub-questions and compounds that error by the differentiation in some important respects of standards of proof. It imposes an objectionable higher standard of proof on one critical provision. As the Joint Committee on Human Rights says in its report HL Paper 143—pages 39 to 41—it raises the standard of proof from a “reasonable likelihood” to a “balance of probabilities”.
The overall holistic approach to Article 31 was established as long ago as 1995 in a case called Ravichandran, which reported in 1996 in immigration appeal report 77. I confess that I wrote the lead judgment, but it has been consistently applied by the higher courts ever since. To quote one passage, the approach to Article 1A of the convention should be
“a single composite question … looked at in the round and all the relevant circumstances brought into account”
to see if there is a real risk.
Those promoting this clause should read a devastating critique of Clause 31 last month by Hugo Storey, the immediate past president of the International Association of Refugee and Migration Judges who has just retired from being an Upper Tribunal judge. He has no doubt that it will lead to “prodigious litigation”; in six compelling pages that those responsible for the Bill must read, he explains precisely why.
Clause 32, on the question of the particular social group, has been dealt with. It seeks to overturn Lord Bingham’s judgment in the case of Fornah, in the Appellate Committee of this House back in 2006, which was all about a 15 year-old girl trying to avoid female genital mutilation in Sierra Leone. I was a junior member of that court, and this clause tries, contrary to that clear judgment, to introduce a conjunctive approach to the two relevant criteria. It would be a grave mistake and cause grave injustice.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I am not sure whether it is the time of the evening that prompted that reference to dinner; otherwise, it is not immediately apparent to me what the relevance of it was. I will come back to that rather less substantive point—if I may say so, respectfully—at the end.
Let me deal first with Clause 31. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. He is right that there are points of principle that underlie these amendments; they underlay the last group as well. I too will try not to repeat the points that I have made. There are points of principle that are at issue between us, and we have set out our respective positions. We believe that the test set out in Clause 31 is compliant with our international obligations. More specifically, we believe that it will provide, and lead to, better decision-making, because it sets out a clear test, with steps for decision-makers, including the courts, to follow. That will lead to greater consistency.
Turning to Amendments 103 and 104, although I listened very carefully to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and I agree with the importance of us carefully assessing whether asylum seekers have a well-founded fear of persecution, as required under Article 1(A)(2) of the convention, we do not agree with these amendments because, taken together, they will essentially maintain the current standard of proof system. In so far as my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering said that it was, to a certain extent, a probing amendment, let me try to explain.
First, this is not about setting aside decisions of the court. The courts are there to interpret the legislation as it stands—that is what they do. Parliament is entitled to change the legislative background, in so far as it is consistent with our treaty obligations. Clause 31 sets out a clear, step-by-step process. I hear the point made by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, that it should be—so far as legislation can be—in simple language and a clear test. The problem at the moment is that there is no clearly outlined test as such. There is case law, there is policy and there is guidance in this area, but the current approach leads to a number of different elements being considered as part of one overall decision. What we seek to do here is to introduce distinct stages that a decision-maker must go through, with clearly articulated standards of proof for each. We believe that this will lead to better and more consistent decision-making.
At its core, in Clause 31(2) we are asking claimants to establish that they are who they say they are and that they fear what they say they fear to a balance of probabilities standard. That is the ordinary civil standard of proof for establishing facts, and those are facts in Clause 31(2); namely, more likely than not. It is reasonable, I suggest, that claimants who are asking the UK for protection are able to answer those questions. We have looked carefully, of course, at the often difficult situations that claimants might come from and the impact that might have on the kinds of evidence that they can provide. However, we consider that our overall approach to making decisions, which includes a detailed and sensitive approach to interviewing, allows all genuine claimants an opportunity to explain their story and satisfy the test.
There is international precedent that supports our decision to raise the threshold for assessing the facts that a claimant presents to us to the balance of probabilities standard. Both Canada and Switzerland—highly respected democratic countries, dare I say it—have systems which examine at least some elements of a claimant’s claim to this higher standard. Respectfully and rhetorically, let me ask this of the noble Baronesses, Lady Ludford and Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, said that this was confusing and complex. The noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, said that she had horror at it. The higher standard is used in Switzerland. Does the horror extend to Canada and Switzerland as well? There is nothing wrong in principle with adopting the higher test for some parts—I will come to it in more detail—of the decision-making tree.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
Does the Minister recall that I did not just say that it is about the higher standard? It is about having different limbs and different requirements under those different limbs, and switching from “reasonable likelihood” to “balance of probabilities” as part of the composite test, which is not holistic but is in different parts. That is what is confusing, not just a change in the standard of proof.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, with the greatest respect, it is not confusing at all, because Clause 31(2) establishes the facts, and that is all a balance of probabilities. Then, in Clause 31(4), the decision-maker turns to questions of the future. It is at that stage that the reasonable likelihood test is the appropriate test, because the decision-maker is looking to assess what might happen in the future. That is why we have a lower test at that stage. It is quite usual in law to have different stages of a test and different levels of probability at each.
Baroness Ludford
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would give effect to the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ recommendation that clause 36 be amended to ensure that it does not contradict the protection Article 31 provides to asylum seekers who have passed through other countries on their way to the UK.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, in moving Amendment 106 in the name of, and at the invitation of, the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, I will speak also to Amendments 109 and 110.
If Clause 36 is not amended or deleted, it will contradict Article 31 of the refugee convention. It seeks to punish or penalise a refugee for arriving in the UK to make an asylum claim by a route that took them through other countries. The requirement in the refugee convention to come directly was intended only to prevent a person who had acquired refugee status and protection in one country deciding to switch to another. Excluding a person from asylum in the UK simply because they stopped in France, Germany or Belgium, perhaps for a night’s rest, is completely unreasonable. The UK courts have confirmed that any merely short-term stopover en route to an intended sanctuary cannot forfeit the protection of Article 31 of the convention.
Any other interpretation, as the Government seek to impose in Clause 36, means, as in so much of this Bill, a shirking of the sharing of international responsibilities, such that looking after refugees falls overwhelmingly on countries neighbouring the countries of conflict from which the person is seeking to escape. Therefore, Amendment 106 would at least amend the clause, which, however, we might find later, needs to be deleted. I beg to move.
Lord Etherton (CB)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 107 in my name, which relates to Clause 36 and provides that a refugee will have come directly to the United Kingdom for the purposes of Clause 11, notwithstanding that
“they have passed through the intermediate country on the refugee’s way to the United Kingdom by way of short-term stopover”.
Those words in the amendment reflect the reasoning and decision of the Administrative Court in Adimi, where my noble and learned friend Lord Brown presided. They also reflect the approval of Adimi by the Appellate Committee of this House in a case called Asfaw.
In this respect, Clause 36 is an important part of the Government’s policy. The reason for that is that it provides a definition of “directly” for the purposes of Clause 11 that makes a distinction between group 1 and group 2 refugees. Under the provisions of Clause 11, if the refugee does not come directly from the place of persecution, they inevitably cannot be in group 1.
Secondly, it is important because, as I pointed out in a previous debate on this Bill, the provisions for describing coming to the United Kingdom directly, as defined in Clause 36, also reflect the provision in the admissibility provision in Clause 15. Your Lordships will recall that, in Clause 15, if there is a connection with another state, the refugee’s claim is inadmissible; in fact, it is not recognised as a claim at all and there is no right of appeal. Clause 15 provides that, if you fall within one of the five conditions inserted in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 by the clause, you have a connection. One of those conditions, condition 4, is that
“the claimant was previously present in, and eligible to make a relevant claim to, the safe third State … it would have been reasonable to expect them to make such a claim, and … they failed to do so.”
So there are two essential elements of the policy behind the Government’s provisions for asylum, where the question of the meaning of coming “directly” is extremely important. I pointed out to the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, that there was a muddle here. If condition 4 in Clause 15, as I have described it, is satisfied, you never get to a distinction between group 1 and group 2 because your claim is inadmissible. The noble Baroness was going to look at that and let me know the position from the Government’s perspective, but I have not yet heard from her.
Before I address what coming “directly” means—as I said, my amendment reflects the reasoning and conclusion in Adimi, and the adoption of the decision in Adimi by the Appellate Committee of this House in Asfaw—I want to say a couple of things about what appears to be the approach of the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, to interpretation. I do not think you need to be a lawyer to appreciate that if, under the aegis of the United Nations, you agree with other states in the world that you will conduct yourself in a particular way and that an agency of the United Nations has a responsibility for overseeing both the implementation of that agreement and that disputes between member states in relation to the meaning and the application of the agreement—here, the refugee convention—will be referred to an international court, there must be a point in time when one has to identify core values. If there are no core values, there is nothing to adjudicate.
The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, referred to Article 35, which requires member states to co-operate with the United Nations body responsible for oversight in relation to the implementation of the refugee convention. So what one has to do here is decide whether what the Government are doing in putting forward these proposals goes beyond the core principles in the refugee convention, which must be applicable generally to member states—otherwise, all the clauses I have referred to, Article 35, co-operation and adjudication by a court are totally meaningless and impracticable.
So I take issue with the broad statement of principle, as I understand it, put forward by the Minister. He said that it was perfectly acceptable for every member state signed up to the refugee convention to decide, from its perspective, what the convention meant. If that were correct and he was saying that it was for Parliament to decide what it meant for the United Kingdom, it would mean that changes could be made by each successive new Government as to what they felt would be appropriate to support their policy. Well, that is obviously nonsense, if I may respectfully say so.
What the courts have done—and this would be the approach of the all the courts of the countries signed up to the convention—is try to understand what the refugee convention was intended, by those who made it, to mean. The starting point is always the travaux préparatoires leading up to the convention—what was said and what was done—and then trying to understand whether there has been a deviation and, if so, why. That has been exactly the approach put forward and implemented in both Adimi and Asfaw.
The starting point, inevitably, for the interpretation of this particular convention is, as I think the Minister said, the Vienna convention on the interpretation of treaties. I do not think it has yet been said that we are entitled to change, and that we have changed, that treaty according to what we think it ought to say. It provides in Article 31.1:
“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”
That phrase, as has been noted by the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, I think, was applied by the UK’s highest court, the Supreme Court, in a case called ST (Eritrea) in 2012 as meaning that there is a duty to give the refugee convention
“a generous and purposive interpretation, bearing in mind its humanitarian objects and the broad aims reflected in its preamble”.
I have to say as a starting point that I have seen nothing so far in this part of the Bill which is a “generous and purposive interpretation”, having regard to humanitarian objects and the broad aims reflected in the preamble of the 1951 convention. Every provision that people have addressed appears to be, as it has been put, a mean-spirited approach to refugee applications.
It is against that background that I now turn to the meaning of “directly”. I have already referred to the clear decision in Adimi on this point about stopping at intermediate countries by way of short-term stopover. Just to give this a bit of flesh, what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, said then was:
“I am persuaded by the applicants’ contrary submission, drawing as it does on the travaux préparatoires, various Conclusions adopted by UNHCR’s executive committee … and the writings of well respected academics and commentators … that some element of choice is indeed open to refugees as to where they may properly claim asylum. I conclude that any merely short term stopover en route to such intended sanctuary cannot forfeit the protection of the Article, and that the main touchstones by which exclusion from protection should be judged are the length of stay in the intermediate country, the reasons for delaying there (even a substantial delay in an unsafe third country would be reasonable were the time spent trying to acquire the means of travelling on), and whether or not the refugee sought or found there protection de jure or de facto from the persecution they were fleeing.”
Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts (Con)
My Lords, I shall be very brief. I am trying to work out exactly what I am being asked to agree to here. Perhaps I may ask the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford—maybe not the noble Lord, Lord Dubs—and certainly my noble friend on the Front Bench: am I being asked to end or at least change the first safe country principle by accepting these amendments? If that is the case, I have grave concern about an increase in what is known as forum shopping. Perhaps I can say to the Hansard writers that forum is spelled “forum” and not “foreign”, which is how it was reported last time. Foreign shopping is what you go to Paris to do; forum shopping is a rather more serious matter.
It is important because this country is an exceptionally attractive place for people seeking to find the best future for themselves. I explained last time that the very fact that debates are going on your Lordships’ House shows how much concern we have to make sure that the rights of people are looked after. It is also an extremely flexible job market once you are here. Getting and maintaining a job is much easier than in some of the areas such as France, where there is a much more rigid job market. There is a non-contributory health and social security system. There is a diaspora from nearly every country in the world. Your mates are here, so you want to come here to join them. We would all want to join our mates. As a last point, you have learned the English language, which is the lingua franca of the world and, in particular, the lingua franca of technology.
I hope that, when my noble friend comes to answer the debate, he will bear in mind that, if we were to accept this, it will open up the borders for people who are seeking—I do not say that they should not seek—the best future for themselves and, as such, are not abiding by the first safe country principle. We are not in a position to provide the answer to a lot of these people.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
I know the noble Lord has listened to a lot of the previous debate. He will know there is no such thing as a first safe country principle under the refugee convention. I tried to explain what the obligation was—namely, not to move on if you have refugee status or protection in a country. The UNHCR has made it clear that there would never have been a refugee convention if there had been a safe first country principle, because countries abutting the problematic countries—for example, Jordan, Iran and Pakistan—have had to accept everyone. No other countries like the UK would ever have had any refugees because we do not abut conflict zones. I am sorry, but this must be rebutted every time it is trotted out.
Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)
I will address Clause 36 very briefly, which I discussed last week in the context of Clause 11. I confine myself today to asking two questions.
First, do the Government accept, as I suggest they must, that Clause 36 would overrule the judgments of Lord Bingham and, among others, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, in Asfaw, fully affirming what had been said on the relevant issues in the judgment I gave in the Divisional Court in Adimi? This has all been elaborated on today by my noble and learned friend, Lord Etherton.
Secondly, if so, are the Government overturning Asfaw and Adimi because, disinterestedly, they genuinely think those decisions are clearly wrong—or because they think an alternative and more anti-asylum seeker interpretation may arguably be available to them?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
I am certainly not trying to be flippant. What I am saying is that we have a refugee convention that sets out our international obligations. We are abiding by those international obligations. It may—I underline “may”—be that a convention entered into in 1951 is not absolutely suitable for the world of 2022. That might be the answer. At the moment, however, my focus as a Justice Minister is on making sure that this country abides by its international obligations, and that is what we are doing. I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My answer to that last point is that if that is what the UK Government feel, they should convene a conference to renegotiate the refugee convention, but they are not doing that. A large number of noble Lords in this Committee believe that the Government are riding roughshod over the refugee convention in a way that demeans this country and sets an extremely poor example, not least to those countries on the front line, which are taking the overwhelming majority of people seeking protection. We have bandied around the statistics in the last few days in Committee, but we are not in the top category of countries in terms of the numbers, which are manageable. They would be particularly manageable if the Home Office got its act together in the way it decides asylum cases initially—if it invested in the initial consideration of the claims and did not make the law ever more complex, with ever more delays and ever more prospects of litigation. It seems we are banging our heads against a brick wall somewhat, but I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Ludford
“Refugee family reunion
(1) The Secretary of State must, within 6 months of the date of the passing of this Act, lay before Parliament a statement of changes in the rules (the “immigration rules”) under section 3(2) of the Immigration Act 1971 (general provisions for regulation and control) to make provision for refugee family reunion, in accordance with this section, to come into effect after 21 days.(2) Before a statement of changes is laid under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must consult with persons he or she deems appropriate.(3) The statement laid under subsection (1) must set out rules providing for leave to enter and remain in the United Kingdom for family members of a person granted refugee status or humanitarian protection.(4) In this section, “refugee status” and “humanitarian protection” have the same meaning as in the immigration rules.(5) In this section, “family members” include—(a) a person’s parent, including adoptive parent;(b) a person’s spouse, civil partner or unmarried partner;(c) a person’s child, including adopted child, who is either—(i) under the age of 18, or(ii) under the age of 25 but was either under the age of 18 or unmarried at the time the person granted asylum left their country of residence to seek asylum;(d) a person’s sibling, including adoptive sibling, who is either—(i) under the age of 18, or(ii) under the age of 25, but was either under the age of 18 or unmarried at the time the person granted asylum left their country of residence to seek asylum; and(e) such other persons as the Secretary of State may determine, having regard to—(i) the importance of maintaining family unity,(ii) the best interests of a child,(iii) the physical, emotional, psychological or financial dependency between a person granted refugee status or humanitarian protection and another person,(iv) any risk to the physical, emotional or psychological wellbeing of a person who was granted refugee status or humanitarian protection, including from the circumstances in which the person is living in the United Kingdom, or(v) such other matters as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.(6) For the purpose of subsection (5)—(a) “adopted” and “adoptive” refer to a relationship resulting from adoption, including de facto adoption, as set out in the immigration rules;(b) “best interests” of a child must be read in accordance with Article 3 of the 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new Clause would make provision for leave to enter or remain in the UK to be granted to the family members of refugees and of people granted humanitarian protection.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
On behalf of my noble friend Lord Paddick, I will move Amendment 112 and speak to Amendments 113 and 117, which I have co-signed. The reason I have been given the honour of moving Amendment 112 is that it reproduces my Private Member’s Bill, which in fact has its origins with my noble friend Lady Hamwee and will have its Committee stage just after recess.
The Conservative Party likes to call itself the party of the family; I believe it needs to demonstrate this. Amendment 112 would build on existing safe routes for family reunion to enable a wider range of family members to reach the UK without undertaking unsafe journeys. This is the real way to stop most of the dangerous channel crossings and put the smugglers out of business.
In the letter and attached chart that the Minister sent to the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, and kindly made available to us all, the Government set out the current safe routes. Even under part 11 of the Immigration Rules, while adult refugees do not have to pay a fee for the visa they do have to pay for travel to the UK, and the integration loan cannot be used for that. Legal aid is also not available, at least not in England and Wales—I do not know about Scotland or Northern Ireland—and they can bring in only their spouse and their under-18 children.
As in my Private Member’s Bill, Amendment 112 would permit dependent children up to the age of 25, as well as adopted children. Crucially, it would permit children recognised as refugees to sponsor their parents and siblings to join them. Although sibling reunion is in theory possible under paragraph 319X of the Immigration Rules, in practice the barriers are often insurmountable. Not only does the visa cost almost £400 but the young sponsor has to show that they can financially support and accommodate their sibling without recourse to public funds, and that the justification for reunion is “serious and compelling”. All these are tough tests to fulfil. Paragraph 297, which governs whether children can join parents or non-parent relatives who have settlement status imposes a fee of £1,500, and then the same serious and compelling test.
Despite promising in a response to the consultation on the New Plan for Immigration to give creator clarity, no guidance has been forthcoming. Can the Minister tell us in her response when that guidance will be forthcoming, and how many visas have been issued under paragraphs 319X or 297 over the last five years?
I reaffirm my support for Amendment 113 from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and Amendment 117 from the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. These both aim to boost family reunion opportunities for unaccompanied minors and for entry to seek asylum, in part substituting for the loss of the Dublin regulation. I also support other amendments in this group. I beg to move.
Lord Hylton (CB)
My Lords, I have added my name to three amendments in this group. I note that they are all new clauses. New clauses are necessary to improve this Bill, and they are essential to humanising our present systems, let alone what may emerge from the Bill once it becomes an Act.
Reuniting families split by wars and persecution brings huge benefits; I think we can all agree on that. Amendment 112 enfranchises both children and their parents. It also empowers the Secretary of State to add new kinds of relationships. Amendment 113 should, as the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, has just mentioned, reduce dangerous crossings of the channel.
On Amendment 114, we all know that the neighbours of Syria and Iraq have been subjected to and have accepted huge influxes of people. The same is also true of southern European states. For these reasons, there is an urgent need for equitable burden sharing. This, in turn, will require much greater international co-operation. We can do our part in this country by using family reunion. Our neighbours and allies are entitled to know what our intentions and proposals are in this respect.
The wording of all three amendments can, I expect, be improved. Will the Government accept at least their principles, take them away and bring them back in pristine condition?
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister, who has given us detailed responses. Some of her points do not really take account of what inspired this set of amendments, which is that people do better if they have the support of their family. It may not be quantifiable, but my noble friend Lady Hamwee mentioned the case of a sibling. I can imagine having that my brother or sister with me in a strange place would be an enormous support. The way the Minister replied—which is obviously in her brief—was all about the numbers: never mind the quality, feel the width. We are talking about quality of life, integration and the chances that the person who gets status would have to thrive in the UK. The Home Office is a bit blinkered on this matter.
The Minister told me that the promised guidance on paragraphs 319X and 297 would be coming “in due course”. That is a phrase that always chills the spine; I hope it is not too far away. It would be interesting to know what constitutes “serious and compelling” circumstances, as people are finding that it is very difficult to get through that test. I also note that she said that there is no data in published statistics on how many applications are granted under either of those two routes, and I look forward to her successful efforts to find that. It is a bit surprising that there are no published statistics on that, but I hope she has success in locating some.
The Minister said that there is no need for statute. I obviously disagree, because I am promoting a Private Member’s Bill that would put it into statute. A lot of the problem here is that there is too much discretion and moving of the goalposts, so people do not know what they can rely on. It is all just too difficult, and there are numerous hurdles.
I listened to the Minister. I am fairly disappointed with what she said, but, as of now, I cannot do other than beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, I am pleased to support Amendment 115, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, which I have co-signed. Of course, it aims to provide a safe route for unaccompanied children from countries in Europe and broadly reproduces what we all know as the Dubs amendment to the Immigration Act 2016. There have been warm words, deservedly, about the role and record of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs; what better way to put that into something concrete than for the Government to accept Amendment 115?
I support all the amendments in this group, but I will just speak in support of Amendment 116, in the name of a noble quartet of Conservative Peers, which would provide for “at least 10,000” refugees to be resettled annually. The noble Lord, Lord Kerr, has discussed the ins and outs of that figure, but it is better than 1,000 a year, which we hear was the low achievement last year. This figure happens to be Liberal Democrat policy, so I very much agree that it is a moderate and sensible amendment. As I say, I support all of the other amendments in the group.
Lord Horam (Con)
My Lords, I am not sure that I should support a Liberal Democrat policy this evening; none the less, I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, said about the importance of targets. I am sure that one of the reasons that local authorities are reluctant to accept more people is the uncertainty that they have at the moment. They genuinely have a shortage but, inevitably, they hold back when they do not know exactly how many are expected.
I have long argued for targets in this area; I think they are an important part of it precisely because you need sensible planning, frankly, and this could be a way forward. Whatever the numbers may be, we ought to have a proper debate each year on refugees, asylum seekers and immigration as a whole, in which the Government’s plans are set out and we can all make a contribution, in the Commons as well as here, and decide what should be the targets for the following year. This would give everyone, including local authorities, some confidence and certainty about what they are expected to do.
I am afraid I do not think that that will actually reduce the numbers of people coming across the channel—I am sorry to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, on this point—for the reasons that I spelled out previously. Demand is so great that people would still try to cross the channel, even if we expanded the number, for certainty, of people coming across under safe schemes. None the less, the idea of having transparency and target setting is very valuable.
Baroness Ludford
Member’s explanatory statement
This would give effect to the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to prevent “arrival” in the United Kingdom without a valid entry clearance, rather than “entry” into the United Kingdom without a valid entry clearance, becoming an offence.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, the effect of Clause 39 is to criminalise the act of seeking asylum in the UK, even if the person has no option but to flee. Clause 39 makes arriving in the UK without leave, without ever actually entering the UK, a criminal offence. I am therefore moving Amendment 120, with the invitation of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, which would remove the relevant part of Clause 39.
I note that whereas a person violating Clause 39 could get a sentence of four years in prison, I recently saw in the media a case of modern slavery which attracted a suspended sentence. So having the temerity to arrive to claim asylum is considered multiple times more serious than enslaving and exploiting someone.
Clause 39 criminalising arrival would cover people intercepted in UK territorial waters and brought into the UK, and presenting themselves to an immigration official to claim asylum. They would arrive, even if they do not enter. Note that this is not targeted at traffickers and smugglers but at the sorry individuals being smuggled and seeking asylum. Why should they be criminalised? Remember that no visa exists for the purpose of claiming asylum—the noble Lord’s amendment wants to rectify that—and it is impossible to claim asylum without coming to the UK. It is a classic Catch-22 situation.
The clause is inconsistent with Article 31 of the refugee convention, which obliges signatories to
“not impose penalties, on account of their illegal entry or presence, on refugees … present in their territory without authorization, provided they present themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or presence.”
This non-penalisation is at the core of the refugee convention—even Australia has never considered criminalising irregular entry.
Of course, if an asylum seeker becomes a criminal as soon as they arrive, this can have implications for their future as a refugee. They will have a criminal record and be deemed to be not of good character, and this will impact on their ability to integrate, to settle and, down the line, to acquire British citizenship.
As we discussed on an earlier group, the definition of “particularly serious crime” is being lowered to a 12-month sentence. Since they could get a four-year sentence under Clause 39, or 12 months on a summary conviction, the person could lose their protection against expulsion and refoulement simply as a result of arriving in the UK to claim asylum. It is pernicious to criminalise someone who simply arrives in, not enters, a country— there has always been a distinction between the two. I am afraid that it is somewhat Kafkaesque—I maybe overuse that phrase—as well as pernicious and unnecessary. I beg to move.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 121 and 122. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for lending her support in signing Amendment 122. As the noble Baroness set out, and as we heard from the Deputy Chairman, if Amendment 120 carries favour with the Committee, Amendments 121 and 122 could obviously not be moved.
I intend these amendments to probe my noble friend the Minister. The thinking behind this is that it represents the concerns expressed to me by Law Society of Scotland, to which I am grateful for drafting the amendments and the wording that it has used. Rather than just deleting the offending wording in new subsections (D1) and (E1), I am proposing to delete “arrives in” from the relevant sections of Clause 39 and insert “enters” instead.
Clause 39 of the Bill adds a new component to the existing offence of illegal entry, and subsection (2) thereof adds new subsections to Section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971. New subsection (D1) makes it an offence for someone who “requires entry clearance” to arrive in the UK without “a valid entry clearance”. An entry clearance is a visa issued before travel, because it becomes leave to enter when the person enters the UK. The burden of proving that a person holds valid entry clearance lies on that person. This is of concern, given that EU citizens are not routinely given any physical evidence of their entry clearance if they apply using the UK Immigration: ID Check app—no visa vignette is placed in their passport. So the key addition to the offence provision is to make arrival an offence.
The Explanatory Notes clearly state:
“The concept of ‘entering the UK without leave’ has caused difficulties about precisely what ‘entering’ means in the context of the current section 24(1)(a) of the 1971 Act.”
Entering is defined in Section 11(1) of the Immigration Act 1971, which I recall studying at the University of Edinburgh some time ago, as disembarking and subsequently leaving the immigration control area. Arrival is not given any technical legal definition, so it will simply mean reaching a place at the end of a journey or a stage in a journey. So it is unclear whether a person needs to reach the mainland in order to arrive in the United Kingdom.
My first question to my noble friend is: can she clarify at what point a person arrives in the United Kingdom? The Explanatory Notes and the separate definitions of the United Kingdom and United Kingdom waters seem to suggest that arrival on the mainland is necessary. The new provisions will allow prosecutions of individuals intercepted in UK territorial waters and brought into the UK, who arrive in but do not technically enter the UK, as set out in paragraph 388 of the Explanatory Notes.
Nationality and Borders Bill
Baroness Ludford ExcerptsThursday 3rd February 2022
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Nationality and Borders Act 2022 View all Nationality and Borders Act 2022 Debates Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 82-III(a) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Third Marshalled List) - (3 Feb 2022)
Lord Horam (Con)
My Lords, I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, that there has to be some shared responsibility in Europe. In particular, his point about Greece, Italy and Spain was well made. They have had to bear the brunt of the inflow of asylum seekers to a very difficult extent, and I understand their problems. The noble Lord was also right that, whatever other solutions may be forthcoming on this very difficult issue, we will eventually have to have some agreement with the French. I am rather hopeful that, with the departure of the noble Lord, Lord Frost, we may have a better chance of reaching agreement—I say that with no malice to the noble Lord, Lord Frost, who I am sure did a very difficult job his way, but none the less, the fact that he has gone seems to me to be rather good news from the point of view of having a rather more diplomatic approach to France. I am glad that the Foreign Office in particular may now be in charge of that. I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, will agree that it is probably better for the Foreign Office to have more say in this matter than under the previous arrangements.
What I am concerned about reflects what the Chief Whip said earlier on. Clauses 14 and 15 seem to do no more than bring into British law what we already had when we were in the European Union—that is all they do—using the Dublin regulations and the Spanish protocol. This is nothing more than a transfer. We have all the rights that we enjoyed when we were members of the European Union to take account of particular circumstances and difficulties which people may have in getting evidence and so forth. All these fairly extensive amendments are already taken account of by our existing rights, so I do not see how we can spend very long on these clauses, given that they really do no more than a transfer job.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, I do not think that the noble Lord is right about EU arrangements. I remember as an MEP fighting hard on the inadmissibility provisions in EU directives. On the Dublin arrangements, my understanding is that the UNHCR is satisfied that those arrangements were compliant with the refugee convention. I contend that Clause 15 is not, hence I have put my name to some of the amendments in this group. My noble friend will propose that Clause 15 be removed altogether, as it fails to recognise the need to share asylum responsibilities with other countries in order for the international system to work effectively, but at least some changes to the clause are necessary, and so I have co-signed the amendments suggested by the JCHR, tabled in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs.
Amendments 69, 70, 71 and 75 all seek to restrict and improve the operation of the scheme proposed in Clause 15. I also support Amendment 68, and convey the apologies of my noble friend Lord Oates, who has a conflict with other business. Clause 15 is about proposals whereby the UK would attempt to persuade some other country to take responsibility for the asylum applicant if it considered that there was a connection to that state, broadly defined, or even if there was no connection at all.
Amendment 69 seeks to ensure that the definition of “safe third State” means it affords the protection and rights to which the person is entitled, so there is no real risk of them experiencing persecution, a violation of their human rights or refoulement, and that there is access to fair and efficient asylum procedures and refugee convention rights. Amendment 70 seeks to ensure that any removal should be only to a state with which the person has a connection. Amendment 71 requires that, unless formal and legal binding return arrangements are in place with the state in question—such as was the case with Dublin, which is why the UNHCR gave it its blessing—and removal takes place within a reasonable period. Absent those conditions, there must be no declaration of inadmissibility and the claim must be considered in the UK. Amendment 75 removes and rejects the suggestion that the UK can remove a claimant to a country in which the UK Government think it would have been reasonable for them to have made a claim, even if they had never visited that country.
As I said, even if these four amendments were adopted, Clause 15 would still be flawed. It would create yet greater delays, backlogs and costs in the asylum system. As we keep saying, the Home Office says the system is broken yet it wants to shoot itself in the foot by having ever-more complicated and long-winded procedures. It would also create greater anxieties for claimants and disruption to the international system. Therefore, Clause 15 must be at least amended, if not removed.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, unsurprisingly, I agree with everyone who has spoken so far except, I am afraid, for the noble Lord, Lord Horam. This is why: we are out of the EU now and have taken back control of our borders and laws. This is the Government’s policy. We are no longer in this family of nations, this bloc called the EU. Therefore, on what logical basis should we be saying that, by definition, we will never consider a claim made by an asylum seeker from that group?
It is one thing when you are in the EU to say that we do not need to be taking refugees from the EU because there is free movement in the EU and we are part of that bloc. You might well say that it will be inadmissible and that we do not consider refugee claims from within that family of nations of which we are a part, but we are not in it anymore. We have taken back control. Therefore, we are no longer able to assert pressure on others in that group to buck up their ideas about human rights or to threaten the Hungarians with being ejected from the EU if they do not sort out their human rights record. We do not have that leverage anymore. Therefore, it is our obligation as global Britain, as great believers in human rights and a signatory to the refugee convention, that if Hungarians are being persecuted we will consider their claims for asylum because we are better than them and we have taken back control in a lovely global Britain sort of way. It is totally illogical for Clause 14 to be part of the Bill.
More generally, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, made an important point about complexity and efficiency. In an earlier group, everyone in the Committee agreed that decision-making needs to be faster and better. That is in everybody’s interest, whichever side of the argument we are on. Creating lots of convoluted provisions about what is inadmissible, before you even consider whether someone is being persecuted, will only make life harder for caseworkers in the home department. I have seen Governments of both persuasions do this over the years. They think they are making it easier, but they actually make it harder by creating more convoluted hoops for people to jump through before their claim is even considered. It is better to have a clean slate and to consider somebody’s circumstances: do they qualify for asylum or not? It would be much easier without all these hoops, so Clauses 14 and 15 should go.
Just consider the claims: if countries are safe, they are safe. If people are not telling the truth, test their credibility and make that decision. Of course, I agree with everything my noble friend Lord Dubs said about safe countries, who has or does not have an association with one and the Government making the decision for them on a spurious basis.
Finally, I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, it is a well-established principle of refugee convention jurisprudence the world over that you do not have to be persecuted just by agents of the state. States have a duty to protect all the people in their state. If they do not do it, there can be behaviour and persecution by non-state agents within that territory. If the state is not offering protection, if there is no effective rule of law, it is not enforcing the criminal law and is allowing Roma or gay people or whoever to be persecuted by fascist skinheads in Hungary or whatever it is, that is persecution for the purposes of the refugee convention.
Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)
No other country is in this position because other countries believe that the refugee convention means what it says. I am uneasy, and I think the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, must be right, but what makes this particularly peculiar is that we are considering inadmissibility here. Suppose there were an agreement in place. Suppose we were handling a case—the Minister says that it is best done case by case—but we have not done anything except say, “This is inadmissible.” We do not know anything about this chap. He has not had an appeal turned down and has not been categorised in group 1 or group 2; he has simply been declared inadmissible. What does the diplomatic post in the intended recipient country have to go on?
Baroness Ludford (LD)
Surely the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is right: there is no realistic possibility. The Minister keeps “not confirming” that there are no return arrangements in place yet; she lives in hope, but the reality is that there are none and it seems unlikely that there will be any in the near future. I know there are hopes for one with France after the presidential election; well, good luck with that.
The Government wanted Brexit, they got Brexit done and Brexit meant that we no longer enjoy the Dublin regulation. Realistically, the countries that she is talking about sending people back to are mainly EU countries. Frankly, the chances of having a readmission agreement with the EU are for the birds, so we are going to be seeking bilateral agreements—and none is in prospect. So Clause 15 is indeed basically window-dressing.
The noble Lord, Lord Rosser, mentioned that apparently 6,500 cases have been declared inadmissible. All we do by kicking the can down the road is create more people waiting, more people demoralised and more work for the Home Office. It is all completely unrealistic.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, I will speak to the five amendments in this group—Amendments 83, 88, 90B, 95A and 137, and the question of whether Clause 25 should stand part—all of which I have co-signed or are in my name. The four I have co-signed are inspired by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and are in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. He has had to leave and has asked me to give his apologies.
The provisions whereby the presentation of evidence, after a date specified by the Home Office or in a priority removal notice, is required to be treated as damaging to credibility or to be given minimal weight are unfair, unjustifiable and should be removed. I agree with everything the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said.
I have also tabled Amendments 90B and 95A in the alternative, as it were. Under Clauses 21 and 25, the decision maker on priority removal notices or in an asylum or human rights claim would at least be obliged to consider whether the presumption of damage to credibility was fair, rather than looking solely at whether there were good reasons for the delay. Taking lateness into account should be rejected if it would be unfair.
The motivation for all these amendments is fair access to justice—both to comply with the European Convention on Human Rights and, as set out in Amendment 137 about removal notices, to uphold a common-law right to access justice. Yesterday, I had the pleasure of being at the Joint Committee on Human Rights session at which the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, gave evidence. We discussed having the common law as an inspiration, as well as the ECHR, in the application of human rights. I am sure the noble Lord will be able to tell me that the Government at least accept Amendment 137.
I do not need to say more because the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, put it very well. To say that evidence is not convincing is one thing; to say that, because it has not been submitted by date X it is incredible or has no weight, is putting process over substance.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
My Lords, I shall speak against Clause 25 standing part. I agree with so much of what has already been said. This is a particularly tawdry little clause in an outrageous Bill, which, as we have heard, has been slammed by UNHCR, the custodian of the refugee convention, by the JHCR, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and everybody, it seems, except noble Lords opposite.
My noble friend Lord Coaker need not apologise for not being a lawyer. It is not necessary to be a lawyer to see how tawdry Clause 25 is and how it absolutely puts process over substance.
This area of the law is not about parking regulations, or the tax owed to the Revenue or even major civil or commercial litigation between powerful opposing forces. This is the David and Goliath situation referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. When an asylum seeker presents themselves to whoever—the Border Force or the Home Office—they are putting themselves in the trust of Her Majesty’s Government in the hope that this is the right place to be.
Noble Lords have been making arguments in Committee, and those opposite have been making arguments about forum shopping, wanting better lives and all those things as if they are terrible but, in essence, the refugee convention is about desperate people escaping and having a fair crack at being believed. They may not all be telling the truth. Whether they are or not, they may not all qualify for convention protection, but there should at least be a kind and fair reception and a fair crack of the whip. That means not taking tawdry little process points such as this.
I have been a refugee lawyer, in and outside the Home Office. When I worked as a lawyer in the Home Office—I am going back now to before the new Labour Government, when my first boss was the noble Lord, Lord Howard—we did not take tawdry process points like this. That was in 1996.
In a moment, the ever-avuncular and brilliant advocate, the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, will get up and tell us not to worry, because this will come into play only when there are no good reasons. So, fear not, Women for Refugee Women, UNHCR, Amnesty International, ILPA and every other bleeding heart. The Home Secretary would call them activist human rights lawyers and they are perhaps almost as contemptible as refugees in her eyes. The noble Lord will say not to worry because, where there are good reasons, this does not come into play and there will not be an issue about evidence.
But why put this in the statute book? Immigration officers, the Secretary of State, the First-tier Tribunal, the Upper Tribunal and SIAC—these bodies are well capable of looking at evidence and credibility. It is an insult to their intelligence for them to look at whether there were or were not good reasons for late evidence. Sometimes late evidence is incredible and sometimes it is perfectly valid, because there are very good reasons—a host of good reasons, more good reasons than not—in relation to trauma.
Baroness Ludford
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would give effect to the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to amend the Bill to provide those receiving a slavery or human trafficking information notice with an equivalent amount of civil legal services support as for those receiving a priority removal notice.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, as I said in an earlier group, the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, who is the lead signatory of these amendments, could not stay so I am moving our amendments in this and the last group.
Clauses 65 and 66 amend LASPO—the Legal Aid, Sentencing and something Act—to allow for people already in receipt of legal aid for an immigration, asylum or human rights claim, under the exceptional case determination procedure, to receive legal aid advice in relation to a referral into the national referral mechanism, whereby they seek a positive reasonable grounds decision as a potential victim of slavery or human trafficking.
However, these provisions help only victims who already receive legal aid and know how to ask for it. It does not cover all victims. Exceptional case funding for legal aid is very difficult to secure in practice, so Clauses 65 and 66 will help only a small number of people, not least, as the Anti-slavery Commissioner has noted, because it requires a lot of time-consuming work up front to get that exceptional case funding and the solicitor is paid only if the application is successful.
The Joint Committee on Human Rights supports the request of the Anti-slavery Commissioner that legal aid advice of seven hours—or preferably more, as my noble friend’s Amendment 94A probes—should also be available to those in receipt of a slavery or trafficking notice in the same way as for those in receipt of a priority removal notice, to avoid victims of severe trauma remaining unidentified and unassisted. The Joint Committee on Human Rights, like others in Parliament, as I know from these Benches, has also repeatedly expressed its concern about legal aid deserts, but that is a wider debate. I beg to move.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, I have Amendment 94A in this group. I am sorry that I could not respond to the Minister on the previous group, but I am sure we will come back to that. I was going to observe that the Chamber seemed largely to have cleared, possibly because other noble Lords could not bear this Bill any longer today, but some noble Lords have rejoined us.
It is clearly better that legal aid is available than not, but I am aware, as my noble friend is, of the shortage of provision and some of the problems here. I would say that it is not a matter for today, but actually it probably is. It is very significant, because the words in the Bill will not provide the advice. The Minister has referred two or three times very confidently to the legal aid offer; we are concerned to ensure that that offer has substance.
I have heard over the years of the difficulties of solicitors—if you can find one—advising and taking instructions in immigration removal centres, with the restrictions there on time, of 30 minutes eaten into by the client having to be fetched and then returned. I do not need to say again, but I will in one sentence, that the client often needs a lot of time over a period to tell his or her story.
My amendment seeks to understand how the Government have landed on seven hours. The Minister gently chided me for the use of the term “arbitrary” before. I will acknowledge that my proposal of 20 hours is arbitrary, but it is my way of probing why the Bill provides for seven hours. I asked ILPA whether that would be sufficient, and the reply was:
“I do not think seven hours of legal aid is sufficient to advise on the notice, the person’s immigration status, the lawfulness of removal, and immigration detention. The immigration system is complex, and the Bill makes it more complex through the expedited processes, priority notices, and new definitions/standards … It is also of concern”
that the Bill
“would allow a power to alter that 7 hour time limit.”
There must have been evidence for coming to the seven hours. If that is so, what evidence would the Minister apply to reduce that figure—or indeed extend it? ILPA says it does not
“have a sense as to the specific number of hours needed for this advice, as it would be so case-specific,”
which is entirely understandable,
“including the immigration and procedural history of the case, novelty of any legal arguments, number of bases on which to raise a claim, the legality of detention”
and so on. So I hope that the Minister can flesh out this provision in the Bill so we can understand what the Government think can be achieved with the seven hours of scarce legal aid.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to all those who have contributed. These amendments obviously deal with matters of legal aid, and I remind the Committee that LASPO is the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act, just to put everybody out of their misery—otherwise they will not be able to sleep when they get home. I will be quick, but I will just make one point: with great respect to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, this is not a matter of generosity. This is not about the Government being generous. I do not want to sound high-falutin’, but this is about the rule of law. Abiding by the rule of law is not a matter of generosity; it is simply non-negotiable, and this provision is in the Bill because it is a proper and necessary thing to do.
Amendment 93 and 94 seek to provide up to seven hours of free legal aid to individuals with a slavery or trafficking notice. They are unnecessary because existing legal aid rules will already ensure that individuals can receive more than seven hours of advice if they receive a slavery or trafficking notice. The key point to bear in mind—and I accept that this is complex—is that a slavery or trafficking notice can be issued only to individuals who have made a protection or human rights claim. That is relevant because it means that they are already within the immigration system and legal aid is already available in order to make that protection or human rights claim. So, in a case where an individual is in receipt of legal aid for their protection or human rights claim and they then receive a slavery or trafficking notice, they are already entitled to advice on that notice as part of their protection or human rights claim. Importantly, there is no limit on the number of hours that can be provided on someone’s protection or human rights claim. Legal advice is available until the matter is resolved, and it may well be for considerably more than the seven hours—or, indeed, 20 hours.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
I am really sorry, I know we are looking at the clock, but if I have understood it, and I am sure the Minister is briefed to the hilt, the problem is that he who has, gets more, as it were. If you are already in the asylum system and then you get the notice, you will get even more legal aid—but what if you have not already made a protection claim? What about those people?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
The noble Baroness must have had access to my notes, because that was just the point I was going to make. I have written down here that I know the Committee will ask about individuals who are not receiving legal aid for their protection or human rights claim—and sure enough, the Committee did. My answer is that there could be multiple reasons for an individual not receiving legal aid in those circumstances. The individual might not have passed the means or merits test, and those two tests, as the Committee will know, are there to ensure that legal aid is targeted at those most in need who cannot afford advice themselves. That is one possibility, and I will come back to that in a moment. Another possibility—and this does happen—is that the individual has just made an application to the Home Office by themselves and has not sorted out a lawyer. If so, I would strongly encourage them to seek out a legal aid lawyer, who would be able to provide more than the seven hours of advice that could be provided.
Turning to Amendment 94A, the short answer to why we have specified up to seven hours in Clause 24 is that a balance must be struck between giving free legal advice and using taxpayers’ money responsibly. Seven hours is intended to reflect that this is an opportunity for initial legal advice to help individuals understand what the notice is and what it is requiring them to. It is available on a non-means-tested and non-merits-tested basis. That means that anyone with a PRN is guaranteed access to legal aid for up to seven hours, but it does not mean that, after seven hours, there is no further access to legal aid. Some individuals will need further advice; it is not intended that seven hours will resolve every immigration issue. At the end of the seven hours, any individual who has an issue within the scope of the legal aid scheme and who passes the means and merits test will be eligible for ongoing legal advice funded by legal aid until the matter is resolved.
I am conscious that that gets us into the territory of means and merits tests. I answered an Oral Question in this area on Tuesday, when I said that there was a review of the means test under way at the moment, on which I have personally spent a lot of time. I hope very much that we will soon be able to go out for consultation on that. We are conducting a really thorough review of the means test.
Finally, I will address the noble Baroness’s concerns that the exceptional case funding scheme might not be up to standard. Respectfully, I disagree. That scheme is specifically designed to act as a safety net and to provide legal-aid funding to individuals who can demonstrate that, without it, their human rights might be breached. In 2019-20, of the immigration cases that applied for exceptional case funding, 80% were granted legal aid, so that shows that the system works. We are continuing to work with legal aid practitioners and the Legal Aid Agency to improve the scheme if we can.
For the reasons that I have set out, I hope that the noble Baroness, speaking also for the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, will be content to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
The noble Baroness’s question is quite broad. She knows that we have had a number of discussions about legal aid, which will continue. I did not do much legal aid in my practice. I do not want to advertise from the Dispatch Box, but my brother-in-law is one of the finest criminal legal aid solicitors in London—I am sure that no one here will ever need his services, but he is absolutely brilliant, none the less.
More seriously, I am very conscious of the need to make sure that people have access to a lawyer with the relevant skill set, because a general right to legal aid is not much use if you cannot find a legal aid lawyer—I absolutely appreciate that. On Tuesday, I explained some of the efforts that we are making in this area. To say any more now might trespass on the Committee’s patience, but I am obviously well aware of this point.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
I appreciate the care with which the Minister has responded to these amendments. Although he started by saying that they were unnecessary, he conceded that there is a group of people who do not get legal aid. We might differ in our views on how meritorious they are in any claim for legal aid, but he said that they could find a solicitor and get legal aid that way—but that might not be the easiest thing in the world, for reasons that include what was just discussed. I am afraid that I am not really persuaded.
I will read the Minister’s remarks in Hansard, but I do not think that he denied that there are people who do not get legal aid. The fact that the anti-slavery commissioner was on the case with the JCHR shows that it is not just these Benches over here that think that this is an issue. For the time being, I have to accept that the Minister has given his response and I cannot get any further. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Ludford
(a) any relevant appeal brought in relation to the decision would be likely to be disposed of expeditiously; and(b) any relevant appeal brought in relation to the decision could be resolved within the time limits set out in subsection (3) without giving rise to unfairness or injustice.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would give effect to the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights to limit the cases that are brought within the accelerated detained appeals process, to prevent unfairness or injustice arising.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
This clause is about accelerated detained appeals. In moving Amendment 97 I will also cover Amendment 99, both of which I have signed. As I have said, the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, is leading on these amendments, but he has had to leave.
I support the deletion from the Bill of Clauses 26 and 27 in order that claimants should retain a meaningful right of appeal. The Government are trying to revive, though with an even wider scope, the detained fast-track system, despite the fact that their arguments were rejected by the Court of Appeal in 2015 and later by the Tribunal Procedure Committee. These provisions would deny access to justice, including for the reason that five days is far too short for a claimant to prepare an appeal, particularly if they are detained—it is even worse if they are in prison or a detention centre. Clause 26 would apply to a greater number of people even than the detained fast track, including those facing deportation.
The Home Office has been struck down and rebuffed twice but is coming back for more. Its decision-making is frequently flawed and unlawful. As we have heard this afternoon, half of all appeals against immigration decisions were successful in the year to June 2019, so people must have access to effective means of appeal.
After the Court of Appeal declared the detained fast track unlawful in 2015, the Government tried to revive it in tribunal rules. However, the Tribunal Procedure Committee said that if the rules were to operate fairly, which is vital given the high stakes for the claimant, they needed procedural safeguards—an additional case management hearing, for example—such that there was no guarantee of a fast conclusion of the appeal. By trying short cuts, the Government are yet again creating more potential delays. Justice cannot be achieved with the kind of short cuts the Government are trying in this Bill.
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar
My Lords, I think we are at cross-purposes. I was not saying that the language had not changed; I was saying that the test in Clause 26(5) is the same test as in Clause 23(7). On the question of whether the language has changed, I think the noble Lord is right. I will write to confirm the position—I do not want to get it wrong at the Dispatch Box—but I think there was a change in this clause. The test as set out is entirely proper. Is the only way that justice can be done to take the case out of this tribunal? If that is the only way justice can be done, it ought to be done. If this tribunal therefore, by obvious logic, can deal with the case justly, it should do so.
On the first question, I am not sure how much more I can say. The Secretary of State must consider, in order to certify a case as suitable for an accelerated detained appeal, that any appeal to that decision would be likely to be disposed of expeditiously and that the other conditions are met. In coming to that conclusion, the Secretary of State would obviously have to look at all relevant factors. I am not sure that I can take it much further than that, but let me look again at the noble Lord’s question in Hansard. If I can add anything more, I will do so, so he is in possession of everything I can say before we look at it again—no doubt on Report.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord again for his detailed responses. On the first point, on Amendment 97, I just hope that we do not find ourselves back in litigation. He asserts that the Bill avoids the pitfalls that the Court of Appeal found in 2015 and that the Tribunal Procedure Committee found later. Let us hope so, because obviously, resorts to litigation will also be something that gums up the system, which the Home Office already says is broken. Time will tell if this is going to stay as it is.
On Amendment 99, I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, is right. If my memory serves, the wording has changed since the Bill was in the other place. Certainly, the JCHR would suggest that wording that says that the tribunal “must”—not just “may”—if the interests of justice and fairness require it, take an appeal out of the accelerated detained system is stronger than the wording that is there at the moment. It says that the tribunal “must” if—and it is a broader test—it is in the interests of fairness and justice. It is a better test, and a fairer and more just test, so I am disappointed that the Minister does not like that amendment—although I guess I am not terribly surprised. On that note, I can only withdraw my amendment.
Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill
Baroness Ludford ExcerptsMonday 15th November 2021
(3 years, 11 months ago)
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Lord Hunt of Kings Heath (Lab)
My Lords, time is against us, so I will be really brief. From all our debates so far, I am convinced that the issue of inconsistent policing is the one where I would put most of my money in terms of improving the situation. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate, which looked at the way police forces dealt with violence to women and girls, was very persuasive about the hugely patchy approach of police forces.
As far as the Law Commission is concerned, anyone reading its work will see that it is complex and that it did not come to an easy conclusion when it gave a provisional view that it would be helpful to add to the categories in the way suggested. Most notably, it identified the risk that hate crime laws could prove unhelpful in certain contexts such as domestic abuse and sexual offences. It then went on to quote evidence from the Fawcett Society, which argues that all sexual and domestic abuse offences committed by men against women should be understood as inherently misogynistic. There is therefore a risk that sex-based hate crime might disrupt this understanding because it would require juries to seek express evidence of misogyny in these contexts, potentially causing some offences to be non-misogynistic where there is insufficient evidence of this.
I am not qualified to comment on the detail, but it is clear that this is a complex issue, as are the issues of sex and gender. Given that the Law Commission will report by the end of the year, the key thing we want to hear from the Minister is that the Government will take the report seriously and it will not join other Law Commission reports in the long grass.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, we are all impatient for the Law Commission report, but I believe it is best to await it before deciding how best to frame any law on hatred towards women. Sex and gender have become conflated in ordinary speech, even in legislation, but they are not the same. While “sex” has a clear meaning in law, as defined in the Equality Act, the term “gender” does not, and is taken to mean social roles or stereotypes associated with someone’s sex, and that is too tenuous, at least at this stage, to be a legal definition.
If the intention of adding “or gender” is to ensure that legislation also covers hate crimes perpetrated towards trans women, it is unclear why the law would not catch a crime directed towards a trans woman on the basis of presumed sex. In addition, crimes directed against someone based on their transgender identity are already covered by hate crimes legislation.
Independent Review of Administrative Law Update
Baroness Ludford Excerpts(4 years, 7 months ago)
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Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, that is a very interesting proposal from my noble and learned friend. Generally, of course, judicial review does not substitute the decision of the court for the decision of the decision-maker, but perhaps that is a matter which I can reflect on and discuss with my noble and learned friend as I consider the responses to the consultation generally.
Baroness Ludford (LD) [V]
My Lords, the Government appointed a distinguished panel to review the operation of judicial review led by a Conservative former Justice Minister. The panel said that
“disappointment with the outcome of a case … is rarely sufficient reason to legislate more generally”.
It was obviously thinking of Miller 2, the prorogation case. The Government seem dissatisfied with that response. and are now consulting on statutory changes, such as for ouster clauses, which the panel advised against. The Faulks review also points out that
“any legislation would be of limited effect unless changes are also … made to the Human Rights Act.”
Given their reaction to the review of judicial review, will the Government similarly ignore the result of the Gross review of the Human Rights Act if they do not get the answers they want?
Lord Wolfson of Tredegar (Con)
My Lords, we are not disappointed with the report from the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, and his team. On the contrary, it is a very good piece of work. We are consulting for the reasons I have already expressed. The panel did not say that ouster clauses should never be used; it said that, when used appropriately, they should not be seen as an affront to the rule of law. We want to consult on whether and how they should be used. The independent review of the Human Rights Act is ongoing. We will consider its results in due course. While very significant reform of judicial review might require changes to the Human Rights Act, the changes we are proposing do not.
Anti-Semitism: University Campus Incidents
Baroness Ludford Excerpts(4 years, 9 months ago)
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Baroness Ludford (LD) [V]
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, for this debate, and the CST, along with the Union of Jewish Students, for preparing this important and distressing report. It is intolerable that students—or, of course, any Jewish person—should be subjected to anti-Semitic abuse. One of the issues highlighted is the flaws and lack of consistency in some universities’ complaints procedures. Some have given strong support, but others have not investigated or adjudicated complaints promptly, thoroughly or fairly. In that context, it is disappointing that only around 40 or 50 of over 130 universities have adopted the full IHRA definition and examples. Only if they do so can they recognise anti-Semitic discrimination, prejudice or abuse based on an appropriate, complete standard that is commonly accepted. I am sorry to see my alma mater, the LSE, missing from the list I saw. What are the results of the Minister’s department’s engagement with universities on adoption of the IHRA definition and best practice complaint procedures? I look forward to hearing his response and I welcome him to the Dispatch Box.
Crown Dependencies
Baroness Ludford Excerpts(9 years, 3 months ago)
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Lord Faulks
My Lords, there will be no immediate change in the way Gibraltar’s people can travel, or how its services can be sold. The Government are most anxious to maintain the Gibraltar-Spain border: it is one of our top priorities. As for the details, I am afraid that, as with so many things in this negotiation, we will have to wait.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
I, too, want to ask about Gibraltar. Obviously it is not a Crown dependency, but naturally there is a great deal of concern in Gibraltar, whose inhabitants voted remain, not only about the economy but also that Spain will be emboldened to press its sovereign claim. How will the Government protect the interests of Gibraltar in all those dimensions?
Lord Faulks
As the noble Baroness says, Gibraltar is not a Crown dependency—the subject of this Question. None the less, the Government of Gibraltar have put forward some specific ideas for ensuring that trade will continue between the UK and Gibraltar, and we look on this matter as a priority. We also continue to uphold sovereignty over British Gibraltarian territorial waters by challenging and protesting all incursions, and we are continually monitoring the situation. We will continue to do so, and the long-term aim is to return to the trilateral forum for dialogue between the UK, Spain and Gibraltar.
Article 50
Baroness Ludford Excerpts(9 years, 3 months ago)
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Lord Faulks
The noble Lord asks a number of questions, including some that were posed, as he quite rightly said, to my noble friend Lady Anelay last week during the debate. I can of course advance the position somewhat from the answer that she gave last week, in that we know, as the noble Lord said, who the next Prime Minister is—and I understand that she will become the Prime Minister on Wednesday evening. There is at least some progress there, which I am sure will provide some confidence that the process will be decided rather sooner than might have been the position had there been a contested election for the Conservative leadership.
As to his question in respect of the devolved nations, I know that there have already been preliminary discussions with the various parts of the United Kingdom and their representative Assemblies and Parliament. That will continue, and he is quite right that Brexit, however it finally comes into being, should involve all of the United Kingdom and as many parts—and representative parts of the United Kingdom—as possible.
As to the question of Parliament’s involvement, I fear I can go no further than my noble friend did. It is the Government’s view—as I indicated in the Statement—that the prerogative power does not require parliamentary involvement, but the current Prime Minister made it clear that Parliament will be involved. How and when Parliament will be involved will be a question for the new Prime Minister when she has considered the best way forward.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for his responses. He seemed to make rather a joke of “enjoyable and highly paid” disputes among the lawyers, but surely it is much bigger than that. For a referendum which was fought largely on the issue of parliamentary sovereignty, and on such a major issue as the terms on which this country is supposed to leave the EU, surely it is inconceivable that a decision to trigger Article 50 should not be taken on the basis of a parliamentary decision. After all, Article 50 says that it is up to British constitutional requirements. So this is not about legal formalities; this is fundamentally about democratic principles. We need clarity in a time of huge turbulence. We need to know the evidential basis on which the negotiations will be conducted. We need to know the timing, before and after negotiations, for triggering Article 50. This is about the national interest, not about the convenience of the Conservative Party. I think that we deserve greater respect for Parliament on this decision.
Lord Faulks
There is no lack of respect for Parliament; quite the contrary. As to the comment that I appeared to make a joke, the noble Baroness will appreciate that I was simply reading out the Statement that was in the House of Commons. If noble Lords found it amusing, that was a matter for them, not any intention on my part. As to the question of sovereignty, there is a distinction drawn by the noble Lord, Lord Norton, as the noble Baroness may remember, between parliamentary sovereignty and political sovereignty in the Diceyean sense. The Government took the view that it is plainly desirable that Parliament should be involved. Whether there is a strict requirement in law may be a matter that courts will decide in due course.
EU Referendum and EU Reform (EUC Report)
Baroness Ludford Excerpts(9 years, 4 months ago)
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Baroness Ludford (LD)
My Lords, as a fully signed-up member of the Boswell fan club, I was very impressed not only by the report but by its introduction today from the noble Lord, Lord Boswell. It has been very useful to have the three reports melded into one debate. I was a little uncertain about that originally, but I have been proved wrong, not least because of the reform and withdrawal elements being brought together but also because we have had a very strong contribution on the scientific work that is supported by the European Union. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Hannay, that, as an arts person, the more I learn about science, the better.
It has been amply demonstrated that the leave campaign has no feasible post-Brexit plan: it would be a leap in the dark, as the noble Lord, Lord Liddle, said. Others have also emphasised the dangers of a chaotic withdrawal in the context of a lack of trust, as my noble friends Lady Falkner and Lady Smith said. The noble Lord, Lord Jay, reminded us that the negotiations would be of a hardball nature, with up to 10 years of fraught discussions. The noble Lord, Lord Howell, recalled that we are not Canada or Japan. We are in Europe, and so we cannot use those models to guide us.
To the noble Lord, Lord Pearson, I say that what the remain campaign and most people in this debate are talking about is Project Reality, not Project Fear. It is about what will happen if, due to what I and others would regard as a very bad decision, this country was to decide on Thursday next week to leave the European Union and follow the Pied Pipers of the leave campaign—a phrase which I have pinched, and will probably use again, from the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones.
I was impressed by the recent entry of former Prime Minister Gordon Brown into the heat of the campaign. He has not traditionally been associated with passion but more with post-neoclassical endogenous growth theory. However, he has come up trumps—not Trump, I hasten to add—with his video filmed in the ruins of Coventry Cathedral. I saw one reference to that video having had 2 million views, and that was a day or so ago.
The Select Committee’s report noted how the Government’s approach had downplayed any visionary or emotional element in their proposals for the future of the EU, focusing almost exclusively on pragmatic and transactional arguments—although that has improved in recent months. Of course, pragmatic arguments are essential, but a dose of what the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, called “feelings and ideals” has the advantage of putting everything in context, set against the past and looking ahead to the future. The noble Lord, Lord Browne, referred to his family history to illustrate the inspiration for the EU. That resonates, and is something that has not come out enough in the referendum campaign. I was at a meeting last night, and the biggest applause of the evening was when I got a bit emotional about the 70 years of peace that we have had.
It is not just vision and emotion that need to be taken into account; we need also to look at the factors beyond the economic, important as those are. The geopolitical and strategic implications of the UK’s exit from the EU are considerable, as is touched on in the EU Committee’s report, and would mean a hit to our security through the loss of key EU co-operation instruments and a loss of diplomatic and political influence.
Following a short break earlier, I came back to the Chamber in the middle of the speech by the noble Lord, Lord Howarth. He enumerated the very unpleasant political forces that are abroad on the continent. We are pretty disputatious as a nation, but we are largely free from the nastiest of the political elements. The injection of our history and stability is much needed in Europe. A couple of days ago, the Financial Times commentator Wolfgang Münchau said that,
“whatever the referendum’s outcome, the chances of the UK playing an active role in shaping Europe’s future are minimal”.
I hope that we will be able to prove him wrong.
I also hope that, in just over a year’s time, the UK will be about to assume the presidency of the EU as a leading, not a leaving, member—in the words of my noble friend Lord Maclennan, echoed by the noble Lord, Lord Hannay. I hope that we will be able to commit to making the EU more streamlined, more effective and possessing of greater legitimacy. I believe that the EU is democratic, with directly elected MEPs and elected Ministers in the Council. However, what we have is a legitimacy deficit. As the noble Lord, Lord Judd, mentioned, we can bring confidence and our outward-looking approach to improve the European Union.
The remain side is not complacent about the current state of the EU, which the noble Lord, Lord Howell suggested. However, he is absolutely right that we have to prepare the EU for the storms to come. It must lift its eyes to the horizon and not be introverted. We can contribute so much to making the EU stronger in addressing the many challenges that there are. For example, we can contribute to making Europe more competitive, with a growing economy, and more ambitious in trade deals. We can also contribute to a Europe that distributes more fairly the gains from globalisation, as the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, remarked.
The noble Lord, Lord Low, spoke very interestingly about the contribution of the EU to accessibility criteria for goods and services. That is essential. We all know what we need to compete in a single market, and there are digital, energy and financial services dimensions.
I absolutely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Boswell, that we have wasted the enormous asset that was the balance of competences review. No other member state has done anything so comprehensive. So please, after next Thursday, when, as I sincerely hope, we vote to remain, let us use the information and contributions in that review. It is disrespectful to everyone who did so much work in contributing to and writing up the report not to draw on that exercise. It would help the EU get smart regulation. Let us build the quality, not the width.
The noble Earl, Lord Selborne, strongly emphasised the importance of a strong regulatory framework in the EU as providing a good basis for scientific collaboration. He also highlighted the things that had not worked so well. However, I am glad that, for example, in the clinical trials directive, the Brussels machine did listen and improve that.
My noble friend Lady Sharp made interesting remarks on the bureaucracy around grants. There is a bit of a “cannot win” dilemma for the European Commission. With the Court of Auditors breathing down its neck, maybe 30-page forms are necessary to be able to audit and track the funds. What I would like to see is Finance Ministers and our own Chancellor sign declarations to say that all money spent in their member states is properly spent. Funnily enough, they never want to do that, because they quite like Brussels being blamed.
So many speakers—too many for me to name them all—emphasised how Brexit would severely hit our universities and scientific collaboration, which has been such a success story. That feeds into the reform of the European budget. Big progress has been made, but more needs to be done with the continued switch to innovation, research and infrastructure. We can do that only if we are in there arguing for those changes.
Also, of course, we are very aware of our unique contribution in security and counterterrorism. The UK is a crucial partner. Having the current director of Europol and the former president of Eurojust, the network of prosecutors, is, I think, a tribute to our first-tier legal and policing status. On defence, foreign policy and the European neighbourhood, we need to capitalise on what my noble friend Lord Watson called our “three circles of engagement”—Europe, the Commonwealth and the transatlantic relationship. There is no country in the world that has the networking assets that we have. We are a sort of Tatler of the diplomatic and political world.
I shall say a word on migration, which is an important part of this campaign—and not only external migration, where we must work with the rest of the EU to get a credible policy of migration management, whose challenge is only going to grow, coupled with development aid, as the noble Lord, Lord Hastings, said. On intra-EU free movement, we have had very helpful judgments from the European Court of Justice, including one just yesterday about the payment of child benefit, which have confirmed that free movement is the right to move for a job. It always was, but there has been clarification and firming up of the rules, including through the Prime Minister’s renegotiation. We need to do two tough things. One is making sure that public resources are targeted at areas in this country which are under migration pressure, and being more nimble in switching the money. The other is the investment in training and skills for our own young people so that employers do not automatically put advertisements in Polish newspapers.
Lastly, I shall say a word about our engagement with the EU institutions. It will not come as a surprise, perhaps, to the noble Lord, Lord Judd, that I, as a former Member of the European Parliament, do not agree with his regret regarding a directly elected European Parliament. We certainly need much better partnership between the European Parliament and national parliaments. Perhaps one little step that we could help achieve would be to give MEPs a pass for the Palace of Westminster. It is absurd that we regard MEPs as some kind of foreign body that should not be allowed on the premises. The stress in the reform report on allowing national parliaments a positive and proactive role—a green-card role, not just a reactive and negative red-card role—is very important.
Many remarks have been made, including by the noble Lord, Lord Browne, about the importance of having British officials in European institutions. I think that there are two things the Government could do. They could revive and beef up the fast-stream program in the Civil Service to prepare people for the “concours”, or competition. Also, as far as I know, they have not reversed the much-regretted decision of some years ago to cease funding scholarships at the College of Europe in Bruges—you could call it the Eton of Brussels—which helps provide a channel into the EU institutions.
We need to be careful what we wish for in a “flexible, multi-layered, diverse Europe”. That is fine, as long as it does not become a pick ‘n’ mix, where we end up losing out. Therefore, I end on the warning from Manfred Weber, the present leader of the EPP group, the biggest group in the European Parliament, who sounded a note of caution about British exceptionalism. We are not in the euro; we are not in Schengen; and I wish we had not been half-hearted about justice and home affairs co-operation—and thank you to everybody in this Chamber who worked so hard to get us opted back into the 35 measures. We need to be very careful that we do not undermine the voice of British Members of the European Parliament in getting senior positions, such as chair of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, which my colleague Sharon Bowles got in 2009. We should not undermine either the chance of that being repeated for the chair of the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs or our weight in the Council. I would say yes, perhaps, to a kind of special arrangement for the UK, because if that goes too far we will actually lose the leading voice that many of us here want.
European Union Referendum (Date of Referendum etc.) Regulations 2016
Baroness Ludford Excerpts(9 years, 7 months ago)
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Lord Lawson of Blaby
The great majority of the agreements we are party to through the WTO and its predecessor, GATT, were concluded before 1995, when, at that time, the European Union or its predecessor was not even a member of the WTO or GATT.
As for the argument that you need to be a member of the so-called single market to trade with the single market, that is an equal nonsense. Indeed, exports into the single market from countries outside it have, for many years now, grown much faster than UK exports to the single market. After all, the weighted average of the European Union’s common external tariff is only 3.6%. The prospect of our not being able to secure a far better free trade agreement than little Switzerland is minimal.
Certainly the future is uncertain. That, after all, is its nature. But the uncertainty surrounding Britain’s future within the European Union, should we decide to stay, is far more worrying than regaining our freedom. The EU’s blundering route to political union—for that is what it is all about; that is the purpose of the whole enterprise—will continue and, even though we have secured an opt-out from political union, we will remain shackled to it: a sort of colonial status.
This referendum debate is not primarily about economics. It is about whether we in this country wish to take control of our own affairs and to be a self-governing democracy with a global rather than a merely European perspective.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
Before the noble Lord sits down, could I press him to spell out what his alternative is? He is the chairman of one of the leave organisations. He always raises a laugh—I have had the privilege of hearing it several times now—when he says that the alternative to being in is being out. But what does that freedom consist of? What kind of deal would he conclude?
Baroness Ludford
My Lords, this has been a very interesting debate. First, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Gilbert of Panteg, on his maiden speech and in particular his stress on the cross-party nature of the campaign for the remain vote. I will return to that point.
I will now utter a phrase not often heard these days. The Liberal Democrats are fully behind the Government and support Mr Cameron to the hilt—rather more than some on his own Benches. That support includes the date of 23 June. The Prime Minister made an excellent start with a sparkling performance on “The Andrew Marr Show” and a combative presentation since. I particularly agree with his arguments about sovereignty needing to be pooled if it is to be real not illusory. That point was made by my noble friends Lord Ashdown and Lord Maclennan.
I am very glad that the Prime Minister stressed the value of the EU to UK security, an argument that the Liberal Democrats and many in this House had to fight hard on. I think of the noble Lords, Lord Hannay and Lord Boswell, in that context. When the coalition had to decide on staying with the opt-in to policing and crime-fighting measures, there was quite a lot of heavy lifting so I am very pleased that the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary have been persuaded there.
The Liberal Democrats, who are fully united as a party behind our 70-year history of support for Britain in Europe, believe passionately that remain is not only the rational and right thing to do but also the patriotic choice, playing to our strengths and multiplying our ability to promote our interests. As my noble friend Lord Lee of Trafford said, leaving would take the great out of Britain.
I want to pay special tribute to Europe Minister, David Lidington, who is something of an unsung hero of the renegotiation exercise. He is intelligent, diplomatic and knowledgeable, and his six-year longevity in the post—a poisoned chalice, some would say; I have no idea whether he wanted to be there for that long—has been an asset given the relationships he must have built up with Ministers and officials across the EU. We saw a dividend of that on 19 February. I hope I have not just dealt a blow to his further career prospects. I particularly enjoyed his response to the Brexiters in the other place last week. He said:
“If the Prime Minister had come back from Brussels brandishing the severed heads of the members of the European Commission and proceeded to conduct an auto-da-fé in Downing Street of copies of the Lisbon treaty, they would still be saying, ‘This is feeble, insufficient, not enough’”.—[Official Report, Commons, 25/2/16; col. 564.]
He was absolutely right.
I heard the Foreign Secretary speak a little less colourfully this morning. While still describing himself as a Eurosceptic, he made a powerful case in presenting the document published today for how Brexit was a risky leap in the dark and that none of the potential alternatives was viable for Britain. Just today, the former Swiss President and, this evening, the current Norwegian Prime Minister advised against copying their countries’ relations with the EU.
We all wait—and still wait—for an honest portrayal by the leavers of what they propose instead of EU membership. We waited in vain during this debate as answer came there none. The noble Lord, Lord Lamont, talked about a free trade agreement but as others—including the noble Lords, Lord Willetts and Lord Kerr, said—that is fundamentally different from access to the single market. Everybody sensible accepts that access to the single market comes at a price.
All out friends and allies, not only in the EU but also in the Commonwealth including Canada and Australia, in NATO—which, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, said is made stronger by the UK’s membership of the European Union and those organisations being partners—and of course in the United States and, importantly, Ireland, urge us to stay in the EU. Can the leavers cite a single country or leader apart from Putin’s Russia that wants Brexit? The US trade representative has said that the United States is not interested in a trade deal with just the UK.
We know, of course, that the leavers are all over the place. Boris Johnson—true to form—could not stick to his suggestion of a second referendum for more than five days. And 13 days before his announced “decision” to back leave, he had been singing the praises of the European Union. Boris executes more U-turns than all the black cab drivers in London, who, by the way, are not among his fans.
We have also heard rather a lot of “porkies” from the leavers, I am afraid. The noble Lord, Lord Willetts, mentioned the one about the habitats directive, which boils down to some non-statutory guidance from Natural England. Boris himself has cited the one about being stopped from having safer lorries that would be more visible to cyclists. He claimed that the French had blocked this measure. However, it passed into law with the agreement of the Council and the Parliament and will come into force in a few years’ time. When the measure was going through, Boris himself blamed the British Government for trying to block this proposal. So some correct facts would not go amiss, including on our budget contribution, where there have also been some wild claims. I commend the organisation infacts.org for picking up a lot of these mistakes.
My noble friend Lord Oates, who made an excellent speech, said that anyone would think that we had no friends. I am afraid that is the attitude of all too many of the leavers. I find a defeatist streak in them and a lack of faith in this country. The side that lacks confidence in the strengths of Great Britain is not the remain side: it is those who want to take their bat home. That quitting attitude undermines, and rats on, our friends. We should be a reliable partner, asking, in the words of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, not just what Europe can do for us but what we can do for Europe. That is the question Winston Churchill asked, who has already been invoked in this debate. I found an article that Edward Heath wrote 20 years ago, which stated:
“I readily accept that at that time”—
that is, the time of the Zurich speech in 1946; I was fascinated to hear the noble Viscount, Lord Eccles, say that he was present—
“Churchill did not envisage Britain being a full member of this united Europe”.
But Edward Heath added:
“This reluctance was based on circumstance; it was not opposition based on principle”.
Mr Heath went on to quote Churchill in the House of Commons debate on the Schuman Plan in June 1950, when Churchill asserted:
“The whole movement of the world is towards an inter-dependence of nations … If independent, individual sovereignty is sacrosanct and inviolable, how is it that we are all wedded to a world organisation?”—[Official Report, Commons, 27/6/1950; col. 2158.]
Apparently, in a letter to his constituency chairman in 1961, he said:
“I think the Government are right to apply to join the European Economic Community”.
One of the joys of the last week or so has been the tweets by Sir Nicholas Soames, who, of course, is the grandson of Churchill. I note that he retweeted a tweet by Charles Grant at the Centre for European Reform, which said:
“As Sir Nicholas Soames’ grandad might have said, the EU is the worst possible way of running relations among European states except for all the others”.
I think there are some things we can do, apart from expressing the remain arguments effectively, to make the British people feel more at ease in the European Union. One is to stop the amount of destabilising change and domestic reorganisation for its own sake in the NHS, local government and the legal system. I am not arguing for stasis when reform is needed, but changing the public and civic realm out of recognition, which has not happened in France or Germany, for instance, makes people nervous, uncertain, bewildered and even frightened, unsure of themselves and their identity, and, all too often, looking for someone or something to blame—and that scapegoat tends to be Europe. I also think that we should stop gold-plating European directives, as has been mentioned.
I make a plea to the Government to go easy on some provocative and partisan policies. I read in the Financial Times that the Prime Minister is advising the Chancellor to ditch his planned raid on pension tax relief because he wants to woo the voters. If the Government would like to do a bit of wooing of the opposition parties in order to create a good cross-party mood of co-operation for the remain campaign, that would not go amiss either. Perhaps the Government could look again at the Investigatory Powers Bill and whether it is a good idea to produce it three weeks after three critical parliamentary reports; at the forced sell-off of social housing; at the attack on Labour Party funding in the Trade Union Bill, which is divorced from a comprehensive reform of party funding; and at slashing the Short money for opposition parties to do their work of holding the Government to account. Perhaps the Government might have a rethink on these policies.
I conclude by hoping that after a remain vote, the Government will pursue multilateral reform inside the EU, working with like-minded partners in a sensible, pragmatic, British way. This was the strategy in coalition of Ministers such as Edward Davey and it must be renewed. That valuable exercise, the balance of competences review, is an excellent basis for doing so. Perhaps then we can get away from using the phrase “Britain’s relationship with Europe”, as the BBC so often does, and remember that if we really want to play a leading role in the EU we have to start by embracing the fact that we do indeed belong to the EU.
European Union Referendum Bill
Baroness Ludford Excerpts(9 years, 11 months ago)
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Lord Hamilton of Epsom (Con)
My Lords, why do I smell another rat here? It seems to me that this is once again trying to slew the whole playing field, which we have desperately been trying to keep level, in favour of those who want to keep us in the EU. It has been quite established for some time. There is the argument that it is very unfair for these people who have been abroad for more than X number of years that they cannot vote in the referendum. But they cannot vote in general elections either. It is quite extraordinary that we seem to be determined all the time to bring in amendments that will make it more likely that we will stay in the EU than leave it.
Baroness Ludford (LD)
Does the noble Lord believe that the Conservative manifesto commitment to raise the 15-year cap in the future is also an attempt to fix the electorate?
Lord Hamilton of Epsom
A large number of commitments have been made in manifestos that have not been brought in. That is rather like, by the same token, arguing that this is the moment to change the electoral mandate for 16 and 17 year-olds. Are we going to bring all these changes in on the back of a referendum Bill? Like my noble friend Lord Forsyth, I believe that we should have a constitutional convention to look into all these things. The whole thing is becoming more messy and piecemeal as it goes along, and I certainly do not approve of that at all.
All the time, amendments are being brought forward that are designed to make it more likely that the electoral register will be slewed in such a way that more people will vote to stay in than to leave.