(8 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise with the leave of the House and at the request of my noble friend Lord Marks to oppose the Question that Clause 49 stand part and speak to the stand part notices for Clauses 50, 51 and 52.
Clause 49 would disapply Section 3 of the Human Rights Act in respect of any decision made under Chapter 2 of Part 2 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997. That chapter of the 1997 Act sets out a range of provisions concerning life sentences and sentences of detention during His Majesty’s pleasure, including minimum-term review for under-18s. For life prisoners, the provisions concern release on licence, termination of licences for public protection, recall for breach of licence conditions, the duration of licences, release at the direction of the Parole Board and removal of life prisoners from the United Kingdom.
The chapter is specifically extended by this Bill, in particular by Clause 41, to provide, in respect of public protection decisions, those considerations that the decision-maker is to be bound to take into account relating to such things as the risk of reoffending and the risk of breach of licence conditions. The clause includes, ominously, the provision under Clause 41(9):
“This section does not limit the matters which the decision-maker must or may take into account when making a public protection decision”.
Clause 44 provides for the Secretary of State to have the power to direct the referral of a prisoner’s case to a court—currently the High Court or the Upper Tribunal —as discussed on 26 February. Clause 48 makes further provision about the termination of the licences for life prisoners for public protection. For all these provisions, Clause 49 would disapply Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
Section 3 lies at the heart of the human rights protection afforded by the Human Rights Act. It governs the interpretation of legislation by courts and also, importantly, by public authorities, and so effectively by all relevant public decision-makers. It provides:
“So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights”.
Section 3 gives legislative teeth to the convention, requiring legislation to be compatible where possible. Clause 49 would disapply that crucial protection in relation to this chapter of the 1997 Act and any subordinate legislation made under it.
The Explanatory Notes, in paragraph 353, claim that this disapplication
“will apply the section as it is intended to be applied, and not use section 3 to alter the interpretation”.
In other words, the clause is intended to operate in a way that enables convention rights to be ignored or overridden; otherwise there would be no point in the disapplication. This represents a real and important threat to human rights and should be removed from the Bill.
Clause 50 would operate in exactly the same way in respect of the provisions of Chapter 6 of Part 12 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 relating to the licences, release, supervision and recall of fixed-term prisoners. These provisions are to be amended by Clauses 42, 45 and 47 of the Bill. At present, this chapter of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 is subject to the protection of the interpretive requirement of Section 3 of the Human Rights Act. Clause 50 would remove that provision, and not just in relation to the new provisions in the chapter introduced in this Bill. As with the 1997 Act dealt with in Clause 49, it would remove it in respect of the whole chapter of the 2003 Act dealing with fixed-term prisoners.
Similarly, Clause 51 would disapply Section 3 in respect of the amended Section 128 of the LASPO Act. This amends the power to change the release test for release on licence in cases involving public protection.
Clause 52 deals with a similar issue. It is not approaching the interpretation of legislation in the light of the convention, but the different question of whether a person’s convention rights have been breached in connection with a prisoner release decision under the two chapters I have previously mentioned in the 1997 and 2003 Acts.
Paragraph 354 of the Explanatory Notes sets out how to govern any challenge on human rights challenge under the convention to a prisoner release decision. Where Clause 52 is offensive is in subsection (3), which requires:
“The court must give the greatest possible weight to the importance of reducing the risk to the public from persons who have committed offences in respect of which custodial sentences have been imposed”.
That provision would apply regardless of the length of the custodial sentence imposed, regardless of what harm was being risked to the public and regardless of the injustice to the offender or the offender’s circumstances or the risk to the offender’s health, family or prospects of rehabilitation. What is the “greatest possible weight”? That, effectively, means exclusive weight—the only factor the judge is to consider.
When the Explanatory Notes say:
“Requiring the courts to give the greatest possible weight to this factor reinforces the precautionary approach and means that public protection will be given appropriate consideration in any balancing exercise”,
they are disingenuous. The provision does not call for a balancing exercise. It requires courts not to consider questions of balance or appropriate considerations, but instead to prefer one factor over all others. That is pernicious and ought to go. Judges are perfectly capable of performing balancing exercises. They can and do give appropriate weight to public protection when they do so. They should not have their judicial function curtailed in this way. The clause should go.
My Lords, here we go again. First, they came for the asylum seekers and then for the prisoners. Which unpopular and demonised group—to quote my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti—will be next to be deprived of some of the rights contained in the Human Rights Act?
As some of us have been arguing during the passage of the Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill, to deprive marginalised groups of their human rights in this way undermines the principle of universality at the heart of human rights. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, quoted back at us that it is
“a fundamental tenet of modern human rights that they are universal and indivisible”.—[Official Report, 14/2/24; col. 342.]
He then went on to try to justify the very opposite.
In answer to some general Oral Questions on our human rights legislation in June, the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice emphasised the Government’s commitment to
“a human rights framework that … works for the British people”.—[Official Report, Commons, 27/6/23; col. 145.]
He later talked about our legislation delivering on the interests of the British people. Leaving aside whether universal human rights can be confined to the British people, it raises the question of whether prisoners no longer count as British people.
As it is, some of the briefings we have received, including from the Howard League for Penal Reform and the Prison Reform Trust, make the point that in the words of the latter,
“it is precisely in custodial institutions like prison … that human rights protections are most vital, because individuals are under the control of the state”.
The NAYJ, a member organisation which campaigns for the rights of and justice for children in trouble with the law, is particularly anxious about the implications for children in prison. The Law Society, the EHRC and the then chair of the JCHR have all expressed their deep concern about the diminution of human rights protection represented by these clauses. The EHRC, in particular, warns that there may be an impact on the UK’s international legal obligations.
The Constitution Committee sets out the government justification for these clauses in the human rights memorandum on the Bill, but invites us to seek further explanation from the Government as to what effect they intend to achieve with the disapplication of Section 3 of the Human Rights Act. According to the memorandum, the intention is to ensure that the HRA does not get in the way of the policy intentions of the release regime. In other words, it seems to be saying that human rights should not trump government policy. No evidence is provided to justify the need for this diminution of human rights, and of course the clauses were not subject to pre-legislative scrutiny.
In his response to the Second Reading debate, the Minister seemed to say that all the organisations expressing concern are making a mountain out of a molehill because Section 3 of the HRA is “a procedural provision only”. He argued that it gives the courts an
“unusual power to reinterpret what Parliament has said in a manner that may not have been and probably was not Parliament’s original intention so as to render a particular provision compatible with the convention”.—[Official Report, 23/12/23; col. 2135.]
This, he suggested, was a “neutral” description of the function of Section 3.
I am grateful to Amnesty for its help in making sense of what the Minister said, although it would be the first to emphasise that its analysis is in line with that of the independent Human Rights Act review, established by the Government. It questioned whether this was a “neutral” interpretation of the role of Section 3. The reference to reinterpreting legislation seemed to suggest that there is one legitimate act of interpretation, which is then challenged by a second questionable one under Section 3. But this interpretation is itself highly questionable. I am advised that Parliament intended for Section 3 to be used in the way that it is. There is no reason to think that Section 3 interpretations lead to interpretations that are “probably not” in line with Parliament’s original intention, as confirmed by the Human Rights Act review, even if that was not the view of one member of the commission cited by the Minister.
More practically, and I think for the first time in this context, the Minister suggested that it has been a difficult section to apply, with the case law having “gone all over the place” and the introduction of uncertainty where the Government want certainty. I am advised that while this may have been true of when Section 3 was first brought into force—although “all over the place” is a misleading description—that period has long passed and the legal issues around it have not substantively changed for the past decade or so. As the Minister acknowledged, it has “settled down more recently”. So having been in effect for 20 years, it is not at all clear why its continued function would create the kind of complexity and uncertainty the Minister fears.
If the Minister cannot come up with a more convincing case for the disapplication of Section 3 from a group of citizens for whom the protection of the Human Rights Act is especially important, given their relationship to the state, I certainly think that these clauses should not stand part of the Bill. I have yet to hear any argument that justifies this further breach of the principle of the universality of human rights.
(8 months, 3 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I wanted to make a couple of brief points in support of Amendments 20 and 21. In Committee, the Minister, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, quoted at length the Lord Chancellor’s submission to the Joint Committee on Human Rights to justify breaching the universality of human rights. Clearly, the Lord Chancellor did not convince the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which in its majority report concluded that the provision
“threatens the fundamental principle that human rights are universal and should be protected for everyone”.
I still do not understand, given the concerns expressed by the JCHR, as well as the EHRC, the Law Society and the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, why this Government continue to try to argue that disapplication does not affect the principle of universality, which the noble and learned Lord waxed lyrical about in his speech.
Secondly, the noble and learned Lord promised to write to me in response to my concerns about the implications for the Windsor Framework and the Good Friday agreement—following on from the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey—and the Joint Committee on Human Rights’ request for a full explanation before Report as to why the Government consider Clause 3 to be consistent with these agreements. I thank the noble and learned Lord for his letter but, to echo what the noble Lord, Lord German, said earlier, I gently point out that it was sent at 3.24 pm this afternoon, after Report began. That really is not good practice, and it does not meet the JCHR’s request that a full explanation should be published before Report. It seems that the actual full publication will not be until some time on Wednesday, when we will be finishing Report.
I am not convinced that the answers to my questions would satisfy the JCHR, the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission or the Human Rights Consortium of Northern Ireland. I am also not clear why the letter was not copied to the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, given that she originally challenged the Minister on this point at Second Reading. I am not going to pursue the matter here, except to point out that I do not think we yet have a satisfactory explanation of the interactions with and the implications for these agreements.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 21 in my name and also link that with Amendments 20 and 18. If Amendment 20 had had any space, I would have signed it as well, because it makes the same case. I will address Amendment 17 later and look forward very much to seeing how the Government deal with it in their response.
At the moment I will just repeat the universality issue of human rights—they are for all. I read once again the response from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, about legitimacy and I am sure we will hear it again today. But the underpinning of the Human Rights Act is that the protections should not be disapplied just to some people. Human rights are for all; if they become qualified, they are no longer human rights but only rights for some people. This violates the principle of the universality of human rights, which is why this amendment is in place.
It does not matter that this is directed at illegal migrants: once the Government do this for one group, they will choose—or could choose—to use it for other groups such as protesters.
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I very much welcome this amendment. I should say that this is not a bid to join the Bishops’ Benches and I thank the most reverend Primate for introducing it. I want to make just three points.
The first has been implicit in quite a lot of what has been said by the most reverend Primate and by other noble Lords on the previous amendment. It is that, if we are to have a global, collaborative strategy, it has to be from a different mindset from the one that underpins the Bill, because that mindset would prevent such a global strategy. We have to stop acting as if we are somehow uniquely burdened by this global refugee crisis. The figures have been given showing how other countries are pulling their weight much more than we are. Countries with far fewer resources than we have are doing so, yet with the Bill we act as if somehow the poor UK is under siege from this global crisis. To think globally means thinking differently, and we have to think and act with compassion. Compassion has certainly been lacking in this Bill and in the approach being taken.
My second point, which links with this, is that we have to start using a different language. The point has been made a number of times during our debates: people are not illegal and journeys are not illegal, but they are being turned illegal when they arrive here. Please let us not talk about “illegal routes” or “illegal migrants”. They are coming by irregular routes but they are not illegal. This goes right back to the beginning, when we talked about the language that is often used by some politicians and by the media: the language of invasion, cannibalisation and so forth.
It reminds me that I spoke in an even later debate—I think it was at about 2 am—on Albania. I met a group of young Albanians and have just discovered the notes I made from that meeting. I could not find them anywhere, and now I have. They talked about how disturbing they found the way that they were talked about in the media. In one newspaper—I leave the Committee to guess which—they were called “vermin”. I wrote down what they said: they felt violated, unsafe, scared, despised and unwanted. It is dreadful that young people feel that because of the way that we talk about them, so we have to change our language when we talk about the future migration strategy. The research of HOPE not hate suggests that every time politicians or the media talk negatively, it leads to a spike in far-right activity against migrants. Again, that is no basis for building a strategy.
Thirdly and perhaps more positively—this goes back to something that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham said earlier—if we are going to develop a strategy, and I hope that we will, we will have to involve refugees themselves in its development. We need the expertise of their experience of what it is like to flee countries and start a new life elsewhere. We have to base our strategy on that understanding, and it involves what the right reverend Prelate referred to earlier as “co-production”. It is not good enough for politicians to sit in their offices and come up with a strategy, then talk to politicians in another country and say, “Right, here’s our strategy”. We need to work from the very start with those people who are experiencing this. That is simply all I want to say.
I wish we could have had this debate at a better time. I am very sorry I was not able to be part of the debate that the most reverend Primate instigated in December, but I have read it and know that there were some inspiring speeches and lots of ideas that could go into the strategy. As I said in my earlier intervention, this is not requiring the Government to do X, Y and Z so that the next Government have to do X, Y and Z; it is simply saying that there has to be a strategic framework, and then Governments work within that. It does not matter what the complexion of the Government is. I certainly hope that my party in government would want to develop a strategic approach towards refugees and, as I say, one that works with refugees in building that.
My Lords, it is a privilege to be able to follow the words we have just heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and my erstwhile colleague the noble Lord, Lord Bourne of Aberystwyth. There are just a few things I want to add to what I said on the previous amendment. I think that, as a principle—the principle that the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, espoused just now—we need to look beyond ourselves. It is only by looking beyond ourselves that we will find a sustainable and effective solution for the problems we have in front of us.
I was thinking about the models for the sort of process that the most reverend Primate is suggesting. One is the Global Campaign for Education. It is known for its Let me Learn campaign, and it works across the globe to bring together people. I have been in meetings in this House with children from around the globe, from the poorest countries to the richest, using modern technology. The Global Campaign for Education basically wants to ensure that every child in this world has the right and the privilege to be educated by being sent to school. That level of collaboration brings together the United Nations, the rich countries and the donor countries, who then meet the poorer countries—there is a whole structure that sits around it. Unless we start thinking about this as being outward looking, and unless we look beyond ourselves, we are never going to find a sustainable solution.
We support this amendment, as it is seeking to recognise that our UK response to refugees has to be considered by how it interconnects with the global community. We cannot pretend that we can pull up the drawbridge and be isolated from the global issues around us. What we do impacts on other countries.
There are some countries which would follow the lead that the UK takes, but that is a race to the bottom. If we seek to discharge responsibilities for refugees to other countries, there is every chance that other countries will follow the UK’s lead. As countries do this, refugees will be pushed back to the border countries and further to the regions from which they fled. A smaller number of countries will end up shouldering the world’s refugee resources, which will be stretched, and regions will be destabilised. That is a real possibility around the globe.
The UK will be impacted in one way or another, and we cannot separate ourselves from this. The whole global refugee protection system would be at risk of collapse. Forced displacement is a global issue which requires a global response. We need to work towards these ends as described in this amendment, and we need to be seen as a country which is able to take a lead.
(1 year, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise in support of Amendment 58. I am sorry that I could not be at the Grand Committee debate on the regulations because of another commitment. Given the representations that have been made by a range of an organisations, I felt it was important to say a few words.
All people should have access to secure, safe and decent accommodation, no matter what status they hold. While it is right that we should not have people housed in hotels for longer than necessary, the removal of so-called red tape, which potentially includes shortcuts around safety standards, as we have heard, seems exceedingly risky. Once again, we have been asked to put our trust in the Home Office and its subcontractors instead of properly resourcing local authorities to provide adequate housing. This is not the way to address the backlog or accommodation shortages. The speed of procurement should not come at the possible cost of life.
Earlier this month, while the Levelling-Up Secretary was unveiling new laws protecting renters’ rights, his colleagues were debating the Government’s intention to scrap HMO licensing for asylum seekers’ accommodation. That seems somewhat perverse. The Government state in their Explanatory Memorandum to the regulations that part of the rationale for the change was that subcontractors
“raised concerns that … regulation is posing a barrier to acquiring … properties”.
But the suspicion is that subcontractors’ concerns are motivated more by profits than by the need to reduce backlogs and move people into accommodation. As my noble friend Lady Taylor of Stevenage asked during the Grand Committee debate, what evidence is there—again there is this question of evidence; it seems that with every amendment we are asking for evidence—to suggest that this change in regulations will speed up procurement of accommodation? The potential to undermine safety and standards seems very risky if there is not clear evidence to suggest that it will achieve the Home Office’s intended outcomes. Local authorities are concerned that any further erosion of enforcement powers will lead to a decrease in accommodation standards, where the reverse is needed.
The excellent briefing from the Chartered Institute of Housing, Crisis, JCWI and others argued:
“The assertion from the Government that HMO licence levels of protection will be maintained in these properties, but overseen by the Home Office rather than the local authority, is deeply suspect. People are already losing their lives in asylum accommodation managed by private subcontractors on behalf of the Home Office”.
Echoing the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, it was alarming to read at the weekend that asylum seekers were left on the streets in Westminster for two nights running because of accommodation problems and that the Immigration Minister had led moves to require groups of up to four adult males to share single rooms in so-called Operation Maximise. Richard Drax, a Conservative MP, has equated this to putting them in prison. As the leader of Westminster Council commented, to ask people who are
“likely to have been through significant and traumatic events … to share an inappropriately sized room”—
we are talking about a single room here, not some palatial five-star room—
“with multiple strangers defies common sense and basic decency”.
Basic decency, as well as safety, is what is at stake with these regulations.
Can the Minister give us an assurance that Operation Maximise will be abandoned at once in the interest of basic decency? With regard to these regulations, can he reassure us that the Home Office or its contractors have the skills to make a proper assessment of the risks around fire safety that an experienced and qualified local authority environmental health officer would have?
In the recent debate in Grand Committee, the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, asked the Minister to confirm that the same conditions that apply to an HMO licence will be replicated in the contract with the provider of accommodation for those seeking asylum. I do not think that the noble Lord has asked this again tonight, but I hope he will forgive me if he has. As the DLUHC Minister was unable to answer the question because it related to Home Office responsibilities, perhaps the Minister could provide an answer now.
In conclusion, this amendment should have never been needed but, unless we get serious assurances around living and safety standards, I can only question how the Government have decided that creating unsafe homes and putting asylum seekers in them is a decent strategy. As the Chartered Institute of Housing has said, HMOs will undoubtedly prove cheaper, but at what cost?
My Lords, this amendment, at its heart, is about the Government’s proposal to exempt housing for asylum seekers from licensing conditions. My noble friend Lady Hamwee outlined the two principal areas of concern, which have been the thread throughout this short debate. One is the conditions of the accommodation and the second is the impact on the rented housing sector in its entirety. I would add that the limited number of properties that are available in the private rented sector is in danger of impacting seriously on the number of houses for people who are looking for that accommodation but are not asylum seekers.
I will ask the Minister as well about the devolved responsibilities in this area, because the private rented sector in Wales is quite differently managed under Welsh Parliament legislation. I would like to understand whether the Government have consulted the devolved Administrations to find out how they propose to deal with this matter. In the case of Wales, all private rented sector accommodation is required to be licensed, not just HMOs. There is a strict regime and landlords pay for that licence. Clearly, that has had some impact on raising standards. That is an important issue, and if it is going to be reduced further, the Government need to explain why.
My noble friend Lady Hamwee pointed out that there is a better way forward, and mentioned the need for a more collaborative, non-regulatory approach. My noble friend Lord Scriven pointed out that licensing provides protections, and I think we all understand that. He illustrated it by talking about smoke and CO2 alarms. The reduction in standards is implicit in the proposals that are contained in the statutory instrument. It seems to me that we need to have a proper inspection regime, as stated by my noble friend Lord Scriven. The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, raised the issue of the safety of people being at risk. That is at the heart of all this. Are we going to put the safety of this vulnerable group of people at risk by returning to the original situation before the HMO legislation came into place? Are we going to manage the contractors properly and correctly? Clearly, the process of creating unsafe homes is not in anybody’s interest in this country at all, and neither is placing people within them.